18th century Enlightenment discredited Christian justification for absolute monarchy -> Hegel’s speculative philosophy discovers rational basis for state authority. World Spirit = the inevitable progress of the “idea of freedom” through repeated dialectical contradictions of global history: Asia -> Greece -> Rome -> Germany. 1807 Philosophy of the Spirit: the master-slave dialectic as the primordial struggle for recognition explains pre-1789 class society divided between aristocrats and labourers. 1517 Martin Luther’s 95 Theses = Protestant equality of believers -> 14/7/1789 Storming of the Bastille = Hegelian equality of citizens. Slaves have learnt to beat masters on the battlefield = end of history as feudal class antagonisms. Instability of post-1789 France: Liberalism = atomised individualism into social chaos -> Jacobinism = Absolute Liberty into Absolute Terror. Bonaparte’s 1799 coup d’état -> Napoleonic empire: meritocratic elite = “every soldier has a Marshal’s baton in his knapsack”; mixed form of government = Emperor, Senate, Tribunate & Conseil d’État; and European unity = Code Civil, common currency & single market. 1821 Philosophy of Right: military defeat of Bonaparte -> political victory of Bonapartism. Hegel’s obscure language = Freemasonry’s occult truths: king of Rome disguised as king of Prussia.

Hegel’s political philosophy = negative freedoms of civil society -> substantive freedoms of the state. Modernity = master-slave dialectic superseded by bourgeois citizenship. Hegel admires liberal economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Private property = externalisation of individual wills. Family = patriarchal contract between two individual wills. Law = universalisation of individual property ownership. Market competition between property owners = multiplication of needs -> one-sided development of bourgeois individuals. Civil society = dynamic and egoistic -> anarchy and collapse. Mass poverty -> violent revolution.

Bonapartist state imposes political discipline upon capitalist competition. Three estates as intermediary institutions between ruler and ruled: notables, bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Assembly of notables = hereditary or appointed landowners who serve the state and funded by land rent. Corporations of bourgeoisie = urban merchants, artisans and bankers who create both wealth and deprivation. State bureaucracy = meritocratic civil service outside and above civil society. Political supervision of market economy: law, defence, infrastructure, welfare and education. Patriotism = reconciliation of individual wills and collective interests through ethical concept of state. Hegel rejects social contract theory of Rousseau = levelling conformity of Jacobin republic. Hegel advocates mixed constitution with separation of powers between executive = bureaucracy and legislature = notables and corporations. Wealth moderated by wisdom.

The people’s emperor: formless mass of egotistic individuals united by Great Man who personifies World Spirit of historical progress. Monarchy is single mind above squabbling factions of notables and bourgeoisie. Long-term goals not short-term gains. Political and military leadership for national conflicts for global dominance. Hegel rejects Immanuel Kant’s belief that liberal republics = perpetual peace. Rationality of warfare = world-historical evolution from autonomous states into universal state. 14/7/1789 = realisation of freedom in one nation -> dissemination to all nations. Bonaparte’s downfall = hubris of ignoring intermediary institutions of Napoleonic empire. Mixed constitution enables selfish individuals of capitalist market to be patriotic citizens of ethical state. The end of world-history = “the real is rational” for everyone everywhere.

Social Democracy = parliamentary democracy and the welfare state.
Bolshevism = totalitarian party and state planning.

19th century Marxism of Marx proposed two different concepts of state power:
The Parasite State = “Strong government and heavy taxes are identical”.
The Class State = “the managing committee of the bourgeoisie”.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels grew up during the post-1815 Restoration.
Bonaparte’s liberal empire replaced by European Christian monarchies.
Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1806).
Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (1820).

Young Hegelians attacked the reactionary politics of the Prussian monarchy by criticising conservative appropriation of Hegel’s Idealist philosophy.
Freedom was creating materialist philosophy to discredit the alienated consciousness of religion.
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

Marx and Engels rejected philosophical criticism for the critique of political economy.
Freedom required a materialist conception of history to end alienated labour under capitalism.
The grand narrative of history as successive modes of production: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
Increasing efficiency of labour through specialisation and professionalisation, especially science and technology.
Egoism of bourgeois individual in market economy reflected one-sided development of modern everyday life.
Bourgeois private property as expression of alienated labour of capitalism.
Proletariat was the propertyless class which would liberate all of humanity by overcoming the division of labour.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845).
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).

Hegel celebrated the universal class of state bureaucrats who regulated the selfish interests of bourgeois society.
Marx saw the state bureaucrats as a self-interested caste created by the division of labour within capitalism.
The common interests of the people transformed into the private property of the government bureaucracy: the parasite state.
Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843)

1848 German Revolution: Red republic against Prussian and Austrian monarchies.
1851 coup d’etat by Louis Bonaparte replaces French republic with new empire.
State was above and against all classes within civil society.
The parasite state living off the taxes extracted from the people.
Oriental despotism: autarchic villages and irrigation schemes
Absolutist monarchy: declining aristocracy and rising bourgeoisie.
Bonapartism: economic modernisation and repression of the proletariat.
Capitalism was authoritarian rule by a liberal oligarchy which feared political democracy.
Karl Marx, British Rule in India (1853).
Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

Marx and Engels lived most of their lives as political refugees in London and Manchester.
Great Britain was the first capitalist nation with 50% of global industrial production in 1850.
Britain was the future of the rest of the world in the present.
Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845).
Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (1867)

Britain was a crowned bourgeois republic: limited franchise, free speech and the rule of law.
Under the liberal republic, the state acted as “the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”.
Class violence against internal enemies, including repression and confiscation.
Rule of law to protect private property: human rights and free contracts enabled class exploitation.
Public works to support capitalist development, such as canals, railways and education.
Economic policies favourable to national bourgeoisie, such as free trade in Britain or protectionism in Germany and the USA.
Imperial conquests to grab resources or exclude competitors from overseas markets, such as the British in Ireland and India.
The struggle over the franchise was over which class fraction would control British state through parliamentary elections.
The abolition of the Corn Laws marked the ascendency of industrial bourgeoisie over the capitalist landowners.
Egoism of civil society undermined political democracy.
Bourgeois politicians were professional hucksters and swindlers.
Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Articles on Britain (1971).

Two-stage revolutionary struggle: political democracy -> social democracy.
Primary task of the continental European Left was to overthrow parasite state.
Alliance of proletarians, petit-bourgeoisie and peasantry fighting to create the democratic republic: the 1871 Paris Commune.
Primary task of British and American Left was to extend the franchise and campaign for social reforms: the Chartist movement.
Both liberals and socialists believed that universal suffrage would lead to “the dictatorship of the proletariat”.
Democratic republic under capitalism was inherently unstable as workers can exercise political power while still being economically exploited.
Universal suffrage secured through participatory politics: abolition of state bureaucracy, official religion, national education, media censorship and professional army.
Marx had been a newspaper editor in 1840s who opposed press censorship, nationalised media and government press subsidies.
“The Paris Commune made that watchword of the bourgeois revolution – cheap government – into a reality.” – Karl Marx.
Participation of citizens in DIY politics ended the division of labour between bureaucrats and people: militia, juries, posses, administration.
From the Ancient Athenian agora to the Wild West democracy of the USA.
The dictatorship of the proletariat would use emergency powers against the threat of the “slave owners’ revolt” like the Union against the Confederacy in the American Civil War.
Karl Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press (1842).
Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

The self-emancipation of the proletariat through the three wings of the labour movement: mass political parties, workers’ militia and trade unions/cooperatives.
Revolutionary reformism of Marx and Engels emphasised political campaigns for economic improvements: limiting the working day, factory regulations, consumer protection, regulating banking system.
Participatory politics abolished politics as a profession: “the withering away of the state”.
Communism was the overcoming of the division between mental and manual labour within civil society.
Workers’ cooperatives were prefiguring the democratic organisation of the whole economy.
“The socialist future will an Athens without slaves.” – Paul Lafargue.
Communism was the principles of participatory democracy applied to all aspects of life.
Karl Marx, Capital Volume 3 (1894).
Paul Lafargue, The Right To Be Lazy (1883).

Post-Communist nostalgia for 1948 Cold War Marxisms.
Social Democracy: parliamentary elections, welfare state and US imperialism.
Bolshevism: totalitarian party, state planning and Russian imperialism.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were ’48ers: the young radicals of the 1848 European revolutions against the post-1815 Christian monarchies and bourgeois liberalism.

1836 students at the University of Berlin.
Young Hegelians were critics of Georg Hegel’s Idealist interpretation of history: the World Spirit making the real rational.

The materialist refutation of religion was the philosophical rejection of reactionary rule in Germany:
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

From the philosophy of intellectual freedom to the materialist conception of history:
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845)

Liberal concept of socio-economic progress: hunting → herding → agriculture → commerce.
Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).

1848 European Revolution: the springtime of the peoples.
Republican democracy, national liberation and socialist reforms.
Marx was a newspaper editor and Engels was a soldier.
The German Republic defeated by Prussian monarchy in 1848.
The French Republic overthrown by Louis Bonaparte in 1851.
The Russian empire was the leader of European reaction.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).
Book launch at the Red Lion (aka Be At One), Great Windmill Street, Soho.
Socialist concept of socio-economic progress: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
The Left of Red Republicanism: ”The communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties.”

Liberal concept of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy in the 1642 English Revolution, the 1776 American Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution:
François Guizot, The History of Civilisation in Europe (1828).
Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856).

Socialist concept of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the 1848 European Revolution:
The limitations of bourgeois liberalism: property franchise, media censorship, regressive taxation, state bureaucracy and professional army.
Bourgeois fear of republican democracy caused the defeat of the 1848 Revolution.
Bonapartism was the parasite state dominating civil society in its own interests.
Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

The proletarian struggle for political democracy: Paris sans-culottes (1792-1794), Polish nationalists (1830/1863), English Chartists (1838-1848), Irish Fenians (1848/1867) and American Unionists (1861-1865).
Red republicanism: universal suffrage, participatory politics, media freedom, low taxes, socio-economic reforms and citizen militia.
1871 Paris Commune held multi-party elections while under siege by the Right.
“Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat.” – Friedrich Engels.
Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

1864 International Working Men’s Association: trade union cooperation, solidarity with the North in the American Civil War and supporting Polish nationalism.
1872 Hague Congress: the split in the First International between the Marxist Socialists and the Bakuninist Anarchists.
Marxists symbolised their victory by moving the headquarters of the First International to New York: the USA was the most advanced capitalist economy which would be the first communist country.

Anarchism: select conspiracy of intellectuals who wanted to be the ‘invisible dictatorship’ directing the spontaneous revolution of the masses.
Pre-1914 Anarchism: Bonnet gang, CGT, CNT and the IWW.

Socialism: mass party of industrial and office workers seeking control of the democratic republic which was the political basis for creating social democracy.
Pre-1914 Socialism: British Labour Party, German Social Democratic Party and French Socialist Party.
Political economy of labour over the political economy of capital: 8 hour day, workers’ cooperatives, left culture and community organisations.

