Category: HRC Archive

  • THE HOLY FOOLS (MUTE MIX) by Richard Barbrook

    The Lost Utopia

    The Net is haunted by the disappointed hopes of the Sixties. Because this new technology symbolises another period of rapid change, many contemporary commentators look back to the stalled revolution of thirty years ago to explain what is happening now. Most famously, the founders of Wired appropriated New Left rhetoric to promote their New Right policies for the Net. [2] Within Europe, a long history of class-based politics and compulsive theorising makes such ideological chicanery seem much more implausible. However, this does not mean that Europeans are immune from embracing digital elitism in the name of Sixties libertarianism. Ironically, this bizarre union of opposites is most evident in writings inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

    Although these two philosophers were overt leftists during their lifetimes, many of their contemporary followers support a form of aristocratic anarchism which is eerily similar to Californian neo-liberalism. By doing so, the Deleuzoguattarians have unwittingly exposed the fatal weaknesses within what appears to be an impeccably emancipatory analysis of the Net. Trapped within the precepts of their sacred creed, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari can’t even grasp why the spread of the Net really is such a subversive phenomenon.

    At the end of the century, the superficiality of post-modernism is no longer fashionable among radical intellectuals. Because the Soviet Union has collapsed, the European avant-garde can return to its old obsession with Leninism. Instead, TJs look back to the libertarian spontaneity of May ‘68. [3] Even after decades of reactionary rule, the folk memory of the Sixties still remains an inspiration for the present. The democratic ways of working, cultural experimentation and emancipatory lifestyles initiated in this period survive – and even flourish – within the DIY culture of the Nineties. [4] However, belief in the overthrow of capitalism is no longer credible. Therefore contemporary European intellectuals have turned social transformation into theoretical poetry: a revolutionary dreamtime for the imagination.

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is a prime example of this aesthetisation of Sixties radicalism. Above all, their most famous book – A Thousand Plateaus – now provides the buzzwords and concepts for a specifically European understanding of the Net. In contrast with the USA, a vibrant techno-culture has been flourishing across the continent for over two decades. Pioneered by computer-generated dance music, this digital aesthetic now embraces fashion, art, graphic design, publishing and video games. When it emerged in Europe, the Net was at first seen as a place for social and cultural experimentation rather than as a business opportunity. Unlike the Californian ideology, the writings of Deleuze and Guattari do seem to provide theoretical metaphors which describe the non-commercial aspects of the Net. For instance, the rhizome metaphor captures how cyberspace is organised as an open-ended, spontaneous and horizontal network. Their Body-without-Organs phrase can be used to romanticise cyber-sex. Deleuze and Guattari’s nomad myth reflects the mobility of contemporary Net users as workers and tourists.

    D&G now symbolises more than just Dolce & Gabbana. Within the rhizomes of the Net, the Deleuzoguattarians form their own subculture: the techno-nomads. These adepts are united by specific ‘signifying practices’: computer technologies, techno music, bizarre science, esoteric beliefs, illegal chemicals and cyberpunk novels. There even is a distinctive Deleuzoguattarian language which is almost incomprehensible to the uninitiated. Above all, these techno-nomads possess a radical optimism about the future of the Net. While all that remains of hippie ideals in Wired is its psychedelic layout, the European avant-garde and its imitators still champions the lost utopia of May ‘68 through the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari. The revolution will be digitalised.

    The Politics of May ‘68

    Far from deterring an audience educated in structuralism, the hermetic language and tortured syntax used within A Thousand Plateaus are seen as proofs of its analytical brilliance. However, this idiosyncratic Deleuzoguattarian discourse is causing as much confusion as elucidation among their followers. For instance, the Rhizome.Com web site blandly announces that: ‘rhizome is…a figurative term…to describe non-hierarchical networks of all kinds.’ [5] At no point does this web site explain either the political meaning of this peculiar concept or how its principles might be applied within the Net. On the contrary, rhizome is simply a hip European phrase borrowed to celebrate the disorganised nature of the New York cyber-arts scene.

