Author: Richard Barbrook

  • The Californian Challenge: what kind of digital future do we want to live in?

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be speaking about two decades of The Californian Ideology at Bucerius Lab‘s The Californian Challenge conference on 19th-20th February 2016 at Kampnagel, Jarrestraße 1, Hamburg, Germany.

  • Hegel & The Ethical State

    French victory over Prussians at 1806 battle of Jena: Hegel in crowds cheering Napoléon Bonaparte = “World Soul on horseback.” Editor of Bonapartist newspaper in Germany. Brother and brother-in-law killed during 1812 French invasion of Russia. Bonaparte’s liberal dictatorship = third way between Bourbon kings and Jacobin republic. 1789 French revolution = “the end of history”: social and political foundation of human freedom.

    18th century Enlightenment discredited Christian justification for absolute monarchy -> Hegel’s speculative philosophy discovers rational basis for state authority. World Spirit = the inevitable progress of the “idea of freedom” through repeated dialectical contradictions of global history: Asia -> Greece -> Rome -> Germany. 1807 Philosophy of the Spirit: the master-slave dialectic as the primordial struggle for recognition explains pre-1789 class society divided between aristocrats and labourers. 1517 Martin Luther’s 95 Theses = Protestant equality of believers -> 14/7/1789 Storming of the Bastille = Hegelian equality of citizens. Slaves have learnt to beat masters on the battlefield = end of history as feudal class antagonisms. Instability of post-1789 France: Liberalism = atomised individualism into social chaos -> Jacobinism = Absolute Liberty into Absolute Terror. Bonaparte’s 1799 coup d’état -> Napoleonic empire: meritocratic elite = “every soldier has a Marshal’s baton in his knapsack”; mixed form of government = Emperor, Senate, Tribunate & Conseil d’État; and European unity = Code Civil, common currency & single market. 1821 Philosophy of Right: military defeat of Bonaparte -> political victory of Bonapartism. Hegel’s obscure language = Freemasonry’s occult truths: king of Rome disguised as king of Prussia.

    Hegel’s political philosophy = negative freedoms of civil society -> substantive freedoms of the state. Modernity = master-slave dialectic superseded by bourgeois citizenship. Hegel admires liberal economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Private property = externalisation of individual wills. Family = patriarchal contract between two individual wills. Law = universalisation of individual property ownership. Market competition between property owners = multiplication of needs -> one-sided development of bourgeois individuals. Civil society = dynamic and egoistic -> anarchy and collapse. Mass poverty -> violent revolution.

    Bonapartist state imposes political discipline upon capitalist competition. Three estates as intermediary institutions between ruler and ruled: notables, bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Assembly of notables = hereditary or appointed landowners who serve the state and funded by land rent. Corporations of bourgeoisie = urban merchants, artisans and bankers who create both wealth and deprivation. State bureaucracy = meritocratic civil service outside and above civil society. Political supervision of market economy: law, defence, infrastructure, welfare and education. Patriotism = reconciliation of individual wills and collective interests through ethical concept of state. Hegel rejects social contract theory of Rousseau = levelling conformity of Jacobin republic. Hegel advocates mixed constitution with separation of powers between executive = bureaucracy and legislature = notables and corporations. Wealth moderated by wisdom.

    The people’s emperor: formless mass of egotistic individuals united by Great Man who personifies World Spirit of historical progress. Monarchy is single mind above squabbling factions of notables and bourgeoisie. Long-term goals not short-term gains. Political and military leadership for national conflicts for global dominance. Hegel rejects Immanuel Kant’s belief that liberal republics = perpetual peace. Rationality of warfare = world-historical evolution from autonomous states into universal state. 14/7/1789 = realisation of freedom in one nation -> dissemination to all nations. Bonaparte’s downfall = hubris of ignoring intermediary institutions of Napoleonic empire. Mixed constitution enables selfish individuals of capitalist market to be patriotic citizens of ethical state. The end of world-history = “the real is rational” for everyone everywhere.

  • Marx on the State

    20th century Marxisms were a theology of state power with Marx’s anti-statist writings as holy texts.

    Social Democracy = parliamentary democracy and the welfare state.
    Bolshevism = totalitarian party and state planning.

    19th century Marxism of Marx proposed two different concepts of state power:
    The Parasite State = “Strong government and heavy taxes are identical”.
    The Class State = “the managing committee of the bourgeoisie”.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels grew up during the post-1815 Restoration.
    Bonaparte’s liberal empire replaced by European Christian monarchies.
    Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1806).
    Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (1820).

    Young Hegelians attacked the reactionary politics of the Prussian monarchy by criticising conservative appropriation of Hegel’s Idealist philosophy.
    Freedom was creating materialist philosophy to discredit the alienated consciousness of religion.
    Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

    Marx and Engels rejected philosophical criticism for the critique of political economy.
    Freedom required a materialist conception of history to end alienated labour under capitalism.
    The grand narrative of history as successive modes of production: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
    Increasing efficiency of labour through specialisation and professionalisation, especially science and technology.
    Egoism of bourgeois individual in market economy reflected one-sided development of modern everyday life.
    Bourgeois private property as expression of alienated labour of capitalism.
    Proletariat was the propertyless class which would liberate all of humanity by overcoming the division of labour.
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845).
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).

    Hegel celebrated the universal class of state bureaucrats who regulated the selfish interests of bourgeois society.
    Marx saw the state bureaucrats as a self-interested caste created by the division of labour within capitalism.
    The common interests of the people transformed into the private property of the government bureaucracy: the parasite state.
    Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843)

    1848 German Revolution: Red republic against Prussian and Austrian monarchies.
    1851 coup d’etat by Louis Bonaparte replaces French republic with new empire.
    State was above and against all classes within civil society.
    The parasite state living off the taxes extracted from the people.
    Oriental despotism: autarchic villages and irrigation schemes
    Absolutist monarchy: declining aristocracy and rising bourgeoisie.
    Bonapartism: economic modernisation and repression of the proletariat.
    Capitalism was authoritarian rule by a liberal oligarchy which feared political democracy.
    Karl Marx, British Rule in India (1853).
    Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
    Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

    Marx and Engels lived most of their lives as political refugees in London and Manchester.
    Great Britain was the first capitalist nation with 50% of global industrial production in 1850.
    Britain was the future of the rest of the world in the present.
    Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845).
    Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (1867)

    Britain was a crowned bourgeois republic: limited franchise, free speech and the rule of law.
    Under the liberal republic, the state acted as “the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”.
    Class violence against internal enemies, including repression and confiscation.
    Rule of law to protect private property: human rights and free contracts enabled class exploitation.
    Public works to support capitalist development, such as canals, railways and education.
    Economic policies favourable to national bourgeoisie, such as free trade in Britain or protectionism in Germany and the USA.
    Imperial conquests to grab resources or exclude competitors from overseas markets, such as the British in Ireland and India.
    The struggle over the franchise was over which class fraction would control British state through parliamentary elections.
    The abolition of the Corn Laws marked the ascendency of industrial bourgeoisie over the capitalist landowners.
    Egoism of civil society undermined political democracy.
    Bourgeois politicians were professional hucksters and swindlers.
    Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Articles on Britain (1971).

    Two-stage revolutionary struggle: political democracy -> social democracy.
    Primary task of the continental European Left was to overthrow parasite state.
    Alliance of proletarians, petit-bourgeoisie and peasantry fighting to create the democratic republic: the 1871 Paris Commune.
    Primary task of British and American Left was to extend the franchise and campaign for social reforms: the Chartist movement.
    Both liberals and socialists believed that universal suffrage would lead to “the dictatorship of the proletariat”.
    Democratic republic under capitalism was inherently unstable as workers can exercise political power while still being economically exploited.
    Universal suffrage secured through participatory politics: abolition of state bureaucracy, official religion, national education, media censorship and professional army.
    Marx had been a newspaper editor in 1840s who opposed press censorship, nationalised media and government press subsidies.
    “The Paris Commune made that watchword of the bourgeois revolution – cheap government – into a reality.” – Karl Marx.
    Participation of citizens in DIY politics ended the division of labour between bureaucrats and people: militia, juries, posses, administration.
    From the Ancient Athenian agora to the Wild West democracy of the USA.
    The dictatorship of the proletariat would use emergency powers against the threat of the “slave owners’ revolt” like the Union against the Confederacy in the American Civil War.
    Karl Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press (1842).
    Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
    Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
    Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

    The self-emancipation of the proletariat through the three wings of the labour movement: mass political parties, workers’ militia and trade unions/cooperatives.
    Revolutionary reformism of Marx and Engels emphasised political campaigns for economic improvements: limiting the working day, factory regulations, consumer protection, regulating banking system.
    Participatory politics abolished politics as a profession: “the withering away of the state”.
    Communism was the overcoming of the division between mental and manual labour within civil society.
    Workers’ cooperatives were prefiguring the democratic organisation of the whole economy.
    “The socialist future will an Athens without slaves.” – Paul Lafargue.
    Communism was the principles of participatory democracy applied to all aspects of life.
    Karl Marx, Capital Volume 3 (1894).
    Paul Lafargue, The Right To Be Lazy (1883).

  • THE MARXIST POLITICS OF KARL MARX

    “The one thing of which I’m certain is that I’m not a Marxist.”- Karl Marx

    Post-Communist nostalgia for 1948 Cold War Marxisms.
    Social Democracy: parliamentary elections, welfare state and US imperialism.
    Bolshevism: totalitarian party, state planning and Russian imperialism.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were ’48ers: the young radicals of the 1848 European revolutions against the post-1815 Christian monarchies and bourgeois liberalism.

    1836 students at the University of Berlin.
    Young Hegelians were critics of Georg Hegel’s Idealist interpretation of history: the World Spirit making the real rational.

    The materialist refutation of religion was the philosophical rejection of reactionary rule in Germany:
    Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

    From the philosophy of intellectual freedom to the materialist conception of history:
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845)

    Liberal concept of socio-economic progress: hunting → herding → agriculture → commerce.
    Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)
    Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).

    1848 European Revolution: the springtime of the peoples.
    Republican democracy, national liberation and socialist reforms.
    Marx was a newspaper editor and Engels was a soldier.
    The German Republic defeated by Prussian monarchy in 1848.
    The French Republic overthrown by Louis Bonaparte in 1851.
    The Russian empire was the leader of European reaction.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).
    Book launch at the Red Lion (aka Be At One), Great Windmill Street, Soho.
    Socialist concept of socio-economic progress: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
    The Left of Red Republicanism: ”The communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties.”

    Liberal concept of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy in the 1642 English Revolution, the 1776 American Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution:
    François Guizot, The History of Civilisation in Europe (1828).
    Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856).

    Socialist concept of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the 1848 European Revolution:
    The limitations of bourgeois liberalism: property franchise, media censorship, regressive taxation, state bureaucracy and professional army.
    Bourgeois fear of republican democracy caused the defeat of the 1848 Revolution.
    Bonapartism was the parasite state dominating civil society in its own interests.
    Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
    Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
    Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

    The proletarian struggle for political democracy: Paris sans-culottes (1792-1794), Polish nationalists (1830/1863), English Chartists (1838-1848), Irish Fenians (1848/1867) and American Unionists (1861-1865).
    Red republicanism: universal suffrage, participatory politics, media freedom, low taxes, socio-economic reforms and citizen militia.
    1871 Paris Commune held multi-party elections while under siege by the Right.
    “Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat.” – Friedrich Engels.
    Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
    Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
    Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

    1864 International Working Men’s Association: trade union cooperation, solidarity with the North in the American Civil War and supporting Polish nationalism.
    1872 Hague Congress: the split in the First International between the Marxist Socialists and the Bakuninist Anarchists.
    Marxists symbolised their victory by moving the headquarters of the First International to New York: the USA was the most advanced capitalist economy which would be the first communist country.

    Anarchism: select conspiracy of intellectuals who wanted to be the ‘invisible dictatorship’ directing the spontaneous revolution of the masses.
    Pre-1914 Anarchism: Bonnet gang, CGT, CNT and the IWW.

    Socialism: mass party of industrial and office workers seeking control of the democratic republic which was the political basis for creating social democracy.
    Pre-1914 Socialism: British Labour Party, German Social Democratic Party and French Socialist Party.
    Political economy of labour over the political economy of capital: 8 hour day, workers’ cooperatives, left culture and community organisations.

    1889 foundation of the Second International: political democracy, trade union cooperation and world peace.
    1914 was the end of Second International Marxism: reformism and nationalism had prevented the socialist revolution.
    The Russian reinterpretation of Marxism: the Bolshevik vanguard party.
    1917 Russian Revolution: the Congress of Soviets not the Constituent Assembly.
    Direct democracy and vanguard party not representative democracy and mass party.
    1917-21 Russian Civil War: one-party state, secret police, ideological mobilisation and professional army.
    1921 Kronstadt Rebellion: Soviets without Bolsheviks.

    20th century Marxisms without Marx’s 19th century politics: Social Democracy, Leninism, Council Communism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Austro-Marxism, Maoism, New Left, Situationism and Autonomism.
    1989-91 Georg Hegel’s end of history was representative democracy and neo-liberal globalisation.
    2008 financial crash and the Occupy movement have popularised David Harvey’s course on Karl Marx’s Capital.
    2015 election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader: the 21st century revival of Second International Marxism.

  • Imaginary Futures at the European Culture Congress

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be participating in the Cyberiad panel of the European Culture Congress at 12.30pm on 9th September 2011 at the Regional Centre for Business Tourism in Wroclaw, Poland. He has written The Davos Parallax which is a SF tale about the banking crisis to introduce this panel.

    Imaginary Futures is one of the inspirations for the Tomorrow Never Dies exhibition and installation on 8th-11th September 2011 at the Design Gallery in Wroclaw, Poland.

  • Imaginary Futures at Virtual Futures 2.0’11

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be talking about Imaginary Futures at the Virtual Futures 2.0’11 conference at the University of Warwick on Saturday 18th June at 6.00pm.

    Location: MS.02, University of Warwick, Kirby Corner Rd, Coventry, West Midlands CV4.

    Richard will also be introducing a screening and discussion of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War on Sunday 19th June in the Milburn Studio at 4.00pm at the same venue.

  • Imaginary Futures at the Babylonia Festival

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be talking about Imaginary Futures at the Babylonia Anti-Authoritarian Festival in Athens, Greece, on Thursday 26th May at 9.00pm.

    Location: School of Fine Arts, Peireos 256, 18233 Athens, Greece.
    metro: Kallithea

    Richard will also be introducing a screening and discussion of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War on Saturday 29th May at 9.00pm at the same venue.

  • Internet Ideology

    REFF: Most of the technologies which are arising in these years are about knowledge and information. Do you think that they are the most revolutionary technologies of the last centuries? What do you think about it?

    RB: The first thing I would say is that if you look at the last century, the key technologies are probably antibiotics and the contraceptive pill. These are actually the most important technologies ever invented. Also maybe mass transit, as cars and above all airplanes. These are technologies that really have transformed people’s lives but it’s interesting that the convergence between computing media and telecommunications is actually seen as the societal shift in technology. You have these technologies which maybe are not the most important but, because they were given this theoretical and ideological role of bringing on the new society, they are seen as the most important technology even if we could argue that they’re not. I personally work with these technologies so obviously I have an interest in saying that Internet is a very good thing. I am also a writer and the fact that I can distribute my writings, I can put up videos and Flash presentations and I can access so much stuff on the Internet, is fantastic. But I doubt that these technologies are important as antibiotics or contraceptive pill. For instance now days you may not die by a minor infection and women would not die giving birth; actually women can control their own reproduction. And what about the fact that you can travel from country to country by airplane very cheaply now? Those things are probably much more life-changing than information and communication technology. It’s not that information and communication technologies are a bad thing or that we should dismiss them, it’s just that I think that we should be sceptical about the way they have been used for ideological purposes. There is a real positive benefit in the convergent technologies, but we should be sceptical about the ideological use that has been made of them. The ideology of Internet comes before its invention; both Russians and Americans thought the Internet was going to create a new society and they both wanted to claim that their empire was building the new society; therefore the Internet took on this much more exaggerated role. The other thing is that if you are a writer or you are involved in the media or you are a journalist, obviously you are going to think that these technologies really affect you as the most important technologies. People that are working in the communication and information industry, or the intellectuals, those people are obviously going to be obsessed by this technologies, but they tend to exaggerate their own technologies and forget about these other things because they can just take antibiotics!

    REFF: One new thing is the example that technologies may give to other disciplines, as, for example, does the open source, which is not only about software, it can be applied to agriculture, politics, everything. Is there a real opportunity?

    RB: I think it is the other way around. It’s not that the technology has created a culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities and technology express them. Guy Debord and Gil Wolman wrote a famous essay on ‘Methods of Détournement’ in 1957 [1] saying what artist should do in this mass media culture. Artists should be able to appropriate the mass media culture, artefacts, cartoons, films, advertising and then remix them – that’s what detournement really means. Debord was right in saying that since we live in this mass media culture, actually making art about it or being creative about it, implies that artist have to continually refer to it. When Debord made his film, The Society of the Spectacle [2], he had to get a very generous patron who allowed him to buy a film, cut it up, and then go to the studio and re-record it and re-dub it, a very laborious, difficult process. When we made Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War [3], we managed to do it with a very small grant from the Arts Council of England, a Mac laptop, Final Cut and we only had to go to the studio to record the voiceover. We can mix the voiceover into the whole, mix the images into the voiceover through one Laptop. It has taken 50 years for the technology to catch up with what someone has done in 1957. Someone would argue that this is actually what the Cubists were doing when Picasso was making collages putting a socialist newspaper into the collage. In a sense Picasso was already doing those things in 1910; now we can do this because of these digital technologies, we can take other people’s films, we can put our own performances together. I think it is the other way around it’s not that the technology has created the culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities, these technologies that actually were often developed for other things. I remember an old hippie from the 1960s who said that he would always remember when he used to build disco sound systems which cut off the sound from one turntable when switching between two records – people had just never thought of that use, taking the two records and playing them together as if they were music. So you are taking a technology and using it for something it shouldn’t be used for.

    REFF: We may say that now days tools are available, if you just have money you get them, but in another way these tools are controlled, e.g. platforms, iPhone, Facebook, lots of stuff. Do you think that there is a paradox out there?

    RB: Well, that is the paradox of capitalism – it is our labour, we are all variable capital, our labour builds capitalism, capitalism has to organise itself to appropriate the collective to make it so sure that we can only work collectively as through the capitalist social innovation. It’s not a new thing, capitalism’s greatest achievement is that it allows people to work together collectively on a global scale but of course people can only do it in a social relationships which individualizes, atomizes. We’ve been in capitalism three or four hundred years, now we have this very intense socialization but people is trying to cooperate in a different way. I think Facebook is really interesting – I mean it is dotcom capitalism in way, they’re making money out of the advertising but they’re giving people all of this service space for free and they’ve made all this very nice interface, easy to use software. I haven’t uploaded things on my own website because I know it is much easier doing it on Facebook then you can share them with your friends. YouTube is amazing as well. You can just stick up videos, the whole world is sticking up videos and as far I can tell they are not making any money off it. They’re making all sorts of money off Google searches and they’re subsidizing our free distribution of videos to enjoy. And if you think if Facebook did try to control the content people would just migrate to another service because they know what happened to MySpace, and then it just got covered with advertising and they tried to make it too corporate and apart from musicians, everybody, all these 18-20 year olds they’re on Facebook now. In a way they are making money out of this but on the other hand they’re providing us with a free service that’s easy to use. Take the bad with the good.

    Let’s answer the question about what happened to the avant-garde movement, I mean I think that’s the interesting. Because fifteen years ago making new media was avant-garde by itself; actually doing anything with a screen was really radical. It is interesting now that that avant garde is being historicised. In the last five years or so people have been writing books about Internet art and they have a lot to look at concerning the last 10 or 15 years. It is interesting because actually just doing something with a screen is considered radical anyway. It is like the Cubist avant-garde, where just making a collage was exciting. You had to make a good collage for people to see, or making a ready-made by itself seemed to be exciting just because you have done it. After a while people said “so what”. Once you’ve got over the ‘shock of the new’, that favorite phrase in art history, you then have to start deciding whether its good or bad, interesting or an absurd concept. So I think to do something avant-garde and new is not going to be necessarily on the screen – it can be partly on the screen or use the screen or it will be collaborative culture. Last Christmas, I met this woman who works at Battersea Arts Theatre in London and she was saying all the most radical wacky ideas of 1960s and 1970s theatre are now mainstream because they have an Internet generation audience. They expect to be able to interact with the play they don’t like just standing there, sitting there, watching the play on a stage. It’s like in the 60s there were people walking through the audience, they want like actors in the audience, you know this guy sitting next to you and he suddenly actually is really an actor gets up after half an hour and starts acting, getting the audience to vote and all this stuff is cause they’re used to participating. And say something that was once seen as wacky extremism, loony stuff, is now mainstream theatre so again that’s the interesting thing about how it does affect the different culture.

    REFF: How do you feel with the fact that Joi Ito the founder of Creative Commons, is a venture capitalist and the intellectual property laws in general?

    RB: Well, there are two ways in which we could look at it. If you are a vulgar Marxist, as I am, you can say that it is the classic examples in Marx: forces of production develop and in relation to production they eventually become a barrier to the development itself. In this sense intellectual property has become a barrier to setting up this network communications system and actually intellectual property is becoming a barrier to how we use it. It’s like the laws against recreational drugs the bad thing about these laws it’s not just that they’re stupid but it’s that they make people disrespect the law. And the same point can be made about copyright, these too are laws that people don’t obey. Politicians can’t enforce laws that most people spontaneously don’t obey: when a law does not work it is like there is no law at all. It seems to me that a big problem with this copyright law is that everybody is expected to pay for every tune that they ever listen to. On the one hand, you have music as a commodity, on the other, it is a gift. If you want to get a tune for free, you can with a bit of effort. But lots of people don’t have the time to look for free tunes, so they buy it on iTunes just because it is easier to do. However what they are paying for now is not the tunes themselves, it is the simplicity of getting hold of them. This a small example of the weird nature of any intellectual property: the copyright owners sell it to you but you don’t really own it. It is not a fully bourgeois form property (bourgeois property means that you can alienate property and do what you like with the property you bought); with intellectual property is much more like feudal property where the king would deem you a land but you could not do what you like with it you could not sell it. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that people can so easily spontaneously ignore the dictates of these copyright laws!

  • NJUJORÅ KA PROROÄŒANSTVA: ZAMIÅ LJENA BUDUĆNOST VEÅ TAÄŒKE INTELIGENCIJE

    Budućnost je ono što je i bila

    “BioloÅ¡ka inteligencija je nepromenljiva, zato Å¡to je u pitanju stara, zrela paradigma, dok nova paradigma nebioloÅ¡kog raÄ?unarstva i inteligencije eksponencijalno raste. Prelaz će se odigrati 2020-ih a nakon toga, bar sa stanoviÅ¡ta hardvera, dominiraće nebioloÅ¡ko raÄ?unarstvo…“
    Kurcvejl (Kurzweil), 2004, str. 3.

    Na poÄ?etku 21. veka, san o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji ukorenjen je duboko u savremenu maÅ¡tu. Od detinjstva pa nadalje, ljudima u razvijenom svetu se govori da će raÄ?unari jednog dana moći da rasuÄ‘uju – Ä?ak i da imaju osećanja – baÅ¡ kao ljudi. U priÄ?ama nauÄ?ne fantastike, maÅ¡ine koje misle su odavno omiljeni likovi. Publika je odrastala sa likovima robota drugara, kao Å¡to je Dejta iz serije Zvezdane staze: Nova generacija. ili nemilosrdnih robota-Ä?udoviÅ¡ta poput kiborga iz Terminatora. (Startrek.com 2005; Kameron/Cameron 1984). Ove nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne maÅ¡tarije dodatno podstiÄ?u pouzdana predviÄ‘anja istaknutih informatiÄ?ara. Neprekidna poboljÅ¡anja hardvera i softvera naposletku će dovesti do stvaranja veÅ¡taÄ?kih inteligencija, moćnijih od “bioloÅ¡ke inteligencije” ljudskog mozga.

    Komercijalni proizvoÄ‘aÄ?i već neko vreme sa nestrpljenjem iÅ¡Ä?ekuju dan kada će prodavati svesne maÅ¡ine koje obavljaju kućne poslove i pomažu starijima (Honda 2004). Neki informatiÄ?ari Ä?ak veruju da je stvaranje “nebioloÅ¡kih inteligencija” jedna duhovna potraga. U Kaliforniji, Rej Kurcvejl, Vernor Vindž (Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge) i njihove kolege s nestrpljenjem oÄ?ekuju Singularnost: Prvi dolazak silicijumskog mesije (Vindž 1993; Bel/Bell 2004). Bilo da su nadahnuti novcem ili misticizmom, svi ovi zagovornici veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije dele uverenje da se sadaÅ¡njost mora shvatiti kao ’embrion’, kao budućnost u zametku – a upravo iz budućnosti će se rasvetljivati potencijal sadaÅ¡njosti. Svaki napredak u raÄ?unarskoj tehnologiji objavljuje se kao novi korak ka stvaranju potpuno svesne maÅ¡ine. ProroÄ?anstvo o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sve bliže je ispunjenju sa pojavljivanjem svakog novog komada softvera ili hardvera. Nije važno ono Å¡to raÄ?unari mogu sada, već ono Å¡to će moći uskoro. SadaÅ¡njica je beta verzija nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nog sna: zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost.

    Uprkos svom istaknutom mestu u kulturi, vera u svesne maÅ¡ine podložna je teorijskom egzorcizmu. Daleko od toga da bude prazan oznaÄ?itelj, ovo proroÄ?anstvo duboko je ukorenjeno u vremenu i prostoru. OÄ?ekivano, savremeni propagatori veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije retko priznaju koliko je sâm koncept star. Žele da napreduju, ne da se osvrću. Ipak, proÅ¡lo je viÅ¡e od Ä?etrdeset godina otkad je san o razumnim maÅ¡inama prvi put zaokupio maÅ¡tu javnosti. ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije ima dugu povest. Analiziranje te prvobitne verzije proroÄ?anstva preduslov je za razumevanje njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. S tim u vidu, vratimo se u drugu deceniju Hladnog rata kada je najveća svetska raÄ?unarska kompanija priredila predstavu o Ä?udesima razumnih maÅ¡ina u finansijskoj prestonici najmoćnije i najbogatije zemlje na planeti…

    Milenijum napretka

    Na dan 22. aprila 1964. godine, Svetski sajam (World’s Fair) u Njujorku otvoren je za javnost. U naredne dve godine, ta moderna zemlja Ä?uda ugostila je preko 51 milion posetilaca. Na izložbi su bili zastupljeni svi delovi ameriÄ?ke elite: savezna vlada, državne uprave, velike korporacije, finansijske ustanove, industrijski lobiji i verske grupe. Svetski sajam je dokazao da SAD prednjaÄ?i u svemu: u robi Å¡iroke potroÅ¡nje, demokratiji, Å¡ou-biznisu, modernistiÄ?koj arhitekturi, lepim umetnostima, verskoj toleranciji, kućnom životu i, iznad svega, tehnologiji. Kao Å¡to je sugerisao jedan od reklamnih slogana izložbe, “milenijum progresa” doživeo je vrhunac u ameriÄ?kom stoleću (Stenton/Stanton 2004, 2004a; Ljus/Luce 1941).

    Ta rodoljubiva poruka slavljena je veliÄ?anstvenim predstavljanjem novih tehnologija na Svetskom sajmu. Pisci i filmadžije odavno su maÅ¡tali o putovanju na druge svetove. Sada je u Nasinom (National Aeronautics and Space Administration – Nacionalna agencija za aeronautiÄ?ka i svemirska ustraživanja, popularno NASA) Svemirskom parku, javnost mogla da se divi ogromnim raketama koje su odnele ameriÄ?ke astronaute u orbitu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf /Time-Life Books 1964, str. 208; Lorens/Laurence 1964, str. 2-14). Uprkos svom poÄ?etnom neuspehu kada su Rusi lansirali prvi satelit 1957, SAD sad tek Å¡to nisu pretekle svog takmaca u “svemirskoj trci” (Å efter/Schefter 1999, str. 145-231). A ono Å¡to je najbolje od svega, posetiocima Svetskog sajma govorilo se kako će i sami imati priliku da za svog životnog veka postanu astronauti. U paviljonu Futurama Dženeral motorsa (General Motors), Amerikanci iz 1980-ih bili su prikazani kako provode godiÅ¡nji odmor na Mesecu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 222). Druge korporacije bile su podjednako sigurne da će dostignuća sadaÅ¡njice ubrzo biti prevaziÄ‘ena trijumfima sutraÅ¡njice. U svom paviljonu Progreslend (Progressland), Dženeral motors predvideo je da će elektriÄ?na energija proizvedena u reaktorima za nuklearnu fuziju biti “isuviÅ¡e jeftina da bi se naplaćivala” (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 90-92; Lorens 1964, str 40-43). U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti Svetskog sajma, Amerikanci neće samo postati svemirski turisti – oni će takoÄ‘e biti blagosloveni besplatnom elektriÄ?nom energijom…

    Za mnoge korporacije, najdelotvorniji metod da dokažu svoju tehnoloÅ¡ku savremenost bio je taj da izlože raÄ?unar. Klerolova (Clairol) maÅ¡ina birala je “najlaskavije boje za kosu” za posetiteljke, a mejnfrejm (eng. mainframe, veliki, Ä?esto i ogromni centralni kompjuterski sistemi, kakvi su poÄ?eli da se razvijaju 40-ih i 50-ih godina, prim. prev.) Parker pena je uparivao ameriÄ?ku decu sa “prijateljima za dopisivanje” iz stranih zemalja (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 86, 90). Koliko god možda delovali impresivno svojoj publici, ti eksponati nisu bili niÅ¡ta drugo do reklamni trikovi. Za razliku od njih, IBM (skraćeno od International Business Machines, jedna od prvih i najvećih informatiÄ?kih kompanija, osnovana pod imenom Tabulating Machine Company 1896, danas sa oko 400 000 zaposlenih u 170 zemalja, prim. prev.) je bio u mogućnosti da svoj paviljon posveti iskljuÄ?ivo Ä?udima informatike kao zasebne tehnologije. U 1961, jedan jedini proizvod – IBM 1401 – Ä?inio je Ä?etvrtinu svih raÄ?unara koji su radili u SAD-u (Pju 1995, str. 265-267). Po poimanju mnogih Amerikanaca, IBM je bio sinonim za ‘kompjuter’. BaÅ¡ pred otvaranje Svetskog sajma, korporacija je izbacila seriju proizvoda koji će joj obezbediti dominaciju industrijom i u iduće dve decenije: System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, str. 54-146). UgrabivÅ¡i priliku za isticanje koju je sajam nudio, Å¡efovi IBM-a naruÄ?ili su paviljon koji će zaseniti sve ostale. Ero Sarinen (Eero Saarinen) – renomirani finski arhitekta – nadgledao je konstrukciju veliÄ?anstvene zgrade: bele dvorane u obliku jajeta sa reljefnim korporativnim logotipom, koja je lebdela visoko u vazduhu uz pomoć 45 metalnih stabala boje rÄ‘e. Ispod te upeÄ?atljive atrakcije nalazile su se interaktivne izložbe koje su veliÄ?ale IBM-ov doprinos raÄ?unarskoj industriji (Stern, Melins i FiÅ¡man/Stern, Mellins, Fishman, 1997, str. 1046-1047).

    Za samu dvoranu, ÄŒarsl i Rej Ims (Charles i Ray Eames) – par koji je bio oliÄ?enje ameriÄ?kog modernistiÄ?kog dizajna – napravili su glavnu zanimljivost u IBM-ovom paviljonu: “InformatiÄ?ku maÅ¡inu” (The Information Machine). PoÅ¡to bi zauzeli svoja mesta u “Ljudskom zidu” (People Wall) sa 500 sediÅ¡ta, posetioci bi bili podignuti u jajoliku graÄ‘evinu. Kada bi se naÅ¡li unutra, narator bi najavio “veliÄ?anstvenu” multimedijalnu predstavu o tome kako su maÅ¡ine izložene u IBM-ovom paviljonu preteÄ?a svesnih maÅ¡ina budućnosti. RaÄ?unari su u procesu sticanja svesti. (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 70-74; Lorens 1964, str. 57-58). U bliskoj budućnosti, svaki Amerikanac biće vlasnik odanog mehaniÄ?kog sluge baÅ¡ kao Å¡to je Robot Robi (Robby the Robot) iz Zabranjene planete (Forbidden Planet), popularnog nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nog filma iz 1956. godine (Vilkoks/Wilcox, 1999). Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku, IBM je ponosno objavio da će taj san o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji napokon biti ostvaren. Sa izbacivanjem serije System/360, mejnfrejmovi su postali dovoljno moćni da izgrade prototipe jednog potpuno svesnog raÄ?unara.

    Ta Ä?udesna meÅ¡avina avangardne arhitekture i multimedijalnog performansa u IBM-ovom paviljonu doživela je veliki uspeh i u medijima i u javnosti. Zajedno sa svemirskim raketama i nuklearnim reaktorima, raÄ?unar je potvrdio svoju poziciju kao jedna od tri ikoniÄ?ne tehnologije moderne Amerike. IdeoloÅ¡ka poruka tih maÅ¡ina bila je nedvosmislena: sadaÅ¡njost je budućnost u zametku. U IBM-ovom paviljonu, raÄ?unari su postojali istovremeno u dva vremenska okvira. Sa jedne strane, tadaÅ¡nji modeli su prikazani kao prototipovi svesnih maÅ¡ina iz budućnosti; sa druge strane, vizija raÄ?unarske svesti pokazala je istinski potencijal mejnfrejmova izloženih u IBM-ovom paviljonu. Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1964, izbacivanje serije System/360 se slavilo kao najava zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije.
    “Nije daleko dan kada će sposobnostî [ljudskog] mozga za reÅ¡avanje problema i rukovanje informacijama biti prekopirane; iznenadio bih se ako se to ne bi ostvarilo u narednoj deceniji.”
    Sajmon/Simon, str. 39.

    Otkrivanje razumne mašine

    FuturistiÄ?ke fantazije iz IBM-ove multimedijalne predstave bile su nadahnute nepristrasnom logikom akademskog sveta. Alan Tjuring (Turing) – utemeljivaÄ? informatike – oznaÄ?io je razvoj veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije kao dugoroÄ?ni cilj te nove discipline. Sredinom 1930-ih, ovaj matematiÄ?ar sa Kembridža objavio je uticajan Ä?lanak koji je opisivao apstrakni model za programabilni raÄ?unar: “univerzalnu maÅ¡inu” (Tjuring 2004). Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, njegov tim inženjera napravio je prvi elektriÄ?ni kalkulator kako bi se ubrzalo deÅ¡ifrovanje nemaÄ?kih vojnih signala. Kada se sukob okonÄ?ao, Tjuring se preselio na Univerzitet u ManÄ?esteru kako bi se pridružio timu istraživaÄ?a koji su pravili programabilnu maÅ¡inu. Kao Å¡to je bilo izloženo u njegovom Ä?lanku iz 1936, koristiće se softver kako bi se hardveru omogućilo da obavlja niz razliÄ?itih zadataka. Na dan 21. juna 1948, pre no Å¡to je Tjuring Ä?ak i doÅ¡ao na svoje novo radno mesto, njegove kolege ukljuÄ?ile su prvi svetski elektronski raÄ?unar sa unapred ugraÄ‘enim programom: Baby. Taj teoretski koncept, do tada opisan u jednom struÄ?nom Ä?asopisu, se materijalizovao u obliku ogromne metalne kutija ispunjene ventilima, prekidaÄ?ima, žicama i brojÄ?anicima (Tjuring 2004a; Ejgar/Agar, 2001, str. 3-5, 113-124; Hodžis/Hoges, 1992, str. 314-402).

    Za Tjuringa, Baby je bio daleko viÅ¡e od poboljÅ¡ane verzije kancelarijskog tabulatora. Kada hardverom upravlja softver, raÄ?unanje postaje svest. U nizu uticajnih Ä?lanaka, Tjuring je izneo tezu da je njegova matematiÄ?ka maÅ¡ina preteÄ?a jednog sasvim novog oblika života: mehaniÄ?kog matematiÄ?ara. To predviÄ‘anje potkrepio je odredivÅ¡i ljudsku inteligenciju kao neÅ¡to Å¡to bi mogli raditi i raÄ?unari. Budući da je raÄ?unanje prefinjeni vid razmiÅ¡ljanja, raÄ?unarske maÅ¡ine su zasigurno sposobne da misle. Ako deca stiÄ?u znanje obrazovanjem, edukativni softver mogao bi da stvori obrazovane raÄ?unare. PoÅ¡to ljuski mozak radi kao maÅ¡ina, oÄ?igledno je da bi se maÅ¡ina mogla ponaÅ¡ati kao elektronski mozak (Tjuring 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Å afer/Schaffer, 2000). Sudeći po Tjuringu, iako prvobitni raÄ?unari joÅ¡ nisu bili dovoljno moćni da bi dostigli svoj pravi potencijal, pre ili kasnije, kroz neprestano poboljÅ¡avanje hardvera i softvera, ta ograniÄ?enja bi bila prevaziÄ‘ena. U drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka, raÄ?unarska tehnologija brzo se razvijala ka svojoj unapred utvrÄ‘enoj sudbini: veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji.

    “Memorijski kapacitet ljudskog mozga verovatno je reda deset hiljada miliona binarnih brojeva. Ali najveći deo toga po svoj prilici se koristi za pamćenje vizuelnih utisaka, i na druge relativno rasipniÄ?ke naÄ?ine. Ostvarivanju istinskog napretka [ka veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji] možemo se osnovano nadati sa nekoliko miliona brojeva [raÄ?unarske memorije].”
    Tjuring 2004a, str. 393

    U svom najpoznatijem Ä?lanku, Tjuring je opisao test za prepoznavanje pobednika u toj ‘trci za budućnost’. Kada posmatraÄ? ne bude mogao da razluÄ?i da li razgovara ljudskim bićem ili raÄ?unarom u onlajn konverzaciji, onda viÅ¡e neće postojati bitna razlika izmeÄ‘u te dve vrste svesti. Ako se imitacija ne može razlikovati od originala, maÅ¡ina se onda mora smatrati razumnom – kompjuter je položio ispit (Tjuring 2004c, str. 441-448; Å afer 2000). Od tada pa nadalje, raÄ?unari su postali mnogo viÅ¡e od pukih praktiÄ?nih alatki i robe kojom se trguje. Kao Å¡to je Tjuringov Ä?lanak objasnio, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije otkrivala je potencijal ove nove tehnologije da se konstantno menja. Uprkos svojim nedostacima, aktuelni modeli raÄ?unara predstavljaju preteÄ?u svesnih maÅ¡ina koje će za njima doći…

    Pred kraj 1940-ih, katihizis veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije već je bio ustoliÄ?en. U okviru informatike, ono Å¡to je bilo i ono Å¡to će biti je postalo jedno te isto. Uprkos tom dostignuću, Tjuring je bio prorok Ä?iji je uticaj slabio u njegovoj roÄ‘enoj zemlji. RaÄ?unar je možda izmiÅ¡ljen u Britaniji, ali njena zadužena vlada nije imala sredstava da bi dominirala razvojem te nove tehnologije (Ejgar 2003, str. 266-278). S druge strane Atlantika, prilike su se umnogome razlikovale. Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, ameriÄ?ka vlada takoÄ‘e je obezbedila izdaÅ¡na sredstva za istraživanje elektronskog raÄ?unarstva. Shodno tome, kada je pobeda izvojevana, presudilo je to Å¡to se nauÄ?nici koji su radili na tim projektima nisu susreli sa ozbiljnim poteÅ¡koćama u daljem obezbeÄ‘ivanju sredstava. Dok je Britanija oskudevala u novcu, SAD su lako sebi mogle priuÅ¡titi da finansiraju najsavremenija istraživanja u oblasti novih tehnologija. Kada je Hladni rat poÄ?eo, ameriÄ?kim politiÄ?arima nije bilo teÅ¡ko da svojim biraÄ?ima opravdaju te dotacije (Lesli/Leslie, 1993, str. 1-13; Luontin/Lewontin, 1997).

    U SAD, informatiÄ?ari su imali joÅ¡ jednu veliku prednost u odnosu na svoje britanske suparnike: meta-teoriju kibernetike. Tokom poznih 1940-ih i ranih 1950-ih, grupa istaknutih ameriÄ?kih intelektualaca sastajala se na Mejsi konferencijama (Macy conferences) kako bi istraživala naÄ?ine da se sruÅ¡e granice izmeÄ‘u razliÄ?itih nauÄ?nih disciplina: (Hajms/Heims, 1991). Od samog poÄ?etka, kao guru tog poduhvata izdvojio se Norbert Viner (Norbert Wiener). Dok je radio na MIT-ju (skraćeno od Massachusetts Institute of Technology, privatni istraživaÄ?ki univerzitet i institut lociran u gradu Kejmbridžu, država MasaÄ?usets, SAD, prim. prev.), on je izmislio kibernetiku kao novi teorijski okvir za analiziranje ponaÅ¡anja i ljudi i maÅ¡ina. Input (unos, ulaz) informacija o okruženju vodi do autputa (output, izlaz, rezultat) delovanja Ä?iji je cilj da to okruženje promeni. Nazvan “povratna sprega” (feedback loop), taj ciklus nadražaja i rezultirajućih odgovora je Å¡irenje entropije u svemiru okrenuo u obrnutom pravcu – red je moguće stvoriti iz haosa (Viner 1948, str. 21, 32-33). U 1948, Viner je izneo svoju novu univerzalnu teoriju u knjizi ispunjenoj stranicama matematiÄ?kih dokaza: “Kibernetika – ili komanda i kontrola u životinji i maÅ¡ini” (Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine).

    Na svoje veliko iznenaÄ‘enje, ovaj nauÄ?nik je napisao bestseler. Prvi put, jedan zajedniÄ?ki skup apstraktnih naÄ?ela povezivao je i prirodne i druÅ¡tvene nauke. Vinerov tekst pružio je moćne metafore za opisivanje haj-tek (hi-tech, visoko-tehnoloÅ¡kog, prim. prev.) sveta Amerike u periodu Hladnog rata. ÄŒak i ako nisu razumeli njegove matematiÄ?ke jednaÄ?ine, Ä?itaoci su lako mogli da prepoznaju kibernetiÄ?ke sisteme u okviru druÅ¡tvenih institucija i mreža komunikacije koje su dominirale njihovim svakodnevnim životom. Povratna sprega, informacije i sistemi ubrzo su postali deo narodnog govora (Konvej/Conway i Sigelman/Siegelman 2005, str. 171-194; Hajms 1991, str. 271-272). Uprkos javnom odobravanju, Viner je ostao autsajder u krugovima ameriÄ?ke inteligencije. Podsmevajući se ideoloÅ¡kom pravoverju Amerike u Hladnom ratu, ovaj guru bio je pacifista i socijalista.

    PoÄ?etkom 1940-ih, Viner – kao i skoro svaki ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nik – verovao je da će Ä?oveÄ?anstvo imati koristi od razvijanja oružja kojima bi se pobedila nacistiÄ?ka NemaÄ?ka. Kada je poÄ?eo Hladni rat, njegove kolege koje je finansirala vojska tvrdile su kako njihov istraživaÄ?ki rad takoÄ‘e doprinosi borbi protiv jednog agresivnog totalitarnog neprijatelja (Luontin 1997). Osporavajući taj patriotski konsenzus, Viner je izneo tezu da bi ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nici trebalo da zauzmu sasvim drugaÄ?iji stav u sukobu sa Rusijom. Upozorio je da bi trka u nuklearnom naoružanju mogla dovesti do uniÅ¡tenja Ä?oveÄ?anstva. SuoÄ?eni sa ovom opasnom novom situacijom, odgovorni nauÄ?nici bi trebalo da odbiju da sprovode vojna istraživanja (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 237-243, 255-271). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, Vinerovo politiÄ?ko otpadniÅ¡tvo nadahnulo je njegovo socijalistiÄ?ko tumaÄ?enje kibernetike. U epohi korporativnih monopola i atomskog oružja, teorija koja objaÅ¡njava ponaÅ¡anje i ljudi i maÅ¡ina mora se upotrebiti kako bi ljudi uspostavili kontrolu nad svojim maÅ¡inama. NapuÅ¡tajući svoje prvobitno oduÅ¡evljenje Tjuringovim proroÄ?anstvom, Viner je sada naglaÅ¡avao opasnosti koje predstavljaju svesni raÄ?unari (Viner 1966, str. 52-60, 1967, str. 239-254). Pre svega, pokuÅ¡aj stvaranja veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije predstavljao je skretanje sa neodložnog zadatka uspostavljanja socijalne pravde i globalnog mira.

    “Svet budućnosti biće jedna sve zahtevnija borba protiv ograniÄ?enja naÅ¡e sopstvene inteligencije, a ne udobna ležaljka na koju se možemo ispružiti da bi nas služili naÅ¡i robovi – roboti.”
    Viner 1966, str. 69.

    Suprotstavljajući se militarizaciji nauÄ?nog istraživanja, osnivaÄ? kibernetike je svoje pokrovitelje iz redova ameriÄ?ke elite doveo u priliÄ?no nezgodnu situaciju. Na sreću po vladare Amerike, na Mejsi konferencijama bio je joÅ¡ jedan briljantan matematiÄ?ar, koji je istovremeno bio i fanatiÄ?an borac u Hladnom ratu: Džon fon Nojman (John von Neumann). Budući traumatizovan nacionalizacijom svoje porodiÄ?ne banke za vreme MaÄ‘arske revolucije iz 1919, njegovi antikomunistiÄ?ki stavovi su bili toliko ekstremni da je sredinom 1940-ih bio zagovornik preventivnog rata kako bi se Rusija spreÄ?ila da napravi nuklearno oružje (Hajms 1980, str. 235-236, 244-251). Dok je igrao glavnu ulogu i u razvoju atomske bombe, Fon Nojman je već primenjivao svoje matematiÄ?ke i organizacione veÅ¡tine u tada novoj oblasti informatike. Kada se 1946. održala prva Mejsi konferencija, njegov tim istraživaÄ?a radio je na izgradnji prototipa mejnfrejm kompjutera za ameriÄ?ku mornaricu (ÄŒeruci/Ceruzzi, 2003, str. 21-4). U Fon Nojmanu, ameriÄ?ka imperija je pronaÅ¡la gurua bez i jednog traga krivoverja.

    Na prvim Mejsi konferencijama, politiÄ?ke razlike meÄ‘u prisutnima nisu bile oÄ?igledne. Ujedinjeni u antifaÅ¡istiÄ?koj borbi, Viner i Fon Nojman mogli su da zastupaju isti koncept kibernetike (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 143-149; Hajns 1980, str. 201-207). MeÄ‘utim, kako su im se politiÄ?ki stavovi razilazili, ove dve zvezde Mejsi konferencija poÄ?ele su da zastupaju suparniÄ?ka tumaÄ?enja te meta-teorije. U svojoj leviÄ?arskoj verziji, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija optužena je kao apoteoza tehnoloÅ¡ke dominacije. Kada je formulisao svoj desniÄ?arski remiks, Fon Nojman je odveo kibernetiku u dijametralno suprotnom pravcu. Pre svega, njegovo tumaÄ?enje podvlaÄ?ilo je Ä?injenicu da je njegova univerzalna teorija nadahnuta proroÄ?anstvom o razumnim maÅ¡inama. Sredinom 1930-ih, Tjuring je kratko radio sa Fon Nojmanom na univerzitetu Prinston. ÄŒitavu deceniju pre no Å¡to je i sam poÄ?eo da se bavi informatikom, maÄ‘arski nauÄ?nik znao je sve o zamisli da se napravi univerzalna maÅ¡ina. Kada su dva Ä?ikaÅ¡ka psihologa poÄ?etkom 1940-ih primenila Tjuringovu teoriju kako bi objasnili procese ljudskog miÅ¡ljenja, Fon Nojman je bio oÄ?aran implikacijama njihovih pretpostavki.

    PoÅ¡to je mehaniÄ?ki raÄ?unar napravljen po modelu ljudskog mozga, Voren Mekalok (Warren McCulloch) i Volter Pits (Walter Pitts) izneli su tezu da je svest isto Å¡to i raÄ?unanje. Poput elektriÄ?nih veza IBM-ovog tabulatora, neuroni su prekidaÄ?i koji prenose informacije u binarnom obliku (Mekalok i Pits 1943). OÄ?aran ovom inverzijom Tjuringove linije argumenta, Fon Nojman je postao uveren da je teorijski moguće napraviti razumnu maÅ¡inu. Ako se neuroni ponaÅ¡aju kao prekidaÄ?i u ljudskom mozgu, ventili bi se mogli upotrebiti kako bi se po istom principu napravio elektronski mozak (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 43-46, 1976, str. 308-311). Dok se bavio raÄ?unarskim istraživanjima za ameriÄ?ku vojsku, Fon Nojman je koristio ljudski mozak kao model za svoju eponimsku kompjutersku arhitekturu. SliÄ?no kao i Tjuring, ovaj prorok je tvrdio da će – kada se broj ventila u raÄ?unaru bude približio broju neurona u mozgu – maÅ¡ina moći da misli (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 36-41, 1976, str. 296-300, 2000, str. 39-52). U roku od decenije, Fon Nojman i njegove kolege opremaće ameriÄ?ku vojsku kibernetiÄ?kim vojnicima sposobnim da se bore u nuklearnom ratu i izvojuju svaku pobedu…

    “Dr Mekalok: Å ta mislite o pravljenju raÄ?unarskih maÅ¡ina tako da ako budu oÅ¡tećene u vazduÅ¡nim napadima… mogu da zamene delove… i nastave sa radom?
    Dr Fon Nojman: To su zaista pre kvantitativna no kvalitativna pitanja.”
    Fon Nojman 1976, str. 324

    Do ranih 1950-ih, ameriÄ?ki akademski svet i korporativni istraživaÄ?ki timovi preoteli su od svojih britanskih takmaca vodeći položaj u informatici. Od tada pa nadalje, sve najnaprednije maÅ¡ine pravile su se u Americi (ÄŒeruci 2003, str. 13-46). Ipak, stvorivÅ¡i kibernetiku bez Vinera, Fon Nojman se postarao da ove ameriÄ?ke laboratorije poÄ‘u Tjuringovim putem ka zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti: kroz izgradnju veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Metafora povratne sprege sada je dokazala da raÄ?unari funkcioniÅ¡u kao ljudi. Inputi informacija vode do autputa delovanja. Ako mozak radi kao maÅ¡ina, onda mora biti moguće razviti maÅ¡inu koja oponaÅ¡a funkcije mozga. Kompjuteri već raÄ?unaju brže od ljudi koji su ih izmislili. Ovladavanje složenostima matematiÄ?ke logike mora biti prvi korak ka opremanju ovih maÅ¡ina novim odlikama ljudske svesti. Jezik je skup pravila koji se može kodifikovati u obliku softvera. UÄ?enje iz novih iskustava može se programirati u hardver (Minski/Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nici su naporno radili na izgradnji misleće maÅ¡ine. Jednom kada bude imao dovoljnu moć obrade podataka, raÄ?unar će postati svestan (Edvards/Edwards, 1996, str. 239-273). Kada je IBM izbacio svoj mejnfrejm System/360 na Svetskom sajmu 1964, delovalo je kao da je Tjuringov san blizu svom ostvarenju.

    Informatika za vreme Hladnog rata

    ÄŒetvrt veka ranije, jedna od zvezda Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939. bio je Elektro (Electro): robot koji je – sudeći po njegovim publicistima – “… umeo da priÄ?a, hoda, broji na prste, pućka cigaretu, i razlikuje crvenu i zelenu boju pomoću fotoelektriÄ?ne ćelije” (Ims i Ims 1973, str. 105). Uprkos svoj svojoj pretvornosti, na ovoj izložbi je prvi put ponovljena zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Pre Svetskog sajma 1939, roboti u knjigama i filmovima gotovo uvek su prikazivani kao frankenÅ¡tajnovska Ä?udoviÅ¡ta koja imaju nameru da uniÅ¡te svoje ljudske stvoritelje (Å elijeva/Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Nadahnut svojim odlascima na izložbu, Isak Asimov (Isaac Asimov) je odluÄ?io da promeni tu negativnu sliku. BaÅ¡ kao i Elektro, roboti iz njegovih nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nih priÄ?a su bezbedni i prijateljski nastrojeni proizvodi jedne velike korporacije (Asimov 1968, 1968a). Kada je 1964. godine otvoren Svetski sajam u Njujorku, ova pozitivna slika veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije već je bila jedna od najpopularnijih zamiÅ¡ljenih budućnosti u Americi. I u nauÄ?noj fantastici i u nauÄ?noj stvarnosti, robot sluga bio je simbol boljih vremena koja će uslediti…

    Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1939, Elektro se nadmetao sa aktuelnom tehnoloÅ¡kom ikonom tog trenutka: automobilom. Zanimljivosti koje se nisu smele propustiti bile su Demokrasiti (Democracity) – maketa izložena u zgradi Perisfera Njujork Stejta (New York State Perisphere) – i Futurama – diorama (Ä?esto “trodimenzionalna” predstava, model ili maketa odreÄ‘enog objekta ili pejzaža, prim. prev.) u paviljonu Dženeral motorsa (General Motors). Obe izložbe promovisale su viziju bogate i haj-tek Amerike 1960-ih. U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti, najveći deo stanovniÅ¡tva živi u porodiÄ?nim domovima u predgraÄ‘u i na posao odlazi vlastitim automobilom (publikacije sa izložbe/Exposition Publications 1939, str. 42-45, 207-209). Za najveći broj posetilaca Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939, ovo proroÄ?anstvo potroÅ¡aÄ?kog blagostanja zasigurno je delovalo kao utopijski san. AmeriÄ?ka ekonomija i dalje se oporavljala od najgore recesije u istoriji zemlje, Evropa je bila na rubu novog razornog graÄ‘anskog rata a istoÄ?na Azija već u vrtlogu smrtonosnih sukoba. No, kada se otvorio Svetski sajam 1964, najÄ?uvenije predviÄ‘anje sa izložbe 1939. već je bilo ostvareno. Koliko god da su posetioci bili podozrivi 1939, dvadeset godina kasnije, diorame Demokrasiti i Futurama delovale su izuzetno dalekovido. Do ranih 1960-ih, Amerika je postala potroÅ¡aÄ?ko druÅ¡tvo koje živi u predgraÄ‘u i poseduje kola. ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost postala je savremena stvarnost.

    “Automobil… upravlja celokupnim [druÅ¡tvenim] ponaÅ¡anjem, od ekonomije do govora. Protok saobraćaja je jedna od glavnih funkcija druÅ¡tva… Prostor [u gradskim oblastima] osmiÅ¡ljava se u skladu sa automobilistiÄ?kim potrebama, a saobraćajni problemi imaju veću važnost od smeÅ¡taja… Ä?injenica je da je za mnoÅ¡tvo ljudi auto možda i najvažniji deo njihovih ‘životnih prilika’.”
    Lefebr/Lefebvre, 1984, str. 100

    Budući da su se predviÄ‘anja sa izložbe iz 1939. u velikoj meri ostvarila, posetiocima Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964. moglo se oprostiti Å¡to su poverovali da će se njegove tri glavne zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti takoÄ‘e ostvariti. Ko je mogao sumnjati u to da će – najkasnije do 1990. godine – većina Amerikanaca uživati u blagodetima svemirskog turizma i besplatne elektriÄ?ne energije? A ono Å¡to je najbolje od svega, živeće u svetu gde će im svesne maÅ¡ine biti verne sluge. MeÄ‘utim, vera ameriÄ?ke javnosti u te zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti zasnivala se na pogreÅ¡nom osećaju kontinuiteta. Uprkos tome Å¡to je održan na istom mestu i Å¡to je na njemu uÄ?estvovalo mnogo istih izlagaÄ?a, Svetski sajam iz 1964. bio je usredsreÄ‘en na neÅ¡to sasvim drugo od njegovog prethodnika iz 1939. Dvadeset pet godina ranije, glavni eksponat na izložbi bio je automobil: potroÅ¡aÄ?ki proizvod masovne proizvodnje. Za razliku od njega, zvezde izložbe na Svetskom sajmu 1964. bile su tehnologije subvencionisane od strane države, a za potrebe voÄ‘enja Hladnog rata. Kompjuteri su izraÄ?unavali putanje kojima će se ameriÄ?ke rakete naoružane nuklearnim bombama kretati kako bi uniÅ¡tavale ruske gradove i njihove nesrećne stanovnike (Ajzeks/Isaacs i Dauling/Dowling 1998, str. 230-243). Ako je reprezentativni objekat na njegovom prethodniku iz 1939. bio motorizovani prevoz za mase, zvezde Svetskog sajma 1964. su bile maÅ¡ine atomskog armagedona.

    Dok je osmiÅ¡ljavala svoj paviljon, korporacija IBM je morala da se pozabavi sa ovim problemom u odnosima sa javnošću. Nalik nuklearnim reaktorima i svemirskim raketama, i raÄ?unari su razvijani kao oružja za Hladni rat. ENIAC – prvi prototipski mejnfrejm napravljen u Americi – bio je maÅ¡ina za izraÄ?unavanje tabela kako bi se poboljÅ¡ala preciznost artiljerijskih topova (ÄŒeruci 2003, str. 15). Od ranih 1950-ih pa nadalje, IBM-ov raÄ?unarski odsek bio je usredsreÄ‘en na dobijanje narudžbi od Ministarstva odbrane (Pju/Pugh, 1995, str. 167-172). Koristeći mejnfrejmove nabavljene od ove korporacije, ameriÄ?ka vojska se spremala za nuklearni rat, pripremala invazije na “neprijateljske2 zemlje, upravljala bombardovanjem neprijateljskih meta, isplaćivala plate svojim trupama, vodila složene ratne igre i rukovodila lancem snabdevanja (Berkli/Berkeley 1962, str. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Zahvaljujući ameriÄ?kim poreskim obveznicima, IBM je postao tehnoloÅ¡ki lider raÄ?unarske industrije.

    Kada se 1964. otvorio Svetski sajam u Njujorku, IBM je i dalje bio tesno povezan sa mnogo razliÄ?itih vojnih projekata. Ipak, paviljon te korporacije je bio posvećen promovisanju nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne maÅ¡tarije o razumnim maÅ¡inama. Kao i u sluÄ?aju predviÄ‘anja o besplatnoj energiji i svemirskom turizmu, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije onemogućavala je posetiocima Svetskog sajma da otkriju pravi motiv za izgradnju IBM-ovih mejnfrejmova: ubijanje miliona ruskih civila. Iako je imperijalna hegemonija supersila zavisila od atomskog oružja, njegovo posedovanje postajalo je sve problematiÄ?nije usled pretnje od sveopÅ¡teg uniÅ¡tenja. Dve godine ranije, SAD i Rusija umalo nisu greÅ¡kom uÅ¡le u katastrofalan rat oko Kube (Dalek/Dallek, 2003, str. 535-574). Uprkos tome Å¡to je propast za dlaku izbegnuta, supersile nisu bile sposobne da prekinu trku u naoružanju. U bizarnoj logici Hladnog rata, predupreÄ‘ivanje totalnog sukoba izmeÄ‘u dva bloka zavisilo je od neprestanog povećanja broja nuklearnih glava koje obe strane poseduju. Vladajućim elitama SAD i Rusije bilo je teÅ¡ko da priznaju sebi – a kamoli svojim graÄ‘anima – duboku iracionalnost te nove vrste vojnog nadmetanja. U retkom trenutku lucidnosti, ameriÄ?ki analitiÄ?ari izmislili su ironiÄ?nu skraćenicu za tu visokoriziÄ?nu strategiju “uzajamnog sigurnog uniÅ¡tenja”: MAD (skraćeno od Mutually Assured Destruction:, na engleskom “mad” znaÄ?i, otprilike, “ludilo”, uglavnom u nasilnom ili agresivnom obliku, prim. prev.) (Ajzeks i Dauling/Dowling, 1998. str. 230-243; Kan/Kahn 1960, str. 119-189).

    OÄ?ekivano, propagandisti sa obe strane opravdavali su ogromno traćenje sredstava na trku u naoružanju promovisanjem mirnodopske primene vodećih tehnologija primenjenih u Hladnom ratu. Do otvaranja Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964, oružje genocida uspeÅ¡no je prepakovano u proizvode korisne za ljude. Nuklearna sila uskoro će svima obezbeÄ‘ivati besplatnu elektriÄ?nu energiju. Svemirske rakete ubrzo će voziti turiste na godiÅ¡nje odmore na Mesecu. Nestali su gotovo svi tragovi vojnog porekla tih tehnologija. SliÄ?no, u IBM-ovom paviljonu, mejnfrejm System/360 promovisan je kao preteÄ?a veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Od posetilaca se oÄ?ekivalo da se dive tehnoloÅ¡kim dostignućima korporacije i da ne preispituju njenu sumnjivu ulogu u proizvodnji naoružanja. Užasi tekućeg Hladnog rata bili su skriveni Ä?udesima zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti. IBM-ov ideoloÅ¡ki trik umnogome je olakÅ¡ala jedna od osobenih crta industrijske modernosti: kidanje eksplicitnih veza izmeÄ‘u proizvoda i njihovih proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a. Hiljadama godina, ratnici i sveÅ¡tenici otvoreno su od seljaÅ¡tva izvlaÄ?ili njihove proizvodne viÅ¡kove radi sopstvene koristi. MeÄ‘utim, kada su Evropljani poÄ?eli da privatizuju vlasniÅ¡tvo nad zemljiÅ¡tem i mehanizuju ruÄ?nu proizvodnju, rodio se jedan novi – i napredniji – ekonomski sistem: liberalni kapitalizam. Preduzetnici su dokazali da se, konkurentnošću cena, ljudskim radom posredno može daleko delotvornije upravljati nego neposrednim metodama feudalizma. Pustolovi su otkrili da je prodavanje robe na svetskom tržiÅ¡tu daleko unosnije od nametanja otimaÄ?ke najamnine zemljoradnicima na jednoj ograniÄ?enoj teritoriji. Prvi put u ljudskoj istoriji ostvarivao se proizvodni potencijal kolektivnog rada (Smit/Smith 1976, str. 1-287; 401-445; Marks/Marx 1976, str. 762-940).

    U toj novoj ekonomiji od ljudi se zahtevalo da meÄ‘usobno komuniciraju putem stvari: robe, novca i kapitala. Podela rada u Ä?itavoj ekonomiji regulisala se cenama i platama koje je odreÄ‘ivala konkurencija na tržiÅ¡tu. MeÄ‘utim, kraj aristokratije i sveÅ¡tenstva nije okonÄ?ao klasnu vladavinu. Kada se rad kupuje i prodaje u kapitalistiÄ?koj ekonomiji, jednakost na tržiÅ¡tu vodi do nejednakosti na radnom mestu (Marks 1976, str. 270-280; Rubin 1972, str. 77-253). PoÅ¡to se roba razmenjivala za drugu robu iste vrednosti, ovaj novi oblik klasne vladavine bio je umnogome drugaÄ?iji od onoga koji mu je prethodio. Neposredno vladanje zamenjeno je posrednim izrabljivanjem. I, pre svega, sudbinu pojedinaca sada je odreÄ‘ivalo bezliÄ?no kretanje tržiÅ¡ta. Svetom viÅ¡e nisu vladali ljudi, već stvari.

    “To znaÄ?i da se tajanstvenost robnog oblika sastoji prosto u tome Å¡to on ljudima druÅ¡tvene karaktere njihovog sopstvenog rada odražava kao karaktere koji objektivno pripadaju samim proizvodima rada, kao druÅ¡tvena svojstva koja te stvari imaju od prirode, a otuda im (se) i druÅ¡tveni odnos proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a prema celokupnom radu odražava kao druÅ¡tveni odnos koji izvan i nezavisno od proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a postoji meÄ‘u predmetima.”
    Marks 1976, str. 164-165

    Razvoj kapitalizma stvorio je mnogo složeniju podelu rada unutar ekonomije. Uporedo sa povećanjem broja radnih mesta u fabrikama i kancelarijama, nauÄ?no istraživanje se takoÄ‘e izdvojilo kao zaseban poziv (Bar/Bahr 1980; Smit 1976, str. 7-16). UspeÅ¡na preduzeća rasla su ne samo tako Å¡to su zapoÅ¡ljavala joÅ¡ radnika, već i ulažući u novu maÅ¡ineriju. U fetiÅ¡izovanom svetu kapitalizma, rast produktivnosti prouzrokovan sve prefinjenijom saradnjom rada i fabrici i nauÄ?nog istraživanja je bio izražen kroz razvoj najsavremenijih tehnologija. Sa ljudskom kreativnošću skrivenom iza robe, proces modernizacije dobio je kao svoj subjekat jedan izuzetno vidljiv objekat: “… automatski sistem maÅ¡inerije… pokretaÄ?ku snagu koja pokreće samu sebe.” (Marks 1973, str. 692)

    Sredinom dvadesetog veka, fetiÅ¡izacija tehnologije dostigla je svoju apoteozu u proroÄ?anstvu o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji. Za ljude koji su živeli u druÅ¡tvu u kojem je nova maÅ¡inerija naoko bila pokretaÄ?ka snaga druÅ¡tvene evolucije, Tjuringova i Fon Nojmanova tvrdnja da maÅ¡ine evoluiraju u živa bića nije delovala neobiÄ?no. Kada raÄ?unari vrÅ¡e svoje operacije, rad uložen u razvoj njihovog hardvera i pisanje njihovih programa nije neposredno vidljiv. OÄ?arani tehnoloÅ¡kim fetiÅ¡izmom, obožavatelji Tjuringa i Fon Nojmana ubedili su sebe da će elektronski mozak ubrzo moći da misli kao i ljudski mozak. U 1964-toj, raÄ?unarska moć mejnfrejma System/360 je bila toliko velika da se Ä?inilo kao da je ta IBM-ova maÅ¡ina na pragu svesnosti. Tvorevina je trebalo da postane stvoritelj.

    KibernetiÄ?ka nadmoć

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti privremeno su uspele da od ameriÄ?ke javnosti prikriju osnovni cilj svoje tri ikoniÄ?ne tehnologije. Ali, Ä?ak ni najbriljantnije opsenarsko umeće nije moglo veÄ?no da krije njihove lažne upotrebne vrednosti. Kako su decenije proticale, nijedno od predviÄ‘anja o kljuÄ?nim tehnologijama iz Hladnog rata datih na Svetskom sajmu se nije ostvarilo. ElektriÄ?na energija se i dalje naplaćivala, turisti nisu posećivali Mesec, a raÄ?unari joÅ¡ uvek nisu postali razumni. Za razliku od dalekovide vizije automobila za mase na Svetskom sajmu iz 1939, proroÄ?anstva o Ä?uvenim tehnologijama sa izložbe iz 1964. delovala su gotovo besmisleno dvadeset pet godina kasnije. Hiper-realnost se sudarila sa realnošću – i izgubila bitku.

    Uprkos neuspehu svog proroÄ?anstva, IBM nije pretrpeo nikakvu Å¡tetu. Za razliku od nuklearne energije i putovanja u svemir, informatika je bila hladnoratovska tehnologija koja je uspeÅ¡no pobegla iz konteksta Hladnog rata. Od samog poÄ?etka, maÅ¡ine koje su se pravile za ameriÄ?ku vojsku prodavale su se i profesionalnoj klijenteli (Pju 1995, str. 152-155). Kada je IBM izgradio svoj paviljon za Svetski sajam 1964, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije morala je da Ä?uva u tajnosti viÅ¡e od sumnjive primene informatike u vojne svrhe. FetiÅ¡izam robe takoÄ‘e je odigrao svoju klasiÄ?nu ulogu skrivanja ljudkog rada u procesu proizvodnje. RaÄ?unari su opisivani kao “razumni” kako bi se zanemario naporan rad uložen u njihovo projektovanje, graÄ‘enje, programiranje i rukovanje. Iznad svega, proroÄ?anstvo o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sakrilo je ulogu tehnoloÅ¡kih inovacija u okviru ameriÄ?kih radnih mesta. Pronalazak raÄ?unara odigrao se u pravi Ä?as za krupan biznis. Tokom prve polovine dvadesetog veka, velike korporacije postale su dominantne institucije ameriÄ?ke ekonomije. Divovska fabrika automobila Henrija Forda (Henry Ford) postala je eponimni simbol nove druÅ¡tvene paradigme: fordizma (Ford i Krouter/Crowther 1922; Aljeta/Aglietta 1979). Kada im je to uvećavalo zaradu, korporacije su zamenjivale posredno regulisanje proizvodnje putem tržiÅ¡ta neposrednim nadzorom preko birokrata. Kako su plate kancelarijskih službenika postojano rasle, preduzećima je bilo potrebno sve viÅ¡e opreme kako bi se podigla produktivnost na radnom mestu. Mnogo pre pronalaska raÄ?unara, fordistiÄ?ke korporacije vodile su informatiÄ?ku ekonomiju uz pomoć tabulatora, pisaćih maÅ¡ina i drugih vrsta kancelarijske opreme (Benidžer/Beniger, 1986, str. 291-425). MeÄ‘utim, do poÄ?etka 1950-ih, mehanizacija u administraciji se zaustavila. Povećanje produktivnosti u kancelariji dobrano je zaostajalo za povećanjem produktivnosti u fabrici. Kada su se na tržiÅ¡tu pojavili prvi raÄ?unari, upravnici korporacija brzo su uvideli da nova tehnologija nudi reÅ¡enje za taj urgentan problem (Sobel 1981, str. 95-184). Posao velikog broja operatera tabulatora sada je mogla obavljati mnogo manja grupa inženjera uz pomoć mejnfrejm kompjutera (Berkli 1962, str. 5). JoÅ¡ i bolje, nove informatiÄ?ke tehnologije omogućavale su kapitalistima da prodube kontrolu nad svojim organizacijama. Mnogo viÅ¡e informacija o mnogo viÅ¡e tema sada je moglo da se sakuplja i obraÄ‘uje na sve složenije naÄ?ine. Upravnici su bili gospodari svega Å¡to su mogli da drže na oku.

    Maltene od svog prvog pojavljivanja na radnom mestu, mejnfrejm je – sa dobrim razlogom – karikiran kao mehaniÄ?ko savrÅ¡enstvo birokratske tiranije. U nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nim priÄ?ama Isaka Asimova, gospodin i gospoÄ‘a ProseÄ?ni bili su ponosni vlasnici sluge-robota. Ali, kada su prvi raÄ?unari stigli u ameriÄ?ke fabrike i kancelarije, tom novom tehnologijom upravljali su Å¡efovi, a ne radnici. U 1952, Kurt Vonegat (Kurt Vonnegut) je objavio nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ni roman koji je satirizovao autoritarne ambicije korporativne informatike. U njegovoj antiutopijskoj budućnosti, vladajuća elita poverila je upravljanje druÅ¡tvom sveznajućoj veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji.

    “EPIKAK XIV… odluÄ?ivao je koliko od svega Amerika i njene muÅ¡terije mogu dobiti i koliko će ih to stajati. I… odluÄ?ivaće koliko će inženjera i upravnika i… državnih službenika, i kakvih veÅ¡tina, biti potrebno da se roba isporuÄ?i; i koji će koeficijent inteligencije i nivo sposobnosti deliti korisne muÅ¡karce [i žene] od onih beskorisnih, i koliko se zaposlenih… može izdržavati na odreÄ‘enom nivou plate…”
    Vonegat, 1969, str. 106

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, IBM-ov paviljon obećavao je da će razumne maÅ¡ine biti sluge Ä?itavog Ä?oveÄ?anstva. A ipak, u isto vreme, njihove službe za prodaju su objaÅ¡njavale Å¡efovima velikih korporacija kako raÄ?unari uvode birokratsku vlast u savremeno druÅ¡tvo. Herbert Sajmon (Herbert Simon) – jedan od vodećih ameriÄ?kih teoretiÄ?ara upravljanja i nekadaÅ¡nji Fon Nojmanov kolega – predvideo je da će sve veća moć mejnfrejmova omogućiti preduzećima da automatizuju sve viÅ¡e i viÅ¡e administrativnih zadataka. Upravo kao u fabrici, i u kancelariji maÅ¡ine preuzimaju posao od ljudske radne snage. Sa pojavom veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije, mejnfrejmovi će bezmalo sasvim zameniti birokratsku i tehniÄ?ku radnu snagu u okviru proizvodnje. Krajnji cilj je stvaranje potpuno automatizovanog radnog mesta. Preduzećima tada viÅ¡e neće biti potrebni ni fiziÄ?ki ni kancelarijski radnici koji bi pravili proizvode ili pružali usluge. ÄŒak će i sami upravnici većinom postati ‘viÅ¡ak’. Umesto njih, ameriÄ?kim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljaće razumne maÅ¡ine (Sajmon 1965, str. 26-52). U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije, korporacija i raÄ?unar biće jedno isto. Ovo predviÄ‘anje temeljilo se na Fon Nojmanovom konzervativnom tumaÄ?enju kibernetike. U svojim tekstovima o teoriji upravljanja, Sajmon je izneo tezu da rad u jednom preduzeću nalikuje operacijama raÄ?unara. Kao i u psihologiji Mekaloka i Pitsa (McCulloch i Pitts), ovo poistovećivanje bilo je dvosmerno. Upravljanje radnicima izjednaÄ?avano je sa programiranjem raÄ?unara. Pisanje softvera bilo je nalik sastavljanju poslovnog plana. I zaposlenima i maÅ¡inerijom upravljalo se nareÄ‘enjima izdatim odozgo. RadniÄ?ka antiutopija ‘Veliki Brat’ superkompjutera je mutirala u kapitalistiÄ?ku utopiju kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma. IroniÄ?no, verodostojnost Sajmonove ideologije upravljanja zavisila je od toga hoće li njegovi Ä?itaoci zaboraviti žestoke kritike koje je na raÄ?un korporativne informatike izneo sam utemeljivaÄ? teorije sistema. Pozivajući se na Marksa, Viner je upozoravao da je osnovna uloga nove tehnologije pod kapitalizmom intenziviranje izrabljivanja radnika. Umesto da stvori viÅ¡e slobodnog vremena i poboljÅ¡a životne standarde, kompjuterizacija ekonomije će pod fordizmom povećati nezaposlenost i smanjiti plate (Viner 1967, str. 206-221). Da bi se izbegla Vonegatova antiutopija, ameriÄ?ki sindikalisti i politiÄ?ki aktivisti moraju se mobilisati protiv korporativnog Golema (Viner 1966, str. 54-55). U skladu sa Vinerom, kibernetika je dokazala kako veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija predstavlja pretnju za ljudske slobode.

    „Ne zaboravimo da je automatska maÅ¡ina… precizan ekvivalent robovske radne snage. Svaka radna snaga koja se nadmeće sa robovskom mora prihvatiti ekonomske uslove robovske radne snage.“
    Viner 1967, str. 220

    Za poslovne rukovodioce, Vonegatova i Vinerova noćna mora bila je njihov raÄ?unarski san na javi. MeÄ‘utim, ova korporativna vizija kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma znaÄ?ila je zaboravljanje istorije samog fordizma. Ova ekonomska paradigma zasnivala se na uspeÅ¡noj koordinaciji masovne proizvodnje sa masovnom potroÅ¡njom. IroniÄ?no, budući da su bile u većoj meri povezane sa druÅ¡tvenom realnošću, izložbe Demokrasiti i Futurama iz 1939. pružile su daleko taÄ?nije predviÄ‘anje razvojnog puta informatike nego Å¡to je to uÄ?inio IBM-ov paviljon iz 1964. BaÅ¡ kao i automobili dvadeset pet godina ranije, ova nova tehnologija polako se preobražavala iz retke, ruÄ?no pravljene maÅ¡ine u sveprisutnu robu masovno proizvedenu u fabrici. Isto kao i u Fordovim fabrikama, IBM-ovi mejnfrejmovi sastavljali su se na pokretnim trakama (Pju, Džonson/Johnson i Palmer 1991, str. 87-105, 204-210). Ti prvi koraci ka masovnoj proizvodnji raÄ?unara predvideli su ono Å¡to će biti najvažniji pomak u ovom sektoru dvadeset pet godina kasnije: masovnu potroÅ¡nju raÄ?unara. Po svojem spoljaÅ¡njem obliku, mejnfrejm System/360 iz 1964. je bio nezgrapan i skup prototip mnogo sitnijeg i jeftinijeg IBM-ovog PC-ja iz 1989.

    ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije bila je naÄ?in da se izbegne razmiÅ¡ljanje o verovatnim druÅ¡tvenim posledicama Å¡iroko rasprostranjenog posedovanja raÄ?unara. Ranih 1960-ih, superkompjuter tipa ‘Veliki Brat’ je pripadao moćnoj vladi i krupnom biznisu. Pre svega, povratna sprega je bila znanje onih nad kojima se vlada, monopolizovano od strane vladara. MeÄ‘utim, kao Å¡to je istakao Viner, fordistiÄ?ka proizvodnja će skupe mejnfrejmove neminovno pretvoriti u jeftinu robu (Viner 1967, str. 210-211). Zauzvrat, sve rasprostranjenije posedovanje raÄ?unara verovatno će poremetiti postojeći druÅ¡tveni poredak. Jer je povratna sprega informacija u okviru ljudskih institucija najdelotvornija kada je dvosmerna (Viner 1967, str. 67-73). Ponovnim povezivanjem zamisli i izvrÅ¡enja, kibernetiÄ?ki fordizam je podrivao druÅ¡tvene hijerarhije koje su bile osnova samog fordizma.

    “… prosta koegzistencija dve jedinice infomacije relativno je male vrednosti, psim ako se te dve jedinice ne mogu uspeÅ¡no kombinovati u nekom umu… koji je sposoban da jednu oplodi pomoću druge. Ovo je upravo suprotno od organizacije u kojoj svaki Ä?lan prelazi unapred odreÄ‘eni put…”
    Viner 1967, str. 172

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, ta mogućnost definitivno nije bila deo IBM-ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti. Pre nego da za cilj ima proizvodnju sve većeg broja sve efikasnijih maÅ¡ina po nižim cenama, korporacija je bila usredsreÄ‘ena na stabilno povećavanje sposobnosti svojih raÄ?unara kako bi saÄ?uvala svoj skoro potpuni monopol nad vojnim i korporativnim tržiÅ¡tem. Umesto da se maÅ¡ine veliÄ?ine sobe smanjuju i vremenom postaju stoni raÄ?unari, laptopovi i, naposletku, mobilni telefoni, IBM je bio uveren da će raÄ?unari zauvek ostati krupni i nezgrapni mejnfrejmovi. Korporacija je iz sve snage verovala da će – ukoliko taj put tehnoloÅ¡kog razvoja bude ekstrapoliran – rezultat sasvim sigurno biti veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija. I, najvažnije, ovaj konzervativni oporavak kibernetike je podrazumevao da će svesne maÅ¡ine neizbežno evoluirati u oblike života naprednije od obiÄ?nih ljudi. FordistiÄ?ko razdvajanje izmeÄ‘u ideje i izvrÅ¡enja bi dostiglo svoju tehnoloÅ¡ku apoteozu.

    OÄ?ekivano, IBM je bio reÅ¡en da se usprotivi tom uznemirujućem tumaÄ?enju sopstvene futuristiÄ?ke propagande. Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, paviljon korporacije je isticao utopijske mogućnosti informatike. Ipak, i upkros svojim najvećim naporima, IBM nije mogao da u potpunosti izbegne dvosmislenost sadržanu u zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Ta fetiÅ¡izovana ideologija mogla je biti privlaÄ?na svim slojevima ameriÄ?kog druÅ¡tva samo u sluÄ?aju da će raÄ?unari ispunjavati najdublje želje obe strane na radnom mestu. Stoga je IBM, na izložbama u svom paviljonu, promovisao jednu jedinu viziju zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti, viziju koja je objedinjavala dva nepomirljiva tumaÄ?enja veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Sa jedne strane, radnicima se govorilo da će sve njihove potrebe zadovoljavati razumne maÅ¡ine-roboti: sluge koje se nikada ne umaraju, ne žale i ne dovode nareÄ‘enja u pitanje. Sa druge strane, kapitalistima se obećavalo da će njihovim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljati razumne maÅ¡ine-roboti: proizvoÄ‘aÄ?i koji nikada ne zabuÅ¡avaju, ne izražavaju miÅ¡ljenje i ne Å¡trajkuju. Robot Robi viÅ¡e se nije mogao razlikovati od EPIKAK-a XIV. Iako tek na nivou ideologije, IBM je pomirio klasne podele u Americi 1960-ih. U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti, radnici viÅ¡e neće morati da rade, a poslodavcima viÅ¡e neće biti potrebni nameÅ¡tenici. NauÄ?nofantastiÄ?na maÅ¡tarija o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji uspeÅ¡no je omela ljude u pokuÅ¡aju da preispitaju posledice uvoÄ‘enja informatike na radnom mestu. Posle posete IBM-ovom paviljonu na Svetskom sajmu 1964, bilo je suviÅ¡e lako poverovati da će svi biti na dobitku jednom kada maÅ¡ine dobiju svest…

    Izmišljanje novih budućnosti

    ÄŒetrdeset godina kasnije, joÅ¡ Ä?ekamo na zamiÅ¡ljenu budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. U meÄ‘uvremenu, neprestano su nam obećavali njen neposredni dolazak. Ipak, uprkos stalnim pomacima u razvoju hardvera i softvera, maÅ¡ine i dalje nisu sposobne da “misle”. Likovi u video-igrama i dalje predstavljaju neÅ¡to najbliže veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sa Ä?ime se većina ljudi susrela. MeÄ‘utim, kao Å¡to pokazuje rastuća popularnost igranja na Internetu, gde ljudi i dalje igraju jedni protiv drugih, virtuelni protivnik je slaba zamena za ljudskog igraÄ?a. Kada se osvrnemo na istoriju ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti, oÄ?igledno je da se ni optimistiÄ?ka ni pesimistiÄ?ka verzija veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije nisu ostvarile. Robot Robi nije naÅ¡ verni sluga, a EPIKAK XIV ne upravlja naÅ¡im životima. Umesto da se razviju u razumne maÅ¡ine, raÄ?unari su postali potroÅ¡aÄ?ka roba. Mejnfrejmovi veliÄ?ine sobe nastavljaju da se smanjuju u sve sitnije i sitnije maÅ¡ine. U savremenom svetu raÄ?unari su svugde – a njihovi korisnici itekako znaju da su oni i dalje glupi.

    Ovi ponovljeni neuspesi bi, oÄ?ekivano, trebalo da su nepovratno naruÅ¡ili ugled zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Ipak, njeni zagovornici nemaju griže savesti. ÄŒetiri decenije posle Svetskog sajma 1964, IBM i dalje tvrdi da su njihove maÅ¡ine na pragu toga da postanu svesne (Bel/Bell 2004, str. 2). Upornost ove nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne fantazije pokazuje trajnu važnost Fon Nojmanovog konzervativnog pripajanja kibernetike raÄ?unarskoj industriji. Kao i ranih 1960-ih, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija i dalje pruža sjajan alibi za razvoj novih vojnih tehnologija. Stvaranje Singularnosti deluje daleko prijateljskije od saraÄ‘ivanja sa ameriÄ?kim imperijalizmom. A Å¡to je joÅ¡ važnije, ova zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost nastavlja da prikriva posledice uvoÄ‘enja informatike na radno mesto. I upravnicima i radnicima i dalje se obećavaju tehnoloÅ¡ka reÅ¡enja za druÅ¡tveno-ekonomske probleme. San o svesnim maÅ¡inama je mnogo bolji medijski materijal od realnosti kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma. Na poÄ?etku 21. veka, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija ostaje dominantna ideoloÅ¡ka manifestacija (velikog) obećanja informatike.

    Verodostojnost ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti zavisi od zaboravljanja njene sramotne istorije. Osvrt na to kako su ranije verzije proroÄ?anstva iznova i iznova diskreditovane podstiÄ?e duboki skepticizam po pitanju njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. NaÅ¡a liÄ?na frustriranost raÄ?unarskom tehnologijom bi trebalo da pokaže koliko je mala verovatnoća da se ona pretvori u Silicijumskog mesiju. ÄŒetrdeset godina posle Svetskog sajma u Njujorku, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija je postala zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost iz davne proÅ¡losti. Ono Å¡to nam umesto toga sada treba jeste daleko prefinjenija analiza potencijala informatike. Viner – ne Fon Nojman – mora biti naÅ¡ kibernetiÄ?ki guru. ProuÄ?avanje istorije bi trebalo da nas pouÄ?i kako da iznova izmislimo budućnost. Mesijanski misticizam se mora zameniti pragmatiÄ?nim materijalizmom. Pre svega, ta nova slika budućnosti bi trebalo da slavi raÄ?unare kao oruÄ‘a za uvećavanje ljudske inteligencije i kreativnosti. VeliÄ?anje hijerarhija kontrole mora se zameniti zagovaranjem dvosmernog deljenja informacija. Budimo nadahnuti i strastveni u zamiÅ¡ljanju naÅ¡ih sopstvenih vizija boljih vremena koja će uslediti (Barbruk/Barbrook i Å ulc/Shultz 1997; Barbruk 2000).

    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    Argumenti u ovom Ä?lanku dalje se razvijaju u knjizi RiÄ?arda Barbruka ZamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti: od razumnih maÅ¡ina do globalnog sela, Pluto, London 2007. ViÅ¡e tekstova i ažurirane informacije na adresi: www.imaginaryfutures.net
    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

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    Simon, H. (1965) The Shape of Automation for Men and Management, New York: Harper.
    Sobel, R. (1981) IBM: colossus in transition, New York: Truman Talley.
    Smith, A. (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Volume 1 & Volume 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Stanton, J. (2004) ‘Best of the World’s Fair’.
    Stanton, J. (2004a) ‘Building the 1964 World’s Fair’.
    Startrek.com (2005), ‘Data’.
    Stern, R., Mellins, T. and Fishman, D. (1997) New York 1960: architecture and urbanism between the Second World War and the Bicentennial, Köln: Benedikt Taschen.
    Turing, A., (2004) ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’ in B. J. Copeland (ed.), The Essential Turing: seminal writings in computing, logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence and artificial life plus the secrets of the Enigma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 58-90.
    Turing, A., (2004a) ‘Lecture on the Automatic Computing Engine’ in B. J. Copeland (ed.), The Essential Turing: seminal writings in computing, logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence and artificial life plus the secrets of the Enigma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 378-394.
    Turing, A., (2004b) ‘Intelligent Machinery’ in B. J. Copeland (ed.), The Essential Turing: seminal writings in computing, logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence and artificial life plus the secrets of the Enigma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 410-432.
    Turing, A., (2004c) ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ in B. J. Copeland (ed.), The Essential Turing: seminal writings in computing, logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence and artificial life plus the secrets of the Enigma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 433-464.
    Turing, A., (2004d) ‘Intelligent Machinery, a Heretical Theory’ in B. J. Copeland (ed.), The Essential Turing: seminal writings in computing, logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence and artificial life plus the secrets of the Enigma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 472-475.
    Turing, A., (2004e) ‘Can Digital Computers Think?’ in B. J. Copeland (ed.), The Essential Turing: seminal writings in computing, logic, philosophy, artificial intelligence and artificial life plus the secrets of the Enigma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 482-486.
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    Wiener, N. (1948) Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine, New York: John Wiley.
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    Wilcox, F. (dir.) (1999) Forbidden Planet, Turner Entertainment.

  • Imaginary Futures – Introduction to the Polish edition

    I was sitting in a lecture theatre at University College London listening to the speakers at the final session of the Solidarity/solidarities conference on the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Jan Dzierzgowski had worked hard on this translation and I owed it to him to write a smart introduction for its Polish readers. Where better to find inspiration than at this retrospective look at the demise of the Cold War? Imaginary Futures is a book about the political and cultural impact of the technological prophecies which emerged from this geopolitical confrontation. Computers and the Net are much more than useful tools. For over half a century, they have also embodied utopian dreams in the service of imperial ambition. During the Cold War, the American and Russian empires competed not only to control space, but also to own time. The nation that was pioneering the future in the present could claim leadership over the peoples of the world. The Berlin Wall might have fallen and the Russian troops have returned home, but this technological determinist ideology has proved to be remarkably persistent. The cheerleaders of neo-liberal globalisation have spent the past two decades pointing out American predominance over the computer industry and the Net – and then ordering the rest of the humanity to adopt their socio-economic panaceas of US-style privatisation, deregulation and financial speculation. By painstakingly explaining the history of the imaginary futures of artificial intelligence and the information society, my aim is to equip the readers of this book with the knowledge to refute this passé argument. The next time that someone tells you that the post-industrial utopia is just around the corner, you can reply that this prediction is nothing more than recycled McLuhanism. The Cold War is over – and so are its made-in-America imaginary futures.

    If I needed confirmation of this book’s relevance, I could find it in the air of melancholy at the Solidarity/solidarities conference. This event was being held to mark the 20th anniversary of the wonderful historical moment when the Stalinist monopoly over political power was breached for the first time: the 4th June 1989 multi-party elections to the Polish parliament. Within a few months, the old order was being swept away across Eastern Europe – and decades of mendacity and oppression had come to an end. Yet, as I sat in the lecture theatre, the closing session of this conference seemed to be as much a memorial service for frustrated aspirations as a celebration of revolutionary victories. One Polish member of the audience ruefully admitted that he and his compatriots now enjoyed that greatest of European privileges: being able to complain in public about how dreadful everything was. The excitement of 1989’s ‘springtime of the nations’ seemed like a distant memory when the region was being battered by the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. Adding to the misery, its governments were still in thrall to the ideological choices that had been made during the transition to national independence and political pluralism. Neo-liberal economic policies didn’t just mark the break with the impoverished Russian empire, but also a commitment to American post-industrial modernity. The new elites of ‘new Europe’ had made the mistake of swapping one Cold War superpower’s imaginary future for that of the other. While I was listening to the downbeat discussion at the Solidarity/solidarities conference, I cast my mind back to when I first realised that our continent was on the brink of a momentous upheaval. The implosion of the Russian empire might have been a big surprise to expert opinion in the West, but it wasn’t to me. A Polish leftie had predicted what would happen in 1984 – and the opinions of someone who is on the side of the workers are always more credible than those who only think what is allowed to be thought. Trust your own, that’s what I say.

    “It’s all over, you know. No one believes in the system. Not the workers, not the peasants, not even the bureaucrats.” Elcia was a Solidarnösc activist who had fled to London after the 1981 military coup. We’d first met when she and her friends were making a programme for their fellow refugees on Our Radio: 103.8FM. They would knock on the door of the house in Kilburn where the studio of this pirate station was based and proudly announce that the “mad Poles” had arrived to do their show. Yet, beneath this bravado, there was the sadness that they faced long years of exile from their homeland. Scattered across London were the exiles from the 1953 Berlin Uprising, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring. This new wave of Polish émigrés knew that they might have to wait 10 or 20 years before another attempt was made to overthrow the Stalinist regimes which oppressed the nations of Eastern Europe. They would be condemned to live in limbo – separated from their family and friends back home with their children growing up in England having little more than an exotic name to connect them with their Polish heritage. No wonder my friend was so jubilant. It was only three years after the military coup that had crushed Solidarnösc – and she’d been able to make a quick visit to see her parents without any difficulties. The secret police must have known about her subversive activities in London, but no one seemed to care in Warsaw. She was enjoying a sweet irony: “Remember what Lenin said? The revolution will succeed when the masses can’t go on in the same old way and neither can the ruling class. Well, that’s what it’s like in Poland now. It’s all over, finished, done with. Once Poland goes, the whole rotten structure will collapse across the East. We’ve won, we’ve won!!”

    Elcia had read the historical conjuncture correctly. She could now move back to Poland with her son in anticipation of what was to come. Five years later, it really was all over. For those who weren’t around at the time, it is difficult to explain the liberation that we felt when the Cold War finally ended. I’d spent all of my adult life with the nagging fear that a stoned American pilot or a dodgy piece of Russian technology might accidentally launch a nuclear weapon which would start a conflagration that wiped out a large percentage of the European population. What made matters worse was how the institutionalised hypocrisy of the two superpowers had colonised the minds of people trapped on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was a looking-glass world where the American bastion of democracy overthrew elected governments and the Russian champion of socialism sent in the tanks against the proletariat. Of course, it was easy to see the ideological corruption of this imperial duplicity in others. Our Polish friends from Solidarnösc were horrified when English leftists carried banners of Lenin and Trotsky on their demonstrations. We were disgusted when the workers of Gdansk gave a hero’s welcome to Margaret Thatcher so soon after she had brutally smashed the National Union of Miners’ strike at home. But, trying to get each other to understand that these acts of stupidity were symbolic gestures of defiance was almost impossible. Convinced that your enemy’s enemy must be your friend, too many dissidents on both sides had forgotten that they were united in a common struggle for freedom and dignity.

    In 1989, when the Polish elections began a chain reaction which swept away the Stalinist regimes across Eastern Europe, there was the brief moment of euphoria when it seemed that the doublethink of the Cold War might be exorcised. Jacek KuroÅ„ joked in an interview that he was on the verge of accomplishing his mission in life: restoring the rationality of politics in Europe by making the Left on the left and the Right on the right. The crowds in the streets of Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Berlin and Bucharest chanted the slogan: “We don’t want any more social experiments.” They weren’t like their parents who’d been fooled by fascists who spoke like communists. This was Georg Hegel’s ‘end of history’ when utopian dreams are transformed into pragmatic solutions. On that magic evening of 9th November when the Berlin Wall came down, we celebrated in style in London with expensive champagne and strong weed. Power hungry US Presidents and Russian General Secretaries would no longer be aiming nuclear missiles at the major cities of Europe. The common people had shown that – with enough courage and determination – it was possible to overcome the violence and lies of a modern state. This time, the good guys were the winners.

    Two decades on, the participants at the Solidarity/solidarities conference faced the hard task of explaining what one contributor called the ‘double disappointment’ of the hopes of the 1989 revolutions. Radicals in the West had expected that the collapse of Stalinism would lead to the emergence of a reinvigorated socialism in the East – and instead witnessed the nations of ‘new Europe’ embracing neo-liberalism in its most brutal forms. Oppositionists in the East had anticipated that the adoption of a free market economy would lead to consumer plenty for all like in the West – and instead saw the divisions between rich and poor within their societies growing ever wider. Of course, it is now all too easy to blame the shabby deals that allowed the Party bosses to plunder the state’s assets in return for relinquishing their grip over political power without bloodshed. What is more difficult to understand – twenty years on – is why there was mass support for the ‘shock therapy’ of privatisation, deregulation and cuts in welfare. Having rejected the failed social experiment of Russian-style Communism, sane and sensible people had voted in overwhelming numbers for a new social experiment: US-style neo-liberalism. It wasn’t as if there weren’t any other options. Just across the Baltic, there were the prosperous and egalitarian societies of Scandinavian Social Democracy, but, unfortunately, they lacked the ideological magic of the free market model. Above all, the American empire had seized the ownership of the imaginary future of the information society. As the transition gathered pace in the early-1990s, the arrival of the Net confirmed the correctness of this US-led path of modernisation for the nations of the East. In the same way that their parents had admired the industrial combines of Stalinist Russia, these ‘new Europeans’ were convinced that the dotcom entreprises of neo-liberal California represented the future in the present. No wonder that ‘double disappointment’ was the leitmotif of final panel at the Solidarity/solidarities conference…

    In 2009, the Polish community in London is thriving. Unlike Elcia and her friends, a new wave of exiles has come here voluntarily to earn money, learn English and experience life in a foreign country. They take it for granted that they can move and back forth across Europe with no problems. The only thing that they’re escaping from back home is the conservative morality of the Church. You can move in with your partner without getting married as long as you do it abroad. Tellingly, most of the Polish students who I teach at Westminster University choose the ‘liberal’ option for Political Views on their Facebook profile – and they mean it in both the social and economic senses of the term. These are the children of the defeat-in-victory of the 1989 revolution. Solidarnösc smashed the Stalinist bureaucracy – and then the neo-liberal regime destroyed the organised working class in Poland. As this generation came to adulthood, the dream of dissidents like Elcia of founding the Self-Managed Socialist Republic of Poland must have seemed like a relic from a long forgotten theological debate. Let’s remember that – for them – Francis Fukyama had reinterpreted the ‘end of history’ to outlaw any alternative to US-style capitalism. There was only the American path to modernity.

    The aim of this book is to help its readers to refute this ideological claim to imperial hegemony. On 15th September 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers marked the end of the neo-liberal ascendancy. George W. Bush – one of the most reactionary presidents in US history – was soon implementing the 5th demand of The Communist Manifesto: public ownership of the financial system. In such strange times, it is necessary to rediscover the complex history of the imaginary future of the information society. Here’s an interesting fact which is overlooked in the official accounts of the West. One of the first prophets of post-industrialism was Oscar Lange in the 1950s – and he was Polish. This visionary believed that the advent of the Net would provide the technological foundation for participatory democracy in both politics and the economy: cybernetic communism. With intellectual property withering away in cyberspace, his prediction does seem more prescient than it did a decade ago at the height of the dotcom bubble. If nothing else, Lange is telling us that the future is not necessarily neo-liberal California – and that the Polish Left can find its own path to a better future. The reformers of his generation opened the way for their successors to begin the process of dismantling of totalitarian rule. What they could have never envisaged was that one evil empire’s imaginary future would be replaced with that of its rival. As the last public act of his eventful life, Jacek Kuroń wrote an open letter in support of the people protesting against the 28th–30th April 2004 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Warsaw. Castigating the neo-liberal orthodoxy with the same contempt that he once directed against Stalinism, he called upon the dissidents of the 21st century to ‘create a new conception of social cooperation, realise the ideals of freedom, equality and social justice.’ What more needs to be said? I hope that the Polish translation of my book can make a small contribution towards fulfilling this goal. You can use the tools of the Net to invent new futures for humanity. Enjoy the book – and be inspired!

    Richard Barbrook,
    London,
    England,
    12th June 2009

  • ANARCHISM

    The 1872 Hague Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association
    The split in the First International:
    British, German & Dutch Sections v. Swiss, Spanish & Italian Sections
    Socialism v. Anarchism
    Karl Marx v. Mikhail Bakunin
    mass party v. revolutionary conspiracy
    democratic republic v. local communes
    working class v. peasants, students & bandits
    organised labour v. spontaneous uprisings

    Bakuninists’ forerunners of anarchism:
    William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1789)
    Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? (1840)
    Max Stirner, Ego and His Own (1845)

    1889 Second International: parliamentary socialism, trade unions and cooperatives
    German Social Democratic Party, British Labour Party and French Socialist Party
    Friedrich Engels, The Bakuninists at Work
    Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists

    Libertarianism: invisible dictatorship, propaganda of the deed and collectives
    Mikhail Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy
    Sergei Nechaev, The Catechism of a Revolutionary
    Errico Malatesta, Anarchy

    Individualist anarchism v. collectivist anarchism

    Anarchist terrorism:
    Tsar Alexander II (1881), US President McKinley (1901)
    Sidney Street siege (1911), Bonnot gang (1911-12)

    Anarcho-syndicalism:
    General Strike, labour exchanges and workers’ cooperatives
    CGT in France, CNT in Spain and IWW in USA
    1905 Russian Revolution
    Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence
    Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid

    Socialist Maximalism: anti-parliamentary and syndicalist
    Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions

    Outbreak of 1st World War 1914: patriotism v. internationalism
    Benito Mussolini, National Syndicalism, Italian Fascism and the corporate state

    October 1917 Russian Revolution
    Marx + Bakunin = Bolshevism
    vanguard party, revolutionary dictatorship and worker-peasant alliance
    1918 dissolution of Constituent Assembly
    1921 suppression of the Kronstadt Soviet
    V.I. Lenin, State & Revolution
    Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat

    1919 Third International
    Totalitarian Communism v. Council Communism
    V.I. Lenin, Left-Wing Communism: an infantile disorder
    Anton Pannekoek, World Revolution and Communist Tactics

    1936 Spanish Revolution
    Barcelona workers’ uprising v. fascist military coup
    CNT, FAI and the Durruti Column
    workers’ militias and peasants’ cooperatives
    Popular Front against fascism
    1937 Barcelona May Days:
    Catalan Nationalists, Stalinists and Socialists v. Anarchists and POUM
    George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia
    Abel Paz, Durruti

    New Left revival of anarchism:
    1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Budapest Workers’ Council
    1957 CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and the Aldermaston marches
    1964 Free Speech Movement in UC Berkeley
    1965 American invasion of Vietnam
    Hippie counter-culture: folk music, rock ‘n’ roll, festivals, happenings, pot, LSD and rural communes
    Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism
    Charles Reich, The Greening of America
    Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation

    May ’68 French Revolution
    Sorbonne occupation, general strike and worker-student alliance
    Situationist International, Kommune 1 and Italian Autonomism
    urban squats, rural communes, feminism, gay liberation and anti-racism
    Weather Underground, Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof Gang
    Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle
    Dany & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: the left-wing alternative
    Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved

    Punk subculture: independent labels, pirate radio and fanzines
    Sex Pistols, Anarchy in the UK (1976)
    Class War (1983-9), Stop the City (1983-4, Bash the Rich marches (1984-5) and Poll Tax riot (1990)
    Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming
    Class War, A Decade of Disorder

    Post-modern anarchism: new social movements, anti-prisons and anti-psychiatry
    Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish
    Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Thousand Plateaus

    Green anarchism:
    Earth First!, monkey wrenching and primitivism
    Theodore Kaczynski, The Unabomber Manifesto
    John Zerzan, Why Primitivism?

    Alter-globalisation movement:
    1999 Seattle protests, World Social Forum and the Black Block
    IndyMedia, DIY Culture and social networks
    Toni Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire
    George McKay, DiY Culture
    nettime.org
    metamute.org

  • Imaginary Futures Author at Creative Cities Symposium in Vienna

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be giving a talk entitled ‘Creative Labour and Proletarian Playtime’ at the ORF Symposium on Creative Cities on the afternoon of Tuesday 31st March at RadioKulturhaus, Großer Sendesaal, Argentinierstraße 30a, 1040 Wien, Austria.

    For more details, check out the ORF website.

  • imaginary futures at the Radiator Festival

    Dr Richard Barbrook will speaking about Imaginary Futures at the 4th Radiator Festival – “Exploits in the Wireless City” – on Thursday afternoon on 15th March at the Broadway Media Centre, Nottingham, England. For further details, see the Radiator festival website.

  • Imaginary Futures at St. Petersburg Art Academy

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will speaking about Imaginary Futures as part of a Digital Artisans’ Evening at the ProArte Institute in the Peter & Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg on Wednesday 26th November. For further details, see the ProArte Institute’s website: http://www.proarte.ru

  • imaginary Futures at Cold War Culture conference

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be appearing at the Cold War Culture conference which takes place at the Victoria & Albert museum in London on Friday 21st – Saturday 22nd November. This major conference brings together some of the most exciting thinkers on art, design and architecture in the post-1945 period to reflect on the ways in which Cold War politics shaped art and design. Organised in conjunction with the V&A’s landmark Cold War Modern exhibition, it offers new perspectives on a period which continues to grip the imagination today.

    Richard’s lecture – ‘Cold War Imaginary Futures: cybernetic communism and the information society’ – is scheduled for the Saturday afternoon session of the confernce.

    More details about the Cold War Culture conference can be found on the V&A website.

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  • CREATIVE CITY THESES

    1) We Must Invent New Futures

    The information society has arrived – and the McLuhanist prophecy of the network utopia has been disappointed. The critical analysis of the creative city provides an opportunity to devise new futures to guide our actions in the present.

    2) The New Class of the New

    Like their forebears who moved from artisan workshops into the Fordist factory, the present generation is learning how to make new things in new ways with new technologies. This study will examine how far the flattened hierarchies and cooperative ethos of cognitive capitalism are remaking the shape of the city’s economy.

    3) Mapping the Creative Workforce

    The emergence of a new class of the new lives is not just an economic phenomenon, but also social, political and cultural. This study will measure the vital statistics of the creative class: age, gender, ethnicity, education and ideology. In parallel, psychogeographical research will both delineate the neighbourhoods where its members congregate and trace their links with the global diaspora of intellectual labour.

    4) Funky Businesses in Trendy Locations

    Just like the artisan trades of medieval times, the creative sector is clustered in specific areas of the world city. Forming a distinct subculture, its members wear the same clothes, drink in the same bars, listen to the same music and share a common obsession with cutting-edge technology. This study will examine the role of these marks of distinction in forming the new class of the new.

    5) The Cultural Vanguard of Property Speculation

    The creative sector is making a major contribution to the regeneration of neglected inner-city areas. Unfortunately, in many cases, the original inhabitants of these neighbourhoods have been bypassed by this economic turn around. They lack the technical skills, cultural outlook and social connections required for employment within this post-industrial sector. Worst of all, an influx of creative companies and their employees causes a rapid inflation in property prices and commercial rents in the area. This study will track this gentrification of inner city neighbourhoods and how its negative consequences can be countered.

    6) Self-Managed Exploitation

    The neo-liberal cult of authoritarian managerial power has become an anachronism within the creative industries. Instead, as the business manuals of the dotcom boom explained, the spread of contract working and job insecurity can be rebranded as extending individual freedom and career opportunities. Among the most talented employers and employees, the measure of success isn’t just making lots of money, but also creating something cool. This research will investigate how respect and autonomy for knowledge workers are the preconditions of innovation and excellence in this sector.

    7) The Carnival Economy

    For most of the citizens of the world city, creativity is what happens when they’re playing outside the workplace. Within popular music, the new thing appears on the dance floor and in the streets before it’s repackaged as a commodity. This study will investigate how those who earn their living outside the creative industries are not just participating in cultural production, but also, in many cases, driving forward innovation in this sector.

    8 ) Sharing Knowledge as Collective Production

    The information society isn’t just a new phase of capitalism, but also an evolutionary stage beyond capitalism. Alongside orders and commodities, gifts are now one of the principle methods of organising collective labour. The technical icon of the knowledge economy – the Net – is primarily a tool for sharing knowledge not selling information. This study will examine how the principles of open architecture and open source can be extended from the virtual realm into the real world.

    9) Libertarian Social Democracy

    Social welfare and economic security provide the best foundations for constant change and perpetual innovation. Contrary to the neo-liberal prognosis, public housing, free healthcare, subsidised culture and state education are still the preconditions of a modern civilisation. This study will ponder how this reformist programme can be updated and extended for the new conditions of the 21st century. Political democracy requires cultural democracy. If everyone is a voter, then everyone is also a creator. When mapping out the route to the future of libertarian social democracy, our vision of the new class must become inclusive.

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  • KAUTSKY IN CAMBRIDGE

    “How was the conference?”, Simon Schaffer asked. “Very interesting”, I replied. “The Autonomists have finally come out of the closet as reformists!”At the opening session of the Immaterial Labour conference in Cambridge, Andrea Fumagalli had told us that Toni Negri and the other gurus of the movement now advocated a commendably pragmatic political programme: a guaranteed income for all citizens; employment rights for precarious workers; the democratisation of the European Union; and more environmental protection. “As left-wing members of the Labour Party”, I pointed out, “we can no longer criticise the Autonomists. Their policies are also our policies!”

    I continued, “It’s particularly good to see that – after 25 years – the Autonomists have at long last aligned their practice with their theory.” Back in the early-1980s, Simon and I had both diligently studied the Red Notes booklets which had first made available the key texts by Negri, Tronti and their comrades to an English-speaking audience. What was then so striking about the writings of the Autonomists was their engagement with Marx’s critique of political economy. In contrast with their Althusserian and Trotskyist peers, these Italian leftists did have something intelligent to say about the neo-liberal restructuring of capitalism. However, at this point, the Autonomists’ admiration for Marx’s theory didn’t extend to his practice. Far from being social democrats, they took pride in their revolutionary intransigence. Autonomism was the extreme left of the Ultra-Left.

    “What was the comrades’ reaction to Andrea Fumagalli’s speech?” Simon asked. “As you might have guessed”, I replied, “it didn’t go down very well with most of his audience. For the old school, it was a betrayal of the holy precepts of Autonomism. For the younger generation, it was a bit like going to see Johnny Rotten and discovering that he had always been a Bee Gees fan!” “What did they expect?”, Simon exclaimed. “It was obvious that Autonomism was reformist right from the beginning. Haven’t they ever read Negri’s article on Keynes from the mid-1970s? If you – correctly – point out that ‘effective demand’ is a euphemism for working class struggle, then you’re arguing in favour of social democracy!” “Maybe”, I mused, “their horrified reaction proves that the revolutionary image of Autonomism was always more important than its theoretical achievements? It can’t be an accident that its acolytes prefer reading the Grundrisse to Capital. If they carefully studied the chapter on the Factory Acts in Volume 1, they would realise that Marx himself was a social democrat!”

    “So was your visit to Cambridge worthwhile?”, Simon enquired. “Back in the early-1980s, we might have disagreed with their politics, but we always enjoyed going to their conferences.” “Of course”, I responded. “It’s not just that our politics which have converged. Do you remember the cyber-communism article which I wrote in the late-1990s for the McLuhan conference in New York? At the time, it was meant as a satirical piece: America invented the only working model of communism in human history – it’s called the Net! Well, you’ll be pleased to hear that there were two excellent papers at the conference which put forward the same argument.” “Very good”, Simon said. “But do you think that anyone outside the academic Left is listening to what was said?” “I do hope so since the conference was – rather appropriately – being held in Keynes Hall at Kings. Looking at the current state of the Labour Party, it certainly needs some fresh ideas. Maybe – as in the 1930s – Cambridge can again provide them?” My comrade smiled somewhat sceptically, “I look forward to that day!” “You never know”, I joked, “in a couple of decades time, we could be going to a similar conference in the Negri Hall at Kings.” “After Blairism”, Simon announced, “Autonomist reformism!” “We should drink to this future!”, I concluded – and so we left for the pub to continue the conversation over a few pints…

  • Imaginary Futures wins 2008 Marshall McLuhan Award

    The Media Ecology Association (MEA) has selected Richard Barbrook’s Imaginary Futures: from thinking machines to the global village as the winner of the 2008 Marshall McLuhan Award for Outstanding Book in the Field of Media Ecology.

    Past recipients of this award include Francis Fukuyama, Doug Rushkoff and Neil Postman.

    The official presentation of the award will at the MEA’s annual convention which is being held at Santa Clara University in Silicon Valley, California, USA on 19th-22nd June 2008.

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be attending the awards ceremony on Friday 20th June and will give a lecture about his book.

    Further details can be obtained from the MEA website.

  • World Ex-Position ’08

    Fahim Amir has posted a review of the World Ex-Position ’08 which took place on 26th April-15th May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. He concludes his Mute article with this observation on Richard Barbrook’s talk about Imaginary Futures at the festival:

    “His politically apt and historically well informed argument presents a strong antidote to the euphoric manifestos of the net’s postmodern leftist theorists of the likes of Antonio Negri, without falling for the techno-pessimistic traps of an oversimplifying critique of ideology. Indeed, to quote Barbrook, ‘those who forget the future are condemned to repeat it’.”

    Read Famir Amin’s review.

  • New reviews of Imaginary Futures

    Two reviews of Imaginary Futures were published in December 2007:

    John Barker’s Up For Grabs in Science as Culture, Number 4, Volume 16, 2007, pages 481-488.

    “By giving us the history of intellectuals thriving on an ahistorical view of the world, and what this view leads to, [Barbrook] has given depth to the critique that began with The Californian Ideology, and provided the tools to see through new versions of the same, however attractively packaged. The imaginary future is an area of contestation.”

    Bruce Robinson’s The Future Is What It Used to Be in Solidarity & Workers’ Liberty, 3rd December 2007.

    “The book tells an important story well. The left should neither forget the history and ideology of the Net in a blaze of techno-enthusiasm, nor simply retreat into “neo-Luddismâ€?. Telling the story of the past of the future is a useful aid to orienting ourselves in the “Information Ageâ€?.”

  • Author to Participate in performance of Guy Debord’s The Game of War – 23rd October 2007

    CLASS WARGAMES PRESENTS GUY DEBORD’S THE GAME OF WAR

    Tuesday 23rd October 2007 at 6.00pm

    01zero-one
    Westminster Kingsway College
    Soho Centre
    Peter Street
    London
    W1F 0HS

    (01zero-one’s main entrance is on Hopkins Street)

    Class Wargames

    The Game

    Class Wargames will play Guy Debord’s The Game of War using a replica of his original 1977 design for the board game.

    “Politics is a continuation of war by other means.�

    The Game of War is a Clausewitz simulator: a Napoleonic-era military strategy game where armies must maintain their communications structure to survive – and where victory is achieved by smashing your opponent’s supply network rather than by taking their pieces.

    “The 1789 French Revolution brought great changes in the art of war. Similarly, the establishment of spectacular domination has radically altered the art of government.�

    Debord is celebrated as the leader of the Situationist International and as the author of the searing critique of the media-saturated society of consumer capitalism: The Society of the Spectacle. What is much less well known is that after the May ’68 Revolution, Debord and his partner – Alice Becker-Ho – quit Paris and went to live in a remote French village. Over the next two decades, Debord devoted much of the rest of his life to inventing, refining and promoting what he came to regard as his most important project: The Game of War.

    “Wargames are a continuation of politics by other means.�

    For Debord, The Game of War wasn’t just a game – it was a guide to how people should live their lives within Fordist society. By playing this Clausewitz simulator, revolutionary activists could learn how to fight and win against the oppressors of spectacular society.

    “An untrained militant would only be an object of embarrassment to the vanguard.”

    Now, in 2007, Debord’s fascination with wargames is finally being discovered. Coinciding with the publication by Atlas Press of the English translation of Debord and Becker-Ho’s The Game of War book, Class Wargames in London and the Radical Software Group in New York are playing matches in public and developing their own versions of the game.

    On Tuesday 23rd October, you will have your chance to see The Game of War in action and to question the Class Wargamers about this Clausewitz simulator. Let battle commence!

    The Players

    The members of Class Wargames are:

    Dr. Richard Barbrook, University of Westminster and author.

    Rod Dickinson, University of the West of England and artist.

    Alex Veness, University of Southampton and artist.

    Ilze Black, Waterman’s Art Gallery and artist.

    Fabian Tompsett, London Psychogeographical Association and author.

    Mark Copplestone, Copplestone Castings and figure designer.

    Lucy Blake, designer and e-learning developer.

    Links

    London Games Festival Fringe 2007

    Class Wargames photos

    Atlas Press

    Radical Software Group

  • Cronopis Associats Interview

    Andrés Lomeña of Cronopis Associats interviewed Richard Barbrook on 13th September 2007.

    Question 1

    AL: Franco Bifo Berardi criticises your The Holy Fools. In his opinion, you simplify the rhizomatic thought of Deleuze and Guattari, making equal it to technonomadism and The Californian Ideology. Berardi argues that the state cannot solve the self-organisational structure of the Net. My question is: what ethical and aesthetic paradigm should we take for Internet given that the May ’68 Revolution was defeated?