1889 foundation of the Second International: political democracy, trade union cooperation and world peace.
1914 was the end of Second International Marxism: reformism and nationalism had prevented the socialist revolution.
The Russian reinterpretation of Marxism: the Bolshevik vanguard party.
1917 Russian Revolution: the Congress of Soviets not the Constituent Assembly.
Direct democracy and vanguard party not representative democracy and mass party.
1917-21 Russian Civil War: one-party state, secret police, ideological mobilisation and professional army.
1921 Kronstadt Rebellion: Soviets without Bolsheviks.

20th century Marxisms without Marx’s 19th century politics: Social Democracy, Leninism, Council Communism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Austro-Marxism, Maoism, New Left, Situationism and Autonomism.
1989-91 Georg Hegel’s end of history was representative democracy and neo-liberal globalisation.
2008 financial crash and the Occupy movement have popularised David Harvey’s course on Karl Marx’s Capital.
2015 election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader: the 21st century revival of Second International Marxism.

Imaginary Futures is one of the inspirations for the Tomorrow Never Dies exhibition and installation on 8th-11th September 2011 at the Design Gallery in Wroclaw, Poland.

Location: MS.02, University of Warwick, Kirby Corner Rd, Coventry, West Midlands CV4.

Richard will also be introducing a screening and discussion of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War on Sunday 19th June in the Milburn Studio at 4.00pm at the same venue.

Location: School of Fine Arts, Peireos 256, 18233 Athens, Greece.
metro: Kallithea

Richard will also be introducing a screening and discussion of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War on Saturday 29th May at 9.00pm at the same venue.

RB: The first thing I would say is that if you look at the last century, the key technologies are probably antibiotics and the contraceptive pill. These are actually the most important technologies ever invented. Also maybe mass transit, as cars and above all airplanes. These are technologies that really have transformed people’s lives but it’s interesting that the convergence between computing media and telecommunications is actually seen as the societal shift in technology. You have these technologies which maybe are not the most important but, because they were given this theoretical and ideological role of bringing on the new society, they are seen as the most important technology even if we could argue that they’re not. I personally work with these technologies so obviously I have an interest in saying that Internet is a very good thing. I am also a writer and the fact that I can distribute my writings, I can put up videos and Flash presentations and I can access so much stuff on the Internet, is fantastic. But I doubt that these technologies are important as antibiotics or contraceptive pill. For instance now days you may not die by a minor infection and women would not die giving birth; actually women can control their own reproduction. And what about the fact that you can travel from country to country by airplane very cheaply now? Those things are probably much more life-changing than information and communication technology. It’s not that information and communication technologies are a bad thing or that we should dismiss them, it’s just that I think that we should be sceptical about the way they have been used for ideological purposes. There is a real positive benefit in the convergent technologies, but we should be sceptical about the ideological use that has been made of them. The ideology of Internet comes before its invention; both Russians and Americans thought the Internet was going to create a new society and they both wanted to claim that their empire was building the new society; therefore the Internet took on this much more exaggerated role. The other thing is that if you are a writer or you are involved in the media or you are a journalist, obviously you are going to think that these technologies really affect you as the most important technologies. People that are working in the communication and information industry, or the intellectuals, those people are obviously going to be obsessed by this technologies, but they tend to exaggerate their own technologies and forget about these other things because they can just take antibiotics!

REFF: One new thing is the example that technologies may give to other disciplines, as, for example, does the open source, which is not only about software, it can be applied to agriculture, politics, everything. Is there a real opportunity?

RB: I think it is the other way around. It’s not that the technology has created a culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities and technology express them. Guy Debord and Gil Wolman wrote a famous essay on ‘Methods of Détournement’ in 1957 [1] saying what artist should do in this mass media culture. Artists should be able to appropriate the mass media culture, artefacts, cartoons, films, advertising and then remix them – that’s what detournement really means. Debord was right in saying that since we live in this mass media culture, actually making art about it or being creative about it, implies that artist have to continually refer to it. When Debord made his film, The Society of the Spectacle [2], he had to get a very generous patron who allowed him to buy a film, cut it up, and then go to the studio and re-record it and re-dub it, a very laborious, difficult process. When we made Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War [3], we managed to do it with a very small grant from the Arts Council of England, a Mac laptop, Final Cut and we only had to go to the studio to record the voiceover. We can mix the voiceover into the whole, mix the images into the voiceover through one Laptop. It has taken 50 years for the technology to catch up with what someone has done in 1957. Someone would argue that this is actually what the Cubists were doing when Picasso was making collages putting a socialist newspaper into the collage. In a sense Picasso was already doing those things in 1910; now we can do this because of these digital technologies, we can take other people’s films, we can put our own performances together. I think it is the other way around it’s not that the technology has created the culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities, these technologies that actually were often developed for other things. I remember an old hippie from the 1960s who said that he would always remember when he used to build disco sound systems which cut off the sound from one turntable when switching between two records – people had just never thought of that use, taking the two records and playing them together as if they were music. So you are taking a technology and using it for something it shouldn’t be used for.

REFF: We may say that now days tools are available, if you just have money you get them, but in another way these tools are controlled, e.g. platforms, iPhone, Facebook, lots of stuff. Do you think that there is a paradox out there?

RB: Well, that is the paradox of capitalism – it is our labour, we are all variable capital, our labour builds capitalism, capitalism has to organise itself to appropriate the collective to make it so sure that we can only work collectively as through the capitalist social innovation. It’s not a new thing, capitalism’s greatest achievement is that it allows people to work together collectively on a global scale but of course people can only do it in a social relationships which individualizes, atomizes. We’ve been in capitalism three or four hundred years, now we have this very intense socialization but people is trying to cooperate in a different way. I think Facebook is really interesting – I mean it is dotcom capitalism in way, they’re making money out of the advertising but they’re giving people all of this service space for free and they’ve made all this very nice interface, easy to use software. I haven’t uploaded things on my own website because I know it is much easier doing it on Facebook then you can share them with your friends. YouTube is amazing as well. You can just stick up videos, the whole world is sticking up videos and as far I can tell they are not making any money off it. They’re making all sorts of money off Google searches and they’re subsidizing our free distribution of videos to enjoy. And if you think if Facebook did try to control the content people would just migrate to another service because they know what happened to MySpace, and then it just got covered with advertising and they tried to make it too corporate and apart from musicians, everybody, all these 18-20 year olds they’re on Facebook now. In a way they are making money out of this but on the other hand they’re providing us with a free service that’s easy to use. Take the bad with the good.

Let’s answer the question about what happened to the avant-garde movement, I mean I think that’s the interesting. Because fifteen years ago making new media was avant-garde by itself; actually doing anything with a screen was really radical. It is interesting now that that avant garde is being historicised. In the last five years or so people have been writing books about Internet art and they have a lot to look at concerning the last 10 or 15 years. It is interesting because actually just doing something with a screen is considered radical anyway. It is like the Cubist avant-garde, where just making a collage was exciting. You had to make a good collage for people to see, or making a ready-made by itself seemed to be exciting just because you have done it. After a while people said “so what”. Once you’ve got over the ‘shock of the new’, that favorite phrase in art history, you then have to start deciding whether its good or bad, interesting or an absurd concept. So I think to do something avant-garde and new is not going to be necessarily on the screen – it can be partly on the screen or use the screen or it will be collaborative culture. Last Christmas, I met this woman who works at Battersea Arts Theatre in London and she was saying all the most radical wacky ideas of 1960s and 1970s theatre are now mainstream because they have an Internet generation audience. They expect to be able to interact with the play they don’t like just standing there, sitting there, watching the play on a stage. It’s like in the 60s there were people walking through the audience, they want like actors in the audience, you know this guy sitting next to you and he suddenly actually is really an actor gets up after half an hour and starts acting, getting the audience to vote and all this stuff is cause they’re used to participating. And say something that was once seen as wacky extremism, loony stuff, is now mainstream theatre so again that’s the interesting thing about how it does affect the different culture.

REFF: How do you feel with the fact that Joi Ito the founder of Creative Commons, is a venture capitalist and the intellectual property laws in general?

RB: Well, there are two ways in which we could look at it. If you are a vulgar Marxist, as I am, you can say that it is the classic examples in Marx: forces of production develop and in relation to production they eventually become a barrier to the development itself. In this sense intellectual property has become a barrier to setting up this network communications system and actually intellectual property is becoming a barrier to how we use it. It’s like the laws against recreational drugs the bad thing about these laws it’s not just that they’re stupid but it’s that they make people disrespect the law. And the same point can be made about copyright, these too are laws that people don’t obey. Politicians can’t enforce laws that most people spontaneously don’t obey: when a law does not work it is like there is no law at all. It seems to me that a big problem with this copyright law is that everybody is expected to pay for every tune that they ever listen to. On the one hand, you have music as a commodity, on the other, it is a gift. If you want to get a tune for free, you can with a bit of effort. But lots of people don’t have the time to look for free tunes, so they buy it on iTunes just because it is easier to do. However what they are paying for now is not the tunes themselves, it is the simplicity of getting hold of them. This a small example of the weird nature of any intellectual property: the copyright owners sell it to you but you don’t really own it. It is not a fully bourgeois form property (bourgeois property means that you can alienate property and do what you like with the property you bought); with intellectual property is much more like feudal property where the king would deem you a land but you could not do what you like with it you could not sell it. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that people can so easily spontaneously ignore the dictates of these copyright laws!

“Biološka inteligencija je nepromenljiva, zato što je u pitanju stara, zrela paradigma, dok nova paradigma nebiološkog ra�?unarstva i inteligencije eksponencijalno raste. Prelaz će se odigrati 2020-ih a nakon toga, bar sa stanovišta hardvera, dominiraće nebiološko ra�?unarstvo…“
Kurcvejl (Kurzweil), 2004, str. 3.

Na po�?etku 21. veka, san o vešta�?koj inteligenciji ukorenjen je duboko u savremenu maštu. Od detinjstva pa nadalje, ljudima u razvijenom svetu se govori da će ra�?unari jednog dana moći da rasuđuju – �?ak i da imaju osećanja – baš kao ljudi. U pri�?ama nau�?ne fantastike, mašine koje misle su odavno omiljeni likovi. Publika je odrastala sa likovima robota drugara, kao što je Dejta iz serije Zvezdane staze: Nova generacija. ili nemilosrdnih robota-�?udovišta poput kiborga iz Terminatora. (Startrek.com 2005; Kameron/Cameron 1984). Ove nau�?nofantasti�?ne maštarije dodatno podsti�?u pouzdana predviđanja istaknutih informati�?ara. Neprekidna poboljšanja hardvera i softvera naposletku će dovesti do stvaranja vešta�?kih inteligencija, moćnijih od “biološke inteligencije” ljudskog mozga.