    Yet, Deleuze and Guattari were not simply avant-garde art critics. The two philosophers were ‘soixante-huitards’: supporters of the May ‘68 revolution.[6] Deleuze and Guattari championed the most radical expression of Sixties politics: anarcho-communism. As its name suggests, anarcho-communism stood for the destruction of both state power and market capitalism. Society would be reorganised as a direct democracy and as a gift economy. The appeal of anarcho-communism did not derive only from its abstract theory, but also from its concrete practice. During the Sixties, anarcho-communists led the search for radical solutions to the historically novel problems facing young people. With the arrival of consumer society, the traditional Left policy of unrestricted modernisation appeared to have reached its limits. Once almost everyone had annual rises in income and mass unemployment had disappeared, the problems of everyday life took on increasing importance, such as restraints on sexual and cultural freedom.

    Above all, many people now wanted a say in the decisions which effected them. They were no longer willing to accept leadership from above without some form of dialogue. Responding to these historically specific circumstances, young militants rediscovered and updated anarcho-communism not just as a theory, but also as a practice. Unlike their parents’ parliamentary parties and trade unions, the New Left could articulate their contemporaries’ demands for more participation. Instead of others deciding their lives for them, young people wanted to do things for themselves.

    ‘[Anarcho-]communism is not a new mode of production; it is the affirmation of a new community.’ [7]

    The Romance of ‘Schizo-Politics’

    Like other gurus of the New Left, Deleuze and Guattari believed that the state itself was the source of all oppression. According to their foundation myth, the state and its allies had been using top-down tree-like structures to subjugate people ever since the dawn of agrarian civilisation. Described as a process of ‘territorialisation’, they claimed that the media, psychoanalysis and language were the primary ‘machinic assemblages’ used by the state to control everyday life in the modern world. In contrast with Marxist analyses, Deleuze and Guattari believed that economics was only one manifestation of the state’s primordial will to dominate all human activity.

    Facing the transhistorical enemy of the state was a new opponent: the social movements. Deleuze and Guattari thought that the traditional style of left-wing politics was now obsolete. As part of the ‘guaranteed’ sector of the economy, private and public sector workers not only had been bought off by the system, but also had their desires manipulated by the family, the media, the dominant language and psychoanalysis. Like much of the post-’68 New Left, the two philosophers instead looked to social movements of youth, feminists, ecologists, homosexuals and immigrants to ‘deterritorialise’ the power of the state. As part of the ‘non-guaranteed’ sector, people in these movements were excluded from the system and were therefore supposedly eager to fight for the revolution. [8]

    In A Thousand Plateaus, the nomads poetically symbolised the ‘molecular’ social movements which were making the anarcho-communist revolution against the ‘molar’ tyranny of political power. Far from trying to seize political power, nomads used their mobility to avoid the ‘territorialised’ control of the authoritarian state. Similarly, the social movements formed a multiplicity of hippie tribes which were autonomous from all centralising and hierarchical tendencies, especially those supported by the mainstream Left. Along the ‘lines of flight’ mapped out by the New Left, the oppressed would escape from the control of the authoritarian state into autonomous rhizomes formed by the social movements. In A Thousand Plateaus, the rhizome became the poetic metaphor for this nomadic vision of direct democracy.

    For Deleuze and Guattari, the overthrow of political power was only the beginning of the anarcho-communist revolution. They believed that political domination was only made possible through personal repression. The anarcho-communist revolution therefore had to liberate the libidinal energies of people from all forms of social control. The individual ‘delirium’ of schizophrenics prefigured the chaotic spirit of collective revolution. This meant that radicals not only had to detonate a social uprising, but also personally live out the cultural revolution. The New Left revolutionary was symbolised as the Body-without-Organs: a person who was no longer ‘organised, signified, subjected’ by the rationality of the state. [9] Such individuals were forerunners of the new type of human being who would emerge after the anarcho-communist revolution: a hippie equivalent of Nietzsche’s Superman. For Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was therefore not just the realisation of direct democracy and the gift economy. In their ‘schizo-politics’, the revolution would destroy bourgeois rationality so each individual could become a holy fool.

    ‘[The Fool]…is the vagabond who exists on the fringe of organised society, going his own way, ignoring the rules and taboos with which men seek to contain him. He is the madman who carries within him the seeds of genius, the one who is despised by society yet who is the catalyst who will transform that society.’ [10]

    The Moment of Community Radio

    Within the exuberant writings of the Deleuzoguattarians, there is a curious – and revealing – omission. They almost never mention Guattari’s claim in the Eighties that the Minitel system was about to replace top-down mass media with bottom-up ‘post-media’. [11] The reason for this absence must be found in the close similarity between Guattari’s Minitel utopia and his earlier dreams about the revolutionary potential of community radio. Paradoxically, it is Guattari’s anarcho-communist adventure within radio which provides the answer to why his contemporary disciples have developed such a curious affinity with the aristocratic ideology of Wired.