    RB: Bifo is attacking me for the very crime which inspired my article! In late-1990s London, Hari Kunzru and others at Wired UK were arguing that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari were proponents of the Californian ideology. Knowing these gurus’ political history and theoretical writings, I was curious as to why it was so easy to confuse their particular brand of hippie leftism with its apparent opposite: dotcom neo-liberalism. A decade earlier, an anarchist comrade who was running a pirate radio station in Paris had jokingly told me that Deleuze and Guattari – and their milieu – should be called the “Pol Pot tendencyâ€?. Michel Foucault only a few years earlier had been praising the Islamist seizure of power in Iran as a revolution against modernity. When D&G fantasised about nomads destroying the city in A Thousand Plateaus, they – scarily – did mean what they were saying! In The Holy Fools, I tried to explain this intellectual paradox: these prophets of hardcore anti-modernism had provided the theoretical tools for their own post-modernist recuperation. As Bifo’s loud protests demonstrate, there is obviously an embarrassing similarity between New Left anti-statism and New Right anti-statism. Much more seriously, D&G were also proponents of a post-structuralist approach which is completely compatible with the tenets of McLuhanism. Information – not humanity – is the subject of history. Artists and intellectuals are the new class of the new. So maybe it wasn’t so surprising that D&G’s vision of the Net was so easily misinterpreted as a celebration of the dominant imaginary future of the American empire: the information society…

    Question 2

    AL: You are really witty when you quote and analyse Eric S. Raymond’s essays. You are the first one. It demonstrates that you study the phenomena of Internet from inside, without keeping your distance; we need to contaminate ourselves to talk about Net (the metaphor would be: “we cannot talk about dirtiness if we do not get dirty�). In my opinion, there is a maladjustment between the generations. Are there more hopes with our generation, totally immersed in new medias?

    RB: I’m from the punk rock generation – my formative moment was seeing the Sex Pistols and discovering Situationism as a 20-year old student in 1976. When the Net took off in England two decades later, I thought that technology had finally caught up with what me and my mates had been doing for all of our adult lives. In 2007, instead of climbing tower blocks to install pirate transmitters like we did in the 1980s, my students run their radio stations from their bedrooms – and, most wonderfully, have many more listeners than we ever did. Respect! Of course, it is easy for people from my generation to say that the youth aren’t as politically engaged as we were, but the historical moment is very different. If nothing else, today’s 20-somethings have the advantage over us that Leninism is ancient history. In my Imaginary Futures book, I argue that they also possess the privilege of living within the information society. It is difficult to believe that the Net will liberate humanity when almost everyone you know has a broadband connection – and corporate capitalism is more in control of the global economy than it has ever been.

    Question 3

    AL: The New Left sought anarcho-communism, based on gift economy. However, the New Economy of the cyberspace is an advanced way of social democracy: anarcho-communism is sponsored by corporate capital. This seems paradoxical. Is it possible to have a collapse of the system? All of this is quite disconcerting.

    RB: The contemporary symbiosis of cybernetic communism and dotcom capitalism is only a paradox if – like Deleuze – you are anti-Hegelian! However, if you study history, this contradictory phenomenon is unexceptional. The feudal monarchy played a key role in the rise of capitalism and – against its own intentions – destroyed its own patriarchal power. Stalinist states industrialised their economies and – in the process – undermined the social foundations of totalitarian rule. We should not be surprised that corporate capitalism is similarly unaware of its own historical mission. Kevin Kelly in New Rules for the New Economy says that dotcom entrepreneurs should adopt the maxim of “follow the free�: commercialising the innovations of the hi-tech gift economy. But, as the music industry has found out to its cost, the opposite is also taking place: the decommodification of proprietary information. Don’t be disconcerted, enjoy the paradox!

    Question 4

    AL: I would like to read a critical evaluation of Google. What do you think? Do they symbolise a huge change in the recent history of the Net?

    RB: So would I. What is interesting is that Google makes its money out of searches not content. When most of the information on the Net is made by amateurs who work for nothing and pay for their own hosting, then the profit-making point is owning the large numbers of servers needed to catalogue and sort this data. Google is getting rich off what neo-classical economists call a “natural monopoly�: a privatised public utility. I wonder if Bifo disapproves of the French state’s plans to launch a European competitor to this American hegemon?!

    Question 5

    AL: Creative commons modified the map of Internet. Many people think that this licence is a restrictive choice (with a libertarian make up). They would prefer the deregulated situation before Creative Commons. I do not have opinion here. What about you?

    RB: Tellingly, Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the web – didn’t release html under a copyleft licence because its provisions were too restrictive. Despite its name, Creative Commons is also a form of private property. If you want to operate within the contemporary economy, this licence does offer some protection against your work being ripped off or being used inappropriately. If you were a cynic, copyleft could also be seen as the last stand of intellectual property lawyers against the decommodification of information on the Net. Imprisoning teenagers for sharing music or movie files with each other is absurd in the 2000s. According to its promoters, Creative Commons is the only way that commercial organisations can sue each other for making money out of what private individuals are doing on a daily basis…

    Question 6

    AL: What do you think about the Technorealism Manifesto? I sort of agree with it. It is very symptomatic of lot of manifestos that I’ve read on the Internet.

    RB: Sweet. We should encourage all signs of resistance in America against the neo-liberal hegemony which dominates that long suffering country.

    Question 7

    AL: Is it possible to have a new Luddite movement in our society (I still remember a Thomas Pynchon’s article where he was really ironic about the Luddites)?

    RB: I’m all in favour of celebrating Luddism as long as we’re talking about the Luddites in early-19th century England. These heroic rebels were founders of the Labour movement in this country. Unfortunately, many on the Left believe the smears of the liberal bourgeoisie against them. Contrary to the dictionary definition, the Luddites were NOT against all new technologies – only those which deskilled and displaced artisanal workers. Spinning Jennies deserved to be smashed – and Jacquard Looms were rightly cherished. If we want to learn from the Luddites, we should welcome technologies which make our work more interesting and our lives more pleasurable…

    Question 8

    AL: We must to extend the political history of Internet into all areas of life. However, the thing is that if we begin transforming cyberspace and then we want to change our society… it seems to me that we are adopting a naive reformism. The Internet is a good battlefield, but it’s not the only field where we can fight, right?

    RB: The Net is a tool not a talisman. When Debord published The Society of the Spectacle in 1967, only the privileged few could make radio and television programmes. Four decades later, anyone with the time and money in the North can broadcast their efforts to a global audience over the Net. Contrary to Debord’s expectations, the smashing of the spectacle didn’t require a proletarian revolution. Does this make us backsliding reformists? Or does it mean that we realise that we live within a historical process which capital and labour – consciously or unconsciously – compete to mould society in their own interest? If we’re lefties, our ambition is to ensure our side is more conscious about what we’re doing than our opponents.

    Question 9

    AL: How do you value the role of John Perry Barlow in the history of the Internet? Everyone can laugh at his neo-liberal utopianism, but he founded the EFF, among other things. Maybe we should consider his Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace like poetry, not like a political programme.

    RB: John Perry Barlow was also Dick Cheney’s campaign manager when he stood for the US Senate in 1978! Conclusion: you can smoke good weed and still be on the wrong side of the barricades.

    Question 10

    AL: Is there anything else that you want to add?

    RB: Check out the website of my new book: http://www.imaginaryfutures.net

  • NEW YORK PROPHECIES: THE IMAGINARY FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

    The Future Is What It Used To Be

    ‘Biological intelligence is fixed, because it is an old, mature paradigm, but the new paradigm of non-biological computation and intelligence is growing exponentially. The crossover will be in the 2020s and after that, at least from a hardware perspective, non-biological computation will dominate…’
    Kurzweil 2004, p. 3.

    At the beginning of the 21st century, the dream of artificial intelligence is deeply embedded within the modern imagination. From childhood onwards, people in the developed world are told that computers will one day be able to reason – and even feel emotions – just like humans. In science fiction stories, thinking machines have long been favourite characters. Audiences have grown up with images of robot buddies like Data in Star Trek TNG and of pitiless monsters like the cyborg in The Terminator (Startrek.com 2005; Cameron 1984). These science fiction fantasies are encouraged by confident predictions from prominent computer scientists. Continual improvements in hardware and software will eventually led to the creation of artificial intelligences more powerful than the ‘biological intelligence’ of the human mind.

    Commercial developers are already looking forward to selling sentient machines which can do the housework and help the elderly (Honda 2004). Some computer scientists even believe that the creation of ‘non-biological intelligences’ is a spiritual quest. In California, Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge and their colleagues are eagerly waiting for the Singularity: the First Coming of the Silicon Messiah (Vinge 1993; Bell 2004). Whether inspired by money or mysticism, all these advocates of artificial intelligence share the conviction that the present must be understood as the future in embryo – and the future illuminates the potential of the present. Every advance in computing technology is heralded as another step towards the creation of a fully conscious machine. The prophecy of artificial intelligence comes closer to fulfilment with the launch of each new piece of software or hardware. It is not what computers can do now that is important but what they are about to do. The present is the beta version of a science fiction dream: the imaginary future.

    Despite its cultural prominence, the meme of sentient machines is vulnerable to theoretical exorcism. Far from being a free-floating signifier, this prophecy is deeply rooted in time and space. Not surprisingly, contemporary boosters of artificial intelligence rarely acknowledge the antiquity of the concept itself. They want to move forwards not look backwards. Yet, it’s over forty years since the dream of thinking machines first gripped the public’s imagination. The imaginary future of artificial intelligence has a long history. Analysing this original version of this prophecy is the precondition for understanding its contemporary iterations. With this motivation in mind, let’s go back to the second decade of the Cold War when the world’s biggest computer company put on a show about the wonders of thinking machines in the financial capital of the most powerful and wealthiest nation on the planet…

    A Millennium Of Progress

    On the 22nd April 1964, the New York World’s Fair was opened to the general public. During the next two years, this modern wonderland welcomed over 51 million visitors. Every section of the American elite was represented at the exposition: the federal government, US state governments, large corporations, financial institutions, industry lobbies and religious groups. The World’s Fair proved that the USA was the leader in everything: consumer goods, democratic politics, show business, modernist architecture, fine art, religious tolerance, domestic living and, above all else, new technology. As one of the exposition’s advertising slogans implied, a ‘millennium of progress’ had culminated in the American century (Stanton, 2004, 2004a; Luce 1941).

    This patriotic message was celebrated in the awe-inspiring displays of new technologies at the World’s Fair. Writers and film-makers had long fantasised about travelling to other worlds. Now, in NASA’s Space Park, the public could admire the huge rockets which had taken American astronauts into orbit (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, p. 208; Laurence 1964, pp. 2-14). Despite its early setback when the Russians launched the first satellite in 1957, the USA was now on the verge of overtaking its rival in the ‘space race’ (Schefter 1999, pp. 145-231). Best of all, visitors to the World’s Fair were told that they too would have the opportunity to become astronauts in their own lifetimes. In the General Motors’ Futurama pavilion, Americans of the 1980s were shown taking their holidays on the moon. (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, p. 222). Other corporations were equally confident that the achievements of the present would soon be surpassed by the triumphs of tomorrow. At its Progressland pavilion, General Electric predicted that electricity generated by nuclear fusion reactors would be ‘too cheap to meter’ (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp. 90-92; Laurence 1964, pp. 40-43). In the imaginary future of the World’s Fair, Americans would not only become space tourists but also be blessed with free energy.

    For many corporations, the most effective method of proving their technological modernity was showcasing a computer. Clairol’s machine selected ‘the most flattering hair shades’ for female visitors and Parker Pen’s mainframe matched American kids with ‘pen pals’ in foreign countries (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp 86, 90). However impressive they might have appeared to their audience, these exhibits were nothing more than advertising gimmicks. In contrast, IBM was able to dedicate its pavilion exclusively to the wonders of computing as a distinct technology. For over a decade, this corporation had been America’s leading mainframe manufacturer. In 1961, one single product – the IBM 1401 – had accounted for a quarter of all the computers operating in the USA (Pugh 1995, pp. 265-267). In the minds of many Americans, IBM was computing. Just before the opening of the World’s Fair, the corporation had launched a series of products which would maintain its dominance over the industry for another two decades: the System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, pp. 54-146). Seizing the opportunity for self-promotion offered by the exposition, the bosses of IBM commissioned a pavilion designed to eclipse all others. Eero Saarinen – the renowned Finnish architect – supervised the construction of the building: a white, corporate-logo-embossed, egg-shaped theatre which was suspended high in the air by 45 rust-coloured metal trees. Underneath this striking feature were interactive exhibits celebrating IBM’s contribution to the computer industry (Stern, Mellins and Fishman 1997, pp. 1046-1047).

    For the theatre itself, Charles and Ray Eames – the couple who epitomised American modernist design – created the main attraction at the IBM pavilion: ‘The Information Machine’. After taking their places in the 500-seat ‘People Wall’, visitors were elevated upwards into the egg-shaped structure. Once inside, a narrator introduced a ‘mind-blowing’ multi-media show about how the machines exhibited in the IBM pavilion were forerunners of the sentient machines of the future. Computers were in the process of acquiring consciousness. (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp. 70-74; Laurence 1964, pp. 57-58). In the near future, every American would own a devoted mechanical servant just like Robby the Robot in the popular 1956 sci-fi film Forbidden Planet (Wilcox 1999). At the New York World’s Fair, IBM proudly announced that this dream of artificial intelligence was finally about to be realised. With the launch of the System/360 series, mainframes were now powerful enough to construct the prototypes of a fully conscious computer.

    The IBM pavilion’s stunning combination of avant-garde architecture and multi-media performance was a huge hit with both the press and the public. Alongside space rockets and nuclear reactors, the computer had confirmed its place as one of the three iconic technologies of modern America. The ideological message of these machines was clear-cut: the present was the future in embryo. Within at the IBM pavilion, computers existed in two time frames at once. On the one hand, the current models on display were prototypes of the sentient machines of the future. On the other hand, the vision of computer consciousness showed the true potential of the mainframes exhibited in the IBM pavilion. At the 1964 New York World’s Fair, the launch of the System/360 series was celebrated as the harbinger of the imaginary future of artificial intelligence.

    ‘Duplicating the problem-solving and information-handling capabilities of the [human] brain is not far off; it would be surprising if it were not accomplished within the next decade.’
    Simon, p. 39.

    Inventing the Thinking Machine

    The futurist fantasies of IBM’s multi-media show were inspired by the dispassionate logic of the academy. Alan Turing – the founding father of computer science – had defined the development of artificial intelligence as the long-term goal of this new discipline. In the mid-1930s, this Cambridge mathematician had published the seminal article which described the abstract model for a programmable computer: the ‘universal machine’ (Turing 2004). During the Second World War, his team of engineers had created a pioneering electronic calculator to speed up the decryption of German military signals. When the conflict was over, Turing moved to Manchester University to join a team of researchers who were building a programmable machine. As proposed in his 1936 article, software would be used to enable the hardware to perform a variety of different tasks. On 21st June 1948, before he’d even taken up his new post, Turing’s colleagues switched on the world’s first electronic stored-program computer: Baby. The theoretical concept described in an academic journal had taken material form as an enormous metal box filled with valves, switches, wires and dials. (Turing 2004a; Agar 2001 pp. 3-5, 113-124; Hodges 1992, pp. 314-402).

    For Turing, Baby was much more than just an improved version of the office tabulator. When software could control hardware, counting became consciousness. In a series of seminal articles, Turing argued that his mathematical machine was the precursor of an entirely new life form: the mechanical mathematician. He backed up this prediction by defining human intelligence as what computers could do. Since calculating was a sophisticated type of thinking, calculating machines must be able to think. If children acquired knowledge through education, educational software could create knowledgeable computers. Because the human brain worked like a machine, it was obvious that a machine could behave like an electronic brain (Turing 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Schaffer 2000). According to Turing, although the early computers weren’t yet powerful enough to fulfil their true potential, continual improvements in hardware and software would – sooner or later – overcome these limitations. In the second half of the twentieth-century, computing technology was rapidly evolving towards its preordained destiny: artificial intelligence.

    ‘The memory capacity of the human brain is probably of the order of ten thousand million binary digits. But most of this is probably used in remembering visual impressions, and other comparatively wasteful ways. One might reasonably hope to be able to make some real progress [towards artificial intelligence] with a few million digits [of computer memory].’
    Turing 2004a, p. 393

    In his most famous article, Turing described a test for identifying the winner of this race to the future. Once an observer couldn’t tell whether they were talking with a human or a computer in an on-line conversation, then there was no longer any substantial difference between the two types of consciousness. If the imitation was indistinguishable from the original, the machine must be thinking. The computer had passed the test (Turing 2004c, pp. 441-448; Schaffer 2000). From this point onwards, computers were much more than just practical tools and tradable commodities. As Turing’s articles explained, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence revealed the transformative potential of this new technology. Despite their shortcomings, the current models of computers were forerunners of the sentient machines to come.

    By the late-1940s, the catechism of artificial intelligence had been fixed. Within computing, what was and what will be were one and the same thing. Despite this achievement, Turing was a prophet whose influence was waning within his own country. The computer might have been invented in Britain, but its indebted government lacked the resources to dominate the development of this new technology (Agar 2003, pp. 266-278). Across the Atlantic, the situation was very different. During the Second World War, the American government had also provided generous funding for research into electronic calculation. Crucially, when the victory was won, scientists working on these projects didn’t encounter severe problems in maintaining their funding. While money was scarce in Britain, the USA could easily afford to pay for cutting-edge research into new technologies. Once the Cold War was underway, American politicians had no problem in justifying these subsidies to their constituents (Leslie 1993, pp. 1-13; Lewontin 1997).

    In the USA, computer scientists possessed another major advantage over their British rivals: the meta-theory of cybernetics. During the late-1940s and early-1950s, a group of prominent American intellectuals came together at the Macy conferences to explore ways of breaking down the barriers between the various academic disciplines: (Heims 1991). From the outset, Norbert Wiener was recognised as the guru of this endeavour. While working at MIT, he had devised cybernetics as a new theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of both humans and machines. The input of information about the surrounding environment led to the output of actions designed to transform the environment. Dubbed ‘feedback’, this cycle of stimulus and response reversed the spread of entropy within the universe. Order could be created out of chaos (Wiener 1948, pp. 74-136). According to Wiener, this master theory described all forms of purposeful behaviour. Whether in humans or machines, there was continual feedback between information and action. The same mathematical equations could be used to describe the behaviour of living organisms and technological systems (Wiener 1948, pp. 168-191). Echoing Turing, this theory implied that it was difficult to tell the difference between humans and their machines (Wiener 1948, pp. 21, 32-33). In 1948, Wiener outlined his new master theory in a book filled with pages of mathematical proofs: Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine.

    Much to his surprise, this academic had written a bestseller. For the first time, a common set of abstract concepts covered both the natural sciences and the social sciences. Wiener‘s text had provided potent metaphors for describing the new hi-tech world of Cold War America. Even if they didn’t understand his mathematical equations, readers could easily recognise cybernetic systems within the social institutions and communication networks which dominated their everyday lives. Feedback, information and systems soon became incorporated into popular speech (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 171-194; Heims 1991, pp. 271-272). Despite this public acclamation, Wiener remained an outsider within the US intelligentsia. Flouting the ideological orthodoxies of Cold War America, this guru was a pacifist and a socialist.

    In the early-1940s, Wiener – like almost every US scientist – had believed that developing weapons to defeat Nazi Germany benefited humanity. When the Cold War started, his military-funded colleagues claimed that their research work was also contributing to the struggle against an aggressive totalitarian enemy (Lewontin 1997). Challenging this patriotic consensus, Wiener argued that American scientists should adopt a very different stance in the confrontation with Russia. He warned that the nuclear arms race could lead to the destruction of humanity. Faced with this dangerous new situation, responsible scientists should refuse to carry out military research (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 237-243, 255-271). During the 1950s and early-1960s, Wiener’s political dissidence inspired his socialist interpretation of cybernetics. In the epoch of corporate monopolies and atomic weaponry, the theory that explained the behaviour of both humans and machines must be used to place humans in control of their machines. Abandoning his earlier enthusiasm for Turing’s prophecy, Wiener now emphasised out the dangers posed by sentient computers (Wiener 1966, pp. 52-60, 1967, pp. 239-254). Above all, this attempt to build artificial intelligences was a diversion from the urgent task of creating social justice and global peace.

    ‘The world of the future will be an ever more demanding struggle against the limitations of our own intelligence, not a comfortable hammock in which we can lie down to be waited upon by our robot slaves.’
    Wiener 1966, p. 69.

    By opposing the militarisation of scientific research, the founder of cybernetics had embarrassed his sponsors among the US elite. Fortunately for the rulers of America, there was another brilliant mathematician at the Macy conferences who was also a fanatical Cold War warrior: John von Neumann. Traumatised by the nationalisation of his family’s bank during the 1919 Hungarian revolution, his anti-communist politics were so extreme that he had argued in the mid-1940s in favour of launching a pre-emptive war to stop Russia acquiring nuclear weapons (Heims 1980, pp. 235-236, 244-251). While playing a leading role in developing the atomic bomb, von Neumann had already applied his mathematical and organisational talents to the new field of computing. When the first Macy conference was held in 1946, his team of researchers were working on building a prototype mainframe for the US navy (Ceruzzi 2003, pp. 21-4). In von Neumann, the American empire had found a guru without any trace of heresy.

    At the early Macy conferences, the political differences among its attendees weren’t apparent. United by the anti-fascist struggle, Wiener and von Neumann could champion the same concept of cybernetics (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 143-149; Heims 1980, pp. 201-207). But, as their politics diverged, these two stars of Macy conferences began advocating rival interpretations of this meta-theory. In its left-wing version, artificial intelligence was denounced as the apotheosis of technological domination. When he formulated his right-wing remix, von Neumann took cybernetics in exactly the opposite direction. Above all, his interpretation emphasised that this master theory had been inspired by the prophecy of thinking machines. Back in the mid-1930s, Turing had briefly worked with von Neumann at Princeton. A decade before his own involvement in computing, this Hungarian scientist had known all about the idea of the universal machine. When two Chicago psychologists in the early-1940s applied Turing’s theory to explain the processes of human thought, von Neumann became fascinated by the implications of their speculations.

    Since the mechanical calculator was modelled on the human brain, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts argued that consciousness was synonymous with calculation. Like the electrical contacts of an IBM tabulator, neurons were switches which transmitted information in binary form (McCulloch and Pitts 1943). Entranced by this inversion of Turing’s line of argument, von Neumann became convinced that it was theoretically possible to build a thinking machine. If neurons acted as switches within the human brain, valves could be used to create an electronic brain (von Neumann 1966, pp. 43-46, 1976, pp. 308-311). When he was working on computer research for the US military, von Neumann used the human brain as the model for his eponymous computer architecture. Echoing Turing, this prophet claimed that – as the number of valves in a computer approached those of the neurons in the brain – the machine would be able to think (von Neumann 1966, pp. 36-41, 1976, pp. 296-300, 2000, pp. 39-52). Within a decade, von Neumann and his colleagues would be equipping the US military with cybernetic soldiers capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war.

    ‘Dr. McCulloch: How about designing computing machines so that if they were damaged in air raids … they could replace parts … and continue to work?
    Dr. von Neumann: These are really quantitative rather than qualitative questions.’
    von Neumann 1976, p. 324

    By the early-1950s, the USA’s academic and corporate research teams had seized the leadership of computing from their British rivals. From then onwards, all of the most advanced machines were made-in-America (Ceruzzi 2003, pp. 13-46). Yet, by creating cybernetics without Wiener, von Neumann had ensured that these US laboratories would also follow Turing’s path to the imaginary future: building artificial intelligence. The metaphor of feedback now proved that computers operated like humans. Inputs of information led to outputs of action. If the mind operated like a machine, then it must be possible to develop a machine which duplicated the functions of the mind. Computers could already calculate faster than their human inventors. Mastering the complexities of mathematical logic must be the first step towards endowing these machines with the other attributes of human consciousness. Language was a set of rules which could be codified as software. Learning from new experiences could be programmed into hardware (Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Throughout the 1950s and early-1960s, American scientists worked hard to build the thinking machine. Once it had enough processing power, the computer would achieve consciousness. (Edwards 1996, pp. 239-273). When IBM launched its System/360 mainframe at the 1964 World’s Fair, Turing’s dream appeared to be close to realisation.

    Cold War Computing

    A quarter of a century earlier, one of the stars of the 1939 New York World’s Fair had been Electro: a robot which – according to its publicists – ‘… could walk, talk, count on its fingers, puff a cigarette, and distinguish between red and green with the aid of a photoelectric cell’ (Eames and Eames 1973, p. 105). For all its fakery, this exhibit was the first iteration of the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. Before the 1939 World’s Fair, robots in books and movies had almost always been portrayed as Frankenstein monsters intent on destroying their human creators (Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Inspired by his visits to the exposition, Isaac Asimov decided to change this negative image. Just like Electro, the robots in his sci-fi stories were safe and friendly products of a large corporation (Asimov, 1968, 1968a). By the time that the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, this positive image of artificial intelligence had become one of the USA’s most popular imaginary futures. In both science fiction and science fact, the robot servant was the symbol of better times to come.

    At the 1939 New York World’s Fair, Electro was competing against the technological icon of the moment: the motor car. The must-see attractions were Democracity – a model featured in the New York State’s Perisphere building – and Futurama – a diorama inside the General Motors’ pavilion. Both exhibits promoted a vision of an affluent and hi-tech America of the 1960s. In this imaginary future, the majority of population lived in family homes in the suburbs and commuted to work in their own motor cars (Exposition Publications 1939, pp. 42-45, 207-209). For most visitors to the 1939 New York World’s Fair, this prophecy of consumer prosperity must have seemed like a utopian dream. The American economy was still recovering from the worst recession in the nation’s history, Europe was on the brink of another devastating civil war and East Asia was already engulfed by murderous conflicts. Yet, by the time that the 1964 World’s Fair opened, the most famous prediction of the 1939 exposition had been realised. However sceptical visitors might have been back in 1939, the Democracity and Futurama dioramas seemed remarkably prescient twenty-five years later. By the early-1960s, America was a suburban-dwelling, car-owning consumer society. The imaginary future had become contemporary reality.

    ‘The motor car … directs [social] behaviour from economics to speech. Traffic circulation is one of the main functions of a society … Space [in urban areas] is conceived in terms of motoring needs and traffic problems take precedence over accommodation … it is a fact that for many people the car is perhaps the most substantial part of their ‘living conditions’.’
    Lefebvre 1984, p. 100.

    Since the predictions of the 1939 exposition had largely come true, visitors to the 1964 New York World’s Fair could have been forgiven for believing that its three main imaginary futures would also be realised. Who could doubt that – by 1990 at the latest – the majority of Americans would be enjoying the delights of space tourism and unmetered electricity? Best of all, they would be living in a world where sentient machines were their devoted servants. However, the American public’s confidence in these imaginary futures would have been founded upon a mistaken sense of continuity. Despite being held on the same site and having many of the same exhibitors, the 1964 World’s Fair had a very different focus from its 1939 antecedent. Twenty-five years earlier, the centrepiece of the exposition had been the motor car: a mass produced consumer product. In contrast, the stars of the show at the 1964 World’s Fair were state-funded technologies for fighting the Cold War. Computers calculated the trajectories which would guide American missiles armed with nuclear bombs to destroy Russian cities and their unfortunate inhabitants (Isaacs and Dowling 1998, pp. 230-243). While its 1939 predecessor had showcased motorised transportation for the masses, the stars of the 1964 World’s Fair were the machines of atomic armageddon.

    When the IBM pavilion was being designed, the corporation had to deal with this public relations problem. Like nuclear reactors and space rockets, computers had also been developed as Cold War weaponry. ENIAC – the first prototype mainframe built in America – was a machine for calculating tables to improve the accuracy of artillery guns (Ceruzzi 2003, p. 15). From the early-1950s onwards, IBM’s computer division was focused on winning orders from the Department of Defence (Pugh 1995, pp. 167-172). Using mainframes supplied by the corporation, the US military prepared for nuclear war, organised invasions of ‘unfriendly’ countries, directed the bombing of enemy targets, paid the wages of its troops, ran complex war games and managed its supply chain (Berkeley 1962, pp. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Thanks to the American taxpayers, IBM had become the technological leader of the computer industry.

    When the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, IBM was still closely involved in a wide variety of military projects. Yet, its pavilion was dedicated to promoting the sci-fi fantasy of thinking machines. Like the predictions of unmetered energy and space tourism, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence distracted visitors at the World’s Fair from discovering the original motivation for developing IBM’s mainframes: killing millions of Russian civilians. Although the superpowers’ imperial hegemony depended upon atomic weapons, the threat of global annihilation made their possession increasingly problematic. Two years earlier, the USA and Russia had almost blundered into a catastrophic war over Cuba (Dallek 2003, pp. 535-574). Despite disaster being only narrowly averted, the superpowers were incapable of stopping the arms race. In the bizarre logic of the Cold War, the prevention of an all-out confrontation between the two blocs depended upon the continual growth in the number of nuclear weapons held by both sides. The ruling elites of the USA and Russia had difficulties in admitting to themselves – let alone to their citizens – the deep irrationality of this new form of military competition. In a rare moment of lucidity, American analysts invented an ironic acronym for this high-risk strategy of ‘mutually assured destruction’: MAD (Isaacs and Dowling 1998, pp. 230-243; Kahn 1960, pp. 119-189).

    Not surprisingly, the propagandists of both sides justified the enormous waste of resources on the arms race by promoting the peaceful applications of the leading Cold War technologies. By the time that the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, the weaponry of genocide had been successfully repackaged into people-friendly products. Nuclear power would soon be providing unmetered energy for everyone. Space rockets would shortly be taking tourists for holidays on the moon. Almost all traces of the military origins of these technologies had disappeared. Similarly, in the IBM pavilion, the System/360 mainframe was promoted as the harbinger of artificial intelligence. Visitors were expected to admire the technological achievements of the corporation not to question its dubious role in the arms race. The horrors of the Cold War present had been hidden by the marvels of the imaginary future.

    IBM’s ideological legerdemain was made much easier by one of the distinguishing features of industrial modernity: the breaking of the explicit links between products and their producers. For millennia, warriors and priests had overtly extracted the surpluses of the peasantry for their own benefit. But, when Europeans started to privatise land ownership and mechanise handicraft production, a new – and more advanced – economic system was born: liberal capitalism. Entrepreneurs proved that price competition could indirectly coordinate human labour much more efficiently than the direct methods of feudalism. Adventurers discovered that selling commodities in the world market was much more profitable than rack-renting peasants in one locality. For the first time in human history, the productive potential of collective labour was being realised (Smith 1976, pp. 1-287, 401-445; Marx 1976, pp. 762-940).

    In this new economy, people were required to interact with each other through things: commodities, money and capital. The distribution and division of labour across the economy was regulated by the prices and wages set by market competition. However, the demise of the aristocracy and the priesthood hadn’t ended class rule. When labour was bought and sold in the capitalist economy, equality within the marketplace resulted in inequality inside the workplace (Marx 1976, pp. 270-280; Rubin 1972, pp. 77-253). Because commodities were exchanged with others of equivalent value, this new form of class rule was very different from its predecessor. Indirect exploitation had replaced direct domination. Above all, the impersonal movements of the markets now determined the destiny of individuals. Things not people now ruled the world.

    ‘The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists … simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of [women and] men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relations of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers.’
    Marx 1976, pp. 164-165

    The growth of capitalism created a much more complex division of labour within the economy. In parallel with the proliferation of factory and office jobs, scientific research also emerged as a distinct profession (Bahr 1980; Smith 1976, pp. 7-16). Successful firms grew by not only employing more workers but also investing in new machinery. In the fetishised world of capitalism, the growth in productivity caused by the increasingly sophisticated cooperation of factory labour and scientific research was expressed as the development of cutting-edge technologies. With human creativity hidden behind the commodity, the process of modernity had acquired a highly visible object as its subject: the ‘… automatic system of machinery … a moving power that moves itself.’ (Marx 1973, p. 692).

    During the mid-twentieth century, the fetishisation of technology reached its apotheosis in the prophecy of artificial intelligence. Living in a society where new machinery appeared to be the driving force of social evolution, Turing and von Neumann’s claim that machines were evolving into living beings didn’t seem outlandish. When computers were operating, the labour involved in developing their hardware and writing their programs wasn’t immediately visible. Mesmerised by technological fetishism, the admirers of Turing and von Neumann had convinced themselves that an electronic brain would soon be able to think just like a human brain. In 1964, the calculating power of the System/360 mainframe was so great that this IBM machine seemed be on the threshold of consciousness. The creation was about to become the creator.

    Cybernetic Supremacy

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, imaginary futures temporarily succeeded in concealing the primary purpose of its three iconic technologies from the American public. But even the flashiest showmanship couldn’t hide dodgy use values forever. As the decades passed, none of the predictions made at the World’s Fair about the key Cold War technologies were realised. Energy remained metered, tourists didn’t visit the moon and computers never became intelligent. Unlike the prescient vision of motoring for the masses at the 1939 World’s Fair, the prophecies about the star technologies of the 1964 exposition seemed almost absurd twenty-five years later. Hyper-reality had collided with reality – and lost.

    Despite the failure of its prophecy, IBM suffered no damage. In stark contrast with nuclear power and space travel, computing was the Cold War technology which successfully escaped from the Cold War. Right from the beginning, machines made for the US military were also sold to commercial clients (Pugh 1995, pp. 152-155). By the time that IBM built its pavilion for the 1964 World’s Fair, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence had to hide more than the unsavoury military applications of computing. Commodity fetishism also performed its classic function of concealing the role of human labour within production. Computers were described as ‘thinking’ so the hard work involved in designing, building, programming and operating them could be discounted. Above all, the prophecy of artificial intelligence obscured the role of technological innovation within American workplaces.

    The invention of computers came at an opportune moment for big business. During the first half of the twentieth century, large corporations had become the dominant institutions of the American economy. Henry Ford’s giant car factory became the eponymous symbol of the new social paradigm: Fordism (Ford and Crowther 1922; Aglietta 1979). When it boosted their profits, corporations replaced the indirect regulation of production by markets with direct supervision by bureaucrats. As the wage-bill for white-collar employees steadily rose, businesses needed increasing amounts of equipment to raise productivity within the office. Long before the invention of the computer, Fordist corporations were running an information economy with tabulators, typewriters and other types of office equipment (Beniger 1986, pp. 291-425). However, by the beginning of the 1950s, the mechanisation of clerical labour had stalled. Increases in productivity in the office were lagging well behind those in the factory. When the first computers appeared on the market, corporate managers quickly realised that the new technology offered a solution to this pressing problem (Sobel 1981, pp. 95-184). The work of large numbers of tabulator operators could now be done by a much smaller group of engineers using a mainframe (Berkeley 1962, p. 5). Even better, the new technology of computing enabled capitalists to deepen their control over their organisations. Much more information about many more topics could now be collected and processed in increasingly complex ways. The managers were masters of all that they surveyed.

    Almost from its first appearance in the workplace, the mainframe was caricatured – with good reason – as the mechanical perfection of bureaucratic tyranny. In Asimov’s sci-fi stories, Mr and Mrs Average were the owners of robot servants. Yet, when the first computers arrived in America’s factories and offices, this new technology was controlled by the bosses not the workers. In 1952, Kurt Vonnegut published a sci-fi novel which satirised the authoritarian ambitions of corporate computing. In his dystopian future, the ruling elite had delegated the management of society to an omniscient artificial intelligence.

    ‘EPICAC XIV … decided how many [of] everything America and her customers could have and how much they would cost. And it … would decide how many engineers and managers and … civil servants, and of what skills, would be needed to deliver the goods; and what I.Q. and aptitude levels would separate the useful men [and women] from the useless ones, and how many … could be supported at what pay level…’
    Vonnegut 1969, p. 106.

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, the IBM pavilion promised that thinking machines would be the servants of all of humanity. Yet, at the same time, its sales personnel were telling the bosses of large corporations that computers were hard-wiring bureaucratic authority into modern society. Herbert Simon – one of America’s leading management theorists and a former colleague of von Neumann – foresaw that the increasing power of mainframes would enable companies to automate more and more clerical tasks. Just like in the factory, machines were taking over from human labour in the office. When artificial intelligence arrived, mainframes would almost completely replace bureaucratic and technical labour within manufacturing. The ultimate goal was the creation of the fully automated workplace. Companies would then no longer need either blue-collar or white-collar workers to make products or provide services. Even most managers would become surplus to requirements. Instead, thinking machines would be running the factories and offices of America (Simon 1965, pp. 26-52). In the imaginary future of artificial intelligence, the corporation and the computer would be one and the same thing.

    This prediction was founded upon von Neumann’s conservative interpretation of cybernetics. In his management theory texts, Simon argued that the workings of a firm resembled the operations of a computer. As in McCulloch and Pitts’ psychology, this identification was made in two directions. Managing workers was equated with programming a computer. Writing software was like drawing up a business plan. Both employees and machinery were controlled by orders issued from above. The workers’ dystopia of Big Brother mainframe had now mutated into the capitalist utopia of cybernetic Fordism. Ironically, the credibility of Simon’s managerial ideology depended upon his readers forgetting the fierce criticisms of corporate computing made by the founding father of systems theory. Echoing Marx, Wiener had warned that the primary role of new technology under capitalism was to intensify the exploitation of the workers. Instead of creating more leisure time and improving living standards, the computerisation of the economy under Fordism would increase unemployment and cut wages (Wiener 1967, pp. 206-221). If Vonnegut’s dystopia was to be avoided, American trade unionists and political activists must mobilise against the corporate Golem (Wiener 1966, pp. 54-55). According to Wiener, cybernetics proved that artificial intelligence threatened the freedoms of humanity.

    ‘Let us remember that the automatic machine … is the precise equivalent of slave labour. Any labour which competes with slave labour must accept the economic conditions of slave labour.’
    Wiener 1967, p. 220.

    For business executives, Vonnegut and Wiener’s nightmare was their computer daydream. However, this corporate vision of cybernetic Fordism meant forgetting the history of Fordism itself. This economic paradigm had been founded upon the successful co-ordination of mass production with mass consumption. Ironically, since these exhibits were more closely connected to social reality, Democracity and Futurama in 1939 provided a much more accurate prediction of the development path of computing than the IBM pavilion did in 1964. Just like motor cars twenty-five years earlier, this new technology was also slowly being transformed from a rare, hand-made machine into a ubiquitous, factory-produced commodity. As in the Ford factories, IBM’s System/360 mainframes were manufactured on assembly-lines (Pugh, Johnson and Palmer 1991, pp. 87-105, 204-210). These opening moves towards the mass production of computers anticipated what would be most important advance in this sector twenty-five years later: the mass consumption of computers. In its formal design, the 1964 System/360 mainframe was a bulky and expensive prototype of the much smaller and cheaper IBM PCs of 1989.

    The imaginary future of artificial intelligence was a way of avoiding thinking about the likely social consequences of the widespread ownership of computers. In the early-1960s, Big Brother mainframe belonged to big government and big business. Above all, feedback was knowledge of the ruled monopolised by the rulers. However, as Wiener had pointed out, Fordist production would inevitably transform expensive mainframes into cheap commodities (Wiener 1967, pp. 210-211). In turn, increasing ownership of computers was likely to disrupt the existing social order. For the feedback of information within human institutions was most effective when it was two-way (Wiener 1967, pp. 67-73). By reconnecting conception and execution, cybernetic Fordism threatened the social hierarchies which underpinned Fordism itself.

    ‘… the simple coexistence of two items of information is of relatively small value, unless these two items can be effectively combined in some mind … which is able to fertilises one by means of the other. This is the very opposite of the organisation which every member travels a preassigned
    path ɉ۪
    Wiener 1967, p. 172.

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, this possibility was definitely not part of IBM’s imaginary future. Rather than aiming to produce ever greater numbers of more efficient machines at cheaper prices, the corporation was focused on steadily increasing the capabilities of its computers to preserve its near-monopoly over the military and corporate market. Instead of room-sized machines shrinking down into desktops, laptops and, eventually, mobile phones, IBM was convinced that computers would always be large and bulky mainframes. The corporation fervently believed that – if this path of technological progress was extrapolated – artificial intelligence must surely result. Crucially, this conservative recuperation of cybernetics implied that sentient machines would inevitably evolve into lifeforms which were more advanced than mere humans. The Fordist separation between conception and execution would have achieved its technological apotheosis.

    Not surprisingly, IBM was determined to counter this unsettling interpretation of its own futurist propaganda. At the 1964 World’s Fair, the corporation’s pavilion emphasised the utopian possibilities of computing. Yet, despite its best efforts, IBM couldn’t entirely avoid the ambiguity inherent within the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. This fetishised ideology could only appeal to all sections of American society if computers fulfilled the deepest desires of both sides within the workplace. Therefore, in the exhibits at its pavilion, IBM promoted a single vision of the imaginary future which combined two incompatible interpretations of artificial intelligence. On the one hand, workers were told that all their needs would be satisfied by sentient robots: servants who never tired, complained or questioned orders. On the other hand, capitalists were promised that their factories and offices would be run by thinking machines: producers who never slacked off, expressed opinions or went on strike. Robby the Robot had become indistinguishable from EPICAC XIV. If only at the level of ideology, IBM had reconciled the class divisions of 1960s America. In the imaginary future, workers would no longer need to work and employers would no longer need employees. The sci-fi fantasy of artificial intelligence had successfully distracted people from questioning the impact of computing within the workplace. After visiting IBM’s pavilion at the 1964 World’s Far, it was all too easy to believe that everyone would win when the machines acquired consciousness.

    Inventing New Futures

    Forty years later, we’re still waiting for the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. In the intervening period, we’ve been repeatedly promised its imminent arrival. Yet, despite continual advances in hardware and software, machines are still incapable of ‘thinking’. The nearest thing to artificial intelligence which most people have encountered are characters in video games. But, as the growing popularity of on-line gaming demonstrates, a virtual opponent is a poor substitute for a human player. Looking back at the history of this imaginary future, it is obvious that neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic versions of artificial intelligence have been realised. Robby the Robot isn’t our devoted servant and EPICAC XIV doesn’t control our lives. Instead of evolving into thinking machines, computers have become consumer goods. Room-sized mainframes have kept on shrinking into smaller and smaller machines. Computers are everywhere in the modern world – and their users are all too aware that they’re dumb.

    Repeated failure should have discredited the imaginary future of artificial intelligence for good. Yet, its proponents remain unrepentant. Four decades on from the 1964 World’s Fair, IBM is still claiming that its machines are on the verge of acquiring consciousness (Bell 2004, p. 2). The persistence of this sci-fi fantasy demonstrates the continuing importance of von Neumann’s conservative appropriation of cybernetics within the computer industry. As in the early-1960s, artificial intelligence still provides a great cover story for the development of new military technologies. Bringing on the Singularity seems much more friendly than collaborating with American imperialism. Even more importantly, this imaginary future continues to disguise the impact of computing within the workplace. Both managers and workers are still being promised technological fixes for socio-economic problems. The dream of sentient machines makes better media copy than the reality of cybernetic Fordism. At the beginning of the 21st century, artificial intelligence remains the dominant ideological manifestation of the promise of computing.

    The credibility of this imaginary future depends upon forgetting its embarrassing history. Looking back at how earlier versions of the prophecy were repeatedly discredited encourages deep scepticism about its contemporary iterations. Our own personal frustrations with computer technology should demonstrate the improbability of its transformation into the Silicon Messiah. Forty years after the New York World’s Fair, artificial intelligence has become an imaginary future from the distant past. What is needed instead is a much more sophisticated analysis of the potential of computing. Wiener – not von Neumann – must be our cybernetic guru. The study of history should inform the reinvention of the future. Messianic mysticism must be replaced by pragmatic materialism. Above all, this new image of the future should celebrate computers as tools for augmenting human intelligence and creativity. Praise for top-down hierarchies of control must be superseded by the advocacy of two-way sharing of information. Let’s be inspired and passionate about imagining our own visions of the better times to come (Barbrook and Schultz 1997; Barbrook 2000).

    ==================================================

    The arguments in this article are developed further in Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures: from thinking machines to the global village, Pluto, London 2007. Check out the book’s website: <www.imaginaryfutures.net>.

    =================================================

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  • Virtual Dreams, Real Politics

    ‘What are we fighting Communism for? We are the most Communist people in world history.’

    – Marshall McLuhan, 1969.

    In 1961, at its 22nd Congress, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formally adopted the goal of spreading the benefits of computerisation across the whole economy. Over the next two decades, the information technologies being developed within the Russia’s research laboratories were going to create a socialist paradise. Ever since the 1917 Revolution, totalitarian Communists with a big C had drawn ideological sustenance from their self-proclaimed role as the vanguard of proletarian communism with a small c. Under Stalin, the horrors of forced industrialisation were sold to the Russian population as premonitions of the promised land of socialism. Ironically, it was the successful completion of this task which posed a potentially fatal existential dilemma for the totalitarian system. Having successfully identified communism with the factory, the Communist Party was now making itself obsolete. According to its reformist faction, the vanguard had to move on to tackling the tasks of the next stage of its world-historical mission: building the ‘Unified Information Network’. Computers should be placed in every factory, office, shop and educational institution. In this Russian vision of the Net, two-way feedback between producers and consumers would calculate the correct distribution of labour and resources which most efficiently satisfied all of the different needs of society. Even better, this technological revolution also promised to democratise an undemocratic society. In his leader’s speech at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev assured his audience that – after decades of purges, wars, corruption and austerity – the promised land was within sight. By the 1980s at the latest, the inhabitants of the Russian empire would be enjoying all the wonders of cybernetic communism.

    Across the Atlantic, the CIA had watched the rise to power of the post-industrial reformers in the East with growing concern. Embracing their opponents’ analysis, its analysts warned the US government that the technological race to develop the Net was becoming the key contest which would decide which superpower would lead humanity into the future. Back in 1957, America had suffered a major setback in the propaganda struggle when its Cold War enemy succeeded in launching the first satellite into space. Determined to prevent any repetition of this humiliation, the US government had quickly set up ARPA: the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Next time, America was going to win the hi-tech race. Responding to the CIA’s briefings, the Kennedy administration sent ARPA into battle against the cybernetic Communist enemy. Bringing together the top scientists in the field, the agency coordinated and funded an ambitious programme of research into computer-mediated-communications. In 1969, overtaking the Russian opposition, its team created the appropriately-named first-ever iteration of the Net: ARPANET.

    From the outset, the US government was convinced that this contest was much more than a test of scientific virility. The two superpowers were competing not only to develop new technologies, but also, more importantly, to decide which side had the most advanced social system. In 1964, a multi-disciplinary team of intellectuals led by Daniel Bell was given a large grant to invent the Anti-Communist vision of the non-communist future: The Commission on the Year 2000. Luckily, these experts were able to find exactly what they were looking for in Marshall McLuhan’s bestselling book Understanding Media. Just like Marx, this prophet had also foreseen that the next stage of modernity would sweep away the most disagreeable manifestations of capitalism: national rivalries, industrial exploitation and social alienation. As in proletarian communism with a small c, peace, prosperity and harmony would reign in the global village. What made McLuhan so much more attractive than Marx was that the knowledge elite – not the proletariat – was the maker of history.

    In 1966, three years before its first hosts were connected, the Bell commission persuaded itself that the arrival of the Net utopia was imminent. Just as McLuhan had foreseen, the limitations of industrialism were about to be overcome by the wondrous technologies of the information society. Best of all, 1960s America was already entering into this post-capitalist future. J.C.R. Licklider – the founder of ARPA’s project to build the Net – had long been arguing that the primary purpose of computer-mediated-communications was facilitating the idiosyncratic working methods of the scientific community. Instead of trading information with each other like the overwhelming majority of cultural producers, academics collaborate by sharing knowledge. Promotion and prestige depends upon contributing articles to journals, presenting papers at conferences and distributing findings for peer review. Although deeply enmeshed with the state and corporate hierarchies of the USA, this communistic method of advancing knowledge had proved its worth in both the natural and social sciences. Thanks to the American taxpayer, Licklider now had the money to sponsor the emergence of a virtual social space emancipated from both the market and the factory. Inside this hi-tech gift economy, proprietary hardware and software were technical obstacles to the most efficient ways of working. The people who built the Net were the ones who ran it. In a bizarre twist, at the height of the Cold War, the US military was funding the invention of cybernetic communism.

    Even more ironically, it was the Russian elite which lacked the self-confidence to sponsor even ARPA-style small-scale experiments in networked socialism. The reformers had offered a rejuvenation of the world-historic mission of the vanguard party. However, for their conservative opponents, the advantages of owning the imaginary future were by far outweighed by the threat which the Net posed to their power and authority. When the Czechoslovak reformers’ theoretical manifesto Civilisation at the Crossroads celebrated the Unified Information Network as the demiurge of participatory democracy, the subversive image of this cybernetic technology was confirmed for these conservative bureaucrats. In 1968, the Russian government sent in its tanks to put an end to the Prague Spring. The perpetuation of totalitarian Communism depended upon the prevention of cybernetic communism.

    Back in the 1930s, Stalinist state planning had been at the cutting-edge of economic modernity. But, by holding on to its ideological monopoly, the Communist Party had deprived itself of the information which it needed to deliver the goods. In 1980, the Polish workers rebelled when they were once again called upon to pay for the mistakes of the economic planners. The disintegration of totalitarianism in one country started a chain-reaction of events which within a decade brought down the entire Russian empire. Communism with a big C was the future which had failed. In his 1992 neo-conservative bestseller The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama proudly announced that the whole world had become American. With all alternatives now discredited, there was only one path to modernity.

    Back in the mid-1960s, McLuhanism had been invented as a credo of the mildly reformist Democratic Party. Over the next four decades, its meaning had moved steadily rightwards. In 1983, Ithiel de Sola Pool – a Bell commission member – codified this neo-liberal appropriation of McLuhanism in his masterpiece: Technologies of Freedom. From software to soap operas, all forms of information would soon be traded as commodities over the Net. For the first time, everybody could be a media entrepreneur. By the end of the 1980s, this conservative remix had become the dominant form of American McLuhanism. George Gilder – a Republican Party activist – proclaimed the computer companies of northern California as the harbingers of a free market paradise. Not only Stalinist central planning, but also Social Democratic welfare provision were relics from the Fordist past. Looking at Silicon Valley, the neo-liberal prophets were convinced that the factory and the campus were synergising into a superior entity: the hi-tech entrepreneurial firm.

    By the time that the 1990s dotcom boom took off, McLuhanist technological determinism had become an unapologetic celebration of ‘out of control’ capitalism. In his New Rules for the New Economy, Kevin Kelly explained how technologies which were prototyped within the hi-tech gift economy could be successfully spun off into commercial products. Like the Stalinist elite, the music majors had found out to their cost that it was futile trying to resist the onrush of the McLuhanist future. In contrast, dotcom companies had shown how to transform user generated content and on-line communities into profitable enterprises. The phenomenal growth of MySpace, Bebo and YouTube demonstrates that successful businesses can be built upon Kelly’s dictum of following the free. Clever managers know how to make cybernetic communism serve establishment goals.

    Like their Stalinist predecessors, these 1990s proponents of McLuhanism saw themselves as the vanguard of the hi-tech utopia. As the early-adopters and beta-testers of the dotcom future, this privileged group was prefiguring today what the general public would be doing tomorrow. When everyone had access to the Net, participatory democracy and cooperative creativity would be the order of the day. But, until this happy moment arrived, humanity required the guidance of the cybernetic elite to reach the promised land. Ironically, in the 2000s, the boosters of the information society – like the Stalinists before them – are unexpectedly faced with the problem of living within their own future. Confounding the McLuhanist credo, the advent of the Net hasn’t marked the birth of a new humanistic and equalitarian civilisation. For more than four decades, the knowledge elite have asserted its control over space through ownership of time. Now, in the early-twenty-first century, the imaginary future of the information society is materialising in the present. What the McLuhanists have to explain is why utopia has been delayed.

    When the users of the Net are both consumers and producers of media, the vanguard has lost its ideological monopoly. Yet, at the same time, the arrival of the information society hasn’t precipitated a wider social transformation. Cybernetic communism is quite compatible with dotcom capitalism. Contrary to the tenets of McLuhanism, the convergence of media, telecommunications and computing has not – and never will – liberate humanity. The Net is a useful tool not a mechanical saviour. In the 2000s, ordinary people have taken control of sophisticated information technologies to improve their everyday lives and their social conditions. Freed from the preordained futures of McLuhanism, this emancipatory achievement can provide inspiration for new anticipations of the shape of things to come. Cooperative creativity and participatory democracy need to be extended from the virtual world into all areas of life. Rather than disciplining the present, our futurist visions should be open-ended and flexible. We are the inventors of our own technologies. We can intervene in history to realise our own interests. Our utopias provide the direction for the path of human progress. Let’s be hopeful and courageous when we imagine the better futures of libertarian social democracy.

     

    Response

    Carl Gudeian’s nettime rant

  • THE HI-TECH GIFT ECONOMY by Richard Barbrook

    Abstract

    During the Sixties, the New Left created a new form of radical politics: anarcho-communism. Above all, the Situationists and similar groups believed that the tribal gift economy proved that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. From May 1968 to the late Nineties, this utopian vision of anarcho-communism has inspired community media and DIY culture activists. Within the universities, the gift economy already was the primary method of socialising labour. From its earliest days, the technical structure and social mores of the Net has ignored intellectual property. Although the system has expanded far beyond the university, the self-interest of Net users perpetuates this hi-tech gift economy. As an everyday activity, users circulate free information as e-mail, on listservs, in newsgroups, within on-line conferences and through Web sites. As shown by the Apache and Linux programs, the hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. Contrary to the purist vision of the New Left, anarcho-communism on the Net can only exist in a compromised form. Money-commodity and gift relations are not just in conflict with each other, but also co-exist in symbiosis. The ‘New Economy’ of cyberspace is an advanced form of social democracy.

    The Legacy of the New Left

    “… when … [Ben Slivka] suggested that Microsoft consider giving away its browser, à la Netscape, Gates exploded and called him a ‘communist’ … [1]

    The Net is haunted by the disappointed hopes of the Sixties. Because this new technology symbolises another period of rapid change, many contemporary commentators look back to the stalled revolution of thirty years ago to explain what is happening now. Most famously, the editors of Wired continually pay homage to the New Left values of individual freedom and cultural dissent in their coverage of the Net. However, in their Californian ideology, these ideals of their youth are now going to be realised through technological determinism and free markets. The politics of ecstasy have been replaced by the economics of greed [2].

    Ironically, the New Left emerged in response to the ‘sell-out’ of an earlier generation. By the end of the Fifties, the heroes of the anti-fascist struggle had become the guardians of Cold War orthodoxies. Even within the arts, avant-garde experimentation had been transformed into fashionable styles of consumer society. The adoption of innovative styles and new techniques was no longer subversive. Frustrated with the recuperation of their parents’ generation, young people started looking for new methods of cultural and social activism. Above all, the Situationists proclaimed that the epoch of the political vanguard and the artistic avant-garde had passed. Instead of following the intellectual elite, everyone should instead determine their own destinies.

    “The situation is…made to be lived by its constructors. The role played by a passive…’public’ must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors but rather… ‘livers’ must steadily increase.’ [3]

    These New Left activists wanted to create opportunities for everyone to express their own hopes, dreams and desires. The Hegelian ‘grand narrative’ would culminate in the supersession of all mediations separating people from each other. Yet, despite their Hegelian modernism, the Situationists believed that the utopian future had been prefigured in the tribal past. For example, tribes in Polynesia organised themselves around the potlatch: the circulation of gifts. Within these societies, this gift economy bound people together into tribes and encouraged cooperation between different tribes. In contrast with the atomisation and alienation of bourgeois society, potlatches required intimate contacts and emotional authenticity [4]. According to the Situationists, the tribal gift economy demonstrated that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. After the New Left revolution, people would recreate this idyllic condition: anarcho-communism [5].

    However, the Situationists could not escape from the elitist tradition of the avant-garde. Despite their invocation of Hegel and Marx, the Situationists remained haunted by Nietzsche and Lenin. As in earlier generations, the rhetoric of mass participation simultaneously justified the leadership of the intellectual elite. Anarcho-communism was therefore transformed into the ‘mark of distinction’ for the New Left vanguard. As a consequence, the giving of gifts was seen as the absolute antithesis of market competition. There could be no compromise between tribal authenticity and bourgeois alienation. After the social revolution, the potlatch would completely supplant the commodity [6].

    In the two decades following the May 1968 revolution, this purist vision of anarcho-communism inspired community media activists. For instance, the radical ‘free radio’ stations created by New Left militants in France and Italy refused all funding from state and commercial sources. Instead, these projects tried to survive through donations of time and money from their supporters. Emancipatory media supposedly could only be produced within the gift economy [7]. During the late-Seventies, pro-situ attitudes were further popularised by the punk movement. Although rapidly commercialised, this sub-culture did encourage its members to form their own bands, make their own fashions and publish their own fanzines. This participatory ethic still shapes innovatory music and radical politics today. From raves to environmental protests, the spirit of May ’68 lives on within the DIY culture of the Nineties. The gift is supposedly about to replace the commodity [8].

    The Net as Really Existing Anarcho-Communism

    Despite originally being invented for the U. S. military, the Net was constructed around the gift economy. The Pentagon initially did try to restrict the unofficial uses of its computer network. However, it soon became obvious that the Net could only be successfully developed by letting its users build the system for themselves. Within the scientific community, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists don’t have to turn their intellectual work directly into marketable commodities. Instead, research results are publicised by ‘giving a paper’ at specialist conferences and by ‘contributing an article’ to professional journals. The collaboration of many different academics is made possible through the free distribution of information [9].

    Within small tribal societies, the circulation of gifts established close personal bonds between people. In contrast, the academic gift economy is used by intellectuals who are spread across the world. Despite the anonymity of the modern version of the gift economy, academics acquire intellectual respect from each other through citations in articles and other forms of public acknowledgement. Scientists therefore can only obtain personal recognition for their individual efforts by openly collaborating with each other through the academic gift economy. Although research is being increasingly commercialised, the giving away of findings remains the most efficient method of solving common problems within a particular scientific discipline [10].

    From its earliest days, the free exchange of information has therefore been firmly embedded within the technologies and social mores of cyberspace [11]. When New Left militants proclaimed that ‘information wants to be free’ back in the Sixties, they were preaching to computer scientists who were already living within the academic gift economy. Above all, the founders of the Net never bothered to protect intellectual property within computer-mediated communications. On the contrary, they were developing these new technologies to advance their careers inside the academic gift economy. Far from wanting to enforce copyright, the pioneers of the Net tried to eliminate all barriers to the distribution of scientific research. Technically, every act within cyberspace involves copying material from one computer to another. Once the first copy of a piece of information is placed on the Net, the cost of making each extra copy is almost zero. The architecture of the system presupposes that multiple copies of documents can easily be cached around the network. As Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the Web – points out:

    “Concepts of intellectual property, central to our culture, are not expressed in a way which maps onto the abstract information space. In an information space, we can consider the authorship of materials, and their perception; but … there is a need for the underlying infrastructure to be able to make copies simply for reasons of [technical] efficiency and reliability. The concept of ‘copyright’ as expressed in terms of copies made makes little sense.” [12]

    Within the commercial creative industries, advances in digital reproduction are feared for making the ‘piracy’ of copyright material ever easier. For the owners of intellectual property, the Net can only make the situation worse. In contrast, the academic gift economy welcomes technologies which improve the availability of data. Users should always be able to obtain and manipulate information with the minimum of impediments. The design of the Net therefore assumes that intellectual property is technically and socially obsolete [13].

    In France, the nationalised telephone monopoly has accustomed people to paying for the on-line services provided by Minitel. In contrast, the Net remains predominantly a gift economy even though the system has expanded far beyond the university. From scientists through hobbyists to the general public, the charmed circle of users was slowly built up through the adhesion of many localised networks to an agreed set of protocols. Crucially, the common standards of the Net include social conventions as well as technical rules. The giving and receiving of information without payment is almost never questioned. Although the circulation of gifts doesn’t necessarily create emotional obligations between individuals, people are still willing to donate their information to everyone else on the Net. Even selfish reasons encourage people to become anarcho-communists within cyberspace. By adding their own presence, every user contributes to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return, each individual has potential access to all the information made available by others within the Net. Everyone takes far more out of the Net than they can ever give away as an individual.

    “… the Net is far from altruistic, or it wouldn’t work… Because it takes as much effort to distribute one copy of an original creation as a million … you never lose from letting your product free…as long as you are compensated in return … What a miracle, then, that you receive not one thing in value in exchange – indeed there is no explicit act of exchange at all – but millions of unique goods made by others!” [14]

    Despite the commercialisation of cyberspace, the self-interest of Net users ensures that the hi-tech gift economy continues to flourish. For instance, musicians are using the Net for the digital distribution of their recordings to each other. By giving away their own work to this network community, individuals get free access to a far larger amount of music in return. Not surprisingly, the music business is worried about the increased opportunities for the ‘piracy’ of copyrighted recordings over the Net. Sampling, DJ-ing and mixing are already blurring property rights within dance music. However, the greatest threat to the commercial music corporations comes from the flexibility and spontaneity of the hi-tech gift economy. After it is completed, a new track can quickly be made freely available to a global audience. If someone likes the tune, they can download it for personal listening, use it as a sample or make their own remix. Out of the free circulation of information, musicians can form friendships, work together and inspire each other.

    “It’s all about doing it for yourself. Better than punk.” [15]

    Within the developed world, most politicians and corporate leaders believe that the future of capitalism lies in the commodification of information. Over the last few decades, intellectual property rights have been steadily tightened through new national laws and international agreements. Even human genetic material can now be patented [16]. Yet, at the ‘cutting edge’ of the emerging information society, money-commodity relations play a secondary role to those created by a really existing form of anarcho-communism. For most of its users, the Net is somewhere to work, play, love, learn and discuss with other people. Unrestricted by physical distance, they collaborate with each other without the direct mediation of money or politics. Unconcerned about copyright, they give and receive information without thought of payment. In the absence of states or markets to mediate social bonds, network communities are instead formed through the mutual obligations created by gifts of time and ideas.

    “This informal, unwritten social contract is supported by a blend of strong-tie and weak-tie relationships among people who have a mixture of motives and ephemeral affiliations. It requires one to give something, and enables one to receive something. … I find that the help I receive far outweighs the energy I expend helping others; a marriage of altruism and self-interest.” [17]

    On the Net, enforcing copyright payments represents the imposition of scarcity on a technical system designed to maximise the dissemination of information. The protection of intellectual property stops all users having access to every source of knowledge. Commercial secrecy prevents people from helping each other to solve common problems. The inflexibility of information commodities inhibits the efficient manipulation of digital data. In contrast, the technical and social structure of the Net has been developed to encourage open cooperation among its participants. As an everyday activity, users are building the system together. Engaged in ‘interactive creativity’, they send e-mail, take part in listservs, contribute to newsgroups, participate within on-line conferences and produce Web sites [18]. Lacking copyright protection, information can be freely adapted to suit the users’ needs. Within the hi-tech gift economy, people successfully work together through “… an open social process involving evaluation, comparison and collaboration.” [19]

    The hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. For instance, Bill Gates admits that Microsoft’s biggest competitor in the provision of Web servers comes from the Apache program [20]. Instead of being marketed by a commercial company, this program is shareware [21]. Like similar projects, this virtual machine is being continually developed by its techie users. Because its source code is not protected by copyright, the program can be modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programmingskills. When someone does make a contribution to a shareware project, the gift of their labour is rewarded by recognition within the community of user-developers.

    The inflexibility of commodified software programs is compounded by their greater unreliability. Even Microsoft can’t mobilise the amount of labour given to some successful shareware programs by their devotees. Without enough techies looking at a program, all its bugs can never be found [22]. The greater social and technical efficiency of anarcho-communism is therefore inhibiting the commercial take-over of the Net. Shareware programs are now beginning to threaten the core product of the Microsoft empire: the Windows operating system. Starting from the original software program by Linus Torvalds, a community of user-developers are together building their own non-proprietary operating system: Linux. For the first time, Windows has a serious competitor. Anarcho-communism is now the only alternative to the dominance of monopoly capitalism.

    “Linux is subversive. Who could have thought even five years ago that a world-class operating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?” [23]

    The ‘New Economy’ is a Mixed Economy

    Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, almost nobody still believes in the inevitable victory of communism. On the contrary, large numbers of people accept that the Hegelian ‘end of history’ has culminated in American neo-liberal capitalism [24]. Yet, at exactly this moment in time, a really existing form of anarcho-communism is being constructed within the Net, especially by people living in the U. S. When they go on-line, almost everyone spends most of their time participating within the gift economy rather than engaging in market competition. Because users receive much more information than they can ever give away, there is no popular clamour for imposing the equal exchange of the marketplace on the Net. Once again, the ‘end of history’ for capitalism appears to be communism.

    For the hi-tech gift economy was not an immanent possibility in every age. On the contrary, the market and the state could only be surpassed in this specific sector at this particular historical moment. Crucially, people need sophisticated media, computing and telecommunications technologies to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. A manually-operated press produced copies which were relatively expensive, limited in numbers and impossible to alter without recopying. After generations of technological improvements, the same quantity of text on the Net costs almost nothing to circulate, can be copied as needed and can be remixed at will. In addition, individuals need both time and money to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. While a large number of the world’s population still lives in poverty, people within the industrialised countries have steadily reduced their hours of employment and increased their wealth over a long period of social struggles and economic reorganisations. By working for money during some of the week, people can now enjoy the delights of giving gifts at other times. Only at this particular historical moment have the technical and social conditions of the metropolitan countries developed sufficiently for the emergence of digital anarcho-communism [25].

    “Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [26]

    The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture: the gift was the absolute antithesis of the commodity. Yet, anarcho-communism only exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, money-commodity and gift relations are not just in conflict with each other, but also co-exist in symbiosis. On the one hand, each method of working does threaten to supplant the other. The hi-tech gift economy heralds the end of private property in ‘cutting edge’ areas of the economy. The digital capitalists want to privatise the shareware programs and enclose the social spaces built through voluntary effort. The potlatch and the commodity remain irreconcilable.

    Yet, on the other hand, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial Net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. For instance, Netscape has tried to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence from its foundation. Under threat from the Microsoft monopoly, the company has to ally itself with the hacker community to avoid being overwhelmed. It started by distributing its Web browser as a gift. Today the source code of this program is freely available and the development of products for Linux has become a top priority. The commercial survival of Netscape depends upon successfully collaborating with hackers from the hi-tech gift economy. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital [27].

    “”Hi there Mr CEO [Chief Executive Officer] – tell me, do you have any strategic problem right now that is bigger than whether Microsoft is going to either crush you or own your soul in a few years? No? You don’t? OK, well, listen carefully then. You cannot survive against Bill Gates [by] playing Bill Gates’ game. To thrive, or even survive, you’re going to have to change the rules …”” [28]

    The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. The state isn’t just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. At the same time, the public sector provides essential support for the hi-tech gift economy. In the past, the founders of the Net never bothered to incorporate intellectual property within the system because their wages were funded from taxation. In the future, governments will have to impose universal service provisions upon commercial telecommunications companies if all sections of society are to have the opportunity to circulate free information. Furthermore, when access is available, many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. Within the digital mixed economy, anarcho-communism is also symbiotic with the state.

    This miscegenation occurs almost everywhere within cyberspace. For instance, an on-line conference site can be constructed as a labour of love, but still be partially funded by advertising and public money. Crucially, this hybridisation of working methods is not confined within particular projects. When they’re on-line, people constantly pass from one form of social activity to another. For instance, in one session, a Net user could first purchase some clothes from an e-commerce catalogue, then look for information about education services from the local council’s site and then contribute some thoughts to an on-going discussion on a listserver for fiction-writers. Without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy. Far from realising theory in its full purity, working methods on the Net are inevitably compromised. The ‘New Economy’ is an advanced form of social democracy [29].

    At the end of the twentieth century, anarcho-communism is no longer confined to avant-garde intellectuals. What was once revolutionary has now become banal. As Net access grows, more and more ordinary people are circulating free information across the Net. Crucially, their potlatches are not attempts to regain a lost emotional authenticity. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May ’68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. Sometimes they buy commodities on-line and access state-funded services. However, they usually prefer to circulate gifts amongst each other. Net users will always obtain much more than will ever be contributed in return. By giving away something which is well-made, they will gain recognition from those who download their work. For most people, the gift economy is simply the best method of collaborating together in cyberspace. Within the mixed economy of the Net, anarcho-communism has become an everyday reality.

    “We must rediscover the pleasure of giving: giving because you have so much. What beautiful and priceless potlatches the affluent society will see – whether it likes it or not! – when the exuberance of the younger generation discovers the pure gift.” [30]

    Footnotes

    1. James Wallace, Overdrive, p. 266.

    2. For a critique of the neo-liberal politics of Wired, see Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    3. Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’, p. 25.”

    4. The Situationists discovered the tribal gift economy in Marcel Mauss, The Gift.

    5. For the historical antecedents of New Left anarcho-communism, see Richard Gombin, Les Origins du Gauchisme, pp. 99-151. For its later influence on the new social movements, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, pp. 204-212.

    6. For instance, in their famous analysis of the 1965 Los Angeles Watts riots, the Situationists praised looting as the revolutionary supersession of money-commodity relations: “… instead of being eternally pursued in the rat race of alienated labour and increasing but unmet social needs, real desires begin to be expressed in festival, in playful self-assertion, in the potlatch of destruction.” Situationist International, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’, p. 155.

    7. See John Downing, Radical Media.

    8. DIY stands for ‘do-it-yourself’. This slogan is used to emphasise the need for people to tackle social problems through collective direct action rather than to wait for someone else to solve them. See Elaine Brass, Sophie Poklewski Koziell and Denise Searle, Gathering Force.

    9. See Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’, p. 29.

    10. This is why the increasing role of private funding can hamper as well as help academic research. See David Noble, ‘Digital Diploma Mills’.

    11. See Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, pp. 126-132.

    12. Tim Berners-Lee, ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’, p. 11.

    13. See Neil Kleinman, ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology’.

    14. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, p 10.”

    15. Steve Elliot of Slug Oven quoted in Karlin Lillington, ‘No! It’s Not OK, Computer’, page 3. Also see Andrew Leonard, ‘Mutiny on the Net’.

    16. For instance, one of the major components of the 1993 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was increased protection for patents and copyrights, especially with agriculture and medicine, see John Frow, ‘Information as Gift and Commodity’.

    17. Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pp. 57-58.

    18. Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’, p. 5.

    19. Bernard Lang, ‘Free Software For All’, p. 3.

    20. Keith W. Porterfield, ‘Information Wants to be Valuable’, p. 2.

    21. Shareware is also often known as freeware or open source software. All these names emphasise that the program is a gift to anyone on the Net, especially those who have the skills to improve its code. See the use of these terms in Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’; Free Software Foundation, ‘What is Free Software?’; and Eric S. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’.

    22. See Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’.

    23. Eric S. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’, p. 1.

    24. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man.

    25. “Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods.” Eric S. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, p. 9.

    26. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, p. 700.

    27. See Netscape Communications Corporation, ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’.

    28. Eric Raymond describing his pitch on behalf of shareware to commercial software companies in Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, p. 8. Bill Gates doesn’t just believe that free software is ‘communism’, but even allowing other companies to have access to Microsoft products before their release date! See James Wallace, Overdrive, p. 57.

    29. Wired uses ‘The New Economy’ as a synonym for its neo-liberal fantasies about the Net. See Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy.

    30. Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, p. 70.

    References

    Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, (1996) ‘The Californian Ideology’, Science as Culture, volume 6 part 1, number 26, pages 44-72,

    Tim Berners-Lee, (1996) ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’.

    Tim Berners-Lee, (1997) ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’.

    Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle (editor), (1997) Gathering Force: DIY culture – radical action for those tired of waiting, Big Issue, London.

    Guy Debord, (1981) ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’ in Ken Knabb (editor), Situationist International Anthology, Bureau of Public Secrets,
    Berkeley CA.

    John Downing, (1984) Radical Media: the political experience of alternative communication, South End Press, Boston Massachusetts.

    Free Software Foundation, (1996) ‘What is Free Software?’ .

    John Frow, (1996) ‘Information as Gift and Commodity’, New Left Review, number 219, September/October, pages 89-108.

    Francis Fukuyama, (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London.

    Mark Geise, (1996) ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet: a cultural clash and its implications in framing the debate on the information superhighway’ in Lance Strate, Ron Jacobson and Stephanie B. Gibson (editors), Communications and Cyberspace: social interaction in an electronic environment, Hampton Press, Cresskill New Jersey, pages 123-141.

    Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, (1998) ‘Cooking Pot Markets: an economic model for the trade in free goods and services on the Internet’, First Monday, volume 3, number 3, March, .

    Richard Gombin, (1971) Les Origins du Gauchisme, Editions du Seuil, Paris.

    Warren O. Hagstrom, (1982) ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’ in Barry Barnes and David Edge (editors), Science in Context: readings in the sociology of science, The Open University, Milton Keynes, pages 21-34.

    George Katsiaficas, (1987) The Imagination of the New Left: a global analysis of 1968, South End Press, Boston.

    Kevin Kelly, (1997) ‘New Rules for the New Economy: twelve dependable principles for thriving in a turbulent world’, Wired, volume 5, number 9, September, pages 140-144, 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196-197.

    Neil Kleinman, (1996) ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology’ in Lance Strate, Ron Jacobson and Stephanie B. Gibson (editors), Communications and Cyberspace: social interaction in an electronic environment, Hampton Press, Creskill New Jersey, pages 59-82.

    Bernard Lang, (1998) ‘Free Software For All: freeware and the issue of intellectual property’, Le Monde Diplomatique, January.

    Andrew Leonard, (1998) ‘Mutiny on the Net’, Salon.

    Andrew Leonard, (1998) ‘Let My Software Go!’, Salon.

    Karlin Lillington, (1998) “No! It’s Not OK, Computer,” The Guardian, On-Line Section, 6th April, pages 2-3.

    Karl Marx, (1973) Grundrisse, Penguin, London.

    Marcel Mauss, (1990) The Gift: the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies, Routledge, London.

    Netscape Communications Corporation, (1998) ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’, Netscape Press Release, 22 January.

    David Noble, (1998) ‘Digital Diploma Mills: the automation of higher education’, First Monday, volume 3, number 1, January.

    Keith W. Porterfield, (1997) ‘Information Wants to be Valuable: a report from the first O’Reilly Perl conference’.

    Eric S. Raymond, (1998), ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’, First Monday, volume 3, number 3, March.

    Eric S. Raymond, (1998), ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, First Monday, volume 3, number 10, October.

    Howard Rheingold, (1994) The Virtual Community: finding connection in a computerised world, Secker & Warburg, London.

    Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’, The Guardian, On-Line Section, 9th April.

    Situationist International, (1981) ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’ in Ken Knabb (editor), Situationist International Anthology, Bureau of Public Secrets,
    Berkeley CA.

    Raoul Vaneigem, (1972) The Revolution of Everyday Life, Practical Paradise, London.

    James Wallace, (1997) Overdrive: Bill Gates and the Race to Control Cyberspace, John Wiley, New York.

  • THE::CYBER.COM/MUNIST::MANIFESTO by Richard Barbrook

    A spectre is haunting the Net: the spectre of communism. Whatever their professed political beliefs, every user dreams of the digital transcendence of capitalism. Yet, at the same time, even the most dedicated leftist can no longer truly believe in communism. The horrors of totalitarianism have discredited its promises of social emancipation. Seizing this opportunity, the prophets of American neo-liberalism are now laying claim to the future. The adoption of information technologies will lead to the privatisation and deregulation of all economic activities. The freedoms of the information society will be created by an elite of entrepreneurs, technocrats and ideologues. Needing to popularise their prophecies, right-wing gurus emphasise that every hi-tech professional can compete to join the emerging digital aristocracy. Above all, they predict that everyone will eventually enjoy the technological marvels currently only available to the lucky few. In the late-1990s, the prophets of American neo-liberalism measure our progress towards utopia through increases in the ownership of digital artefacts: home computers, Net connections, mobile phones and laptops. Ironically, this right-wing futurism echoes the preconceptions of Stalinist communism. In the former Soviet Union, the enlightened minority was also leading the ignorant masses towards eventual emancipation. Any suffering caused by the introduction of new technologies was justified by the promise of future liberation. During the 1930s, Josef Stalin similarly measured progress towards utopia through the rising output of modern products: steel, cars, tractors and machine-tools. Although the Soviet Union has long disappeared, the ideologues of American neo-liberalism are still inspired by the Stalinist version of communism.

    vanguard party digerati
    The Five-Year Plan The New Paradigm
    boy-meets-tractor nerd-meets-Net
    Third International Third Wave
    Moscow Silicon Valley
    Pravda Wired
    party line unique thought
    Soviet democracy electronic town halls
    Lysenkoism memetics
    society-as-factory society-as-hive
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    Stakhanovite norm-busting overworked contract labour
    purges downsizing
    Russian nationalism Californian chauvinism

    According to most politicians, executives and pundits, the Net is founded upon the buying and selling of information. As in other cultural industries, intellectual labour within cyberspace must be enclosed into commodities and protected by copyright. However, computer-mediated communications was never designed for trading information. On the contrary, the scientists who invented the Net were working within the academic gift economy. As a consequence, they embedded the free distribution of information within the technical structures and social mores of the Net. Over time, the charmed circle of users has slowly grown from scientists through hobbyists to the general public. Crucially, each new member doesn’t just observe the technical rules of the system, but also adheres to certain social conventions. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. By giving away their own personal efforts, Net users always receive the results of much greater amounts of labour in return from others. Instead of needing a market, people can now work together by circulating gifts between each other. Although many on-line activities are trivial, some collaborations are creating very sophisticated products, such as the Linux operating system and interactive music pieces. Despite their power and wealth, the multi-media multinationals are unable to impose the commodification of intellectual labour within cyberspace. At the dawn of the new millennium, Net users are developing a much more efficient and enjoyable way of working together: cyber-communism.

    commodity gift
    enclosure disclosure
    copyright piracy
    fixed fluid
    product process
    proprietary open source
    digital encryption free download
    original recording latest remix
    scarcity abundance
    alienation friendship
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    market competition network communities
    e-commerce cyber-communism

    In earlier times, the abolition of capitalism was envisaged in apocalyptic terms: revolutionary uprisings, mass mobilisations and modernising dictatorships. In contrast, Net users are engaged in the slow process of superseding capitalism. In this dialectical movement, hi-tech neo-liberals perfect the existing relations of production by developing e-commerce: work-as-commodity. Reacting against this enclosure of cyberspace, left-wing activists celebrate the piracy of copyright material within the on-line potlatch: waste-as-gift. For those nostalgic for ideological certainty, there can be no compromise between these contradictory visions of the Net. Yet, the synthesis of these dialectical opposites is happening for pragmatic reasons. The low ‘cost of entry’ into e-commerce is due to the absence of proprietary barriers within the Net. The rapid expansion of the hi-tech gift economy is facilitated by hardware and software sold by large companies. Above all, Net users always adopt the working methods which are most beneficial to their own interests. Sometimes, they will engage in e-commerce. On most occasions, they will prefer to collaborate within the hi-tech gift economy. Many social activities are already organised by voluntary labour and with donated resources. Now, with the advent of the Net, this gift economy is challenging market competition at the cutting-edge of modernity. Living within a prosperous society, many people are no longer solely motivated by financial rewards. If they have sufficient time and money, they will also work to gain the respect of their peers for their efforts. Within the Net, people are developing the most advanced form of collective labour: work-as-gift. During the last two hundred years, the intimate bonds of kinship and friendship have simultaneously inhibited and underpinned the impersonal relationships needed for market competition. The modern has always co-existed with the traditional. Now, within cyberspace, the exchange of commodities is being both intensified and prevented by the circulation of gifts. The modern must synthesise with the hyper-modern. Far from needing leadership by a heroic elite, ordinary people can now successfully construct their own digital future. In the age of the Net, cyber-communism is a mundane everyday experience.

    The Positive: The Negation: The Negation of the Negation:
    work-as-commodity waste-as-gift work-as-gift

    e-commerce potlatch network communities

    reactionary modernism revolutionary anti-modernism revolutionary modernism

     

  • CYBER-COMMUNISM by Richard Barbrook

    HOW THE AMERICANS ARE SUPERSEDING CAPITALISM IN CYBERSPACE

    ‘…is the impact of the …information revolution on capitalism not the ultimate exemplification of… Marx’s thesis that: “at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production…”? …does the prospect of the… “global village” not signal the end of market relations… at least in the sphere of digitalised information?’ (Zizek 1998: 33-4)

    Ghosts in the Machine

    A spectre is haunting the Net: the spectre of communism. Reflecting the extravagance of the new media, this spectre takes two distinct forms: the theoretical appropriation of Stalinist communism and the everyday practice of cyber-communism. Whatever their professed political beliefs, all users of the Net enthusiastically participate in this left-wing revival. Whether in theory or practice, each of them desires the digital transcendence of capitalism. Yet, at the same time, even the most dedicated leftist can no longer truly believe in communism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, this ideology is completely discredited. The promises of social emancipation turned into the horrors of totalitarianism. The dreams of industrial modernity culminated in economic stagnation. Far from representing the future, communism seems like a relic from the past.

    Above all, the Soviet Union was incapable of leading the information revolution. The political and economic structures of Stalinist communism were far too inflexible and secretive for the emergence of the new technological paradigm. How could the totalitarian party allow everyone to produce media without its supervision? How could the central planning agency permit producers to form collaborative networks without its authorisation? A much more open and spontaneous society was needed to develop the Net. Excited by the libertarian potential of further digital convergence, the proponents of almost every radical ideology have recently updated their positions. Yet, among the cyber-feminists, communication guerrillas, techno-nomads and digital anarchists, there is no new version of the once dominant current of Stalinist communism. Even its former acolytes admit that the Soviet Union exemplified the worst failures of Fordism: authoritarianism, conformity and environmental degradation. (Hall and Jacques: 1989)

    The ideologues of American neo-liberalism have seized this opportunity to lay claim to the future. For almost thirty years, they have been predicting that new technologies were about to create a utopian civilisation: the information society. For instance, the Tofflers have long been convinced that the convergence of computing, telecommunications and the media would free individuals from the clutches of both big business and big government. (Toffler 1980) Similarly, Ithiel de Sola Pool prophesied that interactive television would allow everyone to make their own media and participate in political decision-making. (de Sola Pool 1983) Despite their radical rhetoric, these conservative pundits were primarily interested in proving that information technologies would force the privatisation and deregulation of all economic activity. Their post-Fordist future was the return to the liberal past. When the Net became popular, this free market fundamentalism was quickly adapted to fit the new situation. Most famously, Wired argues that the ‘New Paradigm’ of unregulated competition between cyber-entrepreneurs is extending individual freedom and encouraging technological innovation in the USA. (Barbrook and Cameron 1996) As the Net spreads across the world, the material and spiritual values of American neo-liberalism will eventually be imposed on the whole of humanity. As Louis Rossetto – the founding editor of Wired – explains:

    ‘This new world [of the Net] is characterised by a new global economy that is inherently anti-hierarchical and decentralist, and that disrespects national boundaries or the control of politicians and bureaucrats… and by a global, networked consciousness… that is turning… bankrupt electoral politics… into a dead end.’ (Hudson 1996: 30)

     

    The Cult of the Digerati

    The narcissism of the Californian ideology reflects the self-confidence of a triumphant nation. With the Cold War won, the USA no longer has any serious military or ideological competitors. Even its economic rivals in the EU and East Asia have been surpassed. According to most commentators, the renaissance of American hegemony is founded upon its lead in new information technologies. No country can match the ‘smart weapons’ of the US military. Few companies can compete against the ‘smart machines’ used by American corporations. Above all, the USA dominates the cutting-edge of technological innovation: the Net. Realising the American dream, a lucky few are making huge fortunes from floating their hi-tech companies on Wall Street. (Greenwald 1998) Mesmerised by the commercial potential of e-commerce, many others are speculating their savings on new media share issues.

    ‘Internet stocks… may be the hottest things since the Dutch tulip-bulb craze in the 1600s’. (Kadlec 1999: 1)

    Despite all the wealth being generated by technological innovation, the division between rich and poor continues to widen in the USA. (Elliott 1999) In contrast with the European and East Asian forms of capitalism, American neo-liberalism can successfully combine economic progress with social immobility. Ever since the 1789 French revolution, conservatives have searched for this union of opposites: reactionary modernism. (Herf 1984) Although necessary for the survival of capitalism, the social implications of economic growth have always frightened the Right. Over the long-run, continual industrialisation slowly erodes class privileges. As their incomes rise, ordinary people can increasingly determine the political concerns and cultural attitudes of society. As a result, successive generations of conservatives have faced the dilemma of reconciling economic expansion with social stasis. Despite deep ideological differences, they have always proposed the same solution: the formation of a hi-tech aristocracy. (Nietzsche 1961; Ortega y Gasset 1932)

    The earliest versions of this reactionary fantasy emphasised the hierarchical division of labour under Fordism. Although many skills were destroyed by the industrial system, new specialisms were simultaneously created. Within Fordism, engineers, bureaucrats, teachers and other professionals formed an intermediate layer between management and the shopfloor. (Elger 1979) Unlike most employees, this section of the working class received high incomes and escaped subordination to the assembly-line. Fearful of losing their limited privileges, some professionals became enthusiastic supporters of reactionary modernism. Instead of fighting for social equality, they dreamt of founding a new aristocracy: the technocracy.

    ‘Reason, science, and technology are not inert processes by which men [and women] discover, communicate, and apply facts disinterestedly and without passion, but means by which, through systems, some men [and women] organise and control the lives of other men [and women] according to their conceptions as to what is preferable.’ (Israel 1972: 2-3)

    During the boom years of Fordism, the new ruling class was supposedly being formed by the managers and other professionals from large corporations and government departments. (Burnham 1945) However, when the economy went into crisis in the early-1970s, right-wing intellectuals were forced to look for supporters amongst other sections of the intermediate layer. Inspired by Marshall McLuhan, they soon discovered the growing number of people developing new information technologies. (McLuhan 1964) For almost three decades, conservative gurus have been predicting that the new ruling class would be composed of venture capitalists, innovative scientists, hacker geniuses, media stars and neo-liberal ideologues: the digerati. (Bell 1973; Toffler 1980; Kelly 1994) Seeking to popularise their prophecies, they always claim that every hi-tech professional has the opportunity to become a member of this new aristocracy. Within the convergent industries, skilled workers are essential for the development of original products, such as software programs and website designs. In common with many of their peers, most digital artisans suffer from the insecurity of contract employment. However, they also are better paid and have greater autonomy over their work. As in the past, this ambiguous social position can encourage gullibility towards reactionary modernism. Chasing the American dream, many hi-tech workers hope to make millions from founding their own company. Instead of identifying with their fellow employees, they aspire to join the digerati: the new technocracy of the Net. (Kroker and Weinstein 1994)

    Unlike in earlier forms of conservatism, this desire for domination over others is no longer openly expressed in the Californian ideology. Instead, its gurus claim that the rule of the digerati will benefit everyone. For they are the inventors of sophisticated machines and the improvers of production methods. They are pioneering the hi-tech services which will eventually be enjoyed by the whole population. Over time, the digerati will transform the restrictions of Fordism into the freedoms of the information society. The compromises of representative democracy will be replaced by personal participation within the ‘electronic town hall’. The limits on personal creativity in the existing media will be overcome by interactive forms of aesthetic expression. Even the physical confines of the body will be transcended within cyberspace. In the Californian ideology, the autocracy of the few in the short-term is necessary for the liberation of the many in the long-term. (Toffler 1980; Kelly 1994; Hudson 1996; Dyson 1997)

    ‘Not haves and have-nots – [but have-nows and] have-laters.’ (Rossetto 1996)

     

    The Liberating Minority

    What is now expected from the digerati in the age of the Net was once predicted about other heroic elites in the times of steel and electricity. Ever since the late-nineteenth century, science fiction novelists have fantasised about a small group of scientists and philosophers inventing the technological fix for the problems of society. (Bellamy 1982; Wells 1913) Among political activists, this faith in the leading role of the enlightened minority has an even older pedigree. At the peak of the French revolution in the 1790s, the Jacobins decided that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. Although their regime was fighting for political and cultural freedom, substantial sections of the population violently resisted the modernisation of French society. According to the Jacobins, the minds of these traditionalists had been corrupted by the aristocracy and the clergy. The revolutionary dictatorship was needed not only to crush armed rebellions, but also to popularise the principles of republican democracy. For only once everyone had been educated could all citizens participate in political decision-making. The tyranny of the minority in the short-term would lead to democracy for the majority in the long-term. (Brinton 1961; Barbrook 1995: 19-37)

    Although the Jacobins only held power for a few years, their example has inspired revolutionary movements for generations. In many countries, radical groups have faced the identical problem of transforming traditional communities into industrial societies. Whatever their ideological differences, every revolutionary minority had the same mission: leading the masses towards modernity. By the mid-nineteenth century, the European Left had realised that this goal of political and cultural emancipation could only be achieved through economic progress. Henri de Saint-Simon had explained that the power of the aristocracy and clergy was founded upon agriculture. If the economy could be modernised, wealth and power would inevitably transfer to members of the new industrial professions: entrepreneurs, workers, politicians, artists and scientists. Like the Jacobins, Saint-Simon argued that this new elite shouldn’t just look after its own interests. For these modernisers also had the historical task of liberating their less-fortunate fellow citizens from poverty and ignorance. By creating economic abundance, the enlightened minority would enable everyone to enjoy happy and productive lives.

    ‘Politics should now be nothing more than the science of providing people with as many material goods and as much moral satisfaction as possible.’ (Saint-Simon and Halévy 1975: 280)

    Inspired by Saint-Simon, early socialists believed that economic growth would inevitably lead to political and cultural emancipation. Under capitalism, there had to be continual improvements in the methods and machinery used to make goods and services: the forces of production. Over time, these advances were slowly undermining the private ownership of business: the relations of production. According to this version of Saint-Simon, the increasing interdependence of the modern economy would eventually force the adoption of more collective forms of social organisation. Whatever their current difficulties, the parliamentary parties of the European Left were confident of eventual victory. Sooner or later, the development of the forces of production would democratise the relations of production. (Marx 1970: 20-21; Engels 1975: 74-101)

    By the mid-twentieth century, this Marxist remix of Saint-Simon had also been appropriated by apologists of totalitarianism. Even before seizing power, V.I. Lenin had argued that revolutionary intellectuals should form a prototype of the Jacobin dictatorship: the vanguard party. (Lenin 1975) Under the old order, the minds of most people were filled with incorrect ideologies from right-wing newspapers, churches and other cultural institutions. The enlightened minority had the historical duty of leading these ignorant masses towards the utopian future. After the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin and his followers were able to create a modernising dictatorship. Like its predecessor in 1790s France, this new regime was committed to fighting against reactionary forces and to educating the whole population. (Lenin 1975a) In addition, the revolutionary dictatorship had acquired an even more important task: the industrialisation of the Russian economy. Appropriating the analysis of Saint-Simon and his Marxist interpreters, Lenin claimed that economic modernisation would eventually lead to political and cultural liberation. By imposing authoritarian rule in the short-term, the Russian revolutionaries hoped to construct participatory democracy in the long-run. (Lenin 1932; Bukharin 1971)

    This determination to modernise the economy soon led to the removal of all political and cultural freedoms. The promise of eventual emancipation justified the murder and imprisonment of millions. The creativity of artists was reduced to making propaganda for the totalitarian party. The modernising dictatorship had even lost interest in improving the living conditions of the masses. (Ciliga 1979: 261-291) Instead, the Soviet leadership became obsessed with the introduction of new technologies: the mechanical proof of increasing productive forces. By the early-1930s, Josef Stalin – the successor of Lenin – was measuring progress towards the utopian future by rises in the output of industrial goods: steel, cars, tractors and machine-tools. (Stalin 1954: 512-520) Economic development had become an end in itself.

    ‘The results of the Five-Year Plan [of industrialisation] have shown that the capitalist system… has become obsolete and must give way to another, higher, Soviet, socialist system…’ (Stalin 1954: 541-542)

    Back in the nineteenth century, there had been no clear definition of communism. While Mikhail Bakunin had found its antecedents within peasant communities, Karl Marx believed that the new system was prefigured by industrial co-operatives. (Bakunin 1973: 182-194; Marx 1959: 435-441) But, after the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, there could no longer be any doubt about the correct interpretation of communism. Across the world, almost every revolutionary movement embraced some variant of the Stalinist creed. The radical intellectuals must form a vanguard party to overthrow the existing order. Once in power, this revolutionary minority had to set up the modernising dictatorship. As well as providing security and education, the totalitarian state would organise the rapid development of the economy. (Djilas 1966) Almost all radicals believed that this Stalinist version of communism had been proved both in the factory and on the battlefield. Once the Cold War started, any other interpretations were marginalised. For nearly fifty years, the imperial rivalry between the two superpowers was expressed as a fierce ideological conflict: Russian communism versus American capitalism.

    Stalin in Silicon Valley

    During the Cold War, each side claimed that its particular socio-economic structures represented the future of all humanity. Despite championing rival systems, the apologists of both superpowers still shared a common – and unacknowledged – theoretical source: Saint-Simon. Ever since the 1917 revolution, the Russian state had been using his futurist prophecies to justify its actions. Learning from its Cold War opponent, the US government began making similar claims about its policies. Although promoting liberal capitalism, American propagandists enthusiastically mimicked the theoretical rhetoric of Stalinist communism. The power of the minority of capitalists was in the long-term interests of the majority of the population. Any flaws in American society would be soon solved by further economic growth. Above all, the utopian potential of the USA was proved by continual introduction of new technologies: the symbol of increasing productive forces. (Rostow 1971) Alongside their military-political contest over ‘spheres of influence’, the two superpowers also competed over who represented the future.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t end the theoretical influence of Stalinist communism over right-wing American intellectuals. On the contrary, the global mission of the USA had been confirmed by victory over its totalitarian rival. According to one apologist, American neo-liberalism is now the realisation of the Hegelian ‘end of history’. Although wars and conflicts will continue, there is no longer any alternative form of socio-economic system. (Fukuyama 1992) For the proponents of the Californian ideology, this narcissistic assumption is proved by American dominance over the cutting-edge of economic modernity: the Net. If other countries also want to enter the information age, they will have to imitate the peculiar social system of the USA. Like its Cold War predecessors, this contemporary celebration of American neo-liberalism appropriates many theoretical assumptions from Stalinist communism. Once again, the enlightened minority is leading the ignorant masses towards a utopian civilisation. Any suffering caused by the introduction of information technologies is justified by the promise of future liberation. (Hudson 1996: 33) Echoing the Russian tyrant, the digerati even measure progress towards utopia by increasing ownership of modern artefacts: home computers, beepers, mobile phones and laptops. (Katz 1997: 71-72) Although the Soviet Union has long disappeared, the proponents of the Californian ideology are still appropriating the theoretical legacy of Stalinist communism:

    vanguard party digerati
    The Five-Year Plan The New Paradigm
    boy-meets-tractor nerd-meets-Net
    Third International Third Wave
    Moscow Silicon Valley
    Pravda Wired
    party line unique thought
    Soviet democracy electronic town halls
    Lysenkoism memetics
    society-as-factory society-as-hive
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    Stakhanovite norm-busting overworked contract labour
    purges downsizing
    Russian nationalism Californian chauvinism

     

    The Revenge of Saint-Simon

    Across the industrialised world, this conservative appropriation of Stalinism now dominates discussions about the Net. Every guru celebrates the emergence of the new technocracy: the digerati. Every pundit claims that these pioneers of the Net are building a new utopia: the information society. Yet, like their Soviet predecessors, contemporary right-wing intellectuals can only produce corrupted versions of Saint-Simon’s prophecy. While this socialist philosopher wanted economic progress to liberate everyone, these proponents of reactionary modernism exclude the majority of the population from their hi-tech future. For the privileges of the digerati depend upon the subordination of the unenlightened masses. In the Californian ideology, permanent technological revolution is always identified with unchanging social hierarchy. However, without the promise of eventual redemption, economic modernisation becomes an end in itself. Once again, conservative philosophers are promising an imaginary future to dissuade people from improving their lived present.

    Although always imminent, the arrival of the information society must be perpetually postponed. As in the former Soviet Union, the prophecy of Saint-Simon is never supposed to be actually realised within the USA. On the contrary, the development of the forces of production is designed to reinforce the existing relations of production. For both public and private institutions only introduce new information technologies to advance their own interests. Back in the 1960s, the US military funded the invention of the Net to fight nuclear wars. Ever since the 1970s, financial markets have used computer networks to impose their hegemony over the entire world. During the last few years, both capitalist companies and government departments have adopted the Net to improve communications with their employees, contractors and clients. At the moment, every speculator on Wall Street is looking for the cyber-entrepreneur who is building the next Microsoft. Despite all the utopian predictions of the digerati, there appears to be nothing inherently emancipatory in the convergence of computing, telecommunications and the media. Like earlier forms of capitalism, the information society remains dominated by the hierarchies of the market and the state. (Schiller 1995; Winston 1998: 321-336)

    At the beginning of the new millennium, American neo-liberalism seems to have successfully achieved the contradictory aims of reactionary modernism: economic progress and social immobility. Because the long-term goal of liberating everyone will never be reached, the short-term rule of the digerati can last forever. Yet, as in the former Soviet Union, this dialectic of development and stasis is inherently unstable. By modernising agricultural societies, the ruling parties of Stalinist communism slowly destroyed the foundations of their own power. Over time, the relations of production formed by totalitarianism became incompatible with the continual expansion of the forces of production. At this historical moment, Saint-Simon finally had his revenge on his false disciples.

    ‘The [Stalinist] communist revolution… has brought about a measure of industrial civilisation to vast areas of Europe and Asia. In this way, material bases have actually been created for a future freer society. Thus, while bringing about the most complete despotism, the [Stalinist] communist revolution has also created the basis for the abolition of despotism.’ (Djilas 1966: 41-42)

    Like its erstwhile opponent, American neo-liberalism is now also being undermined by the development of the forces of production. As predicted by Saint-Simon, the full potential of recent technological and social advances cannot be realised within the traditional hierarchies of capitalism. According to the proponents of the Californian ideology, the Net is founded upon the buying and selling of information goods and services. Only through market competition can individual desires be satisfied. Yet, when they go on-line, Net users are primarily engaged in giving and receiving information as gifts. Quite spontaneously, people are adopting more democratic methods of working together within cyberspace.

    Fulfilling the prophecy of Saint-Simon, these new relations of production have emerged at the cutting-edge of economic progress: the Net. Not surprisingly, they are being pioneered by a privileged minority of the world’s population: people with access to computer-mediated communications technologies. As a result, these new ways of working are most widespread within the leading capitalist nation: the USA. The technological and social preconditions for the realisation of Saint-Simon’s prophecy are now present. While conservative ideologues remain entranced by the theoretical legacy of Stalinist communism, their fellow Americans are discovering the practical benefits of a new version of this concept: cyber-communism.

    ‘Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods.’ (Raymond 1998: 9)

    The gift economy of the Net emerges from the technological and social advances catalysed by capitalist modernisation. Over the last three hundred years, the reproduction, distribution and manipulation of information has become slowly easier through a long process of mechanisation. A manually-operated press produced copies which were relatively expensive, limited in numbers and impossible to alter without recopying. After generations of technological improvements, the same quantity of text on the Net is easily circulated, copied and remixed. However, individuals need money and time to access this advanced communications system. While most of the world’s population still live in poverty, the inhabitants of the industrialised countries have reduced their hours of employment and increased their wealth over two centuries of economic growth. Ever since the advent of Fordism, mass production has depended upon workers having enough resources and leisure for mass consumption. (Negri 1988) Having disposable income and spare time, many workers within the metropolitan countries are now able to work on their own projects. (Gorz 1989) Only at this particular historical moment have the technical and social conditions developed sufficiently for the emergence of cyber-communism.

    ‘Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.’ (Marx 1973: 700)

     

    The Academic Gift Economy

    The invention of the Net was the greatest irony of the Cold War. At the height of the struggle against Stalinist communism, the US military unwittingly bankrolled the creation of cyber-communism. Faced with the threat of nuclear attack on command and control structures, research money was given to scientists for experiments in computer-mediated communications. Although initially developed for the military, its inventors soon started using the Net for their own purposes. Crucially, scientists simply assumed that all information should be distributed for free over their new communications system. Unlike most other sectors of production, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour within universities. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists don’t have to turn their intellectual work directly into marketable commodities. Instead, research results are publicised by ‘giving a paper’ at specialist conferences and by ‘contributing an article’ to academic journals. By being quoted, scientists acquire personal recognition which enhances their career prospects within the university system. Despite increasing commercialisation, the giving away of findings remains the most efficient method of solving common problems within a particular scientific discipline.

    ‘The rationality of professional services is not the same as the rationality of the market… In the professions, and especially in science, the abdication of moral control would disrupt the system. The producer of professional services must be… responsible for his products, and it is fitting that he not be alienated from them.’ (Hagstrom 1982: 29)

    Because of these pioneers, the gift economy became firmly embedded within the social mores of the Net. Over time, the charmed circle of its users has slowly grown from scientists through hobbyists to the general public. Each new member doesn’t just have to observe the technical rules of the system, but also adheres to certain social conventions. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. Although the Net has expanded far beyond the university, its users still prefer to co-operate together without the direct mediation of money.

    There are even selfish reasons for adopting cyber-communism. By adding their own presence, every user is contributing something to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return for this gift, each individual obtains potential access to all the information provided on the Net by others. Within a market economy, buyers and sellers tend to exchange commodities of equivalent worth. Yet, within the hi-tech gift economy, everyone receives far more from their fellow users than any individual could ever give away. (Ghosh 1998: 10) Not surprisingly, there is no popular clamour for imposing the equal exchange of the marketplace on the Net. Even the most dogmatic neo-liberals are happily participating within cyber-communism.

    From the beginning, these gift relations of production were hardwired into the technological structure of the Net. Although funded by the military, scientists developed computer-mediated communications to facilitate the distribution and manipulation of their own research data. Working at universities, they never conceived of this information as a commodity. On the contrary, these academics were advancing their careers by giving away the results of their labour. Creating a communications system for their own use, they incorporated these working methods inside the technologies of the Net. (Geise 1996: 126-132) Above all, their invention depends upon the continual and unhindered reproduction of information. When on-line, every connection involves copying material from one computer to another. Once the first copy of a piece of information is placed on the Net, the cost of making each extra copy becomes almost zero. The architecture of the system presupposes that multiple copies of documents can easily be cached around the network. Although most of its users are now from outside the academy, the technical design of the Net still assumes that all information is a gift.

    ‘In an information space, we can consider the authorship of materials, and their perception; but… there is a need for the underlying infrastructure to be able to make copies simply for reasons of efficiency and reliability. The concept of “copyright” as expressed in terms of copies made makes little sense.’ (Berners-Lee 1996: 11)

     

    The Eclipse of Copyright

    Despite its huge popularity, the gift economy of the Net appears to be an aberration. Mesmerised by the Californian ideology, almost all politicians, executives and pundits are convinced that computer-mediated communications can only be developed through market competition between private enterprises. Like other products, information must be bought and sold as a commodity. This faith in market forces comes from historical experience. During the past three centuries, the mediation of commodity exchange has dramatically increased the productivity of labour. Responding to changes in prices, workers and resources are distributed towards the most efficient sectors of the economy. Competing against rival firms, entrepreneurs must continually improve the methods and means of production. When disciplined by the market, the self-interest of individuals can be directed towards increasing the wealth of the whole nation. (Smith 1970; Ricardo 1973)

    The founding fathers of liberal economics discovered the central paradox of capitalism: individual property is the precondition of collective labour. In pre-modern societies, the aristocracy and clergy’s control over their lands was circumscribed by feudal rights and duties. The work of the peasantry was organised through the particular set of customs found in each domain. In contrast, the pioneers of capitalism transformed land into a tradable commodity: the enclosures. Once feudal bonds were removed, work of different types and in various locations could be regulated by a single mechanism: the marketplace. (Marx 1976: 873-930) Over the last few centuries, this modern form of collective labour has become ubiquitous. For the disciplines of market competition not only raised productivity within traditional trades, but also encouraged the development of new industries. Within the metropolitan countries, ordinary people are now using goods and services which were unavailable even to kings and popes in earlier times. However, each of these technological wonders has been shaped by the peculiar production relations of capitalism. As well as satisfying a human desire, every new product must also be sold as a commodity. Within a market economy, the enclosure of collective labour is perpetual. (Midnight Notes Collective 1990)

    Under capitalism, most goods and services are produced as commodities. If they’re tangible objects or temporary actions, this social transformation is usually unproblematic. However, the commodification of intellectual labour has always been more difficult. While teaching and entertaining are like other services, publications are very different from other goods. Most of work to create an information product is expended in making the first copy. Even with the earliest printing presses, the cost of producing each subsequent copy is always much cheaper. In an open market, publishers would be encouraged to plagiarise existing works rather than paying for new material. The first capitalist nations quickly discovered a pragmatic solution to this economic problem: copyright. Although everyone could buy cultural artefacts, the right to reproduce them was limited by law. Like every other form of work, intellectual labour could now be enclosed into a commodity. (May 1998: 68-73)

    ‘Milton produced Paradise Lost as a silkworm produces silk, as the activation of his own nature. He later sold his product for £5 and thus became a merchant.’ (Marx 1976: 1044)

    At the end of the twentieth century, copyright continues to provide the legal framework for information production. Many forms of intellectual labour are sold as commodities: books, music, films, games and software. The publishers of copyright-protected artefacts have become major industries: the multi-media multinationals. The international legal agreements protecting intellectual property are continually tightened: Berne, the WTO, TRIPS. Not surprisingly, most politicians, executives and pundits assume that the Net will inevitably be commercialised. Like radio broadcasting and cable television in earlier times, the moment of the gift economy can only be temporary. As in other cultural industries, intellectual labour within cyberspace has to be enclosed into information commodities. (May 1998a; Frow 1996, Porter 1995)

    Anticipating this obsession, some pioneers did try to incorporate copyright protection within computer-mediated communications. For instance, Ted Nelson’s Xanadu project contained a sophisticated tracking and payment system for enforcing intellectual property. Using this software, individuals could work together by trading information commodities with each other. Yet, despite its technical brilliance, the Xanadu scheme failed for entirely social reasons. (Wolf 1995) Instead of encouraging participation, copyright protection proved to be a major obstacle to on-line collaboration. For most people benefit more from circulating information without payment than trading cultural commodities. By giving away their own personal efforts, Net users always receive the results of much greater amounts of labour in return from others. The scarcity of copyright cannot compete against the abundance of gifts. Far from intensifying commodification, the Net is the practical vindication of the old hacker slogan: “information wants to be free”. (Lang 1998; Ghosh 1998)

    At the cutting-edge of modernity, the exchange of commodities now plays a secondary role to the circulation of gifts. The enclosure of intellectual labour is challenged by a more efficient method of working: disclosure. Within universities, scientists have long solved problems within their specialisms by pooling their findings. As the Net grows, more and more people are discovering the benefits of the gift economy. For they are not only have the opportunity to contribute their own information, but also gain access to the knowledge of many others. Everyday, the users of the Net are sending emails, taking part in listservers, making websites, contributing to newsgroups and participating within on-line conferences. No longer enclosed in the commodity, intellectual labour is continually disclosed as a gift. The passive consumption of fixed information products is transforming into a fluid process of ‘interactive creativity’. (Berners-Lee 1998: 5)

    ‘The logic of digital technology leads us in a new direction. Objects, as well as ideas, are no longer fixed, no longer tangible. In cyberspace, there is no weight, no dimensions; structure is dynamic and changing; size is both infinite and immaterial. In this space, stories are written that change with each new reader; new material can be added, and old material can be deleted. Nothing is permanent.’ (Kleinman 1996: 76)

    The types of ‘interactive creativity’ between Net users are very varied. While some on-line encounters are only temporary, others evolve into long-lasting collaborations. Although many users only talk to close friends and family, some are building relationships which solely exist on the Net. If most on-line conversations are frivolous, other groups are meeting to talk about serious issues. Out of all these different types of ‘interactive creativity’, Net users have developed their own distinctive form of social organisation: the network community. (Rheingold 1994; Hamman 1999) By circulating gifts between each other, individuals are able to work together on common projects. For, as well as having fun, the members of network communities are engaged in a continuous process of collective labour. Everyone can send out gifts of texts, visuals, animations, music, games and other software to their on-line colleagues. In return, they will receive lots of virtual presents from their fellow community members. By contributing their own work, each individual potentially possesses the creative efforts of the whole network community. (Ghosh 1998; Kollock 1999)

    The pleasure of giving and receiving gifts can radically change the personal experience of collective labour. Within the marketplace, individuals primarily collaborate through the impersonal exchange of commodities. The buyers and sellers should remain unconcerned about each other’s fate. In contrast, the circulation of gifts encourages friendships between its participants. The construction of a successful network community is always a labour of love. Working within cyber-communism can be not only more productive, but also more enjoyable than digital capitalism. According to Howard Rheingold, these social benefits of the hi-tech gift economy are not confined to the Net. Despite all their wealth, many Americans are suffering from the isolation and alienation imposed by market competition. Luckily, some can now find friendship and intimacy within network communities. Since there is no necessity for the enclosure of collective labour within cyberspace, Americans can compensate for the damage caused by their nation’s ‘…loss of a sense of a social commons.’ (Rheingold 1994: 12)

    The results of ‘interactive creativity’ within network communities are often trivial and mundane. Yet, at the same time, some on-line collaborations are creating very sophisticated products. Among the most celebrated are the network communities working on free software. From the beginning, scientists developed the core programs of the Net as gifts. The exponential expansion of the system was only made possible by the absence of proprietary barriers. For instance, although the Xanadu project contained most of the technical capabilities of the Web, this prototype of computer-mediated communications lacked the ‘killer app’ of Tim Berners-Lee’s invention: the absence of copyright. Neither the program nor its products were designed to be commodities. (Berners-Lee 1996)

    In recent years, the rapid growth of the Net has catalysed a exuberant revival of the hacker ethic. Increasingly frustrated with commercial products, techies have come together to write their own software. When enclosed by copyright, a program’s capabilities are frozen until the next version is made available. Even its bugs cannot be fixed. In contrast, when disclosed as a gift, this virtual machine can be continually modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programming skills. The product has become a process. Above all, each member of the network community developing a program potentially has access to the skills of all their colleagues. If one person can’t solve a software problem, others within the group will help find the solution. (Leonard 1998a) By participating within such ‘interactive creativity’, formerly isolated techies are now making friends across the world. Like other network communities, collective labour within free software development can be not only more efficient, but also more enjoyable than working on commercial projects. As technological convergence intensifies, this gift economy of the Net is now encroaching further into the market economy of computing. (Porterfield 1998) Starting from a prototype by Linus Torvalds, a network community of developers is building their own non-proprietary operating system: Linux. (Linux Online 1999) For the first time, Microsoft has a serious competitor for Windows. Enclosed by a capitalist monopoly, many American techies are working hard to perfect its pragmatic alternative: software cyber-communism.

    ‘…you assume that bugs are generally shallow phenomena – or, at least, that they turn pretty shallow when exposed to a thousand eager co-developers pounding on every single new release.’ (Raymond 1998a: 7)

    The convergence of many different technologies around digital formats is also reinforcing the gift economies found in other areas of cultural production. According to the multi-media multinationals, the Net will soon have to adopt the methods of the marketplace. Protected by encryption and passwords, digital information will be traded as a commodity. However, these aspiring enclosers of the Net are already confronted by the partial decommodisation of their own cultural industries. For instance, the home-taping of music has existed for many decades. The continual advances in digital reproduction and the rapid spread of the Net are making this piracy of copyright material ever easier. (Chesterman and Lipman 1988: 36-45; Leonard 1998) Crucially, the most innovative forms of popular music now emerge from the creative appropriation of other people’s intellectual property: house, hip-hop, drum & bass. Instead of remaining frozen in a single recording, tunes and breaks can be repeatedly sampled, mixed and remixed. If someone has a good idea, many other musicians will try to refine the concept. Like the Net, contemporary DJ culture is also ‘interactive creativity’. (Garratt 1998; James 1997)

    For years, the most popular word entered into search engines was quite predictable: ‘sex’. Yet, in 1999, the top request became the music format of the Net: ‘MP3’. (Wice 1999) For the commercial music industry, the minor problem of home-taping is amplifying into a major crisis. Since copying and distributing is now so easy, many people are giving away digital recordings not only to their friends, but also to complete strangers. As music is integrated within the Net, the scarcity of commodities is spontaneously transforming into the abundance of gifts. (Leonard 1998) As well as facilitating the piracy of existing recordings, technological convergence also deepens musical ‘interactive creativity’. Like many other people, musicians are working together, making friends and inspiring each other within network communities. By publishing their own material, they can offer their music as gifts to Net users across the world. From these on-line collaborations, they are inventing new forms of rhythmic expression: midi-jamming, interactive music, cyber-trance.

    As other media technologies converge into the Net, all forms of cultural production are slowly integrating into the hi-tech gift economy. Even television and film-making will soon be transformed by the possibilities of ‘interactive creativity’. Despite their power and wealth, the multi-media multinationals can only inhibit this economic transformation. Quite spontaneously, the users of the Net are adopting more efficient and enjoyable ways of working together. At the dawn of the new millennium, many Americans are now experiencing the practical benefits of cyber-communism:

    commodity gift
    enclosure disclosure
    copyright piracy
    fixed fluid
    product process
    proprietary open source
    digital encryption free download
    original recording latest remix
    scarcity abundance
    alienation friendship
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    market competition network communities
    e-commerce cyber-communism

     

    The Market on the Commons

    Compared with the rest of humanity, the inhabitants of the USA are already very privileged. Although still denied adequate welfare provision, most Americans not only consume more goods and services, but also enjoy greater democratic liberties than the majority of the world’s population. Over the past two hundred years, the continual expansion and intensification of commodity exchange has massively raised the productivity of collective labour in the USA. Regulated by the federal government and local states, rival entrepreneurs have competed to build an increasingly complex and interdependent economic system. According to almost all American politicians, executives and pundits, the next stage of the marketisation of society is being pioneered at the cutting-edge of technology: the Net. As in the past, the enclosure of new types of collective labour will inevitably raise living standards and extend personal freedoms within the USA. There is no alternative to the organising principle of the existing relations of production: work-as-commodity.

    Ironically, the revenge of Saint-Simon is now being visited upon his American false disciples. As in the former Soviet Union, constant increases in the forces of production are threatening the dominant relations of production. Far from being the apotheosis of commodity exchange, the social and technical structures of computer-mediated communications embody an alternative form of collective labour: the gift economy. If individuals were forced to collaborate primarily through e-commerce, their opportunities to participate within ‘interactive creativity’ would be very limited. The full potential of the productive forces of the Net can only be realised by adopting the most advanced relations of production: cyber-communism.

    At such historical moments, the proponents of reactionary modernism are thrown into an existential crisis. Despite their deep ideological differences, almost all right-wing intellectuals have the same goal: economic development without social progress. Sometimes for decades, ruling elites can successfully combine these contradictory aims of reactionary modernism. However, the continual growth of the forces of production will eventually undermine the existing relations of production. Sooner or later, the supporters of reactionary modernism are forced to make a hard choice: economic growth or social stasis. For instance, the followers of Stalinist communism were confronted by this dilemma at the end of the 1980s. Wanting to catch up with their Western neighbours, most Eastern European politicians, executives and intellectuals accepted the demise of the totalitarian state which provided their livelihoods. In contrast, the Serbian ruling elite decided to choose another option: destroying the forces of production. Fearful of losing their wealth and power, they launched wars and ‘ethnic cleansings’ to block any further social and economic progress. Instead of moving towards the utopian future, their totalitarian state headed in another direction: ‘the flight from modernity’. (Perovic 1999)

    Within the USA, there are also powerful groups championing reactionary anti-modernism: religious fundamentalists, white supremacists and the gun lobby. As in Serbia, some influential people are willing to sacrifice economic growth to maintain the existing social order. However, most of those with power and wealth would like to avoid to making this choice. Instead, they want to update reactionary modernism for the age of the Net. Within right-wing American politics, hi-tech neo-liberalism has long been the optimistic alternative to traditional conservatism. Far from fearing the future, its prophets confidently predict that economic progress will eventually liberate humanity. Unable to use the ‘L-word’ for peculiar historical reasons, American neo-liberals even describe themselves as ‘libertarians’: a moniker taken from revolutionary left-wing anarchists.