Komercijalni proizvođa�?i već neko vreme sa nestrpljenjem iš�?ekuju dan kada će prodavati svesne mašine koje obavljaju kućne poslove i pomažu starijima (Honda 2004). Neki informati�?ari �?ak veruju da je stvaranje “nebioloških inteligencija” jedna duhovna potraga. U Kaliforniji, Rej Kurcvejl, Vernor Vindž (Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge) i njihove kolege s nestrpljenjem o�?ekuju Singularnost: Prvi dolazak silicijumskog mesije (Vindž 1993; Bel/Bell 2004). Bilo da su nadahnuti novcem ili misticizmom, svi ovi zagovornici vešta�?ke inteligencije dele uverenje da se sadašnjost mora shvatiti kao ‘embrion’, kao budućnost u zametku – a upravo iz budućnosti će se rasvetljivati potencijal sadašnjosti. Svaki napredak u ra�?unarskoj tehnologiji objavljuje se kao novi korak ka stvaranju potpuno svesne mašine. Proro�?anstvo o vešta�?koj inteligenciji sve bliže je ispunjenju sa pojavljivanjem svakog novog komada softvera ili hardvera. Nije važno ono što ra�?unari mogu sada, već ono što će moći uskoro. Sadašnjica je beta verzija nau�?nofantasti�?nog sna: zamišljena budućnost.

Uprkos svom istaknutom mestu u kulturi, vera u svesne mašine podložna je teorijskom egzorcizmu. Daleko od toga da bude prazan ozna�?itelj, ovo proro�?anstvo duboko je ukorenjeno u vremenu i prostoru. O�?ekivano, savremeni propagatori vešta�?ke inteligencije retko priznaju koliko je sâm koncept star. Žele da napreduju, ne da se osvrću. Ipak, prošlo je više od �?etrdeset godina otkad je san o razumnim mašinama prvi put zaokupio maštu javnosti. Zamišljena budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije ima dugu povest. Analiziranje te prvobitne verzije proro�?anstva preduslov je za razumevanje njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. S tim u vidu, vratimo se u drugu deceniju Hladnog rata kada je najveća svetska ra�?unarska kompanija priredila predstavu o �?udesima razumnih mašina u finansijskoj prestonici najmoćnije i najbogatije zemlje na planeti…

Milenijum napretka

Na dan 22. aprila 1964. godine, Svetski sajam (World’s Fair) u Njujorku otvoren je za javnost. U naredne dve godine, ta moderna zemlja �?uda ugostila je preko 51 milion posetilaca. Na izložbi su bili zastupljeni svi delovi ameri�?ke elite: savezna vlada, državne uprave, velike korporacije, finansijske ustanove, industrijski lobiji i verske grupe. Svetski sajam je dokazao da SAD prednja�?i u svemu: u robi široke potrošnje, demokratiji, šou-biznisu, modernisti�?koj arhitekturi, lepim umetnostima, verskoj toleranciji, kućnom životu i, iznad svega, tehnologiji. Kao što je sugerisao jedan od reklamnih slogana izložbe, “milenijum progresa” doživeo je vrhunac u ameri�?kom stoleću (Stenton/Stanton 2004, 2004a; Ljus/Luce 1941).

Ta rodoljubiva poruka slavljena je veli�?anstvenim predstavljanjem novih tehnologija na Svetskom sajmu. Pisci i filmadžije odavno su maštali o putovanju na druge svetove. Sada je u Nasinom (National Aeronautics and Space Administration – Nacionalna agencija za aeronauti�?ka i svemirska ustraživanja, popularno NASA) Svemirskom parku, javnost mogla da se divi ogromnim raketama koje su odnele ameri�?ke astronaute u orbitu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf /Time-Life Books 1964, str. 208; Lorens/Laurence 1964, str. 2-14). Uprkos svom po�?etnom neuspehu kada su Rusi lansirali prvi satelit 1957, SAD sad tek što nisu pretekle svog takmaca u “svemirskoj trci” (Šefter/Schefter 1999, str. 145-231). A ono što je najbolje od svega, posetiocima Svetskog sajma govorilo se kako će i sami imati priliku da za svog životnog veka postanu astronauti. U paviljonu Futurama Dženeral motorsa (General Motors), Amerikanci iz 1980-ih bili su prikazani kako provode godišnji odmor na Mesecu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 222). Druge korporacije bile su podjednako sigurne da će dostignuća sadašnjice ubrzo biti prevaziđena trijumfima sutrašnjice. U svom paviljonu Progreslend (Progressland), Dženeral motors predvideo je da će elektri�?na energija proizvedena u reaktorima za nuklearnu fuziju biti “isuviše jeftina da bi se naplaćivala” (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 90-92; Lorens 1964, str 40-43). U zamišljenoj budućnosti Svetskog sajma, Amerikanci neće samo postati svemirski turisti – oni će takođe biti blagosloveni besplatnom elektri�?nom energijom…

Za mnoge korporacije, najdelotvorniji metod da dokažu svoju tehnološku savremenost bio je taj da izlože ra�?unar. Klerolova (Clairol) mašina birala je “najlaskavije boje za kosu” za posetiteljke, a mejnfrejm (eng. mainframe, veliki, �?esto i ogromni centralni kompjuterski sistemi, kakvi su po�?eli da se razvijaju 40-ih i 50-ih godina, prim. prev.) Parker pena je uparivao ameri�?ku decu sa “prijateljima za dopisivanje” iz stranih zemalja (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 86, 90). Koliko god možda delovali impresivno svojoj publici, ti eksponati nisu bili ništa drugo do reklamni trikovi. Za razliku od njih, IBM (skraćeno od International Business Machines, jedna od prvih i najvećih informati�?kih kompanija, osnovana pod imenom Tabulating Machine Company 1896, danas sa oko 400 000 zaposlenih u 170 zemalja, prim. prev.) je bio u mogućnosti da svoj paviljon posveti isklju�?ivo �?udima informatike kao zasebne tehnologije. U 1961, jedan jedini proizvod – IBM 1401 – �?inio je �?etvrtinu svih ra�?unara koji su radili u SAD-u (Pju 1995, str. 265-267). Po poimanju mnogih Amerikanaca, IBM je bio sinonim za ‘kompjuter’. Baš pred otvaranje Svetskog sajma, korporacija je izbacila seriju proizvoda koji će joj obezbediti dominaciju industrijom i u iduće dve decenije: System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, str. 54-146). Ugrabivši priliku za isticanje koju je sajam nudio, šefovi IBM-a naru�?ili su paviljon koji će zaseniti sve ostale. Ero Sarinen (Eero Saarinen) – renomirani finski arhitekta – nadgledao je konstrukciju veli�?anstvene zgrade: bele dvorane u obliku jajeta sa reljefnim korporativnim logotipom, koja je lebdela visoko u vazduhu uz pomoć 45 metalnih stabala boje rđe. Ispod te upe�?atljive atrakcije nalazile su se interaktivne izložbe koje su veli�?ale IBM-ov doprinos ra�?unarskoj industriji (Stern, Melins i Fišman/Stern, Mellins, Fishman, 1997, str. 1046-1047).

Za samu dvoranu, Čarsl i Rej Ims (Charles i Ray Eames) – par koji je bio oli�?enje ameri�?kog modernisti�?kog dizajna – napravili su glavnu zanimljivost u IBM-ovom paviljonu: “Informati�?ku mašinu” (The Information Machine). Pošto bi zauzeli svoja mesta u “Ljudskom zidu” (People Wall) sa 500 sedišta, posetioci bi bili podignuti u jajoliku građevinu. Kada bi se našli unutra, narator bi najavio “veli�?anstvenu” multimedijalnu predstavu o tome kako su mašine izložene u IBM-ovom paviljonu prete�?a svesnih mašina budućnosti. Ra�?unari su u procesu sticanja svesti. (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 70-74; Lorens 1964, str. 57-58). U bliskoj budućnosti, svaki Amerikanac biće vlasnik odanog mehani�?kog sluge baš kao što je Robot Robi (Robby the Robot) iz Zabranjene planete (Forbidden Planet), popularnog nau�?nofantasti�?nog filma iz 1956. godine (Vilkoks/Wilcox, 1999). Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku, IBM je ponosno objavio da će taj san o vešta�?koj inteligenciji napokon biti ostvaren. Sa izbacivanjem serije System/360, mejnfrejmovi su postali dovoljno moćni da izgrade prototipe jednog potpuno svesnog ra�?unara.

Ta �?udesna mešavina avangardne arhitekture i multimedijalnog performansa u IBM-ovom paviljonu doživela je veliki uspeh i u medijima i u javnosti. Zajedno sa svemirskim raketama i nuklearnim reaktorima, ra�?unar je potvrdio svoju poziciju kao jedna od tri ikoni�?ne tehnologije moderne Amerike. Ideološka poruka tih mašina bila je nedvosmislena: sadašnjost je budućnost u zametku. U IBM-ovom paviljonu, ra�?unari su postojali istovremeno u dva vremenska okvira. Sa jedne strane, tadašnji modeli su prikazani kao prototipovi svesnih mašina iz budućnosti; sa druge strane, vizija ra�?unarske svesti pokazala je istinski potencijal mejnfrejmova izloženih u IBM-ovom paviljonu. Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1964, izbacivanje serije System/360 se slavilo kao najava zamišljene budućnosti vešta�?ke inteligencije.
“Nije daleko dan kada će sposobnostî [ljudskog] mozga za rešavanje problema i rukovanje informacijama biti prekopirane; iznenadio bih se ako se to ne bi ostvarilo u narednoj deceniji.”
Sajmon/Simon, str. 39.

Otkrivanje razumne mašine

Futuristi�?ke fantazije iz IBM-ove multimedijalne predstave bile su nadahnute nepristrasnom logikom akademskog sveta. Alan Tjuring (Turing) – utemeljiva�? informatike – ozna�?io je razvoj vešta�?ke inteligencije kao dugoro�?ni cilj te nove discipline. Sredinom 1930-ih, ovaj matemati�?ar sa Kembridža objavio je uticajan �?lanak koji je opisivao apstrakni model za programabilni ra�?unar: “univerzalnu mašinu” (Tjuring 2004). Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, njegov tim inženjera napravio je prvi elektri�?ni kalkulator kako bi se ubrzalo dešifrovanje nema�?kih vojnih signala. Kada se sukob okon�?ao, Tjuring se preselio na Univerzitet u Man�?esteru kako bi se pridružio timu istraživa�?a koji su pravili programabilnu mašinu. Kao što je bilo izloženo u njegovom �?lanku iz 1936, koristiće se softver kako bi se hardveru omogućilo da obavlja niz razli�?itih zadataka. Na dan 21. juna 1948, pre no što je Tjuring �?ak i došao na svoje novo radno mesto, njegove kolege uklju�?ile su prvi svetski elektronski ra�?unar sa unapred ugrađenim programom: Baby. Taj teoretski koncept, do tada opisan u jednom stru�?nom �?asopisu, se materijalizovao u obliku ogromne metalne kutija ispunjene ventilima, prekida�?ima, žicama i broj�?anicima (Tjuring 2004a; Ejgar/Agar, 2001, str. 3-5, 113-124; Hodžis/Hoges, 1992, str. 314-402).

Za Tjuringa, Baby je bio daleko više od poboljšane verzije kancelarijskog tabulatora. Kada hardverom upravlja softver, ra�?unanje postaje svest. U nizu uticajnih �?lanaka, Tjuring je izneo tezu da je njegova matemati�?ka mašina prete�?a jednog sasvim novog oblika života: mehani�?kog matemati�?ara. To predviđanje potkrepio je odredivši ljudsku inteligenciju kao nešto što bi mogli raditi i ra�?unari. Budući da je ra�?unanje prefinjeni vid razmišljanja, ra�?unarske mašine su zasigurno sposobne da misle. Ako deca sti�?u znanje obrazovanjem, edukativni softver mogao bi da stvori obrazovane ra�?unare. Pošto ljuski mozak radi kao mašina, o�?igledno je da bi se mašina mogla ponašati kao elektronski mozak (Tjuring 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Šafer/Schaffer, 2000). Sudeći po Tjuringu, iako prvobitni ra�?unari još nisu bili dovoljno moćni da bi dostigli svoj pravi potencijal, pre ili kasnije, kroz neprestano poboljšavanje hardvera i softvera, ta ograni�?enja bi bila prevaziđena. U drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka, ra�?unarska tehnologija brzo se razvijala ka svojoj unapred utvrđenoj sudbini: vešta�?koj inteligenciji.

“Memorijski kapacitet ljudskog mozga verovatno je reda deset hiljada miliona binarnih brojeva. Ali najveći deo toga po svoj prilici se koristi za pamćenje vizuelnih utisaka, i na druge relativno rasipni�?ke na�?ine. Ostvarivanju istinskog napretka [ka vešta�?koj inteligenciji] možemo se osnovano nadati sa nekoliko miliona brojeva [ra�?unarske memorije].”
Tjuring 2004a, str. 393

U svom najpoznatijem �?lanku, Tjuring je opisao test za prepoznavanje pobednika u toj ‘trci za budućnost’. Kada posmatra�? ne bude mogao da razlu�?i da li razgovara ljudskim bićem ili ra�?unarom u onlajn konverzaciji, onda više neće postojati bitna razlika između te dve vrste svesti. Ako se imitacija ne može razlikovati od originala, mašina se onda mora smatrati razumnom – kompjuter je položio ispit (Tjuring 2004c, str. 441-448; Šafer 2000). Od tada pa nadalje, ra�?unari su postali mnogo više od pukih prakti�?nih alatki i robe kojom se trguje. Kao što je Tjuringov �?lanak objasnio, zamišljena budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije otkrivala je potencijal ove nove tehnologije da se konstantno menja. Uprkos svojim nedostacima, aktuelni modeli ra�?unara predstavljaju prete�?u svesnih mašina koje će za njima doći…

Pred kraj 1940-ih, katihizis vešta�?ke inteligencije već je bio ustoli�?en. U okviru informatike, ono što je bilo i ono što će biti je postalo jedno te isto. Uprkos tom dostignuću, Tjuring je bio prorok �?iji je uticaj slabio u njegovoj rođenoj zemlji. Ra�?unar je možda izmišljen u Britaniji, ali njena zadužena vlada nije imala sredstava da bi dominirala razvojem te nove tehnologije (Ejgar 2003, str. 266-278). S druge strane Atlantika, prilike su se umnogome razlikovale. Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, ameri�?ka vlada takođe je obezbedila izdašna sredstva za istraživanje elektronskog ra�?unarstva. Shodno tome, kada je pobeda izvojevana, presudilo je to što se nau�?nici koji su radili na tim projektima nisu susreli sa ozbiljnim poteškoćama u daljem obezbeđivanju sredstava. Dok je Britanija oskudevala u novcu, SAD su lako sebi mogle priuštiti da finansiraju najsavremenija istraživanja u oblasti novih tehnologija. Kada je Hladni rat po�?eo, ameri�?kim politi�?arima nije bilo teško da svojim bira�?ima opravdaju te dotacije (Lesli/Leslie, 1993, str. 1-13; Luontin/Lewontin, 1997).

U SAD, informati�?ari su imali još jednu veliku prednost u odnosu na svoje britanske suparnike: meta-teoriju kibernetike. Tokom poznih 1940-ih i ranih 1950-ih, grupa istaknutih ameri�?kih intelektualaca sastajala se na Mejsi konferencijama (Macy conferences) kako bi istraživala na�?ine da se sruše granice između razli�?itih nau�?nih disciplina: (Hajms/Heims, 1991). Od samog po�?etka, kao guru tog poduhvata izdvojio se Norbert Viner (Norbert Wiener). Dok je radio na MIT-ju (skraćeno od Massachusetts Institute of Technology, privatni istraživa�?ki univerzitet i institut lociran u gradu Kejmbridžu, država Masa�?usets, SAD, prim. prev.), on je izmislio kibernetiku kao novi teorijski okvir za analiziranje ponašanja i ljudi i mašina. Input (unos, ulaz) informacija o okruženju vodi do autputa (output, izlaz, rezultat) delovanja �?iji je cilj da to okruženje promeni. Nazvan “povratna sprega” (feedback loop), taj ciklus nadražaja i rezultirajućih odgovora je širenje entropije u svemiru okrenuo u obrnutom pravcu – red je moguće stvoriti iz haosa (Viner 1948, str. 21, 32-33). U 1948, Viner je izneo svoju novu univerzalnu teoriju u knjizi ispunjenoj stranicama matemati�?kih dokaza: “Kibernetika – ili komanda i kontrola u životinji i mašini” (Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine).

Na svoje veliko iznenađenje, ovaj nau�?nik je napisao bestseler. Prvi put, jedan zajedni�?ki skup apstraktnih na�?ela povezivao je i prirodne i društvene nauke. Vinerov tekst pružio je moćne metafore za opisivanje haj-tek (hi-tech, visoko-tehnološkog, prim. prev.) sveta Amerike u periodu Hladnog rata. Čak i ako nisu razumeli njegove matemati�?ke jedna�?ine, �?itaoci su lako mogli da prepoznaju kiberneti�?ke sisteme u okviru društvenih institucija i mreža komunikacije koje su dominirale njihovim svakodnevnim životom. Povratna sprega, informacije i sistemi ubrzo su postali deo narodnog govora (Konvej/Conway i Sigelman/Siegelman 2005, str. 171-194; Hajms 1991, str. 271-272). Uprkos javnom odobravanju, Viner je ostao autsajder u krugovima ameri�?ke inteligencije. Podsmevajući se ideološkom pravoverju Amerike u Hladnom ratu, ovaj guru bio je pacifista i socijalista.

Po�?etkom 1940-ih, Viner – kao i skoro svaki ameri�?ki nau�?nik – verovao je da će �?ove�?anstvo imati koristi od razvijanja oružja kojima bi se pobedila nacisti�?ka Nema�?ka. Kada je po�?eo Hladni rat, njegove kolege koje je finansirala vojska tvrdile su kako njihov istraživa�?ki rad takođe doprinosi borbi protiv jednog agresivnog totalitarnog neprijatelja (Luontin 1997). Osporavajući taj patriotski konsenzus, Viner je izneo tezu da bi ameri�?ki nau�?nici trebalo da zauzmu sasvim druga�?iji stav u sukobu sa Rusijom. Upozorio je da bi trka u nuklearnom naoružanju mogla dovesti do uništenja �?ove�?anstva. Suo�?eni sa ovom opasnom novom situacijom, odgovorni nau�?nici bi trebalo da odbiju da sprovode vojna istraživanja (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 237-243, 255-271). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, Vinerovo politi�?ko otpadništvo nadahnulo je njegovo socijalisti�?ko tuma�?enje kibernetike. U epohi korporativnih monopola i atomskog oružja, teorija koja objašnjava ponašanje i ljudi i mašina mora se upotrebiti kako bi ljudi uspostavili kontrolu nad svojim mašinama. Napuštajući svoje prvobitno oduševljenje Tjuringovim proro�?anstvom, Viner je sada naglašavao opasnosti koje predstavljaju svesni ra�?unari (Viner 1966, str. 52-60, 1967, str. 239-254). Pre svega, pokušaj stvaranja vešta�?ke inteligencije predstavljao je skretanje sa neodložnog zadatka uspostavljanja socijalne pravde i globalnog mira.

“Svet budućnosti biće jedna sve zahtevnija borba protiv ograni�?enja naše sopstvene inteligencije, a ne udobna ležaljka na koju se možemo ispružiti da bi nas služili naši robovi – roboti.”
Viner 1966, str. 69.

Suprotstavljajući se militarizaciji nau�?nog istraživanja, osniva�? kibernetike je svoje pokrovitelje iz redova ameri�?ke elite doveo u prili�?no nezgodnu situaciju. Na sreću po vladare Amerike, na Mejsi konferencijama bio je još jedan briljantan matemati�?ar, koji je istovremeno bio i fanati�?an borac u Hladnom ratu: Džon fon Nojman (John von Neumann). Budući traumatizovan nacionalizacijom svoje porodi�?ne banke za vreme Mađarske revolucije iz 1919, njegovi antikomunisti�?ki stavovi su bili toliko ekstremni da je sredinom 1940-ih bio zagovornik preventivnog rata kako bi se Rusija spre�?ila da napravi nuklearno oružje (Hajms 1980, str. 235-236, 244-251). Dok je igrao glavnu ulogu i u razvoju atomske bombe, Fon Nojman je već primenjivao svoje matemati�?ke i organizacione veštine u tada novoj oblasti informatike. Kada se 1946. održala prva Mejsi konferencija, njegov tim istraživa�?a radio je na izgradnji prototipa mejnfrejm kompjutera za ameri�?ku mornaricu (Čeruci/Ceruzzi, 2003, str. 21-4). U Fon Nojmanu, ameri�?ka imperija je pronašla gurua bez i jednog traga krivoverja.

Na prvim Mejsi konferencijama, politi�?ke razlike među prisutnima nisu bile o�?igledne. Ujedinjeni u antifašisti�?koj borbi, Viner i Fon Nojman mogli su da zastupaju isti koncept kibernetike (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 143-149; Hajns 1980, str. 201-207). Međutim, kako su im se politi�?ki stavovi razilazili, ove dve zvezde Mejsi konferencija po�?ele su da zastupaju suparni�?ka tuma�?enja te meta-teorije. U svojoj levi�?arskoj verziji, vešta�?ka inteligencija optužena je kao apoteoza tehnološke dominacije. Kada je formulisao svoj desni�?arski remiks, Fon Nojman je odveo kibernetiku u dijametralno suprotnom pravcu. Pre svega, njegovo tuma�?enje podvla�?ilo je �?injenicu da je njegova univerzalna teorija nadahnuta proro�?anstvom o razumnim mašinama. Sredinom 1930-ih, Tjuring je kratko radio sa Fon Nojmanom na univerzitetu Prinston. Čitavu deceniju pre no što je i sam po�?eo da se bavi informatikom, mađarski nau�?nik znao je sve o zamisli da se napravi univerzalna mašina. Kada su dva �?ikaška psihologa po�?etkom 1940-ih primenila Tjuringovu teoriju kako bi objasnili procese ljudskog mišljenja, Fon Nojman je bio o�?aran implikacijama njihovih pretpostavki.