    This optimistic form of conservatism is easily adapted for right-wing analyses of the Net. For instance, the proponents of the Californian ideology still believe that constant technological change can be reconciled with the preservation of social hierarchy. (Barbrook and Cameron 1996) Like their conservative forebears, these gurus often claim that their contradictory aims will be realised by mystical means: the Gaia mind, post-humans and memetics. More importantly, they also advocate a practical method for perpetuating reactionary modernism: the hybridisation of the commodity and the gift.

    Like pioneers in the Wild West, cyber-entrepreneurs are seizing all opportunities to enclose the newly-opened electronic frontier. At the cutting-edge of convergence, the profits of commercial companies now depend upon the rapid expansion of the hi-tech gift economy. (Kelly 1997) The hardware and software for accessing the Net can be sold as commodities by large companies: IBM, Sun, Microsoft. The circulation of free information among users can be enclosed within commercial sites: AOL, Yahoo!, GeoCities. Instead of resisting all changes, the digerati must embrace some social advances to reap the material benefits of technological progress. The lucky few have discovered a new way of achieving the American dream: the enclosure of cyber-communist labour into digital capitalist property. (Leonard 1999) Most famously, this bizarre union of opposites underpins the frenzied speculation in Net stocks. Each moment of ‘interactive creativity’ is a potential source of profits. If the correct hybrid of gift and commodity could be found, collective labour would immediately transmute into individual wealth. Excited by the riches of some cyber-entrepreneurs, many Americans are now speculating on the same assumption about the Net: ‘…communism is… a generalisation and consummation of… private property.’ (Marx 1961: 99)

    For nearly thirty years, the prophets of hi-tech neo-liberalism have identified economic growth with social stasis. In many sectors, they have advocated old-fashioned methods for raising profits: extending hours, reducing wages, speeding-up production, cutting welfare and increasing pollution. Yet, within the Net, these gurus champion the synthesis of both technological innovation and social progress. For the commodification of cyberspace is impossible without some accommodation with the gift economy. Even the increasing importance of e-commerce is facilitated by the non-commercial structure of the Net. The ‘cost of entry’ into the digital marketplace is so low due to the absence of proprietary barriers. Small companies now have access to computer-mediated-communications once only available to government agencies, financial institutions and multinational corporations. Cutting-out the middlemen, many providers of goods and services can increase their profits by dealing directly with suppliers and customers over the Net. Excited by these developments, the proponents of the Californian ideology believe that the freest of all free markets is now being held on the commons of cyberspace. (Kelly 1994; Hudson 1996; Dyson 1997)

     

    The Purity of the Gift

    Opposed to this invasion by commercial interests, some left-wing activists are reviving a purist vision of the gift. The enclosure of the Net will be prevented by refusing any compromise with the commodity. (Critical Art Ensemble 1996) This revolutionary position takes its inspiration from 1960s hippie radicalism. Over thirty years ago, many young people rebelled against the socio-economic systems of both the USA and the Soviet Union. The material benefits of modernity no longer compensated for the political authoritarianism and cultural conformity imposed by industrialism. Disillusioned with the hi-tech future, these hippies sought inspiration from the tribal past. While many were simply lifestyle tourists, others were looking for a revolutionary alternative to modernity. Crucially, some left-wing intellectuals believed that this utopia could be found in the gift economy of Polynesian tribes: the potlatch. (Mauss 1990)

    For radical hippies, this gift economy was the complete antithesis of capitalism. Instead of accumulating surpluses, individuals in these primitive societies gained prestige by giving away their wealth at public celebrations. If market competition required alienating work to produce ever more goods and services, the potlatch involved the pleasurable destruction of excess resources. While the modern commodity imposed hierarchy and utilitarianism, the primitive gift encouraged equality and hedonism. Rejecting work-as-commodity, left-wing hippies proclaimed a new organising principle for their utopian society: waste-as-gift. (Situationist International 1981; Baudrillard 1975; Negri 1979)

    Many years later, this revolutionary anti-modernism still influences left-wing analyses of computer-mediated communications. Although emerging at the cutting-edge of technology, the gift economy of the Net can easily be confused with the potlatch of primitive societies. These tribal attitudes are also be found within dance music, free parties, protest movements and other forms of ‘DIY culture’. (Brass, Koziell and Searle 1997; McKay 1998) Imitating their hippie elders, left-wing Net activists emphasise the autonomy of these gift relationships from the corruption of commodity exchange. Rejecting any hybridisation, they champion the destruction of private property through the piracy of copyright material: waste-as-gift. Instead of being bought and sold, information will become freely available to everyone participating within the on-line potlatch.

    Unfortunately, this revival of revolutionary anti-modernism also has reactionary implications. As in earlier times, left-wing intellectuals are tempted to see themselves as a vanguard leading the unenlightened masses. Drawn from the intermediate layer, they champion the ‘refusal of work’ to symbolise their superiority over the rest of the working class. Although deprived of the Soviet Union, some members of the revolutionary minority will still apologise for foreign dictatorships which resist American hegemony. Despite the advent of new information technologies, old political habits are difficult to discard. The revolutionary rhetoric of hippie communism is haunted by the reactionary practice of Stalinist communism. (Barbrook 1998)

     

    The American Road to Communism

    Within the USA, this left-wing vision of the pure gift remains marginalised. Ever since independence, a fervent belief in private enterprise has defined American ‘exceptionalism’. During the Cold War, no patriot could support the revolutionary ideology of the national enemy. Even today, many people still virulently oppose the public provision of welfare services considered indispensable in other developed countries. (Lipset 1996) Yet, these same right-wing Americans are happily participating in the construction of cyber-communism. Quite spontaneously, they adopt the working methods which are most beneficial to their own interests. Sometimes, they want to engage in e-commerce. At other times, they prefer to collaborate within the hi-tech gift economy. Like everyone else, conservative Americans choose cyber-communism for pragmatic reasons.

    Despite their addiction to free market nostrums, Americans have long preferred practical solutions over ideological correctness. Sceptical about the theoretical obsessions of Europeans, they have always been proud of their ‘Yankee pragmatism’. (de Tocqueville 1975: 3-20) Updating this tradition for the Net, most Americans simply ignore the widening discrepancy between their political beliefs and their everyday activities. Although forced to talk like neo-liberals, they often choose to act like communists within cyberspace. For the literal application of the Californian ideology would immediately remove many of the benefits of the Net. Not surprisingly, few Americans will openly admit to their pleasure in sinning against the national myth. While the reformist demand for a public health system remains obviously left-wing, the subversive implications of circulating information as gifts are literally unthinkable. Without any self-doubt, Eric Raymond can be simultaneously a passionate advocate of the decommodisation of software and ‘…a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons…’ (Leonard: 1998a: 2).

    Among Americans, cyber-communism is the love that dares not speak its name. No one talks about what everyone is doing. Above all, the historical significance of their collective behaviour on the Net can never be discussed. Within everyday life, people have always given gifts to each other. Many social activities are already organised by voluntary labour and with donated resources. The DIY culture is the celebration of doing-things-for-yourself in all aspects of life from politics to music. (Hyde 1999; Brass, Koziell and Searle 1997) Now, with the advent of the Net, this gift economy is challenging market competition at the cutting-edge of modernity. For only these new relations of production can fully realise the social and technical potential of its advanced productive forces. When digital gifts are freely circulated, people are able to participate within ‘interactive creativity’. As information is incessantly reproduced, the quantity of collective labour embodied in each copy is soon reduced to almost nothing. Under these social and technical conditions, circulating information as gifts can be not only more enjoyable, but also more efficient than commodity exchange. Although appreciating the benefits of e-commerce, Americans are enthusiastically participating within an alternative form of collective labour: cyber-communism.

    In earlier times, the abolition of capitalism was envisaged in apocalyptic terms: revolutionary uprisings, mass mobilisations and modernising dictatorships. In contrast, cyber-communism is now an unremarkable everyday experience within the USA. The users of the Net are spontaneously adopting more enjoyable and efficient ways of working together. Instead of destroying the market economy, Americans are engaged in the slow process of superseding capitalism. (Hegel 1873: 141-142; Marx 1961: 98-114) In this dialectical movement, hi-tech neo-liberals perfect the existing relations of production by developing e-commerce: work-as-commodity. Reacting against this enclosure of cyberspace, left-wing activists destroy information property within the on-line potlatch: waste-as-gift. For those nostalgic for ideological certainty, there can be no compromise between these contradictory visions of the Net.

    Yet, the synthesis of these dialectical opposites must happen for pragmatic reasons. Often Net users benefit more from working together through circulating gifts than from taking part in e-commerce. Living within a prosperous society, many Americans are no longer solely motivated by monetary rewards. With sufficient time and money, they will also work to gain the respect of their peers for their efforts. Increasing numbers of people are now satisfying this desire for recognition within network communities. Individuals receive praise and friendship from their fellow-members by making excellent contributions to collective projects. Within the Net, the rise in the productive forces encourages a more advanced form of collective labour: work-as-gift. (Kohn 1998; Leonard: 1998a)

    ‘…Work is born from the Desire for Recognition… and it preserves itself and evolves in relation to this same Desire.’ (Kojève 1969: 230)

    The dialectical process of superseding capitalism is marked by the evolving syntheses of gift and commodity within the Net. During this transition, neither the disclosure nor the enclosure of collective labour can be assumed. If the correct hybrid isn’t found, individuals working on a collective project can quickly disappear to more agreeable locations within cyberspace. Sometimes, they will look for monetary rewards. On many occasions, they will prefer the freedom of autonomous labour. Depending upon circumstances, both these desires need to be partially realised in a successful hybrid of gift and commodity. During the last two hundred years, the intimate bonds of kinship and friendship have simultaneously inhibited and underpinned the impersonal relationships needed for rapid economic growth. The modern has always co-existed with the traditional. Now, in the age of the Net, the exchange of commodities is being both intensified and prevented by the circulation of gifts. The modern must synthesise with the hyper-modern.

    The gurus of the Californian ideology emphasise the survival of social hierarchy within these hybrid productive relations of the Net. Already, successful cyber-entrepreneurs begin their careers by giving away their most desirable products. If their brand is widely adopted, they hope to make money by providing supporting services and products to its users. A lucky few digerati can become very wealthy by selling shares to Wall Street speculators. (Cusumano and Yoffie 1998; Leonard 1999) Yet, even in this conservative synthesis of gift and commodity, copyright has ceased to be the precondition of information production. Every consumer is now won with promotional items. Unable to resist the technical possibilities of digital convergence, some neo-liberal ideologues accept the eventual disappearance of copyright. (Barlow 1994) Since plagiarism will soon become ubiquitous, cyber-entrepreneurs must adopt other ways of commodifying the Net: real-time services, advertising, merchandising. The hi-tech aristocracy can only protect their privileges by continually making gifts to the masses.

    This hybridisation of productive relations is prevalent across the hi-tech industries. For instance, many people gain employment only after serving an apprenticeship within network communities. If their work is respected among their peers, they can join the emerging intermediate layer employed by e-commerce companies: the digital artisans. Although operating outside the academy, the gift of information still facilitates the sale of labour. According to the prophecies of Saint-Simon, innovative workers in advanced industries should be pioneering the economic and cultural conditions for social emancipation. The intermediate layer is the vanguard of modernity. Faithful to this role, digital artisans are making many technological and aesthetic advances. Despite having to sell their creativity for money, their ways of working are often egalitarian and collaborative. Once again, the intermediate layer is inventing the future.

    Yet, even this synthesis is already being superseded at the cutting-edge of modernity. The heroic minority is no longer alone. After two centuries of economic growth, ordinary people are also able to adopt advanced productive relations. Within the Net, working together by circulating gifts is now a daily experience for millions of people. As well as in their jobs, individuals also collaborate on collective projects in their free time. Freed from the immediate disciplines of the marketplace, work can increasingly become a gift. The enlightened few are no longer needed to lead the masses towards the future. For the majority of Net users are already participating within the productive relations of cyber-communism. Everyday, they are sending emails, taking part in listservers, making websites, contributing to newsgroups and participating within on-line conferences. Having no need to sell information as commodities, they spontaneously work together by circulating gifts. All across the world, politicians, executives and pundits are inspired by the rapid expansion of e-commerce in the USA. Mesmerised by neo-liberal ideology, they fail to notice that most information is already circulating as gifts within the Net. Engaged in superseding capitalism, Americans are successfully constructing the utopian future in the present: cyber-communism.

    ‘No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. …The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – …an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of humanity accordingly closes with this social formation.’ (Marx 1970: 21-22)

    The Positive: The Negation: The Negation of the Negation:
    work-as-commodity waste-as-gift work-as-gift
    e-commerce potlatch network communities
    reactionary modernism revolutionary anti-modernism revolutionary modernism

     

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    This article is dedicated to the USAF pilots who risked their lives in the 1999 Kosovar national independence struggle.

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    Response

    Ted Byfield, ‘THE GIF ECONOMY: How Several Layers of Lossy Images Are Synthesized into a Moving Image that Will Animate the Masses and Inspire Them to Do What They’re Doing Anyway, Namely, Clicking Their Way to Liberation; Or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Californian Ideology’, nettime, 6th October 1999.

  • THE REGULATION OF LIBERTY by Richard Barbrook

    The State In Cyberspace

    The rapid expansion of e-commerce depends upon effective legal regulation of the Net. As in the rest of the economy, courts and police are needed to enforce the ‘rules of the game’ within on-line marketplaces. Theft remains theft even when committed with the latest technology. Since the Net encourages its own forms of anti-social behaviour, governments also have to update their legislation to counter the new threats from so-called ‘cyber-terrorism’. [2] Trespass laws must now protect computer systems as well as physical buildings. Not surprisingly, media corporations expect that the courts and the police will carry on protecting their intellectual property. Anyone who distributes unauthorised copies of copyright material over the Net must be punished. Anyone who invents software potentially useful for on-line piracy should be criminalised. Like other companies, media corporations need a secure legal framework for conducting e-commerce with their customers. As in the old Wild West, business will only prosper once law and order is established on the new electronic frontier. [3]

    This new common sense has displaced the fashionable anti-statism of a few years ago. According to the Californian ideology, national governments are incapable of controlling the global system of computer-mediated communications. Instead, individuals and businesses will compete to provide goods and services within unregulated on-line marketplaces. The advance to the hi-tech future is simultaneously the return to the liberal past. [4] Above all, this nostalgic ‘New Paradigm’ supposedly not only delivers greater economic efficiency, but also extends individual freedom. For instance, state regulation of broadcasting will become obsolete once everyone can buy and sell programming over the Net. Just like after the American revolution, public institutions will only be needed to provide minimal ‘rules of the game’ for people to trade information with each other. [5] In their constitution, the Founding Fathers formally prohibited government censorship of the press: the First Amendment. This ‘negative’ concept of media freedom emphasised the absence of legal sanctions against publishing dissident opinions. Like their fellow entrepreneurs, writers and publishers should be able to produce what their customers want to buy. Free speech is free trade. [6]

    For decades, experts and entrepreneurs have predicted that the emerging information society would realise the most libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment. They have never doubted the eventual triumph of their hi-tech vision: one virtual marketplace for trading information commodities. Instead of buying physical objects, people would purchase on-line versions of books, newspapers, films, television, radio, music, software and games – and also sell their own creations. Above all, this pay-per-use form of computer-mediated communications would have copyright protection hardwired into its social and technical architecture. The First Amendment is trading intellectual property within cyberspace.

    ‘Anyone with a computer and some organised information located on it can offer the information for sale. The customers are as close to the data base as their telephone. Publishing of information is thus likely to become a more competitive industry…’ [7]

    Intellectual property has long been seen as a commodity just like all other commodities. Yet, at the same time, the sellers of information have always wanted to avoid fully alienating their products to their customers. Even on primitive presses, the costs of reproducing existing publications were very much lower than making the first copy of a new work. As well as justified by liberal philosophy, copyright laws were also a pragmatic solution to the problem of plagiarism. The state enforced the monopoly of particular individuals over reproducing specific items of information to reward their creativity. [8] Unlike political censorship, liberals believed that this economic censorship was essential for media freedom. For instance, the Founding Fathers included copyright protection alongside the First Amendment within the American constitution. If free speech was synonymous with free trade, the state had to defend intellectual property. [9]

    In early copyright legislation, the ownership of information was always conditional. Just as media commodities were never fully alienated, no one could claim absolute ownership over intellectual property. Instead, copyrights could be lawfully expropriated for a ‘fair use’ in the public interest, such as political debate, education, research or artistic expression. [10] However, during the last few decades, these restrictions on copyright ownership have been slowly disappearing. According to hi-tech neo-liberals, all information must be transmuted into pure commodities traded within unregulated global markets. In their Californian ideology, media freedom is the ‘negative’ freedom from state interference. Yet, in practice, the marketisation of information requires more legal regulation of the Net. For instance, national laws and international treaties have already been adopted to cover the on-line trading of media commodities. Even if nation states give up trying to censor the content of the Net, their courts and police will be needed more than ever to defend the ownership of copyrights. [11] As John Locke emphasised long ago: ‘The great and chief end of… Mens… putting themselves under Government… is the preservation of their Property.’ [12]

    The Digital Panopticon

    While the Net remained a predominantly text-based system used by academics and hobbyists, media corporations could happily ignore the emergence of this participatory form of computer-mediated communications. According to the experts, the majority of the population was only interested in new information technologies which would offer a wider choice of media commodities. However, this ostrich strategy became increasingly untenable as more and more people went on-line. Along with making their own entertainment, Net users also enjoy sharing information with each other. For instance, many owners of music CDs give MP3 copies to their on-line friends – and even to complete strangers. Much to their horror, media corporations have slowly realised that the Net threatens the core of their business: the sale of intellectual property.

    The owners of copyrights are now demanding that the state launches the ‘war on copying’. [13] The courts and police must prevent consenting adults from sharing information with each other without permission. In a series of high-profile cases, industry bodies are suing the providers of technical facilities for swapping copyright material. [14] At the same time, media corporations are experimenting with encryption and other software programs which prevents unauthorised copying. [15] However, this anti-piracy offensive is proving to be only partially effective. For instance, the music industry’s attempts to close down Napster simply encourages people to install more sophisticated software for swapping music. [16] Even worse, the failure to agree a common method of encryption means that MP3 has become the de facto standard for distributing music over the Net. Contrary to neo-liberal prophecies, the transmutation of information into commodities is becoming more difficult in the digital age.

    Since intellectual property can’t be protected within the existing Net, media corporations want to impose a top-down form of computer-mediated communications in its place: the digital Panopticon. [17] If everyone’s on-line activities could be continually monitored, nobody would dare to defy the copyright laws. When information was sold as a commodity, media corporations would be able to control its subsequent uses. Across the world, security agencies are already developing ‘Big Brother’ technologies for placing every user of the Net under constant surveillance. For instance, the Chinese regime deters dissent by spying on the on-line activities of its citizens. Even the elected governments of the USA and the EU like snooping on the e-mails of their real or imaginary enemies. [18] According to the Californian ideology, such oppressive behaviour would become an anachronism in the unregulated virtual marketplace. Yet, only a few years later, it is commercial companies which are pressing for the monitoring of private Net use to defend their intellectual property. Until there is some fear of detection, people will carry on spontaneously sharing copyright material with each other. Ironically, the ‘negative’ freedom of the First Amendment now justifies the totalitarian ambitions of the digital Panopticon. As the head of the Motion Picture Association of America warns: ‘If you can’t protect that which you own, then you don’t own anything.’ [19]

    Despite the futurist rhetoric of its proponents, the digital Panopticon perpetuates an earlier stage of industrial evolution: Fordism. Ever since the advent of modernity, each transient burst of technological and social innovation has been idealised as an a timeless utopia. During the last century, the Fordist factory didn’t just become the dominant economic paradigm, but also provided the model for politics, culture and everyday life. [20] The media corporations now want to impose this top-down structure on computer-mediated communications. Like workers on an assembly-line, users of the digital Panopticon will be under constant surveillance from above. Like viewers of television, they can only passively consume media produced by others. The new information society must be built in the image of the old industrial economy. Free speech should only exist as media commodities.

    The Hi-Tech Gift Economy

    Many Left intellectuals also believe that the Net will – sooner or later – be replaced by the digital Panopticon. How could the version of computer-mediated communications devised by poor academics and insignificant nerds triumph over the structure championed by wealthy and influential media corporations? [21] Ironically, these gurus disprove their own masochistic predictions when they themselves go on-line. Like everyone else, they don’t primarily use the Net to consume media, but to send e-mails, swap information, conduct on-line research and participate in network communities. While there can be nothing new about more television, interactive collaboration over the Net is novel. The digital Panopticon is a future which is already history.

    For the emerging information society is being built according to principles laid down by the scientists who invented the Net. Funded by the state and foundations, academics collaborate with each other by giving away their findings in journals and at conferences. Scientists had no need for on-line systems for trading information commodities. Instead, they built the code of the Net in the image of the academic gift economy. Designing for their own use, they invented a form of computer-mediated communications for sharing knowledge within a single virtual space: the ‘intellectual commons’. [22] Above all, the pioneers of the Net knew that the publication of findings across many different books and journals was hampering scientific research. From Vannevar Bush to Tim Berners-Lee, they developed technologies which could overcome this fragmentation of academic knowledge. The passive consumption of fixed pieces of information would become the participatory process of ‘interactive creativity’. [23]

    As the Net spread outside the university, its new users quickly discovered the benefits of sharing knowledge with each other. There has never been much demand for the equal exchange of commodities when people can access the labour of a whole community in return for their own individual efforts. [24] Many non-academics are also striving to overcome the fixed boundaries imposed by the commodification of information. For instance, musicians have long appropriated recordings for DJ-ing, sampling and remixing. [25] The popularity and capabilities of the Net is intensifying these ambiguities within the economics of music-making. The MP3 format doesn’t just make the piracy of copyright material much easier. As importantly, the social mores and technical structure of the Net encourages enthusiasts to make their own sounds. The passive consumption of unalterable recordings is evolving into interactive participation within musical composition. [26]

    What began inside scientific research is now transforming music-making and many other forms of cultural expression. Back in the early-1990s, only a few academics and hobbyists could access this open form of computer-mediated communications. A decade later, almost every academic discipline, political cause, cultural movement, popular hobby and private obsession has a presence on the Net. Whether for work or for pleasure, people are creating websites, bulletin boards, listservers and chat rooms. Although only a minority are now engaged in scientific research, all Net users can participate within the hi-tech gift economy. A few hope that network communities are prefiguring the co-operative and ecological societies of the future. Some are convinced that ‘interactive creativity’ is the cutting-edge of modern art. Most simply participate within on-line projects as a leisure activity. Far from being displaced by the digital Panopticon, the ‘intellectual commons’ of the Net continues to expand at an exponential rate. Free speech is a free gift.

    What’s Left of Copyright?

    The Net is now proclaimed as the new paradigm of society. Business, government and culture are supposed to restructure themselves in its image: flexible, participatory and self-organising. [27] Although often seen as pioneers of the hi-tech future, media corporations are terrified of this emerging paradigm. For the rapid growth of the Net is exposing the contingency of their intellectual property. As information separates from physical products, copyright loses its apparent basis in nature. Quite spontaneously, most people are opting to share knowledge rather than to trade media commodities over the Net. Technological progress is symbiotic with social evolution. Free speech can flourish without free trade.

    The media corporations are desperate to reverse history back to the previous paradigm: the Fordist factory. As in old sci-fi stories, they dream of giant mainframes spying upon everyone’s on-line activities. Like members of the secret police, the owners of copyright are nostalgic for the Cold War days of ‘Big Brother’. However, history has moved on. The centralised vision of computer-mediated communications is already technically obsolete. How much computing power would be needed to make a detailed analysis of every piece of data in the information flows passing across the Net? How could constant top-down surveillance be imposed on all peer-to-peer file-sharing within cyberspace? But, without constant monitoring from above, the effectiveness of encryption and other security devices is limited. As hackers have repeatedly proved, anything which is encoded will be eventually decoded. When no one is looking, media commodities will spontaneously transmute into free gifts on the Net.

    Since there is no technological fix for protecting copyright, the media corporations can only preserve their wealth in one way: state power. The police and the courts must deter people from pirating intellectual property or inventing software for making unauthorised copies. The social mores and software codes of the Net must be criminalised. Only fear of punishment can force everyone inside the digital Panopticon. For the media corporations, the ‘negative’ form of media freedom is now synonymous with state enforcement of economic censorship. The law must be obeyed. The Net must be replaced with the digital Panopticon. Free trade is more important than free speech.

    According to the Free Software Foundation, the growing contradiction between legality and reality within the Net can only be resolved by extending the scope of the First Amendment. The economic interests of the few should no longer take precedence over the political liberties of the many. The ‘negative’ concept of media freedom must now apply to private corporations as well as public institutions. Above all, the state should refrain from enforcing not only political censorship, but also economic censorship. [28] As privileges of copyright disappear, information should be regulated in a more libertarian way: ‘copyleft’. Although producers should still be able to prevent their own work from being claimed by others, everyone must be allowed to copy and alter information for their own purposes. Free speech is freedom from compulsory commodification. [29]

    Even this proposal isn’t radical enough for some Net pioneers. For instance, Tim Berners-Lee decided that the original programs of the web should be placed in the public domain. Instead of making proprietary software for sale in the marketplace, this inventor was developing tools for building the ‘intellectual commons’. His web programs were much more likely to be adopted as common standards if all residual traces of individual ownership were removed. Being a scientist funded by EU taxpayers, Tim Berners-Lee was happy to give away his research to anyone who could benefit from more accessible computer-mediated communications. Owned by nobody, the web could become the common property of all. [30]

    In the prophecies of the hi-tech neo-liberals, all information was going to be inevitably transformed into unalloyed commodities. Inside the digital Panopticon, everyone would be forced to prioritise a ‘single business model’: trading intellectual property. [31] Yet, when given a choice, almost everybody prefers the bottom-up Net over this top-down version of computer-mediated communications. Crucially, the absence of intellectual property within the Net has never been an obstacle to the successful commercialisation of computer-mediated communications. On the contrary, many dot-com entrepreneurs have discovered that more profits can be made outside the protection of the digital Panopticon. Businesses trade more efficiently with their suppliers and their customers when everyone uses open source software. Employees collaborate with each other much more easily within the non-proprietary architecture of the Net. [32] Despite their wealth and influence, media corporations are unlikely to persuade their fellow capitalists to adopt the digital Panopticon. While serious money can be made on the existing Net, why should businesses adopt a less flexible and more intrusive form of computer-mediated communications?

    Even for the trading of intellectual property, there is no pressing need for investing in expensive copyright protection systems. Information can still be commodified through other tried-and-tested methods: advertising, real-time delivery, merchandising, data-mining and support services. [33] While these techniques remain profitable, the weakening of intellectual property within the Net can be tolerated. Increasingly, information exists as both commodity and gift – and as hybrids of the two. No longer always fixed in physical objects, the social distinction between proprietary and free information becomes contingent. For instance, the Linux operating system can either be downloaded without payment from the Net or be purchased on a CD-rom from a dot-com company. [34] This hybrid existence is not confined to ‘cutting edge’ software. For instance, the same dance tune is sold on vinyl, given away on MP3 and sampled to create new sounds. The passive consumption of fixed pieces of information now co-exists with the participatory process of ‘interactive creativity’. Free speech is both free trade and free gifts.

    Making Media

    According to current copyright legislation, this new form of free speech is simply a new type of theft. Information must always remain a commodity within cyberspace. Yet, within the Net, free speech is evolving into the fluid process of ‘interactive creativity’. Information exists as commodities, gifts and hybrids of the two. Oblivious to this growing contradiction, politicians carry on tightening the legal protection of copyright at both national and international levels. [35] They are determined to help their local media corporations to compete successfully within the global marketplace. As a result, the letter of law criminalises the on-line activities of almost every Net user. For instance, giving away bootleg MP3s is stealing the intellectual property of media corporations. The ‘negative’ concept of media freedom prohibits political censorship only to justify economic censorship. Free trade is state power. [36]

    Yet, in their daily lives, everyone knows that there is almost no chance of being punished for swapping MP3s. The existing copyright laws are increasingly unenforceable within the Net. If only for pragmatic reasons, the concept of media freedom now needs be extended beyond freedom from political censorship. For instance, in nineteenth century Europe, Karl Marx argued that free speech shouldn’t be confined within free trade. The Left had to struggle not only against political censorship, but also economic censorship. Crucially, the removal of legal controls was an essential precondition, but not a sufficient foundation for free speech. Everyone also had to have access to the technologies for expressing themselves: the ‘positive’ concept of media freedom. [37] During the Fordist epoch, the Left almost forgot this libertarian definition of free speech. For technical and economic reasons, ordinary people appeared to be incapable of making their own media. Instead, the Left supported public service broadcasting so its leaders could gain access to the airwaves. Free speech was restricted to elected politicians. [38]

    With the advent of the Net, this limited vision of media freedom is becoming an anachronism. For the first time, ordinary people can be producers as well as consumers of information. Marx’s ‘positive’ concept of media freedom is now pragmatic politics. Instead of making media for them, the state can help people to make their own media. For instance, public service broadcasters can nurture network communities and telecoms regulators can encourage infrastructure investment. [39] Above all, the state must reverse the recent tightening of the copyright laws. For the ‘positive’ concept of media freedom precludes vigorous economic censorship. The widespread ‘fair use’ of copyright material should be recognised in law as well as in practice. The rigid enforcement of intellectual property must give way to official toleration of more flexible forms of information: bootlegs, copyleft, open source and public domain. ‘Fair use’ is free speech. [40]

    For most people, the weakening of copyright protection is someone else’s problem. They are unconcerned that trading of commodities in the old media must co-exist with the circulation of gifts in the new media. [41] Even neo-liberals are realising that the trading of physical commodities is much easier outside the digital Panopticon. While e-commerce will always depend upon legal regulation, ‘interactive creativity’ among Net users has little need for courts and police. When copying is ubiquitous, punishing people for stealing intellectual property will seem perverse. Instead of formal laws, most on-line activities can be regulated by the spontaneous rules of polite behaviour. [42]

    ‘The more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itself…’ [43]

    Sooner or later, the state will abandon its attempts to impose economic censorship on the Net. Even the media corporations will eventually have to accept the demise of information Fordism. Instead of copyright enforcement, government intervention can focus on extending and improving access to the Net for all people. The ‘negative’ freedom from state censorship must evolve into the ‘positive’ freedom to make media. In the age of the Net, free speech can become: ‘…the right to make noise… to create one’s own code and work… the right to make the free and revocable choice to interlink with another’s code – that is, the right to compose life.’ [44]

    Footnotes

    [1] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, page 98.

    [2] For instance, the British government is introducing legislation which includes any actions which ‘seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system’ within its definition of ‘terrorism’. See Will Knight, ‘Hackers Will Become Terrorists Under New Law’, page 1.

    [3] For an analysis of increasing legal regulation of the Net, see Lawrence Lessig, Code.

    [4] See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    [5] See Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.

    [6] For an analysis of the origins of the First Amendment in English liberalism, see Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press. An English liberal mandarin later defined ‘negative’ freedom as: ‘…the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he [or she] is able to do or be, without interference by other persons…’ Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pages 121-2.

    [7] Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, page 211.

    [8] See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, pages 16-44.

    [9] See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 7-18; and Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, pages 220-281.

    [10] See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, pages 45-66.

    [11] Despite denouncing state regulation as obsolete, Newt Gingrich’s neo-liberal think-tank still saw that: ‘Defining property rights in cyberspace is perhaps the single most urgent and important task for government information policy.’ The Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, page 11.

    [12] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, page 395. For a socialist remix of this liberal analysis, see Eugeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism.

    [13] This analogy with the repressive ‘war on drugs’ is made in Richard Stallman, ‘Freedom – or Copyright?’, page 2.

    [14] See the Recording Industry Association of America, ‘RIAA Lawsuit Against Napster’; and the Motion Picture Association of America, ‘DVD-DeCSS Press Room’.

    [15] For instance, all the major record labels are members of a consortium to develop encryption methods for copyright-protected music, see the Secure Digital Music Initiative website.

    [16] For instance, see the Gnutella and Freenet websites.

    [17] See Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pages 289-296. The dystopian vision of the Net is inspired by the symbol of oppressive modernity in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish.

    [18] See Elmo Recio, ‘The Great Firewall of China’; and Duncan Campbell, ‘Inside Echelon’.

    [19] Jack Valenti talking about the potential threat from the DeCSS decryption program in ‘Film Studios Bring Claim Against DVD Hackers in Federal Court’.

    [20] See Simon Clarke, ‘What in the F—’s Name is Fordism’.

    [21] For instance, Robert McChesney says: ‘It’s almost an iron law of US communication[s] media… that… the corporate sector comes in, and… muscles all… other people out of the way and takes it over.’ Corporate Watch, ‘Towards a Democratic Media System’, page 3.

    [22] Lawrence Lessig, Code, page 141. Also see Michael Hauben and Rhonda Hauben, Netizens, page ix.

    [23] Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’, page 5. Also see Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’; and ‘Cyber-communism’.

    [24] See Rishab Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’; and Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’.

    [25] See Bill Brewster and Frank Broughton, Last Night a DJ Saved My Life; and Sheryl Garratt, Adventures in Wonderland.

    [26] See Jacques Attali, Noise, pages 133-148. Also see Romandson, ‘Interactive Music’.

    [27] From academic research to management theory, this new paradigm now fascinates the cutting-edge of intellectual life. For instance, see Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society; and Jonas Ridderstråle and Kjell Nordström, Funky Business.

    [28] See Richard Stallman, ‘Freedom – or Copyright?’. Some American judges have already defined computer programming as a form of free speech, see Patricia Jacobus, ‘Court: Programming languages covered by First Amendment’.

    [29] See Free Software Foundation, ‘What is Copyleft?’.

    [30] See Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, pages 78-80.

    [31] See Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, pages 70-71.

    [32] See John Hagel and Arthur Armstrong, net.gain.

    [33] See Esther Dyson, Release 2.0, pages 131-163.

    [34] See Robert Young, ‘How Red Hat Software Stumbled Across a New Economic Model and Helped Improve an Industry’.

    [35] See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights.

    [36] See Lawrence Lessig, Code, pages 30-60.

    [37] See Karl Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press’. In contrast with its ‘negative’ predecessor, ‘positive’ freedom is defined as: ‘I wish to be… a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon… by other men as if I was… a slave incapable of… conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them.’ Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, page 131. For this socialist concept of political rights, also see Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’.

    [38] See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 55-73.

    [39] See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’, pages 63-68.

    [40] See Richard Barbrook, ‘Cyber-communism’, pages 26-35.

    [41] For a discussion of the ‘fragmentation of copyright’, see Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, pages 144-157.

    [42] Among early users of computer-mediated communications, such spontaneous self-regulation was dubbed ‘netiquette’, see Michael Hauben and Rhonda Hauben, Netizens, pages 63-4.

    [43] Tom Paine, Rights of Man, page 165.

    [44] Jacques Attali, Noise, pages 132.

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    Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom: the contradictions of communications in the age of modernity, Pluto, London 1995.

    Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’ in nettime (editors), Readme!: ASCII culture and the revenge of knowledge, Autonomedia, New York 1998, pages 132-139.

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    John Hagel and Arthur Armstrong, net.gain: expanding markets through virtual communities, Harvard Business School Press, Boston MA, 1997.

    Michael Hauben and Rhonda Hauben, Netizens: on the history and impact of Usenet and the Internet, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos CA, 1997.

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  • CULTURAL BABBAGE BOOK REVIEW by Richard Barbrook

    Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention edited by Francis Spufford and Jenny Uglow, Faber and Faber, London, pp 290.

    This book is a collection of essays inspired by Charles Babbage’s Difference Engine – a never-completed Victorian mechanical calculator which is often claimed as the ancestor of the modern PC. In London’s Science Museum, a working version of this machine has pride of place in its computer exhibition. A few years ago, William Gibson and Bruce Sterling used Babbage’s prototype computer as the theme of their sci-fi novel about an alternative Victorian England. Fascinated by this resurrected icon, the essays in Cultural Babbage use the Difference Engine as the starting-point for a discussion of the relationship between arts and science, especially in Britain. Its essays range from the intrguing, such as Alex Pang’s examination of the Cold War origins of the geodesic dome, to the eccentric, such as Lavinia Greenlaw’s musings on being the poet daughter of a doctor. The most interesting contributions to the book deal with the wonderful conceit at the centre of Gibson and Sterling’s novel: the Difference Engine could have only been successfully built in Victorian England as an integral part of a social revolution.

    In their essays, Tom Paulin and Neil Belton demonstrate how political conservatism has encouraged a deep-rooted hostility to science in this country. Despite being the first industrial nation, science in England has always been regarded with suspicion by those in power. Whether in Edmund Burke’s rantings against the French Revolution, Aldous Huxley’s literary snobbery or the present government’s neo-liberal dogmas, the Promethean powers of invention are feared as levelling and democratic forces which could sweep away inherited privileges and traditional deference. Scientific procedures are far too rational and, worst of all, continental in their precision.

    Echoing the analysis of Will Hutton and other ‘New Labour’ gurus, Paulin and Belton believe that the relative and absolute decline of British manufacturing industry has been caused by the semi- feudal political system defended by English conservatism. As a consequence, the key essays in this book champion a ‘republican science’ which combines technical innovation with political change. For instance, Jon Katz demonstrates the continued relevance of Tom Paine’s republican politics in the age of the Net. Now the Difference Engine has evolved into the PC with a modem, we can finally realise Paine’s vision of media freedom where everyone can publish their opinions and participate in politics without the interference of government or monopolists. As in Gibson and Sterling’s novel, science and democracy can advance together.

    However, this use of Babbage’s Difference Engine as the symbol of ‘republican science’ is not without its difficulties. In his essay, Simon Schaffer shows how Babbage promoted the idea that the Difference Engine possessed some form of ‘artifical intelligence’. Babbage was attracted to this deception because it concealed the human labour involved in the machine’s construction. He could never bring himself to acknowledge his dependence on the skills of the trained engineers who built the intricate parts needed for the Difference Engine. Yet, the main reason why Babbage failed to build his famous calculator was his inability to collaborate with Joseph Clement, the master machinist. Far from being a model for ‘republican science’, the story of the Difference Engine could instead be seen as a prime example of how archaic class prejudices have accelerated the industrial decline of England. Whether real or imagined, we need to free ourselves from all varieties of ‘Victorian values’ if we are to realise the democratic potential of scientific modernism.

    An edited version of this article appeared in New Scientist, 16th March 1996.

  • HYPERMEDIA FREEDOM by Richard Barbrook

    Turn On, Log In and Drop Out!

    As with any other law, the Telecommunications Reform Act will face the problem of enforcement. The ‘War on Drugs’ hasn’t stopped Americans from voraciously consuming billions of dollars of illegal chemicals every year. There must be similar doubts about the practicality of the censorship measures in the new Act. Is the American state really going to be able to prevent its citizens saying fuck to each other in their private e-mails? How will it prevent people logging-on to Web sites in other countries with a less hypocritical attitude towards adult sexuality? The development of hypermedia is the result of the convergence not only of radio and television broadcasting, but also of other types of less censored media, such as printing and music. Why should the Net be subject to broadcasting-style restrictions rather than those applied to printed material? A long political battle is now beginning to find an acceptable level of legal controls over the new forms of social communications.

    Yet, at this crucial moment, one of the leaders of the principal cyber-rights lobbying group – the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) – has been gripped by an attack of ideological hysteria. In bizarre act of presumption, John Perry Barlow, the EFF’s co-founder, has issued a Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace. In this manifesto, he casts himself as the new Thomas Jefferson calling the people to arms against the tyranny of Bill Clinton: ‘the great invertebrate in Washington’. Claiming to speak ‘on behalf of the future’, he declares that the elected government of the USA has no right to legislate over ‘Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind’. Because ‘we are creating a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live’, Barlow asserts that cyberspace exists outside the jurisdication of the American or any other existing state. In cyberspace, only Net users have the right to decide the rules. According to Barlow, the inhabitants of this virtual space already police themselves without any interference from Federal legislators: ‘you do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society with more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions.’ Users of the Net should therefore ‘reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers’ and ignore the censorship imposed by the Telecommunications Reform Act.

    It is too easy to laugh at this Declaration as a high tech version of the old hippie fantasy of dropping out of straight society into a psychedelic dreamworld. In sci-fi novels, cyberspace has been often poetically described as a ‘consensual hallucination’. Yet, in reality, the construction of the infobahn is an intensely physical act. It is flesh and blood workers who spend many hours of their lives developing hardware, assembling PCs, laying cables, installing router systems, writing software programs, designing web pages and so on. It is obviously a fantasy to believe that cyberspace can be ever be separated from the societies – and states – within which these people spend their lives. Barlow’s Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace therefore cannot be treated as a serious response to the threat to civil liberties on the Net posed by the Christian fundamentalists and other bigots. Instead, it is a symptom of the intense ideological crisis now facing the advocates of free market libertarianism within the online community. At the very moment that cyberspace is about to become opened up to the general public, the individual freedom which they prized in the Net seems about to be legislated out of existence with little or no political opposition. Crucially, the lifting of restrictions on market competition hasn’t advanced the cause of freedom of expression at all. On the contrary, the privatisation of cyberspace seems to be taking place alongside the introduction of heavy censorship. Unable to explain this phenomenon within the confines of the Californian Ideology, Barlow has decided to escape into neo-liberal hyper-reality rather than face the contradictions of really existing capitalism.

    Cyberspace – the Final Frontier

    The ideological bankruptcy of the West Coast libertarians derives from their historically inaccurate belief that cyberspace has been developed by the ‘left-right fusion of free minds with free markets’ (Louis Rossetto, editor-in-chief of Wired Magazine). As Andy Cameron and I showed in our article, Californian Ideology, neo-liberalism has been embraced by the West Coast version of Kroker and Weinstein’s virtual class as a way of reconciling the anarchism of the New Left with the entrepreneurial zeal of the New Right. Above all, this weird hybrid has relied on projecting old myths about the American revolution onto the process of digital convergence. According to Wired Magazine, the development of hypermedia would create a high tech ‘Jeffersonian Democracy’ – the eighteenth century will be reborn in the twenty-first century.

    In his Declaration, John Perry Barlow consciously mimics the rhetoric of the Founding Fathers’ Declaration of Independence of the United States. Once again, free-spirited individuals are standing up to an oppressive and corrupt government. However, these revolutionary phrases from the past contain within them many reactionary aspirations. Back in 1776, Jefferson expressed the national dream of building a rural utopia in the wilderness of America. The winning of independence from Britain was necessary so that Americans could live as independent, self-sufficent farmers in small villages. Jefferson’s pastoral vision rejected city-life as the source of corruption – which he saw in the rapidly expanding conurbations of contemporary Europe. But, as America itself began to industrialise, the pastoral dream had to be displaced westwards towards the frontier. Even after the Indian wars had ended, the Wild West remained a place of individual freedom and self-discovery in American mythology. Jefferson had become a cowboy.

    By its name, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is therefore invoking not just the cowboy myths of the last century, but also the pastoral fantasies of the writer of the original Declaration of Independence. When American government agencies first decided to crack down on hackers, a group of old radicals decided to defend the new generation of cyberpunks. Out of this act of solidarity, the EFF emerged as the political lobby group of the West Coast cyber-community. Using libertarian arguments, it campaigned for minimal censorship and regulation over the new information technologies. But, the EFF was never just a campaign for cyber-rights. It was also a leading cheerleader for the individualist fantasies of the Californian Ideology. According to the tenets of this confused doctrine, hippie anti-authoritianism is being finally realised through the fusion of digital technologies with free market liberalism. However, this inevitable rebirth of Jeffersonian Democracy now seems to have been postponed. Above all, the lobbying work of the EFF appears to have been frustrated – the repressive measures in the Telecommunications Reform Act passed with almost no opposition in the legislature or from the executive. At this moment of crisis, Barlow has embraced the wildest fantasies of the West Coast anarcho-capitalists. Once encryption is widely available, they believe that free-spirited individuals will be able to live within a virtual world free from censorship, taxes and all the other evils of big government. Unable to face the social contradictions of living within the digital city, Barlow has decided to join the virtual cowboys living on the electronic frontier.

    If This is the Electronic Frontier, Who Are the Indians?

    It is no accident that Barlow mimics Jefferson for this retro-futurist programme. Unlike Europeans who fantasied about rural utopias, Jefferson never rejected technology along with the city. On the contrary, the ‘sage of Monticello’ was an enthusiastic proponent of technological innovation. Crucially, he believed that it was possible to freeze the social development of the United States while simultaneously modernising its methods of production. The proponents of the Californian Ideology follow a similar logic. They wish to preserve cyberspace as the home of rugged individuals and innovative entrepreneurs while at the same time supporting the commercial expansion of the Net. For them, the development of the new information society can only take place through the realisation of the eternal principles of liberalism revealed by the Founding Fathers. Yet, like all other countries, the United States exists within profane history. Its political and economic structures are the result of centuries of contradictory social processes, not the expression of sacred truths. Its leaders were complex human beings, not one-sided ‘men of marble’.

    This dialectical reality can be most easily seen by looking at the lives of those Founding Fathers – Jefferson, Washington and Madison – invoked by Barlow in his Declaration. On the one hand, they were great revolutionaries who successfully won national independence and established constitutional government in America. Yet, at the same time, they were vicious plantation-owners who lived off the forced labour of their slaves. In other countries, people have come to terms with the contradictory nature of their modernising revolutionaries. Even Chinese Communist Party now admits that Mao Zedong’s legacy contains both positive elements, such as the liberation of the country from colonialism, and negative features, such as the massacres of the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, Barlow – and many other Americans – can never acknowledge that their beloved republic wasn’t just created by hard-working, freedom-loving farmers, but also through the slavery of millions of Africans and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of indigenous peoples. The plantation economy of the Old South and the extermination of the First Nations are the equivalents of the Irish Famine, the Holocaust and the Gulag Archipelago in American history. But, these contradictions of the real history of the USA are too painful to contemplate for Barlow and other believers in the ahistorical truths of liberal individualism. Jefferson must remain as an unsullied portrait chiselled into the face of Mount Rushmore.

    Yet, in understanding contemporary debates over the future of the Net, it is important to remember the contradictory nature of historical precedents glibly invoked by the Californian Ideology. Back in the early nineteenth century, the spread of the new industrial technologies freed no slaves. On the contrary, the invention of the cotton gin and mechanical spinning machines actually reinforced the archaic and brutal institutions of slavery in the Old South. Nowadays, the libertarian rhetoric of individual empowerment through new information technologies is similarly used to hide the reality of the growing polarisation between the largely white virtual class and the mainly dark-skinned underclass. If interpreted with a European sense of irony, Jeffersonian Democracy can be an appropriate metaphor for the dystopian present found in the inner cities of the USA!

    The First Electronic Frontier

    Because the liberal principles of Jeffersonian Democracy exist outside real history, Barlow and other Californian ideologues cannot recognise the temporal dynamics of really existing capitalism. Although new frontiers may be opened up by enterprising individuals, the original pioneers are quickly replaced by more collective forms of organisation, such as joint-stock companies. For instance, the free-spirited cowboys of the Wild West soon ended up as employees of agri-businesses financed by the industrialised East. A similar process occured in the first electronic frontier in American history: radio broadcasting. Back in the early 1920s, radio was initially developed by an enthusiastic minority of amateurs and entrepreneurs. With few restrictions over broadcasting, almost anyone could either set up their own station or rent airtime on somebody else’s. Yet, once cheap radio receivers became widely available, the airwaves were rapidly taken over by the corporate networks provided by NBC and CBS. This process of monopolisation was consolidated by the Federal government through the 1927 Radio Act which restricted broadcasting to the holders of licences granted by a state-appointed regulatory body. Not surprisingly, conservative politicians seized the opportunity to silence political and cultural radicals, especially from the Left. However, this imposition of censorship encountered little popular disapproval. On the contrary, most voters supported the Radio Act because the licencing system ensured that the popular programmes of the national networks could be heard clearly without interference from other stations. The democratisation of the availability of radio broadcasting had ironically removed most opportunities for participation within the new media.

    The key question now is whether the new electronic frontier of cyberspace is condemned to follow the same path of development. Contrary to Barlow’s assertion that cyberspace is not a ‘public construction project’, the principal obstacle to the expansion of the Net in the USA is the problem of who pays for the building of the fibre-optic grid. Given that they refuse to provide state investment, the Democrats and Republicans have had to use the new Telecommunications Reform Act to create a regulatory framework friendly to the large corporations which possess the capital needed for the construction of the infobahn. Above all, both parties have given their blessing to the growing number of mergers between companies operating within the converging sectors of the media, computing and telecommunications. Because it has lost its competitive edge in its traditional Fordist industries, the American economy now relies heavily on companies at the centre of the process of digital convergence, such as the Hollywood studios, Microsoft and AT&T. Far from encouraging a Jeffersonian Democracy composed of small businesses, the Telecommunications Reform Act has cleared the way for the emergence of American ‘national champions’ which have sufficent size both to build the infobahn at home and to compete successfully abroad against their European and Asian rivals.

    For many on the Left, these multi-media corporations are the greatest threat to free speech on the Net. As happened in radio – and later television – broadcasting, the desire to attract a mass audience can be a far more effective method of inhibiting political radicalism and cultural experimentation than any half-baked censorship provisions tacked onto the end of a Telecommunications Reform Act. The Neo-Luddite pessimists have their worst fears confirmed when corporate leaders openly proclaim their aim to transform the Net into ‘interactive television’. In this scenario, the new forms of sociability existing within contemporary cyberspace would be replaced by the passive consumption of pop entertainment and biased information provided by multi-media corporations. Despite their disingenuous protests against the anti-pornography provisions in the new Act, these corporations cannot be too sad to see the introduction of regulations which would turn the Net into a safe – and therefore profitable – form of family fun.

    In this vision of the future, Jeffersonian Democracy is simply neo-liberal propaganda designed to win support for the privatisation of cyberspace from the members of the virtual class. By promiscuously mixing New Left and New Right together, the Californian Ideology attracts those individuals who hope that they’re smart – or lucky – enough to seize the opportunities presented by the rapid changes in the technological basis of social production. But, while they’re being sold the dream of making it big as cyber-entrepreneurs, most digital artisans are, in reality, denied the employment security previously enjoyed by workers in Fordist industries. Far from being self-sufficent pioneers on the electronic frontier, many end up living hand-to-mouth from one short-term corporate contract to another. Similarly, the privatisation of cyberspace also threatens community uses of cyberspace. As more commercial money is spent on providing online services, it becomes increasingly difficult for amateurs to create Web sites of sufficient quality to attract large number of users. Yet, as happened in 1920s radio broadcasting, many people will happily accept corporate control over cyberspace if they are provided with well-produced online services. According to the Neo-Luddites, the democratisation of the availability of the Net is removing most opportunities for meaningful participation within cyberspace.

    Cyberspace is Social

    The current controversy in the USA over the Telecommunications Reform Act has cruelly exposed the limitations of the Californian Ideology. Barlow may dream of escaping into the hyper-reality of cyberspace, but he is simply trying to avoid facing the political and economic contradictions of really existing capitalism. Far from producing an electronic frontier composed of many small businesses, the commercialisation of cyberspace is creating the conditions for the concentration of capital on a global scale. Given the huge costs of building a national broadband network, only very large corporations can mobilise enough investment to carry out this infrastructure project. Within this emerging oligopoly, innovative entrepreneurs will still achieve public prominence as either leaders of big businesses or as sub-contractors of the multi-media corporations. But their individual success will only be made possible through the huge collective effort to build the infobahn. The dynamics of digital convergence within really existing capitalism are pushing towards the ever increasing socialisation of production and communications, not the realisation of 18th century fantasies of individual self-sufficiency.

    It is therefore rather one-sided for the EFF to direct its criticisms solely against the anti-pornography regulations contained within the new Telecommunications Reform Act. Freedom of expression on the Net is not only threatened by the state, but also by the market. As shown by the history of radio broadcasting in the USA, these two forms of censorship have often been imposed in parallel. Both politicians and corporations have a common interest in ensuring that middle America is not disturbed by any radical political and cultural ideas emanating from new forms of mass communications. Therefore, any meaningful campaign for digital rights has to fight for freedom of expression against both state and market forms of censorship. The development of the Net offers a way of overcoming the political and economic restrictions on free speech within the existing media. Everyone could have the opportunity not only to receive information and entertainment, but also to transmit their own productions. The problem is how this potentiality will be realised.

    A campaign for hypermedia freedom can only be successful if it recognises the inherent contradictions within this fundamental right of citizens. The political rights of each individual are circumscribed by the rights of other citizens. For instance, in order to protect children, the state has a duty to restrict the freedom of speech of paedophiles on the Net. Because ethnic minorities have the right to live in peace, the democratic republic should try to prevent violent fascists from organising online. But, apart from these minimal restrictions, citizens do have the right to say what they like to each other. A democratic state certainly has no mandate to impose a narrow religious morality on all its citizens regardless of their own beliefs.

    Similarly, a campaign for digital rights must also recognise the economic contradictions within hypermedia freedom. Because they use amateur labour, community hypermedia projects can happily exist within the hi-tech gift economy. But, if digital artisans are to be paid for their work, some form of commodity exchange will have to be created within the Net. However, the dominance of the free market will inhibit the free circulation of ideas. Therefore demands for digital rights have to engage with the economic contradictions of hypermedia freedom. Above all, they cannot take absolutist positions over the shape of the information economy. On the contrary, the development of cyberspace has so far been carried out through a hybrid of public, private and community initiatives. All sectors have played an important role in the construction of the infobahn. But, in the new Telecommunications Reform Act, Americans now face the problem of the wrong type of government action, rather than too much state intervention. While it seems all too eager to impose moral censorship on Net users, the Federal government has simultaneously shirked its duty to ensure that all citizens can have access to online services. While the corporations may possess the resources to build the broadband network, the state should use its powers to prevent any section of society being excluded from cyberspace for lack of resources.

    Contrary to the predictions of the pessimists, it is possible to win the struggle against both the political and economic censorship of cyberspace. Although the state can – and should – prosecute the small minority of paedophiles and fascists, the resources needed to spy on everyone’s email and Web sites will make the imposition of moral puritanism very difficult to enforce. Even with sophisticated censorship programs, the sheer volume of Net traffic should eventually overwhelm even a well-funded surveillance body. While it might just about be possible to regulate the output of thousands of radio and television stations, the sheer cost of employing humans to vet the many millions of users logging onto a global network of online services would be prohibitive. The social nature of hypermedia is the best defence of the individual’s right of freedom of expression.

    Similarly, the corporation’s ambition to buy up the whole of cyberspace will also be checked by the social basis of the process of convergence. For instance, the recent trials of interactive television have been commercial failures. As Andy Cameron points out in Dissimulations, the corporate cheerleaders are trapped within a category mistake: they’re trying to impose the form of earlier media onto the new hypermedia. Above all, interactivity can’t be restricted to clicking through a series of menu options. Most people want to meet other people within cyberspace. Unlike the existing electronic media, the Net is not centred on the one-way flow of communications from a limited number of transmitters. On the contrary, hypermedia is a two-way form of communications where everybody is both a receiver and a transmitter. The multi-media corporations will undoubtedly play a leading role in building the infrastructure of the infobahn and selling information commodities over the Net, but they will find it impossible to monopolise the social potential of cyberspace.

    Over recent years, the advocates of the Californian Ideology have been claiming that 18th century liberal individualism would be miraculously reborn through the process of digital convergence. Yet, now online services are becoming available to the mass of the population, the collective nature of the new information society is becoming increasingly obvious. Within politics, electronic democracy will be at the centre of the relationship between representatives and their voters. Within all sectors of the economy, the infobahn will soon become the basic infrastructure for collaborative work across time and space. Crucially, this socialisation of politics and economics will be the best protection for individual freedom within cyberspace. Far from having to escape into a neo-liberal hyper-reality, people can utilise the new digital technologies to enhance their lives both inside and outside cyberspace. The electronic agora is yet to be built.

  • THE HOLY FOOLS (MUTE MIX) by Richard Barbrook

    The Lost Utopia

    The Net is haunted by the disappointed hopes of the Sixties. Because this new technology symbolises another period of rapid change, many contemporary commentators look back to the stalled revolution of thirty years ago to explain what is happening now. Most famously, the founders of Wired appropriated New Left rhetoric to promote their New Right policies for the Net. [2] Within Europe, a long history of class-based politics and compulsive theorising makes such ideological chicanery seem much more implausible. However, this does not mean that Europeans are immune from embracing digital elitism in the name of Sixties libertarianism. Ironically, this bizarre union of opposites is most evident in writings inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

    Although these two philosophers were overt leftists during their lifetimes, many of their contemporary followers support a form of aristocratic anarchism which is eerily similar to Californian neo-liberalism. By doing so, the Deleuzoguattarians have unwittingly exposed the fatal weaknesses within what appears to be an impeccably emancipatory analysis of the Net. Trapped within the precepts of their sacred creed, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari can’t even grasp why the spread of the Net really is such a subversive phenomenon.

    At the end of the century, the superficiality of post-modernism is no longer fashionable among radical intellectuals. Because the Soviet Union has collapsed, the European avant-garde can return to its old obsession with Leninism. Instead, TJs look back to the libertarian spontaneity of May ‘68. [3] Even after decades of reactionary rule, the folk memory of the Sixties still remains an inspiration for the present. The democratic ways of working, cultural experimentation and emancipatory lifestyles initiated in this period survive – and even flourish – within the DIY culture of the Nineties. [4] However, belief in the overthrow of capitalism is no longer credible. Therefore contemporary European intellectuals have turned social transformation into theoretical poetry: a revolutionary dreamtime for the imagination.

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is a prime example of this aesthetisation of Sixties radicalism. Above all, their most famous book – A Thousand Plateaus – now provides the buzzwords and concepts for a specifically European understanding of the Net. In contrast with the USA, a vibrant techno-culture has been flourishing across the continent for over two decades. Pioneered by computer-generated dance music, this digital aesthetic now embraces fashion, art, graphic design, publishing and video games. When it emerged in Europe, the Net was at first seen as a place for social and cultural experimentation rather than as a business opportunity. Unlike the Californian ideology, the writings of Deleuze and Guattari do seem to provide theoretical metaphors which describe the non-commercial aspects of the Net. For instance, the rhizome metaphor captures how cyberspace is organised as an open-ended, spontaneous and horizontal network. Their Body-without-Organs phrase can be used to romanticise cyber-sex. Deleuze and Guattari’s nomad myth reflects the mobility of contemporary Net users as workers and tourists.

    D&G now symbolises more than just Dolce & Gabbana. Within the rhizomes of the Net, the Deleuzoguattarians form their own subculture: the techno-nomads. These adepts are united by specific ‘signifying practices’: computer technologies, techno music, bizarre science, esoteric beliefs, illegal chemicals and cyberpunk novels. There even is a distinctive Deleuzoguattarian language which is almost incomprehensible to the uninitiated. Above all, these techno-nomads possess a radical optimism about the future of the Net. While all that remains of hippie ideals in Wired is its psychedelic layout, the European avant-garde and its imitators still champions the lost utopia of May ‘68 through the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari. The revolution will be digitalised.

    The Politics of May ‘68

    Far from deterring an audience educated in structuralism, the hermetic language and tortured syntax used within A Thousand Plateaus are seen as proofs of its analytical brilliance. However, this idiosyncratic Deleuzoguattarian discourse is causing as much confusion as elucidation among their followers. For instance, the Rhizome.Com web site blandly announces that: ‘rhizome is…a figurative term…to describe non-hierarchical networks of all kinds.’ [5] At no point does this web site explain either the political meaning of this peculiar concept or how its principles might be applied within the Net. On the contrary, rhizome is simply a hip European phrase borrowed to celebrate the disorganised nature of the New York cyber-arts scene.

    Yet, Deleuze and Guattari were not simply avant-garde art critics. The two philosophers were ‘soixante-huitards’: supporters of the May ‘68 revolution.[6] Deleuze and Guattari championed the most radical expression of Sixties politics: anarcho-communism. As its name suggests, anarcho-communism stood for the destruction of both state power and market capitalism. Society would be reorganised as a direct democracy and as a gift economy. The appeal of anarcho-communism did not derive only from its abstract theory, but also from its concrete practice. During the Sixties, anarcho-communists led the search for radical solutions to the historically novel problems facing young people. With the arrival of consumer society, the traditional Left policy of unrestricted modernisation appeared to have reached its limits. Once almost everyone had annual rises in income and mass unemployment had disappeared, the problems of everyday life took on increasing importance, such as restraints on sexual and cultural freedom.

    Above all, many people now wanted a say in the decisions which effected them. They were no longer willing to accept leadership from above without some form of dialogue. Responding to these historically specific circumstances, young militants rediscovered and updated anarcho-communism not just as a theory, but also as a practice. Unlike their parents’ parliamentary parties and trade unions, the New Left could articulate their contemporaries’ demands for more participation. Instead of others deciding their lives for them, young people wanted to do things for themselves.

    ‘[Anarcho-]communism is not a new mode of production; it is the affirmation of a new community.’ [7]

    The Romance of ‘Schizo-Politics’

    Like other gurus of the New Left, Deleuze and Guattari believed that the state itself was the source of all oppression. According to their foundation myth, the state and its allies had been using top-down tree-like structures to subjugate people ever since the dawn of agrarian civilisation. Described as a process of ‘territorialisation’, they claimed that the media, psychoanalysis and language were the primary ‘machinic assemblages’ used by the state to control everyday life in the modern world. In contrast with Marxist analyses, Deleuze and Guattari believed that economics was only one manifestation of the state’s primordial will to dominate all human activity.

    Facing the transhistorical enemy of the state was a new opponent: the social movements. Deleuze and Guattari thought that the traditional style of left-wing politics was now obsolete. As part of the ‘guaranteed’ sector of the economy, private and public sector workers not only had been bought off by the system, but also had their desires manipulated by the family, the media, the dominant language and psychoanalysis. Like much of the post-’68 New Left, the two philosophers instead looked to social movements of youth, feminists, ecologists, homosexuals and immigrants to ‘deterritorialise’ the power of the state. As part of the ‘non-guaranteed’ sector, people in these movements were excluded from the system and were therefore supposedly eager to fight for the revolution. [8]

    In A Thousand Plateaus, the nomads poetically symbolised the ‘molecular’ social movements which were making the anarcho-communist revolution against the ‘molar’ tyranny of political power. Far from trying to seize political power, nomads used their mobility to avoid the ‘territorialised’ control of the authoritarian state. Similarly, the social movements formed a multiplicity of hippie tribes which were autonomous from all centralising and hierarchical tendencies, especially those supported by the mainstream Left. Along the ‘lines of flight’ mapped out by the New Left, the oppressed would escape from the control of the authoritarian state into autonomous rhizomes formed by the social movements. In A Thousand Plateaus, the rhizome became the poetic metaphor for this nomadic vision of direct democracy.

    For Deleuze and Guattari, the overthrow of political power was only the beginning of the anarcho-communist revolution. They believed that political domination was only made possible through personal repression. The anarcho-communist revolution therefore had to liberate the libidinal energies of people from all forms of social control. The individual ‘delirium’ of schizophrenics prefigured the chaotic spirit of collective revolution. This meant that radicals not only had to detonate a social uprising, but also personally live out the cultural revolution. The New Left revolutionary was symbolised as the Body-without-Organs: a person who was no longer ‘organised, signified, subjected’ by the rationality of the state. [9] Such individuals were forerunners of the new type of human being who would emerge after the anarcho-communist revolution: a hippie equivalent of Nietzsche’s Superman. For Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was therefore not just the realisation of direct democracy and the gift economy. In their ‘schizo-politics’, the revolution would destroy bourgeois rationality so each individual could become a holy fool.

    ‘[The Fool]…is the vagabond who exists on the fringe of organised society, going his own way, ignoring the rules and taboos with which men seek to contain him. He is the madman who carries within him the seeds of genius, the one who is despised by society yet who is the catalyst who will transform that society.’ [10]

    The Moment of Community Radio

    Within the exuberant writings of the Deleuzoguattarians, there is a curious – and revealing – omission. They almost never mention Guattari’s claim in the Eighties that the Minitel system was about to replace top-down mass media with bottom-up ‘post-media’. [11] The reason for this absence must be found in the close similarity between Guattari’s Minitel utopia and his earlier dreams about the revolutionary potential of community radio. Paradoxically, it is Guattari’s anarcho-communist adventure within radio which provides the answer to why his contemporary disciples have developed such a curious affinity with the aristocratic ideology of Wired.

    After May ‘68, many members of the New Left believed that producing alternative media was the most effective and fun way of putting their revolutionary theory into practice. In both Italy and France, the nationalised radio and television corporation had disseminated propaganda from the ruling conservative parties for decades. During the Seventies, New Left activists challenged this monopoly by setting up pirate radio stations. As the regulations against unlicensed broadcasting collapsed, thousands of ‘free radios’ emerged first in Italy and later in France. Although most were commercial, a minority were run by New Left activists.

    According to Guattari, community radio stations were the only alternative to the domination of the airwaves by mindless ‘disco radios’. He wanted radio broadcasting to be used to create an electronic form of direct democracy which could replace the corrupt system of representative democracy. Instead of elected politicians, people would directly express their own opinions on the programmes of the community radio stations. The community radio stations supposedly prefigured the imminent reorganisation of the whole of society around direct democracy after the anarcho-communist revolution. Even this ultra-left utopia didn’t go far enough for Guattari. The ultimate aim of a ‘free radio’ was the subversion of bourgeois rationality and repressive sexuality within everyday life. When people were able to express their own views over the airwaves, Guattari hoped that the ‘delirium’ of desire would be released within the population. [12]

    In the early-Eighties, Guattari was the leader of Fréquence Libre, a community radio station licenced to broadcast across Paris. However, it soon became obvious that turning Deleuzoguattarian theory into practice was impossible. Far from encouraging audience participation, the sectarian politics of the two philosophers actually discouraged people – including many on the Left – from getting involved in their community radio station. Guattari and his colleagues were more interested in lecturing the audience rather than engaging in discussions with them. This revolutionary elitism even extended the musical policies of the station. When some rappers approached Fréquence Libre about the possibility of making some programmes, the station refused to let any hip-hop crews on-air until their lyrics had been politically vetted! After they’d alienated most of their potential activists and audience, Guattari’s ‘free radio’ encountered growing difficulties in raising sufficient cash and recruiting enough volunteers to operate the station. Eventually, Fréquence Libre went bankrupt and its frequency was sold to pay its debts. Guattari’s attempts to turn theory into practice within the ‘free radio’ movement had ended in tragedy. [13]

    From Stalin to Pol Pot

    Techno-nomad TJs are attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Fréquence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how Deleuze and Guattari’s celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. This elitism was no accident. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people in the Sixties experienced a pronounced ‘generation gap’ between themselves and their parents. Feeling so isolated, they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority. [14]

    The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolsheviks. As their ‘free radio’ experience showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. As in other social movements, Fréquence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution. [15]

    In Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its ‘wooden language’, the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies. [16] During the Sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party. [17] For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ of the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, most people supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. Yet, as the rappers who wanted to make a show for Fréquence Libre discovered, Deleuzoguattarian anarcho-communism even included the censorship of music. By adopting an Althusserian analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses – without any formal consent from them – in the fight against capitalism.

    For young militants, the problem was how this committed minority could make a revolution without ending up with totalitarianism. Some of the New Left thought that anarcho-communism expressed their desire to overthrow both political and economic oppression. [18] However, even this revolutionary form of politics still appeared to many as tainted by the bloody failure of the Russian revolution. Had not the experience of Stalinism proved that any compromise with the process of modernity would inevitably lead to the reimposition of tyranny? Consequently, anarcho-communist thinkers increasingly decided that just opposing the oppressive features of economic development was not radical enough. Desiring a complete transformation of society, they rejected the transcendent ‘grand narrative’ of modernity altogether, especially those left-wing versions inspired by Hegel and Marx. According to these ultra-leftists, the whole concept of progress was a fraud designed to win acquiescence for the intensification of capitalist domination. While the mainstream Left still wanted to complete the process of modernisation, the New Left should instead be leading a revolution against modernity. [19]

    Once anarcho-communism was transformed into an ahistorical ideology, the New Left’s opposition to economic development soon developed into a desire to abandon modernity altogether. Following the May ‘68 revolution, support for rural guerrillas resisting American imperialism soon became mixed up with hippie tribalism, concerns about environmental degradation and nostalgia for a lost peasant past. Disillusioned with the economic progress championed by the parliamentary Left, many on the New Left synthesised these different ideas into hatred of the mass urban society created by modernity. For them, a truly libertarian revolution could only have one goal: the destruction of the city. [20]

    Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the ‘deterritorialisation’ of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into ‘molecular rhizomes’, direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was not the ‘end of history’: the material result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary, the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their hierarchical brainwashing to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool. [21]

    Yet, as the experience of Fréquence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari’s dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the ‘grand narrative’ of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The ‘line of flight’ from Stalin had led to Pol Pot. [22]

    The Antinomies of the Avant-Garde

    Ironically, the current popularity of Deleuze and Guattari comes from their stubbon refusal to recognise the failure of the anti-modernist revolution. Even when Fréquence Libre went bankrupt, Deleuze and Guattari never questioned their ‘schizo-politics’. Instead, they transformed the historically specific politics of the New Left into theoretical poetry which existed outside history. The libidinal intensity of revolutionary failure was much preferable to the limited achievements of parliamentary reformism. [23] For ‘cutting edge’ TJs, it is now almost compulsory to sample from the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari. Yet, this New Left revival is taking place in very different circumstances from the revolutionary Sixties. However, the political irrelevance of Deleuze Guattari does not discredit their theoretical poetry among radical intellectuals. On the contrary, the defeat of the New Left has enabled their disciples to complete the transformation of anarcho-communism from the hope of social revolution into the symbol of personal authenticity: an ethical-aesthetic rejection of bourgeois society. Although defeated in reality, the ideals of May ‘68 can be used to imagine a revolutionary dreamtime for the Net.

    The aestheticisation of revolutionary politics is a revered tradition of the European avant-garde. Back in the Twenties, the Surrealists perfected the fusion of artistic creativity with social rebellion. Inspired by Lenin, this avant-garde movement claimed that the consciousness of the majority of the population was controlled by cultural mediocrity and puritan morality. Therefore radical intellectuals had the heroic task of freeing the people from ideological domination. Their innovative art would undermine the repressive cultural norms of bourgeois society. Their bohemian way of living would challenge the dull conformity of everyday life under capitalism. In this interpretation of Leninism, cultural experimentation became the privileged expression of revolutionary politics. Whether from the tribal past or the science-fiction future, any vision of a more authentic life should be used to subvert the cultural philistinism of the bourgeois present. Innovative paintings, sculptures, photography, films and literature would be made “…in the service of the revolution.” [24]

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is the latest manifestation of this European avant-garde tradition. The change in language disguises a continuity in practice. Just like its Surrealist predecessors, the contemporary avant-garde equates experimental art and bohemian lifestyles with social rebellion. Despite their involvement with radio and Minitel, Deleuze and Guattari hoped that the ‘line of flight’ from modernity would lead back to the tribal past. In contrast, their contemporary followers have no ambiquity about their relationship with modern technologies. Far from desiring the destruction of the city, radical intellectuals hope that the Deleuzoguattarian utopia will emerge from the hi-tech Net. Using intellectual alchemy, they transmute their gurus’ anti-modernist scriptures into a philosophy of hyper-modernism.

    This aestheticisation of May ‘68 is made much easier by the poetical style of Deleuze and Guattari. As in modernist painting, the ‘realism’ of the text has been superseded by a fascination with the formal techniques of theoretical production. For Deleuze and Guattari, theory was a piece of literature expressing authentic emotion rather than a tool for understanding social reality. Having failed in practice, New Left politics could live on as theory-art. Following this example, techno-nomad TJs sample Deleuzoguattarian discourse to produce leftfield philosophy. Yet, as with Britpop bands, something is lost in these respectful homages to the past. In the sacred texts, the rational analysis of society had already been replaced by the literary celebration of irrational desires. The European avant-garde is now discarding the few remaining connections with practical politics. Using Deleuzoguattarian discourse, avant-garde intellectuals recreate the May ‘68 revolution as a theory-art project for the Net.

    Yet, like the Leninist vanguard, the European avant-garde is haunted by the fatal contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. In their theory-art, the techno-nomads use Deleuzoguattarian discourse to celebrate DIY culture. However, according to the sacred creed, most people – including members of the DIY culture – are brainwashed by semiotic ‘machinic assemblages.’ But, when illuminated by the teachings of Deleuze and Guattari, radical intellectuals can amazingly cast off the mental shackles of bourgeois rationality and experience the redemption of ecstatic immanence. Although many are called, only few can become true disciples of the esoteric doctrine.

    This elitism is a hallowed tradition of the European avant-garde. For decades, radical intellectuals have adopted dissident politics, aesthetics and morals to separate themselves from the majority of ‘herd animals’ whose minds were controlled by bourgeois ideologies. [25] Despite their revolutionary rhetoric, avant-garde intellectuals fantasised about themselves as an artistic aristocracy ruling the philistine masses. Following this elitist custom, the Deleuzoguattarian champion nomadic minorities from the ‘non-guaranteed’ social movements against the stupified majority from the ‘guaranteed’ sector. Once again, the revolution is the ethical-aesthetic illumination of a minority rather than the social liberation of all people.

    Earlier in this century, this dream of an artistic aristocracy sometimes evolved into fascism. More often, the avant-garde supported totalitarian tendancies within the Left. Nowadays, cultural elitism can easily turn into implicit sympathy with neo-liberalism. The European avant-garde – and its imitators – could never openly support the free market fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. Yet, as TJs cut ‘n’ mix, the distinctions between right and left libertarianism are blurring. On the one hand, the Californian ideologues claim that a heroic minority of cyber-entrepreneurs is emerging from the fierce competition of the electronic marketplace. On the other hand, the Deleuzoguattarians believe that this new elite consists of cool TJs and hip artists who release subversive ‘assemblages of enunciation’ into the Net. In both the Californian ideology and Deleuzoguattarian discourse, primitivism and futurism are combined to produce the apotheosis of individualism: the cyborg Nietzschean Superman.

    ‘…the possibility…to rear a master race, the future “masters of the earth”; – a new tremendous aristocracy…in which… philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will…work as artists on “man” himself.’ [26]

    The Hi-Tech Gift Economy

    Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the contemporary avant-garde must substitute itself for the missing political vanguard. The techno-nomads therefore remix Leninism into Deleuzoguattarian discourse: subversive theory-art ‘deterritorialises’ the semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ controlling the minds of the majority. Lenin is morphed into Nietzsche. In the late-Nineties, revolutionary elitism can only be expressed in the words of May ‘68. Yet, important pioneers of the New Left were highly critical of this tradition of cultural elitism. For instance, the Situationists advocated transforming the social context of cultural production rather than the aesthetics of art. Instead of following the avant-garde elite, everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves. [27]

    Above all, the Situationists looked for ways of living which were free from the corruptions of consumer capitalism. Despite their Hegelian modernism, they claimed that anarcho-communism had been prefigured by the potlatch: the gift economy of Polynesian tribes. Within these primitive societies, the circulation of gifts bound people together into tribes and encouraged cooperation between different tribes. This tribal gift economy demonstrated that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. However, the Situationists believed that here could be no compromise between tribal authenticity and bourgeois alienation. After the social revolution, the potlatch would completely supplant the commodity. [28]

    Following May ‘68, this purist vision of anarcho-communism inspired a generation of cultural activists. Emancipatory media supposedly could only be produced within the gift economy. During the late-Seventies, pro-situ attitudes were further popularised by the punk movement. From then to the present-day, the ‘cutting edge’ of music has remained participatory. Crucially, every user of the Net is now also participating within a gift economy. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. They cooperate together without the direct mediation of either politics or money. Far from being the privilege of intellectuals, anarcho-communism is the mundane activity of ordinary people within cyberspace.

    From the beginning, the gift economy has determined the technical and social structure of the Net. Although funded by the Pentagon, the Net could only be successfully developed by letting its users build the system for themselves. Within the academic community, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists publicise their research results by ‘giving papers’ and by ‘contributing articles’. Despite the dispersed nature of this educational gift economy, academics acquire intellectual respect from each other through citations in articles and other forms of public acknowledgement. The collaboration of many different scientists is only possible through the free distribution of information. [29]

    From its earliest days, the free exchange of information has been firmly embedded within the technologies and social mores of cyberspace. Above all, the founders of the Net never bothered to protect intellectual property within computer-mediated communications. Far from wanting to enforce copyright, they tried to eliminate all barriers to the distribution of information. Within the commercial creative industries, advances in digital reproduction are feared for making the ‘piracy’ of copyright material ever easier. In contrast, the academic gift economy welcomes technologies which improve the availability of data. Users should always be able to obtain and manipulate information with the minimum of impediments. The design of the Net therefore assumes that intellectual property is technically and socially obsolete.

    Even though the system has expanded far beyond the university, the Net remains predominantly a gift economy. From scientists through hobbyists to the general public, the charmed circle of users was slowly built up through the adhesion of many localised networks to an agreed set of protocols. Crucially, the common standards of the Net include social conventions as well as technical rules. The giving and receiving of information without payment is almost never questioned. Even selfish reasons encourage people to become anarcho-communists within cyberspace. By adding their own presence, every user contributes to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return, each individual has potential access to all the information made available by others within the Net. Everyone takes far more out of the Net than they can ever give away as an individual. [30]

    Despite the commercialisation of cyberspace, the self-interest ensures that the hi-tech gift economy continues to flourish. For most users, the Net is somewhere to work, play, love, learn and discuss with other people. Unrestricted by physical distance, they collaborate with each other without the direct mediation of money or politics. Unconcerned about copyright, they give and receive information without thought of payment. In the absence of states or markets to mediate social bonds, network communities are instead formed through the mutual obligations created by gifts of time and ideas.

    The hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. For instance, Bill Gates admits that Microsoft’s biggest competitor in the provision of web servers comes from the Apache program. [31] Instead of being marketed by a commercial company, this program is shareware. Because its source code is not protected by copyright, Apache servers can be modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programming skills. Shareware programs are now beginning to threaten the core product of the Microsoft empire: the Windows operating system. Starting from the original software program by Linus Torvalds, a community of user-developers are together building their own non-proprietory operating system: Linux. For the first time, Windows has a real competitor. [32]

    Beyond the Avant-Garde

    The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture. There could be no compromise between the authenticity of the potlatch and the alienation of the market. Fréquence Libre preserved its principles to the point of bankruptcy. Bored with the emotional emptiness of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are entranced by the uncompromising fervour of Deleuze and Guattari. However, as shown by Fréquence Libre, the rhetoric of mass participation often hides the rule of the enlightened few. The ethical-aesthetic committment of anarcho-communism can only be lived by the artistic aristocracy. Yet, the antinomies of the avant-garde can no longer be avoided. The ideological passion of anarcho-communism is dulled by the banality of giving gifts within cyberspace. The theory of the artistic aristocracy cannot be based on the everyday activities of ‘herd animals’.

    Above all, anarcho-communism exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, the boundaries between the different methods of working are not morally precise. Within the mixed economy of the Net, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial Net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Under threat from Microsoft, Netscape is now trying to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence. Lacking the resources to beat its monopolistic rival, the development of products for the shareware Linux operating system has become a top priority. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital. [33]

    The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. Because the dogmatic communism of Deleuze and Guattari has dated badly, their disciples instead emphasise their uncompromising anarchism. However, the state isn’t just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. Many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. State intervention will be needed to ensure everyone can access the Net. The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is threatened by the miscegenation of the hi-tech gift economy with the private and public sectors. Anarcho-communism symbolised moral integrity: the romance of artistic ‘delirium’ undermining the ‘machinic assemblages’ of bourgeois conformity. However, as Net access grows, more and more ordinary people are circulating free information across the Net. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May ‘68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. In the late-Nineties, digital anarcho-communism is being built by hackers like Eric Raymond: ‘a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons…’ [34]

    Threatened by the banalisation of the hi-tech gift economy, the European avant-garde is surreptiously embracing the capitalist fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. For this convergence to take place, Deleuze and Guattari’s anathema against market competition must be skillfully abandoned. First, their adepts deny the wealth-creating powers of human labour. Then the work of living beings is subsumed within the mobility of dead matter. Finally, far from being condemned as a ‘machinic assemblage’ imposed from above, market competition is sanctified as the apotheosis of self-organising systems. As in the Californian ideology, this Deleuzoguattarian heresy believes that the market is a chaotic force of nature which cannot be controlled by state intervention. Abandoning any residual connections with the Left, these TJs instead celebrate the new aristocracy of nomadic artists and entrepreneurs who surf the ‘schiz-flows’ of the information society. In this bizarre remix, anarcho-communism becomes identical with neo-liberalism.

    As a consequence, the techno-nomads have to ignore the major social transformation catalysed by the new information technologies: the widespread adoption of a new method of working. Rejecting the ‘economism’ of the Left, many TJs have replaced the creativity of human labour on the Net with a digital vitalism inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art. Denying the ability of people to determine their own destinies, these techno-nomads believe that information technologies are the semiotic forces determining culture, consciousness and even the conception of existence. However, there is nothing inherently emancipatory in computer-mediated communications. These technologies can also serve the state and the market. The Net was originally invented for the transmission of orders from the military hierarchy. In the future, electronic commerce will play a significant economic role and public services will increasingly be made available on-line.

    At the same time, millions of people are spontaneously working together on the Net without needing coordination by either the state or the market. Instead of exchanging their labour for money, they give away their creations in return for free access to information produced by others. This circulation of gifts coexists with the exchange of commodities and funding from taxation. When they’re on-line, people constantly pass from one form of social activity to another. For instance, in one session, a Net user could first shop on an e-commerce catalogue, then look for information aon the local council’s site and then contribute some thoughts to a listserver for fiction-writers. Without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy. The ‘New Economy’ of the Net is an advanced form of social democracy. [35]

    The techno-nomads cannot comprehend the subversive impact of these everyday activities of Net users. As members of the avant-garde, they’re looking for the intensity of ethical-aesthetic ‘delirium’ within the flows of vitalist matter. For them, there can be nothing particularly special about the mundane activities of Net users who aren’t producing fashionable theory-art. Yet, at this particular historical moment, market competition is disappearing for entirely pragmatic reasons. While commodified information is closed and fixed, digital gifts are open and changeable. Instead of fixed divisions between producers and consumers, users are simultaneously creators on the Net. Obsessed with immanence of semiotic flows, the Deleuzoguattarians cannot appreciate the deep irony of this contingent moment in human history. This is the point in time when the old faith in the inevitable triumph of communism has completely lost all credibility. Yet, at this very moment, market competition is quietly ‘withering away’ within cyberspace.

    Over the past few centuries, people within the industrialised countries have slowly improved their incomes and reduced their hours of work. Although still having little autonomy in their money-earning jobs, workers can now experience non-alienated labour within the hi-tech gift economy. From writing emails through making web sites to developing software, people do things for themselves without the direct mediation of the market and the state. As Net access spreads, the majority of the population are beginning to participate within cultural production. Unlike Fréquence Libre, the avant-garde can no longer decide who can – and cannot – join the hi-tech gift economy. The Net is too large for Microsoft to monopolise let alone a small elite of radical intellectuals. Art can therefore cease being the symbol of moral superiority. When working people finally have enough time and resources, they can then concentrate upon “…art, love, play, etc., etc.; in short, everything which makes Man [and Woman] happy. “ [36]

    At such a historical moment, the European avant-garde is being made obsolete through the realisation of its own supposed principles. The techno-nomads celebrate digital DIY culture to distinguish themselves from the rest of society. Yet, far from being confined to a revolutionary minority, increasing numbers of ordinary people are now participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Rather than symbolising ethical-aesthetic purity, the circulation of gifts is a pragmatic way of working within cyberspace. Although it is impossible to predict the future of the hi-tech gift economy, one thing is almost certain. The intellectual elitism of Deleuzoguattarian discourse is being superseded by the emancipatory ‘grand narrative’ of modernity. As more and more ‘herd animals’ go on-line, radical intellectuals can no longer fantasise about becoming cyborg Supermen. As digital anarcho-communism becomes an everyday activity, there is no longer any need for the leadership of the cultural avant-garde. The time for the revolution of holy fools has passed. As has already happened within popular music, the most innovative and experimental culture will be created by people doing things for themselves. By participating within the hi-tech gift-economy, everyone can potentially become a wise citizen and a creative worker.

    “…the word ‘creation’ will no longer be restricted to works of art but will signify a self-conscious activity, self-conceiving, reproducing for its own terms…and its own reality (body, desire, time, space), being its own creation.” [37]

    Footnotes

    [1] Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, Pan, London 1947.

    [2] See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    [3] A TJ is a ‘theory-jockey’: Amsterdam slang for intellectuals who cut ‘n’ mix philosophies like DJs in a club.

    [4] DIY stands for ‘do-it-yourself’. See Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle (ed.), Gathering Force: DIY culture – radical action for those tired of waiting, Big Issue, London 1997.

    [5] See the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section on Rhizome (was www.rhizome.com, now www.rhizome.org)

    [6] “May ‘68 was a demonstration, an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state… Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.” Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, Negotiations: 1972-1990, Columbia University Press, New York 1995.

    [7] Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, Black & Red, Detroit 1975.

    [8] See Félix Guattari, Molecular Revolution: psychiatry and politics, Penguin, London 1994.

    [9] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia, Athlone Press, London 1988.

    [10] Alfred Douglas, The Tarot. This Gnostic vision of human freedom is remarkably close to the liberating role of insanity championed by the two philosophers.

    [11] See Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, New Formations, Number 8.

    [12] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’ in Pascal Defrance (ed.), De la Necessité Socio-culturelles de l’Existence de Radios Libres Indépendantes; and his introduction to Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre (translated in Molecular Revolution: psychiatry and politics).

    [13] Jean-Paul Simard, Interview with Author, Fréquence Libre, April 1985; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM: la folle histoire des radios libres, Grasset, Paris, 1986.

    [14] The vanguard was a military term used for the advance guard who opened up the path for the main army. Applied to politics, this phrase emphasised the leadership role of radical intellectuals within revolutionary organisations.

    [15] For a critique of New Left vanguardism, see Jo Freeman, ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’ in CS (ed.), Untying the Knot: feminism, anarchism & organisation, Dark Star/Rebel Press, London 1984.

    [16] See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?: burning questions of our movement, Foreign Language Press, Beijing 1975; and Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, Merlin, London 1968.

    [17] See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, New Left Books, London 1971.

    [18] Above all, anarcho-communism was seen as the heir of those Left Communists who had fought for direct democracy organised through the Soviets against the dictatorship of the Leninist party. See Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks & Workers’ Control: 1917-1921, Solidarity, London 1970; and Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Uprising 1921, Solidarity, London 1967.

    [19] See Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity. Of course, a much diluted variant of this attack on oppressive ‘grand narratives’ later formed the ideological basis for the self-styled post-modernists.

    [20] In classic New Left films like Weekend and Themroc, rebellion against a repressive and alienating urban society was symbolically represented through a return to primitive simplicity. Curiously, both films portrayed cannibalism as the ultimate expression of liberation from bourgeois morality!

    [21] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.

    [22] Apart from its emphasis on peasants rather than nomads, Khmer Rouge ideology was very similar to the anti-modernism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari. See Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982, Allen and Unwin, Hemel Hempstead 1984.

    [23] In contrast, most of their contemporaries gravitated towards either electoral politics or post-modern nihilism. See Jean-Pierre Garnier and Roland Lew, ‘From The Wretched Of The Earth To The Defence Of The West: an essay on Left disenchantment in France’, Socialist Register 1984: the uses of anti-communism, Merlin, London 1984.

    [24] From 1930 to 1933, the Surrealists’ journal was called Le Surréalisme au service de la révolution. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red: the politics of surrealism, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1990.

    [25] According to Nietzsche, the culturally impoverished masses were ‘herd animals’ compared to the ‘eagles’ of the artistic world.

    [26] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Vintage, New York 1968. Deleuze commended Nietzsche for the ‘positive task’ of inventing the reactionary concept of the Superman.

    [27] See Ken Knabb (ed.), Situationist International Anthology, Bureau of Public Secrets, California 1981.

    [28] See Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, Practical Paradise, London 1972. The Situationists discovered the tribal gift economy in Marcel Mauss, The Gift.

    [29] See Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’ in Barry Barnes and David Edge, Science in Context: readings in the sociology of science, The Open University, Milton Keynes 1982.

    [30] See Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets: an economic model for the trade in free goods and services on the Internet’.

    [31] See Keith W. Porterfield, ‘Information Wants to be Valuable: a report from the first O’Reilly Perl conference’.

    [32] See Eric C. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’.

    [33] See Netscape Communications Corporation, ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’.

    [34] Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’.

    [35] Wired uses ‘The New Economy’ as a synonym for its neo-liberal fantasies about the digital future.

    [36] Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY 1969.

    [37] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick NJ 1984.

  • THE HOLY FOOLS (LONG MIX) by Richard Barbrook

    THE HOLY FOOLS

    a critique of the avant-garde
    in the age of the Net

    1: The Lost Utopia

    The Net is haunted by the disappointed hopes of the Sixties. Because this new technology symbolises another period of rapid change, many contemporary commentators look back to the stalled revolution of thirty years ago to explain what is happening now. For instance, the editors of Wired continually pay homage to the New Left values of individual freedom and cultural dissent in their coverage of the Net. Yet, these old hippies no longer believe in political rebellion and collective provision. Instead, in their Californian ideology, they now claim that their youthful ideals will be realised through technological determinism and free markets. The politics of ecstasy have been replaced by the economics of greed. [1]

    Within Europe, it is much more difficult to pull off the Californian scam of camouflaging New Right policies for the Net underneath New Left rhetoric. A long history of class-based politics and compulsive theorising makes such ideological chicanery seem much more implausible. Even post-modernists are much more attracted to pessimism and nihilism than to the reactionary modernism underpinning the Californian ideology. [2] However, this does not mean that Europeans are immune from embracing digital elitism in the name of Sixties libertarianism. Ironically, this bizarre union of opposites is most evident in the writings on the Net by avant-garde intellectuals inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

    Although these two philosophers were overt leftists during their lifetimes, many of their contemporary followers support a form of aristocratic anarchism which is eerily similar to that promoted by Californian neo-liberals. The European avant-garde is rediscovering its elitist traditions through the cult of Deleuze and Guattari. By doing so, the Deleuzoguattarians haven’t just unwittingly exposed the fatal weaknesses within what appears to be an impeccably emancipatory analysis of the Net. Trapped within the precepts of their sacred creed, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari can’t even grasp why the spread of the Net really is such a subversive phenomenon.

    Inside the universities, alternative culture and the art world, the popularity of Deleuze and Guattari is the philosophical equivalent of current nostalgia for Sixties pop music. At the end of the century, the superficiality and detachment of post-modernism are no longer fashionable among radical intellectuals. However, because the Soviet Union has collapsed, the European avant-garde cannot return to its traditional obsession with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Instead, contemporary activists, academics and artists look back to the libertarian spontaneity of the revolutionary Sixties. Just like pop musicians, TJs use samples from this heroic decade to prove their radical credentials. [3] At the peak of the Sixties revolutionary wave, it appeared that old structures were disintegrating and collective subjectivity was about to be realised. During a brief moment, the continent seemed to be on the verge of fundamental social transformation.

    ‘The movement [of May ’68] was a rediscovery of collective and individual history, an awareness of the possibility of intervening in history, an awareness of participating in an irreversible event…It was a generalised critique of all alienations, all ideologies and of the entire organisation of real life…’ [4]

    The great change never happened. Despite marches, strikes, riots, occupations and terrorism, the system was able to defeat the challenge from the New Left. During the Eighties and Nineties, even the social gains of the post-war settlement were being rolled back by triumphant capitalism. Yet, after decades of reactionary rule, the folk memory of May ’68 still remains an inspiration for the present. While ‘really existing socialism’ has imploded, the democratic ways of working, cultural experimentation and emancipatory lifestyles initiated in the Sixties have survived – and even flourished – into the harder times of the Nineties. From raves to environmental protests, the spirit of May ’68 lives on within the DIY culture. [5] Deprived of Leninism, contemporary European intellectuals wishing to revive the revolutionary traditions of the avant-garde are drawn to this legacy of the New Left. However, unlike their hippie mentors, these academics, artists and activists realise that the overthrow of capitalism is not imminent. Apparently unrealisable in practice, social transformation must be turned into theoretical poetry: a revolutionary dreamtime for the imagination.

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is a prime example of this aesthetisation of Sixties radicalism. Their most famous book – A Thousand Plateaus – is a weird pot-pourri of anarchism, therapy, mysticism, art theory, musicology, bizarre science, imaginary history and drug references. Rejecting reasoned sociological arguments, Deleuze and Guattari created free association meditations written in their own inimitable language. As they explained in its opening pages: ‘a book…is a multiplicity – but we don’t know yet what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, after it has been elevated to the status of a substantive.’ [6]

    Despite this warning from its authors, A Thousand Plateaus has become a sacred text: the Kabbala of the techno-generation. This book provides the buzzwords and concepts for a specifically European understanding of the Net. It is the default setting for discussions on nettime and other on-line political-artistic forums. [7] Precisely because it comes from Europe, Deleuzoguattarian theory is now fashionable from New York to Tokyo. On the West Coast, Kevin Kelly and other Wired writers also use an eclectic mix of hippie rhetoric, weird science and pop culture to create the Californian ideology. [8] However, their hard-line neo-liberalism is irrelevant to most European intellectuals – and their imitators overseas. Instead of seeing the Net primarily as a business opportunity, avant-garde academics, artists and activists are much more excited by the cultural possibilities of new technologies. This is not just a reflection of the relative weakness of the European computer industry. For over two decades, a vibrant techno-culture has been developing across the continent. Pioneered by computer-generated dance music, this digital aesthetic now embraces fashion, art, graphic design, publishing and video games. When it emerged in Europe, the Net was not surprisingly pioneered by this already flourishing techno-culture. [9]

    The conservative politics and culture of Wired could never provide a credible explanation of what was happening within this alternative scene. Looking for another approach, TJs have rediscovered the writings of Deleuze and Guattari. [10] Apparently free from the taint of both Leninism and neo-liberalism, these two philosophers seem to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the subversive potential of the Net. While all that remains of hippie ideals in Wired is its psychedelic layout, European cyber-enthusiasts – and their imitators – can still champion the lost utopia of May ’68 by using the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari. The revolution will be digitalised. [11]

    2: Techno-Nomads@Rhizome.Net

    A Thousand Plateaus has achieved such a cult status within the on-line community because Sixties radicalism did fundamentally shape the Net. Despite being funded by the US military, many of its most important aspects came from the hippie counter-culture. Above all, most Net users expect neither to pay for items downloaded nor to be paid for others accessing their sites. This DIY ethic was partially inspired by the New Left. Campaigning against the American invasion of Vietnam, the Yippie movement advocated not paying for any goods or services provided by corporations profiting from the war. Among activists involved in developing the early computer networks, this subversive attitude was expressed in the famous hacker slogan: ‘information wants to be free.’ [12] Although now threatened by state censorship and colonised by commercial interests, the content of the Net is still mainly produced through spontaneous collaboration between autonomous individuals within a hi-tech gift economy. People freely swap articles, music, software, pictures and any other form of intellectual labour which can be digitally recorded. On websites, on-line conferences, listservers, newsgroups and other virtual spaces, they can play, learn and work together outside the control of both state and market. [13]

    Unable to comprehend any form of human sociability except money-commodity relations, the Californian ideology is completely useless for explaining why the hi-tech gift economy is such a fundamental aspect of cyberspace. In contrast, A Thousand Plateaus does seem to provide a credible alternative analysis of the Net. This book contains theoretical metaphors which illustrate how much of the Net’s content is produced without monetary incentives. It even has concepts which can be used to describe some of the more bizarre aspects of on-line culture, such as cybersex. Above all, this sacred text allows the European avant-garde of the late-Nineties to live within a revolutionary dreamtime inspired by the rebellious Sixties.

    For the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari, the rhizome is the key concept found within A Thousand Plateaus. As a metaphor derived from plant roots, this phrase captures how cyberspace is organised as an open-ended, non-hierarchical, spontaneous and horizontal network. Not surprisingly, rhizome has been adopted a shorthand term for websites, listservers, IRC channels, bulletin boards, MOOs and other on-line conferences where people can come together inside the Net without needing the direct mediation of money. [14] One hip New York list server and web site has even adopted Rhizome as its name. [15] According to the Deleuzoguattarians, these non-commodified Net spaces are digital versions of other ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’ liberated by DIY activists, such as squats, pirate radios, illegal raves and environmental protest camps. [16] Far from being the apotheosis of market competition, the Net is seen as heralding a new stage of human civilisation founded on rhizomic collaboration. [17]

    The adepts of A Thousand Plateaus believe that the most utopian demands of May ’68 are about to be realised within cyberspace. Social movements will be able to organise themselves freely using the Net’s decentralised structure. [18] Cyber-feminists will use digital technologies to transcend patriarchal oppression. [19] Community media will be able to distribute their output without fear of censorship or other restrictions. [20] The limitations of representative democracy will be overcome through the creation of the ‘virtual agora’ – a real-time direct democracy made possible through mass participation in social decision-making using the Net. [21] As nations disappear and hierarchies collapse, Sixties radicalism will finally realised within cyberspace.

    The appeal of A Thousand Plateaus lies in more than its poetic recapitulation of New Left communal utopias. In their holy book, Deleuze and Guattari also propagated the myth of the nomad to celebrate hippie tribalism. During the Sixties, many revolutionaries thought that rejecting the dull routines of everyday life was the most effective method of undermining corporate capitalism. Rather than becoming docile workers and contented consumers, ‘…the children of the ants are all going to be tribal people…’ [22] From crusties to cyberpunks, contemporary youth subcultures still retain this hippie belief in the redemptive power of bohemian lifestyles. European avant-garde intellectuals are particularly attracted by the nomadic version of this tradition. Being relatively privileged, they already enjoy greater mobility as employees and as tourists than most of the population of the continent. These academics, artists and activists are making business and forming friendships at conferences, openings, festivals, exhibitions and parties held across the continent and beyond. Now, in their imaginations, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari can even be in motion when sitting in front of their computer screens. They are the ‘hunter-gatherers of CommTech’ – a cyber-tribe who follow the ‘flows’ across the open spaces of the virtual world. [23] Within the rhizomes of the Net, the Deleuzoguattarians are forming their own youth subculture: the techno-nomads. [24]

    There is an eccentric flakiness in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings which fits well with the mood of the times. As in the Sixties, alternative culture has a simultaneous – and contradictory – fascination with mystical beliefs, such as New Age and UFO cults, and with scientific advances, such as quantum physics and genetic manipulation. Among the Californian ideologues, this strange combination of spiritual irrationalism and technical rationalism has been used to justify their neo-liberal analysis of the Net. Using A Thousand Plateaus, TJs have mixed a European version of mystical positivism as wacky as anything found on the West Coast. [25]

    For instance, on-line dating isn’t simply a fun way of meeting new partners and trying to find romance. Someone who talks about sex on an IRC channel or in a MOO is supposedly transformed into a Body-without-Organs – an erotic mind freed by digital technologies from the restrictions of the flesh. [26] According to Pierre Lévy, the Net is forming a ‘collective intelligence’ out of our individual minds – a notion derived by combining neo-Platonist Islamic theology with chaos theory and quantum mechanics. [27] For both Manuel De Landa and Sadie Plant, the self-organising tendencies of the Net are derived from a process of chaotic ’emergence’ which determines everything from hurricanes through living organisms to computer systems. [28] However, even these forms of mystical positivism are not irrational enough for Hakim Bey. Promoting his own incoherent mix of Sufism, acid, anarchism and cyberpunk, this guru openly denounces: ‘…all born-again knee jerk atheists & their frowsy late-Victorian luggage of scientistic vulgar materialism…’ [29]

    The disciples of A Thousand Plateaus are the contemporary version of the European avant-garde. D&G now symbolises more than just Dolce & Gabbana. United by certain ‘signifying practices’, they form an intellectual version of the youth subcultures studied by many of them on Cultural Studies courses. [30] The techno-nomads love computer technologies, they’re fans of techno music, they’re excited by bizarre science, they’re sympathetic to esoteric beliefs, they’re part of the chemical generation and they adore cyberpunk novels. There even is a distinctive Deleuzoguattarian language which is almost incomprehensible to the uninitiated. [31] Above all, the techno-nomads possess a radical optimism about the future of the Net. Intoxicated by reading too much Deleuze and Guattari, these TJs are confident of being able to intervene within cyberspace to maximise its emancipatory social and cultural potential. The development of the Net won’t just undermine the power of the state, but also create a whole new libertarian way of living. The wired future is there for the taking…

    ‘What we want to do is what we can do: cut new channels, create new temporary autonomous zones, defuse cathecting power. More than any other writers, [Deleuze and Guattari] …have developed a coherent set of conceptual tools that help us understand our situation and act upon it.’ [32]

    3: The Politics of May ’68

    As the European universities and art world have long been dominated by French formalist philosophy, it is not entirely surprising that avant-garde intellectuals interested in the Net have elevated A Thousand Plateaus into a cult text. Since Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard and Virilio are no longer the latest thing, they have proclaimed Deleuze and Guattari as the philosophers of the moment. Although sometimes included within the inner circle of French post-structuralism, these two thinkers were until recently considered far too radical to receive official artistic or academic recognition. [33] However, in this current period of rapid social change symbolised by the Net, the subversive ideas contained within their writings now add to their fashionable appeal. The cynicism and detachment of the post-modernists was Eighties style. The techno-nomads need a more passionate approach for the end of the Nineties. Although they’re both dead, Deleuze and Guattari have become the philosophers of the cyber-millennium.

    Far from deterring an audience educated in structuralism, the hermetic language and tortured syntax used within A Thousand Plateaus are seen as proofs of its analytical brilliance. Yet this idiosyncratic Deleuzoguattarian discourse has caused as much confusion as elucidation among their followers. Although the sacred texts are obviously inspired by Sixties radicalism, most of the techno-nomads seem blissfully unaware of what exactly are the theoretical and practical implications of its New Left politics. For instance, the Rhizome website blandly announces that: ‘rhizome is…a figurative term…to describe non-hierarchical networks of all kinds.’ [34] However, at no point does this web site explain either the political meaning of this peculiar concept or how its principles might be applied within the Net. On the contrary, rhizome is simply a hip European phrase borrowed to celebrate the disorganised nature of the New York cyber-arts scene. Some disciples have become even more befuddled by the strange rhetoric of A Thousand Plateaus. For example, Hari Kunzru claims that Deleuze and Guattari are on the same side as the Californian ideologues in the ‘libertarian-communitarian opposition’ within debates about the Net. Just like Wired, these two philosophers are supposedly champions of the ’emergent properties’ of individual initiative against the evils of state domination. [35]

    Such confusion is partially the consequence of political naiveté among many followers of Deleuze and Guattari. Because the two philosophers didn’t use stilted left-wing jargon, most of their followers have avoided understanding the specific political position which informs A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Yet, Deleuze and Guattari weren’t just advocates of avant-garde art – and were certainly never apologists for neo-liberalism. Above all, these two gurus were ‘soixante-huitards’: supporters of the May ’68 revolution. [36] During their lifetimes, they were both participated with high-profile New Left initiatives. Deleuze was actively involved in the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons – the anti-prisons movement led by Michel Foucault. Guattari was the leader of most influential community radio organisation in France. [37] Although it has confused their disciples, Deleuze and Guattari’s idiosyncratic discourse was inspired by their participation in these New Left campaigns. According to the two philosophers, the problem with the ‘wooden language’ of Leninism was that its lack of radicalism not its revolutionary aspirations. [38] In its place, they composed theoretical poetry to express the new subversive practices which developed following the May ’68 uprising against capitalism. Far from supporting Californian neo-liberalism, Deleuze and Guattari actually championed the most revolutionary form of New Left politics: anarcho-communism.

    Like other members of their generation, Deleuze and Guattari wanted to escape from the rigid orthodoxies of Stalinism which had dominated the French Left since the rise of fascism. [39] Trying to find a radical alternative, they took their inspiration from an eclectic range of sources. Along with other young militants, the two philosophers participated in the rediscovery of revolutionary ideologies which had been discarded by their elders, such as anarchism, Trotskyism, Surrealism, council communism and Freudo-Marxism. [40] At the same time, these philosophers also drew on the new ideas and practices which were emerging from the ferment of the New Left, such as Maoism, structuralism, Situationism, urban terrorism, feminism, pacifism, gay rights, community media, psychedelic culture and the anti-psychiatry movement. Despite the profound contradictions between them, all these different currents were united in their disillusionment with the parliamentary parties and trade unions of the mainstream European Left. [41]

    For Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was the most radical expression of New Left politics. As its name suggests, anarcho-communism stood for the destruction of both state power and market capitalism. After bureaucracy and money were abolished, society would be reorganised as a direct democracy and as a gift economy. Initially, anarcho-communists had believed that their utopia would be formed by workers’ councils based in the factories. But, after May ’68, they increasingly identified direct democracy and the gift economy with the social movements and community media created by New Left activists. [42]

    The appeal of anarcho-communism did not only derive from its abstract theory, but also from its concrete practice. During the Sixties, anarcho-communists led the search for radical solutions to the historically novel problems facing young people. Because of the struggle against fascism and the development of Fordism, the babyboomer generation grew up in a period when the Left in Western Europe was dominated by Stalinist and Social Democratic parties. Although divided by the Cold War, both movements prioritised representative politics and economic growth over more radical concepts of human liberation. However, with the arrival of consumer society, the policy of unrestricted modernisation appeared to have reached its limits. Once almost everyone had annual rises in income and mass unemployment had disappeared, the problems of everyday life took on increasing importance, such as restraints on sexual and cultural freedom.

    Above all, many people now wanted a say in the decisions which effected them. They were no longer willing to accept leadership from above without some form of dialogue. Responding to these historically specific circumstances, young militants rediscovered and updated anarcho-communism not just as a theory, but also as a practice. Unlike their parents’ parliamentary parties and trade unions, the New Left could articulate their contemporaries’ demands for more participation. Within the universities, factories, offices and cultural life, young people were no longer content to have others deciding their lives for them in return for the commodities of consumer society. Instead, they wanted to do things for themselves.

    ‘[Anarcho-]communism is not a new mode of production; it the affirmation of a new community. It is a question of being, of life…men and women…will not gain mastery over production, but will create new relations among themselves which will determine an entirely different activity.’ [43]

    4: The Romance of ‘Schizo-Politics’

    In their writings, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari are invoking this revolutionary spirit of May ’68 to celebrate the libertarian aspects of the Net. Opposed to censorship or commercialisation within cyberspace, they instinctively seize on rhizomes, nomads and Body-without-Organs to attack their statist and capitalist enemies. Bored by the political apathy of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are excited by the subversive attitudes of their two gurus. However, the current aestheticisation of Sixties radicalism makes it difficult to understand the particular political position underpinning Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Because of their idiosyncratic language, the origins of their politics in the historically specific circumstances facing the New Left thirty years ago have been obscured. Yet, when read with knowledge of this past, the free association theoretical poetry of A Thousand Plateaus does reveal its rigid political line: anarcho-communism.

    Like the traditional Left, Deleuze and Guattari also believed that modern society was the culmination of thousands of years of social conflict. However, the two philosophers rejected the policies for economic modernisation championed by both the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties. Growing up during the post-war boom, they thought that poverty and unemployment were no longer urgent social problems. Along with other anarcho-communists, Deleuze and Guattari didn’t just think that this strategy was a betrayal of the revolutionary heritage of the Left. Above all, they claimed that the reformism of the parliamentary parties had become ‘a historical absurdity’ after May ’68. [44]

    While the mainstream Left still sought political power, the Deleuze and Guattari denounced the state itself as the source of all oppression. According to their foundation myth, the state and its allies had been using top-down tree-like structures to subjugate people ever since the dawn of agrarian civilisation. [45] Described as a process of ‘territorialisation’, they claimed that the media, psychoanalysis and language were the primary ‘machinic assemblages’ used by the state to control everyday life in the modern world. [46] For Deleuze and Guattari, economics was only one manifestation of the state’s primordial will to dominate all human activity. [47]

    Facing the transhistorical enemy of the state was a new opponent: the social movements. Both Stalinists and Social Democrats believed that the organised working class was the principle enemy of capitalism. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari thought that this traditional style of left-wing politics was now obsolete. As part of the ‘guaranteed’ sector of the economy, private and public sector workers not only had been bought off by the system, but also had their desires manipulated by the family, the media, the dominant language and psychoanalysis. [48] Like much of the post-’68 New Left, the two philosophers instead looked to the new social movements of youth, feminists, ecologists, homosexuals and immigrants to ‘deterritorialise’ the power of the state. Forming the ‘non-guaranteed’ sector, people in these movements were excluded from the system and were therefore supposedly eager to fight for the revolution. [49]

    While the parliamentary Left wanted to unite all workers around common concerns which could be satisfied through reforms, Deleuze and Guattari advocated a ‘micro-politics of desire’ which resisted such homogenisation of individual needs by the state and its left-wing allies. [50] In A Thousand Plateaus, the nomads poetically symbolised the ‘molecular’ groups who were making this anarcho-communist revolution against the ‘molar’ tyranny of political power. Echoing the hippie fascination with American Indians, the two philosophers claimed that nomadic tribes had prefigured the small-scale and non-hierarchical organisations of the social movements. Far from trying to seize political power, nomads used their mobility to avoid the ‘territorialised’ control of the authoritarian state. [51] Inspired this example, the social movements should therefore reject all attempts to unify them behind the programmes for legislative reforms proposed by the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties. Instead, they should form a multiplicity of tribes which were autonomous from all centralising and hierarchical tendencies, especially those supported by the mainstream Left. [52]

    Like other members of the New Left, Deleuze and Guattari advocated the replacement of the state by direct democracy. However, because they distrusted the organised working class, the abolition of political power was no longer to be achieved through the rule of the factory councils. Instead, the two philosophers believed that the bottom-up organisations of the social movements should supersede the top-down authority of the state. In A Thousand Plateaus, the rhizome therefore acted as a poetic metaphor for this updated vision of direct democracy. Along the ‘lines of flight’ mapped out by the New Left, the oppressed would escape from the control of the authoritarian state into autonomous rhizomes formed by the social movements. While the parliamentary Left was still committed to its arboreal, top-down organisations, the New Left was creating rhizomic, bottom-up movements which prefigured the anarcho-communist future. [53]

    ‘To…centred systems, the authors contrast acentred systems, finite networks of automata in which communication runs from any neighbourhood to any other, the stems and channels do not pre-exist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their situation at a given moment – such that the local operations are co-ordinated and the final global result synchronised without a central agency.’ [54]

    According to Deleuze and Guattari, the overthrow of political power was only the beginning of the anarcho-communist revolution. As ultra-leftists, they didn’t just want to replace one type of social organisation with another more sophisticated form. Above all, they sought to create a fully libertarian way of living. Consequently, these two philosophers advocated the destruction of not only the state and the market, but also the family, the media, the dominant language and the asylum. The only truly free individuals were those who had freed themselves from the ‘common sense’ rationality of bourgeois society. In their critique of official psychiatry, the ‘delirium’ of schizophrenics was something to be celebrated rather than cured. Escaping from their oppressive lives under capitalism, the insane expressed their desires at an intensity which went beyond the social limitations imposed by conventional language. [55] Crucially, this meant that anarcho-communism could no longer be expressed through rational arguments used by the mainstream Left. Because language itself was a form of social domination, ‘schizo-politics’ had to be proclaimed through the ‘delirium’ of theoretical poetry. [56]

    According to Deleuze and Guattari, political domination was only made possible through personal repression. The anarcho-communist revolution therefore had to liberate the libidinal energies of people from all forms of social control. The individual ‘delirium’ of schizophrenics prefigured the chaotic spirit of collective revolution. [57] This meant that radicals not only had to detonate a social uprising, but also personally live out the cultural revolution. The New Left revolutionary was symbolised as the Body-without-Organs: a person whose spontaneous desires were no longer ‘organised, signified, subjected’ by the rationality of the state. [58] Such individuals were forerunners of the new type of human being who would emerge after the anarcho-communist revolution. Liberated from the repressive culture of the old order, this post-revolutionary person would be the New Left equivalent of Nietzsche’s Superman: a sovereign individual who could constantly ‘… create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active.’ [59] For Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was therefore not just the realisation of direct democracy and the gift economy. In their ‘schizo-politics’, the revolution had to include the destruction of bourgeois rationality so each individual could become a holy fool.

    ‘[The Fool]…is the vagabond who exists on the fringe of organised society, going his own way, ignoring the rules and taboos with which men seek to contain him. He is the madman who carries within him the seeds of genius, the one who is despised by society yet who is the catalyst who will transform that society.’ [60]

    5: The Moment of Radio Alice

    After two decades of domination by neo-liberalism, it is not surprising that the followers of Deleuze and Guattari don’t wish to ‘come out’ as anarcho-communists. It is much easier to transform the two philosophers’ theoretical poetry into a revolutionary dreamtime about the Net. However, this fear of being overtly anarcho-communist has led to a curious – and revealing – omission among the exuberant writings of Deleuze and Guattari’s disciples. Although they eagerly adapt the poetical metaphors of A Thousand Plateaus to praise the Net, the techno-nomads almost never mention the enthusiasm of one of their holy prophets’ for the emancipatory potential of computer-mediated communications.

    For, as well as being a philosopher and a psychoanalyst, Guattari was also a prominent community media activist. From the mid-Eighties onwards, he became one of the main proponents of the use of computer networks by the new social movements. Over a decade before the Net became popular in the USA, the French government had set up the world’s first public access computer network: Minitel. [61] Guattari thought that this proto-Net was a harbinger of a new ‘post-media’ civilisation. In his philosophical writings with Deleuze, the media had always been condemned for imposing capitalist subjectivity on people. In particular, Guattari detested television as a ‘hypnotic drug’ which stupefied its audience and cut them off from their fellow humans. [62] However, he believed that the domination of the mass media was almost over. Using a Minitel bulletin board, group Eros – an anti-psychiatry organisation – was already pioneering new interactive forms of communications among its members. [63] Following this example, other social movements would soon be forming their own ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’ over the public computer network. [64] Instead of being brainwashed by a few television channels, people would then be able to participate within a multiplicity of information spaces. According to Guattari, the New Left was imminently going to replace top-down, homogenising media with bottom-up, rhizomic ‘post-media’. [65]

    Given the similarity of Guattari’s utopian vision of computer networks with their own, the absence of almost any mention of his enthusiasm for ‘post-media’ by the techno-nomads is indeed very strange. The reason must be found in their – conscious or unconscious – realisation that an examination of Guattari’s involvement within community media would reveal why their favourite philosophical duo do not really provide ‘a coherent set of conceptual tools’ for understanding the Net. This is because Guattari’s enthusiasm for media experiments by social movements was nothing new. In the late-Seventies and early-Eighties, he was a prominent guru of the community radio movement in both Italy and France. However, when the abstractions of the holy prophets were put into practice, they had disastrous consequences. This is why the techno-nomads have so far studiously avoided mentioning Guattari’s own writings about the impact of computer networks. Once these became known, it would be inevitable that people would then look for their origins in the embarrassing history of the application of Guattari’s theory as practice within the community radio movement. Crucially, it is this anarcho-communist adventure within community radio which – paradoxically – provides the answer to why the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari have developed such a curious affinity with the neo-liberal ideology of Wired.