Pošto je mehani�?ki ra�?unar napravljen po modelu ljudskog mozga, Voren Mekalok (Warren McCulloch) i Volter Pits (Walter Pitts) izneli su tezu da je svest isto što i ra�?unanje. Poput elektri�?nih veza IBM-ovog tabulatora, neuroni su prekida�?i koji prenose informacije u binarnom obliku (Mekalok i Pits 1943). O�?aran ovom inverzijom Tjuringove linije argumenta, Fon Nojman je postao uveren da je teorijski moguće napraviti razumnu mašinu. Ako se neuroni ponašaju kao prekida�?i u ljudskom mozgu, ventili bi se mogli upotrebiti kako bi se po istom principu napravio elektronski mozak (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 43-46, 1976, str. 308-311). Dok se bavio ra�?unarskim istraživanjima za ameri�?ku vojsku, Fon Nojman je koristio ljudski mozak kao model za svoju eponimsku kompjutersku arhitekturu. Sli�?no kao i Tjuring, ovaj prorok je tvrdio da će – kada se broj ventila u ra�?unaru bude približio broju neurona u mozgu – mašina moći da misli (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 36-41, 1976, str. 296-300, 2000, str. 39-52). U roku od decenije, Fon Nojman i njegove kolege opremaće ameri�?ku vojsku kiberneti�?kim vojnicima sposobnim da se bore u nuklearnom ratu i izvojuju svaku pobedu…

“Dr Mekalok: Šta mislite o pravljenju ra�?unarskih mašina tako da ako budu oštećene u vazdušnim napadima… mogu da zamene delove… i nastave sa radom?
Dr Fon Nojman: To su zaista pre kvantitativna no kvalitativna pitanja.”
Fon Nojman 1976, str. 324

Do ranih 1950-ih, ameri�?ki akademski svet i korporativni istraživa�?ki timovi preoteli su od svojih britanskih takmaca vodeći položaj u informatici. Od tada pa nadalje, sve najnaprednije mašine pravile su se u Americi (Čeruci 2003, str. 13-46). Ipak, stvorivši kibernetiku bez Vinera, Fon Nojman se postarao da ove ameri�?ke laboratorije pođu Tjuringovim putem ka zamišljenoj budućnosti: kroz izgradnju vešta�?ke inteligencije. Metafora povratne sprege sada je dokazala da ra�?unari funkcionišu kao ljudi. Inputi informacija vode do autputa delovanja. Ako mozak radi kao mašina, onda mora biti moguće razviti mašinu koja oponaša funkcije mozga. Kompjuteri već ra�?unaju brže od ljudi koji su ih izmislili. Ovladavanje složenostima matemati�?ke logike mora biti prvi korak ka opremanju ovih mašina novim odlikama ljudske svesti. Jezik je skup pravila koji se može kodifikovati u obliku softvera. U�?enje iz novih iskustava može se programirati u hardver (Minski/Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, ameri�?ki nau�?nici su naporno radili na izgradnji misleće mašine. Jednom kada bude imao dovoljnu moć obrade podataka, ra�?unar će postati svestan (Edvards/Edwards, 1996, str. 239-273). Kada je IBM izbacio svoj mejnfrejm System/360 na Svetskom sajmu 1964, delovalo je kao da je Tjuringov san blizu svom ostvarenju.

Informatika za vreme Hladnog rata

Četvrt veka ranije, jedna od zvezda Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939. bio je Elektro (Electro): robot koji je – sudeći po njegovim publicistima – “… umeo da pri�?a, hoda, broji na prste, pućka cigaretu, i razlikuje crvenu i zelenu boju pomoću fotoelektri�?ne ćelije” (Ims i Ims 1973, str. 105). Uprkos svoj svojoj pretvornosti, na ovoj izložbi je prvi put ponovljena zamišljena budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije. Pre Svetskog sajma 1939, roboti u knjigama i filmovima gotovo uvek su prikazivani kao frankenštajnovska �?udovišta koja imaju nameru da unište svoje ljudske stvoritelje (Šelijeva/Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Nadahnut svojim odlascima na izložbu, Isak Asimov (Isaac Asimov) je odlu�?io da promeni tu negativnu sliku. Baš kao i Elektro, roboti iz njegovih nau�?nofantasti�?nih pri�?a su bezbedni i prijateljski nastrojeni proizvodi jedne velike korporacije (Asimov 1968, 1968a). Kada je 1964. godine otvoren Svetski sajam u Njujorku, ova pozitivna slika vešta�?ke inteligencije već je bila jedna od najpopularnijih zamišljenih budućnosti u Americi. I u nau�?noj fantastici i u nau�?noj stvarnosti, robot sluga bio je simbol boljih vremena koja će uslediti…

Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1939, Elektro se nadmetao sa aktuelnom tehnološkom ikonom tog trenutka: automobilom. Zanimljivosti koje se nisu smele propustiti bile su Demokrasiti (Democracity) – maketa izložena u zgradi Perisfera Njujork Stejta (New York State Perisphere) – i Futurama – diorama (�?esto “trodimenzionalna” predstava, model ili maketa određenog objekta ili pejzaža, prim. prev.) u paviljonu Dženeral motorsa (General Motors). Obe izložbe promovisale su viziju bogate i haj-tek Amerike 1960-ih. U zamišljenoj budućnosti, najveći deo stanovništva živi u porodi�?nim domovima u predgrađu i na posao odlazi vlastitim automobilom (publikacije sa izložbe/Exposition Publications 1939, str. 42-45, 207-209). Za najveći broj posetilaca Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939, ovo proro�?anstvo potroša�?kog blagostanja zasigurno je delovalo kao utopijski san. Ameri�?ka ekonomija i dalje se oporavljala od najgore recesije u istoriji zemlje, Evropa je bila na rubu novog razornog građanskog rata a isto�?na Azija već u vrtlogu smrtonosnih sukoba. No, kada se otvorio Svetski sajam 1964, naj�?uvenije predviđanje sa izložbe 1939. već je bilo ostvareno. Koliko god da su posetioci bili podozrivi 1939, dvadeset godina kasnije, diorame Demokrasiti i Futurama delovale su izuzetno dalekovido. Do ranih 1960-ih, Amerika je postala potroša�?ko društvo koje živi u predgrađu i poseduje kola. Zamišljena budućnost postala je savremena stvarnost.

“Automobil… upravlja celokupnim [društvenim] ponašanjem, od ekonomije do govora. Protok saobraćaja je jedna od glavnih funkcija društva… Prostor [u gradskim oblastima] osmišljava se u skladu sa automobilisti�?kim potrebama, a saobraćajni problemi imaju veću važnost od smeštaja… �?injenica je da je za mnoštvo ljudi auto možda i najvažniji deo njihovih ‘životnih prilika’.”
Lefebr/Lefebvre, 1984, str. 100

Budući da su se predviđanja sa izložbe iz 1939. u velikoj meri ostvarila, posetiocima Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964. moglo se oprostiti što su poverovali da će se njegove tri glavne zamišljene budućnosti takođe ostvariti. Ko je mogao sumnjati u to da će – najkasnije do 1990. godine – većina Amerikanaca uživati u blagodetima svemirskog turizma i besplatne elektri�?ne energije? A ono što je najbolje od svega, živeće u svetu gde će im svesne mašine biti verne sluge. Međutim, vera ameri�?ke javnosti u te zamišljene budućnosti zasnivala se na pogrešnom osećaju kontinuiteta. Uprkos tome što je održan na istom mestu i što je na njemu u�?estvovalo mnogo istih izlaga�?a, Svetski sajam iz 1964. bio je usredsređen na nešto sasvim drugo od njegovog prethodnika iz 1939. Dvadeset pet godina ranije, glavni eksponat na izložbi bio je automobil: potroša�?ki proizvod masovne proizvodnje. Za razliku od njega, zvezde izložbe na Svetskom sajmu 1964. bile su tehnologije subvencionisane od strane države, a za potrebe vođenja Hladnog rata. Kompjuteri su izra�?unavali putanje kojima će se ameri�?ke rakete naoružane nuklearnim bombama kretati kako bi uništavale ruske gradove i njihove nesrećne stanovnike (Ajzeks/Isaacs i Dauling/Dowling 1998, str. 230-243). Ako je reprezentativni objekat na njegovom prethodniku iz 1939. bio motorizovani prevoz za mase, zvezde Svetskog sajma 1964. su bile mašine atomskog armagedona.

Dok je osmišljavala svoj paviljon, korporacija IBM je morala da se pozabavi sa ovim problemom u odnosima sa javnošću. Nalik nuklearnim reaktorima i svemirskim raketama, i ra�?unari su razvijani kao oružja za Hladni rat. ENIAC – prvi prototipski mejnfrejm napravljen u Americi – bio je mašina za izra�?unavanje tabela kako bi se poboljšala preciznost artiljerijskih topova (Čeruci 2003, str. 15). Od ranih 1950-ih pa nadalje, IBM-ov ra�?unarski odsek bio je usredsređen na dobijanje narudžbi od Ministarstva odbrane (Pju/Pugh, 1995, str. 167-172). Koristeći mejnfrejmove nabavljene od ove korporacije, ameri�?ka vojska se spremala za nuklearni rat, pripremala invazije na “neprijateljske2 zemlje, upravljala bombardovanjem neprijateljskih meta, isplaćivala plate svojim trupama, vodila složene ratne igre i rukovodila lancem snabdevanja (Berkli/Berkeley 1962, str. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Zahvaljujući ameri�?kim poreskim obveznicima, IBM je postao tehnološki lider ra�?unarske industrije.

Kada se 1964. otvorio Svetski sajam u Njujorku, IBM je i dalje bio tesno povezan sa mnogo razli�?itih vojnih projekata. Ipak, paviljon te korporacije je bio posvećen promovisanju nau�?nofantasti�?ne maštarije o razumnim mašinama. Kao i u slu�?aju predviđanja o besplatnoj energiji i svemirskom turizmu, zamišljena budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije onemogućavala je posetiocima Svetskog sajma da otkriju pravi motiv za izgradnju IBM-ovih mejnfrejmova: ubijanje miliona ruskih civila. Iako je imperijalna hegemonija supersila zavisila od atomskog oružja, njegovo posedovanje postajalo je sve problemati�?nije usled pretnje od sveopšteg uništenja. Dve godine ranije, SAD i Rusija umalo nisu greškom ušle u katastrofalan rat oko Kube (Dalek/Dallek, 2003, str. 535-574). Uprkos tome što je propast za dlaku izbegnuta, supersile nisu bile sposobne da prekinu trku u naoružanju. U bizarnoj logici Hladnog rata, predupređivanje totalnog sukoba između dva bloka zavisilo je od neprestanog povećanja broja nuklearnih glava koje obe strane poseduju. Vladajućim elitama SAD i Rusije bilo je teško da priznaju sebi – a kamoli svojim građanima – duboku iracionalnost te nove vrste vojnog nadmetanja. U retkom trenutku lucidnosti, ameri�?ki analiti�?ari izmislili su ironi�?nu skraćenicu za tu visokorizi�?nu strategiju “uzajamnog sigurnog uništenja”: MAD (skraćeno od Mutually Assured Destruction:, na engleskom “mad” zna�?i, otprilike, “ludilo”, uglavnom u nasilnom ili agresivnom obliku, prim. prev.) (Ajzeks i Dauling/Dowling, 1998. str. 230-243; Kan/Kahn 1960, str. 119-189).

O�?ekivano, propagandisti sa obe strane opravdavali su ogromno traćenje sredstava na trku u naoružanju promovisanjem mirnodopske primene vodećih tehnologija primenjenih u Hladnom ratu. Do otvaranja Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964, oružje genocida uspešno je prepakovano u proizvode korisne za ljude. Nuklearna sila uskoro će svima obezbeđivati besplatnu elektri�?nu energiju. Svemirske rakete ubrzo će voziti turiste na godišnje odmore na Mesecu. Nestali su gotovo svi tragovi vojnog porekla tih tehnologija. Sli�?no, u IBM-ovom paviljonu, mejnfrejm System/360 promovisan je kao prete�?a vešta�?ke inteligencije. Od posetilaca se o�?ekivalo da se dive tehnološkim dostignućima korporacije i da ne preispituju njenu sumnjivu ulogu u proizvodnji naoružanja. Užasi tekućeg Hladnog rata bili su skriveni �?udesima zamišljene budućnosti. IBM-ov ideološki trik umnogome je olakšala jedna od osobenih crta industrijske modernosti: kidanje eksplicitnih veza između proizvoda i njihovih proizvođa�?a. Hiljadama godina, ratnici i sveštenici otvoreno su od seljaštva izvla�?ili njihove proizvodne viškove radi sopstvene koristi. Međutim, kada su Evropljani po�?eli da privatizuju vlasništvo nad zemljištem i mehanizuju ru�?nu proizvodnju, rodio se jedan novi – i napredniji – ekonomski sistem: liberalni kapitalizam. Preduzetnici su dokazali da se, konkurentnošću cena, ljudskim radom posredno može daleko delotvornije upravljati nego neposrednim metodama feudalizma. Pustolovi su otkrili da je prodavanje robe na svetskom tržištu daleko unosnije od nametanja otima�?ke najamnine zemljoradnicima na jednoj ograni�?enoj teritoriji. Prvi put u ljudskoj istoriji ostvarivao se proizvodni potencijal kolektivnog rada (Smit/Smith 1976, str. 1-287; 401-445; Marks/Marx 1976, str. 762-940).

U toj novoj ekonomiji od ljudi se zahtevalo da međusobno komuniciraju putem stvari: robe, novca i kapitala. Podela rada u �?itavoj ekonomiji regulisala se cenama i platama koje je određivala konkurencija na tržištu. Međutim, kraj aristokratije i sveštenstva nije okon�?ao klasnu vladavinu. Kada se rad kupuje i prodaje u kapitalisti�?koj ekonomiji, jednakost na tržištu vodi do nejednakosti na radnom mestu (Marks 1976, str. 270-280; Rubin 1972, str. 77-253). Pošto se roba razmenjivala za drugu robu iste vrednosti, ovaj novi oblik klasne vladavine bio je umnogome druga�?iji od onoga koji mu je prethodio. Neposredno vladanje zamenjeno je posrednim izrabljivanjem. I, pre svega, sudbinu pojedinaca sada je određivalo bezli�?no kretanje tržišta. Svetom više nisu vladali ljudi, već stvari.

“To zna�?i da se tajanstvenost robnog oblika sastoji prosto u tome što on ljudima društvene karaktere njihovog sopstvenog rada odražava kao karaktere koji objektivno pripadaju samim proizvodima rada, kao društvena svojstva koja te stvari imaju od prirode, a otuda im (se) i društveni odnos proizvođa�?a prema celokupnom radu odražava kao društveni odnos koji izvan i nezavisno od proizvođa�?a postoji među predmetima.”
Marks 1976, str. 164-165

Razvoj kapitalizma stvorio je mnogo složeniju podelu rada unutar ekonomije. Uporedo sa povećanjem broja radnih mesta u fabrikama i kancelarijama, nau�?no istraživanje se takođe izdvojilo kao zaseban poziv (Bar/Bahr 1980; Smit 1976, str. 7-16). Uspešna preduzeća rasla su ne samo tako što su zapošljavala još radnika, već i ulažući u novu mašineriju. U fetišizovanom svetu kapitalizma, rast produktivnosti prouzrokovan sve prefinjenijom saradnjom rada i fabrici i nau�?nog istraživanja je bio izražen kroz razvoj najsavremenijih tehnologija. Sa ljudskom kreativnošću skrivenom iza robe, proces modernizacije dobio je kao svoj subjekat jedan izuzetno vidljiv objekat: “… automatski sistem mašinerije… pokreta�?ku snagu koja pokreće samu sebe.” (Marks 1973, str. 692)

Sredinom dvadesetog veka, fetišizacija tehnologije dostigla je svoju apoteozu u proro�?anstvu o vešta�?koj inteligenciji. Za ljude koji su živeli u društvu u kojem je nova mašinerija naoko bila pokreta�?ka snaga društvene evolucije, Tjuringova i Fon Nojmanova tvrdnja da mašine evoluiraju u živa bića nije delovala neobi�?no. Kada ra�?unari vrše svoje operacije, rad uložen u razvoj njihovog hardvera i pisanje njihovih programa nije neposredno vidljiv. O�?arani tehnološkim fetišizmom, obožavatelji Tjuringa i Fon Nojmana ubedili su sebe da će elektronski mozak ubrzo moći da misli kao i ljudski mozak. U 1964-toj, ra�?unarska moć mejnfrejma System/360 je bila toliko velika da se �?inilo kao da je ta IBM-ova mašina na pragu svesnosti. Tvorevina je trebalo da postane stvoritelj.

Kiberneti�?ka nadmoć

Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, zamišljene budućnosti privremeno su uspele da od ameri�?ke javnosti prikriju osnovni cilj svoje tri ikoni�?ne tehnologije. Ali, �?ak ni najbriljantnije opsenarsko umeće nije moglo ve�?no da krije njihove lažne upotrebne vrednosti. Kako su decenije proticale, nijedno od predviđanja o klju�?nim tehnologijama iz Hladnog rata datih na Svetskom sajmu se nije ostvarilo. Elektri�?na energija se i dalje naplaćivala, turisti nisu posećivali Mesec, a ra�?unari još uvek nisu postali razumni. Za razliku od dalekovide vizije automobila za mase na Svetskom sajmu iz 1939, proro�?anstva o �?uvenim tehnologijama sa izložbe iz 1964. delovala su gotovo besmisleno dvadeset pet godina kasnije. Hiper-realnost se sudarila sa realnošću – i izgubila bitku.

Uprkos neuspehu svog proro�?anstva, IBM nije pretrpeo nikakvu štetu. Za razliku od nuklearne energije i putovanja u svemir, informatika je bila hladnoratovska tehnologija koja je uspešno pobegla iz konteksta Hladnog rata. Od samog po�?etka, mašine koje su se pravile za ameri�?ku vojsku prodavale su se i profesionalnoj klijenteli (Pju 1995, str. 152-155). Kada je IBM izgradio svoj paviljon za Svetski sajam 1964, zamišljena budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije morala je da �?uva u tajnosti više od sumnjive primene informatike u vojne svrhe. Fetišizam robe takođe je odigrao svoju klasi�?nu ulogu skrivanja ljudkog rada u procesu proizvodnje. Ra�?unari su opisivani kao “razumni” kako bi se zanemario naporan rad uložen u njihovo projektovanje, građenje, programiranje i rukovanje. Iznad svega, proro�?anstvo o vešta�?koj inteligenciji sakrilo je ulogu tehnoloških inovacija u okviru ameri�?kih radnih mesta. Pronalazak ra�?unara odigrao se u pravi �?as za krupan biznis. Tokom prve polovine dvadesetog veka, velike korporacije postale su dominantne institucije ameri�?ke ekonomije. Divovska fabrika automobila Henrija Forda (Henry Ford) postala je eponimni simbol nove društvene paradigme: fordizma (Ford i Krouter/Crowther 1922; Aljeta/Aglietta 1979). Kada im je to uvećavalo zaradu, korporacije su zamenjivale posredno regulisanje proizvodnje putem tržišta neposrednim nadzorom preko birokrata. Kako su plate kancelarijskih službenika postojano rasle, preduzećima je bilo potrebno sve više opreme kako bi se podigla produktivnost na radnom mestu. Mnogo pre pronalaska ra�?unara, fordisti�?ke korporacije vodile su informati�?ku ekonomiju uz pomoć tabulatora, pisaćih mašina i drugih vrsta kancelarijske opreme (Benidžer/Beniger, 1986, str. 291-425). Međutim, do po�?etka 1950-ih, mehanizacija u administraciji se zaustavila. Povećanje produktivnosti u kancelariji dobrano je zaostajalo za povećanjem produktivnosti u fabrici. Kada su se na tržištu pojavili prvi ra�?unari, upravnici korporacija brzo su uvideli da nova tehnologija nudi rešenje za taj urgentan problem (Sobel 1981, str. 95-184). Posao velikog broja operatera tabulatora sada je mogla obavljati mnogo manja grupa inženjera uz pomoć mejnfrejm kompjutera (Berkli 1962, str. 5). Još i bolje, nove informati�?ke tehnologije omogućavale su kapitalistima da prodube kontrolu nad svojim organizacijama. Mnogo više informacija o mnogo više tema sada je moglo da se sakuplja i obrađuje na sve složenije na�?ine. Upravnici su bili gospodari svega što su mogli da drže na oku.

Maltene od svog prvog pojavljivanja na radnom mestu, mejnfrejm je – sa dobrim razlogom – karikiran kao mehani�?ko savršenstvo birokratske tiranije. U nau�?nofantasti�?nim pri�?ama Isaka Asimova, gospodin i gospođa Prose�?ni bili su ponosni vlasnici sluge-robota. Ali, kada su prvi ra�?unari stigli u ameri�?ke fabrike i kancelarije, tom novom tehnologijom upravljali su šefovi, a ne radnici. U 1952, Kurt Vonegat (Kurt Vonnegut) je objavio nau�?nofantasti�?ni roman koji je satirizovao autoritarne ambicije korporativne informatike. U njegovoj antiutopijskoj budućnosti, vladajuća elita poverila je upravljanje društvom sveznajućoj vešta�?koj inteligenciji.