    Like many other innovations of the New Left, the community radio movement began on the West Coast of the USA. The protests against the American invasion of Vietnam didn’t just politically radicalise a generation, but also popularised the hippie counter-culture. Alongside conventional political activism such as marches, election campaigns and sit-ins, young militants showed their opposition to the murderous policies of the US government in South-East Asia by rejecting the puritanical lifestyle of their parents. This fusion of political and cultural radicalism found its clearest expression in the alternative media. Utilising the latest technologies, hippies created many different forms of counter-cultural expression from underground newspapers to rock bands. [66]

    The development of community radio broadcasting was an integral part of this cultural revolution against the American military-industrial complex. As with many other New Left initiatives of the time, community radio stations were organised in ways which supposedly prefigured the anarcho-communist future. For example, stations democratically elected their managements and all important tasks were rotated among their workers. At the same time, the community radio stations were committed to breaking down the separation between programme-makers and their audience. For instance, stations refused to accept advertising and instead relied on donations from the listeners. In place of money-commodity relations, community stations were run as gift economies. Above all, New Left media activists wanted members of the audience to make radio programmes about their own concerns. By encouraging two-way communications over the airwaves, these hippie radicals believed that community radio stations were creating a truly democratic form of media within the USA. [67]

    Across in Europe, young militants were quick to learn from their American contemporaries. The May ’68 French revolution had catalysed a wave of New Left activism across the continent. In particular, Italy was convulsed by increasingly violent protests against the corrupt rule of the conservative Christian Democrats and their clerical allies. However the mainstream Left could not benefit from this popular desire for change. Because of the Cold War, the Italian Communist Party was blocked from coming to power at a national level and was therefore forced into an implicit acceptance of the status quo. [68] With electoral politics frozen, many young people embraced New Left positions. Rejecting existing party and union structures, they not only organised wildcat strikes and sabotage within the universities and the factories, but also created new social movements of feminists, youth, ecologists, lesbian & gays and other minorities. These hippie radicals sparked off a cultural revolution against the oppressive and patriarchal morality of the Catholic church. By the late-Seventies, the Italian New Left had successfully pioneered a exciting and innovative counter-culture which ranged from national newspapers to community theatres. [69]

    Félix Guattari was closely associated with this political and cultural ferment in Italy. Being a prominent New Left psychotherapist, he worked with the Italian anti-psychiatry movement. More importantly, he was proclaimed as the theoretical guru of the Italy’s most celebrated community station: Radio Alice. [70] For decades, the nationalised broadcasting company had been used to disseminate propaganda from the ruling Christian Democrats. Although they complained about political bias, the Left parties didn’t oppose the state’s monopoly over the airwaves. Instead, they campaigned for more ideological pluralism within the existing nationalised system. Just at the point where the opposing parties were edging towards a compromise, some New Left activists decided to undermine this emerging consensus by setting up their own unlicensed radio stations. When the police tried to close them down, these pirates challenged the legality of the state’s monopoly over the airwaves.

    Much to their delight, the Italian supreme court decided in 1975 that this situation was indeed a violation of the right of free speech guaranteed in the constitution. Following the collapse of the regulations against unlicensed broadcasting, thousands of ‘free radios’ were set up all across Italy. While most of these were commercial, about a fifth of these stations were run by New Left activists. Like their American counterparts, the radical ‘free radios’ not only elected their own administrators, but also encouraged listener participation in their broadcasts. From phone-ins to community programme-making, these stations allowed their audience to describe their own experiences in strikes or other social struggles. Refusing corporate advertising, they survived through gifts of time and money from their listeners. No longer hindered by the state, the Italian New Left had discovered how to propagate the cultural revolution over the airwaves. [71]

    Radio Alice was set up as a political ‘free radio’ in 1976. The station was based in Bologna whose reforming local authority was run by the Communist Party. Its name was an ironic reference to how the city was portrayed as a ‘wonderland’ in the party’s propaganda. [72] Like other radical stations, Radio Alice broadcast news about the social struggles led by the New Left and encouraged community groups to make their own programmes. [73] However, the provision of ‘counter-information’ was not the sole purpose of this station. According to Guattari, Radio Alice was replacing the corrupt system of representative democracy with an electronic form of direct democracy. Instead of having their views represented by politicians or other elected officials, people could now directly express their own opinions on the programmes of the community radio stations. Once the ‘immense permanent meeting’ over the airwaves was formed, Guattari claimed that the social movements would then successfully be able to ‘deterritorialise’ the hierarchical power of the state. Although initially limited to community radio stations, this electronic agora supposedly prefigured the imminent reorganisation of the whole of society around direct democracy after the anarcho-communist revolution. [74]

    ‘The social entity is enabled to speak for itself without being obliged to look to representatives or spokesmen to speak for it.’ [75]

    Even this ultra-left utopia didn’t go far enough for Guattari. The ultimate aim of Radio Alice was the subversion of bourgeois rationality and repressive sexuality within everyday life. When people were able to express their own views over the airwaves, Guattari hoped that the ‘delirium’ of libidinal desire would be released within the population. By encouraging ‘poetical-frenzied’ speech, the ‘free radio’ rhizomes would be laying the foundations for a truly libertarian way of living. [76] Not surprisingly, Radio Alice‘s commitment to converting the inhabitants of Bologna to ‘schizo-politics’ was not appreciated by the reformists at the city hall. When the station helped to organise a student rebellion in the centre of Bologna in 1977, the local Communist council finally had a legal excuse to shut down Radio Alice. The first experiment in Deleuzoguattarian community media was over. [77]

    ‘The police have destroyed Radio Alice – its activists have been hunted down, condemned, imprisoned, its premises have been ransacked – but its revolutionary work of deterritorialisation tirelessly carries on right into the nervous systems of its persecutors.’ [78]

    6: Guattari Goes Bankrupt

    Back at home, Radio Alice‘s dramatic martyrdom had turned Guattari into the putative leader of the ‘free radio’ movement in France. [79] As in Italy, the French electronic media was controlled by a state-owned broadcasting monopoly which shamelessly promoted the interests of the ruling conservative parties. However, like the Italian Communist party, the parliamentary Left in France initially didn’t support opening up the airwaves. On the contrary, they wanted the nationalised broadcasting corporation to be reformed along public service lines. [80] This impasse created an opportunity for direct action by New Left activists. In 1977, some Greens in Paris set up the first pirate radio station in France. Inspired by this example, many other groups started to experiment with unlicensed radio broadcasting. Despite state repression, soon almost every political movement in France had its own pirate station. Even François Mitterrand, the leader of the Socialist party, was busted for illegal radio broadcasting! [81]

    Although some pirates were commercial, most of the ‘free radios’ were run by New Left activists. Before the May ’68 revolution, the Situationists had advocated the replacement of ‘the society of the spectacle’ by the electronic agora. This ultra-left organisation believed that creating direct democracy within the media was the precondition for the victory of anarcho-communism across France. [82] For many members of the New Left, pirate radio broadcasting was the most effective and fun way of putting this revolutionary theory into practice. Instead of being represented by others, people could now express their own views over the airwaves and organise collectively to realise common goals. According to this analysis, ‘free radios’ were prefiguring the electronic agoras which would run society after the coming revolution.

    ‘Free radio has the effect of allowing people to be aware of the upheavals which are about to happen. But it is above all the proof that our fate is not determined and that citizens are able to be actors of these transformations rather than forever being (TV) spectators…’ [83]

    As in Italy, Félix Guattari was associated with one of the leading stations of the ‘free radio’ movement. Along with Gilles Deleuze and other New Left philosophers, he set up Radio 93 in Paris. Like Radio Alice, this radical pirate didn’t just broadcast news about revolutionary struggles and programmes made by community groups. Radio 93 was also committed to the ‘deterritorialisation’ of state power and the subversion of sexual-linguistic oppression. Although repeatedly raided, the fame of Guattari and his colleagues ensured that this radio project received considerable attention from the mainstream media. With all this coverage, Guattari soon became accepted as the ‘voice’ of the radical pirates. Crucially, his celebrity status allowed him to win support for his own particular theories about the media within the French ‘free radio’ movement. [84]

    When pirate radio broadcasting started, the lobbying campaign to open up the airwaves was led by pragmatic members of the Socialist party. Although involved with community radio stations, they were willing to form a tactical alliance with the advocates of commercial broadcasting to obtain licences from a conservative government. But, when this compromise was turned down by the ruling parties, their consensual strategy appeared to have failed. Radicalised by police repression, the surviving pirate radio stations moved towards the policies advocated by Guattari and his colleagues at Radio 93. Rejecting any collaboration with the commercial pirates, these ‘soixante-huitards’ argued that ‘free radios’ should concentrate on prefiguring anarcho-communism within their organisations. Above all, this meant that these stations had to refuse any funding from advertising. In order to consolidate this militant position, the radical pirates came together to form a new lobbying organisation: the Fédération Nationale des Radios Libres (FNRL). [85]

    According to Guattari, the principle task of the FNRL was to make clear the community radio movement’s opposition to ‘advertising pollution’. As the state’s monopoly crumbled, the philosopher feared that control would be reimposed over radio broadcasting by commercial organisations. Instead of electronic agoras flourishing within a gift economy, private corporations and their political allies would dominate the airwaves with ‘disco radios’ promoting the values of consumer society. The ‘free radios’ therefore had to maintain their anarcho-communist principles. In place of advertising, community radio stations had to be funded by donations of time and money from their audience. They could then exist within a gift economy rather than become dependent on the ‘territorialising’ forces of capitalism. For the FNRL, the refusal to take radio advertising became the main symbol of a pirate station’s radical credentials. A rhizomic ‘free radio’ could never compromise with arboreal powers from the commercial sector. [86]

    Yet, despite its New Left politics, the FNRL still welcomed the Socialist victory in the 1981 elections. Because Mitterrand himself had been arrested for radio piracy, the Fédération knew that the new government would rapidly open up the airwaves. When legislation was being prepared, the anarcho-communist FNRL ironically emerged as the principle advocate of tight state regulation over this new sector. Determined to prevent the commercialisation of radio broadcasting, the Fédération argued that only voluntary organisations should be granted licences and all on-air advertising should be banned. Despite warnings from more pragmatic ‘free radio’ activists, the FNRL managed to persuade the Socialist government to include these measures in its 1981 broadcasting law. According to this statute, the new stations could only be run by social movements and organised as gift economies. [87] As well as winning this victory, Guattari and his comrades were also granted one of the much coveted radio licences for Paris once they agreed to fuse their project with other New Left pirate stations. After years of struggle, they now controlled their own legal ‘free radio’: Fréquence Libre. [88]

    While many philosophers have theorised in a vacuum, Guattari now had an unrivalled opportunity to turn his and Deleuze’s abstractions into practice. Fréquence Libre had been granted a licence to broadcast to the millions of inhabitants of Paris. It had its own studios, support from leading members of the New Left and even a small subsidy from the government. This ‘free radio’ was a potential rhizome where social movements could make their own programmes, where the gift economy could be developed and where the ‘delirium’ of libidinal desire could be released. Yet it soon became obvious that turning theory into practice was much more difficult than Deleuze and Guattari had ever imagined. In February 1982, the first major survey was made into the popularity of the new local radio stations in Paris. According to its results, the most successful service was a pop music station with a weekly audience of over 500,000. In complete contrast, Fréquence Libre only had 30,000 listeners tuning in each week. [89] During the next three years, Guattari and his comrades were never able to reverse these disastrous results. By 1985, Fréquence Libre was still only 21st out of a total of 23 independent radio stations in Paris. The two stations below Guattari’s station in the ratings both broadcast in languages other than French! [90]

    According to Guattari, the electronic agora would be built through the participation of increasing numbers of people within community radio broadcasting. However, soon after Fréquence Libre was launched, it was obvious that only a minority of activists from the New Left were interested in making programmes for the station. Crucially, the sectarian politics of these militants actually discouraged other people – including many on the Left – from getting involved in this community radio station. For instance, leading Fréquence Libre presenters insisted on ‘talking the same way as in political meetings’ when they were on-air. [91] Despite the promise of community involvement, Guattari and his colleagues were more interested in lecturing the audience rather than engaging in discussions with them. Instead of encouraging the ‘delirium’ of desire, Fréquence Libre was often broadcasting in its own ultra-left version of Stalinist ‘wooden language’.

    This revolutionary elitism could even be found in the musical policies of the station. Although they were from the baby boomer generation, many New Left activists were hostile towards what they perceived as a mindless and consumerist pop culture. The FNRL habitually used ‘disco radio’ as a dismissive term for commercial broadcasting. So when some rappers approached Fréquence Libre about the possibility of making some programmes, the station’s leadership completely failed to realise why the emergence of this multi-racial style of music in the suburban ghettos of Paris was a major cultural event in France. Unable to appreciate the music, they refused to let any hip-hop crews on-air until their lyrics had been politically vetted! Although much of the station’s airtime was filled with the sounds of punk, reggae and other alternative rhythms, the New Left militants who ran Fréquence Libre never really understood the cultural importance of promoting innovative styles of popular music on their community radio station. [92]

    Although ‘free radios’ were theoretically committed to two-way communications among people, Fréquence Libre had in practice become the megaphone for the viewpoints of Guattari and his disciples. However, the station could not survive in the long-run depending on such a limited number of people. Committed to refusing all advertising, Fréquence Libre had to raise most of its income as gifts from its listeners. As well as help in kind, it needed a constant flow of money to pay for its premises, studios, transmitters and other running costs. The station also had to employ a few people to provide essential engineering, broadcasting and administrative support for its volunteer programme-makers. Out of political commitment, people did work for the station for nothing or for very low wages. However, as they acquired family responsibilities or discovered other interests, the first generation of activists slowly started to drift away. Because they’d alienated most of their potential audience, Guattari and his comrades soon discovered that they could neither raise sufficient cash nor recruit enough volunteers to operate the gift economy successfully within their ‘free radio’ station.

    Fréquence Libre now entered into a vicious circle of decline. Without more resources, the station couldn’t produce better programming. Without an interesting service, more listeners wouldn’t tune into the station. Without more listeners, the station didn’t receive enough donations of time and money to survive. Despite Guattari’s earlier optimism, the gift economy was no longer working at Fréquence Libre. Reluctantly, the station’s management eventually agreed to start raising money from advertising. But this compromise with economic reality had come far too late. Hardly anyone was interested in buying commercials on an anarcho-communist station with a tiny audience. In 1985, Fréquence Libre finally went bankrupt. To complete the humiliation, the station’s frequency had to be sold to a commercial radio network to pay off some of its debts. Guattari’s attempts to turn theory into practice within the ‘free radio’ movement had ended in tragedy. [93]

    ‘…the movement [was confined] within the old methods of militancy which came from ’68, while the radio phenomenon proved on the contrary that these were finished.’ [94]

    7: From Stalin to Pol Pot

    As Fréquence Libre headed towards bankruptcy, Guattari never admitted any responsibility for the disaster. Amazingly, he instead blamed the Mitterrand government for the collapse of the community radio movement in France. Despite being given a statute written to FNRL specifications, a Paris-wide licence and limited subsidies, the philosopher still claimed that the Socialists had deliberately destroyed the ‘free radios’ through the process of legalisation. Being outside the law, the pirate stations had never been forced to compromise with political and commercial interests. But, once the 1981 broadcasting law was passed, the revolutionary purity of the ‘free radios’ had been inevitably corrupted by the state and the market. Whatever the circumstances, DIY initiatives had to preserve their complete autonomy from the rest of society. At the moment of defeat, Guattari portrayed himself as the tragic romantic hero. His ambitious plans had been thwarted, but his revolutionary principles remained intact. By reasserting anarcho-communism in theory, the holy prophet avoided explaining why its application hadn’t worked in practice. [95]

    Yet, elsewhere in Europe and in the USA, community radio stations have managed to avoid going bankrupt. When not dominated by a small group of militants, DIY media projects can be much more tolerant and inclusive. As a consequence, community radio stations are able to recruit enough volunteers, produce popular programming and raise sufficient funding, including even from commercial sources. For instance, Radio Populare in Milan is not just financially viable, but also has been the most popular station in the city on several occasions. [96] However, the techno-nomads are not excited by these more successful – and less utopian – examples of community radio broadcasting. On the contrary, as avant-garde intellectuals, they are precisely attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Guattari. What they are looking for is a revolutionary dreamtime to project onto cyberspace rather than a practical method of extending access to the media.

    Above all, the techno-nomads are unable to realise the failure of Guattari’s ‘free radio’ experiment exposes the severe flaws within the theoretical positions championed by the two philosophers. Far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Fréquence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how the revolutionary rhetoric of Deleuze and Guattari hid some very reactionary concepts. Crucially, the tragic history of Fréquence Libre demonstrated that the two philosophers’ celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. Although formally committed to opening up the airwaves to the oppressed, Fréquence Libre collapsed because only a small minority of committed activists were actually allowed to become involved in the project.

    This elitism was no accident. It came directly from the existential situation faced by much of the baby boomer generation. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people experienced a pronounced ‘generation gap’ between themselves and their parents. As political rebels, New Left activists particularly felt that they had little in common with the rest of the population. This disillusionment extended to left-wing parties and unions which were nominally dedicated to overthrowing capitalism. Feeling so isolated, the ‘soixante-huitards’ not surprisingly valued intense commitment over popular support in their politics. Above all, they believed that society could be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. [97] This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority.

    The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. For over two hundred years, radical politics had been caught inside the contradiction between popular freedom and intellectual authority. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. [98] In the late-nineteenth century, Bakunin had called for a spontaneous uprising of the people directed by a secret conspiracy led by himself. [99] During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy by workers’ councils while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolshevik party. [100] As the experience of Fréquence Libre showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. While community groups were supposedly free to express themselves through the rhizomic ‘free radio’, the New Left vanguard really controlled who could – and could not – broadcast over the airwaves. As in other social movements, the lack of formal structures meant that Fréquence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. On the contrary, anarchy and spontaneity were the preconditions for unchecked domination by the intellectual elite. [101]

    ‘If the movement continues deliberately not to select who shall exercise power, it does not thereby abolish power. All it does is abdicate the right to demand that those who do exercise power and influence be [democratically] responsible for it.’ [102]

    In Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its ‘wooden language’, the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: ordinary people were incapable of determining their own destiny. According to Lenin, the mass of the population were trapped within a ‘false consciousness’ imposed by the media and other ideological institutions. [103] During the early-Sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party. According to his analysis, ideological domination was an inevitable feature of all societies because of its psychological origins in the unconsciousness. [104] For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, the majority of the population supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. [105]

    Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical poetry was therefore impregnated with Leninist assumptions. [106] Like other structuralists, they never accepted that ordinary people could make their own history without leadership from the intellectual vanguard. All theories celebrating individual and collective subjectivity were suspect because they assumed that the mass of the population could possess some form of ‘free will’. Instead, these philosophers claimed that semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ controlled the development of society, including the production of human subjectivity. [107] By adopting this analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only a minority of revolutionaries were capable of freeing themselves from ideological domination. Illuminated by the ‘holy idea’, the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses – without any formal consent from them – in the fight against capitalism. [108]

    ‘…the speculative notion of the domination of the speculative ideal in history [turns] into the notion of the domination of the speculative philosophers themselves.’ [109]

    This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. Yet, as demonstrated by the experience of Fréquence Libre, the philosophical duo did turn the elitist side of their theory into practice. The implosion of this ‘free radio’ was caused by the inability of Guattari and his comrades to expand its support beyond the New Left vanguard. As the rappers who wanted to make a show for their radio station discovered, the Deleuzoguattarian interpretation of anarcho-communism could even involve censoring musicians from the ghettos before allowing them on-air. Although it supposedly prefiguring direct democracy in its internal organisation, the principle role of Fréquence Libre was to propagate the beliefs of the intellectual elite among the unenlightened population of Paris. [110]

    For the mainstream Left, the only way out of this contradiction between participation and elitism was to abandon the concept of violent revolution altogether in favour of electoral reformism. [111] However, the New Left had emerged precisely to combat such parliamentary compromises. For young militants, the problem was how a committed minority could make a revolution without ending up with totalitarianism. Some of the New Left thought that the solution to this dilemma could be found in the heroic leftism of the early Bolsheviks. [112] In France, this Leninist revival often acquired an ‘orientalist’ flavour through the influence of Maoism. [113] For others, only anarcho-communism could express their desire to overthrow both political and economic oppression. [114] However, even this revolutionary form of politics still appeared to many as tainted by the bloody failure of the Russian revolution. Had not the experience of Stalinism proved that any compromise with the process of modernity would inevitably lead to the reimposition of tyranny? In the name of a better future, millions had been slaughtered for resisting the programme of forced industrialisation organised by the totalitarian state.

    Consequently, anarcho-communist thinkers increasingly decided that just opposing the oppressive features of economic development was not radical enough. Desiring a complete transformation of society, they rejected the transcendent ‘grand narrative’ of modernity altogether, especially those left-wing versions inspired by Hegel and Marx. According to these ultra-leftists, the whole concept of progress was a fraud designed to win acquiescence for the intensification of capitalist domination. While the mainstream Left still wanted to complete the process of modernisation, the New Left should instead be leading a revolution against modernity. [115]

    Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For instance, although the chapters of A Thousand Plateaus are named after significant historical dates, these are deliberately not put in sequential order. [116] The philosophical duo instead emphasised moments of ‘delirium’ found in intense political, sexual, chemical, psychotic and mystical experiences. [117] For them, the achievement of these ‘becomings’ wasn’t the result of a Hegelian transcendence across time. On the contrary, the immanence of liberation from social controls was Nietzschean: something which always existed potentially within the here and now. [118] For Deleuze and Guattari, there was a hermetic history of ‘delirium’ which could be found within dissident politics and art. However, these intensities had been experienced as particular moments rather than as steps towards the good society. [119] Anarcho-communism was therefore not the ‘end of history’: the material result of a long epoch of social development. Instead, the liberation of desire was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. [120] With enough libidinal intensity, anyone could overcome hierarchical repression to become a fully-liberated individual: the nomad warrior, the Body-without-Organs, the holy fool, the Nietzschean Superman and the New Left militant.

    ‘Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.’ [121]

    Once anarcho-communism was transformed into an ahistorical ideology, the New Left’s opposition to economic development soon developed into a desire to abandon modernity altogether. This dream of returning to a pre-industrial past had deep roots within the baby boomer generation in France. At the beginning of the post-war era, nearly half of the French population still lived in the countryside working in small businesses or as peasants. During their childhoods, the ‘soixante-huitards’ had lived through the rapid completion of the urbanisation and industrialisation of France. [122] While most of their parents had welcomed the increase in their material well-being, many of the younger generation reacted against the superficiality of the new consumer society. Believing that economic crisis would never return, they created the New Left movement to seek more autonomy within their daily lives and combat the undesirable results of industrialism, such as inequality and pollution.

    As in the USA, this radicalisation of French youth coincided with fierce anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World. During the Fifties and early-Sixties, many French intellectuals had courageously supported national liberation movements in their country’s colonies, such as Vietnam and Algeria. Inspired by Mao, Fanon and Castro, some of them had created ‘Third-Worldism’: a belief that the imperialist sins of metropolitan society would be punished by a revolution of the poor peasants in the periphery. When the USA invaded Vietnam, these ‘Third-Worldists’ were at the forefront of the campaigns against this act of brutal aggression. [123] Following the May ’68 revolution, support for rural guerrillas resisting American imperialism soon became mixed up with hippie dreams of tribalism, green concerns about environmental degradation and nostalgia for a lost peasant past. Disillusioned with the economic progress championed by the parliamentary Left, many on the New Left synthesised these different ideas into hatred of the mass urban society created by modernity. For them, a truly libertarian revolution could only have one goal: the destruction of the city. [124]

    Along with many of their contemporaries, Deleuze and Guattari eagerly supported this anti-modernist interpretation of anarcho-communism. For them, the ‘deterritorialisation’ of urban society became the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into ‘molecular rhizomes’, direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. [125] Like other hippies, the two philosophers dreamed of reviving pre-modern tribalism in a new form. Believing that urban democracy was most advanced form of oppression, they championed the untamed nomads who would eliminate the corruption of the city. [126]

    ‘Make the desert, the steppe grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary. If war necessarily results, it is because the [nomadic] war machine collides with States and cities…from then on the [nomadic] war machine has as its enemy the State, the city, the state and urban phenomenon, and adopts as its objective their annihilation.’ [127]

    For Deleuze and Guattari, the destruction of modern urban society was necessary to free humanity not just from the state and the market, but also from the family, media, language and psychoanalysis. What was only immanent in moments of ‘delirium’ within contemporary society would become a fully libertarian way of living once everyone became a member of the nomadic tribes of holy fools. However, as the experience of Fréquence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom ironically contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. Nowhere was this contradiction more intense than in the two philosophers’ opposition to the process of modernity. Far from expressing the most radical concept of freedom, anti-modernism implied authoritarianism in its most regressive form.

    While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari’s dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge organised a successful peasant revolution in Cambodia against an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the ‘grand narrative’ of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. Determined to eliminate the supposedly corrupting influences of urban living, the Khmer Rouge expelled everyone from the cities and turned them into forced labourers within the countryside. When the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges against real and imaginary enemies until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. As a first step in rebuilding Cambodia, the new government encouraged the surviving city-dwellers to return to their homes. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice had resulted in tyranny and genocide. [128]

    8: The Antinomies of the Avant-Garde

    The exposure of the Khmer Rouge’s crimes precipitated a profound crisis within the French New Left. The end of the long post-war boom had already weakened the credibility of a political movement which assumed that poverty and unemployment were no longer major social problems. Now it was revealed that the anti-modernist revolution had unleashed the barbarism of the ‘killing fields’ rather than liberating humanity. The ‘line of flight’ from Stalin had led to Pol Pot. Disillusioned with ultra-left politics, most activists gravitated towards either parliamentary reformism or post-modern nihilism as the Seventies came to a close. The New Left revolution had failed. [129]

    Ironically, the current popularity of Deleuze and Guattari comes from their stubborn refusal to recognise this defeat. In A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts, Deleuze and Guattari completely ignored the harsher socio-economic climate following the 1974 oil crisis and the disastrous consequences of the anti-modernist revolution in Cambodia. Even when Fréquence Libre went bankrupt, the two philosophers never questioned their strategy of ‘schizo-politics’. Instead, they transformed the historically specific politics of the New Left into theoretical poetry which existed outside history. As opponents of the ‘grand narrative’ of modernity, these holy prophets much preferred the libidinal intensity of revolutionary failure to the limited achievements of parliamentary reformism.

    ‘The victory of the revolution is immanent and consists of the new bonds which it installs between people, even if these bonds last no longer than the revolution’s fused material and quickly give way to division and betrayal.’ [130]

    Because of their ultra-leftism, Deleuze and Guattari remained marginal figures within the pantheon of post-structuralist philosophers throughout the Eighties. Despite supporting social movements and denouncing historical ‘grand narratives’, these gurus were far too closely associated with the defeat of the New Left to be promoted by the fashionable advocates of post-modernism. During the decade of ascendant neo-liberalism, avant-garde intellectuals emphasised formal experimentation over social engagement. [131] However, at the end of the Nineties, post-modernist detachment now seems very dated. Looking for an alternative to Eighties apathy, contemporary intellectuals are rediscovering the revolutionary passion of the New Left. For ‘cutting edge’ TJs, it is now almost compulsory to sample from the writings of Situationists, Autonomists and other ultra-leftists of the period. Above all, they have to embrace the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari.

    Yet, this revival of New Left theories is taking place in very different circumstances from those which produced the politics of May ’68. For instance, only a few ‘deep greens’ still believe in the anti-modernist revolution. [132] However, the contemporary irrelevance of Deleuze Guattari’s politics does not discredit their theoretical poetry among radical intellectuals. On the contrary, the defeat of the New Left has enabled their disciples to complete the transformation of anarcho-communism from the hope of social revolution into the symbol of personal authenticity: an ethical-aesthetic rejection of bourgeois society. Divorced from its historical context, the New Left is now admired more for its emotional intensity than for its practical achievements. Although defeated in reality, the ideals of May ’68 can be used to imagine a revolutionary dreamtime for the Net. The political vanguard of the Sixties is reborn as the cultural avant-garde for the Nineties.

    The aestheticisation of revolutionary politics is a revered tradition of the European avant-garde. Back in the Twenties, the Surrealists perfected the fusion of artistic creativity with social rebellion. Inspired by Lenin, this avant-garde movement claimed that the consciousness of the majority of the population was controlled by cultural mediocrity and puritan morality. Therefore radical intellectuals had the heroic task of freeing the people from ideological domination. Their innovative art would undermine the repressive cultural norms of bourgeois society. Their bohemian way of living would challenge the dull conformity of everyday life under capitalism. The Surrealists believed that this assault against aesthetic and personal repression would soon culminate in the people rallying to the revolutionary cause. [133] In culture as in politics, the majority of the population would be liberated by following the leadership of an enlightened minority.

    ‘The essential is always to look ahead…toilingly to go onward towards the discovery, one by one, of fresh landscapes, and to continue to do so indefinitely…that others may afterwards travel the same spiritual road, unhindered and in all security.’ [134]

    In this interpretation of Leninism, cultural experimentation became the privileged expression of revolutionary politics. The Surrealists are still praised for their artistic innovations, such as ready-mades, montages, dream imagery and automatism. They are also remembered for their pioneering use of new technologies, such as film-making and photography. [135] Yet, the Surrealists didn’t make their famous artworks just to transgress the formal limitations of Western aesthetics. Above all, they believed that their experimental art would radicalise the consciousness of the people. For instance, this avant-garde movement borrowed techniques from so-called ‘outsider art’ made by tribal societies, the insane, the intoxicated and the uneducated. Although these groups had little else in common, the Surrealists thought that their members lived more passionately and emotionally than those trapped within the rules and regulations of bourgeois society. [136]

    The Surrealists believed that their use of techniques borrowed from ‘outsider art’ would inspire rebellion against the alienation of life under capitalism. Whether from the tribal past or the science-fiction future, any vision of a more authentic life should be used to subvert the cultural philistinism of the bourgeois present. For the Surrealists, breaking the conventions of high art was directly equated with fighting against the ideological domination of capitalism. Their aesthetic eclecticism was always underpinned by a rigid Leninism. According to the Surrealists, innovative paintings, sculptures, photography, films and literature could only be made ‘…in the service of the revolution.’ [137]

    Although its language is idiosyncratic, the cult of Deleuze and Guattari is the latest manifestation of this European avant-garde tradition. After years of post-modern apathy, Nineties intellectuals are rediscovering the joy of aestheticising the revolution. [138] Because Leninism is discredited, they’ve instead seized on Deleuzoguattarian discourse to signify their political, moral and aesthetic dissidence. Ironically, this change in language is necessary to maintain a continuity in practice. For, just like its Surrealist predecessors, the contemporary avant-garde models itself on the political vanguard. Experimental art and bohemian lifestyles are equated with the fermenting of social rebellion. The primitive and the future are still counterposed against the present. [139] Once again, radical intellectuals are leading the cultural revolution against bourgeois society.

    ‘For artistic practice, the adaptation of the model of the [nomadic] war machine can mean that, in order to enhance the transversal tendencies, insecurities have to be triggered, anti-production has to be initiated and parasitic behaviour has to be developed as a series of inversive strategies: infoldings at the boundaries.’ [140]

    Despite their involvement with radio broadcasting and computer-mediated communications, Deleuze and Guattari had still hoped that the ‘line of flight’ from modernity would lead back to the tribal past. In the sacred texts, the holy prophets perpetuated the primitivist traditions of Surrealism by composing myths about nomadic warriors and Bodies-without-Organs. [141] In contrast, their contemporary followers are much more excited by the digital future than by tribal societies. They have no ambiguity about their relationship with modern technologies. Far from desiring the destruction of the city, radical intellectuals now hope that the Deleuzoguattarian utopia will emerge from the process of ‘deterritorialisation’ unleashed by the Net. [142]

    Using intellectual alchemy, the techno-nomads transmute their gurus’ anti-modernist scriptures into a philosophy of hyper-modernism. The rhizome becomes a metaphor for community networks. The nomad warrior is turned into a hi-tech employee who can easily move between jobs and countries. Semiotic structuralism reflects the digital codes of Net software. The Body-without-Organs is used to mythologise cybersex. For their contemporary followers, Deleuze and Guattari’s ultra-leftism is primarily an ethical-aesthetic stance opposing the conformity of bourgeois society. By separating Sixties anarcho-communism from its specific historical moment, New Left vanguard politics can re-emerge as the hip avant-garde style for the Nineties: ‘What is Fashion? A form of utopia.’ [143]

    This aestheticisation of May ’68 is made much easier by the poetical style of Deleuze and Guattari. In A Thousand Plateaus, the ‘schiz-flow’ of the text continually jumps between radical psychoanalysis, art criticism, historical myths, popular science and several other genres. As in modernist painting, the ‘realism’ of the text has been superseded by a fascination with the formal techniques of theoretical production. For Deleuze and Guattari, theory was no longer a tool for understanding social reality. On the contrary, theory became poetry: a piece of literature expressing authentic emotion. Having failed in practice, New Left politics could live on as theory-art.

    ‘The aesthetic power of feeling, although equal in principle with the other powers of thinking philosophically, knowing science, acting politically, seems on the verge of occupying a privileged position within the collective Assemblages of enunciation of our era.’ [144]

    At the beginning of this century, the founders of the European avant-garde pioneered the combination of revolutionary politics and cultural rebellion into the new aesthetic form of theory-art. [145] Faithful to this hallowed custom, techno-nomad TJs now sample Deleuze and Guattari to produce leftfield philosophical writings. Yet, like Britpop bands imitating their heroes from the Sixties, something is lost in these respectful homages to the past. The faithful coping of the holy prophets’ literary style is obscuring their ultra-left beliefs. For Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical positions are being reproduced for their emotional intensity not for their particular politics. In the sacred texts, the rational analysis of society had already been replaced by the literary celebration of irrational desires. The European avant-garde is now discarding the few remaining connections with the social sciences. Deleuzoguattarian discourse can then become cool multi-media theory-art for the age of the Net. [146]

    The techno-nomads are a cultural movement who constitute themselves through Deleuzoguattarian theory-art. Being an avant-garde, they combine revolutionary politics, bohemian lifestyles and experimental aesthetics. Being a sub-culture, they have a distinct set of ‘signifying practices’. Above all, this new generation continues the most hallowed folk custom of the European avant-garde: the cultural revolution. Despite the disappearance of the utopia of total social transformation, academics, artists and activists can still champion the rebellion of holy fools against the oppressive rationality of bourgeois society. Within the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace, the avant-garde uses Deleuzoguattarian discourse to recreate May ’68 as a theory-art project.

    ‘…network-generated operations conclusively undermine political discourses centred on notions such as agency, action, territory, progress and development. Usership, operation, non-linearity, recursivity and chaos appear as traits of computer technology and of cyberspacetime. These are the characteristics of the breakdown of modernity itself.’ [147]

    At the end of the twentieth century, the potential influence of the European avant-garde has never been greater. The small number of individuals involved in subversive artistic movements have already had a disproportionate impact on popular culture. Since the Twenties, radical intellectuals have not only created modernist aesthetics, but also pioneered libertarian politics and hedonistic lifestyles. In the late-Nineties, the avant-garde now has a much larger pool of recruits and a much bigger potential audience. The rapid growth of the Net is the most dramatic manifestation of the increasing importance of cultural innovation. Many more people are going through further and higher education. [148] The creative industries have emerged as major employers. [149] Some commentators believe that the ‘virtual class’ is the most significant sector of the workforce. [150] Even the fine arts are recognised as a catalyst for local and national regeneration. [151] The appeal of the European avant-garde is therefore no longer confined within artistic and academic circles. For an increasing proportion of the population, continual aesthetic innovation is the basis for their livelihoods: ‘the creative industries are where the growth is, where the jobs are.’ [152]

    The avant-garde tradition of cultural experimentation is now at the centre of socio-economic development in the advanced countries. A minority of dedicated and talented artists can benefit the majority of the population by inventing new aesthetic forms, especially using digital technologies. Within an information society, ‘all power to the imagination’ becomes more than just a utopian slogan from May ’68. A profane economic rationale therefore underpins the recent revival of European avant-garde traditions. Although excluded from serious power, academics, artists and activists do acquire increased social status through recognition of their theoretical erudition and creative innovation. [153] Far from marginalising its proponents, European intellectuals long ago discovered that membership of an avant-garde movement can be the precondition of social success. As the creative industries keep expanding, more and more people are choosing this exciting career path. The rejection of post-modern nihilism is not just morally preferable, but also can often be financially more rewarding too. [154]

    The techno-nomads are not surprisingly happy to benefit from the social recognition given to membership of the avant-garde. Although expertise in a particular hardware or software dates quickly, knowledge of an ahistorical ideology can survive across time. After studying the holy prophets, adepts can find employment propagating the sacred creed through teaching, publishing and the media. Sampling from Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art, they can produce journalism, academic texts, websites and fiction celebrating the Net and other aspects of techno-culture. [155] While others fail to adapt to the new technologies, the Deleuzoguattarians are at the ‘cutting edge’ of theoretical and cultural innovation. ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’, collective intelligence, Body-without-Organs and other phrases from their mystificatory jargon are even entering fashionable speech. Once again, the aestheticisation of revolutionary politics is a successful way of breaking into the highly-competitive art, education and media sectors. [156]

    Yet, like the political vanguard, the European avant-garde is haunted by the fatal contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. In their theory-art, the techno-nomads use Deleuzoguattarian discourse to celebrate DIY culture. However, just by adopting its obscurantist style, they are asserting their intellectual authority over this popular movement. According to the sacred creed, most people – including members of the DIY culture – are brainwashed by semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’. But, when illuminated by the teachings of Deleuze and Guattari, radical intellectuals can amazingly cast off the mental shackles of bourgeois rationality and experience the redemption of ecstatic immanence.

    The members of the avant-garde are supposedly the privileged few who can produce the ‘holy idea’ which liberates the people from ideological bondage. However, as shown by the sad history of Fréquence Libre, this theorisation of anarcho-communism justifies the practice of vanguard politics. The continual sampling of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art therefore reflects elitist tendencies within the contemporary avant-garde. The techno-nomads adopt its post-structuralist method and peculiar jargon to intimidate the uninitiated. The success of their philosophical ‘will to power’ is shown by the increasing incorporation of Deleuzoguattarian phrases within the slang of the techno-culture. Although many are called, only few can become true disciples of the esoteric doctrine.

    ‘Beautiful language, artistic style and aestheticism are merely the end-products of…the alienation of the logos, and the artist has become the high priest of the logos, its magus, or simply its mandarin.’ [157]

    Above all, the European avant-garde embraces the Deleuzoguattarian discourse to emphasise its chosen ‘marks of distinction’: revolutionary politics, experimental art and bohemian lifestyles. [158] For decades, radical intellectuals have adopted dissident politics, aesthetics and morals to separate themselves from the rest of society. According to the European avant-garde, the majority of the population were ‘herd animals’ whose minds were controlled by repressive ideologies. Therefore the ethical-aesthetic rebellion against bourgeois conformity could only be led by the privileged few who were free from all forms of cultural conditioning.

    Despite their revolutionary rhetoric, avant-garde intellectuals constituted themselves as an artistic aristocracy separated from the philistine masses. [159] Continuing this elitist tradition, Deleuze and Guattari championed nomadic minorities from the ‘non-guaranteed’ social movements against the stupefied majority from the ‘guaranteed’ sector. As the activists of Fréquence Libre discovered, even having family responsibilities was considered incompatible with personal commitment to the revolutionary cause. [160] In the late-Nineties, Deleuzoguattarian discourse allows the contemporary avant-garde to perpetuate its venerated custom of cultural elitism. Once again, the revolution is the ethical-aesthetic illumination of a minority rather than the social liberation of all people. As Deleuze emphasised: ‘…art realises…the genius of the superhuman.’ [161]

    This form of aesthetic elitism has rapidly lead to overtly reactionary positions. For instance, the Italian Futurists looked to militant nationalism for deliverance from the cultural sterility of bourgeois society. In their theory-art, the holy fool was transformed into the blackshirt. [162] At the end of the century, the techno-nomads remain trapped within the avant-garde contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. Some TJs are even repeating their predecessors’ flirtation with fascist positions. For instance, Hakim Bey still preaches the Nietzschean creed of ‘radical aristocratism’. [163] In his NYC remix of the European avant-garde, this blessed guru urges Net activists to form a holy order of warrior-monks modelled on the medieval Assassin sect! [164] The cultural revolution remains simultaneously primitivist and futurist. [165] Although he praises DIY culture, Bey primarily uses Deleuzoguattarian discourse to uphold the most reactionary legacy of the avant-garde: the artistic aristocracy. Within the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace, the Nietzschean elite of holy fools are leaders of the pack.

    ‘These nomads practice the razzia, they are corsairs, they are viruses… These nomads chart their courses by strange stars, which might be luminous clusters of data in cyberspace, or perhaps hallucinations.’ [166]

    As the Net develops, the antinomies of the European avant-garde are reaching crisis point. It is now increasingly difficult to be simultaneously participatory and elitist. Nowhere is this clearer than within the writings of the techno-nomads. On the one hand, Deleuzoguattarian theory-art is revolutionary: the sanctification of the hi-tech gift economy. Its poetic phrases and bizarre metaphors exalt every communal and libertarian possibility of the Net. Yet, on the other hand, the aestheticisation of May ’68 is also reactionary: the negation of anarcho-communism as a practice within cyberspace. By definition, the existence of the European avant-garde presupposes that the majority of the population can’t participate within Do-It-Yourself culture. If the minds of the people are controlled by ‘machinic assemblages’, only radical intellectuals can supposedly create the future. When they celebrate DIY culture in their theory-art, the Deleuzoguattarians are simultaneously proclaiming their own superior status as Nietzschean Supermen.

    ‘Artists…are..physically…strong, full of surplus energy, powerful animals, sensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system a Raphael is unthinkable…their lives must contain a kind of youth and spring, a kind of habitual intoxication.’ [167]

    This dream of an artistic aristocracy sometimes evolves into fascism. More often, the avant-garde has supported totalitarian tendencies within the Left. [168] Nowadays, cultural elitism can easily turn into implicit sympathy with neo-liberalism. Despite its ultra-left origins, Deleuzoguattarian theory-art is becoming conservative: the European version of the Californian ideology. In the USA, Wired already uses New Left anti-statism to sell New Right neo-liberalism. [169] The rhetoric of individual freedom justifies the removal of welfare benefits and health care. The European avant-garde – and its imitators – could never openly support the free market fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. As self-proclaimed cultural revolutionaries, the techno-nomads must remain faithful to the spirit of May ’68.

    Yet, as the techno-nomad TJs cut ‘n’ mix, the distinctions between right-wing and left-wing versions of libertarianism are blurring. Crucially, both sides share a fashionable fascination with mystical positivism, such as memes, hive minds, cyborgs, chaos mathematics and artificial life. The convergence of technologies around digital protocols is being paralleled by the adoption of scientific rhetoric for social and artistic debates. [170] The European avant-garde has been performing the trick of combining spiritual primitivism with scientific futurism for decades. As Deleuze and Guattari faithfully followed this hallowed tradition, their disciples can easily confuse Bergsonian vitalism sampled from the holy prophets with the Lamarckian fantasies of the West Coast gurus. [171] The semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ of Deleuzoguattarian discourse already echo the denial of human subjectivity found within the theory of memetics. An enthusiastic TJ can rapidly make the two concepts seem indistinguishable.

    ‘From the “bio-adaptor” of language as the proto-meme to the “infosphere” of global networks as the ultimate habitat of the human mind… The possibility of the emergence of a post-biological, cyberorganic line of evolution out of universal binary code, of which the first protozoans have names like Internet, Cyberspace and I-way… Memes…the identification and integration of virtual communities that gather only at the interface.’ [172]

    The collapse of Deleuzoguattarian discourse into the Californian ideology through mystical positivism is no accident. These pseudo-scientific concepts supposedly prove that the majority of the population are controlled by outside forces. Just as in the avant-garde tradition, these theories claim that only the enlightened few can determine the future. The two forms of aristocratic libertarianism now appear to be the same. On the one hand, the Californian ideologues claim that this heroic minority is composed of cyber-entrepreneurs emerging from the fierce competition of the electronic marketplace. The covers of Wired have portrayed corporate bosses as Conan the Barbarian and Mad Max. [173] On the other hand, the Deleuzoguattarians believe that the new elite is formed by cool TJs and hip artists who release subversive ‘assemblages of enunciation’ into the Net. In their writings, avant-garde intellectuals dream of becoming nomad warriors and cyberpunk hackers. In both the Californian ideology and Deleuzoguattarian discourse, primitivism and futurism are combined to produce the apotheosis of individualism: the cyborg Nietzschean Superman. [174]

    ‘…the possibility…to rear a master race, the future “masters of the earth”; – a new tremendous aristocracy…in which… philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will…work as artists on “man” himself.’ [175]

    Amazingly, neo-liberalism and anarcho-communism can now appear to be on the same side of the ‘libertarian-communitarian opposition’ within cyberspace. [176] The re-emergence of the European avant-garde doesn’t just signify the rediscovery of the revolutionary legacy of May ’68. Ironically, the aestheticisation of the New Left is simultaneously a reaction against mass participation within cyberspace. By turning DIY culture into theory-art, radical intellectuals are asserting their superior status over the majority of Net users. Despite the rhetoric of immanence and non-linearity, the social revolution has once again disappeared from the here and now. Instead, the hope of redemption is projected into the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace. [177]

    Within this imaginary future, May ’68 flourishes as a theory-art project. Yet, in this process, the New Left dream of collective liberation is virtualised into ethical-aesthetic salvation for a select band of artistic aristocrats. Deleuzoguattarian theory-art is impaled on the fatal contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. As was demonstrated by the tragic story of Fréquence Libre, the delirious celebration of DIY culture cannot be reconciled with the simultaneous assumption that most people are unable do things for themselves. The writings of Deleuze and Guattari can therefore never provide ‘a coherent set of conceptual tools’ to comprehend the libertarian potential of the Net. As the millennium approaches, the techno-nomads remain trapped within the antinomies of the avant-garde.

    ‘Aetheticisation is an alibi. It pretends to fill the chasm between unsatisfied subjectivities and increasing unattainable accumulation.’ [178]

    9: The Hi-Tech Gift Economy

    Back in the Twenties, the European avant-garde had no doubt about its heroic mission. The enlightened minority could free the people from ideological domination through experimental art and libertarian lifestyles. The cultural avant-garde was an essential element of the political vanguard. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this Leninist myth has lost all credibility. The ‘grand narrative’ of history can no longer be used to justify the leadership of the few. In the late-Nineties, revolutionary elitism must now be expressed in the words of May ’68. The techno-nomads therefore remix Leninism into Deleuzoguattarian discourse: subversive theory-art ‘deterritorialises’ the semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ controlling the minds of the majority. Crucially, the contemporary avant-garde must substitute itself for the missing political vanguard. Although supposedly possible for everyone, the immanence of ethical-aesthetic ‘delirium’ can only be experienced by radical intellectuals. Cultural rebellion, bohemian lifestyles and ultra-leftism are now the ‘marks of distinction’ for the artistic aristocracy. Lenin is morphed into Nietzsche.

    The current revival of the European avant-garde depends upon the aestheticisation of May ’68. Yet, important pioneers of the New Left were highly critical of this tradition of cultural elitism. Above all, the Situationists attacked aesthetic innovations of the Surrealists for failing to remove the ideological domination of the bourgeoisie. These avant-garde experiments had been too easily incorporated into the fashionable styles of consumer society. The Surrealist experience proved that innovative art could never remain subversive for long. [179] In place of aesthetic experimentation, the Situationists instead advocated transforming the social context of cultural production. Rather than following the avant-garde elite, everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves. [180]

    ‘The situation is…made to be lived by its constructors. The role played by a passive…”public” must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors but rather…”livers” must steadily increase.’ [181]

    The Situationists proclaimed the end of the cultural avant-garde. The New Left didn’t just have to radicalise the content of art. More importantly, young militants had to create opportunities for everyone to express their own hopes, dreams and desires. The Hegelian ‘grand narrative’ could then culminate in the supersession of all mediations separating people from each other. Yet, at the same time, the Situationists never completely escaped from the avant-garde legacy left by their Surrealist predecessors. The movement was predominantly composed of radical intellectuals. [182] This revolutionary minority supposedly prefigured the bohemian lifestyles and ultra-left politics of the future. As with the Surrealists, the ‘holy idea’ of participation for everyone justified unaccountable leadership of the intellectual elite. Once again, the practical transcendence of social oppression had elided into the spiritual immanence of theoretical enlightenment. Despite their invocation of Hegel and Marx, the Situationists remained haunted by Nietzsche and Lenin. [183]

    Unable to break with avant-garde tradition, the Situationists inevitably aestheticised the social revolution. Fearful of repeating the fate of the Surrealists, the movement celebrated cultural activities which couldn’t easily be turned into fashionable commodities. Above all, the Situationists looked for ways of living which were free from the corruptions of consumer capitalism. Like earlier avant-garde intellectuals, they thought that the path into the future was also the return to the past. Despite their Hegelian modernism, the Situationists claimed that anarcho-communism had been prefigured by the potlatch: the gift economy of Polynesian tribes. [184]

    Within these primitive societies, the circulation of gifts bound people together into tribes and encouraged co-operation between different tribes. In contrast with the atomisation and alienation of bourgeois society, these potlatches required intimate contacts and emotional authenticity. According to the Situationists, the tribal gift economy demonstrated that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. Anarcho-communism was therefore a practical possibility. However, the Situationists remained trapped within the antinomies of the avant-garde. Once again, the utopia of mass participation simultaneously justified the leadership of the artistic elite. Unlike the rest of the population, radical intellectuals could supposedly prefigure the libertarian future by producing esoteric theory-art. Anarcho-communism had been transformed into a ‘mark of distinction’ for the New Left vanguard. The giving of gifts therefore became the absolute antithesis of market competition. There could be no compromise between tribal authenticity and bourgeois alienation. After the social revolution, the potlatch would completely supplant the commodity. [185]

    ‘The crumbling away of human values under the influence of exchange mechanisms leads to the crumbling of [commodity] exchange itself…new human relationships must be built on the principle of pure giving. We must rediscover the pleasure of giving: giving because you have so much. What beautiful and priceless potlatches the affluent society will see – whether it likes it or not! – when the exuberance of the younger generation discovers the pure gift.’ [186]

    After May ’68, this purist vision of anarcho-communism inspired a generation of community media activists. For instance, the radical ‘free radio’ stations refused all funding from state and commercial sources. Instead, these projects tried to survive through donations of time and money from their supporters. Emancipatory media supposedly could only be produced within the gift economy. During the late-Seventies, pro-situ attitudes were further popularised by the punk movement. [187] Although rapidly commercialised, this sub-culture did encourage its members to form their own bands, make their own fashions and publish their own fanzines. [188] From punk through rave to the present-day, the ‘cutting edge’ of youth culture has remained participatory. The permanent innovation in styles on the dance floor is driven by people doing things for themselves. [189]

    Crucially, every user of the Net participates within a gift economy. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. They co-operate together without the direct mediation of either politics or money. During the Eighties, post-modern pessimists claimed that the gift economy would always be defeated by market capitalism. [190] Yet, at the end of the Nineties, DIY culture is thriving within the most technologically advanced sector of the economy. Everyday, Net users circulate gifts of information amongst each other. What was once revolutionary has become banal. Far from being the ‘holy idea’ of avant-garde intellectuals, anarcho-communism is now the mundane activity of ordinary people within cyberspace.

    ‘Millions of people have been interacting and participating in what they clearly value… There is no question that there are differences between the economic logic – the application of basic economic principles – on and off the Net. To begin with, most of the economic activity on the Net involves value but no money.’ [191]

    The invention of the Net was one of the greatest ironies of the Cold War. At the height of the struggle of American capitalism against Russian Communism, the US military funded the creation of anarcho-communism within computer-mediated communications! From the beginning, the gift economy has determined the technical and social structure of the Net. Being a military bureaucracy, the Pentagon initially did try to restrict the unofficial uses of its computer network. However, it soon became obvious that the Net could only be successfully developed by letting its users build the system for themselves. [192] Within the scientific community, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists don’t have to turn their intellectual work directly into marketable commodities. Instead, research results are publicised by ‘giving a paper’ at specialist conferences and by ‘contributing an article’ to academic journals. The collaboration of many different academics is made possible through the free distribution of information. [193]

    Within small tribal societies, the circulation of gifts established close personal bonds between people. In contrast, the academic gift economy is used by intellectuals who are spread across the world. Within their peer group, scientists can receive recognition from colleagues who might never meet them in person. Despite the anonymity of the modern version of the gift economy, academics acquire intellectual respect from each other through citations in articles and other forms of public acknowledgement. If someone is often quoted, their career prospects within the university system are usually much enhanced. Scientists therefore can only acquire personal recognition for their individual efforts by openly collaborating with each other through the academic gift economy. Although research is being increasingly commercialised, the giving away of findings remains the most efficient method of solving common problems within a particular scientific discipline. [194]

    When the Yippies proclaimed that ‘information wants to be free’ back in the Sixties, they were preaching to computer scientists who were already living within the academic gift economy. What seemed revolutionary in the rest of the USA was the usual method of working within the university. From its earliest days, the free exchange of information has therefore been firmly embedded within the technologies and social mores of cyberspace. Above all, the founders of the Net never bothered to protect intellectual property within computer-mediated communications. On the contrary, they were developing these new technologies to advance their careers inside the academic gift economy. [195]

    Scattered across the world, scientists from the same speciality needed the Net to disseminate their research results to each other and to work together on collaborative projects. Far from wanting to enforce copyright, the pioneers of the Net tried to eliminate all barriers to the distribution of information. Technically, every act within cyberspace involves copying material from one computer to another. Once the first copy of a piece of information is placed on the Net, the cost of making each extra copy is almost zero. The architecture of the system presupposes that multiple copies of documents can easily be cached around the network. As Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the Web – points out:

    ‘Concepts of intellectual property, central to our culture, are not expressed in a way which maps onto the abstract information space. In an information space, we can consider the authorship of materials, and their perception; but…there is a need for the underlying infrastructure to be able to make copies simply for reasons of [technical] efficiency and reliability. The concept of “copyright” as expressed in terms of copies made makes little sense.’ [196]

    Within the commercial creative industries, advances in digital reproduction are feared for making the ‘piracy’ of copyright material ever easier. Almost everyone already copies music, articles, television programmes and other information products for personal use without payment. The sampling and remixing of other people’s tunes is widespread within dance music. [197] For the owners of intellectual property, the Net can only make the situation worse. In contrast, the academic gift economy welcomes technologies which improve the availability of data. Users should always be able to obtain and manipulate information with the minimum of impediments. The design of the Net therefore assumes that intellectual property is technically and socially obsolete. [198]

    In France, the nationalised telephone monopoly has accustomed people to paying for the on-line services provided by Minitel. [199] Yet, the Net remains predominantly a gift economy even though the system has expanded far beyond the university. The attempt to construct computer-mediated communications around copyright payments ended in failure. [200] The commercial providers of information services have never been able to supplant the free exchange of information amongst the on-line community. [201] Even the porn industry is encountering difficulties in making money on the Net. [202] From scientists through hobbyists to the general public, the charmed circle of users was slowly built up through the adhesion of many localised networks to an agreed set of protocols.

    Crucially, the common standards of the Net include social conventions as well as technical rules. The giving and receiving of information without payment is almost never questioned. Although the circulation of gifts doesn’t necessarily create emotional obligations between individuals, people are still willing to donate their information to everyone else on the Net. Even selfish reasons encourage people to become anarcho-communists within cyberspace. By adding their own presence, every user contributes to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return, each individual has potential access to all the information made available by others within the Net. Everyone takes far more out of the Net than they can ever give away as an individual.

    ‘…the Net is far from altruistic, or it wouldn’t work… Because it takes as much effort to distribute one copy of an original creation as a million…you never lose from letting your product free…as long as you are compensated in return… What a miracle, then, that you receive not one thing in value in exchange – indeed there is no explicit act of exchange at all – but millions of unique goods made by others!’ [203]

    Despite the commercialisation of cyberspace, the self-interest of Net users ensures that the hi-tech gift economy continues to flourish. For instance, musicians are using the Net for the digital distribution of their recordings to each other. By giving away their own work to this network community, individuals get free access to a far larger amount of music in return. Not surprisingly, the music business is worried about the increased opportunities for the ‘piracy’ of copyrighted recordings over the Net. [204] Sampling, DJ-ing and mixing are already blurring property rights within dance music. [205] However, the greatest threat to the commercial music corporations comes from the flexibility and spontaneity of the hi-tech gift economy. After it is completed, a new track can quickly be made freely available to a global audience. If someone likes the tune, they can download it for personal listening, use it as a sample or make their own remix. Out of the free circulation of information, musicians can form friendships, work together and inspire each other. [206] ‘It’s all about doing it for yourself. Better than punk.’ [207]

    Within the developed world, most politicians and corporate leaders believe that the future of capitalism lies in the commodification of information. Over the last few decades, intellectual property rights have been steadily tightened through new national laws and international agreements. Even human genetic material can now be patented. [208] Yet, at the ‘cutting edge’ of the emerging information society, money-commodity relations play a secondary role to those created by a really existing form of anarcho-communism. For most of its users, the Net is somewhere to work, play, love, learn and discuss with other people. Unrestricted by physical distance, they collaborate with each other without the direct mediation of money or politics. Unconcerned about copyright, they give and receive information without thought of payment. In the absence of states or markets to mediate social bonds, network communities are instead formed through the mutual obligations created by gifts of time and ideas.

    ‘This informal, unwritten social contract is supported by a blend of strong-tie and weak-tie relationships among people who have a mixture of motives and ephemeral affiliations. It requires one to give something, and enables one to receive something. I have to keep my friends in mind and send them pointers instead of throwing my informational discards into the virtual scrap heap… And with scores of people who have an eye out for my interests while they explore sectors of the information space that I normally wouldn’t frequent, I find that the help I receive far outweighs the energy I expend helping others; a marriage of altruism and self-interest.’ [209]

    On the Net, enforcing copyright payments represents the imposition of scarcity on a technical system designed to maximise the dissemination of information. The protection of intellectual property stops all users having access to every source of knowledge. Commercial secrecy prevents people from helping each other to solve common problems. The inflexibility of information commodities inhibits the efficient manipulation of digital data. In contrast, the technical and social structure of the Net has been developed to encourage open co-operation among its participants. As an everyday activity, users are building the system together. Engaged in ‘interactive creativity’, they send emails, take part in listservers, contribute to newsgroups, participate within on-line conferences and produce websites. [210] Lacking copyright protection, information can be freely adapted to suit the users’ needs. Within the hi-tech gift economy, people successfully work together through ‘…an open social process involving evaluation, comparison and collaboration.’ [211]

    The hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. For instance, Bill Gates admits that Microsoft’s biggest competitor in the provision of web servers comes from the Apache program. [212] Instead of being marketed by a commercial company, this program is open source software. [213] Like similar projects, this virtual machine is being continually developed by its techie users. Because its source code is not protected by copyright, the program can be modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programming skills. When someone does make a contribution to a shareware project, the gift of their labour is rewarded by recognition within the community of user-developers. [214]

    The inflexibility of commodified software programs is compounded by their greater unreliability. Even Microsoft can’t mobilise the amount of labour given to successful shareware programs by their devotees. Without enough techies looking at a program, all its bugs can never be found. [215] The greater social and technical efficiency of anarcho-communism is therefore inhibiting the commercial take-over of the Net. Open source software programs are now beginning to threaten the core product of the Microsoft empire: the Windows operating system. Starting from the original program by Linus Torvalds, a community of user-developers are together building their own non-proprietary operating system: Linux. For the first time, Windows has a serious competitor. Anarcho-communism is becoming the only alternative to monopoly capitalism. [216]

    ‘Linux is subversive. Who could have thought even five years ago that a world-class operating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?’ [217]

    10: Beyond the Avant-Garde

    The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. Anarcho-communism really did work in practice. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture. According to the ‘soixante-huitards’, the gift was the absolute antithesis of the commodity. There could be no compromise between the authenticity of the potlatch and the alienation of the market. For instance, Fréquence Libre refused to raise money from advertising to prove its ethical-aesthetic integrity. Rather than compromising with the arboreal powers of commercialism, the rhizomic ‘free radio’ station preserved its principles to the point of bankruptcy. The current popularity of Deleuze and Guattari comes from their romanticisation of this uncompromising form of anarcho-communism. What had failed in practice can live on as theory-art.

    Bored with the emotional emptiness of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are entranced by the moral fervour of the holy prophets. In their remixes, the purist interpretation of anarcho-communism is virtualised into the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace. However, as shown by Fréquence Libre, the rhetoric of mass participation often hides the rule of the enlightened few. Instead of providing media freedom for all, the hi-tech gift economy becomes the ‘mark of distinction’ for the cultural avant-garde. The ethical-aesthetic commitment of anarcho-communism can only be lived by the artistic aristocracy. In place of the majority doing things for themselves on the Net, the minority of radical intellectuals make cool theory-art about the ‘holy idea’ of digital DIY culture.

    Yet, the antinomies of the avant-garde can no longer be avoided. The rapid growth of the Net is undermining the particular ‘marks of distinction’ adopted by the Deleuzoguattarians. The ideological passion of anarcho-communism is dulled by the banality of giving gifts within cyberspace. The theory of the artistic aristocracy cannot be based on the everyday activities of the ‘herd animals’. Prominent members of the avant-garde are already starting to distance themselves from their earlier enthusiasm for all things digital. Their revolutionary dreamtime may even have to be built somewhere else other than cyberspace. [218]

    Above all, anarcho-communism exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, the boundaries between the different methods of working are not morally precise. Within the mixed economy of the Net, money-commodity and gift relations are simultaneously in conflict and in symbiosis with each other. On the one hand, each method of working threatens to supplant the other. The hi-tech gift economy heralds the end of private property in ‘cutting edge’ areas of the economy. The digital capitalists want to privatise the shareware programs and enclose the social spaces built through voluntary effort. The potlatch and the commodity remain irreconcilable. [219]

    Yet, on the other hand, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial Net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Under threat from Microsoft, Netscape is now trying to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence. Lacking the resources to beat its monopolistic rival, the company is allying itself with the hacker community to avoid being overwhelmed. The source code of its web browser program is now freely available. The development of products for the shareware Linux operating system has become a top priority. The commercial survival of Netscape will depend upon successfully collaborating with hackers from the hi-tech gift economy. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital. [220]

    ‘”Hi there Mr CEO [Chief Executive Officer] – tell me, do you have any strategic problem right now that is bigger than whether Microsoft is going to either crush you or own your soul in a few years? No? You don’t? OK, well, listen carefully then. You cannot survive against Bill Gates [by] playing Bill Gates’ game. To thrive, or even survive, you’re going to have to change the rules…”‘ [221]

    The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. Because the dogmatic communism of Deleuze and Guattari has dated badly, their disciples instead emphasise the uncompromising anarchism of the holy prophets. The techno-nomads can then enthusiastically advocate ‘anti-statism’ as the primary method of enhancing freedom within cyberspace. [222] However, the state isn’t just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. At the same time, the public sector provides essential support for the hi-tech gift economy. For instance, in the past, the founders of the Net never bothered to incorporate intellectual property within the system because their wages were funded from taxation. In the future, governments will have to impose universal service provisions upon commercial telecommunications companies if all sections of society are to have the opportunity to circulate free information. [223] Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari claimed that participatory ‘post-media’ would supplant electoral politics. Yet, when access is available, many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. [224] Within the digital mixed economy, anarcho-communism is also symbiotic with the state.

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is threatened by this miscegenation of the hi-tech gift economy with the private and public sectors. Faithful to the traditions of the European avant-garde, the holy prophets proclaimed the purifying ethical-aesthetic rebellion against bourgeois society. Anarcho-communism symbolised moral integrity: the romance of artistic ‘delirium’ undermining the ‘machinic assemblages’ of bourgeois conformity. In their theory-art, contemporary intellectuals remix Deleuzoguattarian discourse to celebrate the experimental and innovative potential of the Net. However, the hi-tech gift economy cannot act as the ‘holy idea’ of the avant-garde minority for much longer. As Net access grows, more and more people are circulating free information across the Net. Crucially, their potlatches are not attempts to regain a lost emotional authenticity. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May ’68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. In the late-Nineties, digital anarcho-communism is being built by hackers like Eric Raymond: ‘a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons…’ [225]

    According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism also symbolised the ethical-aesthetic revolution against the oppressive ‘grand narrative’ of modernity. However, the hi-tech gift economy is formed by the practical activities of people who mainly live in highly-industrialised countries. [226] This libertarian way of working was not an immanent possibility in every age. On the contrary, this really existing form of anarcho-communism could only have been built at the advanced technological and social levels of contemporary capitalism. Back in medieval times, the expansion of feudal society spawned the precursors of the modern market and state. At the end of the millennium, three centuries of capitalist industrialisation are culminating in the emergence of digital anarcho-communism. The market and the state could only be surpassed in this specific sector at this particular historical moment.

    The technological advances catalysed by capitalist modernisation are preconditions for the emergence of anarcho-communism within the Net. Crucially, people need sophisticated media, computing and telecommunications technologies to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. Over the last three hundred years, the reproduction, distribution and manipulation of information have become slowly easier through a long process of mechanisation. A manually-operated press produced copies which were relatively expensive, limited in numbers and impossible to alter without recopying. After generations of technological improvements, the same quantity of text on the Net costs almost nothing to circulate, can be copied as needed and can be remixed at will. The scarcity of information is gradually being overcome within the hi-tech gift economy. [227]

    The utilisation of advanced communications tools presupposes that a large proportion of the population have benefited from capitalist modernisation. For individuals need both time and money to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. While a large number of the world’s population still lives in poverty, people within the industrialised countries have steadily reduced their hours of employment and increased their wealth over a long period of social struggles and economic reorganisations. Ever since the advent of Fordism, mass production has depended upon workers having enough leisure and resources for mass consumption. [228] As spare time grows, people can carve out a personal space for living their own lives, including within cyberspace. [229] With rising incomes, they can afford the ‘self-service’ technologies needed for doing things for themselves, such as equipment for accessing the Net. [230] By working for public institutions or private companies for some of the week, people can enjoy the delights of the hi-tech gift economy at other times. Only at this particular historical moment have the technical and social conditions of the metropolitan countries developed sufficiently for the emergence of digital anarcho-communism. [231]

    Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, almost nobody still believes in the inevitable victory of communism. On the contrary, large numbers of people accept that the Hegelian ‘end of history’ has culminated in American neo-liberal capitalism. [232] Yet, at exactly this moment in time, a really existing form of anarcho-communism is being constructed within the Net, especially by people living in the USA. When they go on-line, almost everyone participates within the gift economy rather than engages in market competition. Even the development of sophisticated software is being organised around the free circulation of information.

    Over the past few centuries, the productivity of labour has increased dramatically through the mediation of money-commodity relations protected by the rule of law. Yet, within cyberspace, the enforcement of private property has become both technologically and socially regressive. Because users receive much more information than they can ever give away, there is no popular clamour for imposing the equal exchange of the marketplace on the Net. For most people, the circulation of gifts is simply the most efficient method of working together within cyberspace. Even the West Coast neo-liberals encounter difficulties in explaining why market prices for information are necessary when the marginal cost of reproduction is nearly zero. [233] Once again, the ‘end of history’ for capitalism appears to be communism.

    ‘Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.’ [234]

    Despite the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy, markets and states remain the primary methods of co-ordinating labour for the production of goods and services in the rest of the economy, including within some parts of cyberspace. Responding to changes in prices and funding, workers and resources are distributed across the various sectors of the economy. [235] Being New Left gurus, Deleuze and Guattari denounced both the market and the state as ‘machinic assemblages’ which controlled the lives of the masses. Fréquence Libre therefore refused to sell advertising and only took a small subsidy from the government. Despite this anti-capitalist position, Deleuze and Guattari still rejected the ‘economism’ of the mainstream Left. According to the holy prophets, society was formed through the self-organising properties of psychic structures rather than through the conscious organisation of practical work. The creative power of human labour was only one expression of the vitalist energy of semiotic flows.

    Observing the hallowed custom of the European avant-garde, the two philosophers had substituted ethical-aesthetic redemption for the social revolution. The New Left no longer wanted to change the methods of production. Instead, its philosophers called for the replacement of disciplined labour by spontaneous desire: the ‘refusal of work’. The proletarian had been turned into the artist. [236] In the Nineties, the techno-nomads need this ultra-left myth to justify their resurrection of the avant-garde tradition. While the majority of the population are supposedly stupefied by the ‘machinic assemblages’ of the market and the state, the artistic aristocracy can form its own ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ around the potlatch. After transformation into an ethical-aesthetic stance, anarcho-communism becomes the signifier of the techno-nomad Supermen. [237]

    Despite their residual ultra-leftism, the cultural elitism of the techno-nomads increasingly merges with the conservative positions of the Californian ideologues. The two forms of Nietzschean philosophy are fusing into one. For this convergence to take place, the holy prophets’ anathema against market competition must be skilfully abandoned. [238] First, the new generation of adepts surreptitiously morphs the ‘refusal to work’ into the denial of the wealth-creating powers of human labour. Then the work of living beings is subsumed within the mobility of dead matter. Finally, far from being condemned as a ‘machinic assemblage’ imposed from above, market competition is sanctified as the apotheosis of self-organising systems. [239] As in the Californian ideology, this Deleuzoguattarian heresy believes that the market is a chaotic force of nature which cannot be controlled by state intervention. [240] Abandoning any residual connections with the Left, these TJs instead celebrate the new aristocracy of nomadic artists and entrepreneurs who surf the ‘schiz-flows’ of the information society. [241] In this bizarre remix, anarcho-communism becomes identical with neo-liberalism.

    Mesmerised by this ecstatic vision, radical intellectuals are now incapable of understanding the actual ‘world-historical’ significance of the Net. For the cultural avant-garde’s recent reconciliation with market competition has obscured the historical novelty of digital DIY culture. If both forms of human activity are simply spontaneous semiotic flows, the exchange of commodities and the circulation of gifts can be easily confused with each other. As a consequence, the techno-nomads miss the major social transformation catalysed by the new information technologies: the widespread adoption of a new method of working. Rejecting the ‘economism’ of the Left, many TJs have replaced the creativity of human labour on the Net with a digital vitalism inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art. Denying the ability of people to determine their own destinies, these techno-nomads believe that information technologies are semiotic forces determining culture, consciousness and even the conception of existence. Humanity will not be liberated by its own efforts, but by the new Messiah: the self-organising properties of inert metal, sand and plastic transmuted into information technologies.

    However, there is nothing inherently emancipatory in computer-mediated communications. These technologies can also serve the state and the market. The Net was originally invented for the transmission of orders from the military hierarchy. Ever since the Seventies, computer networks have provided the technical infrastructure for global financial markets to impose neo-liberal policies on countries across the world. Nowadays, many government bodies and commercial companies are building Intranets to improve their internal management and Extranets to interact with their clients. In the future, electronic commerce will play a significant economic role and public services will increasingly be made available on-line. Both the market and the state are becoming digital. [242]

    For these purposes, computer-mediated communications can still be organised by public and private institutions. Dependent upon wages, people will move into the new jobs created within expanding sectors of the economy. However, as in older industries, these workers will remain unable to control their own productive activities. Even cyber-entrepreneurs are constrained by the disciplines of the marketplace. In contrast, millions of people are already spontaneously working together on the Net without needing co-ordination by either the state or the market. Instead of exchanging their labour for money, they give away their creations in return for free access to information produced by others. Far from being equivalent types of self-organising systems, market competition and anarcho-communism are actually two contrasting forms of collective labour.

    ‘The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessities and conveniences of life which it annually consumes…’ [243]

    The hi-tech gift economy is not the only way in which labour is organised within cyberspace. The circulation of gifts coexists with the exchange of commodities and funding from taxation. Like successful community radio stations, participatory spaces within the Net can be constructed as labours of love, but still be partially funded by advertising and public money. Crucially, this hybridisation of working methods is not confined within particular projects. When they’re on-line, people constantly pass from one form of social activity to another. For instance, in one session, a Net user could first purchase some clothes from an e-commerce catalogue, then look for information about education services from the local council’s site and then contribute some thoughts to an on-going discussion on a listserver for fiction-writers. Without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy. Far from realising theory in its full purity, working methods on the Net are inevitably compromised. The ‘New Economy’ is an advanced form of social democracy. [244]

    Although the boundaries between the different forms of collective labour are often blurred, working for money is still very different from working for recognition. Doing things on the orders of others is not the same as doing things for yourself. [245] Despite this crucial distinction, the techno-nomads still cannot comprehend the subversive impact of the everyday activities of Net users. As members of the avant-garde, they’re looking for the intensity of ethical-aesthetic ‘delirium’ within the flows of self-organising matter. For them, there can be nothing particularly special about the mundane activities of Net users who aren’t producing fashionable theory-art. Yet, at this particular historical moment, the supersession of capitalism has ceased to be a moral stance. When using the Net, almost everyone prefers to circulate gifts rather than to exchange commodities. Instead of embodying a mystical ‘collective intelligence’, the hi-tech gift economy is precisely a new method of collaborative working.

    Within cyberspace, market competition is disappearing for entirely pragmatic reasons. While commodified information is closed and fixed, digital gifts are open and changeable. Instead of fixed divisions between producers and consumers, users are simultaneously creators on the Net. Obsessed with immanence of semiotic flows, the Deleuzoguattarians cannot appreciate the deep irony of this contingent moment in human history. [246] This is the point in time when the old faith in the inevitable triumph of communism has completely lost all credibility. Yet, at this very moment, market competition is quietly ‘withering away’ within cyberspace. For most Net users, anarcho-communism is simply the most efficient way of working together. A new mode of production is being born alongside market competition and state intervention. [247]

    ‘Shareware is a more highly evolved survival mechanism than [market] competition.’ [248]

    The contemporary avant-garde resurrects the ‘refusal of work’ to symbolise the primacy of its own artistic creativity. Yet, as Hegelians have long pointed out, the only individuals who don’t have to work are aristocrats. In contrast, ordinary people can only free themselves from exploitation by ‘non-workers’ through their own skills as labourers. [249] Over the past few centuries, people within the industrialised countries have slowly improved their incomes and reduced their hours of work. Although still having little autonomy in their money-earning jobs, workers can now experience non-alienated labour within the hi-tech gift economy. [250] From writing emails through making web sites to developing software, people do things for themselves without the mediation of the market and the state.

    As access to the Net spreads, the majority of the population are beginning to participate within cultural production. Unlike Fréquence Libre, the avant-garde can no longer decide who can – and cannot – join the hi-tech gift economy. The Net is too large for Microsoft to monopolise let alone a small elite of radical intellectuals. Art therefore ceases being the symbol of moral superiority. Everyone now has the opportunity to express themselves in all sorts of ways, including aesthetically. When working people finally have enough time and resources, they can then concentrate upon ‘…art, love, play, etc., etc.; in short, everything which makes Man [and Woman] happy.’ [251]

    During the twentieth-century, the European avant-garde championed revolutionary politics, libertarian lifestyles and artistic experimentation. Following in this tradition, the Deleuzoguattarians celebrate the new ethical-aesthetic rebellion centred on the Net. However, by forming an avant-garde, radical intellectuals are attempting to separate themselves from the rest of the population. They want to be artistic Supermen within cyberspace rather than ordinary workers using computer-mediated communications. The very process of romanticising the hi-tech gift economy into theory-art negates most of its subversive potential. For, within the Net, really existing anarcho-communism is a pragmatic method of working. Rather than buying and selling information, people circulate gifts amongst each other. They always obtain much more than can ever be contributed in return. By giving away something which is well-made, they will gain recognition from those who download their work. [252] Anarcho-communism can no longer be confined to the adepts of Deleuzoguattarian theory-art. It has now become a practical way of working for everyone.

    At such a historical moment, the cultural avant-garde is made obsolete through the realisation of its own supposed principles. The techno-nomads proclaim the ‘holy idea’ of digital DIY culture to distinguish themselves from the rest of society. Yet, far from being confined to a revolutionary minority, increasing numbers of ordinary people are now participating within the hi-tech gift economy. For entirely pragmatic reasons, Net users adopt anarcho-communism as the most efficient method of working with each other. Rather than symbolising ethical-aesthetic purity, the circulation of gifts is one way of working within the advanced social democracy of cyberspace. Although it is impossible to predict the future of the hi-tech gift economy, one thing is almost certain. The intellectual elitism of Deleuzoguattarian discourse is being superseded by the emancipatory ‘grand narrative’ of modernity. As more and more ‘herd animals’ go on-line, radical intellectuals can no longer fantasise about becoming cyborg Supermen. As digital anarcho-communism becomes an everyday activity, there is no longer any need for the leadership of the cultural avant-garde. The time for the revolution of holy fools has passed. As has already happened within popular music, the most innovative and experimental culture will be created by people doing things for themselves. By participating within the hi-tech gift-economy, everyone can potentially become a wise citizen and a creative worker. [253]

    ‘… the word ‘creation’ will no longer be restricted to works of art but will signify a self-conscious activity, self-conceiving, reproducing for its own terms … and its own reality (body, desire, time, space), being its own creation.’ [254]

    11: Footnotes

    [1] Louis Rossetto, the founding editor of Wired, aggressively opposes any form of state economic intervention: ‘Keeping the government out of cyberspace is crucial to the Net’s development, and to the development of the New Economy and global consciousness.’ David Hudson, ‘There’s no government like no government’, page 34. For a critique of the neo-liberal politics of Wired, see Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    [2] For instance, see the miserablism about the Net shown by the contributors to Jon Dovey, Fractal Dreams. The denunciation of the emancipatory potential of new information technologies reached its apogee in the work of Baudrillard: ‘…it really seems that interaction, taken in the communications sense, marks the end of action, taken in its political sense.’ Jean Baudrillard, La Gauche Divine, page 142.

    [3] A TJ is a ‘theory-jockey’: Amsterdam slang for intellectuals who cut ‘n’ mix philosophies like DJs in a club.

    [4] Situationist International, ‘The Beginning of An Era’, pages 225-226.

    [5] DIY stands for ‘do-it-yourself’. This slogan is used to emphasise the need for people to tackle social problems through collective direct action rather than to wait for someone else to solve them. See Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle, Gathering Force.

    [6] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 4.

    [7] See archive of contributions to the nettime listserver on its web site.

    [8] See Kevin Kelly, Out of Control; and for a critique of this Social Darwinist manifesto, see Richard Barbrook, ‘The Pinnochio Theory’.

    [9] An American commentator exiled in Berlin notes that: ‘…because Europe is not crowded with netrepreneurs, because the movers and shakers on the business end of the Net are almost all in the US., digital culture in Europe is precisely that: culture…’ David Hudson, ‘The People are the Party’, page 3. Although many of its pioneers were American, the chemical hedonism, sexual tolerance and racial miscegenation inherent in dance music means that this style has never had the profound impact on popular culture in the USA as it has in Europe. See Matthew Collin with John Godrey, Altered State.

    [10] Uncritical enthusiasm for Deleuze and Guattari’s work led one group of DJs to set up a label named after the original French title of the holy book. See Mille Plateaux Records; and David Hudson, ‘The People are the Party’, pages 2-3.

    [11] Not surprisingly, there are many web sites promoting the teachings of the holy prophets, such as Web Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari Homepage; How To Make Yourself a Plane of Consistency; The Deleuzeguattarionary; and WWW Resources for Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

    [12] For an account of scandal surrounding the publication of a Yippie manual of ‘rip-off scams’, see Abbie Hoffman, Soon To Be A Major Motion Picture, pages 228-240. For the influence of anti-commodity attitudes on the early hacker culture, see Bruce Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown, pages 45-47.

    [13] In some tribal societies, social bonds between people were formed through the giving and receiving of gifts to gain recognition from others: ‘The cycling gift system is the society.’ Mary Douglas, ‘Foreword: no free gifts’, page ix. Similarly, within the Net, users collaborate with each other by giving and receiving information without payment. This is the hacker ethic of the hi-tech gift economy: we all give gifts to strangers because everyone else is already doing it. For a more detailed analysis, see chapters 10 and 11 below.

    [14] IRC means Internet Relay Chat: a CB-style channel for text-based conversations. MOO means Multi-User-Dungeon Object Orientated: a text-based 3D virtual environment.

    [15] On its web site, Rhizome describes itself as ‘an organisation dedicated to fostering communication and community in the field of new media art’. See rhizome.com.

    [16] Hakim Bey popularised the phrase ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ as a more comprehensible way of saying rhizome. Although hostile to industrial society, he does include such hi-tech activities as ‘…the BBS networks, pirated software, hacking, phone-phreaking…’ within his definition of a ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’, i.e. as potential rhizomes. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 109. ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ was first widely used as a description of techno parties. For instance, Debbie Stauton – a rave organiser – explains that: ‘The whole point of festivals is that they are temporary autonomous zones…they are self-organising…Nobody is told where to go or what to do, everyone just does their own bit…’ quoted in Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle, Gathering Force, page 89. Ironically, Hakim Bey admits that: ‘…I don’t go to raves and I don’t enjoy the music or staying up all night taking crypto-speed and dancing my head off…’, Geekgirl, ‘Interview with Hakim Bey’, page 207.

    [17] See Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 137-140, 173-176, 183-185, 190-197, 202-207.

    [18] See Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 50-64.

    [19] ‘Feminist women have a long history of dancing through a variety of potentially lethal mine-fields in their pursuit of socio-symbolic justice. Nowadays, women have to undertake the dance through cyberspace…’ Rosa Braidotti, ‘Cyberfeminism with a Difference’, page 11. Also see the sci-fi fantasies in Sadie Plant, Zeroes + Ones.

    [20] See Andreas Broeckmann, ‘Next Five Minutes: Tactical Media’, pages 8-12.

    [21] See Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 65-94. Another optimistic reading of Deleuze and Guattari concludes that: ‘what people are creating on the Internet is a conversational, demassified, non-representational democracy that transcends the nation-state.’ Dan Thu Nguyen and Jon Alexander, ‘The Coming of Cyberspacetime and the End of Polity’, page 111.

    [22] Gary Snyder in 1966 explaining how the USA – dominated by ‘straights’ organised like an ant hill – would be transformed into a tribal society by the hippie counter-culture. See Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven, page 448.

    [23] Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 109.

    [24] One Deleuzoguattarian has proclaimed that: ‘on this plateau, users [of computer-mediated communications] are virtual nomads, phantoms who circulate in the structures of the labyrinth.’ André Lemos, ‘The Labyrinth of Minitel’, page 46. For a metahistorical defence of the techno-nomad myth, see Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 156-157.

    [25] Like other post-structuralist philosophers, Deleuze and Guattari unashamedly used precise scientific terms as dodgy socio-cultural metaphors. See Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Impostures Intellectuelles, pages 141-152. The Californian ideologues also try to reduce the complexity of human society to the simplicities of natural laws. See Kevin Kelly, Out of Control; and Jànos Sugar, ‘Interview with John Perry Barlow’, pages 96-99. The Deleuzoguattarians are now synthesising the two forms of mystical positivism into a single pseudo-scientific discourse. See Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History; Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective; and Sadie Plant, Zeroes and Ones.

    [26] See Mark Lipton, ‘Forgetting the Body: Cybersex and Identity’.

    [27] Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 95-117. It is probably no coincidence that his concept of the ‘collective intelligence’ has a strong resemblance to the ‘group mind’ experienced by people tripping together. See Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven, page 276.

    [28] ‘…human culture and society (considered as dynamical systems) are no different from the self-organised processes that inhabit the atmosphere and hydrosphere (wind, circuits, hurricanes), or, for that matter, no different from lavas and magamas…’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, page 55. Also see Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, pages 7-9; and Sadie Plant, Zeroes + Ones, pages 156-164.

    [29] Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 50. The Luther Blissett Project wickedly describe Bey’s style as ‘…one part Hippie bullshit and cheap oriental trinkets, one part Post-structuralism and pithy intricacies, one part cyber-crap…’ Luther Blissett, ‘Why I Wrote a Fake Hakim Bey Book and How I Cheated the Conformists of Italian “Counter-Culture”‘, page 147.

    [30] As Dick Hebdige in his seminal text puts it: ‘…it is through the distinctive rituals of consumption, through style, that the subculture at once reveals its ‘secret’ identity and communicates its forbidden meanings. It is basically the way in which commodities are used in subculture which mark the subculture off from more orthodox cultural formations.’ Dick Hebdige, Subculture, page 103.

    [31] One of the ‘winners’ of third annual Bad Writing competition for academic texts was a fan of Deleuze and Guattari. See David Cohen, ‘Pseuds in a Corner’, page ii. A hilarious example of how Deleuze and Guattari’s jargon can be used to write theoretical gobbledygook is: ‘Antioedipus is an anticipatively assembled inducer for the replay of geohistory in hypermedia, a social-systematic fast feed-forward through machinic delirium. While tracking Artaud across the plane it discovers a cosmic catatonic abstract body that both repels its parts (deterritorialising them {from each other}) and attracts them (reterritorialising them {upon itself}), in a process that reconnects the parts through deterritorium as rhizomatic nets conducting schizogeneses.’ Nick Land, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’, page 191.

    [32] James Flint, ‘Harvesting the Tubers: the Planting of Deleuze and Guattari’, page 15.

    [33] Like other post-structuralists, Deleuze and Guattari were marginalised within the French academic system despite their fame among the reading public both at home and abroad. See Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, page xviii. As a consequence, even after the success of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze could still credibly claim that: ‘…neither Félix nor I have turned into little leaders of a little [philosophical] school.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’, page 9. Ironically, this fate has finally happened to the two philosophers in the late-Nineties.

    [34] This brief description is then supplemented by a series of enigmatic quotations from A Thousand Plateaus. See the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section on rhizome.com.

    [35] See Hari Kunzru, ‘Rewiring Technoculture’, page 10. Kunzru was an associate editor of the short-lived British edition of Wired.

    [36] Guattari described May ’68 as ‘a great awakening, a huge thunderclap’ which sparked off the process of ‘molecular revolutions’ across the world by inspiring the emergence of new social movements, especially feminism. Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 4. Gilles Deleuze also made clear his enthusiasm for this momentous event: ‘May ’68 was a demonstration, an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state… Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, page 171.

    [37] For Deleuze’s involvement in the anti-prisons movement, see Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, pages 224-237. For Guattari’s leading role in the French community radio movement, see chapters 5 and 6 below.

    [38] In colloquial French, the stilted jargon used by the French Communist Party and other Leninists was called ‘langue de bois’.

    [39] It is difficult for us now to comprehend the huge influence which Stalinism exercised over the childhood and adolescence of Deleuze and Guattari – as well as other French structuralist philosophers from the babyboomer generation: ‘In 1947 the PCF [French Communist Party] was a political party claiming close to a million members and the electoral choice of over five million (mostly working class) French voters. Basking in the prestige of its Resistance record, its obvious working class support, and its marxist legacy, the PCF exercised a strong attraction on leftist and liberal intellectuals. It was a political party which confidentially claimed to be in sole possession of a philosophically rigorous and scientific theory of history and society. It was a party that claimed to fight for social justice for downtrodden and social progress for all. And despite its many shortcomings, it was a party that compared quite favourably with the other political groupings of the postwar period.’ Arthur Hirsch, The French Left, page 10. Also see Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes Français; and R.W. Johnson, The Long March of the French Left.

    [40] For the intellectual forerunners of the Sixties New Left, see Arthur Lehring (ed.), Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings; Leon Trotsky, The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International (The Transitional Programme); André Breton, What is Surrealism?; D.A. Smart (ed.), Pannekoek and Gorter’s Marxism; and Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism.

    [41] For an analysis of the New Left as a ‘world-historical movement’, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left. Also see Richard Gombin, Les Origins du Gauchisme; and Arthur Hirsch, The French Left.

    [42] For the historical antecedents of New Left anarcho-communism, see Richard Gombin, Les Origins du Gauchisme, pages 99-151. For its later influence on internal structures of the new social movements, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, pages 204-212.

    [43] Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, pages 35-36.

    [44] Félix Guattari, ‘Institutional Politics and Practice’, page 127. According to the holy prophets, the differences between the Stalinist and Social Democratic strategies for taking state power amounted to: ‘…either the proletariat prevails and transforms the apparatus in conformity with its objective interest – but these operations are carried out under the domination of its consciousness or party vanguard, that is, for the benefit for a bureaucracy or technocracy that stands in for the bourgeoisie as the “great-absent” class – or the bourgeoisie keeps its control of the State and is free to secrete its own technobureaucracy, and above all to add a few more axioms for the recognition of the proletariat as a second class.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 256.

    [45] Crucially, Deleuze and Guattari never offered any materialist explanations of why the oppressive power of the state was created in the first place. For them, the origins of political power were completely mystical: ‘The State was not formed in progressive stages; it appears fully armed, a master stroke performed all at once; the primordial Urstaat, the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 217. Later, they even admitted that the emergence of the state resembled the ‘birth of [the Greek goddess] Athena’ from the head of Zeus, chief of the gods! Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 359. This myth was derived from the writings of Pierre Clastres – the anarchist anthropologist – who claimed that the ‘mysterious emergence’ of the state power had destroyed the egalitarian idyll of primitive societies and instituted a new order based on social oppression. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, pages 189-218. Also see Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics.

    [46] This analysis closely resembled the pessimistic reading of modernity proposed by their close friend and political ally Foucault. Far from being progress towards emancipation, this guru believed that social evolution was the refinement of repressive controls over individual freedom. See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, Discipline and Punish; and History of Sexuality.

    [47] The two philosophers explicitly rejected the ‘economism’ of Marxist analyses of society: ‘We think that the material or machinic aspect of an assemblage relates not to the production of goods but rather to the precise state of intermingling of bodies in a society, including all attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another… An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure nor superficial structure; it flattens all of its dimensions onto a single plane of consistency upon which reciprocal presuppositions and mutual assertions play themselves out.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 90.

    [48] Influenced by Reich’s Freudo-Marxist explanation of the popular appeal of Nazism, Deleuze and Guattari emphasised that: ‘…psychic repression is a means in service of social repression.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 119. Also see Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism.

    [49] ‘[The]…dichotomy between social production and the production of desire must be a target of the revolutionary struggle wherever familialist repression works against women, children, drug-addicts, alcoholics, homosexuals or any other disadvantaged groups.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Molecular Revolution and Class Struggle, pages 257-258. The economic causes of the conflict between the supporters of the mainstream Left in the ‘guaranteed’ sector and those of the New Left in the ‘non-guaranteed’ sector were only finally admitted in the collaboration between one of the philosophic duo and a prominent Italian Autonomist economist. See Félix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us, pages 75-84.

    [50] See Félix Guattari, ‘Social Democrats and Euro-Communists vis-à-vis the State’, pages 242-252.

    [51] ‘If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialised par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialisation afterwards as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary’s relation with the earth is mediatised by something else, a property regime, a State apparatus).’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 381. According to Clastres, nomadic tribes and other primitive societies supposedly organised themselves in ways which prevented the emergence of the only institution threatening their freedom: the state. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, pages 207-212. Similarly, Michel Foucault made an unfavourable comparison between the confinement imposed on the insane by modern mental hospitals with the mobility enjoyed by the mad who sailed around Europe on the Ship of Fools in pre-modern times. See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, pages 3-37.

    [52] A crude polarisation between statism and anarchism underpinned this myth of the nomad: ‘In social terms, the contrast is between authoritarian and libertarian organisations: on the one hand, States with their insistence on centralised power…and their hierarchical separations between States and classes; on the other hand, looser organisations of smaller groups, without territorial limits, without hierarchy. The best example of the latter is a society of nomads, whose main value is not authority (which implies stability and order), but flight.’ Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 169.

    [53] This argument is summarised in the introduction to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 3-25. Like the myth of the nomads, the concept of the rhizome was aimed against the reformist policies of the Stalinists and the Social Democrats. Although Deleuze and Guattari realised that constant changes in production and consumption under capitalism led to the ‘deterritorialisation’ of existing ways of living, they claimed that left-wing attempts to regulate this economic process were simply continuing political oppression in the interests of big business: ‘Never before has a State lost so much of its power in order to enter with so much force into the service of the signs of economic power.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 252.

    [54] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 17. Translation altered.

    [55] ‘…schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence and its death.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 246. The two philosophers derived this vision of the revolutionary potential of schizophrenia from the social explanations for mental illness advanced by Ronnie Laing and other members of the anti-psychiatry movement. See R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise, pages 84-107; and Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation.

    [56] According to Guattari, ‘…there is an urgent need to free ourselves of scientistic references and metaphors [as used by the mainstream Left]; to forge new paradigms which are instead ethico-aesthetic in inspiration.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, page 132. As Lecercle points out: ‘The first comment one can make about délire [delirium] is that the truth of it cannot be grasped from the outside: it requires a degree of involvement and renunciation on the part of the philosopher. He must abandon his normal processes of thought, proceed by paradox…he must become delirious’, Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 165.

    [57] ‘…délire [delirium] is itself a form of political expression, as the history of ranting shows: against political or psychological repression, the exaggerated reaction of délire [delirium] carries with it both the political contents of a revolt and its violence.’ Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 167.

    [58] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 161. Despite their rejection of the economic determinism inherent in Marxism, the two philosophers themselves advocated their own form of libidinal reductionism whereby every aspect of human activity – from personal relationships to capitalist production – could be derived from the direct or indirect expression of sexual desire. See Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, pages 160-194.

    [59] Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 185. Nietzsche proclaimed that: ‘I teach you the Superman. Man is something to be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? What is ape to man? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. And just so shall man be to the Superman… The Superman is the meaning of the earth.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pages 41-42.

    [60] Alfred Douglas, The Tarot, page 43. This Gnostic vision of human freedom is remarkably close to the liberating role of insanity championed by the two philosophers. See Félix Guattari, ‘Students, the Mad and ‘Delinquents’, pages 208-216. Similarly, their colleague Michel Foucault revived the pre-modern myth of the mad being able to comprehend spiritual truths better than the learned: ‘…knowledge, so inaccessible, so formidable, the Fool, in his innocent idiocy, already possesses. While the man of reason and wisdom perceives only fragmentary and all the more unnerving images of it, the Fool bears it all intact as an unbroken sphere: that crystal ball which for all others is empty is in his eyes filled with the density of an invisible knowledge.’ Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, page 22.

    [61] For the origins and development of the Minitel network, see Marcel Marchand, The Minitel Saga.

    [62] When writing about the impact of television, Guattari often sounded like Neil Postman or other patrician critics of this mass medium: ‘The television ends by functioning like a hypnotic drug, cutting people off from their environment, contributing to dissolving family relations which are already very strained, diminishing the role of reading and writing in favour of cultural and information events so superficial that they contribute to a phenomenon which has been characterised as ‘short attention span’.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Pour une Éthique des Médias’, page 6. Later on in the same article, he even claimed that video games and cartoon books were causing ‘psychopathy’ among young people in Japan!

    [63] Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, page 143.

    [64] Félix Guattari, ‘Remaking Social Practices’, page 263.

    [65] For Guattari’s enthusiasm for the use of Minitel by the social movements, see Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, pages 142-144; ‘Pour une Éthique des Médias’; and ‘Subjectivities: for Better and for Worse’, page 194. In contrast, Deleuze was much more sceptical about the libertarian potential of the new information technologies: ‘We’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people [in hospitals, schools, factories, etc.] but through continuous control and instant communication.’ Sounding like Baudrillard, he later concluded that: ‘Compared to the approaching forms of continuous control in open sites, we may come to see the harshest confinement as part of a wonderfully happy past. The quest for “universals of communication” ought to make us shudder.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, pages 174-175.

    [66] See David Armstrong, A Trumpet to Arms. The hacker culture was the expression of these hippie attitudes within the computer science departments.

    [67] See David Armstrong, A Trumpet to Arms, pages 74-81; and John Downing, Radical Media, pages 35-157.

    [68] This situation was the specifically Italian reflection of a wider European phenomenon. See Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. As the more perceptive New Left analysts pointed out at the time, the military hegemony of the USA was increasingly being superseded by the more effective disciplines of the global marketplace. For them, this transformation was reflected in the unquestioning acceptance of neo-liberal solutions to the crisis of Fordism in the late-Seventies by all Italian parliamentary parties, including those on the Left. See Sergio Bologna, ‘A Tribe of Moles’.

    [69] See John Downing, Radical Media, pages 215-303; and Red Notes, Italy 1977-8.

    [70] For example, Guattari wrote the introduction and provided the philosophical language for the book summing up the practical and theoretical achievements of Radio Alice. See Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre.

    [71] See Mark Grimshaw and Carl Gardner, ”Free Radio’ in Italy’, pages 14-17; Peter Lewis and Jerry Booth, The Invisible Medium, pages 138-147; and John Downing, Radical Media, pages 273-301.

    [72] For a sympathetic account of the achievements of the Communist local administration in Bologna, see Max Jäggi, Roger Müller and Sil Schmid, Red Bologna. During the Eighties, Bologna city council was a major inspiration for left Labour local authorities in England. For a comparison, see Maureen Mackintosh and Hilary Wainwright, A Taste of Power.

    [73] As well as news reports, Radio Alice also broadcast regular programmes made by feminists, conscripts, lesbians & gays, ex-prisoners, young workers and children. See Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, pages 100-102.

    [74] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’, pages 159-160; and ‘Plan for the Planet’.

    [75] Félix Guattari, ‘The Micro-Politics of Fascism’, page 220.

    [76] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’. The members of Radio Alice declared that they wanted: ‘To break the dictatorship of the Signifier, to introduce frenzy into the order of communication, to speak of desire, anger, madness and refusal. This form of linguistic practice is the only method adequate to the complex practice needed to destroy the dictatorship of the Political, to introduce appropriation, the refusal of work, freedom and collectivism into daily life.’ Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre, page 102.

    [77] The police raid which finally silenced Radio Alice was transmitted live from the station’s studios, see Red Notes, Italy 1977-8, pages 31-32. The closing down of Radio Alice was part of the rapid escalation of the conflict between the Communist party and its left-wing critics which culminated in the almost complete suppression of the Italian New Left by the early-Eighties. See Red Notes, Italy 1980-81 – After Marx, Jail.

    [78] Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre, page 12.

    [79] The example of Radio Alice inspired the first wave of ‘free radio’ pirates in France: ‘Italy is a machine which exports dreams.’ Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, page 22.

    [80] See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 75-90.

    [81] See Collectif Radios Libres Populaires, Les Radios Libres, pages 21-31; Thierry Bombled, “Devine Qui Va Parler Ce Soir?”, pages 77-166; Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, pages 24-42, 109-146; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 9-71.

    [82] See Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, theses 203-211; Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Notes to the Civilised Concerning Generalised Self-Management’, pages 288-289; and Situationist International, ‘The Situationists and the New Forms of Action against Politics and Art’, page 214.

    [83] An activist from Radio Clémentine, a ‘free radio’ pirate in Paris, quoted in Thierry Bombled, “Devine Qui Va Parler Ce Soir?”, page 166. As Collin points out, one important reason for the fascination with radio among New Left militants was the romantic memory of the live broadcasts from the barricades on the Left Bank in Paris during the May ’68 revolution. See Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, page 38.

    [84] See Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 34-36.

    [85] See Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, pages 26-29; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 49-51, 103-108.

    [86] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’, page 160. As another supporter of the radical ‘free radios’ remarked: ‘These electronic “jukeboxes”, far from encouraging creativity and understanding, only promote an ideology of passivity and consumerism.’ Thierry Bombled, “Devine Qui Va Parler Ce Soir?”, page 62.

    [87] See Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM , pages 115-119, 127-132, 139-152; and ‘Loi no. 81-994 du 9 novembre 1981 portant dérogation au monopole d’État de la radiodiffusion’, pages 3,070-3,071.

    [88] See Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 183-188; and Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’.

    [89] Pierre Gavi and Xavier Villetard, ‘La premier hit-parade de la FM Parisienne’, page 9.

    [90] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’.

    [91] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’.

    [92] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’. While avant-garde classical music is discussed in detail, there are no references to any style of popular music within the two philosophers’ sacred text! See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.

    [93] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, page 325. By the time that Fréquence Libre went under, the regulations against commercial broadcasting had also collapsed. See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 109-111.

    [94] Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, page 35.

    [95] ‘I think that if a rightist government had remained in place, we [the ‘free radio’ movement] would have continued to struggle and to achieve things. It sufficed that the Socialists came to power in order to liquidate all that.’ Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 8.

    [96] Radio Populare raises around 40% of its income from local and national advertising with the rest of the money coming from listener subscriptions, fund-raising events and subsidies from left-wing political groups. Despite its success in raising the money, the most important economic resource of this community radio station remains the free labour contributed by volunteers. During the 1991 Gulf War, the station’s campaign against the attack on Iraq led to Radio Populare topping the ratings in the Milan region. See Peter Lewis, ‘Neither Market nor State: Community Radio – a Third Way?’, pages 202-206. For the pragmatic policies which have allowed other community radio stations to thrive, also see Peter Lewis and Jerry Booth, The Invisible Medium, pages 89-162; and Richard Barbrook, ‘Choice or Participation’.

    [97] The vanguard was a military term used for the advance guard who opened up the path for the main army. Popularised by Lenin, the political use of this phrase emphasised the leadership role of radical intellectuals within revolutionary organisations. See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? For Guattari, the prototype of the New Left vanguard was the Mouvement du 22 Mars which had sparked off the May ’68 revolution by organising the student protests at Nanterre University: ‘With their vanguard action to provide a model, they opened a new path, lifted prohibitions, and opened the way to a new understanding and a new logical formulation outside any framework of dogmatism.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Students, the Mad and ‘Delinquents”, page 215. Crucially, this student movement had no direct connections with any working class parties or unions. See Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative, pages 23-90.

    [98] ‘The principle concern of constitutional government is civil liberty; that of revolutionary government, public liberty…To good citizens revolutionary government owes the full protection of the state; to the enemies of the people it owes only death.’ Maximilien Robespierre, ‘On Revolutionary Government (December 25 1793)’, page 59.

    [99] ‘We…must foment, awaken and unleash all the passions, we must produce anarchy and, like invisible pilots in the thick of the popular tempest, we must steer it not by any open power but by the collective dictatorship of all the [revolutionary] allies – a dictatorship without insignia, titles or official rights, and all the stronger for having none of the paraphernalia of power… If you set up this collective, invisible dictatorship, you will triumph, the revolution, properly guided, will triumph. If not, not.’ Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Letter to Albert Richard, April 1st, 1870’ in Arthur Lehring, Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings, page 180.

    [100] Replying to orthodox Marxist criticisms of the Bolsheviks’ decision to dissolve Russia’s first democratically-elected parliament, Lenin proclaimed that ‘…in an epoch of desperate acute war, when history has placed on the order of the day the question whether age-old and thousand-year-old privileges are to be or not to be – at such a time to talk about majority and minority, about pure democracy, about dictatorship being unnecessary and about equality between exploiter and exploited!!.’ V.I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, page 36.

    [101] While the Stalinists wanted to dominate ‘molar’ party politics and trade union struggles, Guattari advocated that the New Left vanguard should instead exercise its leadership over the ‘molecular’ social movements. See Félix Guattari, ‘Plan for the Planet’, pages 268-272.

    [102] Jo Freeman, ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’, page 13.

    [103] In the founding text of the Bolshevik party, Lenin bluntly stated that: ‘…the spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its becoming subordinated to the bourgeois ideology…for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade unionism…and trade unionism means the ideological enslavement of the working-class by the bourgeoisie.’ V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, page 49. A more sophisticated version of this patrician attitude can be found in Georg Lukàcs, History and Class Consciousness.

    [104] According to Althusser, Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud had provided a supposedly ‘scientific’ explanation of how the ideologies spread by the media and other institutions controlled the minds – and therefore the actions – of the majority of the population. See Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)’ and ‘Freud and Lacan’.

    [105] ‘Psychic repression is such that social repression becomes desired; it induces a consequent desire, a faked image of its object, on which it bestows the appearance of independence.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 119. Their uncritical appropriation of Althusser’s theory of ideology can also be seen in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 130, 458-459. Also see the discussion in this book about the supposed ‘desire for fascism’ held by most people, see pages 208-231.

    [106] Along with many other leftists of their generation, Deleuze and Guattari seized on the tortured and obscurantist discourse of Lacan as their replacement for the tired formulas of Stalinist philosophy. As Guattari explained: ‘…it was important for me to have a model of rupture, if I can call it that, all the more so since I was involved in extreme leftist organisations, but still traditionalist from many perspectives. There was all this weight of Sartre’s thought, of Marxist thought, creating a whole environment that it wasn’t easy to eliminate. So I think that’s what Lacan was. Moreover, it’s certain that his reading of Freud opened possibilities for me to cross through and into different ways of thinking.’ Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 10. Yet, as Edward Thompson perceptively explained: ‘I do not wish to be ungenerous to a “post-Stalinist generation”, but it is necessary to be plain…Stalinism as an ideology has continued to reproduce itself long after the particular historical moment of high Stalinism has passed. And so long as it does so in theory, it will tend to reproduce itself in fact – not in exactly the same form, of course, but in a form sufficiently uncomfortable for its human objects, and even for some of the intellectuals who serve as its priests. So far from being a “post-Stalinist generation”, the Althusserians, and those who share their premises and idealist modes, are working hard, every day, on the theoretical production-line of Stalinist ideology. In terms of theory, they are Stalinists.’ E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, page 333.

    [107] As Althusserians, Deleuze and Guattari believed that the creation of subjectivity was a result of psychic control by semiotic structures rather than the self-consciousness of a free citizen celebrated in republican theories. For instance, Deleuze thought that the ‘repetitions’ which shape people’s daily lives were manifestations of Freud’s supposed ‘death instinct’. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pages 16-19. This analysis was developed by Guattari who claimed that: ‘Subjectivity does not only produce itself through the psychogenetic stages of psychoanalysis or the “mathmemes” of the Unconscious, but also in the large-scale social machines of language and the mass media – which cannot be described as human.’ Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, page 9. Later in the book, he described the multiplicity of ‘autopoetic’ structures ranging from economics to music which allegedly shape all aspects of our lives. See Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, pages 33-57; and also Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pages 35-37. Edward Thompson commented on this form of analysis that: ‘None of these ideas is, in origin, absurd, and some rest upon substantial additions to knowledge. But all slip, at a certain point, from sense to absurdity, and, in their sum, all arrive at a common terminus of unfreedom. Structuralism (this terminus of the absurd) is ultimate product of self-alienating reason – “reflecting” the common sense of the times – in which all human projects, endeavours, institutions, and even culture itself, appear to stand outside men, to stand against men, objective things, as the “Other” which moves men around as things. In the old days, the Other was then named “God” or Fate. Today it has been christened anew as Structure.’ E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, page 345. ‘Nuff said!

    [108] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, page 304. Despite their positivist posturing, post-structuralist philosophers advocate the same mystical solutions to practical problems as their Idealist predecessors in the early-nineteenth century: ‘We have seen that the whole problem of the transition from thought to reality, hence from language to life, exists only in the philosophical illusion… This great problem…was bound, of course, to result finally in one of these knight-errant [philosophers] setting out in search of a word which, as a word, formed the transition [to a better society]…which, as a word, ceases to be simply a word, and which, as a word, in a mysterious superlinguistic manner, points from within language to the actual object it denotes; which, in short, plays among words the same role as the Redeeming God-Man plays among people in Christian fantasy.’ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, pages 475-476.

    [109] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, page 144.

    [110] The pride which Fréquence Libre took in its vanguardist politics can be seen by the station’s principle slogan: “plus gauche que moi, tu meurs” (“If you were more left than me, you’d be dead” – i.e. it is impossible to be more left than me). Fréquence Libre, Publicity Poster.

    [111] According to orthodox Marxists, the admirers of the Bolsheviks had confused the violent revolution which overthrew the absolute monarchy with the socialist revolution which would democratise the economy. In the latter case, social transformation would depend upon the majority of the population not only becoming wage-workers, but also supporting the Social Democratic party in parliamentary elections. See Léon Blum, ‘Bolchevisme et Socialisme’, pages 451-460.

    [112] Like many other members of his generation, Guattari was fascinated with ‘the Leninist breakthrough’ which inspired revolutionary politics across Europe after 1917. See Félix Guattari, ‘Causality, Subjectivity and History’, pages 184-195. Although many were sympathetic with Trotskyism, the New Left militants’ hostility against all forms of left-wing reformism in many ways mimicked the ‘third period’ of the Third International. This was the disastrous moment when Stalin asserted his control over the European Communist parties by making them concentrate on fighting against the so-called ‘social fascists’: the orthodox Marxists of the Social Democratic parties. Tragically, in 1933, the result of this sectarianism was the victory of real fascists in Germany. See Franz Borkenau, World Communism, pages 332-385.

    [113] For instance, see the contributions in Patrick Kessel, Le Mouvement “Maoïste” en France.

    [114] Anarcho-communism was seen as the heir of those Left Communists who had fought for direct democracy organised through the Soviets against the dictatorship of the Leninist party. See Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks & Workers’ Control; and Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Uprising 1921.

    [115] For example, one ‘soixante-huitard’ claimed in 1973 that: ‘…Marx’s work seems largely to be the authentic consciousness of the capitalist mode of production… Historical materialism is a glorification of the wandering in which humanity has been engaged for more than a century: growth of productive forces [of industry and science] as the condition sine-qua-non for liberation.’ Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, pages 22-23. Of course, a much diluted variant of this attack on oppressive ‘grand narratives’ later formed the ideological basis for the self-styled post-modernists. See Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition; and David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity.

    [116] For instance, the first chapter is given the date ‘1914’, the next one has ‘10,000 B.C.’, the one after ‘November 20, 1923’, then we jump back again to ‘587 B.C. – A.D. 70’ and so on. See Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus. Lecercle erroneously claims that: ‘Despite their off-hand treatment of history, Deleuze and Guattari’s position is profoundly historical’ because they emphasise the singularity of each instance of ‘delirium’ in time and space. See Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 185. However, as he himself shows earlier in the same chapter, their theoretical oppositions are completely metahistorical, such as ‘territoriality vs deterritorialisation’ or ‘hierarchic (the State) vs nomadic (the tribe).’ See Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 179.

    [117] This ahistorical theorising is clearest in their celebration of the Body-without-Organs – the person ‘…populated only by intensities.’ See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 149-166.

    [118] Deleuze admitted that: “Becomings” are much more important than history in A Thousand Plateaus.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘From Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus’, page 30. In their writings, the holy prophets denounced the moral emptiness of the ‘grand narrative’ of progress supported by the parliamentary Left: ‘The meaning of history and the [Hegelian] dialectic together is not the realisation of reason, freedom or man as a species, but nihilism, nothing but nihilism.’ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 161. In place of the supposedly oppressive historical analyses of Hegel and Marx, Deleuze and Guattari resurrected the ahistorical theory of ‘eternal return’ proposed by Nietzsche. Over time, the negativity of social controls would disappear as the positive moments of ‘delirium’ came back through the process of ‘eternal return’. See Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’; Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pages 237-238, 244-247; and Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pages 186-194. Above all, this Nietzschean myth enabled the two philosophers to dismiss all evolutionary explanations of human history: ‘…a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure or arrival, origin or destination… A line of becoming only has a middle.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 293.

    [119] There is a particular acid sensibility underlying Deleuze and Guattari’s disdain of modernity as an historical process. As someone peaks, a few hundred years either seems an unimaginably long period of time compared with the next five minutes or ridiculously short compared to the cosmic nature of eternity.

    [120] ‘Irresponsibility – Nietzsche’s most noble and beautiful secret.’ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 21.

    [121] Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, page 171.

    [122] For an examination of this profound social transformation, see André Gauron, Histoire Économique et Sociale de la Cinquième République – Tome 1, pages 19-47; and Henri Mendras with Alistair Cole, Social Change in Modern France, pages 15-48.

    [123] See Jean-Pierre Garnier and Roland Lew, ‘From The Wretched Of The Earth To The Defence Of The West’, pages 301-317.

    [124] For instance, Jacques Camatte emphasised that: ‘[Anarcho-communism]…is the destruction of urbanisation and the formation of a multitude of communities distributed over the earth.’ Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, page 37. In some classic New Left films, rebellion against a repressive and alienating urban society was symbolically represented through a return to primitive simplicity. In Weekend, the heroine finally escapes from road rage, traffic jams and car accidents by joining the hippie rural guerrillas of the Front de Libération de Seine et Oise. Similarly, in Themroc, the eponymous hero turns his flat into a hunter-gatherer’s cave by sealing up its doors and knocking down the outside wall. Curiously, both films portrayed cannibalism as the ultimate expression of liberation from bourgeois morality! See Jean-Luc Godard, Weekend; and Claude Faraldo, Themroc.

    [125] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 204, 358, 402-403. According to another student of Althusser, the Cuban revolution had proved that the only true militants were found in the countryside: ‘…any man, even a comrade, who spends his life in city is unwittingly a bourgeois in comparison with a guerrillo.’ Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, page 68. Earlier in this book, Debray praised the ‘hardening’ of revolutionary intellectuals through the ‘absolute nomadism’ adopted by rural guerrilla groups, see page 31.

    [126] In their anti-modernism, Deleuze and Guattari were reviving Nietzsche’s romanticisation of the ‘wild, free, nomadic man’ of tribal society. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, pages 64-65. Yet, in the historical past, nomads were not always natural anarchists, but instead were often the aristocratic warriors who founded the earliest states: ‘…peasants and nomads constitute two factors, the coincidence and collision of which at a certain level of development necessarily resulted in the nomads rendering the peasants subject and tributary to them. Individual tribes of nomads combined numerous local communities or mark communities into a polity that was ruled and exploited by the nomads, who now ceased to be nomads. In this way, the first states were born.’ Karl Kautsky, The Materialist Conception of History, page 281. The original translation uses ‘herdsmen’ for nomads. Given the Islamophilia of many Deleuzoguattarians, it is rather ironic that one of the most famous examples of state-building by nomadic tribes is the creation of the Arab empire by the Prophet and his successors. See Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates.

    [127] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 417. Nietzsche expressed similar anti-modernist sentiments: ‘Woe to this great city! And I wish I could see already the pillar of fire in which it will be consumed!’ Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, page 198.

    [128] Michael Vickery describes the ideology of the Khmer Rouge as ‘Populism’: ‘…a conservative utopianism, a belief in the sacredness of the soil and those who till it, in the quality of the status of all cultivators, a belief that their virtue is endangered by the workings of an active, alien, urban vice. It is apolitical, without a basis for a sustained political party, and its program is one of rough revenge of the verities of the soil on the alien and the sophisticated. It proclaims a sacrifice of freedom in the interests of moral uniformity. There is a distrust of state and bureaucracy, and peasant populists would minimise them before the rights and virtues of local communities.’ Michael Vickery, Cambodia, page 285. Apart from its emphasis on peasants rather than nomads, Khmer Rouge ideology was eerily similar to the anti-modernism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari.

    [129] See Jean-Pierre Garnier and Roland Lew, ‘From The Wretched Of The Earth To The Defence Of The West’, pages 317-322. Despite this defeat at home, Deleuze and Guattari’s faction of the New Left still indulged in ‘orientalist’ fantasies about struggles in faraway countries. For instance, their close friend Michel Foucault enthusiastically supported the 1979 Iranian revolution precisely because it was led by Islamic fundamentalists rather than by the secular Left: ‘Modernisation as a political project and as a principle of social change is a thing of the past in Iran …’ Michel Foucault, ‘Le Poids Mort de la Modernisation’ quoted in Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, page 285.

    [130] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, page 177.

    [131] ‘[The post-modern artist]…gains fame and fortune for no clear accomplishment, but simply for being a stylish symbol, which is all that his production testifies to. Novelty is proof enough of his artistic power and credibility.’ Donald Kuspit, The Cult of the Avant-Garde Artist, page 20. Also see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, pages 39-65.

    [132] The most notorious recent proponent of anti-modernism chillingly threatens that: ‘Whatever society may exist after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people will live close to nature, because in the absence of advanced technology there is not other way that people CAN live. To feed themselves they must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter etc..’ The Unabomber [Theodore Kaczynski], Industrial Society and its Future, page 43. For a critique of the anarcho-primitivist sect which published this manifesto in England, see Luther Blissett and Stewart Home, Green Apocalypse.

    [133] ‘…the liberation of the mind, the express aim of the surrealists, demands as a primary condition…the liberation of man…that today more than ever the surrealists rely entirely, for the bringing of human liberation, on the proletarian revolution.’ André Breton, What is Surrealism, page 115.

    [134] André Breton, What is Surrealism, page 118.

    [135] The European avant-garde is distinguished from earlier art movements by this emphasis on creating modern aesthetics with new technologies: ‘In…earlier periods…there was a strong appeal to revival: the art and learning, the life of the past, were sources, stimuli of a new creativity, against an exhausted or deformed current order… What we now know as modernism, and certainly as the avant-garde, has changed all this. Creativity is all in new making, new construction: all traditional, academic, even learned models are actually or potentially hostile to it, and must be swept away.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, pages 4-5.

    [136] For the influence of ‘outsider art’ on the Surrealists, see David Maclagan, ‘Outsiders and Insiders’. The Surrealists were reflecting the rejection of the positivism and rationalism of orthodox Marxism by many intellectuals following the collaboration of the Social Democratic parties with their national governments during the First World War. Instead of welcoming the opportunties for social change opened up by industrialisation and scientific advances, influential revolutionary thinkers in the ’20s and 30s emphasised the resistance of the human spirit to further reification and fragmentation by capitalist modernisation. See Georg Lukàcs, History and Class Consciousness; and Phil Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School.

    [137] From 1930 to 1933, the Surrealists’ journal was called Le Surréalisme au service de la révolution. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 87-92. As Bürger points out: ‘What distinguishes… [the avant-garde] is the attempt to organise a new life praxis from a basis in art… Only an art the contents of whose individual works is wholly distinct from the (bad) praxis of the existing society can be the starting point for the organisation of a new life praxis.’ Peter Bürger, The Avant-Garde, pages 49-50.

    [138] For instance, the 1997 Documenta festival had texts by Deleuze and Guattari – along with other ‘soixante-huitard’ philosophers – prominently displayed on the walls of its art galleries. In their catalogue, the exhibition’s organisers stress the influence of the New Left on the contemporary European avant-garde. See Documenta X, Politics-Poetics.

    [139] For instance, one disciple first proclaims that: ‘Despotism introduces an organising principle that comes from elsewhere – from ‘above’ – a deterritorialised simplicity or supersoma overcoding the aboriginal body as created flesh. Monotheism…severs the ambivalent integrity of taboo.’ However, a few pages later, he switches from romantic primitivism to delirious futurism: ‘The industrial-information body…operates as an input-output flow-switching nexus, defined by its place among the machines, and redefined ever more exactly by its migration across the mutant sutures in machinic continuum…’ Nick Land, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’, pages 196, 202.

    [140] Andreas Broeckmann, ‘Towards an Aesthetics of Heterogenesis’, page 158.

    [141] For instance, Breton had long ago declared that: ‘The European artist in the twentieth century can ward off the drying up of the sources of inspiration swept away by rationalism and utilitarianism only by resuming so-called primitive visions.’ André Breton, What is Surrealism?, page 263. Similarly, Body-without-Organs was first used as a phrase by Antonin Artaud in articles celebrating the revolutionary potential of the insane for La Révolution surréaliste back in 1925. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, page 30.

    [142] ‘There is always a point at which technologies geared towards regulation, containment, command, and control, can turn out to be feeding into the collapse of everything they once supported…the keystrokes of users on the Net connect them to a vast distributed plane composed not merely of computers, users, and telephone lines, but all the zeros and ones of machine code, the switches of electronic circuitry, fluctuating waves of neurochemical activity, hormonal energy, thoughts, desires…’ Sadie Plant, Zeroes + Ones, page 143.

    [143] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, page 163.

    [144] Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, page 101.

    [145] ‘The novelty of Italian Futurist manifestos…is their brash refusal to remain in the expository or critical corner, their understanding that the group pronouncement, sufficiently aestheticised, can…all but take the place of the promised art work.’ Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Movement, page 85.

    [146] From its earliest appearances, theory-art was always multi-media. This aesthetic form not only involved literature, but also graphic design, typography and public performances. See Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Movement, pages 90-101.

    [147] Dan Thu Nguyen and Jon Alexander, ‘The Coming of Cyberspacetime and the End of Polity’, page 107.

    [148] ‘… the growth in the number of students and also of junior lecturers has been the cause of a quantitative growth in the demand for cultural products, and of a qualitative transformation of this demand: it is certain…that all the intellectual ‘novelties’ find their chosen audience among the students of the new disciplines in the arts field …’ Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, page 119.

    [149] For instance, it is estimated that over 600,000 people are directly employed Britain making cultural products ranging from TV through software to music. See Independent on Sunday, ‘The Cool Economy, pages 2-3.

    [150] The ‘virtual class’ is supposedly being formed by those employed in computing, media, education and similar sectors. See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; Robert Reich, The Work of Nations; and Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein, Data Trash.

    [151] For decades, avant-garde artists have pioneered the reclamation of derelict urban areas for later colonisation by businesses and residential developers. See Armin Medosch, ‘Art and Business’.

    [152] Chris Smith, British Minster of Culture, quoted in Peter Koenig, ‘Is Chris Smith More Vital Than Gordon Brown?’, page 1.

    [153] ‘As the division of labour becomes more general, the artist also turns into a specialist.’ Peter Bürger, The Avant-Garde, page 32. Also see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, pages 11-96.

    [154] Earlier in the twentieth century, one cynical commentator observed that: ‘….there are today two main roads to fortune for a young artist. He may learn to please that still large and naive public that demands a flattering handmade photograph disguised as an old master, or he may squirt his canvas with creosote, scour, scratch, blast and exorciate it, until it hangs in fashionable tatters upon the walls of one of our principal art galleries. The former method may command a steadier sale than the latter, and it calls for less salesmanship; but the latter is the true highway to glory and wealth.’ Quentin Bell, ‘Conformity and Nonconformity in the Fine Arts’, page 699.

    [155] For instance, see the careers of Bruno Latour, Sadie Plant, Nick Land, Manuel De Landa, James Flint, Critical Art Ensemble, Rosi Braidotti, Hakim Bey, Pierre Lévy, the Krokers and many others.

    [156] As Pierre Bourdieu points out, new forms of cultural expression present an opportunity for innovative people to gain a position within the cultural elite: ‘These arts, not yet fully legitimate, which are disdained or neglected by the big holders of educational capital, offer a refuge and a revenge to those who, by appropriating them, secure the best return on their cultural capital (especially if it is not fully recognised scholastically) while at the same time taking credit for contesting the established hierarchy of legitimacies and profits.’ Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, page 87.

    [157] Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, page 176.

    [158] ‘…nothing more rigorously distinguishes the different classes than the…aptitude for taking a specifically aesthetic point of view on objects already constructed aesthetically…’ Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, page 40.

    [159] In the late-nineteenth century, Nietzsche advocated the formation of an aristocracy based on ethical-aesthetic values to replace the declining nobility based on land and finance. Otherwise, democracy, socialism and feminism would impose a morality of ‘timidity’ and ‘mediocrity’ upon society. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pages 120-128.

    [160] ‘…there is a position within the apparent critique of the bourgeois family which is actually a critique and rejection of all social forms of human reproduction. The ‘bourgeois family’…is often a covering phrase for those rejections of women and children which take the form of a rejection of ‘domesticity’. The sovereign individual is confined by such a form. The genius is tamed by it.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 9.

    [161] Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 185. Inspiring this avant-garde demand to turn life into art, Nietzsche claimed that cultural aristocrats shouldn’t just form a new society, but also should become a more advanced type of human: ‘For justice speaks to me: ‘Men are not born equal.’ And they should not become so either! For what were my love for the Superman if I spoke otherwise.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, page 124. Also see Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses.

    [162] What united the fascist Futurists in Italy with the Leninist avant-garde movements was a common commitment to the ‘violent assault on existing [bourgeois] conventions.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 9. In the first Futurist manifesto, Marinetti’s celebration of war and denigration of women was combined with a ferocious assault against failings of the Italian liberal bourgeoisie. See Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Movement, pages 81-92.

    [163] ‘Radical aristocratism’ is one of the ‘Slogans & Mottos for Subway Graffiti & Other Purposes’ in Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 28. This gurus’ desire to become a Nietzschean Superman rapidly turns into unashamed support for reactionary political positions. For instance, Bey claims that the seizure of the Croatian city of Fiume (known today as Rijeka) by D’Annunzio’s supporters in 1919 was a forerunner of contemporary ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., pages 125-126. Yet, the Fiume incident not only pioneered the style and ideology of Italian fascism, but also led directly to the imposition of totalitarianism on Italy. See Laura Fermi, Mussolini, pages 170-184. In his imitation of the European avant-garde, Hakim Bey confuses anarcho-communism with fascism because both positions are opposed to representative democracy and consumer society. Although their colleague Foucault said that Anti-Oedipus should have been subtitled ‘an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life’, Deleuze and Guattari actually revived the discredited Nietzschean myths of the extreme-right in this sacred text. Above all, the holy prophets’ celebration of the untamed nomadic war-machine recapitulated the fascist romanticisation of heroic soldiers who had freed themselves the effeminate morality of bourgeois society. Hakim Bey has simply developed the Deleuzoguattarian myth of the nomad warrior to its logical – and therefore reactionary – conclusion. See Michel Foucault, ‘Preface’, page xiii; Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier, Ecofascism; and Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism.

    [164] Bey claims that imitating the Assassin religious cult would be an ‘interesting…thought-experiment’. Just as the Ismailis hid away from society making magic in their castles, techno-nomads should create ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’ within the Net to perfect the ‘secret sciences’ of making subversive media. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., pages 98-99; and Peter Lamborn Wilson [Hakim Bey], ‘A Network of Castles’, page 27. For someone determined to confuse anarcho-communism with fascism, the Assassins are an excellent choice. Historically, they simultaneously defended conservative religious values and advocated communist social policies. In modern times, their ideological legacy has been found on both political extremes. While Nietzsche admired their hierarchical conception of freedom, others have compared the Assassins with the Trotskyist Fourth International. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, page 124; Frank Ridley, The Assassins, pages 68, 140-156; and Kenneth Setton, A History of the Crusades, pages 99-132.

    [165] ‘The desire for wilderness will gratified at a level undreamed since the early Neolithic, and the desire for creativity and even co-creation will be gratified at a level undreamed by the wildest science fiction.’ Hakim Bey, Primitives & Extropians, page 3. Of course, this will only happen after the anarcho-fascist revolution!

    [166] Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 107.

    [167] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, page 421. According to Deleuze, the Superman represented a ‘new way of feeling…of thinking…of evaluating.’ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 163.

    [168] Although critical of Stalin, the Surrealists were members of the French Communist party during the sectarian ‘Third Period’ phase when all other left-wing groups were denounced as ‘social fascists’. Even after Hitler’s seizure of power, this avant-garde movement could still describe the Popular Front of Socialists, Communists and republicans as ‘counter-revolutionary’. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 119-160; and Franz Borkenau, World Communism, pages 332-375.

    [169] For example, in an attack on the ‘content-free’ 1996 presidential elections, a prominent article in Wired uncritically repeated the fraudulent claim that ‘…unless the [American] nation gets a handle on Social Security and Medicare, it faces a future of crushing debt, exorbitant tax rates, or both…’ See John Heilemann, ‘Reality Checklist’, page 54.

    [170] ‘In all fields, but especially in information technology, the strict separation between the technical and the creative has in fact been made redundant by digital images and the skills required by computer-aided design.’ Rosa Braidotti, ‘Cyberfeminism with a Difference’, page 2. For a more critical look at this phenomenon, see Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Impostures Intellectuelles.

    [171] Deleuze and Guattari were inspired by the work of Henri Bergson, a French Catholic philosopher popular in the early-twentieth century. Although mimicking the language of Darwinian biology, this guru believed that there was a divine ‘vital force’ driving the evolution of life. Many decades later, Deleuze and Guattari hoped that ecstatic states of ‘delirium’ would release this spiritual energy from the restraints of semiotic controls. See Paul Douglas, ‘Deleuze’s Bergson: Bergson Redux’. This bizarre mixture of Darwinian rationalism and Christian irrationalism is also found in Kevin Kelly, Out of Control.

    [172] Gerfried Stocker, ‘Memesis – the Future of Evolution’. This was the opening statement for Ars Electronica ’96, which is Europe’s most prestigious digital arts festival. For a dissection of the full statement, see Richard Barbrook, ‘Memesis Critique’.

    [173] Ray Smith, CEO of the Bell Atlantic telephone company, appears as Conan on the front cover of issue 3.02 and John Malone, head of TCI, is morphed into Mad Max for issue 2.07.

    [174] The disciples are reflecting the dubious fantasies of their holy prophets. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari romanticised nomads for having lifestyles which resembled more that of Clint Eastwood than of Emma Goldman: ‘…a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honour, all of which…impedes the formation of the State.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 358. This macho ideal is very similar to the myth of the self-sufficient cowboy which excites the Californian ideologues. Guattari admitted that he and Deleuze had ‘…participated a little in that America, that new kind of West. It was our dream, our very own America.’ Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 15. This shared dream of the heroic individual reflects the privileged socio-economic characteristics enjoyed by avant-garde artists and capitalist entrepreneurs. Unlike most people living within modern societies, both professions have retained control over their own production and property. Despite embracing revolutionary politics and bohemian lifestyles, the artist can therefore still be ‘…the ultimate apotheosis of that central bourgeois figure: the sovereign individual.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 7. Back in the Thirties, Ortega y Gasset hoped that this affinity between aesthetic intellectuals and innovative businessmen would enable them to come together as a liberal aristocracy which would rule over the people through its spiritual excellence: ‘…nobility is synonymous with a life of effort, ever set on excelling oneself, in passing beyond what one is to what one sets up as a duty and obligation.’ Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, page 49.

    [175] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, page 504. Deleuze commended Nietzsche for the ‘positive task’ of inventing the reactionary concept of the Superman. See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pages 162-4.

    [176] This merging of opposites is already implicitly present in Deleuze and Guattari’s own writings. Despite their self-proclaimed ultra-leftism, the two philosophers’ celebration of the ‘deterritorialisation’ of existing social hierarchies by the globalisation of capitalism anticipated the techno-nomads’ reapprochment with neo-liberalism: ‘…there are avant-garde political positions….which can be seen as a genuine vanguard of a truly modern international bourgeoisie which has emerged since 1945. The politics of the New Right, with its version of libertarianism in a dissolution or deregulation of all bonds and all social and cultural formations, in the interest of what is represented as the ideal open market and the truly open society, look very familiar in retrospect.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 14.

    [177] The contemporary avant-garde turns art into a ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ which protects the ideals of May ’68 from the corrupting influences of the contemporary world. Despite using digital technologies, this process of aestheticisation is a return to the traditional role of art as spiritual compensation for the sufferings of the material world. Lacking any belief in social revolution, ‘…the neo-avant-garde institutionalises the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely avant-gardiste intentions.’ Peter Bürger, The Avant-Garde, page 58.

    [178] Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, page 217.

    [179] See Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’; and Situationist International, ‘Response to a Questionnaire from the Centre for Socio-Experimental Art’.

    [180] The Situationists were reviving the demand for the abolition of specialisation in cultural production championed by many nineteenth century socialists: ‘In a communist society, there are no painters, but only people who engage in painting among other activities.’ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, page 418. For the origins of this attack on the division of labour, see Jonathan Beecher, Charles Fourier.

    [181] Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’, page 25.

    [182] The founding members of the Situationists were architects, painters and film-makers. According to Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord lived off money from his parents while Michèle Bernstein composed horse horoscopes for racing magazines. See Kristin Ross, ‘Lefebvre on the Situationists: an Interview’, page 70.

    [183] The growing popularity of the Situationists after the May ’68 revolution exacerbated the tension between their theory of mass participation and their practice of intellectual elitism until the movement finally imploded. See Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International; and Luther Blissett, Guy Debord is Really Dead.

    [184] The Situationists discovered the tribal gift economy in Marcel Mauss, The Gift. Even before forming the Situationists, Debord and other key members of the movement published an avant-garde art magazine called Potlatch. As its name suggests, this journal was given away for free. See Stewart Home, The Assault on Culture, page 20.

    [185] For instance, in their famous analysis of the 1965 Watts riots, the Situationists praised looting as the supersession of money-commodity relations by a revolutionary form of the gift economy: ‘…the Los Angeles blacks…want to possess immediately all the objects shown [to them by advertising] and abstractly accessible because they want to use them. That is why they reject their exchange-value, the commodity-reality which is their mould, their purpose and their ultimate goal, and which has preselected everything. Through theft and gift they rediscover a use that immediately refutes the oppressive rationality of the commodity, revealing its relations and manufacture to be arbitrary and unnecessary…instead of being eternally pursued in the rat race of alienated labour and increasing but unmet social needs, real desires begin to be expressed in festival, in playful self-assertion, in the potlatch of destruction.’ Situationist International, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’, page 155.

    [186] Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, page 70.

    [187] For the influence of Situationism on the initiators of the punk movement, see Fred Vermorel and Judy Vermorel, Sex Pistols, pages 220-225.

    [188] ”This is a chord,’ wrote the assemblers of Sideburns [a fanzine]…in December 1976, displaying an A, an E and a G: ‘Now form a band.’ Brilliant!’ Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming, pages 280-281.

    [189] For instance, this can be seen in the development of drum ‘n’ bass music. See Martin James, State of Bass.

    [190] For instance, see Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, pages 77-95.

    [191] Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, page 2.

    [192] ‘”Open systems” architecture [of the Net] by its very nature goes against the organisational imperatives of the Defence Department. The threat to this institution from the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons demanded precautions to protect its strategic secrets, its centralised command and control system, and its hierarchical organisation. Paradoxically, the only precaution that could be effective called for a nonhierarchical, decentralised, and essentially egalitarian system.’ Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, page 128.

    [193] Contrary to neo-liberal dogma, money-commodity relations are not always the most efficient way of organising collective production: ‘The rationality of professional services is not the same as the rationality of the market…In the professions, and especially in science, the abdication of moral control would disrupt the system. The producer of professional services must be…responsible for his products, and it is fitting that he not be alienated from them. The scientist, for example, must concerned with maintaining and correcting existing theories in his field, and his work must be orientated towards this goal. The exchange of recognition for gifts tends to maintain such orientations.’ Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’, page 29. Similarly, the donation of blood by volunteers is less wasteful and more healthy than paying for supplies. See Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship.

    [194] This is why the increasing role of private funding can hamper as well as help academic research. See David Noble, ‘Digital Diploma Mills’; and Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’.

    [195] See Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, pages 126-132.

    [196] Tim Berners-Lee, ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’, page 11.

    [197] See John Chesterman and Andy Lipman, The Electronic Pirates; and Matthew Collin with John Godrey, Altered State.

    [198] ‘The logic of digital technology leads us in a new direction [away from the concept of information as a commodity]. Objects, as well as ideas, are no longer fixed, no longer tangible. In cyberspace, there is no weight, no dimensions; structure is dynamic and changing; size is both infinite and immaterial. In this space, stories are written that change with each new reader; new material can be added, and old material can be deleted. Nothing is permanent.’ Neil Kleinman, ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology’, page 76.

    [199] See Marcel Marchand, The Minitel Saga.

    [200] Ted Nelson’s Xanadu project failed for social rather than technical reasons. Unlike the Net, his program was designed to protect intellectual property within cyberspace. For years, Nelson tried to promote his idiosyncratic tracking and payment system for enforcing copyright within computer-mediated communications. However, far from encouraging participation, copyright was a fundamental obstacle to collaboration between on-line users. See Gary Wolf, ‘The Curse of Xanadu’, pages 70-85, 112-113; and Theodor Nelson, ‘Transcopyright’. In contrast, Tim Berners-Lee was able to invent the Web because he didn’t need to include any methods for enforcing intellectual property. As a scientist funded by EU taxpayers, he was already working within the academic gift economy. The design criteria of the first version of the Web therefore included no provisions for copyright protection. See Tim Berners-Lee, ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’, pages 2-4.

    [201] As Mark Stahlman points out: ‘…people are not paying for information, very clearly, which is the substantial problem associated with the economics of the Web – we still haven’t a clue as to the successful business model.’ Mark Stahlman, ‘The Business Tech Interview’, page 4.

    [202] ‘In any new medium, one of the first successful areas of commerce is sex – stag films, X-rated video cassettes, 900 [premium-rate phone] calls. But the bad thing is that sex in a new medium initially sells so well that it sucks in the amateurs as well as the pros in large numbers… If you have a million customers and a hundred sites, you’ve got a thriving retail industry. But if you have a million customers and a hundred thousand sites, many sites are slated for going out of business sales.’ Gerard van der Leun, ‘Trouble in Pornutopia’, pages 1-2.

    [203] Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, page 10.

    [204] As bandwidth and computing power increases, it is becoming much easier to circulate copyrighted pop music within the hi-tech gift economy. See Andrew Leonard, ‘Mutiny on the Net’.

    [205] For instance, a review of the celebrated English hip-hop album Entroducing explains that: ‘[DJ Shadow] …samples wildstyle, stealing from vintage funk, progressive rock, kraut rock (Tangerine Dream etc), acid rock, punk rock (check the drumming on ‘Stem’) and heavy metal. He’ll take anything that’s got a reference, any sound that might mean something when you put it next to another sound, like words making up a sentence.’ Tony Marcus, ‘Shadowplay’, page 61.

    [206] A similar phenomenon can be seen in the growing popularity of listservers. This a form of Net publishing where a group of writers regularly distribute their work to subscribers over email. Most listservers also encourage subscribers to make their own contributions. Because organising a listserver is cheap and easy, any Net user can now potentially become a publisher. Crucially, almost all listservers are organised as gift economies: ‘What is exchanged on a list, where money rarely is the prime measure of success or failure? Ideas, time, and attention…are all part of a complex ecology in an environment remarkably separate from traditional markets… It’s a place where traditional [market] models lose their meaning and power comes not from wealth, but from thought… List publishing is a real example of our idealised picture of the Net as a place where all can speak and ideas flow freely.’ David Bennahum, ‘The Hot New Medium is … Email’, page 3.

    [207] Steve Elliot of Slug Oven quoted in Karlin Lillington, ‘No! It’s Not OK, Computer’, page 3.

    [208] For instance, one of the major components of the 1993 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was increased protection for patents and copyrights, especially with agriculture and medicine. See John Frow, ‘Information as Gift and Commodity’.

    [209] Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pages 57-58. As Mark Geise points out: …if given an opportunity, people will choose to communicate interactively with each other, rather than attend exclusively mass-mediated, one-to-many products as commercial interests might prefer.’ Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, page 139.

    [210] Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’, page 5.

    [211] Bernard Lang, ‘Free Software For All’, page 3.

    [212] Keith W. Porterfield, ‘Information Wants to be Valuable’, page 2.

    [213] Open source software is what was known in the past as freeware or shareware. All these names emphasise that the program is a gift to anyone on the Net, especially those who have the skills to improve its code. See Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’; The Free Software Foundation, ‘What is Free Software?’; and Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’.

    [214] Eric Raymond explains: ‘…like all hackers, my most fundamental motivation is that I want other hackers to think that I’m doing good work. And I want them to believe I’m effective and fruitful and a good designer and so forth.’ Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 4. According to the Free Software Foundation, work done for money and other material inducements is often less productive than the results of voluntary effort. See Alfie Kohn, ‘Studies Find Reward Often No Motivator’.

    [215] Eric Raymond points out that intellectual property is a major obstacle to technical efficiency: ‘The central problem in software engineering has always been reliability. Our reliability, in general, sucks. In other branches of engineering, what do you do to get high reliability? The answer is massive, independent peer review…you wouldn’t trust a major civil engineering design which hadn’t been peer reviewed, and you can’t trust software that hasn’t been peer reviewed either. But that can’t happen unless the source code is open.’ Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 5.

    [216] For instance, the spectacular special effects for James Cameron’s Titanic film were made on Linux machines rather than on those running Windows NT or any other commercial operating system. See Daryll Strauss, ‘Linux Helps Bring Titanic to Life’.

    [217] Eric C. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’, page 1. From the Seventies to the Nineties, shareware projects have steadily evolved from toys and demos through Net applications to the construction of this new operating system. The next stage will be the invention of ‘programs for non-techies’, such as applications for image manipulation. See Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, pages 14-15. At the same time, some ‘non-techies’ are now even inventing their own programs, such as the Web Stalker. See the I/O/D web site.

    [218] For instance, at Cyber.Salon 5 (Sub-Cyberia, London, 22nd April 1998), the pioneering digital artist Heath Bunting claimed that the Net could no longer facilitate social change – and that he was instead going to experiment with bio-technologies! For an analysis of this recent turn by the European avant-garde, see Geert Lovink, ‘Current Media Pragmatism’.

    [219] Some commentators believe that the Net provides the technological basis for the creation of a post-capitalist society. See Nuret Sen, InterNETed. Others believe that the Net must inevitably follow the path of commercialisation experienced in earlier forms of media. See Brian Winston, Media Technology and Society, pages 321-336.

    [220] See Netscape Communications Corporation, ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’. This pragmatic collaboration between hackers and entrepreneurs already exists within the Linux community. See Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, pages 1-3.

    [221] Eric Raymond describing his pitch on behalf of shareware to commercial software companies in Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 8.

    [222] As the ex-associate editor of the UK edition of Wired puts it: ‘…’anti-Statist’ is…’Anti top-down control’… I use ‘The State’ in sense largely derived from Deleuze and Guattari, as a cipher for any power structure which seeks to transcend the social field and channel matter and energy into its singularity, in order to perpetuate itself.’ Hari Kunzru, ‘Rewiring Technoculture’, page 10.

    [223] For a discussion of the possibility of imposing universal service provisions on broadband telecommunications networks within the EU. See Nicholas Garnham, ‘Regulatory Issues’. Government intervention will be particularly needed to extend Net access in developing countries. See Alain Gresh, ‘Et les Citoyens du Sud?’, page 17.

    [224] See Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pages 241-275.

    [225] Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 2. Despite the absence of any commodity exchange, Raymond has to describe the hi-tech gift economy as a ‘bazaar’ – or even as a ‘free market in egoboo’ (i.e. respect). See Eric C. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’. Similarly, Ghosh believes that gifts are being circulated within a ‘cooking pot market’ even though he realises that they’re not the same social phenomenon as commodities. See Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’. In both cases, the practice of anarcho-communism is made compatible with the ideology of neo-liberalism.

    [226] Not surprisingly, one of the most connected nations in 1998 is the USA with over a fifth of its population having access to the Net. One tenth are wired in Great Britain while other industrialised countries have slightly smaller proportions of their citizens on-line (with the notable exception of France where people have access to the Minitel system). See Alex Brummer, ‘Dash For Cash in the Online Marketplace’, page 21; and Marcel Marchand, The Minitel Saga. In addition, those who do use the Net in countries from the North are predominantly employed in good jobs and live in the more prosperous regions. For instance, one recent British survey in discovered that: ‘The typical [Net] user is an affluent working father, aged 35 or under, who lives in the South of England.’ Sarah Hall, ‘Britons Log Fears about Threat of Internet’, page 8. Not surprisingly, the proportion of the population with Net connections in South is negligible. See Alain Gresh, ‘Et les Citoyens du Sud?’

    [227] From McLuhan to the Tofflers, technological determinists have used these constant improvements in media, computing and telecommunications machinery to explain much wider social changes. Just like post-structuralism and mystical positivism, this approach also denies that people can consciously determine their own destinies. Feudal society is ended by the invention of the printing press. Fordism is perfected by the television set. Now a new civilisation is being created by the Net. In the writings of the technological determinists, the messy contingencies of human history are replaced by a procession of clean machines. See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; George Gilder, Life After Television; Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society; and many articles in Wired.

    [228] ‘…if effective demand [for commodities] is deficient, not only is the public scandal of wasted resources intolerable, but the individual entrepreneur who seeks to bring these resources into action is operating with the odds loaded against him.’ John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, pages 380-381. Also see Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved, pages 5-42; and Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation.

    [229] ‘A reduction in working hours will allow individuals to discover a new sense of security, a new distancing from the ‘necessities of life’ and a form of existential autonomy which will encourage them to demand…a social space in which they can engage in voluntary and self-organised activities.’ André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, page 101. Also see Paul Lafargue, The Right to be Lazy.

    [230] ‘The growth in consumption of goods represents a fundamental change in the nature of economic activity. Instead of capital investment taking place in industry, and industry providing services for individuals and households, increasingly, capital investment takes place in the household, leaving industry engaged in what is essentially intermediate production, making the capital goods – the cookers, freezers, televisions, motor cars – used in home production of the final product. This is the trend towards the do-it-yourself economy…’ Jonathan Gershuny, After Industrial Society, page 81. Also see André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, pages 153-169.

    [231] ‘Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods.’ Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, page 9.

    [232] ‘In our grandparents’ time, many reasonable people could foresee a radiant socialist future in which private property and capitalism had been abolished, and in which politics itself was somehow overcome. Today, by contrast, we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist… Other, less reflective ages also thought of themselves as the best, but we arrive at this conclusion exhausted … from the pursuit of alternatives we felt had to be better than [American] liberal democracy.’ Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, page 46.

    [233] The West Coast neo-liberals want to turn the Net into an electronic marketplace where information has to be bought and sold. Trying to explain away the predominance of the hi-tech gift economy, one prominent proponent of the Californian ideology claims that the free circulation of information is only the first stage in developing information goods and services. Over time, there is supposedly an inevitable evolution from the ‘inefficencies’ of the gift economy to the ‘commercial economy’s efficencies’. See Kevin Kelly, ‘New Rules for the New Economy’, page 190. Yet, his own erroneous price theory contradicts this assertion. According to neo-liberal economics, an efficent economic system will price commodities at the cost of producing the last item: ‘Only when prices of goods are equal to Marginal Costs is the economy squeezing from its scarce resources and limited technical knowledge the maximum of outputs.’ Paul Samuelson, Economics, page 462. Since the marginal cost of reproducing information is almost zero, the enforcement of prices within the Net would almost inevitably lead to a greater a waste of ‘scarce resources and…technical knowledge’ than giving away information. Even according to neo-liberal economic theory, the hi-tech gift economy must be operating closer to optimal efficency than the monopoly pricing found in the computer software industry!

    [234] Karl Marx, Grundrisse, page 700. According to nineteenth-century socialists, the regulation of economic activity through individual private property would eventually become obsolete as the productivity of collective labour steadily increases: ‘The mode of production is in rebellion against the mode of exchange, the productive forces are in rebellion against the mode of production which they have outgrown.’ Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, page 327.

    [235] ‘The division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom… It is the necessary…consequence of a certain propensity in human nature…to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another.’ Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, page 117. For a more developed analysis of this interconnection, see Isaak Illich Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value.

    [236] Even before May ’68, Michel Foucault had unfavourably contrasted the rational discipline imposed by work with the libidinal idleness enjoyed by the insane. See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, pages 38-64. Later in the Seventies, the ‘refusal of work’ became one of the principle slogans of the Italian Autonomist movement. While the parliamentary Left still demanded the right to work for everyone, the New Left instead denounced the oppressive discipline imposed in the factories and offices. The Autonomists therefore advocated that people should either disrupt production or avoid employment altogether. See Toni Negri, ‘Capitalist Domination and Working Class Sabotage’. This theoretical turn with the Italian ultra-left reflected the Autonomist movement’s abandonment of labour struggles in favour of organising social movements. See Steve Wright, ‘Negri’s Class Analysis’. Despite certain philosophical incongruities, a common hatred of the ‘workerist’ policies of the mainstream Left later enabled Negri to collaborate with Guattari in a fundamentalist restatement of New Left politics. See Félix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us.

    [237] Inspired by the sacred texts, the Deleuzoguattarians have resurrected the ‘refusal of work’ as an integral part of their nostalgia for May ’68. For instance, in 1997, nettime declared that: ‘We are…rejecting make‑work schemes… Participate in the nettime retirement plan, zero work by age 40.’ As this call for the ‘refusal of work’ was inherently aristocratic, it is not surprising that one of the signatories of this manifesto was the high priest of Nietzschean anarcho-fascism: Hakim Bey. See nettime, ‘The Piran Nettime Manifesto’.
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    [238] ‘Despite the fact that their philosophical work represents an intense movement of destratification, Deleuze and Guattari seem to have preserved their own stratum, Marxism… They retain the concept of…’capitalist system’ defined in a top-down way… It seems to me that it would be useful to push their own line of flight even further, abandoning molar concepts and dealing exclusively with multiplicities…’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, page 331.

    [239] In order to obscure the New Left origins of Deleuzoguattarian discourse, this heresy emphasises the mystical positivism found within the sacred texts: ‘…igneous rocks, ecosystems, and markets are self-consistent aggregates, the result of the coming together and interlocking of heterogeneous elements.’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, pages 66. Hidden under a smokescreen of pseudo-science, Deleuze and Guattari’s anarcho-communism can then be transmuted into classical liberalism. For instance, De Landa distinguishes between the emancipatory effects of rhizomic ‘markets’ (happy peasants buying and selling to each other) as opposed to the oppressive disciplines imposed by arboreal ‘anti-markets’ (militarised labour working in factories and other large institutions). By disaggregating society into multiple flows, De Landa is able to ignore the complete interdependence between the sphere of circulation and the sphere of production. The flow of multiplicities has effectively disguised the most obvious features of contemporary capitalism. See Manuel De Landa, ‘Markets, Antimarkets and Network Economics’. A diluted – and less anti-statist – version of this Deleuzoguattarian analysis is now entering mainstream sociology. For instance, Manuel Castells claims that ‘…society is constructed around flows: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organisational interaction, flows of images, sounds and symbols. Flows are not just one element of the social organisation: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life.’ Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society, pages 411-412.

    [240] ‘…the global economy…[is]…an an assemblage, a cluster…of systems…a vast jumble of processes, actions and decisions, which effect each other in unimaginably..complex ways. …A control system predicated on top-down control is simply not equipped to deal with this speed and complexity, even if it employs computers. The speed will, quite literally, shake such a system apart. The Nation-State…is collapsing.’ Hari Kunzru, ‘Rewiring Technoculture’, page 8.

    [241] Just as the Californian ideologues romanticise the liberal freedoms of the Old South, De Landa also uses Deleuzoguattarian discourse to apologise for earlier forms of aristocratic rule. For instance, he claims that the loss of their land and freedom by the East European peasantry during the proto-industrial period was: ‘…not step down the ladder of progress, but rather a lateral move to a stable state (a stable surplus-extraction strategy) that had been latent in…the dynamical system all the time.’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, page 156. At the time, this semiotic reorganisation in the ‘flow of biomass’ really meant that the peasant who had become a serf was compelled into ‘…devoting a large part of the week to forced labour on the lord’s land, or its equivalent in other obligations. His unfreedom might be so great as to be barely distinguishable from chattel slavery…he could be sold separately from the land.’ E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, page 27.

    [242] For pessimistic interpretations of this process, see Herbert Schiller, ‘The Global Information Highway’; Brian Winston, Media Technology and Society; and James Beniger, ‘Who Shall Control Cyberspace?’.

    [243] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, page 104. All activities on the Net involve work. For instance, ‘…the post [to a newsgroup] – any post, even “junk” and the rudest of “flames” – is a product…’ Therefore ‘…in a knowledge economy, it is reasonable to treat all forms of knowledge – with the broadest possible definition – as economic goods.’ Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, page 2. Even if the content of an item remains the same, the methods of working used for its production can change depending upon socio-historical circumstances: ‘Milton produced Paradise Lost as a silkworm produces silk, as the activity of his own nature. He later sold his product for £5 and thus became a merchant.’ Karl Marx, Capital, page 1044.

    [244] Wired uses ‘The New Economy’ as a synonym for its neo-liberal fantasies about the Net. See Kevin Kelly, ‘New Rules for the New Economy’.

    [245] ‘…to the worker, who appropriates nature through his labour, appropriation [of his labour time] appears as estrangement, self-activity as activity for another and of another, vitality as the sacrifice of life, production of an object as loss of that object to an alien power, to an alien man.’ Karl Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, page 334.

    [246] Being post-modernists, it is difficult for them to realise that: ‘…modernity [could] be the era of irony…’ Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, page 45.

    [247] Far from replacing commodity exchange, the sharing of gifts is now intertwined with commercial activities. This integration of the gift economy with contemporary capitalism parallels the earlier recuperation of economic intervention by the state. During 1848 revolution, strong government action to end unemployment and alleviate poverty was only advocated by a left-wing minority. By 1948, such measures were being applied by even conservative administrations. However, during those hundred years, state intervention had evolved from being the symbol of total social transformation to becoming the reality of partial economic reforms. Instead of abolishing money-commodity relations, the continued growth of the commercial sector depended upon government fiscal and industrial policies. See William Sewell, Work and Revolution in France, pages 243-276; and Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved, pages 5-42. In a similar fashion, what was revolutionary in the Sixties has been realised in a compromised form in the Nineties. Above all, the hi-tech gift economy can only exist in symbiosis with digital capitalism. Anarcho-communism is flourishing, but not in ways envisaged by its New Left founders.

    [248] Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’, page 16.

    [249] ‘In the raw, natural, given World, the Slave is slave of the Master. In the technical World transformed by his work, he rules – or, at least, will one day rule – as absolute Master.’ Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 23. Also see Georg Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pages 111-119; and Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, pages 174-177.

    [250] ‘Work-for-oneself is…what we have to do to take possession of ourselves and of that arrangement of objects which, as both extensions of ourselves and mirror of our bodily existence, forms our niche within the sensory world, our private sphere.’ André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, page 158.

    [251] Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 159.

    [252] ‘If he is truly self-conscious, Man who has created a technical World knows that he can live in it only by living in it (also) as a worker. That is why Man can want to continue working even after ceasing to be a Slave: he can become a free Worker. Actually, Work is born from the Desire for Recognition…and it preserves itself and evolves in relation to this same Desire.’ Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 230

    [253] After centuries of wars, revolutions and social struggles, ‘History…ends in the coming of the satisfied Citizen and the Wise Man.’ Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 243.

    [254] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, page 204.

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    Peter Lamborn Wilson [Hakim Bey], ‘A Network of Castles’, ZKP 4, nettime, Ljubljana 1997.

    Brian Winston, Media Technology and Society, Routledge, London 1998

    Gary Wolf, ‘The Curse of Xanadu’, Wired UK, June 1995

    Steve Wright, ‘Negri’s Class Analysis: Italian Autonomist Theory in the Seventies’, Reconstruction, Winter/Spring 1996.

    WWW Resources for Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

  • THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MEDIA FREEDOM by Richard Barbrook

    Nowadays, almost everybody believes that the freedom of the media is an essential prerequisite of a modern democracy. Yet, at the same time, many people are also convinced that the media are turning democratic politics into a branch of show business. Instead of rational debate between rival ideas, contemporary politics have been trivialised into a series of soundbites and photo opportunities for couch potatoes watching the television news bulletins. Yet, for the Enlightenment philosophers, the struggle for media freedom was fought to create the conditions for the participation of the common people in democratic politics. In their view, citizens of a democratic republic had to decide the issues of the day amongst themselves through public debate, including in print. In the late eighteenth centuries, this participative form of media freedom was put into practice. With the help of a few assistants, revolutionary heroes such as Franklin or Marat were able to print their own publications on their own printing presses. Although the philosophers usually defended media freedom with political or moral arguments, the exercise of this fundamental right was made possible by the widespread ownership of cheap wooden printing presses.

    Despite its libertarian claims, this classical liberal form of media freedom was in reality restricted to a minority of male property owners. With artisanal printing methods, only a limited number of expensive copies of any publication could be produced. However, with the industrialisation of printing, economies of scale allowed printed material to become cheap enough for almost everyone to purchase. When the new electronic media were introduced, the productivity of information production became so great that radio and television broadcasting could be paid for by subsidies from advertisers or the state and provided free to their audiences. But, although the industrialisation of the media made available prodigious quantities of information and entertainment to the public, the end of artisanal methods of production also closed off the possibility of popular participation in the media. Thus neither the direct producers nor their audiences could directly control the output of the media. Instead, its content was determined by the management hierarchies of collective institutions, such as joint stock companies, banks, political parties or the state. As a consequence, the definition of media freedom was fundamentally transformed. While still paying homage to the ideal of active citizens propagating their own thoughts, media freedom was increasingly defined as the representation of actual or supposed views of the audience. Between the Left and Right, there were bitter arguments over what was the correct form of this representation. For some, the interests of the audience were best served by the media being unbiased and truthful in its reporting. For others, the media had to serve the future interests of the people by disseminating revolutionary ideas. According to some, market competition for audiences would make the media respond to the wishes of the public. Despite their real differences, all these political positions assumed the same thing: the complete passivity of the audience. Although almost everyone could receive the output of the media, most people weren’t able to use the media to express their own views. Instead of being actors within the political process, they were only spectators of the pronouncements of professional politicians and media pundits.

    Over the past twenty years, the introduction of new information technologies has intensified this centralisation of the media. For example, using satellites, media corporations are now building worldwide television news services, such as CNN or BBC’s WSTV. Although these new channels can benefit from economies of scale on a global scale, the rise of the multinational media corporations has exacerbated the growing crisis of representation within national politics. Just as the power of the world market restricts the autonomy of national democratic decision making, so the global news media can also escape from any form of influence outside the cash nexus, such as regulations for balance and objectivity. Yet the increasing productivity of the media hasn’t only created the conditions for spectacle politics on a global scale. Over the past thirty years, the spread of new technologies has also encouraged the reemergence of self produced media, such as alternative magazines, community radio stations, access cable television channels and electronic mail systems. Unlike the artisanal methods of eighteenth century printing, the modern access media are centred on collective forms of working and have the potentiality for mass distribution of their output. For example, in the cyberspace of the e mail systems, a single global network is slowly being constructed out of a network of contributors and bulletin boards which even surpasses the centralisation carried out by the most ambitious media multinationals. In recent years, the community media has become an effective source of alternative information to the soundbite politics provided by the media corporations, as during the Gulf war. Even more importantly, this form of media has also partially realised the traditional interpretation of media freedom. But, instead of being restricted to a minority of male property owners, the community media are used by all sections of society as a means of expression, including marginalised groups. According to the visionaries of community media, all citizens will be able to exercise their right to participate directly in political debates within an electronic agora. Only then will the contradictions of media freedom be finally resolved.

  • MEDIA FREEDOM: FROM GUTENBERG TO CYBERSPACE by Richard Barbrook

    Introduction

    Nowadays, almost everybody believes that media freedom is an essential prerequisite of a modern democracy. When an authoritarian regime is overthrown, the first act of the new democratic government is usually the abandonment of direct controls by the state over the media. With the worldwide spread of political democracy, credible politicians can no longer advocate muzzling the media in the name of some higher social goal, such as the defence of the national interest or the liberation of the dispossessed. On contrary, voters rely on the unshackled media to expose the abuses of those with power and wealth. Cynical of the self interest of their rulers, they believe that the media are often the most effective defenders of their democratic rights.

    At the same time, many people are also convinced that the dominance of the media over our societies is slowly destroying democratic politics. Within all industrialised democracies, most citizens feel increasingly powerless to influence political decision making. By turning political conflicts into a branch of show business, the media are often blamed for exacerbating this crisis of representation. For many voters, their feelings of exclusion from the political process are confirmed by the nightly spectacle of self obsessed arguments between professional politicians on the television news bulletins about matters unconnected with the concerns of ordinary people. Instead of providing an opportunity for rational debate between rival ideologies, the media are accused of having transformed contemporary politics into a series of spurious quarrels, mindless soundbites and trivial photo opportunities.

    Yet, the bitter struggles to win freedom for the media weren’t fought to provide an arcane spectator sport for political couch potatoes. For the revolutionary heroes of the past, the fight to abolish censorship and other restrictions was necessary to allow ordinary people to produce their own media. In their view, the involvement of citizens within the media was an integral part of popular participation in democratic politics. Our contemporary unease about the role of the media derives from the contradiction between the rhetoric of the past and reality of the present. In theory, media freedom is needed so that everyone can participate as citizens of a political democracy. However, in practice, the winning of freedom for the media has actually turned most people into spectators of the political process. This pamphlet explores and explains the history of this contradiction within the concept of media freedom. For, if we can understand how we arrived at our current predicament, we can also discover how to resolve the contradictions of media freedom in the interests of the majority of the population.

    Societies Without Media

    There can be no modernity without the media; there can be no media without modernity. Because the media are so pervasive and omnipresent in our contemporary world, it is easy for us to forget that the media are a very recent invention. For the majority of our existence as a species, human beings have lived without any need for newspapers, radio or television. In nomadic tribes, peasant villages or small towns, human societies were organised around groups of extended families. Within their own little worlds, people lived their daily lives isolated from everyone but their immediate neighbours. Although people did move between different places, each human community developed its own specific hierarchies, myths, rituals and languages. Because the lives of nomads, peasants or town dwellers unfolded within limited geographical areas, people directly communicated with one another through words, music or images. In the immediate reality of the present, our ancestors needed either no tools or only the most rudimentary equipment for face to face discussions and live entertainment.

    In this oral culture, the recording of events was hardly known. The history of families, communities or tribes would be recounted in highly romanticised versions by poets and storytellers. But, for the most part, the experience of past generations was passed on directly to young people through working alongside or listening to their elders. The skills of herders, peasants or artisans were never learnt from a textbook. Within these enclosed little worlds, politics was carried out at the level of the tribe, village or town. For most of history, human societies have been controlled by hierarchies derived from the extended family, with power vested in a single patriarch. However this tyranny was sometimes checked by the ordinary people. For example, in classical Athens or medieval Switzerland, the arbitrary authority of monarchs and priests was replaced by the agora, which was the public meeting of the male members of a community. Even in this restricted form, direct democracy was only made possible by the limited geographical area of classical Greek towns or medieval Swiss villages. Because every male citizen could meet in one place for face to face discussions, it was practical to have popular participation in political decision making. Crucially, when all citizens attended the agora in person, there was no need for a mass media to report and comment on the political process.

    While various kingdoms rose and fell, tribal, rural and urban societies continued largely unchanged. Sometimes, after being destroyed in a civil war or foreign invasion, an individual community would disappear. But, for the most part, the great events of history didn’t intrude into the personal lives of ordinary people. Self sufficient within their own communities, they could ignore the tumults of dynastic and religious disputes. However they couldn’t escape from these hierarchies altogether. Both monarchs and priests lived off the systematic expropriation of part of the livestock, crops or money of the people through taxes, rents and tithes. In return, dynastic and religious leaders offered protection from earthly and divine threats to the community. For this task, they created a caste of loyal bureaucrats and priests, who could impose the same social and religious order across many different local communities. Unlike the mass of the population, these servants of the crown and the church needed to communicate across space and time. For their work, it was necessary to record and remember events in writing.

    In the pre modern world, most people couldn’t even read and write. In addition, the holy book, religious commentaries and legal texts were often written in a sacred language which was incomprehensible to the mass of the population. By making legal and sacred knowledge inaccessible to ordinary people, monarchs and prelates asserted their claim to divine authority over many different local communities. In contrast to the public meetings of the agora, the conduct of public affairs was transformed into the private concern of kings and priests. Because monarchical and sacred power was derived from God, there could be no open discussion of the policies of the king by his subjects or matters of religious controversy by believers. Crucially, with the public excluded from political and religious debates, there was no need for the media within this divinely ordained order. For example, even propaganda praising royal decisions was condemned for undermining the power of the absolute monarchy by exposing the reasons for the arbitrary decisions of the king. Not surprisingly, when the first printing presses were developed, both monarchy and church were immediately hostile to the new technology. Frightened of the spread of knowledge outside the chosen few, kings and prelates restricted the ownership of printing presses to their most reliable followers and strictly censored the publications printed. Thus, from the beginning, the use of the media by ordinary people was vigorously resisted by those with political and religious power.

    The Republic of Letters

    The origins of the mass media are inextricably linked with the beginning of social and economic modernisation in Europe. The emergence of the media wasn’t simply the result of the development of innovative techniques of working or the invention of new forms of technology. Long before the end of the medieval period, the principles of printing and the printing press had been known in China without causing a social upheaval. In contrast, the first experiments of the Gutenberg printers had a dramatic impact in Europe because of wider political and economic changes occurring within the continent. Under the divine rule of kings and priests, the public hadn’t been allowed to discuss political or religious controversies. But, when the struggle for democratic liberties started, the demand for media freedom could be articulated for the first time. Above all else, the early radicals championed the rights of individuals to print their own views without interference from the monarchy or the church.

    During the early modern period, the need for the protection of the rights of individuals had been created by the spread of the money economy. In medieval Europe, the countryside was organised as a patchwork of landed estates held together by familial relationships. But, over time, this feudal system slowly started to disintegrate with the emergence of capitalism. At the centre of this social change, there was a profound transformation in the nature of property. Instead of being enmeshed within familial relationships, land and other goods were turned into commodities: the absolute and unconditional property of specific individuals. In turn, the growth in individual ownership of property paralleled the dominance of the money economy over social production. As more and more necessities were produced only for exchange, so society itself became constructed through money. As the influence of the extended family declined, so the social division of labour was created through commodity exchanges. Therefore, with the demise of feudal social relations, atomised individuals increasingly satisfied their collective needs through the spontaneous and reciprocal interconnections created by market competition. As daily life became organised through the market, information about economic and political changes from outside the enclosed world of the village or town was needed to foresee the future movement of prices and the supply of commodities. For the first time, the ordinary people needed to communicate across space and time in their everyday activities. In early modern Europe, the pioneers of the media were ready to fulfill this new social need by reporting important political and economic events in their newspapers and journals.

    The media weren’t only developed to facilitate the functioning of the new economic system. Crucially, the development of the media was also closely connected with the emergence of political democracy on a national scale. Under feudalism, private wealth and political power were simultaneously combined in the hands of the monarchy and aristocracy. In contrast, in early capitalism, a clear separation between the private world of individual property owners and the public sphere of the constitutional state was established. Over time, individual private ownership slowly became the only legitimate form of property. The abolition of feudal property relations created a dialectical separation between the private and public spheres of human existence. On the one hand, the social production of necessities was increasingly privatised by the individual property owners. On the other hand, the rise in individual commodity production undermined the private control of the state by the absolute monarch.

    When social production was organised through market competition, an impartial legal framework was needed to regulate the monetary relations between individuals. In everyday circumstances, isolated producers were linked together in civil society by an endless series of reciprocal business deals. But, when there were disputes, the state had to act as the impersonal interest of the system by arbitrating between litigants through the legal system. By turning the state into an impartial umpire of civil society, political power could no longer be directly connected with the economic relationships between individuals. Instead the dominance of some individuals over others was established through the impersonal relations of exchange, which were backed by the impartial sanctions of the law. Thus the laws of the constitutional state had two dialectical purposes. On the one hand, the legal system defended private autonomy by protecting individual rights, including from arbitrary actions of the state. On the other hand, the law also punished individuals for damaging the interests of the state, which protected the interests of civil society as a whole. The creation of the constitutional state was designed to regulate this separation between the private sphere of individuals in civil society and the public sphere of citizens of the republic. Under the rule of law, the constitutional state became the expression of the private interests of the atomised individuals within civil society in a public form.

    According to the bourgeois revolutionaries, a constitutional state could only be established by the participation of individual property owners within political decision making. In their view, each individual was not only an egotistical, self sufficient property owner, but also a moral, social citizen. In the early modern period, critics of the absolute monarchy created their own meeting places for public discussions of political issues, such as cafés, freemasons’ lodges and salons. Rejecting the hierarchical world of the court, individuals debated as democratic equals within these institutions. By using their reason, the revolutionaries tried to find solutions to their collective problems. Inspired by the classical Greek cities and medieval Swiss villages, Jean Jacques Rousseau claimed that this form of direct democracy should be used to run the constitutional state. In face to face debates in an agora, the individual members of civil society would discover the ‘general will’, which expressed their collective interests. But, in practice, it was impossible to apply the direct democracy of a village or small town to the emerging nation states, such as Britain, France or the USA. Because of their size, political decisions couldn’t be taken by a public meeting of all citizens. As a consequence, Tom Paine and other revolutionaries advocated the creation of a representative democracy. In their view, the ‘general will’ of a large country could be formed by the representatives of local particular interests discovering their common interests in parliamentary debates. Instead of personally attending the agora, individual members of civil society would participate in political decision making by electing representatives to express their views in a parliament.

    With the establishment of representative democracy, media freedom became an essential element in the creation of a constitutional state. Because of physical limitations, every citizen couldn’t personally take part in the discussions of the legislature in the capital city. But, in their debates in parliament, the politicians were guided by public opinion, which reflected the views of the voters. Crucially, citizens could communicate their opinions to their representatives in the legislature by publishing their own newspapers and books. Thus, although the holding of a national agora was physically impossible, two way communications was created between politicians and citizens using the printed word. Despite being dispersed across the country, citizens simultaneously expressed their views through their elected members of parliament and through their own publications. Therefore, as a right of citizens, the freedom of communications was an integral part of the formation of the ‘general will’ of the nation. According to the revolutionaries, individual citizens directly shaped the policies of the state by engaging in reasoned debates over political issues in print.

    Because the written text overcame the physical limitations of face to face discussions, media freedom was vitally necessary to allow the participation of all citizens within political decision making. Therefore one of the first tasks of the bourgeois revolutions was the abolition of censorship and other restrictions on the media imposed by the absolute monarchy. Instead, in bills of rights and republican constitutions, the media were promised their freedom from direct government interference. Under the rule of law, newspapers and book sellers could now print almost anything without the need for prior authorisation. As with other constitutional rights, the absolute freedom of the media was only restricted by the need to protect the rights of other citizens, such as the laws against libel and slander, or to defend the interests of society as a whole, such as the laws against sedition or treason. Even when these laws were defied, the state still encountered great difficulties in punishing miscreant publishers. Because of the need for due legal process, many governments discovered that the bad publicity of court trials often outweighed the benefits of punishing those who broke the law. Except in the most extreme cases, the media had won almost complete freedom from controls over the content of its publications.

    By the late eighteenth century, this participatory form of media freedom had been put into practice. Because hand operated wooden presses were cheap to buy or hire, individual citizens could print their own publications on their own printing presses. During the early modern period, revolutionary heroes such as
    Benjamin Franklin or Jean Paul Marat earned their living by selling their own pamphlets and newspapers to their followers. Not surprisingly, these revolutionaries had a personal interest in preventing any reimposition of censorship and vigorously supported legal guarantees for the freedom of the press. Because they were both journalists and printers, these radicals believed that their political right of the freedom of communications was made possible through their economic right to own their own printing presses as private property. At this moment in history, media freedom was assured by the unity of the social citizen and the private property owner in one person, who was simultaneously a journalist and a printer. Thus radicals not only sold their publications to their fellow citizens as commodities, but also shaped the policies of parliament by their arguments in print. Just as trade and commerce bound together civil society, so competing newspapers and book sellers contributed to the creation of the ‘general will’ of all citizens. In the same way as the division of labour between individuals produced social wealth, so the printing of publications with different viewpoints created a common political culture. The ideological rivalry between different journalist printers was underpinned by a common consensus to respect the economic laws of bourgeois society.

    After the triumph of the bourgeois revolutions, censorship and other restrictions by the monarchy and church were swept away. Instead individual citizens could directly participate in political decision making by publishing their own newspapers or books. Through their reasoned debates over political issues in print, the atomised citizens directly influenced the policies of the state. Thus the views of individuals were not only indirectly represented in the legislature, but also directly expressed in print. As moral citizens, individuals possessed the right of media freedom to shape the policies of the republic. But this political right could only be exercised through the private ownership of printing presses, which derived from their economic rights as members of civil society. By seizing the land of aristocrats or indigenous peoples, citizens in France and the USA temporarily realised this revolutionary aspiration, which was reflected in the legal protection of media freedom in these countries. Yet, even with the widespread ownership of private property, the female majority of the population was still excluded from exercising many of the rights of citizens, including media freedom. According to the bourgeois revolutionaries, the participation of men in the public sphere of the constitutional state depended upon women looking after the children in the private sphere of the household. Thus, although everyone had the formal right to take part in two way communications, only male property owners possessed the means to exercise media freedom in practice. In the republic of property owners, the exercise of media freedom was confined to male members of the bourgeoisie.

    The Industrialisation of the Media

    After decades of struggle, the bourgeois revolutionaries had finally abolished censorship and other restrictions on the press in western Europe and north America. Yet, at the very moment of victory, the ability of male citizens to exercise this media freedom was being fatally undermined by the continued modernisation of the economy. Responding to market competition, entrepreneurs started expanding production by hiring wage workers and introducing new types of machinery. After successive restructurings, innovative capitalists discovered Fordism: the mass production of commodities using semi skilled workers on assembly lines. In turn, the resulting expansion in the number of workers created the consumers for the commodities produced on the assembly lines. Crucially, the successful introduction of Fordism changed the form of property ownership within bourgeois societies. Because of the increased amount of investment needed for mass production, most individuals no longer possessed enough capital to fund their enterprises from their own resources. Instead, individuals had to come together to form collective forms of capital ownership, such as joint stock companies and bank investments. Moreover, as Fordism spread, the production of commodities by individual property owners was increasingly marginalised. Therefore, increasing numbers of individual property owners were forced to join the propertyless working class. With the development of Fordism, the individual owners of private property were gradually separated into a minority of shareholders of joint stock companies and a majority of wage workers.

    Because of the peculiarities of information production, media companies were among the pioneers of Fordism. When a newspaper was published, the majority of the costs of production were incurred in the creation of the first copy of a print run by its journalists and printers. However, unlike other Fordist industries, the owners of newspapers weren’t able to use machinery to replace expensive skilled workers with cheaper semi skilled assembly line operators. Instead they employed the new technologies to displace the costs of their skilled workers through the repeated reproduction of the products of their labour. Because of the dramatic increase in the productivity of media labour, the price of each individual newspaper fell rapidly as further copies were printed. During the bourgeois revolutions, the artisan methods of printing ensured that most publications were too expensive to be purchased by the rural and urban poor. For the first time, after the rapid fall in price caused by the economies of scale of industrialised publishing, almost everyone could afford to buy a copy of a newspaper.

    As in any other sector, the industrialisation of newspaper production involved the simultaneous mechanisation of production and proletarianisation of the direct producers. During the late eighteenth century, individual journalist printers had produced their own newspapers on simple wooden printing presses. But, with the advent of Fordism, newspapers could only be created by the collective labour of large numbers of wage-workers on mechanised presses. Because of this scale of production needed large investments of capital, single individuals could no longer afford to publish their own newspapers. Instead, joint stock companies and large banks took control of the new mass circulation newspapers. Crucially, the industrialisation of publishing didn’t only prevent most individual citizens from expressing their own opinions in print. As mere employees, journalists and printers were only allowed to reproduce views acceptable to their employers within the Fordist media.

    The Fordist organisation of information production was enhanced by the advent of the electronic media. Although originally developed as a new type of point to point communications, amateur experimenters soon discovered that radio communications could also be used to create a new form of media. Within the small world of engineers, radio broadcasting was initially developed as an electronic version of the eighteenth century press. Because everyone owned a transmitter, the broadcaster engineers could simultaneously produce and receive radio programmes. Like the journalist printers of the bourgeois revolutions, each individual could directly exercise their right of freedom of communications over the airwaves. But, this electronic agora did not last long. Using mass production techniques, radio set manufacturers soon started producing simple receivers as consumer commodities. Under Fordism, most individuals could only be listeners.

    In the 1920s, the radio set manufacturing companies were at the leading edge of the second industrial revolution of electronic technologies, which was transforming the economies of the major capitalist countries. The application of scientific advances in production was encouraged by the adoption of the techniques of Fordism. By using Taylorist labour discipline and assembly lines, manufacturers were able to lower the price of radio receivers until almost everyone could afford a set. As in other sectors, the radio receiver was turned into a mass consumption commodity by the dramatic increase in the productivity of labour and capital achieved by the new methods of Fordism. At the same time, the successful adoption of Fordism by radio set manufacturers encouraged companies in other sectors to reorganise their methods of production. In turn, this process transformed more individual private property owners into wage workers, which created more consumers for mass consumption commodities.

    The mass ownership of radio sets formed the basis for the Fordist organisation of radio broadcasting. The industrialization of publishing had been encouraged by the rapid obsolescence of the political news printed by daily newspapers. The advantages of economies of scale in media production were intensified in radio broadcasting. In this new technology, the transmission of music and speech over the airwaves simultaneously produced and distributed the same programme to many different receivers. Instead of printing many individual copies, a radio station broadcast a continuous flow of instantly obsolete programmes. This technical attribute of broadcasting encouraged the industrialisation of programme making by radio stations. With many hours of airtime to fill, radio stations needed paid workers to create a constant flow of programmes for their listeners. As in newspaper publishing, the high costs of employing skilled media workers were displaced by transmitting the same radio programme to many different listeners. Like the mass circulation newspapers, radio stations needed the maximum possible audience for each programme to increase their economies of scale.

    During the bourgeois revolutions, individual journalist printers had both created and owned their own newspapers. Because printing presses were cheap, all citizens could express their own views in print. In the early 1920s, the broadcaster engineers had briefly recreated this two way form of communications over the airwaves. But, with the industrialisation of publishing and broadcasting, individual citizens could no longer directly exercise their right of freedom of speech in print or over the airwaves. This development reflected the changes caused by the spread of Fordism. Because of economies of scale, a clear division between the producers and consumers of the media had been created. In both newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting, large banks and joint stock companies employed paid workers to create information and entertainment for the audiences. Thus, although everyone could now receive the media, the majority of the population couldn’t participate within the production of the media. The Fordist development of the media had restricted the right of freedom of speech in print or over the airwaves to a minority of share holders. As a consequence, both media producers and consumers were prevented from freely expressing their own views. Thus, after industrialisation, there could be no form of two way communications within the media. Instead, there was a one way flow of information and entertainment from the mass circulation newspapers and radio stations. Under Fordism, most individuals could only be consumers of the media.

    The Nationalisation of the Media

    Although it was based upon active participation, the implementation of the eighteenth century model of media freedom was restricted. The journalist printers were only a minority of the population. The publications of the artisan presses were few in number and very expensive. The right of free speech in print couldn’t be exercised in practice by men without property and all women. Out in the countryside, most people couldn’t even read or write. In contrast, after the industrialisation of printing, the majority of the population had access to media products for the first time. Aided by the development of primary education, better transport and the postal services, the mass circulation newspapers soon created a nationwide readership for their publications. Because of industrialisation, individuals could now obtain large amounts of printed entertainment and information at cheap prices. However the greater availability of printed material could only be achieved through the exclusion of the majority of citizens from participation within the media. Because large amounts of capital were needed for industrial production, individual citizens could no longer express their own opinions in print. Within the electronic media, the disappearance of the right of freedom of communications for individuals even became embodied within the new technology. Except for a small number of station owners, the majority of the population could only buy radio receivers. Thus, in both newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting, there could only be a one way flow of communications in the Fordist media.

    Even though it was impossible for most individual citizens to own a printing press, the mass circulation newspapers still enjoyed the media freedom won by the journalist printers. Yet, despite the revolutionary origins of their immunity from state control, the industrialised media quickly abandoned any connection with left wing politics. Under the control of joint stock companies and banks, the mass circulation newspapers were unsympathetic to the emerging socialist movements. In order to win a large readership with a low cover price, these publications relied upon advertising from capitalist businesses and bribes from corrupt politicians. As a consequence, the mass circulation newspapers either promulgated right wing politics or printed only scandal and trivia. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some owners of popular newspapers used their publications to campaign for imperialist foreign adventures and against progressive social policies. For example, the American mass circulation newspapers helped to provoke a war with Spain and the British press denounced any concessions to the trade unions. When radio broadcasting was developed, the new electronic medium was even more dependent upon those with power and wealth. Unable to sell their programmes directly to listeners for technical reasons, commercial radio stations could only fund themselves with revenue from advertising. In the USA, the most popular radio network was owned by a cartel of receiver manufacturers and financed by the leading Wall Street bank. Not surprisingly, the majority of its programmes were devoted to promoting the products of its advertisers and airtime was only available to right wing politicians.

    Because the output of the industrialised media was dominated by advertising and conservative politics, left wing activists soon became disillusioned with the model of media freedom established by the bourgeois revolutionaries. Therefore, in its place, they tried to create a new form of media freedom, which would allow radical views to be expressed in print and over the airwaves. For the bourgeois revolutionaries, media freedom had been founded upon the absence of state controls and the private ownership of printing presses. In their view, the political right of freedom of communications rested upon the economic right of private property. In contrast, left wing politicians believed that the political right of free speech in the media for all citizens was being blocked by the economic right of private property exercised by the owners of mass circulation newspapers and commercial radio stations. Therefore they began advocating increased state controls and the end of private ownership within the media. According to some of the Left, the state had become the protector of democratic liberties, rather than its greatest enemy.

    Ironically, this demand for the nationalisation of the media was a consequence of the development of market competition between private property owners. As the traditional feudal hierarchies collapsed, the state emerged as the defender of the collective interests of the atomised individuals within civil society. Externally, the state protected the people from incursions by foreign enemies. After successive wars, individuals from various villages or towns were transformed into citizens of specific states, which were particular territorial spaces forming separate national markets. Internally, the state also protected the members of civil society by providing the legal framework for market competition. By becoming an impartial umpire in civil disputes, the state slowly developed its own institutional autonomy from the personality of the king. After the bourgeois revolutions, the deprivatisation of political power was accelerated. Under the post revolutionary constitutions, the state was controlled by elected representatives, who could make laws to protect the interests of all citizens from miscreant individuals. Thus, by combating both external and internal enemies, the state emerged as the collective expression of the public interest of the competing members of civil society. Enclosed within the boundaries of a specific state, the inhabitants of different villages and towns had been transformed into citizens of a single Nation People, with its own particular institutions, customs and language.

    According to left wing radicals, the collective equality of citizenship of the Nation People provided the antidote to the selfish privileges of the private property owners. In their view, the contradiction between political and economic rights could only be ended by the nationalisation of all private property. Then, as the embodiment of the ‘general will’, the state would guarantee a reasonable standard of living for all citizens in return for participation in work and political activities. However the radical statism of the early socialists was simply a logical conclusion of the growing autonomy of the state from civil society within contemporary capitalism. As the struggle for democracy was won, a distinct caste of professional politicians and administrators had emerged to administer political power. Because the citizens weren’t able to rule themselves in an agora, the collective needs of the individuals within civil society could only be fulfilled through the actions of the state. Over time, the autonomy of the state bureaucracy slowly increased, especially in periods of national emergency. In the name of protecting the interests of all citizens, the government was able to override the rights of particular individuals. Crucially, with a monopoly over the administration of political power, the politicians and bureaucrats could increasingly run the state in their own interests. Thus, far from guaranteeing the political rights of all citizens, the demand of the Left for the nationalisation of all private property would have completed the process of emancipation of the state from any form of popular control.

    The Totalitarian Media

    The contradiction between the democratisation and bureaucratisation of the state haunted the struggle for media freedom. During the 1789 99 French revolution, the Jacobins pioneered a new definition of the freedom of communications, which extended this right beyond the small number of journalist printers. Ironically, this more democratic form of media freedom was developed during a period of emergency rule, which had been imposed to fight against royalist uprisings and foreign invasions. According to the leaders of the Jacobins, the establishment of a dictatorship in the short term was needed to create the conditions for the foundation of a democratic republic in the long term. As a consequence, the rights of particular individuals could be justifiably violated by the state in the interests of the whole Nation people. Using this argument, the Jacobin government abolished the media freedom of the journalist printers and introduced tight state supervision over all newspapers and other publications. Although censorship had been tyrannical under the absolute monarchy, the republican government believed that the suppression of publications advocating the return of the old order was completely legitimate. As well as these restrictive measures, the Jacobins also used the media for the political and moral education of the people in republican values. In their view, the civil war had been primarily caused by the ignorance of the benefits of democracy among the population. Therefore, alongside the organisation of popular festivals and public education, the Jacobin government subsidised the dissemination of republican propaganda by newspapers and book publishers.

    After the overthrow of the Jacobin government, its supporters were convinced that the experience of these emergency measures had laid the basis for a completely new model of media freedom. According to Babeuf and other radical Jacobins, the freedom of communications for all citizens could only be achieved by the nationalisation of all printing presses. Although they would no longer possess the economic right to own a printing press, the citizens would be able to determine the opinions expressed in the newspapers and books published by the state by exercising their political right to vote for their own parliamentary representatives. Thus, instead of media freedom being restricted to a limited number of journalist printers, all citizens would indirectly have their views expressed in the state owned media by their elected government. However, this new form of media freedom anticipated the limitations of the Fordist media. In Babeuf’s utopia, citizens could only be consumers of the publications of the nationalised printing presses.

    Despite its democratic aspirations, this new form of media freedom was also restricted by the Jacobin belief in the need for a revolutionary dictatorship in the short term to create a democratic republic in the long term. During the 1848 French revolution, Blanqui and his Jacobin supporters called for all political power to be temporarily transferred into their own hands. According to these Jacobins, a revolutionary dictatorship was needed to educate the French people in the values of republicanism. Under the old order, the views of the majority of the population had been corrupted by false ideas, especially by reading newspapers owned by the bourgeoisie. As a consequence, they were incapable of electing a new government in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. Inspired by Babeuf, Blanqui and his followers advocated the nationalisation of all printing presses. Under Jacobin control, the state owned newspapers and book sellers would produce propaganda in favour of the construction of the new society. Thus, in Blanqui’s vision, the citizens would abdicate their media freedom to a temporary revolutionary dictatorship, which would determine the content of all newspapers and books in their long term interests. In the name of democracy, the media was to be controlled by a caste of unaccountable politicians and bureaucrats.

    Although Babeuf and Blanqui influenced revolutionary movements across Europe, these two radical Jacobins were never able to put their version of media freedom into practice. In contrast, after the 1917 revolution, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were able to implement the Jacobin model of media freedom within the Russian Empire. Inspired by Babeuf and Blanqui, Lenin claimed that the old order had ideologically corrupted Russian people, who were consequently incapable of deciding who should control the new republic. Therefore, in his view, a short term revolutionary dictatorship was needed to create the conditions for the establishment of participatory democracy in the long term. Crucially, the Bolshevik leader believed that the primary task of this dictatorship was the elimination of incorrect ideas among the Russian workers and peasants. Therefore, after their seizure of power, the Bolsheviks systematically suppressed all opposition newspapers, including those run by Marxists and anarchists. Alongside these repressive measures, they also greatly expanded their own media to indoctrinate the Russian people in their own ideology. During the early 1920s, the revolutionary dictatorship published national and local newspapers, established the first radio stations within Russia, created a national film industry, organised revolutionary festivals and distributed posters by radical artists. Following the advice of Blanqui, the Bolsheviks were determined to educate the population in the values of the new social order.

    According to the Bolsheviks, the contradiction between political and economic rights within the media had been resolved through the nationalisation of the media. In Lenin’s model of media freedom, the propertyless majority of the population abdicated their political right of media freedom to the minority of professional revolutionaries, who ran the nationalised newspapers and radio stations on their behalf. Crucially, the Bolsheviks derived their claim to absolute political power from their knowledge of the correct revolutionary ideology. Because they had been corrupted by the false ideas of the old order, the Russian workers and peasants were unable to express their long term interests through regular elections. As a consequence, the revolutionary conspiracy had to use the nationalised media for the education of the population in the correct ideas of the new society. Therefore the majority of the population was excluded from any direct or indirect participation within the media. At the same time, media workers were also prevented from expressing their own opinions in print or over the airwaves. In order to guarantee the ideologically correct content of the media, the Bolsheviks turned all journalists, printers, broadcasters and engineers into employees of the revolutionary state. Thus, by the early 1920s, Lenin and his followers had instituted a new definition of media freedom: the one way flow of propaganda from the ruling party to the population.

    Although it was supposed to be only temporary, the Bolshevik dictatorship soon became the permanent form of government of the Russian Empire. Under Stalin, the few remnants of democratic control over the executive were finally abolished. By the early 1930s, the dictator had created a fully totalitarian system of political rule, which completely dominated the lives of the Russian people. Although he relied on state terror to maintain his rule, Stalin also used the nationalised media to mobilise support for the policies of his regime, especially for the rapid industrialisation of the country. Impressed by the success of the Bolsheviks, revolutionaries from around the world imitated their methods of organisation, including their views on the role of the media. As in Russia, the media were used for the one way flow of ideology from the revolutionary conspiracy to the people. Thus, when the Bolsheviks set up the Communist International, the first condition of its membership was that all revolutionary newspapers and other media were to be placed under the complete control of the leaders of the local Bolshevik party.

    Although imitators of the Bolsheviks triumphed in some underdeveloped or colonised countries, the revival of radical Jacobinism encountered greater difficulties within states with democratic constitutions. Ironically, the extreme right opponents of the democratic republic applied the methods of the Bolsheviks with greater success than their left wing opponents. In both Italy and Germany, fascist parties overthrew democratic governments and established totalitarian dictatorships. While the local Bolsheviks had been supported by radical workers, these fascist parties mobilised the discontented members of the petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry, who were either afraid of losing their private property under the rule of the Left or hoped for jobs as functionaries of the new regime. According to the fascists, the ‘general will’ of the people couldn’t be created by democratic elections. Instead the atomised members of civil society needed to be united into a single Nation People by a totalitarian dictatorship under the control of a charismatic leader. By submitting to this leadership, the Nation People would be able to conquer its external and internal enemies, especially those associated with left wing ideas or from different ethnic groups.

    Not surprisingly, the fascists also believed that individuals had to abdicate their political right of media freedom to the charismatic leader of the ruling party, who would express their opinions for them in print or over the airwaves. After their seizure of power in 1933, the Nazis implemented their totalitarian plans for the media through the Ministry of Propaganda, which purged all opponents of the regime from the newspapers, radio stations and the cultural institutions. At the same time, the Ministry also organised the propagation of Nazi beliefs to the German population through the media and the arts. Above all else, the state controlled media disseminated the speeches of Hitler to the people. By listening together to the Nazi leader on the radio, the fascists believed that individual Germans would be transformed into a unified Nation People. As in Bolshevik Russia, the totalitarian organisation of the media in Nazi Germany ensured the complete autonomy of the newspapers and radio stations from any form of popular control.

    Fordism and the Public Service State

    The totalitarian states of Bolshevik Russia and Nazi Germany were the most dramatic examples of a fundamental change in the role of the state within the world economy. In 1914, the global trading system was torn apart by the outbreak of war between the great powers. As the fighting intensified, direct state intervention was needed to organise the production of munitions and other military supplies. In addition, welfare benefits had to be greatly expanded to relieve wartime poverty. Despite some relaxation of controls in the immediate post war period, the advent of the 1930s Depression finally discredited the liberal economic policies of minimal state interference and free market competition. Within the industrialised countries, the slump had been precipitated by the advent of Fordism. By reorganising their methods and technologies of production, companies had greatly increased the quantity of commodities available in the marketplace. However the spread of Fordism didn’t immediately lead to increased prosperity for ordinary people. Instead there was a global crisis of overproduction, which was caused by the lack of profitable markets for the output of the Fordist factories.

    In response, the state was forced to intervene within the economy to ensure that the rapid growth in production was synchronised with a parallel increase in consumption. Without rises in wages and more welfare spending, the expansion of production remained limited by the low living standards of the working class. Without controls over the banks, the bulk of personal savings wouldn’t be invested in industrial production. Under Fordism, the state could no longer simply provide the legal framework for market competition between independent producers. Instead, the state and the joint stock companies had to collaborate in the joint management of the national economy. By the late 1940s, an alliance of politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists had been created to introduce new economic policies, such as the creation of a welfare system, minimum wage laws and controls over the financial sector. Although private ownership remained dominant within western societies, both left wing and right wing governments increasingly used nationalisations and regulations to combat the collapse in production and to direct the modernisation of the economy. In the aftermath of the Second World War, every developed industrialized country depended upon concerted state intervention to create a virtuous circle of rising production and consumption.

    Within western Europe, interventionist economic policies were pioneered by the Socialist parties. In the late nineteenth century, these organisations had been founded by the followers of Marx within the working class movement. According to Marx, the winning of universal suffrage would inevitably lead to a social revolution, which would extend democracy into the workplace. But, by the late 1940s, the Socialist parties had abandoned this revolutionary goal. Instead they adopted their own version of Jacobinism, which was centred on the control of private property by the state. But, in contrast to their Bolshevik rivals, the Socialists rejected the need for a revolutionary dictatorship. Far from leading to the end of political rights, they believed that the nationalisation of private property was needed to protect the democratic republic from the authoritarian ambitions of capitalists and bankers.

    According to Blum, the leader of the French Socialists, the political rights of citizens were being undermined by the industrialisation of capitalism. In the past, the democratic republic had only needed to guarantee the juridical and constitutional rights of the individual property owners. But, with the development of Fordism, the population had been divided into a majority of propertyless workers and a minority of property owning capitalists. As a consequence, political and economic rights were increasingly in contradiction with one another, rather than being in symbiosis. For example, media freedom for all citizens could no longer be realised by the private ownership of printing presses. However, under a democratic constitution, the propertyless citizens could still elect representatives from different political parties to national and local assemblies. According to Blum, the Socialists and their allies had to use political power won in these elections to create the social and economic conditions for the continued exercise of political rights by all citizens. As under the Jacobins, the political rights of the whole Nation People had to take precedence over the economic right of particular individuals. But, in Blum’s version of Jacobinism, the ‘general will’ of the citizens couldn’t only be created by the elected government. Crucially, individual citizens influenced the policies of the democratic republic through the continual electoral competition between different political parties. In contrast with traditional Jacobinism, Blum and the Socialists believed that both government and opposition parties were valid representatives of public opinion. Therefore the state had to act as an impartial umpire between the competing parties.

    In the long term, Blum and other Socialists hoped that the different political parties would reach a consensus over the administration of civil society. Instead of defending the interests of one group, political power would be exercised by a public service state, which would serve all citizens equally. After the liberation from Nazi occupation, left wing and right wing parties across western Europe did cooperate in rebuilding their devastated countries. In particular, this consensus was sealed by the introduction of interventionist economic policies. By regulating Fordism, the public service state could not only raise working class living standards, but also direct the modernisation of the major capitalist companies. Despite the economic benefits of these new policies, the consensus politics of the post war governments only partially advanced the political rights of all citizens. In theory, state intervention imposed the interests of the whole Nation People upon the individual owners of private property. However, in practice, the politicians and bureaucrats increasingly identified their own self interest with the needs of the population. Although they were supposed to be loyal servants of the public service state, these professionals excluded the majority of the population from any involvement in political and economic decision making between elections. Once again, the democratisation of the state had encouraged the bureaucratisation of power. By the late 1940s, most west European states acquired a new type of ruling class alongside the traditional bourgeoisie: the bureaucrats of the public service state.

    Public Service Broadcasting

    The emergence of the public service state in western Europe laid the basis for the creation of a pluralist version of the Jacobin model of media freedom. During the Second World War, most owners of the mass circulation newspapers and the commercial radio stations had enthusiastically collaborated with the Nazis. Fearing the expropriation of their wealth by the Left, these media capitalists had preferred to protect their own individual property rights rather than to fight for the political rights of all citizens against totalitarianism. With private ownership discredited, the consensus governments of the post war period had to find a more democratic method of organising the media. In the 1930s, Blum and his fellow Socialists had advocated that the public service state should directly control the media in the interests of all citizens. In his view, the ideological conflict in the mass media between competing political parties had to be institutionalised through the nationalisation of all newspapers and radio stations by the public service state. Instead of private ownership, Blum proposed that the editorial staff of the different media should be appointed by the various political parties represented in the elected parliament. In this scheme, competing political viewpoints would be expressed in the media in proportion to their popular support, rather than through the wealth of their financial sponsors. Although the public service state couldn’t create two way communications, every citizen could influence the one way flow of communications in the media by choosing between the competing political parties in regular elections.

    Because of the rights won by the journalist printers in the bourgeois revolutions, this new version of media freedom was never applied to the mass circulation newspapers. In contrast, the electronic media within most western European countries were nationalised in the immediate post war period. During the 1920s and 1930s, state broadcasting corporations had been set up to compete with the commercial radio stations. Because of the technical limitations of broadcasting, it was impossible to sell their radio programmes directly to the listeners. But, by imposing an annual charge on the owners of receivers, every listener could be forced to contribute towards the costs of the nationalised radio broadcasting systems. In the same way as advertising provided an income for the commercial radio stations, so revenue from the licence fee created a secure economic basis for the state ownership of the electronic media. Thus, when the commercial radio stations owned by collaborators with fascism were expropriated, these state owned broadcasting corporations had the financial resources to monopolise the airwaves within most western European countries.

    Following Blum’s advice, the post war governments decided that their nationalised broadcasting corporations should be made accountable to their audiences through the direct involvement of the elected parliamentary representatives of the citizens. In many western European countries, the sharing of party control over the state broadcasting corporation culminated in the pillarisation of the electronic media. From top managers to doorkeepers, all jobs within the nationalised radio and television stations were divided among the competing political parties in accordance with their electoral support. Based on the consensus between the different parties, all major political viewpoints were represented within the workforce of the state owned radio and television stations. By having their own supporters within the workforce of the electronic media, both government and opposition parties could use their own members to express their views on the news and other programmes of the nationalised broadcasting corporation. With the adoption of pillarisation, Blum’s version of media freedom was turned into a stable institutional structure for the administration of the state owned radio and television stations. According to its advocates, all citizens could now indirectly express their views within the nationalised electronic media by voting for their political representatives.

    But, in reality, the electronic media were still outside the control of their audiences and workers. As in other institutions of the public service state, the politicians and bureaucrats in charge of the nationalised media increasingly identified their own self interest with the needs of the population. With a monopoly over the electronic media, the main political parties were able to exclude dissidents opposed to the consensus from the airwaves. For example, after the outbreak of the Cold War, the elected representatives of the pro Russian Communist parties were banned from the public service radio and television stations for supporting the totalitarian opponent of the western European countries. Similarly, freed of pressures from advertisers and private owners, the directors of the nationalised media could fill their schedules with educational and cultural programmes. While the majority of the population mainly wanted entertainment shows for their amusement, the state broadcasters primarily catered for the cultural tastes of the most privileged sections of society. Crucially, as members of the bureaucracy of the public service state, the directors of the nationalised media were an integral part of this educated elite. Because media freedom was only seen as a political right, the provision of entertainment programmes could be largely ignored by the nationalised radio and television stations. Instead, following the Jacobin tradition, the dissemination of high culture by the electronic media was encouraged as a means of educating the citizens in correct ideas.

    The process of separating public service broadcasting from any form of popular control was most fully developed in Great Britain. In the early 1920s, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was founded as a nationalised monopoly funded by the licence fee. But, in contrast with the pillarisation adopted by its continental European equivalents, the BBC had complete independence from any direct control by both government and opposition politicians. As the BBC’s first director general, Reith successfully prevented the British political parties from having any day to day involvement in its management. In order to preserve this autonomy, Reith ensured that the leaders of the major political parties regularly appeared on BBC programmes and their views were reported in its news service. By skillful lobbying, Reith persuaded the major political parties to rely on the neutrality of BBC management for the impartial presentation of their views. Yet, within the balanced programmes of the BBC, there were strict limits on political pluralism. During the 1926 General Strike, the leaders of the trade unions and the Labour party were prevented from broadcasting. Even without civil unrest, Communists and fascists were systematically excluded from the airwaves. At the same time, Reith also believed that the BBC had a duty to educate the British population. Under his control, the corporation limited the amount of popular entertainment in its schedules. Instead, the BBC mainly transmitted religious, educational and classical music programmes for its listeners. Above all else, Reith wanted the BBC to impose the culture of the conservative middle classes on the rest of the country. For Reith, the pedagogical role of the corporation even included improving the accents of its working class listeners. By creating ‘BBC English’, he hoped that a standardised southern English accent would be adopted by the whole British population.

    After the industrialisation of the media, the political right of freedom of communications could no longer be foundedupon the economic right of private property. Owned by a minority of share holders, the mass circulation newspapers and commercial radio stations excluded the majority of citizens from exercising their freedom of speech in print or over the airwaves. In response, left wing politicians advocated the nationalisation of the media, which would place the newspapers and radio stations under the control of the ‘general will’ of all citizens. At the end of the Second World War, the collaboration of the commercial media owners with fascism created the opportunity for the introduction of this new model of media freedom. Because the Blanquist and Leninist variants were too authoritarian, Blum’s pluralist version of Jacobin media freedom was adopted for the nationalised electronic media across western Europe. Although public service broadcasting didn’t create two way communications, all citizens could influence the one way flow of communications produced by the state owned media by choosing between the competing political parties in regular elections. However, this democratisation of the electronic media simultaneously led to the bureaucratisation of the airwaves. Because they were only indirectly accountable to the people, politicians and bureaucrats were increasingly able to run the nationalised broadcasting corporations in their own self interest. If all citizens were to be able to express their views in print or over the airwaves, a more radical version of media freedom would be needed.

    The Challenge of the New Left

    By the mid 1960s, both right wing and left wing governments across the industrialised world believed that the adoption of Fordism had removed the main causes of social discontent among their electorates. In national and local contests, the different political parties competed to offer higher wages and more social services to the voters. As their incomes steadily increased, workers were able to buy the consumer goods produced by the corporations, such as refrigerators, record players, vacuum cleaners and washing machines. From the early 1950s onwards, the ultimate consumer commodity became available to ordinary people: the television set. As the ownership of receivers spread, watching television programmes quickly became the most popular leisure activity within Fordist societies. Although they couldn’t escape from the need to work, workers were now entertained and informed by sound and vision in their own homes.

    Despite the rapid rise in living standards, the growth of the consumer society created its own social tensions. During the 1960s and early 1970s, this discontent led to the emergence of the New Left within the leading industrialised countries. Although initially inspired by protests against the American invasion of Vietnam, this movement soon challenged the cultural and sexual conservatism of its own society. In early stages of Fordism, the state and employers had encouraged cultural and sexual repression within the working class to reinforce labour discipline on the assembly lines. Yet, once Fordism was fully developed, the end of unemployment and the spread of mass consumption undermined this puritanical social order. Abandoning the morality of their parents, many young people adopted the hippie lifestyle, which championed sexual and chemical hedonism. By the mid 1960s, this cultural bohemianism had turned into social rebellion. Because they no longer respected the authority of their bosses, young workers instigated a wave of absenteeism, wildcat strikes and sabotage within the factories. While most activists were simply fighting for more wages and better conditions, a revolutionary minority rejected the entire Fordist compromise. While their parents saw televisions, fridges and cars as liberation from poverty, these young radicals believed that the desire for consumer goods had trapped society within the treadmill of wage labour. In their view, cultural liberation was only the first step towards a social revolution.

    Although they were anti capitalist, these young revolutionaries were also critical of the traditional Left parties. Instead of more modernisation, this new generation wanted an immediate revolution against the consumer society. In the early 1960s, this new form of politics was pioneered by the Situationist International, which had been started as a radical art group. According to its analysis, the introduction of mass production and consumption had ended the poverty of the past for the majority of the population. But, in the process of modernisation, the members of civil society had been transformed from individual property owners into wage-workers. Deprived of the ownership of private property, the majority of the population was now unable to control their time at work. With the creation of the consumer society, this alienation had been extended into everyday life. Under Fordism, the workers not only had to labour in factories and offices, but also had to consume the commodities produced by the assembly lines. Because the large corporations tried to manipulate the patterns of consumption, the Situationists believed that the majority of the population was now oppressed in their leisure as well as their work. As passive consumers, workers could only respond to the decisions of others without being able to participate themselves. Using the metaphor of the Theatre, the Situationists denounced Fordism as the ‘society of the spectacle’.

    Rejecting the European Left’s Jacobin traditions, the Situationists claimed that the alienation of work and everyday life could only be overcome by the creation of a direct democracy, which would end the separation of political and economic power from popular control. In the May ’68 Revolution in France, this revolutionary utopia was temporarily realised by the nationwide occupation of factories, universities and other institutions by striking workers and students. Under the slogan of self management, people from many different occupations demanded the extension of democracy into the workplace. But, despite the continuation of industrial unrest throughout the 1970s, the New Left never gained much influence within the labour movement. Instead, across the industrialised world, these young revolutionaries transferred their hopes for the implementation of direct democracy to the new social movements. During the 1960s, American radicals successfully established autonomous campaigns to champion the rights of women, lesbians & gays, ethnic minorities and other communities. Drawing from this experience, many New Left thinkers claimed that the traditional working class parties and unions were now obsolete. In their view, with modernisation completed, the competing classes within capitalism had fragmented into different social groups. Therefore, individuals could only identify with organisations fighting against their own particular oppression as women, homosexuals or members of ethnic communities. Applying this analysis to western Europe, Félix Guattari called for the creation of a ‘micro politics of desire’, which would express these new forms of popular struggle. According to his analysis, revolutionaries could only unite the majority of the population in the fight against capitalism by championing the specific demands of each autonomous campaign. Crucially, Guattari believed that close cooperation between the different new social movements in the revolutionary struggle was made possible by their common commitment to direct democracy within their internal structures. In his view, these autonomous campaigns provided a practical example of the end of the separation of politics from everyday life, which proved that a social revolution was imminent within
    Fordism.

    The Alternative Media

    Because of the New Left’s origins in cultural rebellion, many young revolutionaries were convinced that the spread of the hippie lifestyle was a crucial part of the revolutionary struggle. In their view, the work ethic, patriotism, sexism, racism and other conservative attitudes were cultural defences constructed by the ruling class against the spread of revolutionary ideas among the workers. Like Blanqui and Lenin, most New Left intellectuals believed that the majority of the population had been ideologically indoctrinated in false ideas by the capitalist media. In their writings, these thinkers relentlessly exposed the political biases of the mass circulation newspapers and the electronic media. Inspired by the Chinese Cultural Revolution, some radicals even advocated the creation of new type of totalitarian media, which would educate the whole population in politically correct ideas.

    In contrast, the Situationists rejected the Leninist analysis of the media. In their view, the spread of bourgeois ideologies was only an effect of the power of the media. Instead their analysis emphasised the passivity imposed upon workers by the dominance of the media. According to the Situationists, radio and television broadcasting had to be examined as the primary form of the ‘society of the spectacle’. Crucially, the Fordist organisation of the electronic media prevented any two way communications between the different members of the audience. With their centralised structures, there could only be a one way flow of communications within radio and television broadcasting. With the audience reduced to passivity, the radio and television stations could use their programme schedules to reinforce the daily rhythms of Fordist society. While the morning radio shows encouraged people to go to work, the evening television programmes provided instant relaxation after a tiring day at the office or factory. At the same time, the electronic media also created markets for the consumer goods produced by the Fordist factories by broadcasting advertising and programmes featuring rich lifestyles. Similarly, the electronic media maintained the illusion of choice offered by representative democracy through the provision of airtime for the competing parties. By mesmerising its passive audience, the electronic media had extended the disciplines of the factory into the leisure time of the workers.

    Following the May ’68 Revolution, this Situationist analysis was widely accepted among the most radical sections of the New Left. For example, Guattari thought that the mass media had replaced religion and physical force as the most important method of imposing social discipline within capitalist societies. Using his psychoanalytic studies, Guattari claimed that the electronic media promoted specific forms of ‘desire’ among their audiences. Bombarded by advertisements and mindless entertainment programmes, the majority of the population were being brainwashed into becoming loyal workers and contented shoppers. Crucially, the radical philosopher believed that the effectiveness of this new form of social control depended upon the exclusion of the majority of the population from any participation within the media. According to Guattari and his followers, the New Left had to counter the ideological influence of the newspapers and the electronic media by inventing a new form of media freedom. Rejecting the Jacobin solutions of the past, they called for the application of the principles of direct democracy within the media.

    In the mid 1960s, the American New Left pioneered a self management model of media freedom. Using cheap off set printing techniques, young radicals set up underground newspapers to cover events censored by the mainstream media, such as anti Vietnam war protests, new social movements, rock music and the hippie culture. Unlike their Leninist predecessors, these alternative newspapers didn’t advocate the policies of a single revolutionary party. Instead they tried to provide ‘counter information’ about the activities of all sections of the New Left. Although some were run by hippie entrepreneurs, most alternative newspapers were organised as co operatives. In these self managed newspapers, the journalists not only elected the editors, but also rotated important tasks between themselves. Crucially, these radical underground newspapers allowed their readers to contribute their own articles, poems, photos and drawings. By encouraging participation in the production and management of their newspapers, the American New Left hoped to free people from the passivity imposed upon them by the mainstream media.

    Inspired by the success of the underground press, other New Left radicals began experimenting with community television. In the early 1970s, the first portable video cameras had become available and the price of VCRs had fallen dramatically. According to the community video activists, the skills of television production could be easily learnt by amateurs. Moreover, almost everyone could express their opinions in a television interview. Therefore, these video radicals advocated that the new social movements should make their own programmes about their struggles. Above all else, they wanted to create an interactive television system, which would allow two way communications between viewers. In their view, when everyone was connected to the cable television networks, individuals and groups would be able to speak for themselves without need for representation by politicians or packaging by media professionals. Unfortunately for the community video activists, the construction of an electronic agora within television broadcasting was technically impossible in the early 1970s. With cable networks only available in a few cities, community television broadcasting was restricted to a limited number of experimental channels in the USA and western Europe.

    In contrast, community radio stations were successfully set up across the industrialised world. In the late 1940s, the first community radio stations had been founded by pacifists in the USA. After the emergence of the New Left, these radio stations were rapidly radicalised by their younger members. By the 1960s, the community radio stations were playing a leading role in the protests against the Vietnam war and in the emergence of the new social movements. Like the underground newspapers, these radical stations not only provided ‘counter information’ about dissident political groups, but also were run as self managed organisations. In 1975, this form of New Left media spread to western Europe. After a celebrated court case, the confiscation of the transmitter of a radical pirate radio station was declared unconstitutional in Italy. As a consequence, thousands of unlicenced radio and television stations appeared in all parts of the country. Although most were commercial, a minority of these radio stations were run by revolutionary groups. Using cheaptransmitters, home made studios and voluntary labour, community radio stations were much easier to run than underground newspapers. Crucially, these New Left radio stations not only elected their own administrators, but also tried to break down the separation between media professionals and their audience. From phone ins to programmes made by volunteers, the Italian community radio stations encouraged listener participation in their broadcasts. Above all else, these stations allowed their listeners to describe their own experiences in social struggles or their own opinions on political issues without the interference of parties or journalists. According to many New Left activists, these community radio stations had successfully undermined the domination of the ‘society of the spectacle’ over the electronic media.

    Following the success of community radio broadcasting in Italy, similar stations were set up in most western European countries. Crucially, many New Left radicals believed that the implementation of the self management model of media freedom within radio broadcasting was opening the way for a social revolution. Above all else, the new form of media freedom was the technological fix to the practical problems of creating direct democracy on a national scale. Because every citizen couldn’t personally attend an agora within a large country, the bourgeois revolutionaries had replaced the absolute monarchy with a representative form of democracy. However, although all citizens obtained the vote, the election of professional politicians to run the state exacerbated the separation of political power from civil society. According to the New Left, this alienation could now be overcome by implementing the self management model of media freedom. Within the ‘society of the spectacle’, the centralised radio and television stations only transmitted a one way flow of communications from political parties and media professionals to isolated listeners and viewers. But, after a social revolution, the New Left radicals believed that the electronic media could be used to establish two way communications between localised meetings of workers. With the formation of these horizontal links, direct democracy could be extended electronically beyond the physical confines of a general meeting. Thus, with the establishment of two way communications within radio and television broadcasting, everyone would be able to take part in social decision making by participating within an electronic agora.

    According to some New Left thinkers, the creation of an electronic agora would only be possible once everyone was connected to a cable television network. In contrast, Guattari and other radicals claimed that community radio broadcasting could be used to build the electronic agora. Like other New Left thinkers, they believed that the new social movements had already instituted direct democracy within their own organisations. As a next step, they advocated that feminists, ecologists, lesbians & gays, ethnic communities and other autonomous campaigns should set up their own community radio stations. Then each new social movement could hold its internal discussions on its own radio station. At the same time, a common debate could be conducted between the different communities through the diffuse network of alternative radio stations. According to Guattari and his followers, these specific and general discussions on the community radio stations would be combined into a permanent meeting of the airwaves, which would involve every new social movement and civil society as a whole. Thus the implementation of self management model of media freedom within radio broadcasting would provide the technical fix to overcome the physical limits of direct democracy. Without waiting for the building of a cable television network, the electronic agora could be immediately constructed over the airwaves.

    In the self management model of media freedom, the members of civil society exercised their individual political right of freedom of communications through the collective economic right of ownership exercised by co operatives. Unlike earlier versions, this new form of media freedom didn’t limit participation in production to a minority of male journalist printers or professional politicians and journalists. However the revolutionary hopes embodied in the self management form of media freedom weren’t fulfilled in practice. By the late 1970s, the New Left media had begun to go into decline. During a period of reaction, there was a widespread disillusionment about politics among all sections of the population. Reliant on voluntary labour and funding, most radical publications went bankrupt. At the same time, those underground newspapers with large readerships were slowly transformed into conventional commercial enterprises. Within community television broadcasting, most of the experimental stations never obtained enough support to evolve into permanent channels. Even within community radio, radical stations encountered great difficulties in recruiting new activists and raising revenue. By the late 1980s, much of the alternative media had entered into final stages of collapse, with declining audiences, little money and internal quarrels. Among the survivors, the radical media were usually run by a small minority of New Left activists. With their high level of political commitment, they were often culturally separated from their intended audiences. Under the self management model of media freedom, all individuals were supposed to participate in two way communications. Ironically, in an era of political apathy, most of the New Left media were only providing a one way flow of propaganda from a small group of revolutionary activists. Without the participation of all members of civil society, it was impossible to build the electronic agora. As the utopian hopes of the New Left faded, a new model of media freedom could be tried.

    The Crisis of Fordism

    From the late-1940s onwards, the economies of the industrialised countries enjoyed continuous growth, with wages and profits steadily increasing in parallel. However, in the early-1970s, the rate of growth suddenly went into decline. In part, this slowdown in the economy was caused by the revolt of the New Left against the disciplines of the assembly-lines. At the same time, a rapid rise in the price of oil and other raw materials substantially increased the costs of production for most businesses. As in previous decades, national governments responded to the crisis by adopting reflationary policies. But, unlike in earlier recessions, this Fordist strategy didn’t work. Instead, the world economy entered a period of persistent inflation, currency instability and growing unemployment. This failure in economic policy was caused by the globalisation of production. For over thirty years, American, European and Japanese companies had been slowly expanding to obtain economies of scale on an international level. Outside the control of any one national government, the global trading system created by these multinationals was regulated by the world financial markets. Following the collapse of fixed exchange rates, the international competition between different currencies increasingly determined the internal economic policies of the industrialised countries. For example, reflation in a single country was prevented by balance of payments crises, which forced a return to deflationary policies. Once the governments of the industrialised countries lost control over their own national economies, the virtuous circle of rising production and consumption was broken. Instead of steadily increasing wages and welfare benefits, workers now faced cuts in social benefits, stagnant money wages and mass unemployment. Faced with the reemergence of the social problems of the past, new solutions had to be found to tackle the deepening crisis of Fordism.

    The Post-Industrial Utopians

    After the failure of traditional reflationary remedies, many politicians and intellectuals were convinced that Fordism had reached its inherent social, organisational and technological limits. However, unlike the New Left, they didn’t accept that a social revolution was needed to transcend the crisis of the system. Instead, they believed that a new form of society would spontaneously emerge from the growing convergence of computer, media and communications technologies. Back in the early-1960s, Marshall McLuhan had been the first prophet of a new post-industrial age. According to this guru, the development of human societies was solely determined by their technologies, especially the different forms of media. For example, he claimed that Fordist industrialisation had been caused by the invention of printing, which brought about discipline, individuality and rationality. However, with the introduction of radio and television broadcasting, this industrial society had begun to break down. Because the electronic media were supposed to encourage participation and involvement, the younger generation would no longer accept hierarchies imposed by Fordism.

    For McLuhan, the student revolts and the cultural rebellion of the hippies were simply symptoms of a clash between two rival forms of media. In his view, this crisis could only be overcome by the final triumph of the new information technologies. With the spread of computer automation, Fordist manufacturing would be replaced by information processing. As a consequence, alienating and boring factory labour would be transformed into participatory and enjoyable intellectual work. Similarly, the spread of the electronic media would also overcome national and social divisions among people. When everyone was watching the same television programmes, McLuhan believed that old hatreds and misunderstandings would disappear. As a devout Catholic, this prophet of the information age hoped that the whole world would be united in a mystical version of the electronic agora: the ‘global village’. Inspired by McLuhan’s celebrity status, other intellectuals also started predicting the replacement of Fordism by a post-industrial society. According to these futurologists, the introduction of information technologies would shift employment from the manufacturing and extractive industries towards the service sector, especially its media and high-technology companies. As a consequence, assembly-line workers would be replaced by white-collar professionals. In parallel, bureaucrats and industrialists would lose their political and economic power to scientists and academics, who had the skills to invent the new information technologies. For the futurologists, the crisis of Fordism was proof of the correctness of their analysis. For example, they claimed that the reemergence of mass unemployment was caused by the failure to train workers for the new information age, rather than the loss of control over national economies to the global financial markets. As technological determinists, these prophets believed that the profound economic crisis of the early-1970s was solely caused by the invention of new types of machinery.

    Because of their technological determinism, the futurologists were fascinated by the electronic media. As the personal computer hadn’t yet been invented, radio and television sets were the most important information technologies in daily use. According to these gurus, the electronic media were already pioneering the future information society within the present. For example, with their ever-changing fashions, stars and advertising slogans, radio and television stations demonstrated the obsolescence of the rigid production methods of Fordism. In the future, the futurologists believed that the introduction of satellite and cable television technologies would greatly increase the influence of the electronic media. Crucially, they forecast that the construction of an interactive cable television network would inevitably lead to the development of direct democracy. In the post-industrial utopia, viewers would be able to register their opinions on issues of public concern by simply pressing their remote controls. Thus, without the need for a social revolution led by the New Left, the futurologists believed that the spread of the new information technologies would automatically create the electronic agora.

    Hi-Tech Neo-Liberals

    Despite their utopian conclusions, the prophecies of the futurologists were used by conservative parties to argue for the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by the major industrialised countries. In the early-1980s, led by Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in Great Britain, governments across the world privatised and deregulated their financial and industrial sectors. By abandoning interventionist policies and cutting welfare spending, politicians hoped to revitalise their economies through the rapid integration of their financial institutions and manufacturing corporations within the global marketplace. Crucially, these conservative governments believed that increased market competition would encourage the adoption of the new information technologies. Inspired by the futurologists, they thought that the crisis of Fordism would finally overcome through the emergence of the post-industrial society. Although the futurologists had predicted the imminent advent of direct democracy, neo-liberal governments used their prophecies to defend the creation of greater market competition. Because they limited profits and prevented the entry of new competitors, state regulations were condemned for discouraging companies from taking the risk of introducing new information technologies within their industries. Thus, by accepting the inevitability of the transition to a post-industrial society, conservative governments were able to justify the removal of all regulatory controls over private corporations. Ironically, both Reagan and Thatcher believed that the success of their neo-liberal economic policies was proved by the overexpansion of the service sector and the decline of manufacturing industries in their countries.

    In order to win electoral support for the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, conservative parties appealed to the individual self-interest of the better paid workers. With the advent of the consumer society, the living standards of most people had risen considerably. According to the neo-liberals, workers now had to be encouraged to become individual property owners. By extending the ownership of shares, small businesses and houses, conservative politicians hoped that most workers would no longer support collective solutions to their problems, such as state intervention or democracy in the workplace. Instead, these property-owning wage-earners would be more interested in expressing their individual autonomy, especially within their private lives. Reviving the principles of the bourgeois revolutions, neo-liberals urged that individual citizens should be given legal guarantees of their independence from state controls. While Socialists championed the public service state as the representative of the entire Nation-People, conservatives advocated individual rights for the protection of each citizen against the abuses of political power. Crucially, these rights weren’t only being claimed by individual citizens. With the globalisation of production, corporations also needed guarantees against the arbitrary actions of national governments. As legal persons, joint-stock companies wanted the same juridical rights as individual citizens. Under the slogan of freedom, neo-liberals advocated the protection of the particular interests of private capital in the name of the universal rights of all citizens.

    As a central part of their campaign for more market competition, the neo liberals created a new definition of media freedom. Echoing the prophecies of the futurologists, they claimed that the application of their deregulation and privatisation policies within the electronic media would encourage the rapid construction of an interactive cable network. Once this grid was built, individuals would no longer be passive consumers, who simply watched programmes provided by public or private corporations. Instead, they would become active communicators, who expressed their own opinions over the network. Thus, individual citizens would use cameras, computers and other equipment to engage in two-way communications by producing their own electronic media. Reviving the traditions of the journalist-printers, the neo-liberals claimed that the political right of media freedom could once again be realised through the private ownership of the means of production. Crucially, in contrast with the New Left and the futurologists, these conservatives didn’t believe that the creation of two-way communications over the cable network would lead to the formation of the electronic agora. Instead, they believed that the new information technologies should be used for the construction of an electronic marketplace. In their view, the most important technical advance on the cable network was encryption, which allowed the imposition of a direct price for the consumption of the electronic media for the first time. With the formation of prices, market competition between different electronic media producers could be created within the cable network. Instead of advertising or licence fees, access to the cable network could now be solely decided by market competition. Following the introduction of this technical solution to the social problem of price formation, neo-liberals claimed that state intervention within the electronic media had become obsolete.

    By advocating the creation of an electronic marketplace, conservative governments were able to win the support of both individuals and commercial companies who wanted open access to the media. Back in 1927, the introduction of regulation for radio broadcasting in the USA had been originally justified by the shortage of frequencies on the airwaves. Using their influence over the federal government, the NBC and CBS corporations soon monopolised the airwaves. Although another network emerged, television broadcasting was also dominated by corporate interests. In response, the regulation of the airwaves was gradually tightened to enforce limited pluralism in political reporting, the scheduling of children’s programmes and a few other public service commitments. By the early-1980s, state regulation of the American electronic media was being attacked by both radical groups in favour of more community broadcasting and commercial entrepreneurs calling for the end of expensive public service obligations. Seizing this opportunity, the Reagan government rapidly removed most of the controls over terrestrial and cable television broadcasting. According to the administration, the abolition of regulation would soon lead to the creation of the electronic marketplace, where everyone could take part in two-way communications over the interactive cable network. However, in the short-term, the principle beneficiaries of the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media were the large media companies. Despite the promises of a post-industrial society, economies of scale still favoured the industrialised media controlled by the Fordist corporations.

    Although the new information technologies allowed new services to enter the market, easier access didn’t abolish the influence of first copy costs within media production. Because the tastes of audiences weren’t limited to a specific local community, the same media products were often popular among people from different cultures. For decades, the Hollywood cinema industry had successfully sold its films across the globe and American music companies had marketed their records in many different countries. With the opening up of previously monopolised electronic media to competition, it was now possible to market television broadcasting on an international scale for the first time. For example, wherever they lived, large numbers of teenagers would tune into MTV’s top 40 hit format and many adults would watch CNN’s 24 hour news service. Although language barriers prevented the emergence of a completely global television system, dubbed American series and telefilms still dominated the newly deregulated channels in many countries. By covering its costs across a worldwide audience, a multinational television producer could provide expensively-made programmes at a cheaper price than any local competitor.

    By the early-1990s, deregulation and privatisation had led to the dominance of the global media markets by a handful of American, European and Japanese corporations. These organisations didn’t just extend their control over different types of media, from newspapers through films to television production. At the same time, they also combined with the owners of distribution systems, such as cable television operators or telephone companies. Although these fusions fulfilled the predictions of convergence between different information technologies, the media multinationals weren’t creating enough jobs to replace those lost in the traditional Fordist industries, which had been devastated by the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies. Because of the cheap costs of reproduction, there was an extraordinary disproportion between the small number of workers employed in the media and the large audiences for their output. Despite the promises of the neo-liberals, the overwhelming majority of individuals were still passive consumers, who could only choose between the radio and television channels of the media corporations. Crucially, the rhetoric of two-way communications had been turned into the reality of a greater choice of one-way flows of communications.

    Although market competition had failed to provide much individual access to the electronic media, neo-liberals still believed that deregulation and privatisation would create freedom of communications within radio and television broadcasting. Criticising the public service model, they pointed out that individual citizens could only indirectly express their views over the airwaves by voting for representatives of political parties. In contrast, the neo-liberals claimed that market competition between commercial media corporations directly reflected the wishes of their audiences. Because they wanted to maximise their audiences, competing radio and television stations had to provide the types of programmes desired by listeners and viewers. Therefore, by selecting channels on their radio or television sets, individual citizens determined the content of the programmes within the electronic media. For example, more entertainment programmes were provided for viewers in commercial systems than under a public service monopoly. Crucially, the neo-liberals also claimed that the intense competition for audiences between channels created a diversity of political opinions over the airwaves. Thus, although they couldn’t be active communicators, these conservative gurus believed that individuals had been empowered as channel zappers. In this version of the neo-liberal model, the individual citizens’ political right of freedom of communications was equated with their economic rights as consumers of the electronic media.

    By advocating a free market utopia, the neo-liberals successfully recuperated many of the demands of the New Left. On the one hand, they accepted the opposition of these revolutionaries to cultural puritanism and unaccountable bureaucracies. Thus both sides could oppose the imposition of moral censorship and the monopolisation of the media by the public service state. But, on the other hand, the neo-liberals rejected the demands for the self-management of social and economic institutions, including the electronic media. According to the New Left, individual freedom was only possible through the collective ownership of property by co-operatives, as in the community media. In contrast, for the neo-liberals, individual freedom was the absence of state regulations within the marketplace, as in open competition between different cable television stations. Combating the New Left, the neo-liberals also promised two-way communications and direct democracy for all individuals. Yet, while the electronic agora was supposed to end the alienation of political and economic power from popular control, the electronic marketplace only allowed individuals to realise their needs for information and entertainment through commodity exchange. Above all else, the neo-liberals carefully obscured the consequences of media deregulation and privatisation. Although individuals had the right to produce their own media, the electronic marketplace was dominated by the output of the large corporations. For most people, media freedom was restricted to the right to choose between competing radio and television stations. Instead of being active communicators, they were only channel zappers.

    Infotainment

    Back in the nineteenth century, politicians tried to win the support of voters by holding public meetings, canvassing individual households, recruiting party members and sponsoring newspapers. However, from the early-1920s onwards, political conflicts have been increasingly fought out in the electronic media. For the first time, every citizen not only could receive large amounts of political information, but also were able to hear or see their elected representatives. Once they mastered the techniques of broadcasting, some politicians skillfully used the electronic media to establish an almost intimate relationship with their supporters. Like a trusted friend, these leaders explained the government’s polices to the voters in the privacy of their own homes. Because all citizens now had access to the opinions of their representatives, a few politicians even claimed that their appearances over the airwaves had created the electronic agora.

    Despite these aspirations, radio and television broadcasting have been Fordist media for the last seventy years. Because they were organised as a one-way flow of communications, the electronic media excluded the majority of the population from any direct participation in their output. As the prime example of the ‘society of the spectacle’, radio and television broadcasting reinforced the separation of the state from civil society. During the 1960s and 1970s, the New Left, futurologists and neo-liberals believed that the introduction of the new information technologies would overcome this passivity in both media and politics. But, by the early-1990s, these utopian dreams had failed in practice. Above all else, the implementation of the policies of the neo-liberals had exacerbated the distance between the politicians and their electorates. Just as globalisation of production prevented national governments from controlling their own economic destiny, so the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media had removed the indirect influence exercised by voters in the public service model. Although they had been promised active participation, most people were actually restricted to being couch potatoes zapping between channels.

    Under the neo-liberal model of media freedom, the majority of the population were only offered a choice between almost identical one-way flows of communications. Contrary to the predictions of the neo-liberals, this homogeneity in content had been created by the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media. With a fierce competition for ever higher ratings, news programmes on commercial radio and television stations copied each others’ successful features to prevent viewers from switching to rival channels. Above all else, the rival news bulletins adapted techniques pioneered by the entertainment programmes which filled the rest of the schedules. For example, the lengthy explanations of political situations used by the news programmes of the public services channels were rapidly abandoned., Instead, in imitation of magazine programmes, a quick and sensational coverage of current events was adopted. Copying the talkshows, news programmes started including more gossip about celebrities, sensational court cases and human interest stories alongside their political reports. As competition intensified, television stations increasingly relied on compelling visual images to illustrate their news bulletins. In the ratings war, exclusive pictures of wars, famines, terrorism and natural disasters were proven methods of attracting more viewers. Using live broadcasts, news programmes could even provide the emotional thrill of watching history as it was being made, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the bombing of Baghdad. Imitating the rhythm of sports reports, exciting live coverage of major political crises and foreign wars was now available for viewers in the safety of their own homes.

    By the late-1980s, this combination of information and entertainment in news programmes was known as infotainment. Because it resulted from competition between television stations, this style of news coverage was defended by neo-liberals as an expression of the direct wishes of viewers. Yet, at the same time, the dominance of infotainment within the electronic media exacerbated the crisis of representation within the leading industrialised countries. Unlike its public service predecessor, the neo-liberal model of media freedom no longer guaranteed access to the airwaves for the elected representatives of the voters. Instead politicians could only express their opinions in the form of infotainment which had to attract high ratings among the viewers. In the USA and Britain, Reagan and Thatcher adopted the latest marketing techniques to create publicity stunts and soundbites for the evening television news bulletins. Following their example, both right-wing and left-wing parties across the world soon learnt to sell their political manifestos like consumer commodities. While the public service model was supposed to allow reasoned debate between politicians over the merits of their rival policies, the neo-liberal model turned voters into consumers of the advertising messages produced by the competing political parties. Crucially the use of advertising techniques often allowed the parties of both Left and Right to hide the real consequences of their proposed policies from the voters. Because they were made as infotainment, political advertising campaigns could rely on style rather than on content. But, when the promises of the advertising campaigns couldn’t be fulfilled, the voters became increasingly cynical about their political representatives. Far from ending the alienation of the state from civil society, the neo-liberal model had widened the gap between the professional politicians and their electorates.

    Political Hyperreality

    Following the triumph of infotainment, some intellectuals became disillusioned with the radical possibilities of the media. According to Jean Baudrillard, the mass ownership of computers and television sets had already successfully created the post-industrial society within the advanced capitalist countries. Yet the spread of information technologies hadn’t liberated the population from political and economic alienation. On the contrary, Baudrillard claimed that a new form of domination had emerged: hyperreality. Under Fordism, the electronic media had merely spread incorrect ideas among the people. However, in the new world of post-modernism, all aspects of social life had been transformed into an entirely simulated world of information. Instead of working and playing in the real world, individuals had been sucked into the hyperreality created by computer and television screens.

    For Baudrillard, the domination of infotainment demonstrated the growing power of hyperreality. Once politics had been transformed into show business, the rival social programmes of the Left and Right were only simulations for the news and current affairs programmes of the electronic media. Instead of representing their electors, politicians were now taking part in a form of television gameshow. Therefore, aping the sports commentators, news presenters regularly assessed the latest position of the rival parties by reporting their most recent poll ratings. Moreover, under post-modernism, politicians no longer needed to win the political debate with reasoned arguments. Instead they could use the techniques of political marketing which had won two American presidential elections by selling Reagan’s smile. Similarly, as in the Gulf war, political leaders could embark on foreign adventures to provide thrilling infotainment for the television audiences back home. With the advent of hyperreality, the image of politics had become more important than its real application.