“EPIKAK XIV… odlu�?ivao je koliko od svega Amerika i njene mušterije mogu dobiti i koliko će ih to stajati. I… odlu�?ivaće koliko će inženjera i upravnika i… državnih službenika, i kakvih veština, biti potrebno da se roba isporu�?i; i koji će koeficijent inteligencije i nivo sposobnosti deliti korisne muškarce [i žene] od onih beskorisnih, i koliko se zaposlenih… može izdržavati na određenom nivou plate…”
Vonegat, 1969, str. 106

Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, IBM-ov paviljon obećavao je da će razumne mašine biti sluge �?itavog �?ove�?anstva. A ipak, u isto vreme, njihove službe za prodaju su objašnjavale šefovima velikih korporacija kako ra�?unari uvode birokratsku vlast u savremeno društvo. Herbert Sajmon (Herbert Simon) – jedan od vodećih ameri�?kih teoreti�?ara upravljanja i nekadašnji Fon Nojmanov kolega – predvideo je da će sve veća moć mejnfrejmova omogućiti preduzećima da automatizuju sve više i više administrativnih zadataka. Upravo kao u fabrici, i u kancelariji mašine preuzimaju posao od ljudske radne snage. Sa pojavom vešta�?ke inteligencije, mejnfrejmovi će bezmalo sasvim zameniti birokratsku i tehni�?ku radnu snagu u okviru proizvodnje. Krajnji cilj je stvaranje potpuno automatizovanog radnog mesta. Preduzećima tada više neće biti potrebni ni fizi�?ki ni kancelarijski radnici koji bi pravili proizvode ili pružali usluge. Čak će i sami upravnici većinom postati ‘višak’. Umesto njih, ameri�?kim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljaće razumne mašine (Sajmon 1965, str. 26-52). U zamišljenoj budućnosti vešta�?ke inteligencije, korporacija i ra�?unar biće jedno isto. Ovo predviđanje temeljilo se na Fon Nojmanovom konzervativnom tuma�?enju kibernetike. U svojim tekstovima o teoriji upravljanja, Sajmon je izneo tezu da rad u jednom preduzeću nalikuje operacijama ra�?unara. Kao i u psihologiji Mekaloka i Pitsa (McCulloch i Pitts), ovo poistovećivanje bilo je dvosmerno. Upravljanje radnicima izjedna�?avano je sa programiranjem ra�?unara. Pisanje softvera bilo je nalik sastavljanju poslovnog plana. I zaposlenima i mašinerijom upravljalo se naređenjima izdatim odozgo. Radni�?ka antiutopija ‘Veliki Brat’ superkompjutera je mutirala u kapitalisti�?ku utopiju kiberneti�?kog fordizma. Ironi�?no, verodostojnost Sajmonove ideologije upravljanja zavisila je od toga hoće li njegovi �?itaoci zaboraviti žestoke kritike koje je na ra�?un korporativne informatike izneo sam utemeljiva�? teorije sistema. Pozivajući se na Marksa, Viner je upozoravao da je osnovna uloga nove tehnologije pod kapitalizmom intenziviranje izrabljivanja radnika. Umesto da stvori više slobodnog vremena i poboljša životne standarde, kompjuterizacija ekonomije će pod fordizmom povećati nezaposlenost i smanjiti plate (Viner 1967, str. 206-221). Da bi se izbegla Vonegatova antiutopija, ameri�?ki sindikalisti i politi�?ki aktivisti moraju se mobilisati protiv korporativnog Golema (Viner 1966, str. 54-55). U skladu sa Vinerom, kibernetika je dokazala kako vešta�?ka inteligencija predstavlja pretnju za ljudske slobode.

„Ne zaboravimo da je automatska mašina… precizan ekvivalent robovske radne snage. Svaka radna snaga koja se nadmeće sa robovskom mora prihvatiti ekonomske uslove robovske radne snage.“
Viner 1967, str. 220

Za poslovne rukovodioce, Vonegatova i Vinerova noćna mora bila je njihov ra�?unarski san na javi. Međutim, ova korporativna vizija kiberneti�?kog fordizma zna�?ila je zaboravljanje istorije samog fordizma. Ova ekonomska paradigma zasnivala se na uspešnoj koordinaciji masovne proizvodnje sa masovnom potrošnjom. Ironi�?no, budući da su bile u većoj meri povezane sa društvenom realnošću, izložbe Demokrasiti i Futurama iz 1939. pružile su daleko ta�?nije predviđanje razvojnog puta informatike nego što je to u�?inio IBM-ov paviljon iz 1964. Baš kao i automobili dvadeset pet godina ranije, ova nova tehnologija polako se preobražavala iz retke, ru�?no pravljene mašine u sveprisutnu robu masovno proizvedenu u fabrici. Isto kao i u Fordovim fabrikama, IBM-ovi mejnfrejmovi sastavljali su se na pokretnim trakama (Pju, Džonson/Johnson i Palmer 1991, str. 87-105, 204-210). Ti prvi koraci ka masovnoj proizvodnji ra�?unara predvideli su ono što će biti najvažniji pomak u ovom sektoru dvadeset pet godina kasnije: masovnu potrošnju ra�?unara. Po svojem spoljašnjem obliku, mejnfrejm System/360 iz 1964. je bio nezgrapan i skup prototip mnogo sitnijeg i jeftinijeg IBM-ovog PC-ja iz 1989.

Zamišljena budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije bila je na�?in da se izbegne razmišljanje o verovatnim društvenim posledicama široko rasprostranjenog posedovanja ra�?unara. Ranih 1960-ih, superkompjuter tipa ‘Veliki Brat’ je pripadao moćnoj vladi i krupnom biznisu. Pre svega, povratna sprega je bila znanje onih nad kojima se vlada, monopolizovano od strane vladara. Međutim, kao što je istakao Viner, fordisti�?ka proizvodnja će skupe mejnfrejmove neminovno pretvoriti u jeftinu robu (Viner 1967, str. 210-211). Zauzvrat, sve rasprostranjenije posedovanje ra�?unara verovatno će poremetiti postojeći društveni poredak. Jer je povratna sprega informacija u okviru ljudskih institucija najdelotvornija kada je dvosmerna (Viner 1967, str. 67-73). Ponovnim povezivanjem zamisli i izvršenja, kiberneti�?ki fordizam je podrivao društvene hijerarhije koje su bile osnova samog fordizma.

“… prosta koegzistencija dve jedinice infomacije relativno je male vrednosti, psim ako se te dve jedinice ne mogu uspešno kombinovati u nekom umu… koji je sposoban da jednu oplodi pomoću druge. Ovo je upravo suprotno od organizacije u kojoj svaki �?lan prelazi unapred određeni put…”
Viner 1967, str. 172

Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, ta mogućnost definitivno nije bila deo IBM-ove zamišljene budućnosti. Pre nego da za cilj ima proizvodnju sve većeg broja sve efikasnijih mašina po nižim cenama, korporacija je bila usredsređena na stabilno povećavanje sposobnosti svojih ra�?unara kako bi sa�?uvala svoj skoro potpuni monopol nad vojnim i korporativnim tržištem. Umesto da se mašine veli�?ine sobe smanjuju i vremenom postaju stoni ra�?unari, laptopovi i, naposletku, mobilni telefoni, IBM je bio uveren da će ra�?unari zauvek ostati krupni i nezgrapni mejnfrejmovi. Korporacija je iz sve snage verovala da će – ukoliko taj put tehnološkog razvoja bude ekstrapoliran – rezultat sasvim sigurno biti vešta�?ka inteligencija. I, najvažnije, ovaj konzervativni oporavak kibernetike je podrazumevao da će svesne mašine neizbežno evoluirati u oblike života naprednije od obi�?nih ljudi. Fordisti�?ko razdvajanje između ideje i izvršenja bi dostiglo svoju tehnološku apoteozu.

O�?ekivano, IBM je bio rešen da se usprotivi tom uznemirujućem tuma�?enju sopstvene futuristi�?ke propagande. Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, paviljon korporacije je isticao utopijske mogućnosti informatike. Ipak, i upkros svojim najvećim naporima, IBM nije mogao da u potpunosti izbegne dvosmislenost sadržanu u zamišljenoj budućnosti vešta�?ke inteligencije. Ta fetišizovana ideologija mogla je biti privla�?na svim slojevima ameri�?kog društva samo u slu�?aju da će ra�?unari ispunjavati najdublje želje obe strane na radnom mestu. Stoga je IBM, na izložbama u svom paviljonu, promovisao jednu jedinu viziju zamišljene budućnosti, viziju koja je objedinjavala dva nepomirljiva tuma�?enja vešta�?ke inteligencije. Sa jedne strane, radnicima se govorilo da će sve njihove potrebe zadovoljavati razumne mašine-roboti: sluge koje se nikada ne umaraju, ne žale i ne dovode naređenja u pitanje. Sa druge strane, kapitalistima se obećavalo da će njihovim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljati razumne mašine-roboti: proizvođa�?i koji nikada ne zabušavaju, ne izražavaju mišljenje i ne štrajkuju. Robot Robi više se nije mogao razlikovati od EPIKAK-a XIV. Iako tek na nivou ideologije, IBM je pomirio klasne podele u Americi 1960-ih. U zamišljenoj budućnosti, radnici više neće morati da rade, a poslodavcima više neće biti potrebni nameštenici. Nau�?nofantasti�?na maštarija o vešta�?koj inteligenciji uspešno je omela ljude u pokušaju da preispitaju posledice uvođenja informatike na radnom mestu. Posle posete IBM-ovom paviljonu na Svetskom sajmu 1964, bilo je suviše lako poverovati da će svi biti na dobitku jednom kada mašine dobiju svest…

Izmišljanje novih budućnosti

Četrdeset godina kasnije, još �?ekamo na zamišljenu budućnost vešta�?ke inteligencije. U međuvremenu, neprestano su nam obećavali njen neposredni dolazak. Ipak, uprkos stalnim pomacima u razvoju hardvera i softvera, mašine i dalje nisu sposobne da “misle”. Likovi u video-igrama i dalje predstavljaju nešto najbliže vešta�?koj inteligenciji sa �?ime se većina ljudi susrela. Međutim, kao što pokazuje rastuća popularnost igranja na Internetu, gde ljudi i dalje igraju jedni protiv drugih, virtuelni protivnik je slaba zamena za ljudskog igra�?a. Kada se osvrnemo na istoriju ove zamišljene budućnosti, o�?igledno je da se ni optimisti�?ka ni pesimisti�?ka verzija vešta�?ke inteligencije nisu ostvarile. Robot Robi nije naš verni sluga, a EPIKAK XIV ne upravlja našim životima. Umesto da se razviju u razumne mašine, ra�?unari su postali potroša�?ka roba. Mejnfrejmovi veli�?ine sobe nastavljaju da se smanjuju u sve sitnije i sitnije mašine. U savremenom svetu ra�?unari su svugde – a njihovi korisnici itekako znaju da su oni i dalje glupi.

Ovi ponovljeni neuspesi bi, o�?ekivano, trebalo da su nepovratno narušili ugled zamišljene budućnosti vešta�?ke inteligencije. Ipak, njeni zagovornici nemaju griže savesti. Četiri decenije posle Svetskog sajma 1964, IBM i dalje tvrdi da su njihove mašine na pragu toga da postanu svesne (Bel/Bell 2004, str. 2). Upornost ove nau�?nofantasti�?ne fantazije pokazuje trajnu važnost Fon Nojmanovog konzervativnog pripajanja kibernetike ra�?unarskoj industriji. Kao i ranih 1960-ih, vešta�?ka inteligencija i dalje pruža sjajan alibi za razvoj novih vojnih tehnologija. Stvaranje Singularnosti deluje daleko prijateljskije od sarađivanja sa ameri�?kim imperijalizmom. A što je još važnije, ova zamišljena budućnost nastavlja da prikriva posledice uvođenja informatike na radno mesto. I upravnicima i radnicima i dalje se obećavaju tehnološka rešenja za društveno-ekonomske probleme. San o svesnim mašinama je mnogo bolji medijski materijal od realnosti kiberneti�?kog fordizma. Na po�?etku 21. veka, vešta�?ka inteligencija ostaje dominantna ideološka manifestacija (velikog) obećanja informatike.