    Crucially Baudrillard asserted that the development of interactive computer and cable television networks wouldn’t free people from the domination of hyperreality. On the contrary, he claimed that two-way communications simply encouraged further involvement in the simulated world of information. Instead of creating a self-managed society, the introduction of new information technologies had ended all opportunities for political and economic participation. While they were watching television or using the Internet, individuals couldn’t act as either citizens or members of civil society. Far from creating direct democracy, the electronic agora was the most insidious form of the new type of oppression. According to this guru, the dominance of hyperreality had ended any possibility of establishing media freedom. Whether indirectly or directly, individuals couldn’t express their opinions through the electronic media. For Baudrillard, the only form of resistance to the oppression of hyperreality was the refusal to participate within the media and politics. In his view, even if they watched television programmes, most people were no longer interested in the political role of the electronic media. At the same time, the rising rate of abstentionism demonstrated increasing apathy among the electorate. Far from condemning the separation of the state from civil society, Baudrillard believed that most people were happy to abdicate their responsibilities as citizens to the bureaucrats and politicians. Freed of their public duties, they could then enjoy the pleasures of private life without disturbance.

    The Reregulation of the Media

    The pessimism of Baudrillard and other post-modernists reflected the growing crisis of representation within the industrialised countries. Although they had perfected their media skills, politicians encountered increasing difficulties in arousing the interests of voters. In the early-1980s, right-wing politicians had claimed that deregulation and privatisation were needed to hasten the adoption of new information technologies. as the old manufacturing industries declined, redundant workers were supposed to find new jobs in the post-industrial sectors, such as computers and the media. Yet the electronic media and other information sectors only created a limited number of new jobs. Instead a two-tier society emerged within many advanced capitalist countries. Following Japanese and Third World examples, the labour force was slowly polarised into a core of full-time employees and a periphery of part-time or unemployed workers. Unable to meet the needs of all the electorate, politicians concentrated on winning the votes of core workers through tax cuts and abundant credit. Even when left-wing governments were elected, the domination of the world financial markets prevented any attempts to isolate a single national economy from the crisis of Fordism. Deprived of any chance to improve society, politicians and bureaucrats concentrated on enjoying the perks of power. Not surprisingly, many voters reacted with a combination of apathy and anger. With seemingly no possibility of radical change, they now believed that elections could no longer accomplish anything.

    Faced by a disillusioned electorate, western European Socialist parties advocated the revival of state controls over the economy in a new form. In their view, government intervention could mediate between the conflicting interests of corporations, small firms and employees. Although integrated within the world market, they believed that the state could use regulations to improve competitivity and accelerate technological innovation. As representatives of the ‘general will’, the elected government had to override the particular interests of capital in the interests of all citizens. Inspired by this analysis, Socialist parties also reasserted the need for state regulation over the electronic media. In their view, the failure of media deregulation proved that the political right of freedom of communications couldn’t be solely guaranteed by the economic right of private property. Instead they argued that the state had to intervene within radio and television broadcasting in the interests of all citizens. Although the economic impact of the electronic media was marginal, their cultural and political impact was immense. Because of the dramatic economies of scale in information production, thousands of media workers could provide an increasingly wide range of radio and television channels to millions of listeners and viewers. By the late-1980s, many people within the advanced capitalist countries were spending more time watching television than working.

    Despite supporting state controls, the Socialists didn’t advocate a return to the system of pillarisation within a single public service monopoly. Instead the Socialists wanted a new form of regulation which would enforce political pluralism across a mixed economy of nationalised and private electronic media providers. Using regulatory bodies, governments would ensure that internal pluralism was respected within the news and current affairs programmes of the major radio and television channels. By issuing licences to an ever larger number of stations, the state could also create external pluralism between competing providers of the electronic media. According to its supporters, this regulation model of media freedom combined the best elements of the public service and neo-liberal models by providing guaranteed access to the airwaves for the competing political parties and a choice of services for the listeners and viewers. Using limited government subsidies, the surviving examples of the self-management model could even be incorporated within this new media consensus. For some, the creation of internal and external pluralism within radio and television broadcasting led to a limited version of the electronic agora. Under the supervision of the state, a combination of pluralism within the electronic media and regular sampling by opinion polls had established a permanent dialogue between citizens and their representatives. But, in reality, this form of two-way communications was very indirect. Crucially, without full employment, the implementation of the regulation model couldn’t end the growing crisis of representation within the advanced industrialised countries.

    The Revival of the Media Utopias

    In the late-1980s, the collapse of the credit boom sent the world economy back into recession. Despite integrating their economies within the world market, governments across the world were now faced with the threat of continual economic stagnation and permanently high rates of unemployment. As core workers realised that the days of easy credit were over, the economic crisis slowly led to political instability. With a few exceptions, ruling parties within the advanced industrialised countries were decisively defeated in elections. However, trapped within an increasingly integrated world economy, the new administrations encountered great difficulties in abandoning neo-liberal economic policies. Yet, without new solutions, popular disillusionment with the main political parties would increase further and the voting patterns of the electorate would become even more volatile. Harking back to the early-1970s, some leading politicians decided to revive the media utopias of the futurologists. For example, they held up the success of Internet system as proof of the long awaited convergence of computers, telecommunications and the electronic media. After the election of Clinton, the American government increasingly used the construction of ‘information superhighways’ not only as an excuse for state intervention within the economy, but also as a potential technological fix for the country’s intractable social problems. Once again, leading politicians were claiming that the solution to the crisis of Fordism was the construction of an interactive fibre-optic network which would create two-way communications among its users.

    Encouraged by government support, the major telephone and cable television companies embarked on a series of mergers and alliances to mobilise the capital needed for this infrastructural project. In parallel, the media corporations combined film studios, record companies, video games developers, television stations and newspapers within one organisation to provide a full range of services for the emerging ‘information superhighway’. As other countries developed their own interactive networks, the media multinationals hoped to take advantage of economies of scale on a global scale. By eroding cultural differences between nations, they dreamt of an international electronic marketplace where all forms of information would be traded under their control. Not surprisingly, these corporations saw the installation of secure encryption systems and enforceable copyright laws as the key to the further development of the network. Once electronic commodity exchange was fully established, they hoped that the final vestiges of the public service model could be removed from a globalised electronic media system outside the control of any national regulatory body. Far from increasing political diversity, this international media oligopoly threatened to turn all news and current affairs programmes into infotainment.

    Ironically this further development of the media exacerbated the crisis of representation across the developed world. As shown by the sudden success of fringe parties, there was a desperation for some magical solution to the political and economic impasse. Echoing the New Left, some politicians called for the creation of direct democracy over the network. Bypassing the discredited politicians, voters would be able to make their own political decisions in ‘electronic town halls’. The revival of this utopian vision demonstrated that the new networks didn’t have to be solely used for the sale of information commodities by the media corporations. Whether adopted by underground magazines, community radio stations, access cable television channels or electronic bulletin boards, the self-management model provided the only clear alternative to the dominance of the world information economy by an oligarchy of a few corporations. While conventional capitalist companies were limited by the constraints of price formation and copyright controls, musicians and other artists had already demonstrated how the new digital technologies were breaking down the rigid divisions between the production and consumption of information. In addition, Minitel in France and the Internet in the USA showed how a simple e-mail system could be turned into a participatory medium by its users. Although initially limited to text, these networks allowed individuals to carry out both point-to-point communications and the mass distribution of information. In a developed interactive system, every user was not only a receiver, but also a transmitter. By combining different systems, a single global network could be created from the different servers and contributors. Although reliant on subsidies from the American defence budget and universities, the success of the Internet system was based on the spontaneous collaboration of its participants on a global scale. Dubbed cyberspace, this fusion of networks could centralise the production and distribution of media on a scale surpassing the ambitions of the most predatory multinationals. Alongside the international electronic marketplace, a global electronic agora is waiting to be born as well.

    Conclusion

    In the late-medieval period, the emergence of the capitalist economy destroyed the intimacy of village and urban life. As people needed to communicate across time and space, the media were invented to carry news of economic and political events. At the same time, the creation of civil society also led to the overthrow of the absolute monarchies. From the beginning, the struggle for media freedom has been synonymous with this formation of the democratic republic. However the further development of capitalism has exposed the contradictions at the heart of modern politics and media: the need for representation. Although media freedom was originally defined as the right of journalist-printers to express their own opinions in print, the media freedom of the owners of printing presses presupposed the exclusion of most of the population. The propertyless majority may have possessed media freedom in theory but were unable to exercise it in practice. Not surprisingly, as in politics, most people were willing to accept representation as a substitution for participation. Just as parliamentary democracy created the conditions for universal suffrage, the industrialisation of the media reduced the price of information to levels affordable by all sections of the population.

    Ever since the disappearance of the traditional interpretation of media freedom, there have been repeated attempts to reconcile the rhetoric of participation with the reality of representation. In the various Jacobin models, the views of the majority of the population were more or less successfully articulated by political parties. With the advent of the crisis of Fordism, there have been both left-wing and right wing attempts to surpass the limitations of the indirect forms of media freedom. Despite the failures of the New Left and the neo-liberals, the current revival of interest in the electronic marketplace and electronic agora demonstrates the persistence of this central contradiction within media freedom. Just as the crisis of representation within the state can only be resolved through the end of the separation of politics from control by civil society, so the construction of the electronic agora offers the democratic solution to overcoming domination by the ‘spectacle’. Until everyone can participate freely in the production and consumption, the struggle for media freedom cannot be over.

  • FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: DIGITAL WORK by Richard Barbrook

    * How does digital work differ from its analogue forms?

    Increasingly people would like to enjoy the dignity of artisan labour without losing the material benefits of Fordism. Over the past two centuries, industrialisation has slowly replaced skilled craft labour with repetitive factory and office work. In the Fordist factory, even the pace of working can be determined by the speed of the assembly lines. For most of this century, people have grudgingly accepted the boring nature of their jobs. In return, they have been given enough wages to buy large amounts of goods and services produced by Fordist industrialisation. However, once their living standards are sufficient, many people would also like to rediscover satisfaction in their work. In sectors such as the media, people can already combine skilled labour with high productivity. Because each extra copy can be reproduced at a very low price, the high costs of employing craft labour for making the first copy of a film, programme or recording are economically viable. With the advent of the Net, the potential productivity of creative work is even greater. Like the artisans of the proto-industrial epoch, digital workers have to use craft skills to produce quality artefacts. Like labourers in a Fordist factory, they can reproduce multiple copies of the same product. In the age of the Net, digital work could synthesise the best features of its analogue predecessors: the high skills of the artisans and the high productivity of the factory hands.

    * How can digital work be creative?

    In a capitalist society, paid work is performed to produce goods and services which can be sold in the marketplace or will be purchased by the state. Like other products, hypermedia products also have to be made to the specifications of others. For most of their clients, digital artisans use standardised software packages and mainstream graphic designs to get the job completed on time and within budget. Their creativity is restricted to producing a quality product which will satisfy the needs of its users. However, the constant changes in hypermedia software and design fashions have also opened up opportunities for more innovative and experimental types of work. With clients seeking products which realise the full potential of new technologies, skilled workers can push forward the technical and aesthetic limits of their craft. Instead of continually repeating what has already been done, digital artisans can demonstrate their creativity by producing wonderful artefacts which have never been seen before.

    * What skills are involved in digital work?

    In many sectors, the introduction of computer and Net technologies hasn’t abolished Fordist methods of working. In financial institutions, much of the labour remains tedious data-processing. In call-centres, each moment of an individual’s working-day is still closely supervised. Even within new media, many people primarily carry out routine coding and design for their jobs. Yet, despite these continuities with Fordism, the production of digital artefacts also encourages new methods of working. Because of the ease of reproduction, most of the costs of manufacture are no longer expended making multiple copies of the same product. Instead, investment is concentrated upon the design and building of the first copy of a digital artefact. Because such tasks are difficult to mechanise, this form of production must be carried out by craft labour. In order to make useful and beautiful products, digital artisans need both technical and aesthetic skills for their work. Because different people’s abilities are often combined to complete a specific job, these workers must have social skills to collaborate easily with each other. Above all, digital artisans must possess the self-confidence to run their own working lives.

    * What distinguishes digital artisans from dotcom entrepreneurs?

    According to neo-liberal cyber-gurus, the dissemination of computer and Net technologies will create a completely ‘new paradigm’ where everyone can become a dotcom entrepreneur. Yet, despite some important changes in the methods of working, the divisions between management and workers persist. Above all, the most important social question within capitalism remains: who controls economic institutions? Within many sectors, the ‘new paradigm’ is obviously just a trendy Californian buzzword. Although the personal relations between management and employees are less formal, the old Fordist techniques for supervising and controlling all aspects of production from above persist. Yet, the increased importance of craft labour within the digital economy has forced even long-established corporations to change their methods of management. Rather than directly supervising skilled workers, large companies increasingly prefer to sub-contract their tasks either to small companies or directly to artisans. Instead of bureaucrats directing people to perform tasks, market competition for short-term contracts instead controls workers who couldn’t be disciplined by other means. Like their proto-industrial predecessors, self-employed digital artisans can earn high wages and control the pace of their work. Compared to those in traditional jobs, they are members of a new ‘labour aristocracy’. However, most of these skilled workers still have little or no say in the companies which employ them. If they own a few shares, they usually have little influence over the strategy of the firm. Even those artisans who do control their own companies remain subordinate to market disciplines imposed by their corporate clients. Needing to ensure products are delivered on time and within budget, they are either forced either to become managers themselves or sell their companies to someone else so they can still engage in creative work. Despite the rhetoric of the ‘new paradigm’, the old class divisions of capitalism persist.

    * What are the common interests of digital workers?

    Whether working as an employee of a Fordist corporation or as an artisan carrying out a contract, all digital workers need good conditions to carry out their jobs. Their place of work should be safe, comfortable and healthy. The technologies used in production should not harm their users over the long-term. Work patterns should not lead to people getting industrial illnesses. As in other industries, digital workers also need to advance their economic position as a group. Within corporations, they must jointly negotiate their terms and conditions of employment. Within contract work, they must establish industry agreements on rates for jobs and common business practices. Above all, data-processors and digital artisans must develop political solidarity between each other as workers. They all have a common interest in ensuring that the state advances the legal, welfare and other interests of employees rather than hinders them. 

    * How can digital workers organise to advance their common interests?

    For generations, workers formed trade unions to bargain with their employers and to campaign for political reforms. As in other industries, workers in the emerging digital economy also need to defend their common interests. However, most of the existing labour organisations are not responding quickly enough to the changes in people’s working lives. Although formed to fight the employers, industrial trade unions were also created in the image of the Fordist factory: bureaucratic, centralised and nationalist. For those working within the digital economy, such labour organisations seem anachronistic. Instead, new forms of unionism need to be developed which can represent the interests of digital workers. As well as reforming the structures of existing labour organisations, digital workers should start co-operating with each other using their own methods. As they’re already on-line, people could organise to advance their common interests through the Net. Formed within the digital economy, a virtual trade union should emphasise new principles of labour organisation: artisanal, networked and global.

  • THE NAPSTERISATION OF EVERYTHING by Richard Barbrook

    Review of John Alderman, Sonic Boom: Napster, P2P and the battle for the future of music, Fourth Estate, London 2001.

    “They just don’t get it.” During the dotcom boom of the late-1990s, this catch phrase was a popular way of dismissing anyone who expressed doubts about the world-historical significance of the Net. How could someone be so out-of-touch as not to realise that this technology was transforming everything: business, politics, culture and even personal relationships? The future would belong to those did “get it.” Yet, only a couple of years later, such optimism about the potential of the Net already sounds dated. How can anyone still believe that this technology will change anything after the implosion of the NASDAQ share bubble and the collapse of so many dotcom companies. Surely the wild times of the Net were only a temporary aberration? As Microsoft, AOL-Time-Warner and the other big corporations take over cyberspace, it will soon be back to business as usual. There is no longer any necessity to “get it.” The Net will change nothing.

    John Alderman’s new book – Sonic Boom: Napster, P2P and the battle for the future of music – is a useful correction to this new consensus. Just as it was once necessary to criticise dotcom boosters, it is now important to challenge the Net pessimists. In Sonic Boom, John Alderman tells the cautionary tale of a rich and powerful industry which was determined not to “get it” – and how it suffered the consequences of this mistake. During the late-1990s, while so many others were succumbing to dotcom hype, the music business stubbornly resisted any accommodation with the new technology. Its corporate leaders used all of their lobbying power and legal resources to attack the Net. They had the copyright laws strengthened, blocked software development and closed down websites. They even successfully prosecuted Napster – one of the most popular services on the Net. Yet, despite these triumphs, all their efforts could only delay the inevitable. For while others might comfort themselves that nothing much has changed, the music industry is finally realising – much to its horror – that the Net is transforming everything.

    Sonic Boom is a journalist’s account of this transitional period in media history. In the best tradition of the genre, John Alderman provides a well-paced narrative of the key events and insightful descriptions of its leading players. Above all, he explains why the music business has been so determined to resist the Net. From its earliest days, the new communications system was organised around the sharing of information between its users. Despite its recent commercialisation, this gift economy remains at the heart of the Net. People build their own websites, contribute to listservers, send emails and take part in chatrooms. If someone asks for some information, they are usually happy to give it to them. As long as the Net was only used by a minority of enthusiasts, the music industry could ignore what was going on in cyberspace. However, complacency was no longer an option when advances in hardware and software meant that large numbers of people started sharing music files with each other. Meeting through services such as Napster, Net users could usually find someone who would give them copies of tunes which they are looking for – and, in return, they were delighted to send out tracks from their own collections to those who requested them.

    For music fans, file-sharing is a dream come true. From the latest releases to deleted rarities, everything is available for only the cost of connecting to the Net. Someone somewhere must have made a copy of that sought-after track from their CD and vinyl collection – and, more than likely, lots of other people will have copies of their copy. But, for music industry executives, file-sharing is their worst nightmares about home-taping from the 1970s come back to haunt them. Although accessing Net still costs money, downloaded music is free. Worst of all, this hi-tech gift economy isn’t just a short-lived phenomenon. One of the main reasons why the Net was invented in the first place was to allow file-sharing between computers in different locations. Over thirty years later, this concept is at the centre of another wave of technological innovation: peer-to-peer computing (P2P). Contemporary developers are enabling computers, mobile phones, games consoles, and all sorts of other devices to interact with each other. Everything linked with everything. Everyone swapping files with everyone.

    As Sonic Boom emphasises, this utopian vision of ubiquitous peer-to-peer computing inspired the emergence of a new youth subculture in the late-1990s. Exemplified by the founder of Napster, talented school kids and university students wrote many of the pioneering P2P programs. Their contemporaries were the first to realise the potential of this code – and were the people who turned peer-to-peer computing into a global phenomenon. Napster was the icon of this new generation. As John Alderman points out, the music business has long prided itself in its skill at spotting the latest trends and its ability to make money out of the most subversive forms of youth subculture. Back in the 1960s, the hippie generation had called for political revolution – and broke almost every aesthetic and social taboo. Yet the music industry was still able to profit from its cultural creativity. Compared to their predecessors, the ambitions of the Napster generation seemed much more modest: sharing cool tunes over the Net. Ironically, it was this apparently apolitical youth subculture which – for the first time – confronted the music industry with an impossible demand. Everything is permitted within the wonderful world of pop with only one exception: free music.

    Unlike earlier forms of youthful rebellion, peer-to-peer computing is a direct threat to the economics of the music industry. Despite the rapid changes in musical tastes over the decades, the fundamentals of its business structure have remained the same. Musicians are contracted to make recordings. Music is sold on bits of plastic to consumers. Copyright laws ensure that no one can distribute recordings without paying their owners. Everyone supposedly benefits from this arrangement. Fans are offered a wide choice of many different types of music. Musicians are able to earn a living – and a few can become seriously rich. Small companies can survive by selling niche styles of music. Large corporations can own profitable music companies as part of their multi-media empires. Having recuperated successive cultural revolutions, this business structure appeared to be immutable. It took the arrival of P2P to prove otherwise.

    The author of Sonic Boom argues that the collapse of the traditional economics of the music industry wasn’t inevitable. If different decisions had been made at particular moments, it might have been possible to preserve copyright within cyberspace. For instance, in the mid-1990s, it seemed obvious to some dotcom pioneers that the music industry would quickly embrace the Net. Up to then, the business had thrived on technological innovation. The electric guitar had inspired rock music. The CD had given new life to old tunes. Like these earlier inventions, the Net was simply another improvement in the production and distribution of music. Learning from experience, these dotcom entrepreneurs were convinced that old economics would inevitably be replicated in new technologies. All that would happen is that music would be sold as digital files over the Net rather than as bits of plastic through record shops. Encryption would prevent any unauthorised copying of these music files.

    As John Alderman relates, these dotcom start-ups were surprised when the music industry fiercely opposed their plans. Despite the Net hype of the period, many executives still hoped that the digital future implied nothing more serious than producing more sophisticated bits of plastic: CD-roms or DVDs. They were worried that on-line distribution systems would wipe out their substantial investments in disc pressing plants. Others feared that a virtual music marketplace would lead to the ‘disintermediatisation’ of the industry. The Net might allow musicians to sell tunes directly to their fans across the world without needing to sign with a major record label. Either way, these dotcom schemes sounded dangerous. It was much easier to ignore the Net and hope that it would go away. The music industry was determined not to “get it.”

    According to John Alderman, this failure to create a virtual marketplace for selling music was a fatal error. Deprived of a legal method of obtaining music over the Net, people began swapping digital copies of their CD and vinyl collections with each other. Since payment wasn’t required, these music files were usually formatted in MP3 – an open standard without any copyright protection. Like other Net obsessions, sharing music soon developed into a fun way of meeting people on-line. Fans could chat about their favourite musicians while giving away tunes. This underground scene was given a massive boost by the invention of Napster. Written by an MP3 collector, this program created a virtual meeting-place where people into swapping music files could find each other. From the moment of its release, the popularity of Napster grew exponentially. Early adopters recommended the program to their friends who, in turn, passed on the good news to their mates. What had begun as a cult quickly crossed over into the mainstream. For the first time, rebellious youth were identifying themselves not by following particular bands, but by using a specific Net service: Napster.

    A new generation gap had emerged. Each youth subculture achieves notoriety by antagonising its elders. Just like hippies smoking dope, the users of Napster were united through a minor form of civil disobedience: breaking the copyright laws. As in the past, their youthful cool was confirmed when out-of-touch oldies tried to stop them from misbehaving. But what was different this time around was that the music industry was leading the persecution of the new subculture. Outraged at young people getting music for free, its down-with-the-street rebels quickly mutated into tight-arsed-corporate conservatives. They compiled long lists of names of fans who had to be prevented from sharing music files with each other. They hired expensive lawyers to scare the youth into obeying the law. Rock ‘n’ roll had declared war on the Net.

    Sonic Boom takes the reader through the twists and turns of the celebrated court case against Napster. Having persuaded the political establishment to tighten the copyright laws, the music industry decided to close down the most prominent threat to its profits. Since the Napster service had become a dotcom company, it was an easy target. Here was a commercial operation hoping to benefit from the theft of intellectual property by its users. The music industry eventually won its case. Napster was ordered to prevent its users from sharing tunes without paying their owners. However winning a battle isn’t the same as winning the war. Crucially, Napster was an underdeveloped form of peer-to-peer computing. When it was disabled, people were forced to move their music file-sharing to more sophisticated P2P programs: Gnutella, Aimster, Morpheus, Freenet. Ironically, the court case has provided the opportunity to fix the social and technological flaws within Napster. A proprietary program requiring a central meeting-place was being replaced by open source software directly connecting users with each other. One court case couldn’t destroy the hi-tech gift economy.

    In his book, John Alderman remembers attending one of the first on-line music conferences in the mid-1990s where an industry executive declared that the Net should be immediately closed down. Copyright protection had to take precedence over technological innovation. In contrast, the author of Sonic Boom – then and now – does “get it.” The music industry has no veto over the future. Its lobbyists and lawyers can only slow down the spread of peer-to-peer computing. Sooner or later, file-sharing over broadband networks will become as unremarkable as making a phone call, watching television or using a computer today. The utopian vision of the Napster generation is technically feasible: every tune – ever made – for free. Quite rightly, what worries John Alderman is how anyone can earn a living from making music in such circumstances? While almost every other sector of the economy will be profiting from peer-to-peer computing, the music industry will have lost its major source of revenue: selling bits of plastic. Who then will pay the piper?

    Sonic Boom begins with an introduction by Herbie Hancock who – not surprisingly – emphasises this problem. Like so many others, this great musician knows how the industry has always cheated and exploited both artists and audiences. Yet, he fears that the cure of the youth might be worse than the disease of their elders. Musicians could end up the biggest losers if all music files are free. At the end of his book, John Alderman outlines some possible solutions to this dilemma. Even if it might have been possible in the mid-1990s, it is now too late to replicate the buying and selling of music imprinted on bits of plastic in virtual form. Big mainframes serving encrypted tunes to passive consumers is a science-fiction fantasy from the Fordist past. Instead, the music industry must find some way of commercialising peer-to-peer file-sharing. Even before the Napster case was concluded, the Bertelsmann corporation broke ranks with the other major record companies to buy a stake in this P2P pioneer. For a small monthly subscription, Napster users would be allowed to break the copyright laws. Soon afterwards, its competitors announced their own plans for on-line music services. Yet even this compromise may have come too late. Why would anyone pay for music which is easily available for free? The old tunes are all available on unencrypted formats and the protection on new tracks is quickly broken. Once they have experienced digital abundance, why would anyone welcome the forced imposition of analogue scarcity upon the Net?

    John Alderman believes that more inventive methods must be found to finance on-line music. Like so many other Californian analysts of the Net, the author looks back to the West Coast’s hippie past for potential solutions. For instance, the Grateful Dead – a prominent late-1960s psychedelic rock band – pioneered one promising way of creating an alternative economic relationship between musicians and their audiences. Although signed to a major label, its members encouraged their fans to make and trade tapes of their live performances. Contrary to free market orthodoxy, these altruistic ethics proved to be financially rewarding. While their contemporaries faded into obscurity or lost all credibility, the Grateful Dead are still worshipped by a devoted community of fans long after the demise of the band’s charismatic leader. Any money lost from bootlegs has been more than compensated by increased sales of their commercial recordings and of tickets for their live concerts. The Grateful Dead proved that musicians could earn a good living out of free music.

    John Alderman proposes that the music industry should learn from this tried and tested example. For a start, swapping MP3s should be accepted as the contemporary equivalent of trading bootleg tapes. Instead of fighting this phenomenon, corporate executives should realise that giving away music can be another way of making money. For instance, a tune available for free over the Net could persuade someone to buy a concert ticket or, as long as the sound quality remains superior, to purchase CD or DVD versions. Above all, the music industry must move from selling tunes to servicing fans. Although young people are reluctant to buy individual tracks over the Net, they have already shown willing to pay for a more intimate relationship with their heroes. New releases, concert tickets, celebrity gossip, chat zones and other goodies can be made available on-line for a monthly fee. From being little more than a sideline, fan clubs could become the major source of revenue for the music industry in the future. As one way of making money disappears, another may be opening up.

    Being a journalist’s tale, Sonic Boom can’t be expected to provide a sophisticated theoretical analysis of the economics of the Net. Neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx were ever likely to appear in its index. Yet, John Alderman’s populist account is still much more perceptive than most books or articles on the subject published by academics. Above all, this author does “get it.” No copyright law or encryption system is going to stop the swapping of music files between consenting adults in the long-run. There can be no return to business-as-usual for the music industry. It’s over, it’s finished. The ideological shibboleths of neo-liberal economics have been broken. Just as importantly, John Alderman knows that money can be made inside the hi-tech gift economy. Free music on the Net will provide wages for musicians – and profits for their employers. A more evolved form of capitalism will emerge from the advent of ubiquitous file-sharing.

    Living in California, the author of Sonic Boom has to concentrate on the economic consequences of peer-to-peer computing. What has happened within the music industry is already beginning to spread to Hollywood. With a broadband connection, sharing movies becomes almost as easy as swapping music. Lots of jobs and money could be at risk on the West Coast if the leaders of the movie business repeat the same mistakes made by the CEOs of the music industry. Sonic Boom has an important lesson to teach them. However, John Alderman’s fascination with the economic impact of the Net sidelines any consideration of its cultural meaning. Over the past few decades, musicians have been using computer technologies to change music itself. Long before people were swapping MP3s, sampling, remixing and home studios had already redefined the sounds heard in the clubs and on the airwaves. Above all, these new ways of creating music anticipated many of the contemporary changes in the economics of music caused by the advent of peer-to-peer computing. The fixed product has long been mutating into a fluid process within house music. Despite living near San Francisco’s famous rave scene, John Alderman never discusses this socio-cultural revolution. While the Grateful Dead may have pioneered new methods of rewarding artists, their music never evolved beyond the aesthetics of the electric guitar. Yet, as was pointed out long ago, radical changes in the economic base of society are paralleled within the cultural superstructure. By transforming the ways of distributing music, peer-to-peer computing will also inspire new forms of music.

    No book can predict the exact shape of the P2P future. Rather Sonic Boom should be praised for providing some important lessons from its recent history. Although they were a minority even among Net users, the Napster subculture successfully pioneered peer-to-peer computing for the masses. As increasing numbers go on-line and connections speeds keep rising, more and more people will come to discover the wonders of swapping information over the Net. The secret is out. However, as Sonic Boom recounts, there are powerful interests who are terrified of the social upheaval being unleashed by peer-to-peer computing. The prosecution of Napster has encouraged more attempts to reverse the evolution of the Net. Repressive legislation and technological fixes are still being used to inhibit the spread of file-sharing. There are even plans to outlaw all computers which aren’t hardwired to protect copyright material! What Sonic Boom does so well is demonstrate is the futility of these schemes in the long-term. Digital files can’t be confined inside bits of plastic for ever. Instead the music industry – and other creative industries – will just have to develop more sophisticated ways of doing business. For peer-to-peer computing isn’t simply a technological leap forward. More importantly, it is also the catalyst of economic innovation. Now do you “get it?”

  • NEVER MIND THE CYBERBOLLOCKS… by Richard Barbrook

    After the Wall 

    As this century draws to its close, the rapid development of the Net has rekindled a sense of optimism within the developed world. For almost two decades, we have been facing a failure of imagination and creativity. Despite the end of the Cold War, Western societies haven’t even been able to protect their existing welfare provisions let alone advance further towards the good society. As expressed in the nihilism of post-modernism, we have lost faith in the universal values which were to be realised through the ‘grand narrative’ of history. Rejecting praxis, commitment and hard thinking, intellectuals have instead proclaimed the triumph of fatalism, apathy and triviality. All that was left for us to do was “play with the pieces” inherited from earlier and more inventive times.

    Suddenly, after the long night of neo-liberalism, the arrival of the Net has signalled the recommencement of the emancipatory project of modernity. As the process of digital convergence accelerates, divisions between different professions are being broken down. The structural rigidities of Fordism are being replaced by more flexible and informal methods of working. People are acquiring new skills and creating innovative forms of artistic expression. With cheaper global communications, they are discovering how easy it is becoming to work and play together across time and space. Even the right of every citizen to disseminate their own media is in the process of finally being realised.

    Hard Work

    Hypermedia is being developed through the collective effort of many millions of people. Despite its hi-tech basis, the construction of cyberspace in part depends on some very traditional forms of working. For instance, large numbers of semi-skilled manual workers have to dig holes in the road so that the fibre-optic grid can be built. Other people need to labour on assembly-lines making the computers needed for receiving, manipulating and transmitting information. Yet, at the same time, hypermedia also is facilitating the emergence of innovative ways of working. Much of its content is being produced by digital artisans. By spending many long hours in front of their screens, these artist-engineers are creating the aesthetics and writing the code for the new hypermedia products and services. Their design skills and cultural imagination are now at the centre of the process of making hypermedia part of everyday life.

    As with other sectors of cultural production, digital artisans are faced with the problems of working within a late-twentieth century capitalist economy. They have to negotiate their way through the maze of interlocking corporations, state regulations, copyrights, health & safety issues, legal contracts, tax demands and so on. At this stage of modernity, we only seem to be able to work together successfully through the mediation of reified social relations. Yet, hypermedia does facilitate more flexible ways of organising our labour. The Net itself is the result of a synergetic miscegenation of state, corporate and d.i.y. initiatives. The importance of artisan labour within the virtual economy demonstrates how hypermedia is helping to break down the previously rigid polarisation between commercial and community, state and market, proletarian and bourgeois.

    The digital artisans do not labour simply to support themselves financially. Their days and nights of creative effort are slowly integrating hypermedia into the daily lives of everyone within the developed world. At some point in the near future, the hype over hypermedia will disappear. A minority of people are already sending e-mail, using CD-roms and browsing the Web on a regular basis. Over the next few years, many more will be using the Net and other digital technologies for work, entertainment and education. As Buckminster Fuller said, a good technology is successful when it has become transparent. The skilled work of the digital artisans is slowly transforming hypermedia into an essential part of our everyday lives. They will have succeeded in this task when people use hypermedia without noticing how strange and wonderful these new tools are. One day, hypermedia will be as prosaic and banal as the electric light, the washing machine or the vacuum cleaner.

    Mystical Positivism

    Yet, at the very moment when hypermedia is becoming an everyday tool, there are increasing numbers of people who are turning digital convergence into a new religion. For them, hypermedia is no longer simply a useful and beautiful tool for work, entertainment or education. Instead, it is the focus for their mystical fantasies. Confusing science fiction with science fact, they believe that new silicon forms of life are being born and/or that humans are about to be transformed into cyborgs. Like earlier attempts to fuse science and religion, this new cyber- faith does contains elements of insight into the contemporary condition. From fractal geometry to evolutionary progress, digital technologies do simulate aspects of the natural world. From consumer goods to medical technologies, humans do live in symbiosis with their machines.

    Yet, the new believers are not really interested in how nature can inspire the making of good hypermedia or how we can invent technologies for better living. Even John Perry Barlow’s crazy scheme to declare the independence of cyberspace is far too utilitarian for them. Instead, they want to be present at the apocalypse itself – the end of time, the world and the human race. For intellectuals, artists and ordinary punters alike, this millenarian vision can be both romantic and intoxicating. If they’re really lucky, they won’t just witness the dawning of a new epoch, but also might even get absorbed by the Net into the Godhead or be turned into immortal post-humans!

    Ironically, one of the key concepts of this new cyber-faith is the old enemy of religious belief: Darwinism. Back in the nineteenth century, evolutionary theory didn’t just discredit the literal truth of the holy texts. It also provided a rational basis for understanding the human condition. From Spencer on the right to Marx on the left, Darwinism acted as an inspiration for social thinkers to examine human society without being trapped within the confines of religious belief. Yet, nowadays, it is evolutionary theory itself which is being used to proclaim the imminent arrival of the God-Man. Nowhere is this clearer than in the popularity of the concept of the meme – the cultural form which self-replicates using human society like DNA reproducing itself through a species. Because this theory already uses the computer virus as an analogy, the existence of memes has become a central article of faith for the cyber-mystics. For what are the new Gods emerging from digital convergence but memes embodied in silicon and metal?

    The Fallacies of Memetics

    Although we may still hunger for spiritual meaning, it is almost too easy to debunk the positivist mysticism of memes. Firstly, the meme theory is dud philosophy. As Feurbach pointed out, all religion inverts reality. The creative powers of the human species are projected onto a divine being which we then bow down to worship. As Christianity and other religions went into decline, this swapping of subject and object has been rehashed by all the most dubious trends in social theory. Over the last seventy years, psychoanalysis, neo-classical economics, Leninism, structuralism, semiotics, post-modernism and technological determinism have been used to deny the Promethean powers of human labour. Whatever their formal differences, these various ideologies are all profoundly anti-democratic. Crucially, they deny that ordinary people – although limited by their circumstances – can influence their own destiny. Instead, the advocates of these theories claim that we’re simply passive objects of impersonal forces outside our control, such as the unconscious, market forces, ideologies, structures, languages, discourses or technologies. In all these theories, there is no dialectic between free will and necessity.

    The meme theory is yet another attack on human subjectivity. Our complex social development is first simplified into technological progress, then reduced to culture, and finally explained away through the biology of memes. Our creativity and imagination as humans is once again denied. Translated from bio-babble, meme is simply another word for the all-powerful idea, ideology or sign. It is the Platonic deity reborn. Yet again, we’re supposed to believe that we’re simply empty vessels manipulated by mysterious outside powers. As Feurbach said, when illusion becomes sacred, truth is rejected as profane.

    Secondly, the meme concept is bad science. It is the revival of the discredited theory of Lamarck in a new form. Because people will no longer believe that learnt behaviours can be actually embedded in our genes, we’re now told that the development of human societies can be explained by a hybrid of DNA and memes. Yet, like the unconscious in psychoanalysis or utility in neo- classical economics, the concept of memes is completely unprovable. No one has ever seen a meme. You cannot examine one under a microscope. You cannot measure its impact on the social world. Lacking any credible scientific evidence, acceptance of the meme theory can only be a pure act of faith. Yet, on this flimsy assertion, we’re called upon to reject all previous research into the development of human societies. Although social science may not appear as positivist as biology, at least many people working in this field have recognised the fundamental specificity of the human species. Unlike other animals, we not only possess consciousness, but also are capable of acting collectively to change our own circumstances.

    Lastly, the meme concept is reactionary politics. Earlier in the process of modernisation, other versions of biological reductionism – Social Darwinism and Nazi race science – were used as a pretext to reverse social progress. Although great human suffering was justified by these ideas, we’re now once again being called upon to believe in biological reductionism. Despite the denials of the Californian ideologues, the theory still contains a strong smell of fascism. In the USA, some sections of the white ‘virtual class’ dream of embodying their racial privileges in a cyborg form. For others, the meme theory promises a more subtle justification of their social position. Using memetic theory, they claim that unregulated trade between competing companies is the same thing as the circulation of genes between members of a species. As in Spencer’s Social Darwinism, any attempts to alleviate poverty or correct other market failures can then be denounced as contravening the immutable laws of nature.

    Whether in its racist or neo-liberal variants, the popularity of the meme concept thus expresses a deep fear of the emancipatory process of modernisation. Even when hidden behind sci-fi fantasies of artificial intelligences or post-humans, this theory denies the ability of people to invent themselves in ways which go beyond the particular situations in which they find themselves in. The process of modernity has often been cruel and wasteful, but it has also involved a liberation of our Promethean powers. Despite wars and genocides, we have been able to civilise our societies in this century through introduction of universal suffrage and the creation of welfare states. The rapid development of hypermedia is a sign that this process of enlightenment is not over. For instance, it is now conceivable that one of the founding principles of republicanism – media freedom for all citizens – is on the verge of being achieved through the two-way communications made possible by the Net. By escaping into sci-fi fantasies, the adepts of the cyber-faith avoid facing the difficult problems of how the democratic potential of hypermedia can be realised in practice. It is much less strain on their brains to regurgitate mystical mantras than to think hard about how we can provide access for all to the Net, build a fully two-way communications system, invent systems of payment for digital work, decide who has property rights in cyberspace, debate the role of state regulations over the virtual world and so on. The building of the infobahn will never be accomplished by divine revelation. It can only be achieved through the pragmatic application of our collective imagination and effort.

    In The Beginning Was The Deed

    Given that the meme concept is nothing more than hip bio-babble, what is interesting about this theory is why anyone would want to believe in such an intellectually dubious proposition in the first place. The meme concept is therefore important as an object of social anthropology rather than as a credible way of understanding human history. Alongside the Californian ideology, the positivist mysticism of memes is a discourse designed to sooth the existential confusion of the ‘virtual class’. In the USA, the development of the digital economy has exacerbated the racial polarisation between the largely white professionals and the mainly black ‘underclass’. The removal of this archaic social divide will only come about through the difficult task of reviving the New Deal in the USA, especially its policies for the redistribution of wealth. In contrast, the new cyber-faith offers a much lazier way of dealing with the guilt of privilege suffered by the ‘virtual class’. Like Christianity in earlier times, positivist mysticism promises to resolve all earthly problems through magical means: the birth of the God-Man. By postponing any solutions to the apocalypse, this theory has the advantage of allowing its adepts to avoid actually doing anything practical to improve the everyday lives of people. It even allows members of the ‘virtual class’ to vote for Newt Gingrich and his “kill-the-poor” policies with a clear conscience.

    The reactionary basis of positivist mysticism is often hidden behind radical rhetoric about the imminent arrival of the cyber- utopia. The belief in the imminent paradigm shift is one of the enduring cliches of modernity. Over the past two centuries, each successive generation has believed that it was on the brink of entering a new world. The continuous process of change within modernity gives the illusion that we’re always about to make the great leap forwards. However, for inhabitants of the developed world, the truth is rather more prosaic. The hoped-for revolution has already taken place! We’re no longer peasants scratching a subsistence existence in the countryside. Instead, over the past two centuries, we have turned ourselves into wage-workers living within an urban consumer society. If we wish to be poetic, we can commemorate the actual moment of our liberation from serfdom and slavery as dating from 14th July 1789: the storming of the Bastille. But this crucial historical event was only the birth of the emancipatory project of modernity. Being the heirs of the French Revolution, we face the more pragmatic problems of realising and universalising its abstract principles in practice. As Hegel pointed out, we have to make the rational into the real.

    The meme concept can only obscure this long-term process of enlightenment. Hypermedia is important not because it is giving birth to the God-Man, but because it is helping to actualise the principles of 1789. For instance, the French revolutionaries promised that every citizen would have the opportunity to exercise media freedom. For the first time, this right could finally be realised within the developed world through the spread of hypermedia. But, this goal can only be achieved by overcoming many practical difficulties, including the rebuilding of the telecommunications networks and making the ownership of computers more widely available. Above all, the digital artisans will have to design useful and beautiful hypermedia which will allow people to work, learn and play together. Memetic theory can contribute nothing towards the resolution of these practical problems. Instead, we need to examine what are the political, economic and social obstacles to building a democratic and inclusive cyberspace – and how we can then overcome them. The refusal to be duped by false promises of the memetic nirvana is an important step towards ensuring that hypermedia is used to improve the daily lives of everyone. The emancipatory project of modernity has recommenced – and it is our task to contribute towards its realisation in practice.

  • PINNOCHIO THEORY by Richard Barbrook

    Review of Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: the New Biology of Machines, social systems and the economic world.

    At the end of the twentieth century, the USA finds itself the winner of the Cold War, but the loser of the subsequent peace. On one side, America’s hundred year superiority in industrial manufacturing has been overturned by Japan and the other Asian ‘tigers’. On the other side, the country’s claim to be the centre of democracy has been superseded by the reunification of Europe. At such moments of national crisis, the market for millennial prophecy and mystical cures is buoyant. Based on the West Coast – the home of both the computer industry and hippiedom – Wired magazine has recently spun the most sophisticated apologies for the supposed superiority of the American way of life. Now, in the new book by its executive editor, comes the blockbuster defence of the indefensible. In a burst of almost Victorian self-confidence, Kevin Kelly is determined to prove that the historically specific society created in the USA is the only possible outcome of millennia of natural evolution.

    In essence, ‘Out of Control’ argues that American-style ‘free market’ capitalism is not a peculiar social creation, but an ahistorical natural eco-system. The ‘invisible hand’ of the marketplace and the blind forces of Darwinian evolution are one and the same thing (pp. 27-32, 509). As proved by the collapse of the USSR, any attempt by the state or the community to plan or regulate the development of capitalism is against the laws of nature (pp. 52-3). The social can only be produced as “spontaneous order” – the emergent property of individual consumers and producers pursuing their own self-interests in an unregulated marketplace (p. 157). Like members of a swarm of bees or a flock of birds, people cannot influence their own destiny (pp. 6-14). The future is ‘out of control’.

    This analysis is hardly new. Herbert Spencer argued for a similar form of ‘Social Darwinism’. For him, the laissez-faire economic policies of late-nineteenth century Britain reflected the ‘tooth and claw’ struggle for survival within the natural world. In his book, Kelly has simply updated this theory for the age of computers and the Net. ‘Social Darwinism’ no longer just reflects the natural laws of past evolution, but also the science fiction future foretold by the new information technologies. The evolutionary pressures of the marketplace are bringing forth the post-human world of artificial life and digital cyborgs (p. 61). Far from being overtaken by its rivals, the USA is still the future.

    Kelly’s book presents itself as an entertaining and accessible overview of the influence of natural systems on ‘cutting edge’ scientific research into artificial life, the Net, computing, the biosphere and so on. Yet, despite its Darwinian rhetoric, this book has actually nothing to do with biology at all. What it is about is the use of mathematics for building models of the natural and human world. Ever since the end of the Second World War, American academics have been very good at procuring grants to use each new generation of computers as research tools. As computing power increased, they were able to build ever more complex simulations. Mesmerised by the beauty of their own creations, these scientists have been increasingly sucked into the hyperreality of their own models. Led by the advocates of ‘Artificial Intelligence’, gullible scientists started believing that their mathematical simulations were actually alive. As in the old folk tale, Pinnochio came alive.

    The philosophical weakness of this position is clear. We use abstractions to understand the concrete world. A model – however sophisticated – is not the same thing as the real. A mathematical equation mimicking natural evolution is not actually alive. The idiocy of Kelly’s argument is most obvious when he starts talking about the film fantasy of Toon Town as if it will soon really exist: “…someday Disney will have to deal with an autonomous out-of-control Roger Rabbit” (p. 424). But behind this apparent foolishness lurks something much more dangerous: the irrationality of neo-Platonism. Kelly is promoting a form of cyber-astrology. He believes that “…there is a mathematics of life” (p. 498). For him, underneath the chaos of the everyday experience of society and nature, mystical equations lie hidden which explain everything. By using better maths and bigger computers, the cabalistic secret of the universe is waiting to be discovered. As he himself concedes, Darwinian positivism is simply the path towards a “new spiritualism” (p. 260).

    At this point, the reactionary heart of Kelly’s work is exposed. The mathematical model is no longer a way of examining the world. It has ceased even to be a substitute for the real. It is now a way of not understanding what is going on. By accepting mathematical simulation as the only method of analysis, Kelly can uncritically take over the most blatantly ideological form of social theory: neo-classical economics. Within this discipline, mathematical models are widely used by tenured professors to avoid any examination of actually existing capitalism. Its primary theoretical concepts – ‘free markets’, ‘market equilibrium’, ‘marginal utility’ and ‘marginal cost’ – can only exist within the fantasy world of simulation. For instance, any company which actually did try to sell its goods or services at ‘marginal cost’ would go bankrupt almost immediately! Even Kelly is forced to admit that the central concept of neo-classical economics – ‘market equilibrium’ – has no factual basis. Despite this limited insight, he thinks that a hefty dose of non-linear equations will mysteriously reveal the order beneath the chaos of competition (pp. 119-21).

    This uncritical belief in neo-classical economics is most evident in Kelly’s analysis of the impact of the new hypermedia. According to him, the Net is the iconic example of the creation of the unregulated ‘free market’ through the fusion of nature and technology. Invoking Adam Smith, Kelly claims that the Net “…is the mystery of the Invisible Hand – control without authority” (p. 33). Yet, until recently, commercial interests have only played a secondary role in the development of on-line services. The Net was largely built with taxpayers’ dollars from the American defence and education budgets. Many of its key programs were written by state-funded academics. Blinded by the mathematical beauty of economic models, Kelly simply ignores this well-known history of government involvement altogether! Instead, he bizarrely asserts that the global network of computers emerged entirely spontaneously from the actions of disparate individuals – like a synthetic version of a swarm of bees or a flock of birds (pp. 33-6). Similarly, Kelly can only conceive of the future of the Net as an electronic marketplace. He enthuses about the potentiality of encryption, digital money and other programs needed for on-line commodity exchange (pp. 262-96). Undoubtedly, private companies will increasingly advertise and sell their goods and services over the Net. However, Kelly’s obsession with the ‘free market’ sidelines the other non-commercial uses of computer networking made by people, from public education and political campaigning to flirting and making friends. The price mechanism is not the only reason why humans like coming together in groups – whether off- or on-line!

    As a rich white American, it is not surprising that Kelly uncritically regurgitates Cold War ideology in his analysis of the current wave of scientific innovation. Newt Gingrich – the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives – regularly claims that the advent of ‘Third Wave’ information technologies justifies his programme for cutting welfare spending and removing economic regulations. What is strange about Kelly is his attempt to reconcile a blind faith in the ‘free market’ with an ecological sensibility. In the past, most laissez-faire ideologues have tried to ignore the criticisms of the Green movement altogether. Some thoughtful neo-classical economists have admitted that the unfettered price mechanism ignores ‘externalities’: the market cannot cost the damage to the environment of everyone by the actions of individuals. But, once problems such as pollution and resource depletion are recognised, the case for state and community intervention becomes unquestionable. From the acceptability of environmental regulations, it is then but a short step to further un-American activities, such as socialised medicine, vibrant trade unions, nationalised utilities, gun control and all the other features of the successful mixed economies of the European Union. Fearing this challenge to the American dream, Kelly is ready with the mathematical equations of ‘Social Darwinism’ to fend off the horrors of European civilisation.

    This slight of hand is done with ease. By reducing the natural world to a mathematical model, it is easy to make a direct leap from biological simulations to the algebraic fantasies of the economics departments. Reflecting the mystical equations of nature, the unfettered marketplace can now be described as a self-regulating eco-system (pp. 29, 92-3, 155-7). Far from being a threat to nature, unrestrained industrialism becomes the most evolved expression of the biological world (pp. 227-8, 240-50). Crucially, for his analysis, Kelly adopts the hardline form of neo-liberal economics promoted by Freidrich von Hayek and other members of the ‘Austrian School’. Back in the 1920s, these economists launched the ‘calculation debate’ with the erroneous claim that it was impossible to run an economy without prices being formed by spontaneous market competition. Although ostensibly aimed at Soviet state planning, their immediate target was the Austrian Social Democratic Party with its proposals for social housing, a national health service and state economic intervention. In exile in the West, these ideologues continued their attacks on welfare provision and mixed economies throughout the post-war period.

    With the arrival of the crisis of Fordism in the ’70s, their analysis was taken over by the most reactionary political forces within the Western democracies: the British Conservatives and the American Republicans. During the ’80s, using Hayek as justification, both the Thatcher and Reagan governments attacked the social gains of the post-war period with a vengeance. Faced with the failures of these regimes, many people are now looking for other ways of understanding how capitalism actually works. The rise of the Green movement throughout the world has been one response to the inadequacies of neo-classical economics. Yet it is precisely the failed ideology of Hayek and his followers which lies at the centre of Kelly’s social analysis. In his weird hippie Republicanism, it is Hayek’s unfettered ‘free market’ which becomes the epitome of ecological thinking. Yet, in the ’90s, what is needed is a revived ‘calculation debate’ to show how the neo-liberal price mechanism cannot cost environmental damage. The ‘free market’ is not some spontaneous self- regulating product of nature. As shown by American big cities, it can simply be a dumb way to run a modern industrialised society.

    At the back of his mind, even Kelly realises this. With no sense of irony, he quotes the examples of Danish and German firms who have adopted more ecologically-friendly forms of industrial production (pp. 228-36). Yet this was not achieved by the spontaneous working of the ‘free market’. On the contrary, it is a product of two decades of passionate campaigning by the European Green movement. With their long tradition of Social Democracy, the people of these countries have forced companies through state regulation and public pressure to change their ways of doing things. Undoubtedly, many industrialists believed that this was an unwarranted interference in the spontaneous workings of capitalism. Yet, with the subsequent economic gains produced by these policies, most companies now realise the short-term losses incurred have led to long-term advantages for European industries. As with the creation of socialised medicine, public transport and other features of the welfare state, actually existing capitalism works better within the social discipline of the mixed economy than through the selfish anarchy of the Hayekian ‘free market’.

    It is this practical success of European Social Democracy which drives Kelly towards mathematical mysticism. For the first time in their history, Americans are no longer clearly better off than their European cousins. A combination of stagnant pay levels, long working hours, minimal holidays, unsafe streets, declining welfare services, rampant racism, poor education and many other problems have tarnished the American dream. For a nation founded as a utopia, this is causing a major existential crisis. Kevin Kelly’s own magazine – Wired – regularly features denunciations of the French, the Chinese, the Singaporeans or anyone else who dares not to be American. In ‘Out of Control’, this sneering at funny foreigners is elevated to an eternal struggle between the divine and the profane. Unable to abandon its Cold War ideology, the USA must justify itself as the realisation of Nature, Mathematics and even God himself. The historically specific path taken by the development of capitalism in the USA has become the sacred fruit of eternal principles. The creation of ‘Artificial Life’ – the God-Man – will be the final proof of the superiority of the American way (pp. 441-53).

    The descent of Kelly’s analysis into cyber-spiritualism demonstrates the unscientific basis of his fusion of Darwin and Hayek. The mathematical simulation of reality cannot be substituted for the actual examination of nature and humanity. Above all, what is completely missing from Kelly’s analysis is history. He escapes into the eternal verities of mathematical equations as a means of avoiding the messy temporality of human life. Kelly yearns for complexity, quantum jumps, paradigm shifts and even for Lamarckian self-evolution. Yet, his vision of human society is impoverished and one- dimensional – there is no alternative to the racially-polarised ‘free market’ capitalism of late-twentieth century America. But the present-day circumstances of the USA aren’t simply the emergent properties of the ‘invisible hand’ of the marketplace. It is the result of specific decisions taken in series of unique historical circumstances. If American capitalism is faltering, it is because the political and economic elites are incapable of adopting policies to improve the conditions of the majority of the population. If, in contrast, German capitalism is thriving, it is because alternative policies were implemented within central Europe.

    Crucially, in many European countries, citizens have used the democratic republic to impose the ‘general will’ on the egoism of the entrepreneurs, such as environmental regulations and welfare provisions. Conscious decisions are needed to manage nature and help the needy. Even Kelly’s own iconic technology – the Net – is proof of the need for a mixed economy. The state, private businesses and d.i.y. culture have all made their own unique contributions to its successful development. Similarly, in the future, the imposition of social duties – such as universal Net access – on telcos and cable companies will benefit not only the poorer members of society, but also commercial companies. There will never be a mass market for on-line services without the masses being connected to the Net. Rather than abandoning ourselves to the spontaneous working of market forces – however lifelike mathematical models of the price mechanism might appear – what is needed is democratic debate amongst an informed citizenry about the direction in which they want to evolve. Far from wanting to be mindless members of a bee hive, we need to assert our rights to determine our own destiny. Rather than being ‘out of control’, humanity in the modern age needs to be in control. Let’s seize the time…

    Download Kevin Kelly’s book

  • REVIEWING REWIRED by Richard Barbrook

    Review of David Hudson in association with eLine Productions, Rewired: a brief (and opinionated) net history, Macmillan Technical Publishing, Indianapolis IA 1997, pp. 327, US$ 29.99.

    The publication of Rewired represents a new phenomenon: the book-of-the-web-site. Successful films and TV series have long been repackaged into books. Now, for the first time, popular web sites are spawning hardcopy versions of themselves. For over two years, the Rewired e-zine has been publishing articles and holding discussions on the social and cultural issues affecting the Net. As its name suggests, Rewired has particularly targeted the wacky positions championed by Wired magazine, the mouthpiece of the West Coast cyber-elite. By publishing Rewired, David Hudson has provided a clear and well-argued summary of what has been happening on the Rewired web site during the last couple of years. For this reviewer, there even is the peculiar pleasure of seeing my own personal appearances in Rewired once again!

    The traditional form of the book has one major advantage over the web site: a clear narrative structure. Although some commentators celebrate the non-linear nature of hypertext, users are often overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of interlinked information available on the web. Hudson has usefully edited the large amount of material found on the Rewired site into a linear analysis of the history and politics of cyberspace. However, unlike other Net books, Rewired is not a tale of specific technologies or particular companies. Above all, the author doesn’t claim that the development of the Net is realising some science fiction dream, such as the creation of ‘artificial life’. On the contrary, Hudson has written his history to demonstrate the importance of ordinary people in the construction of cyberspace.

    As the author explains, individuals have been subverting the official purposes of the Net from its very beginning. The U.S. military initially funded the early experiments in network communications to enhance its nuclear war fighting capabilities. Yet academics involved in these pioneering developments quickly transformed the new communications system into a tool for working, playing and gossiping together. Even in the present age of glossy corporate web sites, the success of an e-zine like Rewired demonstrates how the Net still retains its hacker roots. As Hudson points out, the “killer app” of cyberspace is not a particular piece of software, but the people who inhabit it.

    This humanist history of the Net has a definite political purpose. Hudson wants to refute the mystical positivism championed by Wired magazine. For instance, its editors believe that the latest developments in genetics prove that our minds are controlled by memes: the biological equivalents of self-propagating computer viruses. This pseudo-scientific nonsense would be simply laughable if it did not hide a particularly nasty form of politics. As Hudson shows, what appears to be 21st century biobabble is really the revival of 19th century Social Darwinism. In issue after issue, the editors of Wired have claimed that historically specific phenomenon of market capitalism is founded on ahistorical natural laws. Crucially, they predict that the spread of the Net will remove any need to compromise the purity of neo-liberal economics with state intervention, including help for the sick and needy. While posing as radical futurists, the editors of Wired act as cheerleaders for the reactionary policies of Newt Gingrich, the conservative Congressional leader.

    For anyone who still has illusions in the progressive nature of Wired, the most revealing section of Hudson’s book will be its truly scary interview with Louis Rossetto, the founder of the magazine. Sounding like a West Coast version of Mussolini, Rossetto rants against the corrupting effects of electoral democracy, minimum wages, welfare provisions and other collectivist iniquities introduced by the Left. In their place, he celebrates the victory within the marketplace of the heroic cyber-capitalist: a Nietzschean Superman emerging from the fusion of information technologies with biological advances. Although wrapped up in science fiction rhetoric, Rossetto’s politics are thus completely atavistic. As Hudson exposes in great detail, this authoritarianism is not simply ideological. Within Wired, writers who have dared to question its neo-liberal ‘party line’ quickly found out that their articles were censored – and that they were purged from the magazine’s staff. Fearful of serious debate, Rossetto ensured that all his critics were silenced.

    Because so few people within the USA challenge the conservative politics of Wired, the publication of Rewired is an important event over there. For instance, Hudson’s historical approach is useful for reminding Americans that the Net was invented using their tax dollars rather than through market competition. Above all, the author shows how Wired magazine’s vision of the future is really a return to an imaginary past. However, even after exposing such intellectual flaws, Hudson’s book has one dehabilitating weakness: its pessimism about any Left alternative to the retro-futurism of Wired. Despite ending Rewired with a look at the potential of community networks, Hudson accepts that cyberspace will inevitably be swallowed up by commercial interests. Much worse, he remains mesmerised by the sheer ideological fervour of the hi-tech neo-liberals. In an interview included in the book, Hudson agrees with Pauline Borsook – a Californian critic of Wired – that the neo-liberal ideologues face no serious opposition within cyberspace. Tortured with self-doubt, the American Left is incapable of imagining any future other than being defeated again and again.

    Such profound pessimism disables the power of Hudson’s trenchant criticisms of Wired magazine. Rossetto may be a dangerous fanatic, but it is his crazy opinions which are shaping the digital future. This lack of self-confidence shows how Rewired is a deeply Californian book. When myself and other European leftists appear in the book, our more optimistic views are largely marginalised simply because we are not from the West Coast. Even the political terms used to describe people’s opinions will disorientate many non-American readers. In this book, libertarians are not anarchists, but loopy neo-liberals; liberals are not Thatcherites, but confused leftists; and communitarians are certainly not communists! Beneath the peculiarity of American political descriptions lies a deeper confusion which disables the radical aspirations of this book. How can anyone take a Left seriously which erroneously calls itself liberal because it doesn’t dare even to be rhetorically socialist? Hudson may denounce the evil consequences of the neo-liberal economics championed by Wired magazine, but he possesses no social democratic alternative to such regressive policies. Despite all the evidence which he himself produces, Hudson is forced to accept that the Net must be the apotheosis of the free market. As a patriot, he certainly cannot find solutions in the Europe which so many emigrated from in search of the American dream.

    The author’s Californian parochialism seems very strange as he lives in the heart of Europe in Berlin rather than somewhere out on the West Coast! Yet, like so many exiles, Hudson ignores his physical surroundings in favour of his lost homeland. Of course, the Net has made such dislocations between mind and body much easier. As Hudson recounts, he uses local bulletin board services to remain an active participant within San Francisco cyber-culture without actually having to live there. However, it is still very odd that the author avoids any real comparisons between the USA and the EU. For Wired magazine has no such inhibitions. Articles regularly appear denouncing the sins of Europeans against the holy precepts of neo-liberalism. Rossetto even has a personal grudge against the continent because an earlier version of Wired flopped when it was launched in Amsterdam. Above all, him and his fellow editors have a deep fear that the welfare states of Europe may be a preferable place to live than their free market dystopia in California.

    Even with cyberspace itself, the lack of any real comparison between the two continents severely weakens the book. For the American experience is only one aspect of the history of computer networks. Crucially, Hudson fails to pick up on one particularly dumb assertion made by Rossetto in his interview for the book. The editor of Wired falsely claims that Minitel set back the development of the Net in France by ten years. Yet, in reality, French people were building virtual communities, enjoying cybersex and assuming false identities on-line over ten years before most Americans had even heard of computer-mediated communications. As a narrow-minded ideologue, Rossetto could never admit that a European nationalised telephone monopoly successfully pioneered the hi-tech future before the neo-liberal Californians. More importantly, this West Coast guru has to avoid facing the strangest paradox of all. While it remains difficult to sell on-line services over the Net, France Telecom has created a vibrant commercial sector within Minitel by using premium phone lines to charge consumers. Even commodity exchange works better on Minitel than the Net!

    The complete absence of any discussion of Minitel in Rewired is the clearest example of this book’s Californian parochialism. Although operating in a country adjacent to his own residence, Hudson – like Rossetto – thinks that Minitel is simply an obsolete technology which will have to conform to the Californian model of computer-mediated communications. Yet, the Minitel terminal is the precursor of the much heralded Network Computer. Furthermore, its different trajectory of development does demonstrate that there is no inherent neo-liberal logic at work in the emergence of the Net. Like many other sectors in France, Minitel grew through a creative synergy between the state, private companies and community initiative. The history of this parallel computer network is important because it illustrates how the Net too is the product of a similar miscegenation between different sectors of society.

    Rather than the realisation of free market ideology, the Net is therefore – if anything – proof of the inevitability of the mixed economy in the contemporary world. Far from becoming more pessimistic, the spread of computer networks should now be making the American Left increasingly optimistic. As neo-liberal ideology cannot be realised within cyberspace, the way will eventually be opened up for more radical uses of interactive technologies. Above all, the global nature of the Net will slowly break down the isolation of Americans from other people’s experiences, including those of the wicked Europeans. Hudson maybe won’t have to be so reticent about sharing his overseas experiences with the folks back home. As their circumstances improve, American leftists in time might acquire the self-confidence to call themselves social democrats rather than liberals! The future will be wired, but certainly not in ways imagined by Wired – or even, at this point, by Rewired…..

  • GIVING IS RECEIVING by Richard Barbrook

    One of the most striking features of the Net is the ubiquity of its hi-tech version of the gift economy. When you go on-line, most information is available for free. Other users are happy to share music, movies and software with you. People spend hours building websites which they don’t charge you for visiting. You are invited to join listservers which will fill your in-box with e-mails every day. Compared to the media developed during the past 200 years, what makes the new media into something new is the vitality of these non-commercial activities. Information is for sharing not for selling. Knowledge is a gift not a commodity. The Net is a strange and novel form of mass communications.

    Yet, during the late-1990s dotcom boom, politicians, CEOs and experts tried to convince us that the Net was simply technological upgrade of the old media system – or even just an electronic mail-order catalogue. The convergence of computing, telecommunications and the media was supposedly creating the “information superhighway”: a distribution system for commercial producers to sell their goods and services to passive consumers. Any misuse of the network could easily be prevented by an irresistible combination of strong encryption, intrusive surveillance and draconian copyright laws. Corporate brochures, government pronouncements and media reports repeatedly told us that the Net was the technological apotheosis of neo-liberalism: a global electronic marketplace where individuals and companies could trade with each other unfettered by state regulations, trade unions or national boundaries. Books, films, music and software were in the process of losing their material form and would inevitably be transformed into virtual products. Paying for things would be replaced by paying for downloads. In the dotcom future, every piece of information would be a commodity and everyone would be a media entrepreneur.

    At the time, there seemed little reason to doubt this conventional wisdom. There was no alternative to free market capitalism. America had triumphed in the Cold War. The Left had learnt to love big business. The stock markets were booming. Above all, bitter experience had taught us that the radical potential of new technologies is always short-lived. For instance, instead of overthrowing the ‘society of the spectacle’, the opening up of the FM spectrum by community radio stations in the USA in the 1960s and in Europe in the 1970s rapidly led to the monopolisation of the airwaves by commercial operators on both continents. Why should anyone expect things would be any different on the Net? Academics, nerds and enthusiasts may have invented this new form of communications. But who could doubt that their time was now over? Rich and powerful media corporations were already moving in to remould the Net in their own interests. Although there would be plenty of opportunities for new businesses to prosper within the electronic marketplace, any different way of doing things would be marginalised. The hi-tech gift economy was finished. The triumph of the dotcoms was assured.

    How wrong can you be? Only a few years later, everything seems very different. Leading Net companies have gone bust. Their CEOs are disgraced – and some are even on trial for fraud. The speculation in dotcom shares has tipped the global economy into recession. In contrast, the hi-tech gift economy has not only survived, but is also flourishing. Far from disappearing, this sector is still at the forefront of innovation on the Net. Peer-to-peer computing. File-sharing. Wi-fi. Network communities. The dotcom boosters have been proven to be mistaken. The monopolisation of the Net by commercial interests wasn’t inevitable. What happened in the old media didn’t have to be repeated in the new media. Of course, money is being made on the Net. People buy products from e-commerce sites. Books. Videos. Fridges. Computers. Motor cars. Plane tickets. Companies purchase goods and services from on-line suppliers. Corporate intranets. E-business extranets. Component auctions. B2B networks. However, the electronic marketplace is missing what was once predicted to be its principle function: the buying and selling of information in virtual forms.

    Although old media is bought over the Net, it has proved almost impossible to persuade people to pay for downloading their digital equivalents. With the exception of the real-time services provided by pornography and financial websites, it is now almost universally assumed that information should be available for free on the Net. Pirate MP3s. Morpheus. “E-mail this text to a friend.” Why should I pay for a tune, a movie or a text when someone somewhere will give it to me for free? It can be technically difficult for people to learn how to swap files. But the rewards for knowing how to use these programs are almost immediate. Welcome to the free world – a world where everything is for free! The media corporations are incapable of reversing this decommodification of information. Encryption systems are broken. Surveillance of every Net user is impossible. Copyright laws are unenforceable. Even on-line advertising has been a disappointment. This time around, community has trumped commerce.

    Crucially, the hi-tech gift economy isn’t just a method of pirating commercially-available media. It has also proved to be an excellent method of working together without the immediate mediation of markets and bureaucracies. We can collaborate in creative projects with people from across the world. We are able to publish our own media without needing prior approval from corporate bosses or state regulators. Websites. Open source software. “Join our listserver.” The Net is the do-it-yourself technology for the DIY culture. As well as its altruistic appeal, contributing time and effort to the hi-tech gift economy is in our egotistical self-interest. However much of our own work we give away, we will always get more information back in return from all the other people who are on the network. Who wants to engage in equal exchange within an electronic marketplace when we receive more than we donate within the hi-tech gift economy? As the Enlightenment founders of liberal economics pointed out, private vice is the firmest foundation for public virtue.

    Who is threatened by this outbreak of selfish altruism on the Net? Anyone who has profited from information scarcity in the past. Copyright emerged in a world with only limited media. Granting a monopoly over each piece of information created markets for cultural commodities. The writer, the artist and the musician – and their employers – had something to trade with the farmer, the clerk and the factory worker – and their employers. Over the past few centuries, the dynamic development of capitalism has – slowly but surely – ended the scarcity of information. Printing and broadcasting technologies enabled the mass production of knowledge and culture. Information has become ever cheaper. The Net is now completing this process. It costs almost nothing to make perfect copies of digital data. Information really is free. The owners of copyrights are desperately trying to slowdown this process of decommodification. They have lobbied and browbeaten politicians to introduce repressive laws to protect the source of their wealth and power. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The EU Copyright Directive. Anyone who distributes unauthorised copies of copyright material over the Net must be punished. Anyone who invents software potentially useful for on-line piracy should be criminalised. But state power is a limited tool against the logic of social evolution. Individuals may suffer, but progress can’t be stopped altogether. Sooner or later, even the most technologically illiterate politician will realise that it is impossible to enforce information scarcity in an age of information plenty.

    The triumph of the hi-tech gift economy is the return of the repressed. Sharing information is exactly what the Net was invented for. Scientists needed unhindered access to each other’s research. Hackers enjoyed writing code together. Activists wanted to promote their causes. These pioneers hardwired their own social mores into the technical protocols of the Net. Unlike media corporations, they did not make their living from buying and selling information. On the contrary, they were already living within real-life gift economies. Scientists achieve fame by contributing to journals and giving papers at conferences. Hackers gain respect from their peers by improving open source programs and cracking encrypted software. Activists win support for their political positions by publicising their ideas to the widest possible audience. If in no other way, the pioneers of the Net were all in agreement about one thing: copyright laws and proprietary formats are obstacles to their preferred ways of working. No wonder that they believed “information wants to be free” in the most literal economic sense of the word…

    During the past few years, over-exuberant investors in dotcom start-ups have tried to ignore the non-commercial origins of the Net. Yet the widespread popularity of swapping information is a reminder of what the system was designed to do. Almost every academic discipline, political cause, cultural movement, popular hobby and private obsession has a presence on the Net. Whether for work or for pleasure, people are creating websites, bulletin boards, listservers and chat rooms. Although only a minority are now engaged in scientific research, hacking or political activism, the overwhelming majority of Net users participate within the hi-tech gift economy. Quite spontaneously, most people have opted to share knowledge rather than to trade media commodities when on-line. This is why – instead of the concept of the electronic marketplace – the community vision of its originators still drives forward the technological development of the Net. Every computer is a server. The browser is an editor. Information is a process. Knowledge is for sharing. The hi-tech gift economy is a future which is still under construction.

    For you ain’t seen nothing yet. The Net is in the early stages of its development. The hardware is too expensive and the software is too clunky. Most users still lack the skills and technologies to take full advantage of its potential. This is why the sharing of MP3s is only a taster of what is to come. The music corporations can close down Napster and try to flood its successors with spam files. But what they can’t do is make people forget that they are able to share and modify information with each other. All the copyright owners can do is slow down history. As bandwidth increases and interfaces improve, the prevention of media piracy will become ever more difficult. No copyright law or encryption system is going to stop the swapping of information between consenting adults in the long-run. The media corporations will even find themselves increasingly isolated from their fellow capitalists. For anyone selling material goods and services, the spread of peer-to-peer computing is an opportunity not a menace. Flexible working. Knowledge dissemination. Flattened hierarchies. Consumer participation in production. Why should most capitalists care about copyright infringement if they are making money on the Net in other ways? Copyright laws become an anachronism when the ‘cutting-edge’ of hardware capitalism is software communism.

    Despite its many benefits in the wider economy, the greatest impact of the hi-tech gift economy will still be cultural. The information society is built upon information. The Net already provides the structure for realising an unfulfilled revolutionary demand: media freedom for all. Authors can publish their writings on their own websites. Musicians can release their tunes on MP3 first. Film-makers can distribute digital files of their movies. Not just the right to consume media, but also the right to produce media too. Even better, the Net is inspiring novel forms of expression. Things beyond the delights of making and distributing old media in improved ways, Net.Art. Blogging. Webcams. These are the first experiments in a new aesthetics – an aesthetics which reflect the social mores and technical protocols of the Net. Interactive. Modifiable. Accessible. Communal. Democratic. Upgradable. We can only imagine what our imaginations will be able to create once the Net begins to reach its full potential. We can only dream what happens when the hi-tech gift economy makes possible the flourishing of a socially advanced gift culture:

    “We must rediscover the pleasure of giving: giving because you have so much. What beautiful and priceless potlatches the affluent society will see – whether it likes it or not! – when the exuberance of the younger generation discovers the pure gift.”  Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, page 70.

  • THE DIGITAL ECONOMY by Richard Barbrook

    Commodities or Gifts?

    The Net is now the iconic technology of our age. From California, Wired magazine has achieved global notoriety through its claims that the Net will create the sort of free market capitalism until now only found in neo-classical economics textbooks. Everyone will be able to buy and sell in cyberspace without restrictions. States will no longer be able to control electronic commerce which can cross national borders without hinderance. The Net will allow the whole world to realise the American dream of material riches. Coming from California, this neo-liberal fantasy has even acquired a mystical dimension. By releasing the supposed laws of nature immanent in unregulated capitalism, the information technologies will allegedly lead to the birth of a new race of ‘post-humans’: cyborg capitalists freed of the restrictions of the flesh. Like Victorian factory-owners, hi-tech neo-liberals believe that their narrow self-interest represents the pinnacle of Darwinian evolution.

    The Californian ideology is the fantasy of the ‘virtual class’: the West Coast entrepreneurs and engineers who hope to make their fortunes out of the Net. Yet, Europeans are not immune from the influence of this Californian dreaming. With the collapse of Stalinism, many intellectuals have adopted a stance of post-modern nihilism which offers no alternative to neo-liberalism. Some on the Left even take a masochistic pleasure in seeing all forms of technological innovation as the triumph of capitalist domination. According to these pessimists, the cause of labour is lost in cyberspace. Yet, the hi-tech neo-liberalism championed by the Californian ideologues is itself an attempt to control the Promethean power of human creativity. As global communications have improved, the wider availability of capital and materials has undermined social power based solely on the monopoly control of wealth. Above all, constant technological innovation makes success in the marketplace increasingly dependant on the skills and enthusiasm of the workforce. In the emerging digital economy, nothing is more precious than human ingenuity.

    For over two hundred years, the boredom and discipline of the factory system were accepted as the only possible methods of increasing our material wealth. Under Fordism, workers could live better than medieval aristocrats. However, once the consumer society was no longer a novelty, many people started looking for something beyond money. Ever since the ’60s, workers have been seeking more autonomy in their jobs and more freedom in their personal lives. Abandoning traditional conservatism, neo-liberals have used marketisation and privatisation to recuperate these aspirations. For instance, talented workers within the hi-tech industries are promised the possibility of running their own companies and enjoying the independence bought by great wealth. If you have a good idea and lots of luck, you too can become a member of the ‘virtual class’.

    However, this hi-tech neo-liberalism is a false dream for most people. In the USA, average wages have been falling for twenty years. In the EU, mass unemployment has become a permanent phenomenon. Even the lucky few of the ‘virtual class’ cannot completely isolate themselves by hiding in their gated suburbs and encrypted cyberspace from the social and ecological problems exacerbated by neo-liberalism. Above all, free market solutions cannot remove alienation within the workplace. Under neo-liberalism, individual autonomy is only expressed through deal-making rather than making useful and beautiful artifacts. The history of computing and hypermedia is filled with sad tales of engineers and artists who have sacrificed their creativity to the demands of paper-shuffling. In place of the Californian ideology, what is now needed is a more profound understanding of the impact of the Net on our society. For, instead of being the technological expression of neo-liberalism, the emergence of the digital economy demonstrates the need to create a twenty-first century form of social democracy.

    The origins of the Net itself exposes the fairy tale quality of the Californian ideology. Far from being the product of the free market, it was created as one part of a huge military research programme funded by American tax-payers to counter the threat posed by the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union. Like many Cold War inventions, the Net could have remained a official secret. However, when it was being developed within the universities, academics and students hijacked the new technology for their own purposes. From on-line discussion groups through electronic mail to the Web, the most popular features of the Net were developed by enthusiasts. This non-commercial ethos attracted others who began to develop the Net as a new form of community media. Even today, the majority of the material available on the Net is made by amateurs. Although they have produced much of the hardware, it is the entrepreneurs who were the last people to comprehend the potential of the Net. The reason that Microsoft and other corporations are pouring billions of dollars into cyberspace is precisely because they have to catch up with the widespread use of the Net by state-funded institutions and by DIY culture.

    The Net, therefore, is not the harbinger of a globalised unregulated marketplace. On the contrary, its profane history exemplifies the miscegenation of state, commercial and community interests within the emerging digital economy. Each sector will have its part to play and each cannot exist without the other. For example, public intervention is needed to ensure that a broadband network linking all households and businesses is built. If left to unregulated market forces, universal access to the new information services will be very slow in arriving. Yet, the commercial potential of the Net can only be fully realised through the construction of the fibre-optic grid which covers the whole population. As with earlier types of utilities, profitable on-line businesses will only flourish through state regulation – and even ownership – of the digital infrastructure.

    Similarly, the further development of DIY culture is also necessary. As the history of the Net demonstrates, hacking, piracy, shareware and open architecture systems all helped to overcome the limitations of both state and commercial interests. Whether for political or profit-making reasons, large institutions are still trying to impose their own proprietary controls over cyberspace. Yet, one of the major attractions of the Net for its users is that it is not tightly controlled by any major public or private bureaucracy. Already, a minority of the population can use the Net to inform, educate and play together outside both the state and the market. Once a broadband network is built, everyone will have the opportunity to join this hi-tech gift economy. Most current Net users don’t simply download other people’s products. They also want to express themselves through their own web sites or within on-line conferences. Unlike traditional media, the Net is not just a spectacle for passive consumption but also a participatory activity.

    Ironically, this DIY culture is also one of the essential preconditions for the development of a successful commercial sector within the Net. By allowing people to acquire some basic knowledge of making hypermedia, the hi-tech gift economy is helping to create a skilled and innovative digital labour force. However, it is very difficult to adapt the traditional factory system to managing these new workers. The rapid spread of personal computing and now the Net are the technological expressions of the desire of many people to escape from the petty controls of the shopfloor and the office. Despite the insecurity of short-term contracts, they want to recover the independence of craft labour which was lost during the process of industrialisation. Because of rapid technological innovation, skilled workers within the hypermedia and computing industries are precisely those best able to assert this desire for autonomy.

    While neo-liberals can only can promise success to a privileged few, the reemergence of artisanal methods offers a way of working within the commercial sector which most creative labourers can adopt. Already, digital artisans are the people pushing the cultural and technical limits of hypermedia as far forward as possible. Crucially, their virtual artifacts can be easily reproduced and distributed through the Net. For the first time, artisans can take advantage of the economies of scale up to now only enjoyed by factory-owners. Far from being a return to a low-tech and impoverished past, the contemporary revival of artisanship is therefore at the ‘cutting edge’ of the development of post-Fordism.

    The evolution of capitalism has been reflected through the process of technological advance. While classical liberalism depended on coal-mining and metal-working, Fordism produced electro-magnetic and chemical technologies. At the end of the twentieth century, it is now claimed that the Net is creating a new economic paradigm. However, the full benefit of an innovative technology can only be realised by changing the ways of working. The rise of Fordism didn’t just depend on the invention of the motor car and other mass consumer goods. Above all, this form of capitalism relied on the adoption of assembly-line methods of production. Even the Californian ideologues argue that the expansion of the Net depends upon the subordination or cooption of workers by unregulated markets. Despite their overt technological determinism, they implicitly accept that the organisation of labour is at the centre of the emerging digital economy.

    However, in practice, hi-tech neo-liberalism is hindering the development of a thriving digital economy. For instance, only a small minority can be lucky enough to become members of the ‘virtual class’. The creative potential of most makers of hypermedia will still be limited by Fordist methods of production. This is why we should not be intimidated by simple-minded slogans from California. Instead, we need to comprehend the complexity of the mixed economy being produced by post-Fordism. Above all, we have to recognise that human ingenuity is the most important feature of this emerging digital economy. The state, commercial companies and DIY culture are all different ways of realising the Promethean spirit of human creativity. Under Fordism, the factory worker was seen as a heroic figure – the embodiment of hope of a better future. In contemporary society, the digital artisan has taken over this role. Whether producing inside the public, money-commodity or gift economies, digital artisans represent a future centred on skilled, creative and autonomous labour. The promise of the digital economy lies not just in the practical potential of the new information technologies, but, more importantly, in the emergence of this new type of worker. This is why the digital artisans are pioneers of a social democracy fit for the twenty-first century.

    A translated version of this article appeared in Freitag, 18th July 1997.

  • ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY by Richard Barbrook

    An Analysis of On-Line Representation

    The Limits of Representation

    At the end of the twentieth century, the advocates of liberal democracy are faced with a strange paradox. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, its ideological ascendancy across the world has never been more complete. Yet, at the same time, voters within the industrialised countries are increasingly disillusioned with the political process. Tarnished by broken promises and widespread sleaze, the present British Conservative government is held in contempt even by its erstwhile supporters. In the recent French presidential elections, the eventual winner – Jacques Chirac – was the first choice of only a fifth of the electorate. In the USA, the situation is even worse. In successive elections, a majority of Americans haven’t bothered to vote at all.

    The Technological Fix

    As the alienation of voters increases, technology is increasingly been touted as a magical cure for this pressing political problem. Mesmerised by the rapid convergence of telecommunications, the media and computing, many people now believe that the ‘information superhighway’ will create the conditions for the direct participation of all citizens in political decision-making. (For instance, see the writings of Howard Rheingold). Back in the ’60s, this technological utopia was first propounded by the Situationists and other New Left groups. Rejecting distrusted party politicians, these young revolutionaries wanted people to run their own lives through a hi-tech form of direct democracy – the electronic agora. Inspired by this vision, activists across the world set up a wide variety of radical media from pirate radio stations to hackers’ bulletin boards. (See my article on Media Freedom).

    In a bizarre twist, this left-wing anarchism is now being echoed by free-market zealots within the American Republican party. Newt Gingrich – the Speaker of the House of Representatives – believes that the Internet will create ‘electronic town halls’ where voters can directly participate within the political process. Fearful of big government, American conservatives hope that information technologies will allow them to return to the simple days of the early Republic when hard-working white folk solved their own problems through public meetings rather than relied upon the impersonal aid of the welfare state. (See the publications of the Progress and Freedom Foundation).

    Whether from left or right, these techno-utopians hope that the gulf between the electorate and their representatives can be overcome by connecting them together electronically – or by bypassing the politicians altogether. However, up to now, the reality of electronic democracy has been rather more prosaic. Soon after he was elected, President Bill Clinton set up a Web site for the White House where government documents can be downloaded and e-mail can be sent. Following this precedent, other American politicians and foreign governments have also established their own Web sites to promote their views. Some politicians have even taken part in discussions within newsgroups or in on-line conference. Yet, in reality, these experiments have not lived up to the hype of the utopians. Tapping furiously on a keyboard to your M.P. can’t suddenly overcome decades of cynicism about the political process. More seriously, the membership of this embryonic electronic agora has so far been limited to a privileged minority of engineers, academics and professionals who have access to the Net.

    Yet, even when the whole population is eventually wired up, the utopia of direct democracy will still face the most important obstacle of all: the problem of how large numbers of people can make communicate and take decisions together. However good it is, a new technology cannot solve fundamental social and political problems by itself. Back in the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau – the Enlightenment philosopher – believed that democracy could only be created through a public meeting of all citizens – as happened in Swiss villages or New England towns of the period. However, with the emergence of modern nation states, it was no longer possible for every citizen to meet in one place at the same time. Even if the electronic agora eliminates the physical limitations on citizens gathering together in one place by creating virtual spaces, it cannot remove the entirely social problem of how large groups of people can successfully interact with one another. As shown by existing Net conferencing programs, it becomes very difficult to hold a meaningful conversation if everyone is talking at once. Unless an electronic agora only consists of a small number of people, some form of representation will have to be used to mediate between the different social, cultural and geographical groups wishing to shape political decision-making. Despite the dreams of the techno-anarchists, wiring up the country wouldn’t get rid of the need for professional politicians.

    What Can Be Done

    Yet, despite its limitations, the Net can still improve the dissemination of political information and improve the accountability of elected representatives. For example, the Zapatista rebels in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico have been using Web sites and newsgroups to call for support for their struggle for land reform. Jose Angel Gurria – Mexico’s Foreign Minister – recently acknowledged that the government had been forced into half-hearted negotiations with the insurgents only because of the power of local and global public opinion mobilised by the Net. It is becoming much more difficult for those in authority to look the other way when news reports made by those people suffering from economic exploitation and corrupt officials are being sent directly into the homes of their electorates.

    Despite not realising the direct democracy dreamed of by left or right-wing anarchists, this more limited version of the electronic agora will play a key role in revitalising our democratic institutions. As the Demos think-tank has recently pointed out, electronic democracy will only be useful as one part of an overall modernisation of the political process – along with electoral reforms, protection of civil liberties, curbs on corruption and an end to official secrecy. Technology cannot cure political or social problems by itself, but it can be used to reinforce human solutions. Back in the late-eighteenth century, republican philosophers called for the creation of an informed citizenry who would possess the knowledge needed to make those political decisions affecting their own lives. Maybe, as we enter the twenty-first century, the Net will help to realise this democratic ideal for the first time.

    A shortened version of this article appeared in New Scientist, 29 July 1995.

  • THE SACRED CYBORG by Richard Barbrook

    The Search for Meaning

    ‘Religion is a dream, in which our own conceptions and emotions appear to us as separate existences, beings out of ourselves.’ – Ludwig Feurbach, The Essence of Christianity.

    During the Cold War, we were told that we had a stark choice between two incompatible ideologies: liberal democracy or totalitarian socialism. However, as the decades of struggle for world domination continued, people became increasingly reluctant to sacrifice themselves for the utopias championed by the competing superpowers. By time the Cold War ended, it was very difficult to believe that either the American or Soviet empires provided a universal model for human development. The ‘grand narratives’ of both liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism had been discredited by the actions of their superpower patrons. As the post-modernists eagerly pointed out, philosophies of liberation had turned into ideologies of domination.

    Yet the end of the Cold War has not led to the demise of ideology. On the contrary, other ‘grand narratives’ have rapidly filled the gap left by the implosion of liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism. Because the secular utopias of the Cold War are no longer credible, many of the contemporary ideologies have a strong spiritual component. From the USA to Iran, religious fundamentalists dream of returning to an imaginary past. However, the acolytes of these reactionary movements have great difficulty in reconciling the pre-modern tenets of their spiritual beliefs with the modern reality of their everyday lives. This has opened a space for more syncretic belief systems. Ever since the advent of modernity, there have been a succession of new faiths which tried to combine religion with science. Freemasonry, Saint-Simonism, Christian Science, Freudianism and Scientology are only the most well known attempts to reconcile these two opposites. But, despite their ingenuity, all these cults have been surpassed by the relentless process of modernisation. What many people now want is a more up-to-date, hi-tech way of combining religion and science.

    Responding to this spiritual hunger, many different varieties of mystical positivism are now flourishing. From the mathematics of chaos to the development of hypermedia, the latest advances in science and technology are raided for their magical significance. For instance, some gurus are championing the concept of memes: the self-replicating cultural entities which supposedly control our destiny. This new faith claims inspiration from the latest researches in evolutionary theory, which used to be the fiercest opponent of religion. Yet, at the same time, the memes cult also believes that matter is controlled by spirit, which has been the basis of religion for thousands of years. While many people find it impossible to accept that gods and angels could control their lives, they are happily able to believe in exactly the same concept as long as these spirits are renamed memes.

    According to some acolytes of this new faith, the ghostly memes are even about to take physical form. As in the New Testament, the spirit will actually become matter. However, the new saviour will not be in human form. Instead, in the age of the Net and the PC, the God-Man must emerge from silicon, plastic and metal. Far from being an isolated fantasy, this is now one of the most popular manifestations of contemporary mysticism. For decades, governments and corporations have been funding lots of expensive research into Artificial Intelligence and sentient robots. As Shoshana Zuboff points out in The Age of the Smart Machine, the simulation of human reasoning by machines underpins much of the rapid increase in economic productivity now occurring within certain industries. However, the disciples of Hans Moravec, Marvin Minsky or other proponents of artificial life aren’t really interested in how smart machines can make cheaper commodities or provide better services. Instead they are searching for spiritual salvation in machine form. Above all, they dream of witnessing the birth of the silicon God-Man.

    Like the Christian Apocalypse, the arrival of this Artificial Intelligence is perpetually postponed. Yet, it remains a powerful contemporary myth. In science fiction, conscious computers and sassy robots are essential elements of the genre. From Rachel in Bladerunner to Data in Star Trek TNG, sci-fi stories use the fantasy of artificial life to express the modernist dilemma: what makes us truly human? Yet, when embraced by mystical positivism, this sci-fi anthropomorphism ironically becomes the repository of some very pre-modern desires. As in traditional religion, the cult of Artificial Intelligence feeds off atavistic fantasies: making babies without sex; being the master of slaves; achieving immortality; and even turning into pure Spirit. With secular utopias discredited, old myths are reborn as sci-fi monsters.

    Fantasy 1: Men Having Babies

    ‘A new species would bless me as their creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs.’  Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus.

    The creation of life without sex is an ancient patriarchal myth. In Christianity and other pre-modern religions, the God-Man was conceived without the need for the messy emotions aroused by sexual desire. Because pregnancy by divine intervention is no longer credible, we now have virgin births produced through science. By pretending human consciousness is like a computer program, some scientists claim that they can build machines which will think for themselves. This wild assertion seems like a radical feminist parody of the masculine bias of science. Gripped by womb envy, male scientists try to make a form of life without emotion, empathy and sociability.

    In contrast, in her pioneering story of artificial life, Mary Shelley portrays the monster as a tragic figure precisely because his crimes are a reaction against his exclusion from the emotional warmth of human society. Lacking Mary Shelley’s political convictions, the boosters for Artificial Intelligence miss this fundamental point. Human consciousness isn’t simply the product of electrical pulses within the brain. It is also the culmination of a long process of social development. Our intelligence is not only individual, but also collective. At the moment, we form a species of around 5 billion conscious beings on this planet. But many of these autonomous intelligences are having a bad time. About half the world’s population live in poverty and almost a quarter are destitute. Rather than dream of building God-Men, we should instead be working out how smart machines can help us to look after one another and to care for our planet. The heirs of the ‘modern Prometheus’ haven’t yet implemented the republican ideals championed by Mary Shelley in Frankenstein.

    Fantasy 2: Loyal Slaves

    ‘”The tv set shouted, ‘- duplicates the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War Southern states! Either as body servants or tireless field hands, the custom-tailored humanoid robot – designed specifically for YOUR UNIQUE NEEDS, FOR YOU AND YOU ALONE – given to you on your arrival absolutely free, equipped fully, as specified by you before your departure from Earth…”‘ Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electronic Sheep?.

    The search for artificial life involves another retrogressive fantasy: the desire for slavery without guilt. Many white Americans are still nostalgic for the Old South. Some Europeans and Asians dream of returning to the feudal past. The advocates of Artificial Intelligence promise to realise these reactionary fantasies in a hi-tech form. In their sci-fi future, the privileged will enjoy unquestioning service from robot slaves. Programmed to obey without question, artificial life will always be content with its menial status. No Spartacus or Toussaint L’Ouverture will ever threaten the pleasures of these masters of robot slaves.

    However, in reality, it is impossible to enjoy the benefits of slave labour without the reality of human bondage. Even if work is carried out by robots, humans are needed to invent, build and maintain machines. Technology is never simply a thing. It is also the crystallisation of social relationships between people. For instance, in the early-twentieth century, the technologies associated with manufacture on assembly-lines paralleled the imposition of Taylorist labour discipline within factories. Over the past few decades, the spread of the PC and the Net within the workplace has reflected the emergence of post-Fordist methods of organising work. As Douglas Landauer points out in The Trouble With Computers, the technical potential of information technologies can only be fully realised through maximising the creative imagination of humans. Rather than dream about robot slaves, we instead need to celebrate the inventive powers of the digital artisans. By acquiring new craft skills, they use hardware and software to create useful and beautiful hypermedia. For them, technology is a tool rather than a servant. The emergence of digital artisans is the latest manifestation of the Hegelian project of modernity. In this vision of the future, the rule of the masters is inevitably doomed because only slaves understand how to transform the world through hard work.

    Fantasy 3: Cyborg Immortality

    “You wanted to know who I am. I gave you one answer. A robot-remote. A servo-unit operated by a program stored in a bopper spaceship. But…I’m still Misty-girl too. The soul IS the software, you know. The software is what counts, the habits and the memories. The brain and the body are just meat, seeds for the organ-tanks.” – Rudy Rucker, Software.

    The most potent fantasy of traditional religion was its promise of eternal life. By claiming to possess the magic needed to overcome death, priests soothed our fear of inevitable physical annihilation and made bearable the loss of our loved ones. However, this false promise has long been discredited by the advance of science. This makes people yearn for a hi-tech way to avoid bodily disintegration. Like the Ancient Egyptians mummifying their dead, Marvin Minsky and others now advocate making digital simulacra of the deceased. They even believe that they will live on after death through computer or robot models of themselves. Instead of waiting for divine resurrection, their souls will be instantly reincarnated within new silicon bodies.

    Ironically, this new spiritualism is inspired by the profound transformation of our everyday lives by technology. We take it for granted that we can have light at night, fly across oceans and communicate with people on the other side of the world. Above all, we expect medical science to postpone our mortality. Unlike our ancestors, we’re unlikely to die in early childhood, almost certainly survive giving birth and will probably live for many decades. From glasses to pace-makers, we’ve invented an array of technologies to compensate for our bodily weaknesses and to prolong our physical existence. In the modern world, we’re all cyborgs now. Yet, despite these technical advances, we still remain flesh ‘n’ blood humans. We’re profane rather than sacred cyborgs. We have to accept our own mortality. As in the past, the search for the chimera of immortality distracts us from the practical problems of improving the years of life which we do have. There are no mystical solutions to the existential dilemmas of the human condition.

    Fantasy 4: Becoming Pure Spirit

    ‘”There’s a great burning column, like a tree of fire, reaching above the western horizon. It’s a long way off, right round the world. I know where it springs from: THEY’RE on their way at last, to become part of the Overmind. Their probation has ended: they’re leaving the last remnants of matter behind.”‘ Arthur C. Clarke, Childhood’s End.

    The desire for a silicon body usually leads to an even more primitive form of mysticism: the fantasy of the separation of mind from matter. According to the Gnostics, religious fervour would allow the pure soul to leave the corrupt flesh and to merge with the God-head. In the modern world, we can’t believe that our spirits can ascend to heaven by magical means. Instead, we’re urged to fantasise about abandoning our bodies to live in cyberspace. Already, if we use Minitel messageries, IRCs or MUDs, we can adopt virtual identities distinct from our everyday selves. The adepts of mystical positivism wish to take this process to its illogical conclusion. Our avatars will no longer be simply means of role-playing. They will become our sole form of existence. They will even allow us to fuse together into a cyber-version of the Overmind.

    As with its other fantasies, this manifestation of the artificial life cult partially draws on our experiences of modern life. People living in modern societies are dependent on information technologies to overcome the limitations of time and space. Both in work and at play, we spend increasing amounts of time in cyberspace. But digital technologies cannot eliminate the interdependence of our minds and bodies. Even when we’re being avatars in cyberspace, our physical beings remain sitting in front of the screen. The PC, the Net, the telephone and the media are tools which enhance our ability to work and play together. Believing that these technologies can lead to a digital nirvana simply obscures the crucial question: how can hypermedia be used to improve the lives of the majority of people on the planet. Half the world’s population hasn’t yet got access to a telephone let alone the Net. Mystical answers do not provide practical solutions to our problems.

    The Modern Condition

    ‘Modernity caricatures and cashes in on the total revolution which never happened.’  Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity.

    Although post-modernists denounce ‘grand narratives’, the popularity of the Artificial Intelligence myth demonstrates our deep desire to understand our historical past and our likely future. Far from slowing down, the recent rapid spread of PC ownership and Net usage shows that the pace of change is speeding up again. Old industries have gone into decline and new ways of working are emerging. But neither liberal democracy nor totalitarian socialism are able to explain what is going on. Because these tired political ideologies are no longer credible, an opening has been created for new explanations by non-politicians. Freed from the necessity of studying past and present human societies, priests and scientists are able to advocate fantastic explanations of human destiny. In mystical positivism, the errors of both are combined together to form a potent ‘grand narrative’ for our age. With the aid of rational science, we will fulfill our irrational fantasy of becoming Gods.

    For, despite its futurist rhetoric, mystical positivism is really a restatement of very traditional ideas: virgin birth; slave-ownership; life after death; and the existence of spirits. In the writings of Hans Moravec, Marvin Minsky and others, the robot is the fetishised expression of pre-modern desires. Old religious myths materialised in silicon, plastic and metal. New Age illusions expressed in the language of hard science. But, even if they are fundamentally crazy, the dreams of mystical positivism do answer the human need for some kind of ‘grand narrative’. Because the ideologies of liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism are defunct, biological reductionism and cyber-utopianism can create a new vision of our future.

    However, the main effect of this mystical positivism is to hinder clear thinking about how to build a better future. As in the past, a fervent belief in supernatural nirvana is a good excuse to avoid doing anything practical about mundane earthly problems. In the USA, the ‘virtual class’ of hi-tech entrepreneurs and skilled workers is already withdrawing into its gated suburbs and encrypted cyberspace. The myth of artificial life reflects this social autism. Obsessed with creating the God-Man, the privileged can ignore the continued existence of arbitrary power and economic injustice. Believing that they’re about to become post-human, members of the ‘virtual class’ are able to suppress their troublesome feelings of solidarity with humanity as a whole.

    Yet, in reality, we cannot create the good society and maintain environmental stability without a more equitable distribution of wealth and power. We therefore need a SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ‘grand narrative’ which can inspire people to overcome the many obstacles to human happiness. The failure of the secular ideologies of the Cold War is not an excuse to abandon all rationality. On the contrary, the demise of liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism is an opportunity to revitalise the project of modernity. The principles of the French revolution – freedom, equality and solidarity – are still relevant. What we need now is some hard thinking and practical work on how these ideals can be realised within a contemporary context. Rather than using information technologies to form a new religion, we should be exploring how they can be used as tools for completing the modernist project. The introduction of smart machines will liberate us from much of the mundane work which we still have to do. The deepening of our skills in using digital technologies will allow us to invent new goods and services for ourselves. However, women will give birth to babies, slaves won’t do all the work, we can’t live forever and we will remain flesh. The rejection of the myth of artificial life is a necessary step towards the improvement of the reality of human lives. We will not be freed by any sacred cyborg. We can only liberate ourselves through intelligent thinking and hard work. We still have a really existing world to win…

  • THE MEMESIS CRITIQUE by Richard Barbrook

    A critique of the Memesis statement of Ars Electronica ’96

    ASSERTION 1

    >The human being, characterized by a remarkable ability to process information…

    In the first subclause of the opening sentence, the human ability to communicate complex thoughts to each other is elevated above all other aspects of our existence. Although expressed in computer jargon, this separation of thinking from doing is one of the oldest inversions found in philosophy, as in Plato’s parable of the cave. For centuries, it was used the conjuring trick of the priestly caste – elevating the speaking of sacred words above physical toil on the earth of the peasants. After over two centuries of modernity, it is surprising to find this ancient idea at the beginning of a declaration supposedly describing the future. But, as we will see, the process of seeing the world upside down is one of the most important failings of the whole Memesis statement.

    ASSERTION 2

    Let’s start again:

    >The human being, characterized by a
    >remarkable ability to process information,
    >has extended his phenotype further than any
    >other species. Complex tools and
    >technologies are an integral part of our
    >evolutionary “fitness”. Human evolution is
    >fundamentally intertwined with technological
    >development; the two can not be considered
    >apart from one another. Humanity has
    >co-evolved with its artifacts; genes that
    >are not able to cope with this reality will
    >not survive the next millennium.

    The other major error in the Memesis statement is its use of dodgy biological analogies. The discovery of evolution was one of the key intellectual moments in the development of modern society. By offering a rational understanding of the origins of humanity in nature, it destroyed the intellectual basis of revealed religion. Crucially, evolutionary theory was conceived in the first truly modern society: Great Britain. The rapid economic and social changes taking place in this first industrial society enabled Darwin to understand that nature itself was also in flux.

    However, problems arise when the relationship is drawn in the other direction: when natural evolution is used to explain social development. In this century, millions of people were shoved into gas chambers because it was believed that they possessed ‘genes that are not able to cope’ as the Memesis statement puts it. Following the defeat of fascism, the biological metaphor is now more often used to revive an earlier illegitimate use of Darwinian theory for political purposes: Social Darwinism. As championed by Herbert Spencer, this theory claimed that unregulated market competition between private property owners was a natural phenomenon rather than a social one. The moral claims of liberalism were restated in positivist language. For instance, Spencer even opposed the installation of municipal sewerage systems to prevent cholera and other diseases as an obstruction of the natural laws of the market!

    Although discredited in the early part of this century, the globalisation of capitalism over the past few decades has been accompanied by a renewed faith in the simplicities of liberal economics. In turn, the idiocies of Spencer have been revived in an updated form – as can be seen in Kevin Kelly’s book ‘Out of Control’. By adopting the rhetoric of biology, the Memesis statement is not simply trying to reduce the complexities of millennia of social development to the self-replication of DNA proteins. It is also implicitly supporting the failed social and economic policies of the 1980s.

    ASSERTION 3

    >As an analogy to the building blocks of
    >biology, the genes, memes describe cultural
    >units of information, cognitive behavioral
    >patterns that propagate and replicate
    >themselves through communication. From the
    >”bio-adapter” of language as a proto-meme to
    >the “infosphere” of global networks as the
    >ultimate habitat for the human mind.

    If you combine two errors, you go further into confusion. Having separated thinking from doing and reduced society to biology, the Memesis statement now goes on to assert that human consciousness is an autonomous gene! Dressed up in newly fashionable biospeak, what we have here is a garbled fusion of:

    * the old Stalinist lie that history is a process without a subject;
    * the old post-structuralist lie that language speaks us;
    * and the old McLuhanite lie that technology shapes our minds.
    For if memes ‘replicate themselves’, what are humans doing in the meantime? We’re not the blind objects of genes or memes. Rather, whether using language or global networks, humans transform themselves and nature through our own activity. We are the subject of history – even if it is not always in circumstances of our own choosing.

    ASSERTION 4

    >The discussion is intended to probe specific
    >segments of the techno-cultural revolution
    >against the background of the idea of a
    >”culturally based history of creation”.

    So now we get to the core of the Memesis statement. The current process of the convergence of telecommunications, the media and computing is to be explained through the dubious biological metaphor. The prosaic task of developing the hardware and software for an integrated communications and information network is to be transformed into a positivist mysticism: the fulfillment of our pre- programmed genetic destiny. Henri Lefebvre remarked that structuralism, semiotics and psychoanalysis were usually used by intellectuals as ways of avoiding examining the social relations of capitalism. Now we can add biology to the list.

    ASSERTION 5

    …and also science fiction!

    >This is not to develop new utopias, but
    >rather to critically assess the current
    >scenario, which promises the fulfillment of
    >long prophesied visions of the future. The
    >possibility of the emergence of a post-
    >biological, cyberorganic line of evolution
    >out of universal binary code systems, of
    >which the first protozoans have names like
    >Internet, Cyberspace and I-way.

    The Memesis statement is certainly not advocating a ‘new utopia’. It is instead repeating one of the oldest plots in science fiction: the Frankenstein monster, Hal in 2001, the Terminator and so on. But, whereas in the past we were supposed to fear the destructive powers of technology, we’re now invited to celebrate ‘the emergence of a post- biological, cyberorganic line of evolution’. The ending might be more optimistic, but we’ve read the book and seen the film before.

    And where is this new life form supposed to come from? Allegedly it emerges from the ‘Internet, Cyberspace and I-way’. Yet the Net is a creation of human labour. Someone has to dig holes in the road to lay the fibre-optic wires. Someone has to work on the production line building the PCs. Someone has to design the hardware which will control the flow of data across the networks. Someone has write the software to enable people to use the Net. And all of us participate in communicating across cyberspace with one other. Without human activity, the Net is nothing but an inert mass of metal, plastic and sand. We are the only living beings in cyberspace.

    ASSERTION 6

    >As the biological body coincides with its
    >mechanical and now informational clone as
    >well, neurobionic, robotic prosthetics
    >question our relationship to the body and to
    >gender; cyborg theory and cyberbody fetish
    >as response.

    If the Net can be explained by Social Darwinism, why not recent advances in medical science also? In an orgy of hyperbole, people with pacemakers – or even glasses – can become characters from science fiction tales: the cyborgs. Deprived of the consolation of religion, we can now rediscover the promise of eternal life in a new hi-tech form.

    But by embracing this positivist mysticism, we ignore the creative powers of our own species to transform its own conditions of existence. Above all, it is not technology by itself which has changed our perception of gender relations. Rather the possibilities of modernity have been grasped by women – and some men – to transform the limitations on human existence imposed by patriarchal societies and biological necessity. It might seem deliciously wicked to indulge in ‘cyborg fetish’, but worshiping the machine and the gene obscures past and present struggles of flesh ‘n’ blood humans to civilise social relationships between the genders.

    ASSERTION 7

    >Media memory – the collective memory and
    >experience of humanity externalized in
    >world-wide networks. Memes, as a “mass
    >crystal”, the identification and integration
    >of virtual communities that gather only in
    >network interfaces.

    After repeatedly claiming that memes are self- replicating, the Memesis statement suddenly announces that ‘media memory [is] the collective memory and experience of humanity externalised in world-wide networks’. So the memes are actually our own creation. But, if there is active human involvement in the construction of cyberspace, how can technology and genes be autonomous forces outside our control? The fetishistic conception of technology and information within the Memesis statement is now openly revealed for the first time. What we’re dealing with here is a moment of Feurbachian revelation: the Memesis statement now admits that it wants us to worship the magical power of graven images built with our own labour.

    The central error of the Memesis statement has become obvious. It regards machines and information as autonomous things outside our control. Yet, in reality, both technology and culture are expressions of the social relationships between individual humans. It is human activity which is crystallised into machines and information, not memes which create ‘mass crystal’. Crucially, by denying the Promethean power of collective creativity, the Memesis statement ignores one of the central questions of modernity: how are the rewards of labour to be divided among the different groups involved in the social production of machines and information? Ah, but the social question is so unfashionable nowadays…

    ASSERTION 8

    >Memes, the cognitive pixels as a blueprint
    >for the cultural practice of sampling, of
    >the universal “copy and paste”, which has
    >emerged from the new conditions of media.

    Having briefly admitted that humans are the subject and culture is the object of their labour, the Memesis statement quickly reverts to its favourite philosophical inversion dressed up in computer jargon. Once again, it is not clever artists, musicians or designers who use digital technologies to create innovative new forms of cultural expression. On the contrary, the software mystically writes itself!

    Moreover, the practice of sampling the work of others is hardly new. For centuries, artists have plagiarised their predecessors and contemporaries. All collective endeavours involves a constant process of sampling and ‘copy and paste’. What the new information technologies have done is make the process much easier and more aesthetically pleasing. Above all, they have enhanced and deepened the possibilities of strange juxtapositions and hallucinatory combinations. The Futurists could only dream of machine music. Jungle musicians can now actually create the digital rhythms of drum ‘n’ bass.

    ASSERTION 9

    >Memesis: a synonym for the current process
    >of compression, for the convergence of
    >various developmental vectors, which achieve
    >a breakthrough as a whole.

    Exhausted, we at last reach the end of this journey through intellectual confusion. Assuring that this was all just a ‘synonym’ for the process of convergence, the statement concludes with the promise of imminent rapture: ‘a breakthrough as a whole’. But, at best, the Memesis statement is a piece of bad poetry. At worst, it is an apology for the defunct neo-liberalism and tired post- modernism of the last decade. The Memesis statement presents a Californian Ideology for Europeans: radical rhetoric hiding conservative ideas.

    The real crime of the Memesis statement is the way that it willfully obscures the process of human innovation and creativity under a mass of dodgy biological metaphors. In contrast, we must celebrate the Promethean power of humans to create – and recreate – themselves. It is precisely our refusal to accept our biological destiny which makes us more than insects. Unlike our fellow species, we can transform ourselves through thought and action.

    The advent of modernity has radically accelerated this process of human self- transformation. The ‘convergence of various developmental vectors’ – as the Memesis statement so inelegantly puts it – is only the latest stage in this process of modernisation. What is interesting about our present situation is how imaginative people are using new technologies to push forward the limits of social and cultural creativity. Instead of being mesmerised by memes, what we should be doing instead is celebrating the achievement of these digital artisans – the artist- engineers who’re pioneering the ways in which everyone will be able to participate within cyberspace in the future.

  • A REVIEW OF PIERRE LÉVY’S COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE by Richard Barbrook

    A review of Pierre Lévy, Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace, Plenum, New York, $27.95, ISBN 0306456354.

    The Net has become our symbol for the future. Like clocks, steam engines and nuclear power for earlier generations, we use this icon of technology to imagine what will result from our current period of rapid social change. In Collective Intelligence, Pierre Lévy provides a French vision of what will happen when everyone can participate within cyberspace.

    Up until now, because the Net was mainly developed in California, it is not surprising that our view of the digital future has long been dominated by gurus from this state. So far, the Californians have proved to be better at making virtual machines than social analyses. Some of their cyber-theories promise not just the invention of synthetic life, but even immortality through uploading our brains into cyberspace.

    But lurking behind this techno-mysticism is something much more sinister. In Wired magazine, John Perry Barlow, Kevin Kelly and other Californian ideologues assert that the Net is the sort of unregulated marketplace up to now found only in economics textbooks. Instead of supporting a caring society, they hope that technological progress into the 21st century will inevitably lead back to 19th-century tooth-and-claw capitalism. Their utopia looks like most other people’s dystopia.

    Lévy’s book is important because it advocates an alternative future for the Net. As a French intellectual, he doesn’t accept free market dogmas. This approach is not simply morally preferable. It is also a precondition for any coherent analysis of what’s really happening in the Net. Contrary to the predictions of Wired, it has proved difficult to create a profitable digital economy. While existing products can be promoted or sold online, most Net users are reluctant to pay for visiting Web sites – or even to click on the advertising links placed on them. So why can’t the dotcom capitalists easily turn the Net into another form of commercial media?

    This is because the entrepreneurs were the last people to arrive in cyberspace. Originally invented for military purposes, the Net was quickly hijacked by academics and amateurs as a cheap – even free – method of distributing information and communicating with colleagues. Within cyberspace, most users participate in discussions or publish their work for the pleasure of others recognising their efforts. When Net enthusiasts proclaim that “information wants to be free”, they mean it literally.

    Rather than being just a business opportunity, Lévy claims instead that the Net is a qualitatively new way of living. In the tradition of French philosophy, he explains this insight with a grand abstraction. Inspired by the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Lévy describes how four types of social spaces have emerged that allow us to live in different ways. Back in the distant past, we wandered the open space of the Earth as nomads. With the emergence of agriculture, we then built the fixed space of the Territory. For the past couple of centuries, increasing numbers of us have survived within the industrialised space of the Commodity. Now we are witnessing the emergence of a fourth way of living: the space of Knowledge formed by cyberspace. Within this virtual world, individuals can think and discuss with each other freely. Once everyone is wired up, we will come together as the “collective intelligence”: an inclusive society borne out of the Net. Cyberutopia is imminent.

    Lévy’s visionary anthropology is therefore diametrically opposed to that of the Californian ideologues. Instead of forming a perfect market, the Net opens the space of Knowledge. Crucially, this new space is completely distinct from the space of the Commodity. When we are on-line, we want to learn, play and communicate with one another rather than to make money. Above all, we want to participate within the “collective intelligence” because we suffer from individual alienation caused by capitalism. Like many of the West Coast gurus with whom he takes issue, Lévy can become mystical about his vision of cyberspace.

    Inspired by Islamic theology, he says in one chapter that the “collective intelligence” is rather similar to God. This New Age rhetoric disguises, however, a specific form of politics. Nearly thirty years on, Lévy still champions the most radical demands of the New Left of the Sixties. Back then, these revolutionaries believed that replacing governments or nationalising industries would change very little. Instead, they thought that the ills of modern society could be cured only by everyone directly controlling their own lives. In the industrialised countries, this was prevented by the professionalisation of politics and the passivity of watching television. The New Left therefore demanded the simultaneous creation of direct democracy and interactive media. Once people were no longer represented by others, everyone would be able to participate in the running of society. According to Lévy, the Net is about to realise this 1960s revolutionary dream. What proved to be impractical in the past is now possible with new digital technologies. Once we all have access to cyberspace, we will be able to determine our own destiny through a real-time direct democracy: the “virtual agora”. According to Lévy, cyberspace therefore is the online version of a hippie commune.

    While emphasising the Net’s noncommercial aspects is preferable to Californian free market platitudes, this New Left cybertheory has its own problems. Above all, the formalist method of French philosophy obscures as much as it illuminates. By abstracting too far into theory, Lévy avoids examining the messy nature of human activity. For instance, there is in reality no clear separation between the Net and the rest of industrial society. Over the past few centuries, the development of both the market and the state has only been possible through constant improvements in the technologies of physical and symbolic communications. The Net itself is created out of the convergence of already existing industries: telephony, media and computing. What is happening in cyberspace is the intensification of previous trends rather than something completely new. If the Californian ideologues think that the Net can only be a market, then Levy makes exactly the opposite error.

    Despite its noncommercial aspects, the Net isn’t a world completely separated from money-making. Big corporations contribute to the Net from building PCs to laying networks. Small companies help from writing software to making Web sites. Because the Net has to be a total break with the past, Lévy can never admit that one of its major uses is for business communications.

    By ignoring the world of work, Lévy crucially cannot explain why the Net was developed as a hi-tech gift economy in the first place. Invented by scientists, this technology was originally designed to facilitate a specific way of working. In their specialist fields, the direct application of markets hampers research. Instead of trading with each other, scientists distribute their findings for peer review, present papers at conferences and contribute articles to journals.

    Now scientists are no more moral than anyone else. In their professions, the gift economy is adopted because it is a more effective way of working. When the Net expanded beyond its founders, its new users have unconsciously adopted this scientific behaviour. Although commercial interests are using the Net, many others have discovered the benefits of working within the hi-tech gift economy. Rather than forming a “collective intelligence”, cyberspace is facilitating new types of collective labour.

    Despite these faults, Lévy’s book is still a useful corrective to the free-market orthodoxy coming out of the West Coast. It is preferable to overemphasise the role of the gift economy within cyberspace than to ignore it altogether. However, both the Californian and French visions of the digital future do share a common vice: the desire to impose a rigid model on an evolving social phenomenon. Yet, the Net precisely encourages the hybridisation and intermixing of different ways of behaving. If we really want to comprehend the digital future, we will have to move beyond the abstractions of both California and France.

    The book review first appeared in the New Scientist, 13th December 1997.

  • MARXISM AND THE VISUAL ARTS by Richard Barbrook

    It is the opening plenary of an academic conference on Marxism and the Visual Arts being held at a magnificent lecture theatre in University College London. After the organisers have had their say, the chair proudly announces: “…the next speaker is Nicos Hadjinicolaou – the author of The History of Art and the Class Struggle and other books on…â€? Who cares what else he has written? Nothing since has matched the sheer chutzpah of this title. The 120 people in the hall aren’t here to listen to Hadjinicolaou’s subtle analysis of Goya. They want him to remind them that – in the early-1970s – making radical art was an integral part of making the revolution. Above all, they want him to be an unapologetic Marxist.

    Only a few years ago, things were very different. There was nothing more unfashionable than books with titles like The History of Art and the Class Struggle. Marxism had disappeared along with the Soviet Union. Semiotics, structuralism and psychoanalysis were the only ways to explain the multiplicity of identities found within the post-modern world. It was the emergence of the global justice movement which shattered this academic consensus. Cultural studies simply didn’t have the theoretical tools to challenge free market orthodoxies. In contrast, Marxism was founded upon a critique of capitalist economics. Even better, this intellectual current could explain how market competition shapes modern culture, including the rarefied world of the arts. At this conference, some of its younger participants started hissing in disapproval when one of their elders praised Foucault and Kristeva. What had once seemed so subversive is now the epitome of conservatism.