Verodostojnost ove zamišljene budućnosti zavisi od zaboravljanja njene sramotne istorije. Osvrt na to kako su ranije verzije proro�?anstva iznova i iznova diskreditovane podsti�?e duboki skepticizam po pitanju njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. Naša li�?na frustriranost ra�?unarskom tehnologijom bi trebalo da pokaže koliko je mala verovatnoća da se ona pretvori u Silicijumskog mesiju. Četrdeset godina posle Svetskog sajma u Njujorku, vešta�?ka inteligencija je postala zamišljena budućnost iz davne prošlosti. Ono što nam umesto toga sada treba jeste daleko prefinjenija analiza potencijala informatike. Viner – ne Fon Nojman – mora biti naš kiberneti�?ki guru. Prou�?avanje istorije bi trebalo da nas pou�?i kako da iznova izmislimo budućnost. Mesijanski misticizam se mora zameniti pragmati�?nim materijalizmom. Pre svega, ta nova slika budućnosti bi trebalo da slavi ra�?unare kao oruđa za uvećavanje ljudske inteligencije i kreativnosti. Veli�?anje hijerarhija kontrole mora se zameniti zagovaranjem dvosmernog deljenja informacija. Budimo nadahnuti i strastveni u zamišljanju naših sopstvenih vizija boljih vremena koja će uslediti (Barbruk/Barbrook i Šulc/Shultz 1997; Barbruk 2000).

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Argumenti u ovom �?lanku dalje se razvijaju u knjizi Ri�?arda Barbruka Zamišljene budućnosti: od razumnih mašina do globalnog sela, Pluto, London 2007. Više tekstova i ažurirane informacije na adresi: www.imaginaryfutures.net
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If I needed confirmation of this book’s relevance, I could find it in the air of melancholy at the Solidarity/solidarities conference. This event was being held to mark the 20th anniversary of the wonderful historical moment when the Stalinist monopoly over political power was breached for the first time: the 4th June 1989 multi-party elections to the Polish parliament. Within a few months, the old order was being swept away across Eastern Europe – and decades of mendacity and oppression had come to an end. Yet, as I sat in the lecture theatre, the closing session of this conference seemed to be as much a memorial service for frustrated aspirations as a celebration of revolutionary victories. One Polish member of the audience ruefully admitted that he and his compatriots now enjoyed that greatest of European privileges: being able to complain in public about how dreadful everything was. The excitement of 1989’s ‘springtime of the nations’ seemed like a distant memory when the region was being battered by the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. Adding to the misery, its governments were still in thrall to the ideological choices that had been made during the transition to national independence and political pluralism. Neo-liberal economic policies didn’t just mark the break with the impoverished Russian empire, but also a commitment to American post-industrial modernity. The new elites of ‘new Europe’ had made the mistake of swapping one Cold War superpower’s imaginary future for that of the other. While I was listening to the downbeat discussion at the Solidarity/solidarities conference, I cast my mind back to when I first realised that our continent was on the brink of a momentous upheaval. The implosion of the Russian empire might have been a big surprise to expert opinion in the West, but it wasn’t to me. A Polish leftie had predicted what would happen in 1984 – and the opinions of someone who is on the side of the workers are always more credible than those who only think what is allowed to be thought. Trust your own, that’s what I say.

“It’s all over, you know. No one believes in the system. Not the workers, not the peasants, not even the bureaucrats.” Elcia was a Solidarnösc activist who had fled to London after the 1981 military coup. We’d first met when she and her friends were making a programme for their fellow refugees on Our Radio: 103.8FM. They would knock on the door of the house in Kilburn where the studio of this pirate station was based and proudly announce that the “mad Poles” had arrived to do their show. Yet, beneath this bravado, there was the sadness that they faced long years of exile from their homeland. Scattered across London were the exiles from the 1953 Berlin Uprising, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring. This new wave of Polish émigrés knew that they might have to wait 10 or 20 years before another attempt was made to overthrow the Stalinist regimes which oppressed the nations of Eastern Europe. They would be condemned to live in limbo – separated from their family and friends back home with their children growing up in England having little more than an exotic name to connect them with their Polish heritage. No wonder my friend was so jubilant. It was only three years after the military coup that had crushed Solidarnösc – and she’d been able to make a quick visit to see her parents without any difficulties. The secret police must have known about her subversive activities in London, but no one seemed to care in Warsaw. She was enjoying a sweet irony: “Remember what Lenin said? The revolution will succeed when the masses can’t go on in the same old way and neither can the ruling class. Well, that’s what it’s like in Poland now. It’s all over, finished, done with. Once Poland goes, the whole rotten structure will collapse across the East. We’ve won, we’ve won!!”

Elcia had read the historical conjuncture correctly. She could now move back to Poland with her son in anticipation of what was to come. Five years later, it really was all over. For those who weren’t around at the time, it is difficult to explain the liberation that we felt when the Cold War finally ended. I’d spent all of my adult life with the nagging fear that a stoned American pilot or a dodgy piece of Russian technology might accidentally launch a nuclear weapon which would start a conflagration that wiped out a large percentage of the European population. What made matters worse was how the institutionalised hypocrisy of the two superpowers had colonised the minds of people trapped on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was a looking-glass world where the American bastion of democracy overthrew elected governments and the Russian champion of socialism sent in the tanks against the proletariat. Of course, it was easy to see the ideological corruption of this imperial duplicity in others. Our Polish friends from Solidarnösc were horrified when English leftists carried banners of Lenin and Trotsky on their demonstrations. We were disgusted when the workers of Gdansk gave a hero’s welcome to Margaret Thatcher so soon after she had brutally smashed the National Union of Miners’ strike at home. But, trying to get each other to understand that these acts of stupidity were symbolic gestures of defiance was almost impossible. Convinced that your enemy’s enemy must be your friend, too many dissidents on both sides had forgotten that they were united in a common struggle for freedom and dignity.

In 1989, when the Polish elections began a chain reaction which swept away the Stalinist regimes across Eastern Europe, there was the brief moment of euphoria when it seemed that the doublethink of the Cold War might be exorcised. Jacek Kuroń joked in an interview that he was on the verge of accomplishing his mission in life: restoring the rationality of politics in Europe by making the Left on the left and the Right on the right. The crowds in the streets of Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Berlin and Bucharest chanted the slogan: “We don’t want any more social experiments.” They weren’t like their parents who’d been fooled by fascists who spoke like communists. This was Georg Hegel’s ‘end of history’ when utopian dreams are transformed into pragmatic solutions. On that magic evening of 9th November when the Berlin Wall came down, we celebrated in style in London with expensive champagne and strong weed. Power hungry US Presidents and Russian General Secretaries would no longer be aiming nuclear missiles at the major cities of Europe. The common people had shown that – with enough courage and determination – it was possible to overcome the violence and lies of a modern state. This time, the good guys were the winners.

Two decades on, the participants at the Solidarity/solidarities conference faced the hard task of explaining what one contributor called the ‘double disappointment’ of the hopes of the 1989 revolutions. Radicals in the West had expected that the collapse of Stalinism would lead to the emergence of a reinvigorated socialism in the East – and instead witnessed the nations of ‘new Europe’ embracing neo-liberalism in its most brutal forms. Oppositionists in the East had anticipated that the adoption of a free market economy would lead to consumer plenty for all like in the West – and instead saw the divisions between rich and poor within their societies growing ever wider. Of course, it is now all too easy to blame the shabby deals that allowed the Party bosses to plunder the state’s assets in return for relinquishing their grip over political power without bloodshed. What is more difficult to understand – twenty years on – is why there was mass support for the ‘shock therapy’ of privatisation, deregulation and cuts in welfare. Having rejected the failed social experiment of Russian-style Communism, sane and sensible people had voted in overwhelming numbers for a new social experiment: US-style neo-liberalism. It wasn’t as if there weren’t any other options. Just across the Baltic, there were the prosperous and egalitarian societies of Scandinavian Social Democracy, but, unfortunately, they lacked the ideological magic of the free market model. Above all, the American empire had seized the ownership of the imaginary future of the information society. As the transition gathered pace in the early-1990s, the arrival of the Net confirmed the correctness of this US-led path of modernisation for the nations of the East. In the same way that their parents had admired the industrial combines of Stalinist Russia, these ‘new Europeans’ were convinced that the dotcom entreprises of neo-liberal California represented the future in the present. No wonder that ‘double disappointment’ was the leitmotif of final panel at the Solidarity/solidarities conference…

In 2009, the Polish community in London is thriving. Unlike Elcia and her friends, a new wave of exiles has come here voluntarily to earn money, learn English and experience life in a foreign country. They take it for granted that they can move and back forth across Europe with no problems. The only thing that they’re escaping from back home is the conservative morality of the Church. You can move in with your partner without getting married as long as you do it abroad. Tellingly, most of the Polish students who I teach at Westminster University choose the ‘liberal’ option for Political Views on their Facebook profile – and they mean it in both the social and economic senses of the term. These are the children of the defeat-in-victory of the 1989 revolution. Solidarnösc smashed the Stalinist bureaucracy – and then the neo-liberal regime destroyed the organised working class in Poland. As this generation came to adulthood, the dream of dissidents like Elcia of founding the Self-Managed Socialist Republic of Poland must have seemed like a relic from a long forgotten theological debate. Let’s remember that – for them – Francis Fukyama had reinterpreted the ‘end of history’ to outlaw any alternative to US-style capitalism. There was only the American path to modernity.

The aim of this book is to help its readers to refute this ideological claim to imperial hegemony. On 15th September 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers marked the end of the neo-liberal ascendancy. George W. Bush – one of the most reactionary presidents in US history – was soon implementing the 5th demand of The Communist Manifesto: public ownership of the financial system. In such strange times, it is necessary to rediscover the complex history of the imaginary future of the information society. Here’s an interesting fact which is overlooked in the official accounts of the West. One of the first prophets of post-industrialism was Oscar Lange in the 1950s – and he was Polish. This visionary believed that the advent of the Net would provide the technological foundation for participatory democracy in both politics and the economy: cybernetic communism. With intellectual property withering away in cyberspace, his prediction does seem more prescient than it did a decade ago at the height of the dotcom bubble. If nothing else, Lange is telling us that the future is not necessarily neo-liberal California – and that the Polish Left can find its own path to a better future. The reformers of his generation opened the way for their successors to begin the process of dismantling of totalitarian rule. What they could have never envisaged was that one evil empire’s imaginary future would be replaced with that of its rival. As the last public act of his eventful life, Jacek Kuroń wrote an open letter in support of the people protesting against the 28th–30th April 2004 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Warsaw. Castigating the neo-liberal orthodoxy with the same contempt that he once directed against Stalinism, he called upon the dissidents of the 21st century to ‘create a new conception of social cooperation, realise the ideals of freedom, equality and social justice.’ What more needs to be said? I hope that the Polish translation of my book can make a small contribution towards fulfilling this goal. You can use the tools of the Net to invent new futures for humanity. Enjoy the book – and be inspired!

Richard Barbrook,
London,
England,
12th June 2009