    In the early-2000s, Marxism symbolises a break with the immediate past. Anti-capitalism is much more modern than post-modernism. At the same time, this theory also connects contemporary intellectuals with an impressive revolutionary tradition. For instance, one speaker at this conference celebrated the fabulous life of Ralph Rumney: the English abstract artist who helped to found the Situationist International. As another contributor emphasised, here is one avant-garde group which art galleries and art history departments have found very difficult to domesticate. Instead its legacy lives on in the playful tactics of the global justice movement. As if to prove this point, one of the audience was wearing a red t-shirt which proclaimed ‘anti-capitalist’ in the style of the Coca-Cola logo. The history of art can inspire the class struggle…

    Ironically, this revolutionary tradition is also the major obstacle to the renewal of Marxism. Unlike the Situationists, most radical intellectuals and avant-garde artists in the last century were – more or less – supporters of Russian totalitarianism. Despite the implosion of the Soviet Union over a decade ago, their interpretations of Marxism still dominated this conference. Sometimes this influence was benign. In one session, academics from the former Eastern bloc gave an historical overview of the artistic movements of the old system and attacked attempts to downplay their achievements. However much you dislike Stalin, it is impossible not to admire Mukhina’s giant Worker and Collective Farmer statue.

    What was much more problematic was the uncritical attitude of many Western academics towards Russian totalitarianism. At this conference, the Marxist theory of art was – once again – defined by two infamous fellow-travellers of Stalinism: Georg Lukács and Theodor Adorno. Although they argued over whether Socialist Realism or high modernism was the politically correct style, these two mandarins agreed that the proles had no taste. Hadn’t Marx proved in Capital that their brains were confused by commodity fetishism? Like helpless children, they needed rescuing by the enlightened few.

    During the conference, some of the audience pointed out that Karl Marx himself had written about art. Far from being an elitist, he had consistently argued for the democratisation of knowledge and culture. Anyone who reads Capital soon realises that Lukács and Adorno deliberately misinterpreted his analysis of commodity fetishism to fit their own dubious politics. How outrageous! Speaker after speaker emphasised that Marxist theory of art was what Lukács and Adorno said it was. Marx never wrote anything serious about art. The vehemence of these responses had been anticipated by Nicos Hadjinicolaou at the opening plenary. During his speech, he commented that the conference would have to confront two crucial questions: “Who is a Marxist? Who decides?â€? From the evidence of this academic gathering, neither can yet be answered. For some, the exhaustion of post-modernism means the revival of totalitarian ideologies. For others, Marxism is the theory of participatory democracy and DIY culture. Which interpretation will prevail? Just like art in Hadjinicolaou’s classic text, the evolution of Marxism is now part of the class struggle…

    The Marxism and the Visual Arts  conference ’ took place on 8th–10th April 2002 at University College London, London, England.

    This article was first published in Mute magazine.

  • CHOICE OR PARTICIPATION?

    An Analysis of British Radio in the 1990s

    Radio in the Recession

    In January 1991, the Bristol radio station For The People (FTP) was relaunched as Galaxy. Instead of a name promising community service, the Bristol station now shares the same trademark as a chocolate bar. This change in image symbolised the final stage in the corporate takeover of the station. Originally, FTP was a pirate station broadcasting to Bristol’s black community. After obtaining the licence, FTP was set up as a commercial station playing black music. But, FTP retained many of the ideals of its pirate days, such as the provision of speech programmes for the local Afro‑Caribbean community. However, in the current slump, FTP was unable to raise enough advertising revenue to pay its bills. Therefore, the black founders of FTP have lost control of the station to a local commercial radio group, Chiltern Radio. As Galaxy, the Bristol station has adopted a pop‑orientated dance music format and its community programmes have been axed. (Kavanagh 1991; 1991a) The collapse of FTP is only one of many failures among the incremental radio stations recently licenced in Great Britain. In almost every case, existing commercial radio stations have taken control from the original owners of the incremental licences. The change in management is soon followed by the abandonment of minority programmes and the introduction of a more mainstream music format. (Goodwin 1991) Even in London, Kiss‑FM has only escaped a corporate take‑over by watering down its dance music format with more chart hits. (Now Radio 1991)

    The incremental radio licences were originally introduced by the IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority) to provide extra specialist stations for areas with an existing commercial radio station. (IBA 1989: 7). Over the last two years, the IBA has awarded 21 incremental radio licences across the country. (IBA 1988; IBA 1988a) These incremental stations were the ‘forerunners’ of the ‘hundreds’ of new stations envisaged under the 1990 Broadcasting Act. (IBA 1989a: 1) For many years, neo‑liberal pressure groups within the Conservative party have demanded the reorganisation of British radio broadcasting along American lines. In their view, listeners would prefer a choice of many different stations operating under deregulated market competition, rather than the limited number of regulated channels offered by the existing radio system. (Adam Smith Institute 1984) But, with the economy in recession, commercial radio stations are sacking staff and combining into larger groups to survive the fall in advertising revenue. (Goodwin 1991) In its first stage, the neo‑liberal strategy for the expansion of radio broadcasting is already failing.

    The Rule of the Duopoly

    The major reason for the weakness of commercial radio in Great Britain is the popularity of the stations run by the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). During 1990, the BBC stations obtained just under 60% of the total radio audience. (Kavanagh 1991c) The predominance of the BBC dates back nearly seventy years. During the 1920s, the BBC was set up as a broadcasting monopoly by the radio set manufacturers. Under pressure from the newspaper proprietors, the British government decided radio broadcasting couldn’t be funded by advertising. Instead, a licence fee was levied on all radio set owners to pay for the BBC’s services. (Barbrook 1985) Although the licence fee was a price for listening to radio programmes, the state collection of money for a private company was opposed by many politicians. (Sykes 1923; Crawford 1926) Therefore, the Conservative government decided to turn the BBC into a nationalised corporation. With no competitors and secure funding, the BBC was more insulated from the preferences of its listeners than foreign stations funded by advertising. Instead of maximising its audience, the BBC had political and cultural goals. Reith, the BBC’s first Director‑General, centralized most programme‑making in London. Under his control, radio broadcasting was used to impose the culture of the ruling class of South‑East England on the rest of the country. For example, ‘BBC English’ was created out of the Home Counties dialect. In its schedules, the BBC provided a choice of programmes, which covered the different tastes of the social classes. But, Reith only provided ‘cheap and catchy music’ to encourage radio listening by working class people. But, once these new listeners were tuned in, Reith believed that they could be led to an appreciation of ‘good music’ by inserting the classical concerts in the schedules. (Reith 1924: 174) Eventually, Reith hoped radio broadcasting would unite the British nation around a common method of speech, musical taste and political views: ‘the same music rings sweetly in mansion as in cottage.’ (Reith 1924: 217)

    Since Reith’s days, the BBC has grown into the largest electronic media corporation in Great Britain. Nowadays, the two television channels have displaced radio broadcasting as the centre of the BBC’s activities. During the 1980s, only one‑third of total BBC expenditure was spent on radio broadcasting. (Peacock 1986: 13). However, the BBC still remains the dominant company within this sector. The corporation controls five national networks, regional services and 38 local stations. The national networks are divided into 5 specialist services:

    • Radio 1: Pop music and youth programmes;
    • Radio 2: Easy listening and nostalgia;
    • Radio 3: Classical music;
    • Radio 4: News, drama and ‘meaningful speech’;
    • Radio 5: Education, sport, youth and general.

    Through these channels, the BBC provides a choice of programmes for listeners of all ages and classes. The national networks are aimed at specific demographic groups. While Radio 3 has a music service for the richer and older audience, Radio 1 broadcasts records favoured by poorer and younger listeners. Over the decades, the BBC has created a distinct style of public service broadcasting. As under the Reith, the corporation tries to provide a ‘universal service’ for all British listeners. But, instead of providing a mix of programmes for all types of listeners on one channel, the BBC now produces a choice of specialist services covering various audiences formed by the age and class differences within British society. Moreover, the corporation hasn’t lost its bias towards high culture over the years. Thus, despite having one‑fifth of its audience, Radio 3 receives twice as much income as Radio 1. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 15; Peacock 1986: 13).

    Yet, the committment to provide programmes for different types of listeners has resulted in a wide variety of programmes in the BBC schedules, from drama to reggae music. In addition, the necessity of winning listeners from different backgrounds has created a limited form of political pluralism within the BBC’s news and current affairs programmes. During the 1980s, Thatcher’s hostility towards the corporation was caused by the BBC’s unsycophantic coverage of her policies. For the BBC, the creation of public service broadcasting has been a great success. This is not only reflected in the high ratings of BBC radio stations, but also in the high levels of satisfaction with the corporation’s performance discovered in listener surveys. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 34‑5) During Thatcher’s rule, this public support protected the BBC from schemes for the privatisation and commercialisation of the corporation, which were advocated by neo‑liberal pressure groups. When the Peacock committee examined broadcasting, it recommended not only the privatisation of Radios 1 and 2, but also the introduction of advertising on BBC local stations. However, fearing public opposition, these proposals were subsequently rejected by the Thatcher government. (Peacock 1986: 140‑1; Home Office 1987: 21) With a loyal listenership, the BBC remains the dominant force in British radio broadcasting.

    In contrast, commercial radio broadcasting has remained the weaker sector within the British radio system. During the 1960s, the BBC’s monopoly over radio broadcasting in Great Britain was ended by offshore pirate radio stations operating from the North Sea. Because of cultural elitism, the BBC refused to create an all‑day pop music service for young working class listeners. Instead, by using a top 40 format, the pirate stations gained the large audience for this type of music. In turn, companies seeking younger consumers started advertising on these illegal stations. With the popularity of the pirates increasing, the Labour government decided to close down the pirate ships by cutting off their advertising revenue. Simultaneously, the BBC was authorised to set up a pop music service, known as Radio 1. This station not only copied the top 40 format of the pirates, but also employed most of its DJs from the outlawed stations. (Chapman 1991)

    Although Radio 1 provided the choice of a pop music service for young listeners, the companies interested in running commercial stations were still prevented from obtaining licences. In 1972, a Conservative government decided to licence commercial radio stations. Under new legislation, the IBA was established as the regulatory authority and transmitting company for the new commercial stations. After rival bids were considered, the IBA was empowered to award only one commercial radio licence in each city or area of Great Britain, with the exception of two stations for London. Under the law, all commercial stations were only allowed to broadcast as the ‘IBA’s agents’. (IBA 1989: 4) In theory, this dependence on IBA transmitting facilities ensured the observance of various public service requirements by the franchise‑holders. In their franchise bids, the new commercial radio stations promised to provide a wide range of programmes in their schedules. However, soon after winning the licences, most commercial radio stations adopted the top 40 format of the pirates and Radio 1.

    Despite having a local monopoly over radio advertising, the British commercial stations have never been financially successful, except in the major cities. Although a large number of British people listen to the radio, only a minority tune into the commercial stations. (IPA 1987a: 6; Kavanagh 1991c) In turn, the low listenership of commercial stations has reduced the amount of advertising money spent in this sector of the mass media. While over 10% of advertising money is spent on radio commercials in France or the USA, only 2.3% of the agencies’ campaigns goes into this medium in Great Britain. (Peacock 1986: 69) Among advertising agencies, radio broadcasting is disparagingly known as the ‘2% medium’. (IPA 1987a: 14) Thus, the commercial radio sector has never raised enough advertising revenue to challenge the BBC’s dominance over radio broadcasting. Without money, the commercial stations couldn’t produce enough quality programmes to gain audiences. But, without a large listenership, the advertising agencies weren’t interested in using radio for their campaigns.

    The Challenge of the Pirates

    What is more, the commercial radio stations weren’t only financially unsuccessful. The top 40 format adopted by these stations excluded many other types of music, especially those favoured by ethnic communities. As in the 1960s, the refusal of licenced stations to play certain styles of music created an audience for pirate stations. During the early‑1980s, land‑based pirate stations appeared in London and other major cities. Soon, illegal broadcasting evolved beyond the craze of a few hobbyists into a serious challenge to the BBC and commercial radio stations. The new microelectronic technologies had created cheap radio transmitters, which could cover a whole city for only £250. By promoting their own clubs, DJs and engineers could survive the regular confiscation of their transmitters by the DTI (Department of Trade & Industry), which was responsible for policing the airwaves. By the late‑1980s, the pirate radio stations had become an integral part of the ‘ragamuffin’ economy, which ranged from drugs to warehouse parties. (Barbrook 1987: 96‑9; 1988: 82‑4)

    Unlike other European Community countries, there have been few political pirate stations in Great Britain. Instead, the major pirate stations have won substantial audiences by playing black dance music. In the early‑1980s, this music was usually African‑American in origin. However, in the last few years, the pirates have helped to popularise British and European dance music records. Since the arrival of Afro‑Caribbean immigrants in the 1950s, British popular music has evolved through different cross‑fertilisations of black and white influences. (Hebdige 1979: 46‑70) Moreover, because of the ‘morbidity of English culture’, black styles of music have been adopted as a mark of ‘distinction’ by large sections of the British working class. (Gilroy 1989; Bourdieu 1984) In the late‑1980s, house music emerged as the dominant sound within British clubs. As with previous musical styles, house music was denounced by the right‑wing newspapers for encouraging sexual and chemical hedonism. Once again, young workers were castigated for being more interested in short‑term pleasure than long‑term responsibilities. However, house music wasn’t simply a moral panic. The new musical style was created by the availability of cheap computer technologies, such as samplers and MIDIs. This was part of the long‑term shift within popular music away from live performances towards studio production and DJ-ing. (Frith 1988; Franklin 1991) As with radio transmitters, cheap microelectronics dramatically lowered the price of computer and studio technologies. This fall in the price of electronic instruments encouraged more people to make their own recordings. In turn, these new musicians relied on the pirate stations to popularise their records. For example, most house music records have only been included in the top 40 formats of BBC and commercial radio stations after becoming hits on the pirate stations. Contrary to the low‑tech image of radio, both the hardware and software used by the pirates were on the leading edge of the new microelectronic technologies.

    In one week of the summer of 1989, there were 35 pirate stations broadcasting in London, 8 of them in stereo. (Anoraks 1989: 3) By the late‑1980s, it had become very cheap to set up an unlicenced radio station. For example, Centreforce, a London house music pirate, started broadcasting for only £1,300. (Heley 1989: 15) The further proliferation of pirates was only checked by the DTI confiscations of illegal transmitters. However, because of the cheapness of transmitters, the policing of the radio spectrum became increasingly expensive. Between 1985 and 1988, the DTI spent £2,000,000 enforcing the broadcasting law. (Butcher 1988) By the late‑1980s, it became obvious that the DTI’s efforts were doomed to failure. The pirates were earning enough money from advertising and clubs to cover the costs of transmitters removed by the DTI. In effect, the impossibility of enforcing the ban on unlicenced broadcasting had created a form of radical deregulation. Although the DTI could harry individual pirates off‑air, new illegal stations quickly emerged to replace them. In turn, the continued existence of the pirates created public pressure for legal stations playing black music. For example, in one London survey of radio audiences, nearly half of Afro‑Caribbeans were found to be regularly listening to the pirate stations. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 78‑9) Thus, the government was forced to admit that the popularity of pirates had demonstrated the demand for a wider choice of radio services. (Home Office 1987: 14)

    The Neo‑Liberal Solution

    As in other European Community countries, pressure for the expansion of commercial radio broadcasting in Great Britain didn’t only come from the pirate stations. During the 1980s, the media corporations and the advertising agencies were lobbying for the deregulation of radio broadcasting. (Barbrook 1988) In this campaign, the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) has played a leading role. In its view, there needed to be not only a rapid growth in the number of local commercial stations, but also the licencing of National Commercial Radio stations (NCRs). Within the IBA system, eleven regional conglomerates of local commercial stations had already been formed. These amalgamations were sanctioned by the IBA to prevent the weaker members of the commercial system from bankruptcy. (Vick 1988) At present, FTP and other failing incremental stations are being incorporated into these commercial radio groups. According to the IPA, this process of concentration should be taken further by licencing national networks. The creation of the NCRs and more local stations was designed to create a ‘critical mass’ of commercial radio listeners for the advertising agencies. With a greater choice of services, the commercial radio system could gain larger audiences. In turn, this should increase substantially the amount of advertising money spent on radio commercials. (IPA 1987: 4) According to the IPA, a significant rise in the number of listeners to commercial radio stations could double the percentage of total advertising revenue received by this sector of the mass media. (IPA 1987: 12) For many commercial radio companies, a large increase in radio’s share of advertising spending was the only guarantee of long‑term financial success for their stations. (Goodwin 1991

    The Conservative government also saw the licencing of more commercial stations as a solution to the collapse of the laws against illegal broadcasting. By filling up vacant frequencies with legal services, radio piracy could be made technically impossible. For example, the NCR service on the FM band will exclude many local stations from the airwaves by occupying many different frequencies across the country. (Home Office 1987: 43) In addition, the  legalisation of pirate radio broadcasting will dramatically increase the costs of becoming involved in operating a station. Outside the law, the pirates didn’t have to pay copyright fees, wages and other overhead costs. Even with lighter regulation, it will be very much more expensive to run a legal local station than a pirate operation. This financial barrier is be even higher for the NCRs. Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, a NCR licence‑holder has to be rich enough not only to construct a nationwide network of transmitters, but also to bid for the franchise in a competitive auction. (Broadcasting Act 1990: 88‑96) In the first franchise contest, the NCR FM licence was initially awarded to Showtime. But, when this group failed to raise enough money, the licence had to be reallocated to Classic FM, which did have the necessary investment. Despite this drama, the auction system successfully restricted the NCR franchise to commercial companies financed by the major financial institutions. (Kavanagh 1991d; Now Radio 1991a)

    At present, determined people can participate in radio broadcasting by setting up a pirate station. Once there are no vacant frequencies, only groups with enough money to run a station along business lines will gain access to the airwaves. However, despite the discriminatory intentions of present government policy, many pirate stations still support the expansion of commercial radio proposed in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. Because most pirates are already run as small businesses, their owners are as much yuppies as ragamuffins. Moreover, for many within the Afro‑Caribbean community, the pirates are an integral part of the construction of an independent black business sector. Ironically, this oppositional nationalism has created the conditions for the assimilation of black pirates within the commercial radio system. For FTP and other ex‑pirates, the legalisation of the pirates as commercial companies was welcomed as long as the majority of shares were owned by black people. (Gilroy 1989)

    The planned future of British commercial radio is based on the system of competing stations with different formats developed in the USA. Because they are funded by advertising, these American stations try attract those audiences which can be sold to advertisers. Using careful research, each station’s format is constructed around a particular playlist of records. (Barnes 1988: 43) Within a station’s service area, the potential listeners are already segmented by the division of labour under capitalism into classes and class fractions. The various classes and class fractions within industrial societies use music and other forms of culture as a way of marking themselves out from each other. Moreover, within the individual classes, the different generations also have their own cultural preferences. (Bourdieu 1984: 60, 83‑4, 326‑7) The programme controllers of format stations use these musical marks of ‘distinction’ to create an individual playlist suited for a particular audience. If successful, the style of music used in the format will attract the desired section of the radio audience.

    In theory, the format radio system should give the widest possible choice of services for listeners. As more licences are given out, so stations will provide increasingly specialised services for specific sections of the radio audience. If a commercial station broadens its format to gain a larger audience, it is in danger of losing its existing listeners to rivals who provide a more specialised service. (Routt, McGrath and Weiss 1978: 35‑7) As competition increases, the radio audience will be increasingly fragmented into different classes and age‑groups. On the one hand, the classical music stations will attract the richest and oldest audience. On the other hand, dance music stations will have the poorest and youngest listeners. The stations with other formats will be position in-between these economic and cultural poles. (Barbrook 1990: 210) In place of broadcasting a mix of programmes for listeners from different classes and ages, each format radio station narrowcasts a specific service for each section of the radio audience. Under this system, a single public service broadcasting corporation is no longer needed for the provision of specialised formats. Instead, competition between different commercial stations for specialist audiences ensures that every major group of listeners will have a format provided for their cultural needs. (Routt, McGrath and Weiss 1978: 33)

    Although the advocates of format radio promise a variety of specialised services, the results of competition between many commercial stations are different in practice. In the USA, the format radio system doesn’t provide programmes for all sections of the audience. Because they are funded by commercials, American radio stations won’t adopt formats aimed at poorer listeners. Instead, successful formats will be duplicated across several channels, especially if they attract high‑spending audiences. Thus, market competition in radio broadcasting can only create a limited choice between formats aimed at the larger and richer demographic groups in society. In its recent broadcasting legislation, the British government has recognised these limits on the adoption of laissez‑faire policies in the electronic media. Despite rhetoric of deregulation, there has not been any substantial weakening of controls over radio broadcasting. Because of the sector’s past economic difficulties, the IBA had already lifted most of the public service commitments of the commercial radio stations. In the 1970s, the commercial stations were allow to abandon their minority programmes for a narrow top 40 format. In recent years, the rules over networking of programmes, sponsorship and the concentration of station ownership have been relaxed as well. (Barbrook 1988: 73‑7)

    In the 1990 law, the major change carried out in radio broadcasting was the replacement of the IBA by a new regulatory body, called the Radio Authority. (Broadcasting Act 1990: 76‑9) After this reorganisation, the radio regulatory body no longer acted as the transmission company for the commercial radio franchise‑holders. However, the new Radio Authority still retained extensive powers over the commercial radio stations. When the incremental stations were licenced, each franchise holder had to sign a ‘promise of performance’ as part of its licence contract with the IBA. (IBA 1989: 7) This statement pledged the station to produce only ‘…programmes aimed to appeal within an identified geographical area either to a specialist need or interest or community…’ (IBA 1989b: 1) If a station failed to fulfill this promise, the radio regulatory body could impose fines and other sanctions on the offending franchise‑holder. Now the 1990 act has been passed, all commercial radio stations will have to give a ‘promise of performance’ as part of their licence agreement. As a choice of services can’t be ensured by competition, the Radio Authority uses regulation to ensure a diversity of formats across the commercial radio stations licenced in each city or region.

    The duplication of the same format by different commercial stations hasn’t been outlawed solely to preserve the choice of services for radio listeners. The close regulation of radio broadcasting is also needed to protect the shaky finances of the existing commercial radio stations. Despite having a local monopoly over the sale of radio advertising in its own transmission area, most commercial stations have been almost continual financial difficulties since their launch. During the 1981‑2 ‘monetarist shock’, many stations were severely weakened by the collapse in advertising spending, which led to cutbacks and redundancies. (Peacock 1986: 20) Along with the rest of British industry, the finances of commercial radio broadcasting slowly improved in the mid‑1980s. But, even then, nearly one‑quarter of the stations were still running at a loss. (Phillips 1985; Phillips 1986; Phillips 1987) Finally, when the Lawson credit boom had overstimulated the whole economy, there was a substantial rise in the advertising revenue of all commercial radio stations. For a brief moment, the commercial stations enjoyed windfall profits, with even the weakest stations making money. (Deloitte, Haskins and Sells 1988)

    Because of the optimism generated by Lawson’s ‘economic miracle’, the Conservative government assumed that there would be no difficulties in expanding the number of commercial radio stations. However, the passing of the new Broadcasting Act has coincided with the arrival of another economic slump. During 1990, there was a large decline in advertising revenue, which sent many commercial radio stations back into losses. FTP and other incremental stations were among the first victims of the recession in the commercial radio sector. (Goodwin 1991) With many incrementals being taken over, the ‘promise of performance’ has become the crucial method of regulating radio broadcasting. In the USA, a failed station can abandon its old format and introduce a more popular service. But, in Great Britain, the ‘promise of performance’ inhibits an owner of a loss‑making radio station from adopting a radically different format. In effect, the ‘promise of performance’ prevents any competition with the top 40 and oldies formats provided by the original commercial radio stations. Similarly, the recently awarded NCR FM franchise has been forbidden from playing any pop records made after 1960. (Kavanagh 1991b) By preventing duplication of the most successful formats, the Radio Authority can protect the main commercial radio stations from insolvency. After a decade of neo‑liberalism, British commercial radio broadcasting still depends for its survival on close regulation of the sector by the state.

    While radio broadcasting remains the ‘2% medium’, tight regulation will be needed to protect this sector from too intensive competition. But, a rapid expansion in commercial radio broadcasting is still planned. For many commercial radio operators, only a ‘quantum leap’ in the number of listeners will finally make the sector profitable. (Goodwin 1991) However, their dreams of a virtuous circle of growing audiences and advertising revenue aren’t only threatened by the recession, but also by the continuing dominance of the television sector. Because they were licenced first, the commercial television stations already had a strong position within the advertising market when the commercial radio franchises were awarded. (Peacock 1986: 94) The expansion of both terrestrial and satellite commercial television broadcasting will further intensify the competition for corporate advertisers between the two types of electronic media. In this struggle, commercial radio broadcasting also suffers from the hostility of many listeners to radio advertising. Unlike television advertising, many British people think radio commercials are annoying and unpleasant. This widespread view not only reduces the potential audience of commercial stations, but also their usefulness of their advertising slots for the agencies. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 46) Thus, even without a slump, there are severe economic limitations on the expansion of commercial radio broadcasting in Great Britain. Although frequencies remain unused, the shortage of sufficient advertising revenue will hamper the rapid growth of the commercial radio secto

    The Community Radio Alternative

    With the expansion of commercial broadcasting stalled, the British government can only prevent more radio piracy by repression. During 1991, the increased penalties for running a pirate station in the recent broadcasting legislation have temporarily checked the increase in illegal stations. However, the repression of the pirate stations is a costly solution to the problem of illegal broadcasting. Hence, for the Conservative government, the granting of more commercial radio licences was never a form of deregulation. Instead, this policy was introduced to re-regulate a section of the electronic media outside all government controls. But, without sufficient commercial radio licences, there will still be space on the FM band for pirate stations. As a consequence, other ways of expanding radio broadcasting are being examined again. In 1986, the Home Office [Ministry of the Interior] almost licenced a number of community radio stations across the country. (Barbrook 1987) Although this scheme was abandoned, 3 of the later incremental stations were members of the community radio movement. In Great Britain, the Community Radio Association (CRA) has been campaigning over many years for the establishment of a third tier of radio broadcasting, organised differently from both BBC and commercial services. For the CRA, community radio stations must be non‑commercial organisations, such as co‑operatives or voluntary organisations. Using overseas experience, the CRA has lobbied for the recognition of this new sector of radio broadcasting. (CRA 1987; Jones 1987/8) Over recent years, the CRA has had an ambiguous relationship with the pirates. On the one hand, many CRA members disapprove of the illegal tactics of the pirates. But, on the other hand, some CRA activists are involved in pirate stations. But, with the limitations of commercial radio stations becoming apparent, there has been a gradual convergence between the two different groups fighting for access to the airwaves.

    Crucially, both pirate and community radio stations share one fundamental characteristic: they are do‑it‑yourself media. Although it is an old discovery, radio has benefited from the latest advances in microelectronic technologies. With contemporary recorders and mixers, it is nowadays cheaper and easier for amateurs to make radio programmes than in the past. Moreover, participation in radio broadcasting is encouraged by developments in other communications technologies, as with the homemade house music records played by British pirate stations. In turn, these advances in media technologies can help to transform the methods of production as well. The weakening of skill hierarchies within radio broadcasting facilitates the creation of internal democracy within a community radio station. Thus, the CRA stresses the need for all community radio stations to be organised as co‑operatives or voluntary organisations. By participating in programme‑making, listeners can become involved in the management of their community radio station. For the CRA, community radio stations act as focal points for those listeners ignored by the state and commercial radio stations, such as ethnic communities or neighbourhoods. In addition, this type of station can provide a space for cultural experimentation. Contrary to the promises of the neo‑liberals, format radio stations are usually culturally conservative. With the need to win ratings, format stations wouldn’t risk alienating existing listeners with new styles of music. In contrast, community radio stations can take more risks in their musical and other programmes. Moreover, the creation of community radio stations is closely connected with the wider struggles for more democracy within capitalist societies. Once they can run their own radio station, people are encouraged to demand participation in other social institutions. (Barbrook 1987: 117‑26)

    According to one unlicenced broadcaster, ‘the real reason for pirate radio lies in a basic ethos, which is “knowledge is power”.’ (Holiday 1990: 48) For those excluded by the mainstream media, pirate radio stations offered a means of participating in the production of information and entertainment within British society. Already, the pirates have already helped to change British culture by popularising house music. As in the new forms of music, the pirates have appropriated the technological advances of microelectronics for their own purposes. Under capitalism, new technologies are only integrated within society through social struggles. In each case, capitalists and workers fight over who gains from the introduction of new technologies, especially when methods of working are changed by these advances. (Preteceille and Terrail 1985: 125‑6; Aglietta 1979: 165) As electronic media, radio and television broadcasting are being dramatically changed by the new information technologies. However, many socialists fear these technological changes are leading to the domination of the mass media by large multinationals. But, the success of the pirate radio stations proves that microelectronics can also create opportunities for the Left. The pirates not only used cheap transmitters to survive repeated raids by the DTI, but also played music made on the latest computers.

    As technological advance quickens, the rapid pace of social change within capitalist societies can only be managed through increased participation by the working class. However, the involvement of workers in this process can undermine the social division between labour and capital. For the neo‑liberals, deregulation policies were a solution to this dilemma. In their view, the creation of competition would turn the innovators within the dominated classes into small entrepreneurs. Moreover, the ending of existing cartels would bring more choice of goods and services for the rest of the working class. In radio broadcasting, the application of these neo‑liberal policies has created a greater choice of services, especially for dance music fans and the ethnic communities. However, this diversification of services was started by the BBC, the nationalised broadcasting monopoly. While the BBC broadcast a mix of programmes for different listeners in its early years, nowadays the corporation narrowcasts a range of services for the main demographic groups. The success of the BBC’s strategy has considerably weakened the commercial radio sector in Great Britain. Upto the licencing of the incrementals, most commercial radio stations have been poor copies of BBC Radios 1 or 2.

    Nowadays, there are commercial radio stations providing services for previously excluded audiences, such as from the ethnic communities. But, although a few pirate operators have turned into legal entrepreneurs, the majority of radio listeners remain as much passive consumers as in Reith’s days. Yet, the musical innovations of the pirates were largely created by amateurs. By allowing DJs and musicians to experiment on‑air, the pirate stations changed the rhythms of British popular music. With microelectronic technologies, it is very easy for most listeners to participate in radio programme‑making. In any society, it is unlikely the majority of listeners will want to be involved in broadcasting. But, communications within communities and cultural experimentation involves creating the conditions for the participation in radio broadcasting by an active minority of listeners. As more frequencies are used up, the campaign of the CRA for a ‘third tier’ of radio broadcasting becomes more important. By being organised as co‑operatives or voluntary organisations, community radio stations can offer a legal method of listener participation in broadcasting. As the pirates have shown, without participation in radio broadcasting, it is impossible to know what choices of services will be needed for the future.

    Publication Details: ‘Choice or Participation: British Radio in the 1990s’, Science as Culture, No. 15, Vol. 3, part 2, 1992, pp. 240-262, (ISSN 0950 5431).

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    IBA (1989) Independent Local Radio Incremental Contract Specification, London: Independent Broadcasting Authority.

    IBA (1989a) IBA Extends Listener Choice in Radio, London: Independent Broadcasting Authority.

    IBA (1989b) Incremental Contract Agreement between Independent Broadcasting Authority and Incremental Station, London: Independent Broadcasting Authority.

    IPA (1987) The Future of the Radio Industry, London: Institute of Practitioners in Advertising.

    IPA (1987a) ‘Institute of Practitioners in Advertising Submission to Peacock Committee’ in IPA, The Future of the Radio Industry, London: Institute of Practitioners in Advertising.

    Jones, B. (1987/8) ‘Community Benefit’, Airwaves, Winter.

    Kavanagh, M. (1991) ‘FTP Hit by Resignations’, Broadcast, 11th January.

    Kavanagh, M. (1991a) ‘Galaxy to Redirect FTP’, Broadcast, 18th January.

    Kavanagh, M. (1991b) ‘Rock of Ages’, Broadcast, 18th January.

    Kavanagh, M. (1991c) ‘No JICRAR Joy for the BBC’, Broadcast, 2nd February.

    Kavanagh, M. (1991d) ‘Games “Mad as Hell” Over Barring of Metronome Bid’, Broadcast, 31st May.

    Now Radio (1991) ‘Programme Head Axed’, Now Radio, 6th June.

    Now Radio (1991a) ‘Classic FM Finds the Cash’, Now Radio, 3rd October.

    Peacock, A. (1986) Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC, London: HMSO.

    Phillips, W. (1985) ‘Bugbears and Bogey Men Don’t Frighten Well Managed Stations’, Broadcast, 13th September.

    Phillips, W. (1986) ‘The Biggest aren’t Always the Best’, Broadcast, 19th September.

    Phillips, W. (1987) ‘How ILR Became Everybody’s Pet’, Broadcast, 25th September.

    Preteceille, E. and Terrail, J.‑P. (1985) Capitalism, Consumption and Needs, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Reith, J. (1924) Broadcast Over Britain, London: Hodder & Stoughton.

    Routt, E., McGrath, J., and Weiss, F. (1978) The Radio Format Conundrum, New York: Hastings House.

    Sykes, F. (1923) The Broadcasting Committee Report, London: HMSO.

    Vick, D. (1988) Interview with Author, IBA Radio Division, 28th June.

  • MISTRANSLATIONS: LIPIETZ IN LONDON AND PARIS by Richard Barbrook

    Introduction

    The latest buzzword on the British Left [in 1990] is post-Fordism. This a theory which is being used to justify the ‘New Times’ politics promoted by Marxism Today. This article examines the origins of this concept in the French Regulation School of political economy. In particular, it looks at the work of one of this group’s leading members: Alain Lipietz. He has used these theories to argue for a Red/Green political programme for the Left in Europe. This strategy is inconsistent with that put forward by the advocates of post-Fordist theories in Britain. On each side of the English Channel, the same theoretical language is used to justify very different political programmes.

    Past, Present and Future

    While the tenth anniversary of Thatcher’s victory is a cause for celebration among the British ruling class, the anniversary is an unwelcome reminder of a decade of defeats for the British Left. The Labour Party has not only lost three successive General Elections, but also its local powerbases have been undermined through the centralisation of government. The trade unions have seen unemployment reduce their membership, repressive laws restrict industrial action and their General Secretaries are no longer welcome in the councils of state. Even the National Union of Mineworkers has been defeated. If the traditional organisations of the Labour movement have had problems, the ‘new social movements’ have fared no better. The peace movement is confused by the new detente in Europe and the women’s movement has fragmented. With all alternatives discredited, Thatcher is able to determine the terms of the debate within British politics. Nowadays even the opposition parties support the economic restructuring of the country by big business through market competition. Britain seems set to become the Alabama or Queensland of Western Europe.

    This period of defeat has created an opening for the politics promoted by Marxism Today. This magazine originated as the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Great Britain. During the 1980s, as the Communist party disintegrated into various competing factions, Marxism Today survived this debacle by turning itself into a think tank for the Left. In the early 1980s, the magazine called for a ‘Popular Front’ of anti-Thatcher parties and movements against the Conservative government. (Hall and Jacques 1983) This strategy was rejected by most of the British Left because it abandoned any commitment to explicitly socialist solutions to the country’s problems. However, repeated defeats have made Marxism Today‘s project seem more credible. The political initiative has now passed from the Trotskyist sects and the supporters of Tony Benn to Marxism Today and the followers of Neil Kinnock. Nowadays there are no longer even rhetorical promises of socialist solutions.

    Marxism Today doesn’t just offer an electoral strategy for removing Thatcher. Its theorists are trying to redefine the whole outlook of the British Left. The magazine asserts that Britain is entering ‘New Times’. The old debate between Left and Right is being replaced by a new opposition between the past and the future. This conceptual shift reflects the changed aspirations and expectations within British Left. Especially among the Left’s metropolitan and white collar supporters, there has been a rejection of the traditional version of Socialism as a combination of the paternalist state, centralised institutions, heavy industrial technologies and a collectivist proletarian culture. Marxism Today wants to portray this vision as not only undesirable, but also as historically obsolescent. In this new era, the task of the Left is to adapt the technological and institutional developments within capitalism for progressive ends. In part, these ‘New Times’ politics are only a repackaging of the Communist party’s old strategy of a crossparty coalition for the 1990s. But Marxism Today has also rediscovered technological determinism with a vengeance. It now believes that technology and therefore history is on its side. The theory which proves the inevitability of the success of the magazine’s politics is known as post-Fordism.

    The New Times are Here

    Post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-Marxism, post-feminism… and now post-Fordism. Like its etymological antecedents, post-Fordism is defined as the antithesis of its predecessor. In the issue of Marxism Today announcing the advent of the ‘New Times’, the new credo is described by Robin Murray (1988), the ex-Chief Economic Advisor to the Labour Group on the Greater London Council. The past was Fordism, an age of mass production and consumption. It was characterised by:

    • the standardisation of commodities;
    • the mechanisation of production;
    • the Taylorist division between conceptual and manual work;
    • the use of assembly lines in factories.

    For Marxism Today, the impact of Fordism was not just limited to the workplace. The magazine uses Fordism and Taylorism to analyse all areas of the politics and culture. These concepts become catchphrases, indiscriminately applied to all aspects of the past. Therefore the mass class-based parties and the industrial trade unions are simply seen as reflections of the monolithic organisation of labour found in the factories.

    According to Murray (1988), even the arts were shaped by the disciplines imposed by the rhythms of mass production: ‘…Diaghilev was a Taylorist in dance…’ The first break with Fordism came from within the Left, especially in the worker and student revolts from 1968 onwards. In computer networks or worker cooperatives, these activists pioneered the earliest experiments which broke with the Taylorist division of labour. But, in recent years, the initiative has passed to private capital. Especially in Japan, companies have replaced the old methods of standardised and rigid production with new specialised and flexible systems. Both the Taylorist separation between conceptual/manual labour and assembly lines are abandoned. These are replaced by quality circles and information technology: ‘the guerrilla force takes over from the standing army.’ This is the preordained future and its name is post-Fordism.

    The importance of this article lies less in what it says, but where it is. Robin Murray wants the Left to campaign for shorter hours, more flexible shifts, local and central government economic intervention and campaigns to unite full-time and part-time workers. These are modest reforms designed to take advantage of the impending and inevitable future. But Marxism Today is not primarily interested in specific proposals. It wants theoretical proof for the magazine’s overall political strategy. The distinction between Fordism and post-Fordism is useful for the magazine because it makes a clear separation between the past and the future. After interpretation by Marxism Today, post-Fordist theories can explain:

    • why the Left suffered a series of defeats;
    • why these defeats were inevitable;
    • why these defeats were the Left’s fault;
    • why these defeats were a good thing.

    Marxism Today sees Thatcher’s victories as a result of the Left’s defective strategy. In the early 1980s, many socialists thought the Tories could be defeated by a class struggle waged by the Labour Party and the trade unions. For Marxism Today, this approach was doomed to failure. The Left was fighting for the past and not the future. The mass party and mass unions were products of the centralisation and standardisation of the Fordist era. (Benton 1989; Bassett 1989) Above all else, these organisations were fatally contaminated by the authoritarianism of the factory system. This made the victory of the old-style Left not only impossible, but also undesirable as well. Therefore Marxism Today rejects class politics in both its Social Democratic and Leninist vanguard party forms. These are the politics of the old Fordist Left.

    Instead, the magazine calls a rebirth of the Communist party’s old strategy of a multi-party coalition in combination with the ‘new social movements’. (Leadbeater 1988; Hall 1988) But this strategy is not a different way of reaching the old destination of Socialism. For Marxism Today, political pluralism and social diversity have now become goals in their own right. The breakdown of the monolithic Fordist methods of production within the factories is seen as inevitably leading to the success of these post-Fordist political and social aims.

    Not suprisingly, many on the Left have reacted strongly against the ‘New Times’ debate. For example, the Trotskyist journal Socialist Organiser described the ‘New Times’ as ‘old rubbish’ because the Communist party had called for cross-class alliances since the 1930s. (Bradley 1988: 67) Others have gone beyond attacking the particular political proposals of Marxism Today. Increasingly, those who disagree with the magazine’s politics are also rejecting the determinist explanation of its inevitable triumph. (Clarke 1988)

    Because Marxism Today popularised this approach, the Fordist/post-Fordist analysis now suffers from “guilt by association”. Many think that it is necessary to debunk this theory as a way of discrediting the magazine’s strategy. Amongst the furore of these British quarrels, the specific origins of the post-Fordist debates within the French Left are completely forgotten. Marxism Today borrowed wholesale the language and concepts of French theorists. But there are crucial contrasts between the use of the post-Fordist approach in the two countries. Using similar theories, Alain Lipietz and other leading French analysts of post-Fordism have drawn very different conclusions from those of Marxism Today. Moreover, they have been very active in combating the ideological equivalents of Marxism Today in France! Thus it is necessary to turn to the French originals if the British Left is to find anything useful in these theories.

    La École de la Régulation

    In France, Lipietz is a member of an intellectual movement known as the Regulation School. The origins of the Regulation School can be traced to a group of economists based at Grenoble University in the early 1970s. Like many others, these intellectuals were radicalised by the political and social upheavals of the period. The earliest regulationist studies were a combination of Marx’s political economy with structuralism, systems theory and Keynesian macroeconomics. (Boyer 1987: 257, 98) The crucial step in the emergence of the Regulation School was the publication of its seminal text: Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme [A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience] by Michel Aglietta. (1979) This book did not simply draw on the researches of the Grenoble founders of the School, it also popularised the terminology of future regulationist studies, such as Fordism, mode of regulation, regime of accumulation and so on. Hence Lipietz uses Aglietta’s book as a starting point for his own researches. Such is the influence of Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme that some critics claim Lipietz and other regulationists are doing nothing more than popularising Aglietta’s findings! (Clarke 1988: 90)

    Aglietta used this new terminology because he wanted to expand the analysis of capitalism beyond the basic social relations of the commodity and wage labour. He did not see these social relations as fixed and immutable, but as subject to continuous evolution and increasing complexity. Capitalist societies could successfully develop only by transforming these fundamental social relations over time. For Aglietta, a regime of accumulation was an ‘intermediary concept’ used to explain the connection between abstract Marxist theories of capital accumulation and specific historical periods. (Aglietta 1979: 68) The distinguishing feature of the different epochs of capitalism was the organisation of the process of production. Thus Aglietta saw the modern era was begun by the introduction of Taylorist labour disciplines into the factories. Through the separation of conceptual and manual labour, Taylorism was able to increase the productivity of labour by using close supervision to compel continuous working. In turn, this reorganisation of the process of production developed into Fordism. The Taylorist organisation of production was complemented by the introduction of assembly line production. Now the pace of working was determined not only by labour discipline, but also by the speed of the machinery used in production.

    But Aglietta saw Fordism as more than a specific type of factory mechanisation. The large increase in labour productivity led to a wider transformation of society. Aglietta characterised the earliest stages of capitalism as the extensive regime of accumulation. This was because capitalism expanded by reorganising production while leaving the traditional way of life untouched. But the success of this type of growth led to the emergence of the intensive regime of accumulation. Slowly, but surely, capitalism created a new way of life for the working class by replacing communal interpersonal relations with the individual consumption of commodities. Therefore Fordism represented a simultaneous increase in the productivity of labour and the consumption of commodities.

    ‘Fordism is…the principle of an articulation between process of production and mode of consumption, which constitutes the mass production that is the specific content of the universalisation of wagelabour.’  (Aglietta 1979: 117)

    But Aglietta’s book was not just a work of theory. He integrated his analysis with an empirical history of the development of capitalism in the USA. Aglietta wanted to prove his theoretical concepts through an examination of specific changes in the USA in the types of capital, the organisation of labour, and the introduction of new technologies. For Aglietta, the importance of this historical study was as a way of understanding the contemporary economic crisis. As the book’s name suggests, it was written during the years when the postwar boom ended. Aglietta wanted to know why thirty years of uninterrupted growth had suddenly faltered. His analysis showed how the Fordist form of capitalism was reaching its structural limits. In the early 1970s, most Marxist economists thought the crisis could be simply explained as a consequence of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. (Boyer 1987: 77) But this approach failed to tackle the real historical uniqueness of crises in different countries and in different epochs. The crisis of the 1970s was not the same as that of the 1930s.

    For Aglietta, the history of capitalism was composed of alternating periods of growth and crisis. During certain times, a specific combination of capital, production process and technology led to years of successful accumulation. But, at other times, capitalist societies entered crises which could only be resolved by reorganising the established forms of capital, production and technology. This approach borrowed from the structuralist schema of alternating stages of social integration and disintegration. Aglietta used this model to show the specificity of each epoch of capitalism. He wanted to find the inherent social, organisational and technical limitations within each particular era of capitalism. The individuality of a crisis was determined by the particular structures of each regime of accumulation. Aglietta was one of the few Marxist economists who could show why the tendency of the rate of profit to fall manifested itself as inflation and stagnation in the 1970s, instead of deflation and unemployment as in the 1930s. The credibility of his explanations meant Aglietta’s book soon acquired cult status.

    This analysis was not simply theoretical. By describing contemporary capitalism as Taylorist and Fordist, Aglietta also showed how working class resistance was taking new forms. In the 1970s, many strikers did not want just better wages and conditions, but also an end to the Taylorist organisation of work. Similarly, as Fordism spread commodity relations across all of society, struggles over consumption also became increasingly important. For Aglietta, this heightened class antagonism exposed the fundamental nature of the crisis of the 1970s. Capitalism was about to undergo a radical and irreversible transformation so that a new period of growth could start. Aglietta predicted that the next stage of capitalism would be Neo-Fordism. As in earlier times, this new era would be characterised by a restructuring of production. The most advanced factories were already experimenting with an abolition of Taylorism. Semi-autonomous work groups were taking over many supervisory functions. These teams increased productivity by switching workers between different tasks. This had become possible because of increased automation in production control technologies.

    This forecast of Neo-Fordism seems very similar to the post-Fordism proclaimed by Marxism Today. Both analyses see the restructuring of production around flexible working and new technologies as transforming capitalist society. However, Aglietta’s vision of the next stage of capitalism was very different from that of Marxism Today. In the first place, Aglietta did not see the new reorganisation of production as a complete end of Taylorism and Fordism. In a large part, it was the continuation of the old methods without their inefficient rigidities. This similarity meant Neo-Fordism was on the same trajectory of growth as Fordism. Aglietta did not see a decentralised and pluralist future. Instead, he predicted a growing disjuncture between private consumption and social production. Far from promoting decentralisation and competition, labour flexibility and new technologies were accelerating the process of concentration and monopoly. The institutional limits to Fordism could only be overcome by increased socialisation of production and consumption. Neo-Fordism meant the triumph of corporate and state control. Therefore, in 1976, Aglietta predicted that:

    ‘It would be quite illusory to believe that recourse to market mystique and private initiative could magically limit the take-over by the state of the social cost engendered by the expansion of commodity relations.’ (Aglietta 1979: 245)

    and also:

    ‘The coming massive socialisation of the conditions of life will destroy free enterprise as the pillar of liberal ideology.’ (Aglietta 1979: 385)

    This spectacular failure of prediction was shared by the entire French Left of the 1970s. Both the Communist Party and their Maoist rivals believed the crisis would lead to the growing statisation of the economy. Their theoreticians foresaw the tendency to the rate of profit to fall being countered by the state socialising the costs of the crisis through nationalisations and increased government expenditure. Aglietta faithfully reproduced this prognosis in his book. It was left to the next generation of regulationists to understand why this confident prediction failed to come true. This would lead to a further development in the Regulation School approach in understanding the history and trajectory of the crisis of Fordism.

    Lipietz as Regulationist

    A major problem with making prophecies is that they often don’t come true. The work of Lipietz and other contemporary regulationists is an attempt to understand the disjuncture between Aglietta’s past predictions and presentday reality. Aglietta foresaw more statisation and monopolisation, but the 1980s have seen a growth in the power of private capital and an increased use of market forces. Aglietta was following the ‘scientific’ tradition established by the IInd and IIIrd Internationals. Both Social Democrats and Leninists agreed on a predetermined teleology within capitalism. Family firms evolved into joint stock companies, then into large corporate monopolies and, finally, into state capitalism. This prediction derived from the common interest of both reformist and revolutionary party bureaucrats in substituting the statisation of capital for the self-emancipation of the working class. This vision of the future was reproduced by Left intellectuals as a theoretical view of history as a machine working towards an inevitable statist future. In 1960s France, the high priest of this approach was Louis Althusser.

    After 1968, French Left intellectuals were highly influenced by the work of Althusser, especially the Maoists. The Regulation School was no exception to this fashion. Aglietta even wrote his classic text in the same style of convoluted prose! Althusser started from the primacy of theory over empirical investigation. (Thompson 1978: 205-229) In turn, this method asserted the dominance of social structures over human actions. This meant that history became a ‘process without a subject’ because people were merely fulfilling their preordained destiny. Therefore, for Althusser, the centre of any examination of capitalism was the reproduction of the social structures which determined social actions by individuals. The Regulation School borrowed heavily from this method. It allowed them to understand how forms of capital, types of labour process and technologies were combined to form an interdependent structure. Althusser’s work also showed the regulationists how the internal contradictions of these social structures led to moments of disintegration and crisis. (Jessop 1988: 149-150; Clarke 1988: 68) However, by being influenced by Althusser’s method, Aglietta also absorbed his ‘scientific’ statist teleology. This was the ultimate source of Aglietta’s wrong predictions.

    What distinguished the Regulation School theorists from their contemporaries was their dislike of Althusser’s ‘anti-historicism’ and ‘anti-economism’. For the regulationists, a purist application of Althusser’s approach could not explain actual crises within capitalism. Althusser dismissed empirical historical research and reduced economics to the ‘last instance’. In contrast, the regulationists embraced the study of both history and political economy. Thus Aglietta’s Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme was a combination of theory with an economic history of twentieth century USA. Though this seminal study was still influenced by Althusser’s determinism, later regulationists were able to rid themselves of these false prophecies as well. Increasingly, empirical investigations were showing the ‘…historically contingency of the forms of organisation’. (Boyer 1987: 1212) The Regulation School were no longer treating political economy as a proof for statism.

    In the late 1970s, many French intellectuals broke with their traditional role as apologists for state socialism. For a majority, this took the form of an espousal of the benefits of capitalist democracy. (Garnier and Lewis 1984) Lipietz is an exception to this recuperation of the May ’68 generation. In 1983, he headed an electoral list called ‘Ecologie 93: Les Verts, les Alternatifs, les Autogestionnaires’ [Ecology 93: Greens, Alternatives, Self-Management Supporters]. This is a continuation of a lifetime of political activism, which began in Gauche Ouvriere et Paysanne [Worker and Peasant Left], a 1970s Maoist sect within the ultraleft Parti Socialiste Unifie [Unified Socialist Party]. (Biard 1978: 161-2) Despite their mistakes, Lipietz still defends the Maoists as the only section of the French Left who opposed the capitalist ‘modernisation’ of France. (Lipietz 1984: 10-34)

    Lipietz acknowledges a large theoretical debt to Althusser. (Lipietz 1985a: 159) This influence can be seen in Lipietz’s partial continuation of Althusser’s ‘scientism’. He affirms his belief in the construction of a ‘scientific project for understanding history’ by the Regulation School. This is ‘…the study of the regularities which past struggles have imposed upon human relations…’ and how these ‘regularities’ evolve and develop into crises. (Lipietz 1987: 12) However Lipietz has abandoned Althusser’s ‘scientific’ certainties over the direction of history. Institutional stability within capitalist societies is the result of ‘chance discoveries’ and is inherently transient. (Lipietz 1987: 15)  For Lipietz, political economy cannot be a set of fixed and immutable laws. Instead he puts history in the centre of the comprehension of the laws of political economy. Because capitalist social relations are in a state of constant flux, uncertainty and evolution, the prime task of political economists is to understand this process of change. (Lipietz 1989: 1)

    Lipietz uses regulationist theories as a way of examining recent history. Aglietta’s work is the starting point for his studies. He examines contemporary capitalist societies as products of the Fordist regime of accumulation. He echoes Aglietta when he defines a regime of accumulation as: ‘…the fairly longterm stabilisation of the allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation. This implies a certain correspondence between the transformation of the conditions of production and the transformation of the conditions of the reproduction of wagelabour, between certain of the modalities in which capitalism is articulated with other modes of production within a national economic and social formation, and between the social and economic formation under consideration and its ‘outside world’.’ (Lipietz 1987: 14)

    What Lipietz stresses in Aglietta’s approach is the concept of the mode of regulation. The word ‘regulation’ has a much wider meaning in French than in English. Régulation does not simply describe certain types of law or bureaucratic watchdogs; it also covers the culture, manners, myths and dreams of a society. In other words, the mode of regulation is a way of understanding many aspects of society which are usually seen as ‘non-economic’ are, in fact, deeply bound into the processes of capital accumulation. For example, Fordism depended upon workers internalising social and sexual disciplines outside work as part of their submission to the rhythms of the assembly line. The mode of regulation is ‘the regime of accumulation… materialised in the shape of norms, habits, laws and regulating networks…’ (Lipietz 1987: 14) This concept is a way of overcoming the polarisation between economics and politics/ideology found in most structuralist theories without abandoning the distinction altogether.

    The Golden Years of Fordism

    For Lipietz, the breakdown of the mode of regulation lies at the heart of the present crisis of Fordism. But, to understand this crisis, it is necessary to understand the birth of Fordism. The pre-Fordist regime of accumulation is called competitive regulation. This describes not only the era of family firms, the Gold Standard, free trade and the British Empire. It also signifies a specific stage in the organisation of work. In this period, capitalists intensified exploitation mainly by lengthening hours or cutting pay. Following Aglietta, Lipietz sees competitive regulation as an extensive regime of accumulation. Capital was primarily accumulated through an expansion in the scale of production, rather than altering the way production was carried out. However, at the leading edges of the economy, firms were increasing profits through reorganising work patterns and mechanising production. (Marx 1976) As in Aglietta, this is seen as leading to an intensive regime of accumulation characterised by constant reorganisation of the means and methods of production. (Lipietz 1987: 33)

    Lipietz’s definition of Fordism follows the regulationist orthodoxy. He sees Fordism as ‘…first of all a form of the organisation of labour…’ (Lipietz 1984: 16) Fordism emerged as a distinct regime of accumulation because these new techniques of production systematically spread across the leading capitalist countries. Therefore Fordism primarily took the form of a two-stage transformation of the production process:

    • Taylorism: first of all, the workforce was divided into three: managers/ technocrats; skilled workers; and semiskilled or unskilled workers. The separation of conception and execution led to rigid division and specialisation between workers.
    • Mechanisation: the second stage was the systematic incorporation of the skills of the workers into the machines used in production.

    The adoption of Fordism was a dynamic process which involved a continuous restructuring of the process of production. This led to a long-term rise in the productivity. (Lipietz 1985: 15) More and more commodities could be produced with less and less labour. By 1929, this increase volume of commodities led to a crisis of overproduction. According to the Regulation School, this occurred because the mode of regulation was still shaped by the era of competitive regulation while the regime of accumulation was already Fordist. (Lipietz 1987: 334) Under competitive regulation, competition forced firms to keep wages down. Yet, without higher wages, there could be no mass consumption of the commodities produced by the new methods. Failure to resolve this contradiction led to a financial crisis and the Great Depression. During the 1930s and 1940s, there were fierce conflicts within and between states as the different strategies were tried for escaping from the crisis. In the end, the Keynesian policies of the New Deal and Social Democracy were able to pioneer a new mode of regulation which assured the continuing expansion of the Fordist regime of accumulation.

    The new mode of regulation primarily involved the introduction of new policies by the nation state, such as a welfare system, minimum wage laws and credit money. (Lipietz 1987: 359; Lipietz 1989: 36) The successful combination of a Fordist regime of accumulation with a mode of regulation didn’t just depend on the skills of the ‘hegemonic bloc’ controlling power in particular states. (Lipietz 1985: 11) It also was a victory for working class resistance to the low wages and bad conditions of competitive regulation. In turn, underlying social conditions had to be sufficiently developed. This maturity was not simply the growth of a powerful Labour movement. For example, it also included the establishment of paper money, regular employment, an established banking sector and state economic intervention. (Lipietz 1985a: 845) For the Regulation School, the process of Fordism may have had its genesis within the production process, but its continued success depended on the reorganisation of society as a whole. The ‘real subsumption of labour to capital’ spread to all areas of social life.

    When societies fully adopted the new forms of regulation to complement the new production processes, a ‘Golden Age’ of Fordism occurred. There was a ‘virtuous circle’ of falling costs of fixed capital preventing mechanisation being halted by the price of machinery; consumption rising in parallel with productivity increases through increased wages and welfare provisions; and cyclical fluctuations within production being mitigated through fiscal regulation. (Lipietz 1987: 369) The ‘regularity’ of Fordism was also ensured by trapping workers into a cycle of ‘métro-boulot-télé-dodo’ [commuting-work-TV-sleep]. (Lipietz 1984: 233) However, this ‘ideal type’ of Fordism only existed for a limited period and in a few countries. Lipietz is interested not just in understanding Fordism’s era of (relative) stability, but also why its internal makeup led to revolt and crisis.

    The Crisis of Fordism

    ‘Fundamentally, the researchers have one single conclusion, repeated and multiplied in a flowering of overlapping citations: the rupture with the economic tendencies prior to 1973 comes from the crisis of Fordism, as the principal technical, social and economic form of organisation.’ (Boyer 1987: 35)

    In common with the rest of the Regulation School, Lipietz believes that Fordism reached its economic and social limits during the 1970s. Nowhere was this clearer than at the foundations of the whole regime of accumulation: the production process. As Lipietz puts it: ‘at the root of the current economic crisis, there is the crisis of labour.’ (Lipietz 1989: 18) Each new round of restructuring resulted in fewer gains in productivity. (Lipietz 1984: 424) This was not due solely to the re-emergence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall because of rising costs of fixed capital. It was also connected with the ‘…counteroffensive of the semi-skilled worker…’ which occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Lipietz 1984: 41) The workers were no longer overawed by the disciplines of Taylorism and the controls of mechanisation. Absenteeism, wildcat strikes and sabotage were all forms of resistance against the alienation of the assembly line. This showed how the rigid divisions of labour under Taylorism were themselves becoming a source of inefficiency.

    But this crisis of Fordism was not caused solely by internal difficulties within the regime of accumulation established in the advanced capitalist countries. There were external reasons as well. The mode of regulation developed by nation states began to break down because of the internationalisation of capital. (Lipietz 1986: 23) As key areas of production became organised on a global scale, it became increasingly difficult to regulate the economy on a national level. (Lipietz 1989: 11) Crucially, the global market was not subject to any minimum wage laws. This allowed certain countries to ‘cheat’ by benefiting from mass consumption without themselves paying the wages needed to make this possible. Within nation states, Fordist regulation was successful when wages and productivity rose in parallel. Yet the international competition between national economies was preventing the rise in wages necessary to prevent a crisis of overproduction. (Lipietz 1985: 17)

    The first phase of the breakdown of Fordism covered the period of from the first Oil Crisis of 1974 to the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Lipietz describes this as the era of the ‘Social Democratic management of crisis’. (Lipietz 1984: 456) The remedies discovered after the 1929 Crash were applied within the metropolitan countries to offset the growing profits crisis. Most notably, this strategy involved the rapid expansion in creditmoney. Governments gambled on expanding their way out of the crisis. But the mode of regulation was no longer able to postpone the crisis. Instead the ‘social democratic’ policy led to stagflation: a combination of rapid inflation and stagnating production. (Lipietz 1987: 136) Stagflation was only the ‘symptom of the disease’, demonstrating that the mode of regulation could no longer resuscitate an exhausted regime of accumulation. Inflation was simply displacing the problems of profitable production into the future. (Lipietz 1985a: 1356)

    Thus the crisis of Fordism became obvious once the traditional countermeasures were a failure. There were no longer any ‘social democratic’ solutions to the crisis. Lipietz sees capitalism seeking new ways out of the crisis. This was a restructuring of labour disciplines and the introduction of new technologies in the production process. Within the Western industrialised countries, capitalist companies ended the Fordist compromise. In the 1970s, strikers had demanded more wages without corresponding increases in productivity. Now managements were refusing wage rises for greater productivity. Companies were demanding that workers accept new flexible work patterns and the introduction of new technologies. Both these moves were designed to be internal counter-tendencies against declining productivity and falling profits. Companies also took advantage of the external causes of the crisis of Fordism by exporting semi-skilled and unskilled production processes to the Third World. (Lipietz 1984: 468)

    In his formative study, Aglietta apologised for deliberately avoiding the issue of imperialism and the world market. Lipietz’s principal contribution to the Regulation School is the use of regulationist theory to analyse capitalism on an international scale. This allows Lipietz to criticise his own Maoist past. The Maoist sects believed that the world revolution would be a repeat of the Chinese Revolution. Rebellion would first be successful in the countryside (the Third World) before spreading to the cities (the West). This analysis asserted that the Third World was being ‘underdeveloped’ by Western imperialism. Therefore industrialisation was impossible without a Maoist revolution. Moreover this belief was not limited to the Maoists, but was widespread on the Left during the 1960s. In Latin America, a whole school of ‘dependency theorists’ arose to defend this thesis. (Lipietz 1987: 64) However, these analysts ran into trouble when reality did not conform to their theories. During the 1970s and 1980s, the impossible occurred.  ‘Real capitalist industrialisation’ started in those Third World countries which had not experienced a ‘socialist’ revolution. This was the era of the emergence of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), such as Brazil, South Korea or Taiwan. (Lipietz 1987: 23, 131)

    In his book, Mirages and Miracles (1987), Lipietz uses regulationist theory to rethink the history of the relationship between the First and Third Worlds. He links the emergence of Fordism on a global scale with the postwar dominance of the American empire. This led to a new international division of labour centred on the USA. Successive American governments oversaw the dismantling of the old European empires. In the stage of competitive regulation, these had been semi-autarkic blocs connecting the metropolitan power with its dependent colonies in the periphery. But, under American protection, the spread of Fordism across the old imperial nations led to a metropolitan-centred regime of accumulation. Trade between the First and Third World dropped dramatically, reaching an all-time low in the mid 1960s. Despite the claims of the Maoists and dependency theorists, the exploitation of the periphery played little part in the success of the Fordist countries of the centre. The South only began to play an important part in the world economy again when Northern Fordism entered into crisis.

    The internal crisis within the Fordist regime of accumulation in the metropolitan countries encouraged the internationalisation of production. The Taylorist division of labour had already separated workers into managers, skilled labour, and semiskilled/unskilled labour. Therefore companies began to subcontract labour-intensive production processes to Third World countries. These factories used unskilled labour in conjunction with low levels of fixed capital. Lipietz calls this ‘primitive’ or ‘bloody’ Taylorism because it involved the super-exploitation of workers. Repressive Third World regimes denied union and political rights to enforce labour discipline and low wages on their workers.

    But the industrialisation of the South did not stop simply at the level of factories using semiskilled or unskilled labour. Central to Lipietz’s analysis is the rise of peripheral Fordism within the NICs. While ‘bloody’ Taylorism was labour intensive, the next stage of growth in many Third World countries was increasingly capital intensive. As more fixed capital was invested, workers were disciplined by the speed of the machinery rather than just by supervision. The rise of the NICs was partially encouraged by the stagnation of the Fordism in the centre which encouraged the multinationals to switch investment to these new areas of growth. But Lipietz stresses that the international corporations have only played a limited part in the rapid development of the NICs. The most important part of their growth has come from internal demand. The arrival of ‘peripheral Fordism’ within the NICs depended on the emergence of the top two layers of the Taylorist division of labour: managers and skilled workers. This not only allowed the NICs to export more capital intensive commodities, but, more importantly, created a growing internal market. The success of certain NICs has broken down the old homogeneity among the excolonies of the European empires. There is now a new division of labour within the South between industrialising and nonindustrialising countries. This has even led to the emergence of some NICs as regional imperialists.

    Despite the ‘miracle’ of industrialisation in the South, the international system was still unstable. For Lipietz, a central problem was that the spread of Fordism to the Third World has undermined the state-based mode of regulation. Third World factories could produce cheaper commodities by paying low wages and welfare benefits to their workers. But First World workers provided a market for these commodities only if they had the wages and welfare benefits imposed by the Fordist compromise. Third World competition created a dilemma for First World companies. They needed to cut prices by lowering wage costs while simultaneously needing high wages to sell their commodities. Unfortunately, none of the international institutions were able to impose the Fordist mode of regulation on a global scale. During the 1970s, the banks and finance houses recycled OPEC’s oil rents to the NICs. But this meant that international regulation took place through the financial markets and not through any global Fordist institutions. For example, the shifting of work from First to Third World workers was carried out to cut wage bills. But, in turn, without these workers as consumers, the spectre of overproduction would return.

    This source of instability in the world market was closely linked with the lack of the key institutions of Fordism within the NICs. (Lipietz 1985: 256) To compete internationally, corporations relied on their cheap labour. There are no minimum wage laws or welfare state. However, there are plentiful supplies of credit. The NICs have set up an exclusionary version of the Fordist regime of accumulation. The old oligarchy, the capitalists and more skilled workers were well paid. On the other hand, the semiskilled and unskilled workers were pauperised. They were excluded from the high wage and welfare benefits given to workers in the First World. (Lipietz 1987: 149) Because of competition from the NICs,  this exclusionary version of Fordism has spread into the centre during the 1980s. Now it threatened to supplant altogether the old inclusionary regime of accumulation, with its welfare state and minimum wage laws.

    This is how Lipietz explains why Aglietta’s prophecies did not come true. Nationalisation and centralisation could act as counter-tendencies to the crisis of Fordism only at the level of an individual state. However, these states were part of an expanding global market. Once Fordism spread to the Third World, national attempts at intervention in the metropolitan countries were checked by the dynamics of an international system organised through market competition. This is how the 1980s became an historical break with the supposedly inevitable advance of statisation and monopolisation. The fatal flaw of Aglietta’s book was his failure to see national economies can exist only as part of a global economy. This is why the crisis of Fordism did not lead to more nationalisation and monopolisation, but instead to privatisation and market competition.

    Which Post-Fordism?

    Lipietz has seen a vision of the future and it is called Brazil. This is a world where the crisis of Fordism has been resolved by organising the economy through the exclusionary regime of accumulation. Society is divided between a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’. The core consists of socially integrated, high-paid, skilled and fulltime workers. In contrast, the periphery is composed of marginalised, lowpaid, unskilled and part-time menials. This polarised society combines hitech consumer goods with urban deprivation. Lipietz is not alone in this nightmare. It is the ‘cyberpunk’ backdrop to many science fiction films, such as Bladerunner and Robocop. The potency of this image is strengthened by the spread of this type of society from the Third World into the First World. Lipietz (1987) sees the Reagan years in the USA as having a ‘…bizarre similarity with Brazil in the seventies’. The economy was expanded by redistributing wealth from the poor to the rich and the widespread availability of credit. The consequences were a bizarre combination of rapid technological advance with growing social deprivation.

    But Lipietz thinks this post-Fordist dystopia is not the inevitable future for all countries. Within each country, there are competing ‘hegemonic blocs’ offering alternative solutions to the crisis. Some parts of the Left want to defend the old Fordist order, while some sections of the Right dream of a revival of pre-Fordist society. However Lipietz thinks that any return to the Fordist or pre-Fordist past is impossible.  Therefore the central question within contemporary capitalism is: which type of post-Fordism will be adopted? Unlike the determinism promoted by Marxism Today, Lipietz does not believe there is only one way out of the crisis of Fordism.

    As shown in the diagram ‘The Psychogeography of the Left’, he sees there are two diverging types of post-Fordism:

    • Liberal productivism: This strategy resolves the crisis in the interests of capital. The production process is restructured by the introduction of new technologies and the division of the labour force into core and periphery workers. The state no longer guarantees mass consumption through minimum wage laws and the welfare state. This is post-Fordism for states who want to be Japan, but could end up like Brazil.
    • Alternative: This approach wants to discover a way out of the crisis which will benefit labour. The production process is restructured using new technologies, but in ways which preserve the unity of the working class. The benefits of increases in productivity continue to be shared between capital and labour. This is post-Fordism for workers who want to combine socialism with ecology. (Lipietz 1989a)

    As the crisis of Fordism was caused by the declining productivity of labour, Lipietz (1985) thinks that the introduction of both types of post-Fordism can only occur through a fundamental restructuring of the production process. A new type of labour organisation is needed if there is to be a new type of regime of accumulation. This can only be achieved through the introduction of new types of machinery and types of labour management. Computer technology can create flexible machines, which are used in many different ways in production. If these new machines are introduced, flexible workers are also needed. This new type of production process is called flexible specialisation. The successful introduction of post-Fordist production methods depends upon the enthusiasm and skills of all grades of workers being devoted to raising productivity. Increasingly, new technologies are more productive when they are used for reskilling workers, rather than deskilling them. As with other commentators, Lipietz finds the best examples of this new type of labour process in Japan. But, unlike them, Lipietz does not want the European Left to model their countries solely on Japan. The Left’s main task is to ensure the benefits of the new types of production are not limited to the core workers.

    Liberal Productivism in Rocard’s France

    Lipietz agrees with the analysis put forward by Robin Murray and Marxism Today on the introduction of flexible specialisation at the leading edge of capitalist production. But he does not think that the reorganisation of the production process leads inevitably to a single variant of post-Fordism. Lipietz thinks there are two possible ways out of the crisis. This means he draws very different political conclusions from the arrival of flexible specialisation. Most importantly, Lipietz doesn’t support the type of political strategy espoused by Marxism Today. He thinks the Left should be fighting for a more radical solution to the crisis of Fordism. Moreover, coalition politics are not an oppositional policy in France as this is the official programme of the government! Under the leadership of Michel Rocard, the Socialist party administration has adopted a policy of ‘opening’ towards the centre parties. The Socialist party also wants to form a new ‘social compromise’ between capital and labour for the ‘modernisation’ of France. (Rocard 1986: 3649; 138205) Lipietz believes the Socialist party is introducing the liberal productivist version of post-Fordism. Not suprisingly, this type of ‘modernisation’ involves the working class paying the costs of resolving the crisis of Fordism. Lipietz challenges these political and economic policies which support liberal productivist post-Fordism.

    This submission to liberal productivism resulted from the failures of the first Socialist party government. In 1981, Mitterrand won the presidential election ending two decades of rightwing rule. He came to power on a programme which promised a ‘…radicalised perfection of Fordist compromise.’ (Lipietz 1986: 3) France was going to expand its way out of economic difficulties through rises in welfare, cuts in hours worked and extensive nationalisations. When this approach led to trade deficits and a franc crisis, the Socialist party decided to change course. With the old Left discredited, policies promoted by Rocard became the new Socialist party orthodoxy. This culminated in his elevation to the premiership after Mitterrand’s re-election in 1987. Since the mid 1970s, Rocard has led a faction of the Socialist party known as the deuxième gauche (second Left). This group campaigned to replace the old models of statist socialism with a new approach based on the experience of the leading industrial sectors in Japan, California and Northern Italy. (Lipietz 1984: 801) The deuxième gauche were among the earliest proponents of the type of liberal productivist post-Fordism. Their proposals included:

    • the quick introduction of high technology in industry and society;
    • the replacement of the nation by the firm in economic policy;
    • an emphasis on individual rights as opposed to class solidarity;
    • the reorientation of state aid from welfare to investment.

    The adoption by the Socialist party of a version of liberal productivism resulted from the breakdown of the old social democratic compromise. During the 19816 Socialist party government, these policies started creating an exclusionary regime of accumulation on the Brazilian model. There was a fall in real wages and a rise in unemployment as the costs of the crisis were off-loaded onto labour, especially the weakest sections of the working class such as women, immigrants and part-timers. (Hall 1987) Lipietz (1984) describes this strategy as ‘social sadism’ because suffering was imposed on workers in the name of liberty. Pluralism and diversity became justifications for unfettered exploitation.

    The deuxième gauche opposed state controls over the economy and society in the name of liberty and democracy. Instead, Rocard’s tendency saw capitalist companies as the leading instruments of social change. The role of the Socialist party government was to support and regulate this dynamic private sector. The deuxième gauche believed the Socialist party could channel the private egoism of capitalists towards fulfilling the public good. The rise of Rocard and the deuxième gauche to power is an integral part of the recuperation of the generation of ’68. Those who once were Maoists calling for a social revolution in France are now advocating a policy of ‘modernisation’. As Lipietz sardonically comments: ‘the Japanese Left have beaten the Chinese Left’. (Lipietz 1984: 273)

    The Alternative Compromise

    As shown in the diagram ‘The Psychogeography of the Left’, Lipietz believes there is another way out of the crisis of Fordism. For Lipietz, regulationist studies can show how the Left can propose a policy of modernisation which benefits the working class. This strategy is the only way of regaining the political initiative from the Right. At present, Lipietz sees an ‘absurd polarisation’ within the European Left. (Lipietz 1985: 24) This sterile division is reflected within the different parties of the French Left:

    • the Communist Party wants to preserve the old Fordist compromise. This involves not only defending the welfare state, but also opposing the restructuring of the traditional organisation of production in the factories.
    • the Socialist party is following policies described above which are designed to encourage liberal productivist post-Fordism.

    Neither party’s strategy is credible. The Communist party’s strategy is doomed to failure because the old Fordist order cannot be revived, while the Socialist party ‘s policies cannot succeed because liberal productivist post-Fordism is already reaching its social limits. (Lipietz 1989a) The escalating ecological crisis is the most dramatic proof of the long-run unsustainability of liberal productivism’s ‘…reckless unplanned accumulation…’. (Lipietz 1987: 192) What is more, liberal productivism is also discovering that its restructuring of the production process has not even solved the crisis of Fordism. It has only provided a short-term reversal of the long-term decline in the growth in productivity. The problem is that liberal productivism finds difficulties in mobilising workers behind the goals of capital. It can only bribe core workers with more money and terrorise periphery workers with the threat of unemployment. Lipietz believes the faltering of liberal productivism gives an opening to a more radical solution to the crisis of Fordism. He thinks the Left should put forward a new type of compromise, distinct from both the Fordist and liberal productivist models. (Lipietz 1985: 29)

    Lipietz believes this strategy is credible because it expresses certain possibilities apparent within the restructuring of the production process around flexible specialisation. The alternative compromise is based on growing need by capital for workers’ conscious involvement in the process of production. The most productive use of information technologies and flexible working leads to continuous innovation within the production process. In turn, this can only happen when the close supervision of the Taylorist division of labour is abandoned. Line workers have to take over many of the functions of management. With the removal of traditional types of labour disciplines, workers must become self-motivated behind the aim of continuously increasing productivity. For Lipietz (1989), this is the only long-term solution to the falling growth in productivity. This makes an alternative compromise attractive to sections of capital as well as labour. Therefore Lipietz thinks the working class is in a strong position to extract a compromise in the interests of all workers in return for rising productivity. Lipietz thinks the workers should extract a high price for its enthusiasm in this process of constant organisational and technical restructuring. He suggests some fundamental demands for the working class during these negotiations:

    • guaranteed lifetime employment in the workers’ home town or area;
    • workers’ involvement in the pace and direction of technological
      change;
    • new technology to be used for reskilling rather than deskilling;
    • constant retraining of workers in new skills;
    • a reduction in hours worked with each new increase in productivity;
    • ecologically sustainable production processes.

    Above all else, the primary goal in the negotiations for this new compromise would be the abandonment of Taylorism within production. Lipietz (1989; 1989a) sees this as the major gain for the working class in any negotiations. The need to involve both skilled and unskilled workers within the process of change means the old hierarchies are impossible within any sophisticated version of post-Fordism. Lipietz sees this unification of skilled and unskilled workers as a vital first step towards realising full self-management within production. The negotiations themselves will act as ‘schools of self-management’ for the workers as they become involved in issues outside basic pay and conditions.

    The workers will not gain solely from the end of the rigid Taylorist division of labour within production. Lipietz is convinced that another important gain of the new compromise will the shortening of the hours worked. Therefore a primary demand in the new compromise will be a trade off between increased productivity and greater free time. This is necessary because there are increasing ecological limits on the production of more and more commodities. It is already impossible for everyone in the world to consume as wastefully as First World inhabitants.

    Therefore Lipietz (1989b) sees that ‘the only long-term ecologically sustainable growth is the growth in free time and individual autonomy’. This analysis sees a cut in working hours as not just ecologically justified. A shorter working day is also needed if workers are to achieve individual autonomy by discovering a life beyond work. This demand is made by other radical economists who also see freedom for the working class can only come once it frees itself from alienating, but socially necessary, labour. (Gorz 1985) Thus Lipietz’s short-term compromise between labour and capital is based on the long-term goal of liberating the working class from the necessity for wage labour.

    For Lipietz, Marxism Today and the deuxième gauche have abandoned solidarity between social individuals in favour of competition between asocial individuals. In contrast, Lipietz thinks that class solidarity is the only guarantee of autonomy for individual workers. The aim of the new compromise is to strengthen the power of the working class so it can democratically define its own social needs. For example, only when freed from the fear of unemployment, workers will no longer find it necessary to defend unecological or dangerous jobs, such as work in nuclear power stations or mines. Also the introduction of flexible technologies and working patterns can be used to lessen the sectional interests within the working class. When workers are less tied to particular trades, they can be more easily united around their common status as workers. Lipietz wants this process taken even further within the institutions of the welfare state.

    In the Fordist era, most welfare services were organised along Taylorist principles. Lipietz (1989) thinks this sector could be an area where self-management could be introduced immediately. He envisages replacing services provided by the welfare state or domestic labour with a new sector organised as self-managed enterprises. He thinks this section of the economy could employ around 10% of the workforce. These welfare providers would not be organised in a Taylorist hierarchy, but be accountable to their workers and clients. This would allow them to respond more closely to the needs of the communities which they would serve. Lipietz (1984) hopes this would form a vital part of the ‘…the collective management of the reproduction of the labour force’ by the workers themselves.

    Finally, Lipietz believes that this internal compromise must have an external component as well. This does not simply involve an ending of the debt burden on the NICs and the rest of the Third World. It also must involve the ending of the ‘beggar my neighbour’ policies encouraged by the lack of regulatory institutions on a global level. To prevent the importing of the Brazilian model into the First World, it is necessary to spread the alternative compromise to Brazil itself. This can only happen if the Third World’s debt and trade dependency is alleviated. Above all else, Lipietz (1989) believes First World countries should discriminate in their trade in favour of those countries which guarantee democratic social and political rights for their citizens. This is in the self-interest of the Northern working class. It will make it difficult to undermine the new compromise through competition from super-exploited workers.

    The Alternative Movement

    In France, Lipietz is politically active in building the Alternative. This is composed of Left groups able to seize the opportunity for a new compromise in labour’s favour. But, as the last elections showed, the French Left is still dominated by the liberal productivist Socialist party and the Fordist Communist party. For Lipietz (1986), the problem is to create a movement which is neither the Left of liberal productivism, nor the Left of Fordism.

    Here Lipietz is faced with an ambiguity central to the experience of his generation. He wants the Alternative movement to be both Green and Red. On the one hand, he is inspired by the new social movements which arose outside the traditional party and union structures after the May ’68 Revolution. Thus he sees the political nucleus of the Alternative in the ecologist, immigrant and feminist movements. In contrast to his sharp analysis of Left parties, Lipietz is entirely uncritical of the new social movements. Here, as with the German Greens, his vision of the new Left is as a continuation of the old counterculture of the 1960s. This is Gorz’s new historical subject: the ‘non-class of post-industrial proletarians’. (Gorz 1982) On the other hand, Lipietz’s new compromise is rooted in the persistence of the class struggle within modern capitalist societies. The alternative compromise over the restructuring of the production process is reached in negotiations between capital and labour as contending classes.

    For the Left, this strategy can only succeed if the Alternative overcomes the divisions among the working class and creates the basis of class unity. The Socialist party’s liberal productivist strategy can appeal to skilled core workers if they are rewarded with more pay and greater autonomy. The aim of the Alternative must spread the benefits of restructuring to those in  unskilled, semi-skilled and part-time jobs. In this case, the Red/Green movement is appealing to women, immigrants and youth primarily as workers, as part of a coalition which must cover all sections of the oppressed. (Lipietz 1986: 5) This strategy is underpinned by the form of restructuring created by the alternative version of post-Fordism. If the long-term decline in productivity is to be halted, then all workers have to be reskilled if they are going to use the new technologies. For the Left, the major advance in the alternative compromise is the creation of a highly skilled and selfconfident ‘new working class’. (Mallet 1975)

    Lipietz doesn’t believe that the Alternative can be limited to one particular political party or social organisation. Instead, he is looking for a family of currents, both  inside and outside the Old Left. (Lipietz 1986: 10) In France, this is expressed through les Verts [Greens], the Nouvelle Gauche [New Left] of Pierre Juquin, dissidents within the Communist or Socialist parties, and people simply active in local campaigns. Though Lipietz is conscious of the need for state intervention to help new initiatives, he also stresses the necessity to build a wide social base for the Alternative. What is more, this movement cannot be limited to one country. The common problems of Western European countries demonstrate the need for cooperation among movements throughout the European Union. The peace and ecological movements have shown the power of organising campaigns on a global basis. Now it is necessary to extend this solidarity further. It is increasingly in the interests of workers in the North to help in stopping super-exploitation in the South, if only to protect their own conditions in the metropolitan countries. (Lipietz 1987: 191) In a sense, Lipietz is proposing a return to the Maoist strategy of an international workerpeasant alliance, but in a more radical and ecological form.

    Lipietz and the British Left

    In contemporary Britain, the writings of Alain Lipietz suffer from guilt by association with the policies promoted by Marxism Today. The magazine shares the same theoretical language, but uses it to draw different conclusions from those proposed by Lipietz. Marxism Today sees its primary task as reclaiming the future from the Tories. Therefore the magazine rejects the traditional centralised and statist model of socialism. For Marxism Today, this abandonment of the belief in state socialism means that the old divisions between Left and Right are no longer relevant. Now there is only a post-Fordist future. The reorganisation of production around the new methods of flexible specialisation is supposed to bring greater individual freedom and the end of centralised bureaucracies. But it also involves the abandonment of collectivist struggles in favour of modest reforms and coalition politics as ends in themselves.

    This analysis is overly determinist about the future of capitalism. In the past, from the IInd and IIIrd Internationals to Aglietta, the Left believed in a statist teleology. Nowadays, Marxism Today promulgates the inevitability of the liberal productivist version of post-Fordism. But is the new determinism any more accurate than the old version? By reading Lipietz’s work, the British Left can learn to take a more critical view of both present day developments and over-optimistic predictions of the future. For a start, Lipietz shows how the post-Fordist future might not be a more humane version of California, but a Northern copy of Brazil’s polarised society.

    For Lipietz, historical changes in all areas of social life are shaped by changes in the production process. The development of labour disciplines and assembly line technologies formed the heart of Fordist society. But Lipietz is not just interested in the subordination of the workers to the factory system. He is also interested in the cross-class collusion necessary for the long boom of Fordism. The working class gained from rising social and real wages under Fordism. However, these gains are now under threat because of the end of Fordism. The fundamental cause of the crisis lies within the production process. By the late 1960s, additional mechanisation was failing to keep pace with previous gains in productivity. This problem was exacerbated by the growing revolt by workers against the disciplines of Taylorism.

    The policies promoted by Marxism Today accept to capital’s solution to the crisis of Fordism. Nowadays, the leading companies are adopting flexible specialisation as the method of organising their production processes. In turn, this is leading to the restructuring of the whole of society around the liberal productivist model of post-Fordism. As an exclusionary regime of accumulation, this type of post-Fordism cuts back on the regulatory mechanisms of Fordism, such as the welfare state and minimum wage laws. However, Lipietz argues that this liberal productivist solution to the crisis of Fordism cannot succeed. It is already reaching its institutional limits because it cannot solve the problem of productivity which lies at the heart of the crisis of Fordism. Liberal productivism cannot continuously advance labour productivity because it can only incorporate the core workers through money and periphery workers as superexploited subcontractors. Therefore it is pointless for the British Left to support any humanised version of this type of post-Fordism.

    Lipietz places the need to raise labour productivity at the centre of the current crisis. The new information technologies and flexible working practices are making the Taylorist division of labour obsolete. Even from the capitalists’ viewpoint, the rule of fear is economically inefficient. Instead, modern production process can only fulfill their potential with a self-disciplined and reskilled working class. The crucial finding of Lipietz for the British Left is that there is choice over the type of post-Fordism adopted. The introduction of flexible specialisation can represent an opportunity for the working class to drive a hard bargain with their employers. If the workers are in a strong situation, Marxism Today‘s capitulation to liberal productivist post-Fordism is unnecessary. The working class can exact a far better deal from the capitalists. This is Lipietz’s alternative compromise. He is not just interested in the shortterm benefits from a new settlement. Lipietz calls for the cutting the working day as ecologically, economically and psychologically necessary. He also sees the reduction in the working day as a step towards the escape from wage work for everyone.

    Therefore the British Left can learn from Lipietz’s analyses that there is a different way out of the crisis of Fordism. After the defeats of the past decade, it often seems that the working class is in a very weak position. The present government seems determined to resist all forms of compromise. Therefore Marxism Today‘s policies of modest reforms seem like the only feasible strategy, especially if the success of liberal productivist post-Fordism is inevitable. But Lipietz’s work shows the British Left that these changes within the production process are actually leading in another direction. In time, this will result in a strengthened and more powerful working class. But the alternative compromise will not lead to the immediate end of the alienation of wage slavery. This makes the alternative compromise only a lesser evil than its liberal productivist rival. However the potential gains of the compromise could be major steps towards lessening the daily exploitation of workers, especially if they include cutting the hours of work; reskilling the working class; ending Taylorism and the core/periphery division; stopping discrimination against women and immigrant workers; and encouraging ecologically sound production. The greatest lesson the British Left can learn from Lipietz is his optimism about the emerging historical opening for successful class solidarity politics.

    ———————————————————————————–

    Thanks to Les Levidow, Alain Lipietz and the Centre for Communication and Information Studies, Polytechnic of Central London.

    First Publication:
    ‘Mistranslations: Lipietz in London and Paris’, Science as Culture, No. 8, 1990, pp. 80-117, (ISSN 0950 5431).

    Re-Publication:
    ‘Mistranslations: Lipietz in London and Paris’ in Bob Jessop (ed.), The Parisian Regulation School: regulation school and the crisis of capitalism volume 1, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2001, pp. 303-340, (ISBN 1-840664-651-9).

    Corrected: 5th May 2007.

    Check out Alain Lipietz’s website: <lipetz.net>

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    Lipietz, A. (1986) ‘Les Conditions d’un Mouvement Alternatif en France’, Seminar Paper, A.E.R.I.P. “Les Enjeux Institutionnels et Politiques de Mars 1986, 31st January1st February. [Shortened and translated version in Socialist Alternatives, Volume 1, Number 2, October/November 1986]

    Lipietz, A. (1987) Mirages and Miracles, London: Verso.

    Lipietz, A. (1989) An Alternative Design for the Twenty First Century, Paris: photocopy.

    Lipietz, A. (1989a) Talk given at Polytechnic of Central London, 27th January.

    Lipietz, A. (1989) ‘Le Printemps Vert de l’Europe’, Libération, 24 Mai.

    Mallet, S. (1975) The New Working Class, Nottingham: Spokesman.

    Marx, K. (1976) Value Studies, London: New Park Publications.

    Murray, R. (1988) ‘Life after Henry (Ford)’, Marxism Today, October.

    Rocard, M. (1986) A l’Epreuve des Faits, Paris: Editions du Seuil.

    Rowbotham, S., Mitter, S. and Murray, R. (1989) ‘A Step Ahead: Combining Economic Strategy and Vision’, Interlink, February/March.

    Thompson, E.P. (1978) The Poverty of Theory and other essays, London: Merlin.

  • BROADCASTING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN IRELAND

    Broadcasting was Invented in Ireland

    On Tuesday, 25th April 1916, a transmitter from the School of Wireless Telegraphy in Dublin started sending messages across the airwaves. The morse code signals announced to the world that a combined force of armed nationalists and socialists were occupying central Dublin and had proclaimed an Irish Republic, independent from the British Empire. (Mulryan 1988: 1‑2) According to legend, this transmission was the world’s first radio broadcast. Before April 1916, radio technology had been used primarily for point‑to‑point communications between ships and shore bases. In contrast, the Irish rebels didn’t transmit to any particular recipient, but to anyone who happened to be listening. They hoped their messages would be picked up by a passing ship and news of the uprising relayed to the American press. Easter 1916 not only marks the birth of the Irish Republic, but also the invention of broadcasting. (McLuhan 1964: 304)

    From the beginning, the independence of the modern Irish state has depended on control over its own electronic media. In the early years of independence, radio broadcasting was committed to the preservation of Ireland’s distinct national culture. Hence, Irish governments denounced the ‘spill‑over’ of signals from British stations within southern Ireland as a form of cultural imperialism. However, in recent decades, a new generation of Irish politicians has adopted completely different attitudes towards broadcasting. In their view, the national survival of Ireland depended on its successful integration within the European Community. Thus, Irish politicians have encouraged the electronic media to bring the ideas and cultures of the wider world into the homes of Irish people. Recently, the Irish government has even introduced a new means of television transmission to relay British stations to those regions outside their present coverage area. In turn, the rejection of cultural separatism also has created major changes in the structure and regulation of Irish domestic broadcasting. Therefore, in contrast to most other European Community countries, the development of the Irish electronic media is still heavily influenced by national policies for political, economic and cultural self‑determination.

    A New State for an Old Country

    The Irish Republic is the larger of the two states on the island of Ireland. In the north‑east, there is the British province of Northern Ireland, with a population of approximately 1,500,000. The rest of the island forms the territory of the Irish Republic, which has around 3,500,000 inhabitants. (Department of Foreign Affairs 1990: 2‑3) Within the European Community, Ireland forms part of the periphery of poorer states and regions which surround the rich core of southern Britain, northern France, northern Italy, western Germany and the Low Countries. As the European Community moves towards economic and political union, this uneven development between members states is a formidable obstacle to further integration. Along with Greece, Portugal or southern Italy, the Irish Republic has the classic problems of a peripheral region, such as lower living standards, state corruption, economic domination by foreign multinationals and overdependence on peasant agriculture. The creation of a federal European state may offer a solution to these difficulties through interventionist regional policies. But, as well as being a peripheral region, Ireland faces its own specific problems inherited from its unequal relationship with its closest neighbour: Great Britain. For centuries, Ireland was under British colonial rule. The present‑day Irish Republic was created by the independence movement against British domination. However, political independence hasn’t removed the large difference in the relative size of the two countries. Because southern Ireland has a much smaller economy and under a tenth of the British population, every Irish government must adopt policies to protect the nation’s autonomy from the hegemony of its powerful neighbour. Even the surrender of national independence to federal European institutions is only supported by most Irish politicians because integration will further weaken Britain’s influence over Ireland.

    If Great Britain was the first nation state, then Ireland was the first colony of the modern epoch. Although British domination over Ireland can be traced back to the Norman conquests in the twelfth century, it was the Tudor and Cromwellian settlements which turned Ireland into an agricultural colony of Britain. From the sixteenth century onwards, the occupation of Ireland ensured rents were paid to foreign landlords and produce was provided for British cities. In addition, the Irish people became a source of cheap labour for the British army, factories and colonies. Ireland provided a large part of the money and people needed for the birth of industrial capitalism in Britain. The industrial prosperity of nineteenth century Britain was based on agricultural poverty in Ireland. The 1840s Irish Famine demonstrated the human cost of the British occupation of Ireland. In a few years, over a million Irish people starved to death while food was being exported to pay rents to British landlords. (Burns 1974: 22‑3) The inaction of the London government during the Famine also demonstrated the failure to integrate Ireland within the British state. In 1800, Ireland had been politically absorbed into Britain through the union of the parliaments of the two countries. But, unlike Scotland or Wales, the political fusion of the two nations didn’t result in the disappearance of the colonial status of Ireland.

    During the nineteenth century, there was a rapid growth in Irish nationalism among all sections of the population. After the devastation of the Famine, there was widespread rural poverty throughout Ireland. From 1860s onwards, Irish nationalists organised campaigns for the ownership of land among the peasants. The nationalists saw the expropriation of the foreign landlords as the first step towards the achievement of political independence. After years of violent and constitutional agitation, the British government slowly conceded ownership of the land to the Irish peasantry. Between 1881 and 1903, a series of Land Acts gave security of tenure, fair rents and loans for land purchase to the tenants of the British landlords. (Lyons 1973: 160‑223) Before independence was achieved, the Irish peasantry had already won the social revolution in the countryside. The British government hoped the granting of land ownership would weaken the Irish peasantry’s support for political independence by encouraging social conservatism. Instead, the creation of a society of rural family property‑owners provided the economic basis for political separation from the urban industrialised economy of Great Britain. Moreover, social conservatism among the peasantry actually created more support for political separatism. The further development of capitalism in Ireland could only be accomplished by the replacement of individual property with more collective forms of ownership, such as joint‑stock companies. Thus, the Irish peasantry needed political independence to protect their individual property against the threat of economic modernisation from Britain. As in France, Malthusian attitudes among the peasantry created not only social conservatism, but also political radicalism.

    Although they formed the backbone of Irish nationalism, the peasants were incapable of controlling the struggle for independence. As in other emerging countries, the urban intellectuals provided the political leadership for the peasant revolution. Therefore, the Irish nation was invented as a distinct political and cultural entity by nationalist intellectuals. (Anderson 1983: 66‑79) However, during independence struggle, this urban intelligentsia created two distinct forms of Irish separatism: secular republicanism and Catholic nationalism. Although many Irish revolutionaries attempted to combine these two strands of the separatist tradition, both forms of nationalism were based on fundamentally incompatible world‑views. The ideas of secular republicanism were imported from Jacobin France during the struggle against the enforced political union of Britain and Ireland. According to this political theory, the Act of Union was unjust because the Irish people hadn’t given their consent to the loss of their independence. For secular republicans, the democratic state could only be created through the active participation of its individual citizens. Therefore, the inhabitants of Ireland possessed the democratic right to form their own nation state, independant from Great Britain.

    Many Irish nationalists were also attracted to secular republicanism as a way of overcoming the sectarian differences between the Protestant settlers and Catholic natives encouraged by the British colonial authorities. In republican theory, individuals became citizens through their membership of civil society rather than through their religious or ethnic origin. In Ireland, as in other parts of Europe and in the USA, secular republicans advocated the separation of church and state in an independent republic. By the late‑nineteenth century, most secular republicans were members of a Jacobin revolutionary conspiracy, called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This organisation wanted an armed insurrection to expel the British and to establish a completely independent Irish Republic. Because of this revolutionary strategy, the IRB’s form of separatism became known as ‘physical force’ nationalism. (Lyons 1973: 131‑3)

    In contrast, ‘moral force’ nationalism was represented by the reformist Irish National Party (INP) in the late‑nineteenth century. Instead of armed resistance, the INP participated in elections to the British parliament. The party wanted to use its pivotal position within the House of Commons to win home rule for Ireland. The INP was descended from the campaign against the institutionalised discrimination against Catholics in British‑occupied Ireland. As a parliamentary party, the INP encouraged and benefited from the gradual extension of the franchise within the British state. (Farrell 1988: 18‑9) As the majority of these new voters were peasants, the ‘moral force’ separatists created their own form of nationalism to win their votes. During the struggle for land ownership, there was a strong Catholic revival within rural Ireland. The Church introduced new rituals and cults from continental Europe to encourage the public expression of piety. (Brown 1981: 27‑8) For many peasants, Catholicism acted as a mark of national ‘distinction’ between the Irish people and the inhabitants of the rest of the British Isles. (Bourdieu 1984; Brown 1981: 28)

    But, Catholic nationalism was popular among the peasantry for more than separatist reasons. The Church also provided wider social regulation for the emerging economy of small property‑owners. The preservation of subsistence family farms depended on the successful transfer of ownership to the succeeding generation without excessive division. This problem was partially overcome by the massive emigration of younger children to the USA, Britain and other countries. The repressive sexual morality of the Church also helped to prevent the break‑up of rural property through premature marriages or divorces. The observance of pre‑marital chastity by the Irish peasantry expressed the Malthusian limits of a society based on individual land ownership. (Brown 1981: 19‑21) By the end of the nineteenth century, the faith in the Church of the peasantry was turned into Catholic nationalism by the INP. By cultivating a close relationship with the ecclesiastical hierachy, the party won support from pious voters for the campaign for Irish home rule. However, under this arrangement, the INP needed approval from the Catholic Church for the central parts of its political programme. Despite their committment to constitutional politics, the party’s leaders defered to the undemocratic authority of the clergy. In contrast to the IRB’s secular republic of equal citizens, the INP believed popular sovereignty would create a state representing the interests of the majority of Irish people: the Catholic peasantry. Even before partition, the dominant form of Irish nationalism not only excluded the Protestant minority for its pro‑British sympathies, but also for its heretical religious beliefs. Subjectively, the INP believed in a united Ireland, while, objectively, the parliamentary party was almost exclusively the representative of the Catholic population of Ireland.

    The limitation of Irish identity to the Catholic inhabitants of the island was a reflection of the failure to find alternative marks of cultural ‘distinction’ between the Irish and the British. In other parts of Europe, nationalist intellectuals transformed local peasant dialects into formal languages to separate members of oppressed nationalities from their Austrian, Turkish or Russian masters. (Anderson 1983: 69) In Ireland, both secular republicans and Catholic nationalists tried to use the Irish language in a similiar fashion. From the late nineteenth century onwards, the Gaelic League campaigned for the revival of the local language, games, customs, place‑names and surnames in Ireland. These cultural nationalists saw themselves participating in a ‘Battle of Two Civilisations’ between native Irish and foreign British influences in Ireland. The Gaelic League and similiar organisations called for the ‘de‑Anglicising’ of Ireland as a central part of the liberation of the country from British imperialism. (Lyons 1973: 231‑3) However, although Irish was an ancient language, the long British occupation of Ireland had turned English into the first language of the majority of the population. At the beginning of the twentieth century, less than a fifth of the population used Irish in everyday life. (Lyons 1973: 635) Instead, most Irish people spoke a vernacular, creole version of English adapted from the official language of their colonial overlord. With its many borrowings from the old language, Irish‑English became the medium for many globally successful writers, from Oscar Wilde to James Joyce. However, the cultural nationalists rejected the new creole language in favour of traditional Irish. (Lyons 1973: 224, 238‑9) In contrast to the successful promotion of living vernaculars by East European nationalists, the Gaelic League and its allies were defending a dying language.

    The idealisation of the peasantry by the cultural nationalists strengthened the role of Catholicism within the Irish independence movement. For secular republicans, the Gaelic revival was another way of creating a common identity outside religion which could unite both Catholic and Protestant Irish. But, instead of returning to the old language, the Irish peasantry expressed their cultural nationalism through the affirmation of their distinctive faith. Because of this weakness in Gaelic revivalism, the romanticisation of the peasantry evolved towards Catholic nationalism. In continental Europe, the Church’s intellectuals were advocating rural authoritarianism as an alternative to the urban ideologies of liberalism and socialism. The Irish Catholic nationalists attacked both Protestants and leftists as representatives of the foreign culture which was oppressing Ireland. In their view, the refusal of these groups to observe the national religion and culture threatened the natural social cohesion created in rural Ireland. This desire for cultural uniformity reflected the Malthusianism of Irish society after the Land Acts. The cultural nationalists created the romanticised Gaelic past as a metaphor for the emerging society of peasant property‑owners. In their de‑anglicised utopias, cultural homogeneity created a harmonious society without class or other social divisions. For them, the traditional Irish peasant lifestyle was ‘… a primal innocence miraculously preserved from the contaminating influences of civilisation.’ (Davis 1974: 235; Brown 1981: 92) This idealisation of rural life was a reaction against the slow spread of more advanced forms of capitalism from Great Britain into Ireland. In the view of many nationalists, the preservation of family property in land from industrialisation was the same as the protection of an Irish Catholic identity from foreign cultural influences. In both economics and culture, the assertion of national independence was encouraged by the fear of further social change.

    During 1916‑21, both the IRB and the INP were eclipsed by the emergence of Sinn Féin, which successfully combined violent and constitutional methods of resistance to win independence from Britain. Before the War of Independence, Sinn Féin had already developed a synthesis of the two traditions of secular republicanism and Catholic nationalism. In its programme, the party rejected home rule within the British Empire and called for absolute political independence. Moreover, Sinn Féin didn’t just advocate political and cultural separatism, but also economic nationalism. It wanted an independent Irish state to develop local agriculture and manufacturing by imposing tariffs on goods imported from Britain and elsewhere. Crucially, this rejection of economic free‑trade also involved the abandonment of the liberal individualism defended by most secular republicans. For Sinn Féin, Ireland’s claim for independence wasn’t derived from the popular sovereignty of individual Irish citizens. Instead, the party asserted that the existence of the Irish people as a distinct race since the Dark Ages justified the independence of Ireland. In this argument, the collective needs of the Irish nation took precedence over the individual rights of any of its citizens. For many contemporaries, Sinn Féin’s advocacy of complete independence from Britain made the party closer to the IRB than the INP. However, the party’s policies of economic and cultural separatism were heavily influenced by the Catholic proponents of an authoritarian rural society. Thus, Sinn Féin’s separatist vision of Ireland implicitly excluded the Protestant minority as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the Irish nation. As with the INP, Sinn Féin was partitionist in practice, if not in theory. (Davis 1974: 127‑9, 151‑2)

    National Independence and the Nationalisation of Broadcasting

    The goal of ending British rule over Ireland was partially achieved during the Irish War of Independence of 1916‑21. Through a combination of Sinn Féin election victories and guerilla warfare, the London government was forced to recognise the secession of Ireland from Britain. The present‑day Republic of Ireland is the direct descendent of the Irish Free State created by the War of Independence. However, the British government only agreed to withdraw from the southern 26 counties of Ireland. In the 6 northern counties, the Irish Protestant minority remained part of Great Britain. The partition of Ireland not only removed most Irish Protestants from the Free State, but also the most important industrial region in the country. As a consequence, the large majority of citizens of the southern state were both Catholics and peasants. Thus, the political partition of Ireland entrenched existing social and economic divisions between the two parts of the country. The influence of Catholic nationalism over the southern nationalist movement weakened opposition to partition within the Irish Free State. Although two factions of Sinn Féin fought a vicious civil war over the degree of Irish independence from Britain, neither side advocated ending partition by force. Despite rhetorical denunciations of the division of Ireland, the Catholic nationalism of both Sinn Féin factions had already excluded most Protestants from membership of the Irish people.

    Despite the influence of church hierarchy, the political institutions of the Irish Free State were inspired by secular republicanism. The Irish nationalists had participated in the struggle for political democracy within Great Britain. In the War of Independence, Sinn Féin used these democratic rights to assert the right of the Irish people to national self‑determination. The will of the British government to maintain its rule over southern Ireland was destroyed by both Sinn Féin election victories and armed resistance. Therefore, when independence was won, the new state was established as a representative democracy with universal suffrage. As in Britain or France, the Irish Free State was ruled by a cabinet system of government, which derived its authority from a directly elected legislature. Similiarly, the new nation almost entirely recruited its civil service from the old colonial administration. (Farrell 1988: 20; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 23) This institutional continuity reflected the political nature of the Irish revolution of 1916‑21. Despite the violent struggle for independence, there was no social upheaval after the departure of the British. The radical political changes in Ireland were underpinned by the stability of the country’s social structures. During the earlier phase of the nationalist struggle, the Irish peasantry had already the obtained ownership of the land. Therefore, the achievement of political independence was the culmination of the rural social revolution which had been won in the late‑nineteenth century.

    Despite the pioneering transmissions of the Easter rebels, radio broadcasting almost disappeared in Ireland of the following years. By the end of the Irish War of Independence, radio stations were already broadcasting speech and music programmes to large audiences in the USA and elsewhere in Europe. While Ireland was winning its independence, the electronic media had been born. Once the civil war was over, the Free State government was able to tackle the country’s economic and social problems, including radio broadcasting. By the mid 1920s, the BBC was transmitting across mainland Britain and had started a regional station in Northern Ireland. But, the poor reception of contemporary radio sets prevented most people from listening to BBC programmes in southern Ireland. However, the example of British broadcasting encouraged enthusiasts in the Irish Free State to campaign for their own radio service. In their view, an Irish radio station would aid the revival of the ‘national spirit’ taking place in newly independent Ireland. (Cathcart 1984: 40‑2) From its moment of birth, the primary role of Irish broadcasting was defined as the defence of the cultural autonomy of Ireland.

    The importance of cultural separatism for the nationalist parties created a specifically Irish model of public service broadcasting. In Great Britain, the BBC was dedicated to the education of its listeners and the creation of a political consensus between the main parties. In contrast, the Free State government nationalised radio broadcasting to protect the national culture against foreign influences. At first, the government proposed granting a licence to a commercial consortium. However, it was soon discovered that a British newspaper company was a major shareholder in the proposed commercial station. Because the Free State government didn’t want the Irish radio station owned by a British company, its plans for commercial broadcasting were abandoned. (Bell 1985: 34‑5) Instead, the politicians decided that radio broadcasting should be organised directly by the state. In 1926, the Free State government passed the Wireless Telegraphy Act, which empowered the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs to set up radio stations across the country. Under the 1926 Act, the stations were staffed by civil servants and the Minister was given ultimate control over what was broadcast. (Saorstát Éireann 1926: 27‑9). Before the Act was passed, the Irish Post Office had started broadcasting a limited service in Dublin. The Post Office now proceeded to open radio stations in other urban areas across the country.

    Unlike other European countries, radio broadcasting was slow to develop in the Irish Free State. In 1929, just 30,000 receiving licences were issued for the whole country. By 1941, only 183,000 people were paying the licence fee out of a population of 3 million. The low number of licence‑holders was partially caused by widespread evasion of the charge, especially in rural areas. In addition, radio sets remained a luxury item for most peasant families throughout the first decades of Irish independence. (Fisher 1978: 20‑2; Brown 1981: 153; Cathcart 1984: 44) Because the licence fee was its major source of income, the restricted number of licence payers hampered the growth of the national broadcasting service. During the inter‑war years, there was only a small amount of advertising on the Irish radio station. The government was also unwilling to provide extra money to extend the service more quickly. Therefore, radio broadcasting only reached most rural areas with the opening of a long wave service in 1933. Although the Free State government saw the construction of a national broadcasting system as a central part of building a new nation, the radio stations weren’t used as direct agitational or propaganda instruments by the state. Instead, the Irish radio station concentrated on broadcasting educational, farming and music programmes, with only a limited news service. The Post Office’s radio station acted as a branch of the civil service and tried to avoid political or moral controversies. The distinctively nationalist form of public service broadcasting was created in the cultural programmes transmitted by the Irish radio station. From the beginning, the station transmitted programmes in Irish and provided education in the old language. In addition, traditional folk singers and bands dominated the schedules of the national radio station. (Mulryan 1988: 8; O Tuathaigh 1984: 102‑3)

    The Irish Free State didn’t develop its own form of public service broadcasting for only cultural reasons. The nationalisation of radio broadcasting in Ireland also reflected the growing importance of state intervention throughout the whole economy of southern Ireland. As in radio broadcasting, the Free State government set up other nationalised companies to reduce Ireland’s economic dependence on Britain. Although the landlords and colonial officials had departed, Irish farmers still needed to export to the British market for their economic survival. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 106) The Irish economy remained predominantly agricultural, especially as partition had removed the main industrial region from the new state. In 1926, half the population owned or worked on family peasant farms. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 3) Ironically, one immediate effect of political independence was to reinforce the economic dependence of Ireland on Britain. In response, the Free State government established various nationalised companies to compensate for the lack of domestic investors in farming and manufacture. For example, state credit institutions made loans to peasant farmers, while the nationalised Electricity Supply Board extended the grid into rural areas. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 26) The nationalised radio station was a pioneer of this parastatal sector in the Irish economy. Crucially, this state interventionism was primarily Malthusian in intent. Because the majority of voters were peasants, the Free State government couldn’t industrialise Ireland by dispossessing the peasants of their land along Bolshevik or Fordist lines. As in the French 3rd Republic, the Irish state only intervened to protect the existing economy of small property‑holders from more advanced forms of capitalism.

    National Autarchy and the Radio Monopoly

    Although socialists had played a leading role in the 1916 Rising, the dominance of agriculture within the economy ensured that the Labour party never developed into an effective political force within the southern state. Instead, the defeated anti‑treaty nationalists emerged as the main opposition to the Free State government during the late 1920s. Under Éamon de Valera, the majority of the anti‑treaty nationalists decided to contest elections in a new party called Fianna Fáil. While the Free State government drew its support from the large farmers, professionals and capitalists, Fianna Fáil became the representative of the peasants, shopkeepers, artisans and some workers. (Lyons 1973: 524) In 1932, the party won a general election and immediately began dismantling the treaty settlement with Britain. During the 1930s, de Valera’s government removed the remaining constitutional and symbolic links with Britain, culminating in the adoption of a new constitution. (Boland 1982: 8‑10) By achieving the major objectives of the anti‑treaty nationalists through constitutional means, the Fianna Fáil government incorporated the defeated side of the civil war within the political institutions of southern Ireland. By abolishing the Free State in name, the partition state finally won the support of the mass of the southern Irish people. The reconciliation of the two sides in the civil war was completed by a government formed with Free State supporters. In 1948, this administration passed an act renaming the southern 26 counties as the Republic of Ireland. (Lyons 1973: 567)

    The Fianna Fáil government didn’t just want to achieve complete political separation from Britain. The party was also committed to implementing Sinn Féin’s programme of economic autonomy as well. The Fianna Fáil government not only expanded state intervention into the economy to create Irish substitutes for foreign goods, but also introduced tariffs and quotas against British imports. (Lyons 1973: 614‑5) In response, the London government restricted Irish agricultural exports to Britain. The ‘Economic War’ between Ireland and Britain damaged the large farmers who supported the Free State, but helped the local businesses and peasants who voted for Fianna Fáil. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 28‑9) De Valera hoped these protectionist policies would isolate Ireland from the world economy and achieve national self‑sufficency in basic goods. In the first programme of Fianna Fáil, he had advocated an ‘economically self‑contained and self‑sufficing’ country based on peasant farming and rural industries. (Boland 1982: 36) This demand was an idealised vision of the everyday existence of the peasants and shopkeepers who supported the party. Furthermore, the protectionist policies of Fianna Fáil were also derived from the Malthusian fear of the emergence of Fordism held by these small property‑owners. Under De Valera, Irish nationalism became defined as ‘… preferring an Ireland of frugal God‑fearing country folk to any absorption of the country into industrial Europe.’ (Brown 1981: 145)

    By implementing Sinn Féin’s programme of political and cultural autonomy in practice, Fianna Fáil finally codified the synthesis between secular republicanism and Catholic nationalism created in the years before independence. The clearest expression of this compromise between the two traditions within Irish nationalism was the 1937 constitution. De Valera introduced this new fundamental law to remove the remaining political links with Britain and to abolish the Free State in name. (Fanning 1988: 34) But, the 1937 constitution wasn’t only concerned with external affairs. It also legally defined the comprise between popular sovereignty and theocratic authority developed by Sinn Féin and supported by Fianna Fáil. Because this synthesis was successful, the 1937 constitution is still supported by all major political parties and remains the basic law of the Irish Republic. Thus, in the 1960s, a Supreme Court judge could speak of ‘the Christian and democratic nature of the state’ without seeing any contradiction between these two traditions. (Kelly 1988: 169)

    During the nineteenth century, IRB had fought for a secular republic on French or American lines. In 1916, the Proclamation of the Irish Republic not only declared the independence of Ireland from Britain, but also promised civil and political rights to all of its citizens. (Lyons 1973: 369‑71) During the War of Independence, Sinn Féin supported these basic democratic liberties as an integral part of the struggle for national self‑determination. After independence was won, the Free State government was organised as a parliamentary democracy, with civil and political liberties guaranteed in the constitution. (Farrell 1988: 28) De Valera continued this republican committment to popular sovereignty and political rights in the 1937 constitution. Most of the document established the framework for the election and functioning of an executive elected by the universal suffrage of all adult citizens. Furthermore, under article 40, legal protection was promised for the ‘fundamental rights’ of each Irish citizen. (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1980: 126‑36) Thus, the 1937 constitution institutionalised the democratic demands of the secular republican tradition.

    However, the 1937 constitution was also heavily influenced by the Catholic nationalist tradition of the INP. After partition, over nine‑tenths of the inhabitants of the Irish Free State were followers of the faith. (Brown 1981: 30) Moreover, the division of the country ensured that the Catholic faith remained one of the primary expressions of Irish nationalism. By the 1930s, both southern nationalist parties had become ‘… deeply partitionist in nature.’ (Coulter 1990: 18) Although Fianna Fáil believed its policies of complete Irish independence from Britain were a step towards a united Ireland, its policies of political and economic autonomy further entrenched the border between the two parts of Ireland. (Boland 1982: 7‑8) The creation of a socially and racially homogeneous southern state encouraged the cultural nationalists to campaign for a purge of the remaining British influences in Ireland. During the 1920s, the Free State government tried to revive the Irish language, especially through the education system. But, despite these political initiatives, there was a continuing decline in the numbers of Irish speakers in southern Ireland. (Brown 1981: 60‑2) The failure of this state‑sponsored Gaelic revival opened the way for a further intensification of Catholic nationalism. Without the Irish language as a mark of ‘distinction’, Catholicism became the major expression of the Irish national identity. According to de Valera, Ireland had a spiritual mission to save ‘Western Civilisation’ from the scourge of materialism by constructing a moral christian society. (Brown 1981: 36‑8)

    During the 1930s, Catholic nationalism also acquired a distinct political ideology, known as Vocationalism. In his 1931 Quadragesimo Anno encyclical, Pope Pius XI rejected both liberalism and socialism in favour of a corporate society, modelled on elements of Fascist Italy. For the Pope, neither hedonistic individuals nor the nation state could create a moral society. Instead, the family and the clergy had to act as essential intermediaries between citizens and political power. Under Vocationalism, the needs of these social institutions took priority over the abstract rights of individual citizens. (Lyons 1973: 544‑6; Brown 1981: 160‑1) In southern Ireland, this political theology was taken up by some supporters of the defeated Free State party, who founded the fascist Blueshirt movement. Although this organisation soon collapsed, Vocationalism did win wider support among the southern Irish population. The frugal life of rural family farms and urban small businesses had already found expression in the ascetic morality and sexual repression of Catholicism. (Coulter 1990: 10, 18) After 1931, Vocationalism provided a specific political theory for Catholic nationalists who idealised southern Ireland as a society of self‑sufficent families united in submission to the one true faith.

    In the 1937 constitution, de Valera successfully defused the conflict between secular republicanism and Catholic Vocationalism. On the one hand, the new constitution asserted the democratic nature of the Irish state against the threat of fascism from the Blueshirts and other authoritarian clericalists. On the other hand, the 1937 constitution also recognised the primacy of the Catholic religion over the southern Irish people. In a contradictory synthesis, the social and moral teachings of the Church were incorporated as part of the ‘fundamental rights’ of citizens. Alongside the equal rights of women as citizens, the 1937 constitution institutionalised the authoritarian power of fathers over the female members of their families. (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1980: 136‑52) Under the fundamental law of the southern state, popular sovereignty could only be exercised within the limits of the moral totalitarianism of the Catholic Church.

    The influence of Catholic nationalism substantially weakened the protection of the freedom of communications in the 1937 constitution. Before the adoption of the new constitution, political instability within the southern state had already curbed the right to free speech in practice. From the 1916 Proclamation to the 1922 Free State constitution, Irish nationalists had defended the freedom of expression as an abstract democratic right of all citizens. But, during the civil war, the Free State government had imposed censorship as part of its struggle against the anti‑treaty faction. After the civil war, overt political censorship was gradually relaxed. However, both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments continued informal restrictions over opposition publications. During the Second World War, de Valera used the international crisis to impose formal political censorship on all publications once again (Murphy 1984: 59) But, because secular republicanism enshrined free speech as a fundamental democratic right, no southern Irish government was able to silence its political rivals completely. For example, de Valera was able to set up his own paper under the Free State government and the other major national newspapers continually criticised the subsequent Fianna Fáil adminstration.

    These restrictions on political speech were minimal compared with the moral censorship imposed in southern Ireland. In 1925, the Free State government established a censorship board for all films exhibited in the country. This legislation was followed by the 1929 Censorship of Publications Act, which set up a similiar institution for the vetting of all books and magazines distributed within southern Ireland. (Lyons 1973: 686‑8) According to the Free State government, these laws were only designed to prevent the distribution of pornographic and family planning material. However, in practice, these censorship boards banned all types of films and literature on grounds of immorality. Between 1930‑9, the literature censorship board outlawed over 1,200 books and 140 magazines. Along with pornographic works, the list of forbidden books contained almost every major novel written by an Irish authors in the inter‑war years. (Brown 1981: 149; Carlson 1990: 1, 3‑4) Under these laws, cultural and political dissidents within the Irish Free State were the primary target. Because of Catholic nationalism, the observance of the faith had become the major expression of Irish cultural identity in the southern state. For many nationalists, artistic modernism and socialist politics threatened to the cultural self‑determination of the Irish people by questioning the repressive morality of the Church. In their view, the freedom of communications could only be exercised within the narrow limits of the teachings of the Catholic Church. According to the Bishop of Cork, the freedom of the press was defined as a ‘press that is legally free to print whatever is morally justified.’ (Murphy 1984: 60)

    But, moral censorship wasn’t only aimed at dissidents within the Irish Free State. Many Catholic nationalists also wanted to remove the cultural influence of Britain within southern Ireland. Because of the common language, Irish people could easily understand films, books, magazines and other forms of cultural expression imported from other English‑speaking countries. The Catholic hierachy was convinced that the British media encouraged the spread of ‘pagan’ ideas among the Irish population. By reflecting the attitudes of an industrial society, foreign films and literature undermined the strict sexual morality of rural Ireland. (Brown 1981: 39‑40; Murphy 1984: 51) The Church’s campaign against moral corruption from Britain echoed the demand for cultural self‑sufficency by the Irish nationalist movement. Many secular republicans also believed in an ascetic morality, inspired by the French Jacobin’s vision in the 1790s of a Republic of Virtue. (Murphy 1984: 52) Even for those opposed to the Church hierarchy, the protection of repressive Catholic morality became a symbol of Irish self‑determination. For the Free State government, the censorship of British media was a declaration of cultural independence from the old colonial master. (Brown 1981 67‑70)

    After its election, the Fianna Fáil government didn’t abolish the censorship of films and publishing. For de Valera, support for moral censorship was one means of synthesising the Catholic nationalist and secular republican traditions within his political movement. In his view, the Irish government ‘… should not give to the propagation of what is wrong and unnatural the same liberty as would be accorded to the propagation of what is right.’ (Pine and Thomas 1986: 7) Under de Valera, the freedom of communications of individuals remained limited by the moral values of the Irish people as a whole. Moreover, Fianna Fáil’s policies for economic autonomy encouraged further cultural protectionism in southern Ireland. The censorship of imported films and publications paralleled the imposition of tariffs against British manufactured goods. When de Valera wrote the 1937 constitution, he incorporated the existing forms of censorship within the right of freedom of communications. In article 40. 6.1 of the constitution, the freedom of communications was guaranteed as part of the ‘fundamental rights’ of every Irish citizen. But, compared with article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in France or the 1st Amendment of the American constitution, article 40. 6. 1 provided a very narrow definition of the freedom of communications

    ‘The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality:‑
    i ‘The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions. The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State. The publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with law.’ (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1980: 133‑4)

    This constitutional guarantee entrenched the restrictions on the freedom of communications for reasons of both national security and Catholic morality. In turn, the censorship of films and literature was also applied to the programmes of the state broadcaster. Under the Free State government, the national radio station never transmitted programmes offensive to the Catholic morality of the Irish population. Moreover, under the 1926 Wireless Telegraphy Act, the Post Office’s service station was banned from broadcasting not only obscene material, but also ‘… any message subversive of public order’. (Saorstát Éireann 1926: 23) This legal censorship of radio broadcasting was supplemented by adminstrative arrangements. Under the 1926 act, the national radio station was constituted as part of the civil service. (Saorstát Eireann 1926: 27‑9) Therefore, the Irish government could supervise the finances of the radio station, deciding the level of the licence fee, the price of advertising, appointments of managers, wages of the staff and the amount of capital spending.

    When it was elected, Fianna Fáil used these administrative and financial powers to take control over the state radio station. Almost immediately, the Director‑General of the national broadcaster was sacked and replaced with a party loyalist. Like its predecessor, the Fianna Fáil government ensured the impartiality of the radio news service was tempered by censorship on behalf of the ruling party. (Cathcart 1984: 44, 48‑9) During the 1930s, Fianna Fáil expanded the services of the state radio station by collecting more licence fees. The national broadcaster also was given a more prominent identity by being named Radio Éireann. During the ‘Economic War’ with Great Britain, de Valera increased the radio news service to win support from the voters for his resistance to British pressure. The Fianna Fáil government was also interested in the further development of the cultural nationalist role of Irish public service broadcasting. Therefore, the state radio station increased the numbers of Irish language and traditional folk music programmes in its schedule.

    In addition, the Fianna Fáil government funded a series of regional studios for the broadcasting of programmes made in the rural areas. The ruling party hoped that the decentralisation of broadcasting would remove the corrupting influence of urban culture from Radio Éireann. In the countryside, radio broadcasters would reflect the values of the peasants, who represented the centre of the Irish identity for most nationalists. (Cathcart 1984: 45‑6) The political importance of cultural autarchy also forced the cancellation of plans to establish a commercial radio service aimed at a British audience, along the lines of Radio Luxemburg. Because this money-making enterprise needed urban and working class British listeners, it was proposed that the radio station would play mainly jazz music. However, the cultural nationalists opposed the broadcasting of ‘alien’ music from by the proposed radio station because its programmes would be heard by Irish listeners. For them, it was necessary to prevent the emergence of any alternative to their preferred style of traditional folk music. (Cathcart 1984: 43‑4)

    This increased committment of the Irish government to public service broadcasting was encouraged by the reception of BBC radio signals in parts of southern Ireland. As radio set technology improved during the 1930s, Irish listeners were able to hear programmes broadcast by British and other European stations. During the Second World War, the BBC started making special programmes for listeners in southern Ireland. The British hostility to Irish wartime neutrality made these programmes appear politically threatening. In order to meet this challenge, de Valera’s government decided to set up an Irish international radio station, broadcasting on short wave. This external radio service was designed to present southern Ireland’s viewpoint to a global audience, especially listeners descended from Irish emigrants. However, before these plans came to fruition, the Allies defeated Nazi Germany and the war was over. Therefore, the extra money allocated to this international broadcasting project was redistributed to the domestic radio service. For the first time, Radio Éireann received sufficent funding to provide a comprehensive news service, classical and light music orchestras, theatre and mobile recording studios. Faced with potential competition from BBC stations, the Fianna Fáil government decided that the Irish national radio station should provide a comprehensive service for its listeners. (Cathcart 1984: 47‑8)

    Under both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments, a specifically Irish form of public service broadcasting was created. The central difference between the Irish model and its European equivalents was the importance placed on the defence of the national culture from foreign influences. Under the British rule, the assertion of cultural autonomy was an integral part of the struggle for national self‑determination. Once independence was achieved, the existence of a common language between Ireland and its old colonial master maintained the political pressures for cultural separatism. The imperative of cultural nationalism shaped Irish public service broadcasting in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, the national radio station helped to reverse centuries of British repression against Irish political and cultural life. In its broadcasts, Radio Éireann presented news and current affairs programmes about the personalities and parties of the independent southern state. Thus, when de Valera spoke to his listeners, they were constituted as citizens of a distinct Irish national community. Moreover, Radio Éireann also created programmes aimed specifically at Irish listeners, from information for farmers to broadcasts in the old language. The Irish language and folk music programmes expressed a committment to preserving the traditional rural culture with the new electronic mass medium.

    On the other hand, this committment to cultural nationalism by Irish public service broadcasting also had negative consequences. Underlying the defence of traditional peasant culture was a Malthusian fear of the modernisation of Irish society. This social conservatism not only led to cultural protectionism against media from the outside world, but also censorship of any opinions challenging the nationalist consensus. Radio Éireann never presented the work or views of artistic modernists or urban socialists. Above all else, as with films and literature, the questioning of the repressive morality of the Catholic Church was strictly forbidden. In the Irish version of public service broadcasting, the national radio station had to reflect the restricted political and sexual outlook of the peasant and petit‑bourgeois majority of southern Ireland. For Irish politicians, the freedom of communications of secular republicanism was always limited by the moral totalitarianism of Catholic nationalism. Hence, Irish public service broadcasting maintained cultural and intellectual poverty among the population by not presenting a more diverse range of programmes for its listeners. In Ireland, the state broadcasting monopoly was not only an expression of national self‑determination, but also of cultural exclusion.

    The End of Autarchy

    During the Second World War, Ireland stayed neutral throughout the conflict. With the rest of Europe engulfed by war, the country was forced to survive on its own resources. Although Britain continued to be the major overseas market for Irish food exports, De Valera’s vision of Ireland as a self‑sufficent nation of frugal and devout peasants was temporarily realised through the breakdown of the world system into armed conflict. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 4) However, once the war was over, the revival of the West European economies soon undermined the limited economic and cultural autarchy achieved by the southern Irish state. Despite protectionism and a world war, southern Ireland had neither industrialised nor urbanised its economy. Instead, Ireland remained a mainly agricultural economy composed of small family farms and businesses. As the techniques of production had changed little since the nineteenth century, the standard of living of the Irish peasantry remained low. (Lyons 1973: 603‑4) In contrast, the introduction of Fordist methods of production and economic regulation created rapid industrial growth in the rest of Western Europe. The workers in these countries were rewarded through higher wages and more welfare spending. During the 1950s, there was a growing disparity between the living standards of the Irish peasantry and the British proletariat. For the first time in Irish history, many rural proprietors decided working in a factory overseas was preferable to owning land at home. Soon, emigration to Britain, America and Australia was no longer confined to the younger children deprived of land under the primogeniture system. The departure of the inheritors of peasant farms from the countryside threatened the long‑term viability of the southern Irish state. (Brown 1981: 186; Wickham 1980: 57) By the end of the 1950s, the continued political independence of Ireland required the abandonment of the nationalist programme of economic and cultural self‑sufficency.

    In 1958, the Fianna Fáil government accepted the recommendations of the Whitaker Report on Economic Development. This commission proposed that the Irish state should adopt the policies of ‘peripheral Fordism’ policies to speed up the modernisation of the country. (Lipietz 1987) At the centre of this strategy was an economic plan for the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of southern Ireland. Under the plan, the state made grants to attract investments from foreign multinationals, carried out infrastructure projects and developed the nationalised industries. For the Whitaker commission, the survival of Ireland as an independent nation depended on its integration within the European and global economies. In its view, Irish businesses could only prosper by having access to a larger market than their domestic customers. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990:35‑40) By accepting the Whitaker commission’s proposals, Fianna Fáil adopted a new goal of transforming Ireland into a prosperous industrial region of Europe in place of its old aim of encouraging ascetic rural self‑sufficency. Moreover, Fianna Fáil not only abandoned the goal of economic autarchy championed by Sinn Féin and de Valera, but also their dream of cultural isolation. Once the Irish economy was opened up to the outside world, it would be impossible to prevent foreign media from reaching the Irish people. From now on, the prevention of mass emigration through rapid economic growth took priority over the protection of Ireland’s Gaelic and Catholic traditions. (Brown 1981: 214)

    Ironically, Fianna Fáil’s success in completing the political independence of Ireland created the conditions for the abandonment of its own protectionist and Malthusian policies. By abolishing the Free State, de Valera created a stable political system within the southern partition state. By the 1950s, elections between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (the old Free State party) were fought over the economic prosperity of the voters, not the constitutional status of the state. Both nationalist parties had created electoral strongholds across Ireland by building patronage networks. As the dominant party, Fianna Fáil was more successful in making voters dependent on favours from its parliamentary representatives, especially in rural areas. (Coulter 1990: 9‑13) But, Fianna Fáil didn’t just help its traditional supporters among the peasantry and shop‑keepers. Under its new leader Seán Lemass, Fianna Fáil also became the party of the ‘mohair suits’, the new capitalists recruited as leading members of the party. (Lyons 1973: 584‑5) This transformation within Fianna Fáil’s leadership paralleled the dramatic switch in the party’s economic policies from national autarchy to integration within the European and global markets. Moreover, under the new planning system, Fianna Fáil had many more opportunities to use the nationalised industries and other forms of state intervention to reward its supporters throughout the country. The increased scope for patronage by the ruling party compensated for any loss of support caused by its ideological apostasy in abandoning de Valera’s dream of national self‑sufficency.

    The opening‑up of the economy encouraged a campaign against the strict censorship of the arts and media imposed in the first years of independence. Throughout the 1950s, the Archbishop of Dublin was still organising the banning of books by internationally acclaimed authors – including many from Ireland – who offended his fundamentalist interpretation of Catholic morality. (Carlson 1990: 113) However, the end of economic autarchy had undermined the rationale for restrictions on cultural influences from abroad. In addition, the call for tolerance and modernisation by the 1962 Second Vatican Council further weakened the Irish Church’s moral authority over the arts and media. (Brown 1981: 198‑200, 294‑6) Although the strict controls weren’t abolished altogether, cultural censorship was slowly weakened during the 1960s. Many previously banned books were now allowed to be printed and sold. However, the Irish government didn’t abandon its attempt to control over local artists. In place of the direct censorship of culture, the Irish state created a system of informal supervision such as tax exemptions for artists and grants from the state‑funded Arts Council. (Brown 1981: 297, 315‑6)

    The relaxation of cultural censorship was speeded up by the reception of British television programmes in parts of southern Ireland. After the war, the BBC restarted television broadcasting and rapidly built up a service covering both Britain and Northern Ireland. The programmes transmitted by the BBC and, later on, the ITV stations could be picked up on television sets owned by people living in the north and east of the Irish Republic. Because they were produced for an urban consumer society, these British television programmes challenged the rural Catholic morality of southern Ireland. More importantly, the advent of television broadcasting exacerbated the rural discontent over low living standards, which was already being helped by the availability of other British media throughout southern Ireland. The Irish peasantry knew about the higher incomes of workers elsewhere in Europe not only through the experience of emigrants, but also through British newspapers, magazines and radio or television programmes. (Brown 1981: 184‑5, 216‑7) By encouraging the exodus from the land, the British electronic media played a major role in ending Fianna Fáil’s policies of economic and cultural protectionism. In turn, the availability of British radio and television programmes in northern and eastern areas of the Republic foreshadowed the opening‑up of the whole Irish economy to European and global competition.

    The Limits to Irish Public Service Broadcasting

    Unlike radio in the 1920s, the Irish government was forced to create a national television service in response to the reception of British signals within the boundaries of the southern state. As a first step, the Fianna Fáil government established an independent commission to find a method of establishing an Irish television service without spending a large amount of public money. In 1959, the Murnaghan commission proposed that a commercial television station should be licenced under close state regulation. However, the Fianna Fáil government decided the new station would be easier to supervise as a nationalised industry. Therefore, Radio Éireann was transformed into RTÉ (Radio Telefís Éireann), a state‑owned monopoly providing radio and television broadcasting throughout southern Ireland. (Fisher 1978: 23; Bell 1985: 40‑1) At the same time, the government removed the state radio and television stations from civil service control in the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act. During the early 1950s, a coalition government had already set up an advisory council for Radio Éireann, which partially limited the control of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs over the state radio station. (Mac Conghail 1984: 65) Building on this experience, the 1960 Act turned the national broadcasting monopoly into an autonomous state‑owned company. Like the BBC, the state broadcasting company was run by an independent board of management, called the RTÉ Authority. This body appointed the organisation’s Director‑General, other leading members of staff and supervised the management of the broadcasting corporation. (Irish Republic 1960: 16‑7)

    Even after the opening‑up of the economy, the Irish cultural nationalist version of public service broadcasting still heavily influenced the development of RTÉ. Under the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act, the state broadcasting institution remained committed to the defence of the national culture and language. Under section 17 of the 1960 Act, RTÉ was charged with helping in ‘…the national aims of restoring the Irish language and preserving and developing the national culture…’ (Irish Republic 1960: 23) This duty was reinforced by the report of the 1974 Murnaghan Broadcasting Review Committee, which more closely defined the content of the national culture preserved by the Irish form of public service broadcasting. The Committee urged RTÉ to produce more programmes on the religion, languages, folklore, work and leisure activities of the country. (Howell 1980: 230) While the spread of the electronic media was a central part of the modernisation and urbanisation of Ireland, RTÉ was still legally committed to preserving the disappearing culture of the rural areas.

    The growth of the electronic media particularly threatened the survival of the remaining Irish‑speaking areas. The traditional culture of the Gaelic peasantry couldn’t compete with the innovations coming in from the anglophone world, especially television and pop music. In 1958, a government commission had called for a new government initiative to preserve the language, including the provision of electronic media in Irish. Because the number of native Irish‑speakers had declined to around 50,000, RTÉ had to finance these services with hardly any money from advertising. Raidió na Gaeltachta, the Irish language radio station, didn’t start broadcasting until 1972. Although this service only attracted about 2% of the total Irish radio audience, RTÉ did obtain a substantial listenership among the Irish‑speaking minority. But, despite repeated promises, the lack of resources prevented the state broadcaster from establishing a television service for Irish‑speaking viewers. (Howell 1982: 41‑4; Kelly and Truetzschler 1986: 153) Even so, the setting‑up of a specialist radio service for the small minority of Irish‑speakers was given priority over demands by much larger groups for pop music, local and community stations. This decision demonstrated the continued importance of preserving the old language in the Irish version of public service broadcasting.

    The influence of cultural nationalism also limited RTÉ’s committment to the West European public service broadcasting values of political pluralism and impartiality. In theory, the nationalised electronic media in Ireland were supposed to be unbiased and objective in their political coverage. Under section 18 of the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act, RTÉ had to ensure its news and current affairs were ‘… presented objectively and impartially and without expression of the Authority’s own views.’ (Irish Republic 1960: 23) The regulation of impartiality was strengthened by an obligation to respect political pluralism in the 1976 Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act. Under section 3, RTÉ was required to ensure that news and current affairs programmes were ‘fair to all interests’ in their reporting. (Irish Republic 1976: 5‑7) This legal regulation was reinforced by the internal regulations for broadcasters drawn up by the management of the nationalised broadcasting corporation. According to these rules, RTÉ was legally required to include the opinions of all major political parties and social groups within their programmes.

    ‘The requirement to be “fair to all interests” is seen as requiring the programme‑makers to present in an equitable manner the views of persons or interests involved in a significant way in a particular issue.’ (RTÉ 1989a: 53)

    However, this committment to political and social pluralism was much more limited in practice. As in Radio Éireann, the freedom of expression by broadcasters working for RTÉ was restricted by the continuing influence of Catholic nationalism in Ireland. Thus, the state broadcaster wouldn’t broadcast programmes which offended against the conservative morality of the majority of the population. In its editorial guidelines, the RTÉ management stated that the corporation’s programmes ‘… must generally reflect the mores and repect the values of the society in which it operates, acknowledging its standards of taste, decency and justice.’ (RTÉ 1989a: 51) Radio and television programmes weren’t only censored by the defenders of the sexual and cultural mores of Catholic nationalism. The state broadcasting corporation also had to reflect the secular values of republican democracy. The constitutional dispute between the two major nationalist parties was ended by their mutual acceptance of the democratic constitution of an Irish Republic restricted to the southern 26 counties. As employees of the Irish national broadcasting organisation, RTÉ workers had to be impartial between the mainstream political parties, but they couldn’t be ‘neutral’ in their ‘basic philosophy and attitudes’. (RTÉ 1989a: 51) Thus, political and cultural pluralism with Irish broadcasting was limited by conformity to both Catholic nationalism and secular republicanism.

    The prohibition against attacks on republican democracy has often been used as justification for control over broadcasting by the ruling party. In Lemass’ view, RTÉ was ‘an instrument of public policy’, which had a duty to explain the policies of the government to the Irish people. (Pine and Thomas 1986: 7; Bell 1985: 45) Despite separating the national broadcasting organisation from the civil service, the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act continued the political controls established for Radio Éireann. In southern Ireland, the electronic media remained under the control of the ruling party. Under sections 4‑7, the government could appoint or dismiss the chair and members of the RTÉ Authority at will. (Irish Republic 1960: 9‑10) The representation of opposition political parties or social organisations on the management board depended upon the benevolence of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Furthermore, the government also had control over the finances of RTÉ. Under the 1960 Act, the RTÉ Authority needed permission from the Ministers of Posts and Telegraphs and Finance before deciding on the amount and times of advertising, the level of the licence fee, capital investments or any borrowing. (Irish Republic 1960: 25, 29‑35)

    This combination of political and financial controls ensured that RTÉ remained subservient to the ruling party. For example, in the 1960s, Fianna Fáil helped de Valera’s campaign for re‑election as president by concealing his physical incapacity from the voters through their control over the corporation’s news service. The same government also covered up personal scandals involving its ministers and banned protesting farmers’ leaders from current affairs programmes. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 32, 49‑51, 175) In turn, Fine Gael and Labour also exerted their political control over RTÉ when they were in power. In 1984, the Coalition government prevented the RTÉ Authority from nominating a new Director‑General for the corporation because its members had been appointed by Fianna Fáil. (Coogan 1987: 124‑5) These formal powers over the RTÉ news service have been reinforced by informal links between journalists and politicians, especially as the ruling party could favour certain reporters with leaks of official information. With this strong influence over the national broadcaster, Irish politicians of all parties expected deferential and respectful coverage from its reporters.

    As well these adminstrative and informal controls over RTÉ, Irish governments also retained powers of direct political censorship over the programmes of the state broadcasting organisation. Under section 31 (1) of the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs could order RTÉ ‘… to refrain from broadcasting any particular matter or matter of any particular class …’ (Irish Republic 1960: 35) In this wording, the law gave unlimited censorship powers to the Irish government over radio and television broadcasting. But, in practice, section 31 remained dormant until the outbreak of political unrest in northern Ireland. During the late 1960s, the Fianna Fáil government had supported the campaign to prevent discrimination against Catholics in the northern partition state. But, the alliance between the southern Irish government and the northern nationalists was ended by the descent of the north into civil war. After the peaceful campaign for civil rights was suppressed by force, the northern nationalists started violent resistance against British rule, led by the Provisional IRA. However, the southern Irish government refused to support the armed struggle of the northern nationalists. Despite the Republic’s constitutional committment to reunification, the Irish government wanted to prevent the civil war spreading south and to avoid a confrontation with Britain.

    In the early 1970s, the Fianna Fáil government introduced a series of repressive measures against the supporters of the Provisional IRA and other ‘physical force’ republican groups in Ireland. As part of this clamp‑down, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs used section 31 of the 1960 Act to forbid the appearance of anyone advocating political violence on RTÉ’s programmes. However, there was no attempt to ban newspapers or other publications supporting the armed struggle in northern Ireland. The management and staff of RTÉ protested against this discriminatory censorship of news and current affairs programmes. In 1972, the corporation decided to challenge the section 31 ban by broadcasting an interview with the military leader of the Provisional IRA. After this programme was screened, the Fianna Fáil government reasserted its control over the nationalised broadcasting corporation. The entire membership of the RTÉ Authority was sacked by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs for supporting their news staff’s defiance of section 31. (Mac Conghail 1984: 71‑2)

    At the time, the opposition parties protested against the arbitrary and unlimited powers of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs under the 1960 Act. But, when Fine Gael and the Labour party formed a new government, they didn’t abolish the political censorship of RTÉ’s radio and television programmes. Instead, the Coalition government introduced the 1976 Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act to limit ministerial discretion over the censorship of radio and television programmes. In the Coalition Minister of Posts and Telegraphs’ view, the aim of the legislation was the replacement of the ‘absolute power’ of censorship over any matter with a narrower restriction on the appearances by members of ‘armed conspiracies’ on RTÉ programmes. In his view, continued censorship of the electronic media was needed because interviews by the national broadcasting corporation gave ‘legitimacy’ to the views of the Provisional IRA and similiar organisations. (O’Brion 1975: 39‑40; Mac Conghail 1984: 72‑3) Therefore, under the 1976 Act, the government introduced a system of approval by the Irish parliament for the banning of specific groups from the airwaves. (Irish Republic 1976: 31‑3) From 1976 onwards, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs has issued annual directives to all radio and television stations to censor any appearances by members of the Provisional IRA and other named groups. Thus, the legal restrictions on the expression of political opinions in the programmes of RTÉ and other broadcasting organisations were the joint creation of both Fianna Fáil and Coalition governments.

    For the Provisional IRA, the broadcasting ban was a capitulation by the southern nationalist parties to pressure from the nation’s colonial oppressor, Great Britain. For example, under the section 31 restrictions, any group declared a ‘proscribed organisation’ in Northern Ireland by the British government was also banned from the Irish Republic’s radio and television stations. (RTÉ 1989a: 59) But, for the southern Irish nationalists, the section 31 restrictions weren’t simply a panic measure enacted under foreign influence. In their view, the censorship of political speech in RTÉ programmes was an integral part of the Irish version of public service broadcasting. As part of its national role, RTÉ had to uphold the principles of republican democracy. Therefore, the national broadcasting organisation couldn’t transmit the opinions of revolutionary groups dedicated to overthrowing the constitutional system of the Irish Republic by force. For southern nationalists, the Provisional IRA’s armed struggle against partition was also an attack on the constitutional settlement agreed between the main political parties within the Irish Republic. This revolutionary organisation not only wanted to end British rule over the north of Ireland, but also to abolish the southern partition state as well. Under section 31, the constitutional protection for the freedom of speech in radio and television broadcasting was restricted to those people who participated in politics within the rules laid down by the constitution of the Irish Republic.

    In 1982, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs banned RTÉ from transmitting any party political broadcasts for the general elections by Sinn Féin, the legal political party of the Provisional IRA. (RTÉ 1989a: 59‑60) In response, Sinn Féin challenged the constitutionality of this directive under article 40.6.1 of the 1937 constitution, which guaranteed the freedom of speech. (Bunreacht na hEireann 1980: 133‑4) In their submission, Sinn Féin argued that the prevention of their party political broadcasts was ‘… inconsistent with the democratic nature of the State’ because the party was prevented from expressing its views to the voters through radio and television programmes. (Supreme Court 1982: 5‑6) However, the Supreme Court judges ruled that the section 31 restrictions were consistent with the ‘democratic nature’ of the Irish Republic. In their view, article 40.6.1 not only guaranteed the freedom of speech in the mass media, but also placed specific obligations on the ‘organs of public opinion’, such as radio and television broadcasting. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional provision prohibited any individual or group from using the electronic media ‘… to undermine public order or public morality or the authority of the State.’ (Supreme Court 1982: 11; Bunreacht na hEireann 1980: 133‑4) Because the leaders of Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA called for the abolition of the southern partition state, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs was justified in banning members of these organisations from RTÉ programmes as a subversive organisation. (Supreme Court 1982a: 11‑3) Thus, in their judgement, the Supreme Court judges reiterated the established view of southern Irish secular republicanism, where the defence of republican democracy for all citizens was more important than the right of free speech of individuals.

    ‘A democratic State has a clear and bounden duty to protect its citizens and its institutions from those who seek to replace law and order by force and anarchy.’ (Supreme Court 1982a: 13)

    By declaring the section 31 ban to be constitutional, the Supreme Court confirmed that Sinn Féin supporters had no right of free speech in radio and television broadcasting. Under Irish broadcasting law, they could be not only prevented from arguing for support for the armed struggle in northern Ireland, but also from expressing an opinion on any other matter as well. During the 1970s and 1980s, Sinn Féin members were banned from participating in radio phone‑ins, giving eye‑witness accounts of events or even reading the lesson for a televised mass. (Irish Reporter 1990: 13) Moreover, the section 31 restrictions didn’t just affect members of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin. The ban was also used to impose a ‘total blackout’ on the coverage of the civil war within Northern Ireland in RTÉ news and current affairs output. Because of section 31, all programmes on the north had to be supervised by the highest levels of RTÉ’s management. (RTÉ 1989a: 60) Through fear of direct intervention, successive Irish governments restrained broadcasters from making critical programmes about the problems of northern Ireland. In the opinion of many people, ‘… a credible and comprehensive programme about the political situation in the North could not be made today [in the 1990s] by RTÉ.’ (Irish Reporter 1990: 14)

    After the introduction of the section 31 controls, Sinn Féin spokespeople continued to be interviewed on the BBC’s and ITV’s news bulletins, which were widely available in southern Ireland. However, in 1988, the British government introduced its own ban on appearances by Sinn Féin members on British radio and television programmes. The British censorship of Sinn Féin ended this major loophole – and removed any embarassment for the Irish government over its own media clampdown on supporters of the Provisional IRA. Ironically, the tightening of censorship during this decade coincided with the increasing participation in electoral politics by Sinn Féin, with the 1984 party conference recognising the constitution of the southern partition state. But, these changes in strategy did not remove Sinn Féin’s intimate connection with the Provisional IRA, which acted outside the Irish constitution. The overt imposition of political censorship clearly distinguished the Irish version of public service broadcasting from its equivalents in most West European countries, which instead emphasised political pluralism over internal security. However, since the 1970s, the radio and television stations in most other members of the European Community hadn’t had to deal with armed revolutionary groups with a substantial political base operating in their territory. As with other institutions, the specificity of Irish public service broadcasting was shaped by the persistance of the colonial past in the present.

    The Modernisation of Ireland

    Although Fianna Fáil remained formally committed to ending partition, the introduction of repressive measures against the Provisional IRA and its supporters finished any real attempts to achieve reunification by the party. When Fianna Fáil was founded, its members believed that the full political and economic independence of Ireland could only be achieved by the end of British rule over the northern counties of the country. (Boland 1982: 7‑14, 140‑2) But, after many years of government, Fianna Fáil’s committment to Irish reunification had become rhetorical. The constitutional settlement had not only reconciled the party’s members with the southern partition state, but also attracted a new generation of supporters. In the 1920s and 1930s, Fianna Fáil had been run by the ‘comrades in arms’ from the Civil War period. By the 1960s, Lemass had transfered power within the party to the ‘mohair suits’, who were close friends of the rising capitalists of southern Ireland. The end of help for the northern nationalists was a crucial victory for these new members over the republican old guard within Fianna Fáil. For the ‘mohair suits’, Fianna Fáil was an electoral machine, which delivered patronage to its voters and power to its politicians. In modern Ireland, winning elections and making money were more important than fulfilling republican aspirations. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 39; Coogan 1987: 20‑3, 40) While the Provisional IRA continued the fight for complete national independence, Fianna Fáil wanted to run southern Ireland as a thriving region of the European Community.

    The shift in political position by Fianna Fáil also reflected the rapid modernisation of southern Ireland. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Irish Republic had the highest growth rate in Western Europe. After the end of protectionism, foreign multinationals invested heavily in the Irish economy as a low‑cost, English-speaking base within the European market, especially in engineering, pharmaceuticals and electronics. By the 1980s, over half of the businesses operating within the Irish economy were subsidiaries of foreign multinationals or banks. In turn, the opening‑up of the Irish economy encouraged some local firms to expand into overseas markets. Soon, there were multinational companies owned by Irish entrepreneurs, notably in food‑processing and construction. Underpinning this rapid expansion of the economy was the strategy of peripheral Fordism followed by the Irish state, which helped foreign investors through grants, taxbreaks and infrastructural investments. However, this state aid for industrial investments was financed through ever increasing foreign loans and budget deficits. (Coogan 1987: 4‑5, 126; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 74)

    In 1972, over two‑thirds of the electorate voted in favour of membership of the European Community by the Irish Republic. (Lyons 1973: 588) For most Irish people, the goal of an autarchic nation state was no longer credible or desireable. What is more, the abandonment of protectionist policies had actually lessened Ireland’s economic dependence on Great Britain by creating new export markets in the other West European countries. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 39) The acceptance of European integration by the Irish voters also reflected the rapid fall in the number of self‑sufficent farmers within the country. From the 1960s onwards, there was a massive shift in employment from farming into industrial or office jobs. Although the European Community’s agricultural policies subsidised agriculture, Ireland rapidly changed from a nation of peasants into a society of wage‑workers. In parallel, individual property in land ceased to be the dominant form of wealth. Instead, manufacturing and financial joint‑stock companies were at the centre of the economy. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 54‑9) While agriculture remained an important employer and exporter, the majority of jobs and overseas trade were within the manufacturing, food‑processing and service sectors. (Department of Foreign Affairs 1990: 8‑10) This modernisation of the economy had rapidly diminished the numbers of self‑sufficent peasants and shopkeepers, who were the social basis of de Valera’s autarchic nation‑state. Ireland was turning into a Fordist industrial country, with a growing class division between the owners of joint‑stock companies and the workers who were employed by them.

    Accompanying the growth in wage‑labour was the decline of the rural population. Whereas only one‑third of the population lived in towns in the 1920s, over half of southern Irish people were living in urban areas by the 1970s. This urbanisation was concentrated in a few cities, with over a third of the population living in the Dublin area. (Brown 1981: 257‑8) The spread of wage‑labour and urban living started changing the social attitudes of the Irish people. Instead of the peasant extended family, the Irish started living in urban nuclear families. In turn, there was a slow increase in the number of women entering paid employment. In place of frugal rural living, these new wage workers could enjoy the commodities of the consumer society. As Irish Catholicism had been built around the puritan morality of the peasantry, the Church’s teachings on sexual morality and personal frugality were increasingly ignored by the urban population, especially among younger people.

    By 1990, three‑quarters of teenagers approved of sex before marriage and nearly two‑thirds agreed with the right to divorce. (Black 1990) Although the Church had slowed down this process of secularisation by building strong congregations in most urban areas, it was unable to reverse the slow decline in the faith. (Brown 1981: 219‑21) Moreover, the modernisation of Ireland led to a dramatic fall in the number of clergy and nuns. Without their cheap labour, the Church slowly had to relinguish some of its control over the education and health services to the state. All these developments combined to spread secular attitudes within the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish Republic. For example, in an important hearing on the legality of contraceptives, the Supreme Court ruled that the individual rights of citizens took precedence over the Church’s teachings on sexual morality. Within the southern partition state, the process of modernisation was strengthening secular republicanism at the expense of Catholic nationalism. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 108‑11)

    Modernisation as Commercial Broadcasting

    The availability of the electronic media encouraged these social and cultural changes in Ireland. Although set ownership spread slowly in rural areas, almost everyone in urban areas soon had a television. The rapid success of television reflected the changing lifestyles of the Irish people. The television set was the centre of the new urban household. Watching the box had become the favourite leisure activity of the Irish, with the average viewer consuming around 3 hours each night. (Brown 1981: 261; Ox Pictures 1990) In their programmes and adverts, the radio and television stations usually reflected urban life, rather than the rural concerns of traditional culture. According to Bishop Cathal Daly, any foreign visitor watching RTÉ television wouldn’t guess that Ireland had the highest rate of church attendance in Western Europe. (O’Tauthaigh 1984: 100) However, unlike the Church, the Irish electronic media were able to articulate the new cultural and moral world of an urban Ireland. For example, in many people’s view, Gay Byrne’s radio and television programmes played a major role in encouraging the emergence of more liberal social and sexual attitudes in the south. (Coogan 1987: 2)

    The modernisation process also changed the nature of the Irish electronic media. Over the decades, RTÉ had created a specifically Irish model of public service broadcasting based on the defence of the national culture. The electronic media had been nationalised to provide Irish programmes reflecting the distinct world‑view of the country. However, from the 1960s onwards, RTÉ steadily increased the proportion of imported programmes in its schedules. The corporation continued to provide a comprehensive news service, but increasingly relied on imports for its entertainment programmes. In 1978, this process was accelerated by the launching of the second RTÉ television station, Network 2. While the corporation produced nearly 60% of its own programmes in 1965, the number of home‑made shows fell to below 40% in 1980. By this date, RTÉ was showing more imported programmes than any other television company in European Community. (Howell 1982: 46) The existence of a state monopoly over broadcasting was no longer restricting the influence of foreign ideas on Irish society. On the contrary, the RTÉ was spreading the consumer culture of the USA, Australia and Britain throughout the country.

    For the RTÉ management, the abandonment of the basic tenets of Irish public service broadcasting occured for pragmatic reasons. The introduction of television had been initially financed by the licence fee. But, after the early years of rapidly rising revenues as set ownership spread, the growth in income for RTÉ was limited to increases in advertising revenue. In this new situation, the corporation had to transmit programmes which would attract audiences for their advertisers. As in other countries, most Irish viewers wanted to watch many hours of entertainment programmes. Hence, RTÉ filled its schedules with soaps, dramas, comedies, films and game shows. With the introduction of Network 2, the corporation didn’t have the resources to fill the increased hours of broadcasting with its own programmes. As a result, its management decided to buy cheaper American, Australian or British entertainment programmes to fill the gaps in their schedules. By stages, RTÉ had changed the definition of Irish public service broadcasting from defending cultural separatism to pleasing the Irish viewers and advertisers. In place of national identity, the corporation embraced the logic of commercial competition.

    In 1978, RTÉ launched both Network 2 and 2FM, a second national radio station. The new television channel mostly transmitted entertainment programmes and gave little airtime to educational or minority interests. Similiarly, 2FM provided a Top 40 format for younger listeners with only minimal speech content. (Mulryan 1988: 60‑1) Both these stations reflected the transformation of Irish public service broadcasting during modernisation. From the 1920s to the 1950s, Radio Éireann had provided a variety of programmes for the whole Irish nation. Insulated by state funding, the corporation’s success was judged by its contribution to national cultural self‑sufficency. But, by the 1970s, RTÉ’s reliance on advertising for half its revenue had changed these goals. The management of Network 2 and 2FM were aiming to win the maximum possible audience. Instead of uniting the Irish people within a common national culture, RTÉ started segmenting its audience into distinct target groups. The adoption of a Top 40 format by 2FM was a recognition of the generational and class divisions appearing within Irish society. Unlike de Valera, the ‘mohair suit’ politicians were unwilling to fund RTÉ adequately from the licence fee or taxation to maintain the cultural unity of the nation. With protectionism over, they were happy for the state broadcaster to divide its audience into distinct groups if this policy increased the amount of money raised from advertising.

    Despite commercialisation, RTÉ encountered a growing financial crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When the recession restricted advertising, the corporation was unable to cover its increased costs by selling more commercials. By 1982, RTÉ had deficit of I£2.8m out of a total income of I£56.4m. (Bell 1985: 28) Without help and reorganisation, the Irish state broadcasting organisation was heading towards bankruptcy. The financial crisis speeded up the development of commercial attitudes within RTÉ. In response to the global recession, the Fine Gael and Labour coalition government restructured all Irish nationalised companies to prevent further losses. (Mitchell 1990a) The Minister of Communications commissioned independent consultants to examine the ‘efficency’ of the corporation. In this report, the defence of the national culture took second place to the ‘value for money’ of RTÉ. (SKC 1985: 3) The consultants recommended cutting 15% of the staff, as well as raising advertising rates and introducing sponsorship. (SKC 1985: 20‑1, 25) In addition, they proposed that RTÉ should extend its involvement in other media ventures, such as cable television systems, local radio stations and broadcasting to Great Britain. (SKC 1985: 23) By internal restructuring and diversification, the corporation was able to recover its profitability by the late 1980s. The corporation was even able to increase the number of home‑produced programmes to half of its schedule in primetime. (RTÉ 1989: 2) But, this financial recovery was achieved through further commercialisation of this national institution. By the late 1980s, RTÉ was not only a public service broadcaster, but also an entrepreneurial multi‑media company.

    In other European countries, the funding of radio and television stations by advertising had also encouraged commercialism within public service broadcasting organisations. In Ireland, the pressure to win large audiences was intensified by competition from British television stations. Because of a mountain range in the middle of the country, only viewers in northern and eastern Ireland were able to receive the signals from these foreign stations. Intensifying existing social divisions, the country was separated into urban ‘multi‑channel’ and rural ‘single‑channel’ areas. (Howell 1980: 227) Facing competition from British stations in the richer urban areas, RTÉ orientated its programmes towards the town‑dwellers. As Radio Éireann, the state broadcaster had tried to preserve the traditional culture of the peasantry. However, RTÉ could no longer transmit this type of programmes against competition from British stations. The need to win mass audience marginalised previously revered types of programmes, such as broadcasts in the Irish language. (Kelly and Truetzschler 1986: 155)

    During de Valera’s rule, leading nationalists had denounced the influence of foreign broadcasting in Ireland as a form of cultural imperialism. Once autarchy was abandoned, most Irish politicians completely changed their attitudes towards foreign cultural influences. From the 1960s onwards, they started welcoming the availability of British television stations within southern Ireland. Many believed exposure to programmes from an industrialised country would help the development of Ireland by encouraging an urban outlook. In the mid‑1970s, the Coalition government proposed relaying the programmes of BBC1 in the ‘single‑channel’ areas of the Irish Republic. In part, Conor Cruise O’Brien, its Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, was trying to win permission from the British government to broadcast RTÉ signals across Northern Ireland. (O’Brion 1975: 40‑1) But, he also wanted to expose the Irish people to the cultural influences of British television. In his view, BBC programmes were an antidote to the parochial and insular attitudes of many inhabitants of the Irish Republic. For O’Brien, the English language was no longer seen as a barrier to national identity, but a means of participating in the wider world. (Moran 1990) In a parliamentary debate, the Minister completely repudiated the old arguments in favour of cultural protectionism:

    ‘…I believe that to open windows rather than to close them is the more natural function of broadcasting and television and also the one of which our national culture, generously interpreted, stands the more in need.’ (Howell 1980: 231)

    Because of this ‘open window’ policy, the Irish government tolerated the growth of cable systems relaying British television services in the urban areas. (Moran 1990) During the late 1960s, private cable operators started building primitive networks to distribute British television signals to homes with reception difficulties in the ‘multi‑channel’ areas. In 1974, the government introduced regulations for cable operators and imposed a 15% levy on subscriptions to compensate RTÉ for the increased competition. (Kelly and Truetzschler 1986: 160) By the early 1980s, the desire to watch British television stations had created the highest density of cable users within the European Community in Dublin. However, RTÉ didn’t suffer because of the loss of its viewers to British stations. As part of its policy of diversification, the corporation took over the major private cable operators, including the largest cable network in Dublin. (Moran 1990; Bell and Meehan 1989: 99) Thus, through its cable subsidiary, RTÉ introduced satellite television stations for its subscribers in the late 1980s. Once again, instead of protecting an autonomous Irish world‑view, the corporation extended the availability of foreign influences for commercial reasons.

    Despite the popularity of British programmes, Irish viewers consistently showed a strong demand for home‑produced programmes. When a referendum was held on the proposal to relay BBC1 programmes to the ‘single‑channel’ areas in 1975, a two‑thirds majority opted for a second RTÉ station instead. (Howell 1980: 234) Similiarly, in the late 1980s, no satellite television service was able to build up a dedicated audience apart from MTV. There was even only a limited demand for the premium satellite services, such as film channels. (Bell and Meehan 1989: 102‑4) The favourite programmes of Irish viewers tended to be Irish programmes, with nine out of the ten top shows on RTÉ1 being home‑produced in 1988. (RTÉ 1989: 15) Responding to its audience’s tastes, the state broadcaster reduced its use of imported material in its schedules during the late 1980s. This policy increased RTÉ’s share of the audience in ‘multi‑channel’ areas from 40% to 45%. (RTÉ 1989: 2, 9) When it led to higher ratings, the corporation was willing to fulfill its traditional public service committments.

    But, RTÉ was less successful in dominating the expansion of radio broadcasting in Ireland. For decades, there was only one radio station within the Irish Republic, which aimed to produce programmes for the whole nation. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the modernisation of the country created the social conditions for a home‑grown variant of the global youth culture. Van Morrison and other Irish rock pioneers were laying the foundations for the later international success of Planxty, U2 and other local bands. Interestingly, the popularity of many Irish artists was based on their synthesis of traditional folk music with modern African‑American styles. Before the advent of 2FM, the RTÉ national radio station was unable to satisfy simultaneously the conservative tastes of their older audience and the desire of a new generation for pop music. The pirate radio stations soon won the younger listeners by adopting a Top 40 schedule. (Mulryan 1988: 22‑3) With a growing listenership, the music pirates attracted advertising from companies selling to this lucrative market. Once illegal broadcasting became profitable, the hobbyist stations were replaced by commercial operations in Dublin and other big cities. Although outside the law, these ‘superpirates’ used large transmitters, introduced formats for their programmes and employed professional presenters. By 1983, the most successful Dublin unlicenced station had reached a turn‑over of around I£1m a year. Four years later, another ‘superpirate’ became the most popular station in the captial city among listeners under 50. With the industry still illegal, commercial radio stations were earning over I£2.5m each year in Dublin alone. (Mulryan 1988: 87‑144)

    The pirate radio stations were able to evade the law against illegal broadcasting through loopholes in the 1926 Act. Over time, inflation had weakened the fines imposed for defying the law. In 1983, a major attempt to close down the pirates ended in failure because of these light penalties. (Mulryan 1988: 10, 112‑3) But, the survival of the pirates also depended on their popularity among potential voters. No Irish government was strong enough to close down the pirates before providing an alternative service for their listeners. (Mitchell 1990a) In 1978, RTÉ set up a second national station with a pop music format. However, the corporation had difficulties adopting the techniques of commercial music radio in its most traditional sector of activities. For years, many listeners thought 2FM ‘… was like a priest running a disco.’ (Mulryan 1988: 76) Once RTÉ had failed to stop the rise of the ‘superpirates’, many politicians decide to tolerate the illegal stations. In the 1981 elections, all major parties contributed to programmes on the major Dublin pirates. (Mulryan 1988: 77‑8) Some pirates were even more closely involved with the political parties. During the 1982 election, a Dublin ‘superpirate’ not only campaigned for Fianna Fáil, but also set up a unlicenced propaganda station for the party. (Mulryan 1988: 91‑3)

    Throughout the 1980s, successive Irish governments attempted to pass new legislation on radio broadcasting. On the one hand, these bills were designed to repress the pirates by raising the penalties for transmitting without official permission. On the other hand, these laws also legalised these illegal operations by providing licences for more radio stations. Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael supported the legalising commercial stations under some form of regulatory body. While a Fianna Fáil government tried to establish an Independent Radio Authority in 1981, a Fine Gael minister introduced legislation for a Local Radio Commission in 1985. (Mulryan 1988: 65; Pine and Thomas 1986: 13) But, each party was unable to pass an act through the Dáil Éireann, the Irish parliament. During this period, Fianna Fáil never stayed in power long enough to complete its legislation and Fine Gael’s attempts to introduce an act were blocked by its Labour coalition partners.

    In the 1985 Local Radio Bill, the Fine Gael Minister for Communications proposed the granting of licences for both commercial and community stations. However, the Labour Party sabotaged the introduction of legal commercial radio stations. In their view, commercial operators were just interested in quick profits and would only provide ‘lowest common denominator’ programmes for the listeners. (Mulryan 1988: 110, 153) Instead, the Labour party wanted to restrict licences to community stations, owned by voluntary organisations or co‑operatives. During the 1980s, a few pirates were run as community radio stations, giving access to the airwaves to many groups for the first time. (Mulryan 1988: 81‑3) Represented by the National Association of Community Broadcasters (NACB), these stations campaigned the licencing and regulation of community stations as part of any expansion of radio broadcasting. However, although unimpressed by the ‘superpirates’, the NACB didn’t oppose the licencing of all commercial stations. Instead, the main oppostion to commercial radio stations came from RTÉ, which was afraid of losing its advertising revenue to increased competition. The corporation wanted to take a leading role in any new radio stations, by running their technical facilities and having a substantial share‑holding. However, the Fine Gael Minister for Communications was not prepared to allow RTÉ to dominate the new independent stations. In his view, ‘I would prefer to do nothing and sit and wait until the time was opportune to do something rather than do something that I didn’t believe in’. (Mitchell 1990a) With Labour party refusing to compromise, the Minister for Communications tolerated the existence of 70 illegal stations within the Irish Republic. (Pine and Thomas 1986: 13; Mulryan 1988: 117‑8)

    The success of the ‘superpirates’ effectively broke the RTÉ’s monopoly over the Irish‑owned electronic media. The emergence of a commercial sector of broadcasting was the culmination of the decline of the specifically Irish version of public service broadcasting. Once protectionism was ended, the policy of cultural separatism was also doomed. In competition with British stations, RTÉ could have emphasised the national distinctiveness of Ireland, especially its Catholic heritage. But, because it needed to large audiences to raise advertising revenue, the corporation offered a similiar mix of urban entertainment programmes as its foreign rivals. Far from insulating the Irish people from alien ideas, RTÉ became a major supplier of imported programmes and foreign television stations to the Irish viewers. During the 1970s and 1980s, RTÉ had evolved from a defender of the national culture into a semi‑commercial multi‑media corporation, with limited public service committments. However, the commercialisation of the state broadcasting company made the continuation of its monopoly increasingly unteneable. For most Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael politicians, there was little difference between 2FM and a ‘superpirate’ as both were playing pop music and were funded by advertising. The successful adoption of commercialism by RTÉ opened the way for a fully independent commercial broadcasting sector in the Irish Republic.

    The Neo‑Liberal Consensus

    Like other members of the European Community, the Irish Republic was severely affected by the ‘monetarist shock’ of the early 1980s. The international recession exacerbated internal economic problems caused by rising foreign debts and continuous budget deficits. When the world economy faltered, the strategy of peripheral Fordism followed by successive Irish governments was already reaching its fiscal limits. In response, Irish governments adopted the neo‑liberal policies introduced in other industrialised countries, such as the USA, Great Britain and France. Under a Fine Gael and Labour coalition government, public spending was reduced and the nationalised industries were restructured to cut their losses. These deflationary policies were coupled with ‘supply‑side’ measures to encourage new private enterprises, such as financial services. In opposition, Fianna Fáil defended its traditional sources of patronage by advocating increased support for the nationalised industries and more welfare spending. However, after its victory in the 1987 election, the party implemented the same neo‑liberal economic policies as its Coalition predecessor. As in 1958, Fianna Fáil abandoned its fundemental principles to retain its dominance over Irish political life. With increasing support from private enterprise, the party was no longer dependent on its traditional patronage networks in the government bureaucracy and the nationalised industries. Instead, Fianna Fáil created business opportunities for its richer supporters through the deregulation and privatisation of the economy. by the late‑1980s, there was a complete consensus within the Irish political establishment over the adoption of neo‑liberal economic policies for the southern state. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman & Whelan 1990: 209‑221; Coogan 1987: 71‑3)

    The change in policies by Fianna Fáil reflected the urbanisation of the Irish population, which undermined the social basis of the division between the two nationalist parties. As the mass of the population were turned into wage‑workers, the traditional competition between the two ‘cross‑class’ parties became increasingly anachronistic. From the 1960s onwards, the Labour party tried to move Irish politics towards the European system of antagonistic class‑based parties. In the 1970s, a split within the revolutionary nationalist movement led to the creation of the Workers’ Party, which also campaigned on a socialist programme. However, the class polarisation of Irish politics between conservative and social democratic parties was never fully achieved. The Left has never become either the government or the main opposition within the Irish Republic. Instead, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Labour party participated in coalition governments with Fine Gael. Although its leaders became ministers, the unpopularity of these governments delayed the achievement of the Left’s long‑term goal of creating a social democratic alternative within Irish politics. However, the neo‑liberal consensus between the two nationalist parties in recent years has increased pressures for a realignment within the political system. (Coogan 1987: 14, 62‑8) In November 1990, an alliance between Labour and the Workers’ Party secured the victory of Mary Robinson in the election for the presidency of the Irish Republic. Although the president’s powers were limited, the polarisation of voters between conservative and social democratic candidates in the presidential election weakened – if only temporarily – the old system of two rival nationalist parties.

    For the Right, neo‑liberalism was a replacement for the traditional synthesis between Catholic nationalism and secular republicanism. In 1983 and 1986, fundamentalist Catholic pressure groups won two referendums in favour of constitutional prohibitions on abortion and divorce. As in the past, voters supported the repressive morality of the Church to protect the family ownership of land and other property. (Coogan 1987: 81, 97‑111; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 108‑11) However, while few nationalist politicians openly opposed the Church, all right‑wing parties continued the economic policies which were undermining the social basis of repressive catholic morality. Since 1958, no major conservative party had advocated a return to economic and cultural separatism. But, if Catholic nationalism was unable to supply a coherent economic or social programme for the southern nationalists, secular republicanism also couldn’t provide a distinctive right‑wing programme. With failure of the Provisional IRA to secure the support of more than a committed minority in the south, all major parties within the Irish Republic were advocates of a republican democracy limited to the 26 counties. In place of these traditional ideologies, the Irish conservative parties followed their American and European colleagues by adopting neo‑liberal economic policies of deregulation and privatisation. From the 1950s onwards, both nationalist parties sought political power through raising the living standards of Irish voters by increased economic growth. Although Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had abandoned peripheral Fordist economics, the party leaderships maintained their political strategy of winning votes through increasing the incomes of the electorate. As in 1958, the national autonomy of Ireland took second place to the need for economic development.

    But, the neo‑liberal consensus between the nationalist parties disguised the instability within these political organisations. The social democratic alternative could only be created by the realignment of all right-wing parties into one block. During the 1980s, leading nationalist politicians competed to build a conservative alliance based upon the common programme of neo‑liberalism. With increased urbanisation and the privatisation of the economy, the traditional networks of state patronage run by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael were weakened. Instead, both conservative parties became increasingly reliant on their supporters within corporate and small business sectors. With the end of ideological differences, competition between these two party machines was reduced to a battle between celebrity leaders and their financial backers. Despite the split by the Progressive Democrats, Fianna Fáil reemerged as the dominant party within the Irish political system. As a ‘catch‑all’ party, Fianna Fáil retained most of its support among the peasantry and petit‑bourgeoisie while implementing the economic policies of big business. Moreover, under Charlie Haughey’s leadership, the party was able to carry out the ‘strokes’ and ‘deals’ needed to hold onto political power during a series of indecisive elections during the late 1980s. (Coogan 1987: 46‑7) After national autarchy and peripheral Fordism, Fianna Fáil had now become the champion of deregulation and privatisation.

    Controlled Liberalism in Broadcasting

    The decline in the traditional patronage networks of the nationalist parties lessened the dependence of voters on personal favours from politicians. Instead of direct contacts, politicians increasingly had to win support through appearances on the electronic media. Many Irish politicians had an ambiguous relationship with radio and television broadcasting. On the one hand, they needed to appear on the electronic media to win elections. On the other hand, they didn’t trust the state broadcaster to treat their party favourably in its news and current affairs programmes. These contradictory attitudes were particularly held by Haughey when he led Fianna Fáil. During elections, he ran presidential‑style campaigns centred on the electronic media. Yet, Haughey also resented the decline in deference among radio and television journalists. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 175) During the 1960s, Haughey had censored RTÉ news and current affairs programmes for Fianna Fáil. However, by time he had become party leader, Haughey could no longer directly control the nationalised broadcasting corporation. By winning autonomy from the politicians, RTÉ began setting its own news agenda in the coverage of national political life. Imitating the journalists of other European public service stations, ‘most [RTÉ] reporters will go for the story and not for the political niceties of the time.’ (Gagan 1990)

    Because he never accepted the independence of journalists, Haughey continually came into conflict with the mass media. In 1982, a Fianna Fáil minister was discovered to be tapping the telephones of reporters working for newspapers hostile to the government. During the Progressive Democrats’ split, Haughey blamed the internal crisis of Fianna Fáil on a ‘media conspiracy’ led by RTÉ. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 191‑8; Coogan 1987: 50) According to Haughey, the corporation’s news team was dominated by members of the Workers’ Party, ‘Dublin 4 intellectuals’ and trade unionists. Because of their left‑wing sympathies, the RTÉ journalists had formed an alliance with two national newspapers to discredit the government in their political coverage. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 201; McCann 1990; Mulryan 1988: 139) For Fianna Fáil supporters, these accusations were proved by the stories covered in RTÉ’s news programmes. Many Fianna Fáil members blamed television coverage of the cuts in health spending for preventing an outright victory in the 1987 election. This controversy was soon followed by an accusation of corruption against the Minister of Tourism and Transport made by a RTÉ journalist during a radio interview. For Fianna Fáil supporters, one of the main tasks of the Haughey government was ending the left-wing bias of the corporation’s news programmes. (Dempsey 1990; Gagan 1990)

    Despite appointing an RTÉ Authority dominated by Fianna Fáil supporters, it was no longer possible to impose direct political censorship over news and current affairs programmes on the state-owned channels. Looking for another solution, the Haughey government decided to end the corporation’s monopoly over the coverage of national politics by licencing new commercial radio and television stations. (Murphy 1990) According to Ray Burke, the Minister for Communications, the ‘fundamental objective’ of Fianna Fáil’s media policies was to create alternative sources of news and current affairs programmes outside the control of RTÉ. (Burke 1990: 1571; Burke 1990c) To achieve this goal, the Minister didn’t just create licences for local commercial stations, as in the previous Coalition bill on broadcasting. Ignoring the advice of his officials, Burke decided to award franchises for a national radio station and a national television service as well. (Moran 1990) The Fianna Fáil leadership believed the introduction of commercial broadcasting would politically benefit their party in two main ways. Firstly, commercial radio and television stations were more likely to provide sympathetic coverage of the neo-liberal politics of Fianna Fáil than the ‘left‑wing’ news team of RTÉ, especially if these new media outlets were owned by members of the party. Secondly, the competition from these new commercial stations would bring pressure for a more ‘balanced’ news coverage by the state broadcasting corporation. In the past, Fianna Fáil had tried to control the electronic media through the nationalisation of broadcasting. Under Haughey, the party hoped to achieve the same aim through the privatisation of radio and television broadcasting.

    In Fianna Fáil’s media policy, the political goal of news services outside RTÉ control took precedence over any consideration of the economic constraints on commercial broadcasting in southern Ireland. (Hogan 1990) At the same time, the introduction of commercial broadcasting formed part of the neo‑liberal economic policies adopted by the Fianna Fáil government. According to the Irish Development Agency, southern Ireland needed to create a ‘post‑industrial’ economy based on the information technology sector, including the electronic media. In its view, the success of this post-industrial strategy could only be secured by the further integration of the Irish economy within the world market through deregulation and privatisation. (Bell and Meehan 1989: 106‑7) Similarly, Burke argued that the dismantling of the state monopoly over broadcasting and the licencing of new commercial stations was an integral part of the liberalisation of the wider Irish economy. In adopting this strategy, the Minister was inspired by the examples of other European Community members, who were licencing commercial stations as part of their neo‑liberal economic policies. (Burke 1990b: 1148; Burke 1990c) Moreover, Burke believed that the recent history of Irish broadcasting had created the conditions for the introduction of commercial radio and television stations. In his view, the success of the ‘superpirates’ had already demonstrated ‘… a dissatisfaction with the monopolistic state‑run broadcasting services and a failure on their part to respond and adapt to public demand.’ (Burke 1990: 1571) The Minister claimed that a greater choice of services for Irish listeners and viewers could only be created by the application of neo‑liberal policies in the electronic media. (Burke 1990c) As in other areas of the economy, the needs of consumers could only be satisfied by market competition between different producers.

    In accordance with the principles of ‘supply‑side’ economics, Burke initially wanted to introduce a mainly ‘self‑regulatory’ system of commercial broadcasting in southern Ireland. In his view, the financial dependence of commercial stations on advertising largely removed the necessity for close regulation by the state. Instead, the competition between the stations for an audience would make the new services respond to the needs of the public. (Mulryan 1988: 151) However, even in this deregulatory approach, it was necessary to outlaw pirate radio stations altogether. With the support of all parties, the Minister for Communications introduced legislation which closed all loopholes in the 1926 Wireless Telegraphy Act. Under articles 6 and 12 of the new law, the size of fines was substantially increased and the number of offences connected with unlicenced broadcasting considerably extended. In addition, in articles 4, 5 and 7, the 1988 Broadcasting Act prohibited the provision of a wide range of services to pirate radio stations, including electricity, telephone lines and premises. Crucially, the buying of advertising on unlicenced stations was outlawed by the new law. (Irish Republic 1988: 5‑18) After a decade of tolerance, the 1988 Broadcasting Act signalled the end of pirate radio stations in southern Ireland. Within months of the passing of the legislation, most unlicenced stations had closed down and were preparing to apply for one of the new commercial radio franchises.

    Although there was little opposition to the law against the pirates, the Minister for Communications encountered more difficulties in winning support for a second piece of legislation implementing his proposals for lightly regulated commercial stations. At first, Burke decided against setting up any form of supervisory body for this new type of broadcasting. As part of his scheme of minimum regulation, the Department of Communications would oversee the commercial sector itself, including the distribution of franchises for the new stations. However, the opposition parties strongly denounced these proposals. Under the Coalition government, a Local Radio Commission had been established to licence and regulate stations during its abortive broadcasting bill. According to Fine Gael and Labour, an independent regulatory authority was necessary to prevent the Minister for Communications awarding licences his friends or ignoring infractions of the law in return for political favours. (Mitchell 1990a) Under pressure, Burke agreed to abandon his scheme for deparmental control over the commercial sector. Instead, the Minister established an autonomous regulatory body, called the Independent Radio and Television Commission (IRTC).

    Under article 4 of the 1988 Radio and Television Act, the IRTC was set up to licence and regulate the new commercial stations. (Irish Republic 1988a: 4‑5) The new law protected the autonomy of the IRTC by preventing the Minister from sacking its members without the approval of both houses of parliament. (Irish Republic 1988a: 16) As with the RTÉ Authority, the institutional self‑awareness of the IRTC prevented its complete subservience to the ruling party. Moreover, the IRTC had inherited its officials from the Department of Communications, who had been trained the civil service tradition of impartiality. These bureaucrats also acted as a partial check on overt political favouritism by the IRTC commissioners. But, despite these arrangements, this regulatory body was not really independent of the ruling party. Under the second 1988 law, the members of the IRTC board were directly appointed by the government for a period of 7 to 10 years. The Minister for Communications was under no obligation to nominate representatives of the opposition parties or autonomous social groups as IRTC commissioners. (Irish Republic 1988a: 16) The Fianna Fáil government rejected proposals for the appointment of the IRTC members by the independent Local Appointments Committee. (McCartan 1990) What is more, Burke had no scruples about using these powers of appointment in the 1988 Radio and Television Act. Although its first chairman was a Supreme Court judge, the 9 other members of the Commission were avowed supporters of the government. (Connelly 1990) In the words of Dick Spring, the Labour party leader, ‘… with the exception of the chairman, [the IRTC] was loaded to the gills with prominent Fianna Fáil activists.’ (Spring 1990: 1603)

    The Legalisation of Commercial Radio Broadcasting

    The IRTC was kept under close political control because of its extensive powers over commercial broadcasting. The Minister for Communications did retain some important powers over this new legalised sector, such as choosing the number and location of the radio franchises across the country. (Irish Republic 1988a: 6) However, all other important decisions were delegated to the IRTC, including the licencing and regulation of every commercial station. Under article 6 of the 1988 Radio and Television Act, this regulatory body was charged with awarding radio franchises to the ‘most suitable applicant’. The law defined ‘suitability’ in two distinct ways. On the one hand, candidates for radio licences had to possess the money and expertise to run a station. On the other hand, the aspiring operators had to promise to observe various public service committments, such as making their programmes for a specific locality or interest group. (Irish Republic 1988a: 8 ) In addition, the 1988 Act retained many elements of the Irish model of public service broadcasting. The IRTC was supposed to award franchises to those stations which could produce programmes on ‘Irish culture’ and provide ‘new opportunities for Irish talent in music, drama and entertainment.’ (Irish Republic 1988a: 7) After the franchise was awarded, the IRTC was charged with enforcing these public service duties on the commercial radio stations, including any committments made for the ‘quality, range and type of programmes’. Furthermore, the IRTC was empowered to remove the licence of any station which committed ‘repeated breaches of his obligations’. (Irish Republic 1988a: 13‑4)

    But, unlike previous broadcasting legislation, the regulation of commercial radio stations wasn’t really centred on the promotion of the national culture. These obligations under the 1988 law were largely decorative. For the Minister, the principal aim of the legislation was the requirement to provide a news and current affairs service alongside any entertainment programmes. (Burke 1990c) In article 9, the 1988 Act stated that ‘not less than 20 per cent. of the broadcasting time’ of commercial radio stations had to be devoted to news coverage. Furthermore, the fulfillment of this quota had to include at least two hours of news and current affairs during the primetime of listening between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.. (Irish Republic 1988a: 9) The Minister didn’t only want to create an external pluralism of news between RTÉ and commercial stations, but also to ensure that there was internal pluralism on the new stations as well. Under the 1988 law, the IRTC regulated the content of the news and current affairs programmes on the new commercial stations as well. Each franchise-holder had to ensure that the news was presented in ‘objective and impartial manner’. (Irish Republic 1988a: 9) The IRTC also had to draw up a code of practice which regulated the availability of party political broadcasts on stations and ensured balanced coverage for elections. (Irish Republic 1988a: 10; Connelly 1990)

    As with RTÉ, the freedom of communications on the new stations was limited for reasons of public security and Catholic morality. The section 31 censorship of members of Sinn Féin and other revolutionary nationalist organisations was extended to the news coverage of the commercial radio stations. In addition, no programme could present ‘anything which might be regarded as offending against good taste or decency’. (Irish Republic 1988a: 10) Through regulation, the IRTC forced the new stations to copy the public service rules securing and limiting political pluralism established by the public service broadcaster for their own news coverage. The enforcement of these requirements on commercial stations realised Fianna Fáil’s ambition of creating sources of radio and television news outside the control of RTÉ. While the protection of national culture was left to self‑regulation, the Minister was determined that the private operators would be obliged to broadcast large amounts of political speech. Crucially, the obligations to respect internal pluralism between the parliamentary parties ensured would report the viewpoints of Fianna Fáil.

    After a period of IRTC consultation, the Minister for Communications announced that 25 local radio licences would be granted alongside a national commercial radio service. By creating so many franchises, Burke ignored the research carried out for the Coalition government, which had shown only a few regional stations could be economically viable. (Moran 1990; Mitchell 1990a) Instead, the Minister decided to licence one station in every city or rural area within the Irish Republic. During 1989, there was fierce competition between the rival applicant groups for the franchises. On the one hand, voluntary organisations and the Church supported bids from the community radio movement. On the other hand, former pirate operators and local business people wanted to set up commercial radio stations. Unlike the Coalition’s broadcasting bill, the 1988 law had not distinguished between commercial and community radio services. According to the IRTC chairman, despite the existance of successful pirates and the NACB, there were no coherent principles for the creation of a non-profit-making independent radio sector in Ireland. Moreover, because they could attract the audiences of commercial broadcasters, he refused to provide for a special tier of community radio stations in addition to the existing 25 franchises. (Kenny 1989a: 6)

    The IRTC decided between the competing commercial and community applicants in a series of public hearings. While this procedure limited overt favouritism towards Fianna Fáiil supporters, the national franchise and 22 of the 25 local radio licences were awarded to the commercial radio applicants. Not suprisingly, many of the businessmen involved in the successful commercial applications happened to be supporters of the ruling party. (Murphy 1990) Although the IRTC was supposed to favour candidates who promised to respect public service principles, the community groups were largely seen as interlopers into commercial radio. In the opinion of the IRTC chairman, the new radio stations were simply ‘… a new form of commercial industrial activity.’ (Kenny 1989a: 6) For Fianna Fáil, the predominance of private operators ensured that the new stations would be more friendly to the neo-liberal attitudess of the party than the more radical community radio groups. For example, during the first year of broadcasting, Horizon was the only station which ‘stretched the limits’ of the 1988 act by transmitting a programme by gays and lesbians. (Connelly 1990) Unlike most other licensees, this station in Bray was run by a community group. In addition to the formal censorship of the 1988 act, there was now also the ‘self‑regulation’ of the commercial radio stations by their private owners.

    The Dismantling of the National Television Monopoly

    The spread of cable television systems and the ‘spill‑over’ from British transmitters had already ended RTÉ’s monopoly of television broadcasting in the northern and eastern counties of the Irish Republic. However, the nationalised broadcasting corporation had offset the effects of this competition by taking over the private cable companies in Dublin and elsewhere. In the view of Burke, the ownership of the Dublin cable network by RTÉ was slowing down the expansion in the system. Therefore, in 1990, the Minister forced the corporation to sell its cable interests to Telecom Éireann, the nationalised telecommunications corporation. (Spandler 1987: 13; Sheeney 1990) Although the new owner promised to invest heavily in its acquisition, the rapid growth in cable television couldn’t remove the unequal availability of television stations across the Irish Republic. In 1990, over half the southern Irish population could still only receive the signals of RTÉ 1 and Network 2. Furthermore, less than 10% of the population was able to watch satellite or cable channels on their television sets. (Ox Pictures 1990) As in the 1970s, this division in the provision of television services mirrored the social divide between the cities and the countryside. While most urban viewers were able to watch British and satellite stations, the country‑dwellers were largely restricted to the RTÉ stations. Because the party still received strong support from the rural areas, the Fianna Fáil government was determined to end this division in the availability of television channels. However, it was too expensive to provide cable television networks for the sparsely populated country areas. Therefore, the Minister for Communications decided to introduce a multiple microwave distribution system (MMDS) network to provide British, satellite and cable stations for the rural population.

    In some country areas, British television stations were already supplied to subscribers using illegal transmitters, known as ‘deflectors’. While these pirates relayed the British channels for as little as I£5 a year, the proposed annual subscription for the MMDS service was around I£100, with extra charges for watching any film channels. (Ox Pictures 1990) For the ‘deflector’ viewers, the new distribution system was a ‘big step up in cost’ compared with their existing service. (Connelly 1990) Despite protests from the pirates and their viewers, the Minister pressed ahead with the introduction of MMDS. As soon as each microwave transmitter started operating, he promised to close down any ‘deflector’ systems in its area. Because the pirate transmitters only covered around 80,000 homes, Burke was determined to introduce MMDS to cover the more than 500,000 households with only RTÉ television channels. (Spandler 1988: 12; Ox Pictures) In his view, ‘… MMDS is the only practical and legal method by which multi‑channel television can be brought to the rural communities.’ (Burke 1990c) Once every MMDS transmitter was operational, British and other foreign television stations would be available across the whole of the Irish Republic. Far from defending the national culture, the Fianna Fáil government now was determined to ensure that the remotest rural areas of southern Ireland would be able to watch stations from Great Britain or other countries. The old fear of cultural imperialism has been replaced by the desire to win rural votes by providing more television channels.

    The Minister for Communications tried to offset the extended coverage of foreign broadcasters by granting a licence to TV3, a third Irish television channel run by a commercial operator. For Burke, this new television station would ‘balance influences coming in from abroad’ by providing an alternative source of Irish programmes for the viewers. (Ox Pictures 1990) Originally, TV3 was going to be distributed only on the cable and MMDS networks. However, the new television station’s owners complained that only 50% of households were likely to subscribe to either a cable or MMDS system. Therefore, Burke allowed the new television station to broadcast using terrestial transmitters as well. But, these frequencies granted to TV3 were supposed to be allocated to an Irish‑speaking television service. Once again, the protection of the national culture took second place to the development of commercial broadcasting. (Moran 1990; Spandler 1988: 13; Ox Pictures 1990) Yet, under the 1988 Radio and Television Act, the IRTC could only grant the commercial television licence to a contractor who would ‘… have special regard for the elements which distinguish [Irish] culture and in particular for the Irish language …’ (Irish Republic 1988a: 15) The new television station wasn’t only supposed to promote the national culture, but also fulfill other public service committments, such as encouraging the ‘liberty of expression’. However, in practice, these public service committments were understood to be largely rhetorical. As in commercial radio broadcasting, the principle aim of the Fianna Fáil government was the provision of ‘a reasonable proportion of news and current affairs programmes’ on the new television station. (Irish Republic 1988a: 15)

    Under the 1988 Act, the news and current affairs programmes of TV3 were subject to the same rules on internal pluralism and censorship of subversive or immoral views as the commercial radio stations. (Irish Republic 1988a: 14) Although the franchise was granted to an entrepreneur associated with Fine Gael, the regulation of commercial television ensured that the views of Fianna Fáil would still be represented on the station’s news coverage. Furthermore, as RTÉ’s ratings demonstrated, TV3’s owners knew that it would need news and current affairs programmes to win a large audience for its advertisers. As Irish‑made entertainment programmes were also more popular than imports, it would also be forced to transmit a wide range of domestically made material. In imitation of Channel 4 in Great Britain, TV3 intended to commission the majority of its home‑produced programmes from independent television producers based in southern Ireland. The franchise‑holders claimed that the independent sector could provide new programmes more cheaply than the in‑house production system used by RTÉ. (Ox Pictures 1990; Connelly 1990) Yet, although the creation of a sector of independent television companies was an integral part of the post‑industrial economic policies of neo‑liberalism, this economic aim was only a secondary goal of the Fianna Fáil government. Instead, the political goal of establishing a source of television news outside the control of RTÉ remained the primary aim of the 1988 Radio and Television Act.

    The Limitations of Commercial Broadcasting

    Before awarding the licences, the IRTC researched the radio audience across Ireland. The Commission wanted to ensure that the commercial radio stations reflected the musical tastes of their audiences in their formats. In the IRTC’s view, Ireland was divided between the rural and urban areas. While the country‑dwellers preferred listening to either traditional or ‘Country and Irish’ music, the city listeners wanted to hear pop and rock songs on the airwaves. (Connelly 1990) What is more, this difference in tastes extended across the whole radio schedule. In the countryside, there was a strong demand for speech radio among the listenership of the new stations. As one owner put it, ‘country people like to talk. On MWR, we have successfully recreated the western “rambling house”. Guests drop into the studio unannounced to discuss life, sex or whatever springs to mind.’ (Curran 1990: 11) Not surprisingly, the rural commercial radio stations had little difficulty in meeting their 20% target for news and current affairs. (Connelly 1990; Murphy 1990) In contrast, fulfilling this quota presented far more problems for the urban commercial stations, especially in Dublin. The ‘superpirates’ had broadcast a continuous music format based on the constant rotation of the most popular records, which was very successful with the urban audience. According to Capital Radio in Dublin, the 20% news quota discouraged listeners from tuning into the new legal services. In the city, listeners wanted continuous music services, rather than the speech‑orientated radio of the rural areas. (Hogan 1990; Ox Pictures 1990)

    Despite the news quota, the urban commercial stations continued the music formats pioneered by the ‘superpirates’. In Dublin, Capital played contemporary hits aimed at listeners in their teens and twenties, while 98FM used a classic pop format to attract an older audience. Using overseas experience, these formats were constructed by careful research of the tastes of the target audience. (Hogan 1990; Barbrook 1990: 205‑7) As with 2FM, the division of listeners by age and class was a rejection of the old vision of a homogeneous Irish audience united in a common national culture. Moreover, the Dublin commercial stations won large audiences by playing mainly Anglo‑American pop music. Both Capital and 98FM also refused to follow the self‑imposed quota of domestic music adopted by RTE for fear of losing listeners. In 1990, 2FM played more records by Irish artists than 98FM, Capital and the national commercial radio station combined. (Playback 1990)

    During the 1980s, the internationalisation of Irish rock music gathered pace through the success of Sinéad O’Connor, the Hothouse Flowers and other bands. However, the Dublin commercial stations played little part in nurturing this growth in local rock music. Because of the intense competition between stations, the commercial stations didn’t promote records by new Irish artists. (Hogan 1990) Although their music policy pleased the listeners in the short‑run, some commentators believed that the conservative programming policies of the new radio stations was causing long‑term damage to the Irish music industry. (Grahem 1990) The Anglo‑American and Irish records played by the Dublin commercial stations were firmly within the rock tradition, which was partially derived from Celtic folk music. But, in the 1980s, new forms of popular music were emerging in the USA and Europe, such as rap and house. Yet, the rigid observance of formats excluded even pop‑orientated dance records from the playlists of contemporary hits stations, such as Capital. (Hogan 1990) While other European musicians were experimenting with computers and house rhythms, the formats of the Dublin stations were perpetuating the old-style rock within Irish popular music. In turn, this musical insularity lessened the chance of local artists achieving international popularity in the future. (Grahem 1990) Ironically, commercial radio stations playing imported music proved to be as culturally protectionist in their own way as Radio Éireann was in the past.

    Under the 1988 Act, a greater choice for listeners was supposed to be created by the IRTC licencing specialist music services, such as a jazz or dance station. (Irish Republic 1988a: 14) In Dublin, at least 4 FM frequencies were available for more city‑wide stations, along with space for local community radio services as well. However, whether in Dublin or elsewhere, the major limitation on the number of commercial or community radio stations was financial. Compared with piracy, the overhead costs of legal radio broadcasting proved to be two or three times greater. In part, this inflation in costs was caused by the much higher royalty payments and wages needed for running a licenced station. Above all, the sheer amount of news and current affairs coverage also dramatically increased the costs of the commercial stations. To fulfill the news quota, the legal stations had to employ many more journalists and presenters than their pirate predecessors. (Curran 1990: 8; Hogan 1990) Because the news quota was imposed for political reasons, the Fianna Fáiil government failed to examine the economic feasibility of their plans for commercial radio broadcasting.

    As in other European Community countries, the Fianna Fáil government discovered the financial constraints on the expansion of broadcasting funded by advertising. Although commercial radio attracted just under a quarter of all Irish advertising revenue during 1990, this revenue was insufficent to maintain all licenced stations in profit. (Curran 1990: 8 ) In the view of one commercial operator, the Minister for Communications ‘… overestimated the amount of money in the marketplace to operate the radio stations.’ (Hogan 1990) Most advertising agencies also thought that there wasn’t enough money from advertising to support the large expansion of commercial radio broadcasting envisaged by the ruling party. (Curran 1990: 9‑10) Moreover, these new private stations were faced with the prospects of even greater competition for advertising revenue from a third television channel. According to one commentator, a successful TV3 would ‘suck up all the advertising’ and send the commercial radio sector into a financial crisis. (Hogan 1990)

    Already, by 1990, Radio West Galway had gone bankrupt and been taken‑over by 98FM, a Dublin station. (Playback 1990a) In the view of one station owner, only 7 out of the existing 25 commercial radio licence‑holders were likely to survive until 1992. As with Radio West Galway, the unsuccessful stations would be absorbed in a series of regional networks run by the more successful commercial radio operators. (Hegarty 1989: 17; Curran 1990: 11) In part, the concentration of ownership within commercial radio was a response to the increased costs of legal broadcasting, especially the news quota. However, it was also caused by continuing popularity of RTÉ’s stations among Irish listeners. Despite commercial competition, RTÉ Radio 1 still had half of the total listenership in Ireland. As a consequence, it could sell more advertising slots than any other station in the country. (O’Regan 1990; Kenny 1990: 6) When it was started, Century, the national commercial radio station, planned to compete for listeners with Radio 1. Unfortunately for its owners, this scheme failed when Century was unable to persuade Gay Byrne to leave the RTÉ station. Having failed to poach this major star, Century was forced to reorientate its service towards the pop music audience served by RTÉ’s 2FM. (McCann 1990) However, most of the local commercial radio stations were also trying to attract the same listeners, especially in the urban areas. Moreover, 2FM was in a strong position to defend its ratings, with an established audience and popular presenters. Both the national and local commercial stations encountered great difficulties in taking both listeners and advertising money from RTÉ. When Radio West Galway collapsed, its owners partially blamed its demise on ‘unfair competition’ from its public service rival. (Playback 1990a)

    While the Fianna Fáil government expected some local stations to go bankrupt, the financial crisis of the national commercial radio station was far more politically serious. From the begining, Century encountered major engineering and programming problems. In turn, poor reception and unfocused formating resulted in low listening figures. In Dublin, Century not only failed to beat the RTÉ radio stations, but also came behind Capital and 98FM in the ratings. (McCann 1990; Kenny 1990: 6) By the end of 1990, Century had already lost around I£4m in capital and running costs. (Fox 1990: 13) Faced with financial disaster, Century’s owners attempted to blame their own failings on RTÉ. According to them, the reason for Century’s low advertising revenue was predatory pricing by their public service competitor. Using licence fee money, RTÉ was subsidising 2FM to undercut Century’s rate card. However, these charges were not only rejected by RTÉ’s management, but also by the advertising agencies. In their view, Century was failing because ‘2FM still delivers better audiences and better coverage than its competitors.’ (Kenny 1989: 1‑2; Kenny 1990: 7) However, despite these rebuttals, Century continued with its campaign against RTÉ. Its owners called for intervention from the Fianna Fáil government to save the national commercial radio station. In their view, there was a ‘need to equalise the situation’ between the licence‑funded RTÉ and its competitors dependent upon advertising revenue alone. (Kenny 1989: 1) What is more, Century was supported by TV3 in its demands for government action. Just as Century was being squeezed by Radio 1 and 2FM, the commercial television operators feared strong competition from RTÉ 1 and Network 2 would wreck their business plans. (Kenny 1989: 1)

    In 1989, RTÉ was still winning nearly half the audience among households connected to cable television networks. Ironically, despite this ratings success, its share of national advertising spending in Ireland fell during the late‑1980s. Contrary to Century’s claims, new commercial radio stations and publications had already eroded the state sector’s dominance over the Irish advertising market. But, although the corporation faced increased competition and a freeze on licence fee rises, RTÉ increased its profits during the late‑1980s, with around a 5% annual surplus by the end of the decade. (Fox 1990: 13; AAI 1990: 2; RTE 1989: 2) During this period, RTÉ had been effectively transformed from a public service broadcaster into a multi‑media corporation. For example, it had formed a partnership with RTL, a major European commercial operation based in Luxemburg. In 1989, the two corporations collaborated in launching Atlantic 252, a long‑wave pop music station aimed at listeners in northern Britain. Unlike the 1930s, there was no opposition to the national broadcaster making programmes for a British audience. Acting like a commercial multi‑media company, RTÉ set up Atlantic 252 to generate profits from advertising for the corporation as a whole. After its restructuring during the 1980s, this public service broadcaster was a powerful and determined competitor for the private radio and television station owners. Moreover, with advertising revenue limited, the success of the corporation created financial difficulties for its commercial rivals. In turn, the fear of bankruptcy created growing pressures from the private operators on the Fianna Fáil government for some action against RTÉ. Unless the competitive power of the public service provider was curbed, the commercial broadcasting sector was heading towards some embarassing financial failures.

    In order to save his overambitous plans for commercial broadcasting, the Minister for Communications rapidly started searching for methods of restricting RTÉ’s dominance over Irish broadcasting. Above all, there were strong political reasons for Burke to save Century in particular. The two owners of the national commercial radio station were close friends of the Fianna Fáil leadership. (McCann 1990) Soon, the Minister was repeating the charges against RTÉ made by his political allies at Century. According to Burke, the corporation was using the licence fee to sell advertising at ‘below cost’ rates. RTÉ had adopted this strategy to dominate the advertising market and remove any competition from the commercial sector. In his view, Century’s difficulties weren’t caused by the incompetence of its owners, but by the impossibility of ‘fair competition’ under the existing arrangements. Because of its dual funding from the licence fee and advertising, RTÉ had become too competitive for its commercial rivals. (Burke 1990: 1573; 1990c) To tackle this problem, the Minister proposed introducing measures to create a ‘level playing field’ between the public service and commercial broadcasting sectors. In place of his earlier enthusiasm for ‘self‑regulation’, Burke now claimed that tighter legislation was needed to create ‘fair competition’ within Irish radio and television broadcasting. (Burke 1990c; Burke 1990: 1573; Ox Pictures 1990)

    ‘Examination of the process of transistion from monopoly control or dominant market share to competition in any sphere…will show that it requires an increase in regulation and not deregulation.’ (Burke 1990: 1572)

    In its 1990 legislative programme, the Fianna Fáil government had planned to introduce a new broadcasting bill. Originally, this law was only intended to ‘tidy up’ various omissions in the 1988 laws, especially the remaining loopholes in the legislation against unlicenced broadcasting. However, with Century in financial difficulties, the Minister suddenly decided to add new clauses curbing the power of RTÉ into the bill. In a few weeks, the officials of the Department of Communications drew up some ‘hasty proposals’ to curb some of the financial advantages enjoyed by the nationalised broadcasting corporation. At first, the Minister proposed to remove around one‑fifth of the licence fee revenue from RTÉ. Instead, this money would be given to the IRTC for dispersal to the national and local commercial radio stations. According to Burke, the licence revenue was being reallocated to subsidise the public service requirements imposed on the commercial radio stations, especially the news quota. In addition, the Minister suggested that 2FM should cease being a pop music station. Because the commercial stations were already providing this type of service, the RTÉ radio station should concentrate on broadcasting education and farming programmes. (Moran 1990; Fox 1990: 12)

    Not suprisingly, both RTÉ’s management and the opposition parties strongly attacked these proposals. In their view, the reallocation of licence fee revenue ‘… was making a gift of a large amount of public money to some of the wealthiest business people in the country.’ (De Rossa 1990: 1615) Because many of these owners of commercial stations were supporters of Fianna Fáil, the public subsidy of private radio services was denounced as a form of political corruption. However, the opponents of this proposal were too successful in their campaign to preserve the income from the licence fee exclusively for the nationalised broadcasting corporation. In the view of one commentator, the RTÉ management ‘shot themselves in the foot’ by creating a major scandal over Burke’s original scheme. (Moran 1990) Under political pressure, the Minister was forced to abandon his plans for the redirection of licence fee revenue to the commercial radio stations. Instead, he decided to introduce new clauses into the 1990 broadcasting bill, which restricted the amount of advertising raised by RTÉ. Under article 3 of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, only 7.5% of total broadcasting time on its radio and television stations could be used for advertising, with a maximum of five minutes of commercials in any one hour. The only service exempted from this limit was Atlantic 252, the long‑wave station aimed at a British audience. In addition to this curb on the number of commercials, article 3 also restricted the total amount of advertising revenue raised by RTÉ in any one year. To ensure compliance, any excess income in one year would be deducted from the corporation’s budget for the next year. (Irish Republic 1990: 4) Under this clause, the Minister limited RTÉ’s total income from advertising to the amount of money granted to the corporation from the collection of licence fees.

    ‘…it shall be the duty of the Authority to ensure that the total revenue derived by it from advertising, sponsorship or other forms of commercial promotion in broadcasts in any year does not exceed the amount paid to the Authority…[from licence fees].’ (Irish Republic 1990: 4)

    According to Burke, the advertising restrictions on RTÉ were an anti‑trust measure designed to prevent the former broadcasting monopoly from driving its commercial rivals into bankruptcy. The Minister claimed his new legislation was based on the terms of the recently passed European Community Directive on Television Broadcasting. Under its provisions, the individual governments of European Community states were obliged to ensure the ‘freedom of expression’ within television broadcasting by preventing ‘the creation of dominant positions which would lead to restrictions on pluralism’. (European Community 1989: 23‑4) Citing this obligation, the Minister argued that his 7.5% limit on advertising time on RTÉ stations was derived from the 15% restriction laid down in the European Community directive. (European Community 1989: 28‑9) Since half of its budget came from the licence fee, the corporation was only being allowed to sell half the advertising time available to commercial television stations under the European Community directive. (Burke 1990a: 1264) These tougher restrictions on RTÉ advertising income were justified by the duty to ensure political pluralism imposed by European legislation. For the Minister, the diversity of opinions within the electronic media could only be created by external pluralism between many competing radio and television stations. In his view, he had a duty to ensure that there were sources of radio and television news outside the control of RTÉ. Restricting the dominance of the public service broadcaster over the Irish advertising market would guarantee the freedom of communications within the Irish Republic.

    ‘The whole principle behind this legislation is the need for pluralism of information and of the media generally and of entertainment within this country coming from Irish sources.’ (Burke 1990a: 1240)

    According to Burke, the 7.5% limit on RTÉ would divert around I£12m from the nationalised broadcasting corporation to the commercial radio and television stations, as well as the newspaper industry. This figure was considerably larger than the amount of licence fee money which was to have been diverted to the commercial radio and television stations. (Moran 1990) In his view, commercial broadcasting and newspapers needed increased revenue from advertising to survive the strong competition coming from RTÉ. (Ox Pictures 1990; Burke 1990c) Moreover, the Minister claimed that the cuts in the corporation’s income wouldn’t effect the quality or range of the corporation’s radio and television services. He believed that RTÉ could make substantial savings by cutting the costs of programme‑making through the better management of its resources. (Burke 1990c; Ox Pictures 1990) However, the RTÉ management strongly disagreed with this optimistic view propounded by the Minister. According to its Director of Television Programmes, the corporation had entered a period of ‘structured decline’ caused by rising costs and falling income. With licence fee frozen and advertising revenue capped, the only source of increased income was an effective clampdown on those people who weren’t paying their licences. (O’Brien 1990) But, despite this campaign against defaulters, RTÉ was still unable to raise its income in line with inflation. Soon after the 1990 Broadcasting Act was passed, the corporation announced 200 immediate job losses among its staff, with another 350 redundancies to follow shortly. An extension of European and international news coverage on RTÉ’s stations was also abandoned. (Ox Pictures 1990; Dowling and Moloney 1990; McCartan 1990) In turn, both the reduction of RTÉ’s budget and the fall in the number of commercials screened severely impacted upon the independent television companies. Working on short‑term contracts, they were the first victims of any cut‑backs. (Fox 1990: 13) Contradicting Burke’s optimistic prognosis, the decline in RTÉ’s income inevitably led to an erosion in the quality of the radio and television programmes broadcast by the nationalised broadcasting corporation. (Gagan 1990)

    As a state‑owned institution, RTÉ was prevented from too strongly criticising the government. Moreover, the RTÉ Authority was almost entirely composed of supporters of Fianna Fáil. (Mitchell 1990a) However, the opposition parties had no such inhibitions. For some politicians, setting up a third private television channel was like a ‘cargo cult’ for the Fianna Fáil government. Because TV3 represented the application of neo‑liberal policies to the electronic media, Burke was willing to sacrifice RTÉ to prevent the failure of their plans for commercial television. The Fianna Fáil government was afraid that a major bankruptcy within the commercial broadcasting sector would discredit not only Burke’s media legislation, but also Haughey’s whole economic strategy. (Higgins 1990: 584) What is more, as with Burke’s original proposals, the charges of ‘political cronyism’ and ‘moral turpitude’ were repeated in attacks against the revised broadcasting bill. (Spring 1990: 1608; Higgins 1990: 584) For many opposition politicians, the capping of RTÉ was a repetition of the Ryan Air scandal when the Fianna Fáil government had also intervened to curb competition from a nationalised industry against one of their supporters. According to the leader of the Labour party, the advertising restrictions on RTÉ were introduced solely to help a ‘failing commercial enterprise … run and managed by political associates of the ruling party.’ (Spring 1990: 1608; Kenny 1990a) Moreover, many opposition politicians linked the restrictions on RTÉ with the long‑standing hostility between the corporation and the ruling party. In an infamous incident, the Minister had promised to ‘screw’ RTÉ on the night of the 1987 election count because of its coverage of the health issue during the campaign. (Mitchell 1990: 1585) For the opposition parties, the 1990 Broadcasting Act had turned this threat into reality.

    In addition to the criticism from opposition politicians, the new broadcasting act was also attacked by the advertising industry. In its view, the advertising restrictions on RTÉ were unworkeable in practice. According to the main agencies, the financial difficulties of the commercial stations were caused by the limited size of the Irish economy. As they pointed out, the Irish Republic only had the same population as Greater Manchester in Great Britain. Yet, the Minister expected this small economy to support 3 television stations and numerous radio services mainly through advertising. Moreover, the spending on all forms of advertising by Irish companies was lower as a proportion of national expenditure than in most other European Community states. If other sources of broadcasting finance weren’t found, there were too many stations to be supported by the small economy of southern Ireland. (AAI 1990: 1; Fox 1990: 12; Hogan 1990)

    The advertising industry also believed that the Minister had wrongly forecast the consequences of the capping of RTÉ. Ironically, the first effect of the restrictions was to increase the corporation’s dominance over the Irish advertising market. With the supply of RTÉ advertising limited, the big advertisers would be forced to compete for the available commercials, especially within highly rated programmes. As a consequence, there would be a large increase in the price of commercials on public service stations. Because RTÉ could raise its permitted advertising income more quickly, the corporation would have greater control over the advertising market by being able to offer free commercials to clients who were not using other radio or television stations. (AAI 1990: 2; Dowling and Moloney 1990) Moreover, even if RTÉ didn’t engage in such aggressive tactics, there was no guarantee that the restrictions would make advertisers switch their spending to TV3, the commercial radio stations or the newspapers. Much of advertising was specific to a particular type of mass medium. For example, food companies tended to buy television commercials, while the housing industry advertised in the local press. If the main television advertisers were prevented from buying commercials on RTÉ, it was unlikely that they would purchase airtime on the commercial radio stations or space in the national newspapers instead. (AAI 1990: 3; Ox Pictures 1990)

    although the 1990 Broadcasting Act restricted advertising on RTÉ, there was no alternative source of television advertising in southern Ireland. Although the restrictions came in force in October 1990, TV3 had still not started broadcasting. There was also no guarantee that this new commercial station would win a large audience for the commercials shown within its schedule. Instead, the advertising industry predicted that many advertisers would switch their spending to Ulster Television (UTV), the British commercial station based in Northern Ireland. Already, UTV could reach half of the southern Irish population and had more potential viewers within the Irish Republic than within the north. Using the cable and MMDS networks, UTV was already planniing to increase its coverage to the rest of the Irish Republic. Withprogrammes from other ITV regions, UTV was well placed to challenge TV3 for its place as access to third television channel within southern Ireland. In the advertising industry’s view, UTV was becoming a very ‘cost‑effective and attractive alternative option’ for advertisers from the Irish Republic. (AAI 1990: 2‑3; Playback 1990b) Ironically, one of the unintended effects of Fianna Fáil’s broadcasting act might be the ending of partition within television broadcasting!

    If advertising revenue did move mainly to UTV, the economic aim of the 1990 Broadcasting Act would have failed. For both advertisers and opposition politicians, this possibility demonstrated that external pluralism within Irish broadcasting was more likely to come from British or other foreign television stations than from another domestic channel. (Mitchell 1990: 1244; Fox 1990: 12) In fact, the establishment of TV3 threatened to strengthen the influence of these outside stations by weakening the national broadcasting corporation. Instead, the advertisers prefered one strong domestic broadcaster with a large audience to two television companies with weaker ratings. (AAI 1990: 1) In response to Burke’s policies, there was a rehabilitation of the traditional Irish view of public service broadcasting as a defence of national culture. No mainstream party or major lobbyist was advocating a return to the old forms of cultural protectionism. Yet, both politicians and advertisers wanted the nationalised broadcasting corporation to have adequate funds to produce programmes of sufficent quality. Then, RTÉ could compete sucessfully against the challenge from British and satellite television stations. Furthermore, for many politicians, the creation of a stable domestic broadcasting system was a prerequisite of reversing the flow of electronic media between the Irish Republic and Great Britain. In this view, the common language between the two countries was no longer a threat to Irish cultural identity. Instead, because English was the dominant global language, the Irish broadcasting industry could export its programmes to audiences in the wider world. The nurturing of national broadcasting was also necessary for the success of Irish radio and television stations among international audiences in the future.

    ‘Are there any steps we can take to allow RTÉ, TV3 and Century to penetrate the British market in particular, or do we have to sit back while they rape our market, leaving us with no hope of access to theirs.’ (Mitchell 1990: 1598)

    The National Question and the Electronic Media

    The 1990 Broadcasting Act was the result of a long process of change within the Irish electronic media. Long before the 1916 Uprising, the existence of autonomous Irish-owned forms of cultural expression has been closely associated with the political independence of Ireland from Great Britain. In the first years of independence, most Irish nationalists feared the continuation of ideological domination by old imperial master. Despite the end of direct British rule, southern politicians believed that its larger neighbour could influence the opinions of the Irish people through the mass media. Moreover, as the population of both countries spoke English, there was no linguistic barrier preventing the comprehension of British publications and programmes by Irish audiences. Under both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments, the southern Irish state adopted a policy of cultural protectionism against this perceived threat from Great Britain, including the establishment of a nationalised broadcasting monopoly. However, from the early 1960s onwards, this isolationist model of public service broadcasting has been slowly abandoned. By the 1990s, no major party within the Irish Republic was arguing for a return to the cultural protectionism of the past, especially within the electronic media.

    However, there was no agreement on the future development of Irish broadcasting among the conservative and social democratic parties within southern Ireland. On the one hand, the Fianna Fáil government licenced commercial radio and television stations alongside the existing RTÉ services. In its view, new sources of news and current affairs had to be established outside the control of the nationalised broadcasting corporation. Although the Fianna Fáil government was criticised by other conservative parties for favouring its political friends, both Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats advocated similiar schemes for a duopoly of private and public broadcasting organisations. Moreover, all conservative politicians believed that competition between the two sectors would increase the freedom of communications within the Irish Republic. For them, this political right was guaranteed by the external pluralism of competing radio and television stations. However, few conservative politicians supported the undiluted adoption of neo‑liberal policies within the electronic media. The Fianna Fáil government abandoned its lightly regulated broadcasting policy for tighter controls over the electronic media. In its place, new laws were enacted to ensure the provision of news and current affairs programmes by the new commercial stations, as well as to limit the dominance of RTÉ over the Irish advertising market. But, some consistent neo‑liberals did argue against interventionist policies for the electronic media. In this view, the freedom of communications promised in article 40.6.1 of the 1937 constitution could only be guaranteed by competition between radio and television stations under minimal regulation.

    ‘This Article does not permit legislative provisions seeking to make broadcasting the preserve of the State. Under the freedom of expression provision, there is an open market to publish or broadcast.’ (ILT 1990)

    On the other hand, the social democratic parties championed the adoption of the West European version of public service broadcasting in southern Ireland. In their view, the licencing of commercial radio and television stations had only partially increased the freedom of communications. Because stations were dependent on selling commercials, the advertisers could control the content of programmes more fully than old forms of state censorship. (Gilmore 1990: 969) In the battle for ratings, controversial views or unfamiliar musical styles were shunned as threats to the audience share of the new stations. Despite the regulation of commercial broadcasting, both Labour and the Workers’ Party doubted that external pluralism between competing stations could fully protect the freedom of communciations. Instead, they believed that this political right had to be guaranteed by a strong nationalised broadcasting corporation. In the West European model of public service broadcasting, freedom of communications was created through internal pluralism within its programmes. Already, RTÉ claimed to reflect ‘the diverse factors and views of a pluralist society’ in its schedule. (RTÉ 1989: 3) For the social democratic parties, this committment could only be fulfilled in practice when public service broadcaster was not only adequately financed, but also democratically accountable to its audience and workforce. (Workers’ Party 1990: 4)

    In addition, as defenders of RTÉ, the social democratic parties also retained some allegiance to the Irish version of public service broadcasting. With British and other foreign stations available across most of southern Ireland, many on the Left were convinced that a strong domestic broadcasting organisation is needed to produce programmes expressing Irish culture. Because of commercial pressures, RTÉ’s domestic rivals were unlikely to include many cultural programmes in their schedules. Therefore, ‘… the protection of our culture can only be achieved by a state broadcasting institution.’ (McCartan 1990) However, for the Left, this promotion of Irish culture didn’t involve a return to protectionism. Instead, the RTÉ stations guaranteed the expression of the national culture within a multi‑channel radio and television system, which includes stations from other countries. The social democratic parties didn’t support public service broadcasting as a defence against moral corruption from abroad, but as part of their committment to the freedom of communications for Irish citizens. For them, this political right included not only the right to receive a variety of radio and television stations, but also the ability of Irish citizens to express their opinions on the airwaves. This definition of the freedom of communications as access to the electronic media was championed by the community radio movement in southern Ireland. In this form of broadcasting, local people were encouraged to participate directly in both programme‑making and administration. (Murphy 1990) For the NACB, the freedom of communications was transformed into the right to communicate.

    ‘…The achievement of a two‑way flow of information, of free exchange, of access and full participation, opens up a wide new and exciting media dimension to us.’ (Byrne 1990)

    Although their rhetoric often hid self‑interest, both conservative and social democratic parties used a common ideological discourse to argue about the future of the electronic media in the Irish Republic. Both sides claimed that their media policies would increase the freedom of communications for the Irish people. As in other areas, the underlying ideological consensus within the Irish media debate reflected the dominance of secular republicanism over Catholic nationalism within the southern partition state. By the 1990s, no major party was committed to defending the moral economy of the peasantry and petit‑bourgeoisie through censorship and protectionism against British cultural imperialism. Yet, in 1921, the independence of southern Ireland was soon followed by the establishment of a state monopoly over radio broadcasting, which was designed to provide specifically Irish programmes for the domestic audience. This cultural nationalist version of public service broadcasting reflected the partition of the island of Ireland. In the south, a homogenous society of small property‑holders was created, centred on family farms and small businesses. For the peasantry and petit‑bourgeoisie, Catholic nationalism provided a Malthusian moral code, which protected their family property against subdivision.

    After the failure of the language movement, the Catholic faith also became the national mark of cultural ‘distinction’ against the British. (Bourdieu 1984) In the independence movement, both secular republicans and Catholic nationalists worked for the cultural separation of the Irish people from British influences as part of the struggle for political self‑determination. The Irish nationalists demanded a sovereign nation‑state, completely separate from the rest of the world. Along with other European nationalists, the Irish independence movement believed that ‘as a single individual, [the nation‑state] is exclusive against other like individuals.’ (Hegel 1971: 275) Across Europe, nationalist intellectuals fostered cultural distinctiveness to create their own ‘historic people’, each needing a separate state. (Hegel 1971: 275‑6; Hegel 1975: 124‑51; Anderson 1983) Thus, the struggle for cultural and political separation by the Irish nationalists was part of a wider process encompassing the whole of Europe. As the continent was divided into competing nation‑states, each political unit based its claim to political independence on long‑standing cultural differences from its neighbours.

    ‘A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make‑up manifested in a community of culture.’ (Stalin 1936: 8 )

    Despite the constitutional basis of the new state, Catholic nationalism expressed the desire for complete separation from Great Britain more effectively than secular republicanism. The creation of an Irish version of public service broadcasting was an integral part of this quest for national autarchy. In its early years, Radio Éireann’s programmes reflected a distinctively Irish culture, centred on frugal rural living and Catholic spirituality. For Catholic nationalists, the freedom of communications was only tolerated within the confines of the moral totalitarianism of the Catholic church. In turn, this censorship justified direct political controls by the ruling party. Both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments believed that there was a single homogenous Irish audience, which could be served by a national broadcasting monopoly. But, this Irish model of public service broadcasting slowly disappeared after the end of 1950s. With the spread of Fordism across western Europe, the old policy of national autarchy was no longer credible. From the Whitaker Report onwards, the southern nationalist parties decided to encourage the modernisation of the Irish economy. Whether using policies of peripheral Fordism or neo‑liberalism, successive governments integrated the Irish economy within the European and global market‑place. In the 1970s, the Irish government simultaneously refused to support the armed struggle of the northern nationalists against British rule and decided to enter into the European Community. These two choices were symbolised by the abandonment of the traditional goal of complete national sovereignty by southern Irish politicians.

    Although independence was only won after a long struggle, the Irish Republic encountered less difficulties in pooling national sovereignty than the old imperial states like Great Britain. In part, this embrace of federalism was caused by the economic benefits of membership, such as gaining access to a wider market and subsidies from the Community’s agricultural or regional policies. As a result, European Community membership reduced Ireland’s economic dependence on Britain more effectively than the former strategy of national autarchy. As a small state, the national interests of southern Ireland were best served inside the framework of collaborative European institutions. (Wickham 1980: 69) In addition, the Irish Republic’s enthusiasm for European federalism reflected the appropriateness of its political structures for further integration. According to the principles of ‘subsidiarity’ espoused by the European Commission, ‘… we never entrust to a bigger unit anything that is best done by a smaller one.’ (Delors 1989: 1) In this approach, the larger nation‑states have to be broken down into smaller federal units for complete European unification. While the British state was too large, the Irish Republic was already the correct size for a region‑state of a future European Federation. (Fouéré 1980: 78, 115‑29) Under this form of European unification, southern Ireland not only would maintain control over its domestic concerns, but also would be able to participate fully in decisions which have to be taken at a federal level. For both the president of the European Commission and most Irish politicians, this type of federalism was:

    ‘…a way of reconciling the irreconcilable…the need for a European power capable of tackling the problems of our age and the absolute necessity to preserve our roots in the shape of our nations and regions…’ (Delors 1989: 1)

    The goal of transforming southern Ireland into a region‑state of the European Community was based on its economic integration within the wider continental economy. The urbanisation of the Irish economy had already changed individual property‑holders into wage workers or capitalists. The development of the electronic media was closely connected with this modernisation process. From the 1960s onwards, the television set was not only a Fordist commodity in its own right, but also helped to spread the new culture of consumerism among the Irish people, especially in its commercials. The electronic media helped to open up the Irish economy by spreading urban secular attitudes among the rural Catholic population. The Irish radio and television stations disseminated foreign culture throughout the country, whether through imported television programmes shown by RTÉ or Anglo‑American pop music played by commercial radio stations. Moreover, the British electronic media were no longer seen as forms of cultural imperialism, but as a window on the wider world. The common language between the two countries ceased to be a threat to cultural independence and became a means of reaching global anglophone audiences. In turn, the end of cultural separatism changed the nature of the nationalised broadcasting corporation, which evolved from the protector of traditional culture into a multi‑media corporation, with some public service committments. Faced with competing domestic and foreign stations, RTÉ no longer addressed a homogneous audience united by its Catholic nationalist culture. As elsewhere in Europe, the nationalised broadcasting corporation segmented its audience by class and age to maximise its ratings. Instead of creating national unity through its output, the 1990s RTÉ aimed to satisfy the information and entertainment needs of its diverse Irish audience. The Europeanisation and modernisation of southern Ireland was reflected in the common ideological discourse used for debates on the development of the electronic media by both conservative and social democratic parties. In modern Ireland, secular republicanism provided the inspiration for political arguments, rather than Catholic nationalism. Both Right and Left claimed that their media policies were based on extending the freedom of communications for the Irish people. On one hand, the conservative parties argued for the application of neo‑liberal policies in the mass media, with regulation to prevent monopolies and to protect political pluralism. On the other hand, the Left parties advocated the application of social democratic policies in the media, including a revitalised public service broadcasting corporation, community stations and tighter regulation. By becoming a region‑state of the European Community, the Irish Republic was no longer committed to the achievement of complete national sovereignty. By the early 1990s, the protection of the national culture had ceased to be a major aim of the broadcasting policies of the southern Irish state. Instead, the political debate over the future of the electronic media was conducted between different methods of ensuring the freedom of communications for Irish citizens within the limits of the constitution, such as the Section 31 restrictions. As in other member countries, policies for the electronic media were justified in terms of democratic rights, not national self‑determination. With the emergence of media regulation by the European Community, the broadcasting policies of the Irish Republic had to be consistent with those adopted by other member states. The freedom of communications had replaced the struggle for national cultural identity in Irish broadcasting policy. From now onwards, the rights of Irish citizens would take precedence over the need to create a nation‑state for Ireland.

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  • DIGITAL RHYTHMS by Richard Barbrook

    Amongst all the different forms of mass culture, music is the most personal and emotional. Almost everyone can identify certain songs with particular moments in their life. The rites of passage from childhood to adulthood usually involve joining a musical subculture. We fall in and out love to the accompaniment of the latest hits. In the modern world, a major way of creating our identity as individuals is through our own musical tastes. If you criticise your friends’ record collection, you can be attacking their worth as a human being! What is more, in contrast to movies or television, many people are very conservative in their musical taste. My mother watches the same films as me, but doesn’t listen to the same records. For lots of people, their basic likes and dislikes in music are fixed during their teenage and twenties. It is a true cliché that many people’s record collection stops when they start having children. This can be seen in the popularity of radio stations which play nothing but oldies and the successful repackaging of old hits on CD. Despite the rapid changes in musical fashions, it seems that many listeners think music represents something transcendental and eternal‑ even if this is only the memory of their own youth.

    This cult of nostalgia means most people live in a musical timewarp. This ranges from the classical music buffs stuck in the nineteenth century to the indie rock fans wishing to revive the 1960s. This cultural conservatism means many people have hardly noticed the rapid technological changes taking place in music. Many listeners have purchased the latest hardware and enjoy the better reproduction offered by the new recording techniques. However the newly purchased CD is often used to play old music performed on obsolete instruments. There is something absurd about the latest microelectronics being used to make a faithful reproduction of the music of the last century. The distinctive sounds of a particular style of making music are closely connected with the machines which help humans create music. Each major style of music is connected with earlier technical advances in instrument‑making. The violin and the piano were new instruments which created the particular sound which we now recognise as classical music. In the same way, jazz music is unthinkable without the technology which produced the saxophone and other sophisticated metal wind instruments. Similarly, rock music is identified with the invention of the electric guitar and amplification. Our emotional response to these styles of music is closely connected with the distinctive sounds of the weeping violin, wailing sax or screeching guitar. Now the new microelectronic instruments are creating their own distinctive sounds and styles of music.

    Electronic music is already decades old. The Futurists and Surrealists dreamed of a music which would match the aspirations of the machine age. This influenced avant‑garde classical composers, like Stockhausen, to experiment with the earliest synthesisers. Out of these early efforts came Kraftwerk, the first musicians to popularise synthesisers. In their use of heavy rhythms and everyday sounds turned into music, Kraftwerk pioneered many contemporary sounds. In the early 1980s, English bands were the leading edge of electronic music, with groups such as the Human League, Heaven 17, Cabaret Voltaire and Depeche Mode. In turn, they influenced musicians in the USA. In the work of Afrika Bambaataa and many hip‑hop records, computer music came to dominate large sections of black American music. In the last few years, these new technologies have helped create house music, especially those records influenced by the Detroit techno sound. As this style has crossed the ocean back to England and the rest of Europe, so new musicians have emerged to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the new instruments. What is interesting about the development of music made by computers is how its success has depended on the falling price of the technology. Despite the French government squandering large amounts of money on Boulez’s electronic music lab in the Centre Pompidou, it has had no cultural impact at all. Only when the music computers escaped from the academy into the ghettos did the real possibilities of the new technologies become apparent. Today, Todd Terry and Juan Atkins are far more musically innovative and experimental than Boulez can ever hope to be. This is because the spread of the new musical technologies is intimately connected with the growing global dominance of west African rhythms over all other styles of music. The new technologies are ideally suited to a heavily rhythmic music which uses multi‑layered, complex and repetitive patterns. African‑originated music has proved its ability to absorb all other styles of music within its beats, from celtic through flamenco to bhangra. The future of music may derive from the villages of ancient Ghana, but it will be played on the latest computer musical technologies.

    These new ways of producing music are part of the global transformation of the technological basis of capitalist societies. Economists see the introduction of microelectronic technologies as the movement from Fordism to post‑Fordism. Musicians are no different from other workers in finding their old skills are becoming rapidly obsolete. The post‑Fordist economy reduces all labour to the generic ability to work‑ as a computer operator! Therefore the musicians of the future will work on computers too. This has been made possible by the introduction of digital recording techniques. By reducing all sounds to numbers, digital recording does not just create the ‘perfect’ reproduction of music. It also allows musicians to manipulate sounds using computer technology. By using a sampler, the computer can mimic other instruments or play snatches taken from other recordings. This not only allows these computers to copy existing sounds, but to create completely new forms of music. The distance between playing and recording music is blurred in these new technologies. But importance of these new instruments does not lie simply in their technical capacities, but also in the rapid fall in their price. The early synthesisers were American or European and very expensive. As in many other areas, the Japanese corporations have turned the playthings of the rich into everyday consumer durables. A musical computer which cost £30,000 in 1984 is now available for £3,000. Casio are even offering a cheap sampler for only £99! It is the cheapness of these microelectronic instruments which is revolutionising modern music. In recent years, the government monopoly of radio broadcasting has been broken by the availability of very cheap transmitters. The increasing spread of these powerful, easy to use and flexible new instruments among the population is already allowing many more people to become musicians and make records.

    These new technologies are a nightmare for the defenders of the traditional craft skills of musicians, such as the Musicians’ Union (MU). This organisation was founded in the factory‑like organisation of the classical orchestra. The MU never really adapted itself to the more anarchic world of jazz combos or rock bands. The campaign to “Keep Music Live” demonstrated its dislike of the gramophone, let alone any more advanced technologies. The new computer technologies confirm the worse fears of the MU. Now one musician can reproduce a whole orchestra using the new instruments. This threatens the jobs of skilled musicians as live orchestras become too expensive for film scores or other session work. Nowadays, the trained violinist is like a hand‑loom weaver competing against the latest computer‑operated mill. Even worse, a computer system is already cheaper than a good violin. The MU faces catastrophe because it does not know how to cope with the long‑term trend away from live music. On the one hand, the reproduction of the same piece in live performances has become economically ‘inefficient’. On the other, it is also increasingly difficult to reproduce many types of modern music in ‘real time’. More and more, musicians are famous for being producer‑DJs, rather than as live performers.

    The more pessimistic defenders of traditional music believe that the computers are taking over. However, these new computer‑based instruments are still musical instruments. At the end of the day, they are only as good as their programmers. The potentialities of the new musical technologies will only be realised if there are musicians who know how to use them creatively. Learning how to play music on the new technologies is involves acquiring skills as much as learning the violin or guitar. Computer technologies do not just abolish old skills, but also create new ones. Already some rich rock stars have made terrible records using all the latest instruments and recording equipment. In contrast, some of the most innovative records of the last twenty years were made by dub reggae musician‑producers using the most basic recording techniques. As in other areas being restructured by microelectronic technologies, the central question is whether the machines will dominate us or whether we will control the machines. As DJ Keith Franklin puts it: “We need to know how to combine the human feel with digital sounds”.

    But the new musical technologies are not just causing problems for the musicians with traditional skills. The big record companies are also worried about the long‑term trends involved in the introduction of microelectronics into music production and recording. This is one of the reasons behind the recent mergers between the hardware and software branches of musical production, as can be seen in the recent takeover of CBS by Sony. What the record companies fear is a break‑down of the commodity form within music. This is a common problem across the information economy. Music is like any other piece of software: it is expensive to make the first copy, but extremely cheap to reproduce every extra copy. In earlier stages of the industrialisation of music, the record companies thrived because they could lock a particular song onto vinyl in the shape of a record. In turn, this allowed the record companies to set up a system which sold musicians as individual ‘artists’, not as members of a collective culture. Nowadays, already this commodification of music is threatened by the home‑taping of records. The introduction of digital technologies makes things even worse for the record companies. Not only can perfect reproductions be easily made, but even the fixed shape of the record is being blurred. For example, many modern hits rely on sound samples lifted from other records. This has created innumerable copyright problems as the lawyers argue over who owns a ten second ‘break’. But this is only the start of a process which is unraveling the whole relationship between songs, records and the commodity form. In house music, the same rhythm will appear in many different remixes and samples. In this endless cycle of innovation and plagiarism, where does one musicians’ contribution stop and another’s begin? In the near future, you may no longer buy records as a fixed piece of music. Instead you could be purchasing a piece of ‘rhythm software’ mixed into various versions by different people. Moreover, as software, you will also be able to create your own versions of the rhythm if you want to! These advances open up interesting opportunities for reducing the separation between musical production and consumption. In turn, this will further blur the distinctions between musicians and listeners.