    After May ‘68, many members of the New Left believed that producing alternative media was the most effective and fun way of putting their revolutionary theory into practice. In both Italy and France, the nationalised radio and television corporation had disseminated propaganda from the ruling conservative parties for decades. During the Seventies, New Left activists challenged this monopoly by setting up pirate radio stations. As the regulations against unlicensed broadcasting collapsed, thousands of ‘free radios’ emerged first in Italy and later in France. Although most were commercial, a minority were run by New Left activists.

    According to Guattari, community radio stations were the only alternative to the domination of the airwaves by mindless ‘disco radios’. He wanted radio broadcasting to be used to create an electronic form of direct democracy which could replace the corrupt system of representative democracy. Instead of elected politicians, people would directly express their own opinions on the programmes of the community radio stations. The community radio stations supposedly prefigured the imminent reorganisation of the whole of society around direct democracy after the anarcho-communist revolution. Even this ultra-left utopia didn’t go far enough for Guattari. The ultimate aim of a ‘free radio’ was the subversion of bourgeois rationality and repressive sexuality within everyday life. When people were able to express their own views over the airwaves, Guattari hoped that the ‘delirium’ of desire would be released within the population. [12]

    In the early-Eighties, Guattari was the leader of Fréquence Libre, a community radio station licenced to broadcast across Paris. However, it soon became obvious that turning Deleuzoguattarian theory into practice was impossible. Far from encouraging audience participation, the sectarian politics of the two philosophers actually discouraged people – including many on the Left – from getting involved in their community radio station. Guattari and his colleagues were more interested in lecturing the audience rather than engaging in discussions with them. This revolutionary elitism even extended the musical policies of the station. When some rappers approached Fréquence Libre about the possibility of making some programmes, the station refused to let any hip-hop crews on-air until their lyrics had been politically vetted! After they’d alienated most of their potential activists and audience, Guattari’s ‘free radio’ encountered growing difficulties in raising sufficient cash and recruiting enough volunteers to operate the station. Eventually, Fréquence Libre went bankrupt and its frequency was sold to pay its debts. Guattari’s attempts to turn theory into practice within the ‘free radio’ movement had ended in tragedy. [13]

    From Stalin to Pol Pot

    Techno-nomad TJs are attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Fréquence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how Deleuze and Guattari’s celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. This elitism was no accident. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people in the Sixties experienced a pronounced ‘generation gap’ between themselves and their parents. Feeling so isolated, they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority. [14]

    The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolsheviks. As their ‘free radio’ experience showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. As in other social movements, Fréquence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution. [15]

    In Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its ‘wooden language’, the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies. [16] During the Sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party. [17] For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ of the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, most people supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. Yet, as the rappers who wanted to make a show for Fréquence Libre discovered, Deleuzoguattarian anarcho-communism even included the censorship of music. By adopting an Althusserian analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses – without any formal consent from them – in the fight against capitalism.

    For young militants, the problem was how this committed minority could make a revolution without ending up with totalitarianism. Some of the New Left thought that anarcho-communism expressed their desire to overthrow both political and economic oppression. [18] However, even this revolutionary form of politics still appeared to many as tainted by the bloody failure of the Russian revolution. Had not the experience of Stalinism proved that any compromise with the process of modernity would inevitably lead to the reimposition of tyranny? Consequently, anarcho-communist thinkers increasingly decided that just opposing the oppressive features of economic development was not radical enough. Desiring a complete transformation of society, they rejected the transcendent ‘grand narrative’ of modernity altogether, especially those left-wing versions inspired by Hegel and Marx. According to these ultra-leftists, the whole concept of progress was a fraud designed to win acquiescence for the intensification of capitalist domination. While the mainstream Left still wanted to complete the process of modernisation, the New Left should instead be leading a revolution against modernity. [19]

    Once anarcho-communism was transformed into an ahistorical ideology, the New Left’s opposition to economic development soon developed into a desire to abandon modernity altogether. Following the May ‘68 revolution, support for rural guerrillas resisting American imperialism soon became mixed up with hippie tribalism, concerns about environmental degradation and nostalgia for a lost peasant past. Disillusioned with the economic progress championed by the parliamentary Left, many on the New Left synthesised these different ideas into hatred of the mass urban society created by modernity. For them, a truly libertarian revolution could only have one goal: the destruction of the city. [20]

    Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the ‘deterritorialisation’ of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into ‘molecular rhizomes’, direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was not the ‘end of history’: the material result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary, the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their hierarchical brainwashing to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool. [21]

    Yet, as the experience of Fréquence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari’s dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the ‘grand narrative’ of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The ‘line of flight’ from Stalin had led to Pol Pot. [22]

    The Antinomies of the Avant-Garde

    Ironically, the current popularity of Deleuze and Guattari comes from their stubbon refusal to recognise the failure of the anti-modernist revolution. Even when Fréquence Libre went bankrupt, Deleuze and Guattari never questioned their ‘schizo-politics’. Instead, they transformed the historically specific politics of the New Left into theoretical poetry which existed outside history. The libidinal intensity of revolutionary failure was much preferable to the limited achievements of parliamentary reformism. [23] For ‘cutting edge’ TJs, it is now almost compulsory to sample from the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari. Yet, this New Left revival is taking place in very different circumstances from the revolutionary Sixties. However, the political irrelevance of Deleuze Guattari does not discredit their theoretical poetry among radical intellectuals. On the contrary, the defeat of the New Left has enabled their disciples to complete the transformation of anarcho-communism from the hope of social revolution into the symbol of personal authenticity: an ethical-aesthetic rejection of bourgeois society. Although defeated in reality, the ideals of May ‘68 can be used to imagine a revolutionary dreamtime for the Net.

    The aestheticisation of revolutionary politics is a revered tradition of the European avant-garde. Back in the Twenties, the Surrealists perfected the fusion of artistic creativity with social rebellion. Inspired by Lenin, this avant-garde movement claimed that the consciousness of the majority of the population was controlled by cultural mediocrity and puritan morality. Therefore radical intellectuals had the heroic task of freeing the people from ideological domination. Their innovative art would undermine the repressive cultural norms of bourgeois society. Their bohemian way of living would challenge the dull conformity of everyday life under capitalism. In this interpretation of Leninism, cultural experimentation became the privileged expression of revolutionary politics. Whether from the tribal past or the science-fiction future, any vision of a more authentic life should be used to subvert the cultural philistinism of the bourgeois present. Innovative paintings, sculptures, photography, films and literature would be made “…in the service of the revolution.” [24]

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is the latest manifestation of this European avant-garde tradition. The change in language disguises a continuity in practice. Just like its Surrealist predecessors, the contemporary avant-garde equates experimental art and bohemian lifestyles with social rebellion. Despite their involvement with radio and Minitel, Deleuze and Guattari hoped that the ‘line of flight’ from modernity would lead back to the tribal past. In contrast, their contemporary followers have no ambiquity about their relationship with modern technologies. Far from desiring the destruction of the city, radical intellectuals hope that the Deleuzoguattarian utopia will emerge from the hi-tech Net. Using intellectual alchemy, they transmute their gurus’ anti-modernist scriptures into a philosophy of hyper-modernism.

    This aestheticisation of May ‘68 is made much easier by the poetical style of Deleuze and Guattari. As in modernist painting, the ‘realism’ of the text has been superseded by a fascination with the formal techniques of theoretical production. For Deleuze and Guattari, theory was a piece of literature expressing authentic emotion rather than a tool for understanding social reality. Having failed in practice, New Left politics could live on as theory-art. Following this example, techno-nomad TJs sample Deleuzoguattarian discourse to produce leftfield philosophy. Yet, as with Britpop bands, something is lost in these respectful homages to the past. In the sacred texts, the rational analysis of society had already been replaced by the literary celebration of irrational desires. The European avant-garde is now discarding the few remaining connections with practical politics. Using Deleuzoguattarian discourse, avant-garde intellectuals recreate the May ‘68 revolution as a theory-art project for the Net.

    Yet, like the Leninist vanguard, the European avant-garde is haunted by the fatal contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. In their theory-art, the techno-nomads use Deleuzoguattarian discourse to celebrate DIY culture. However, according to the sacred creed, most people – including members of the DIY culture – are brainwashed by semiotic ‘machinic assemblages.’ But, when illuminated by the teachings of Deleuze and Guattari, radical intellectuals can amazingly cast off the mental shackles of bourgeois rationality and experience the redemption of ecstatic immanence. Although many are called, only few can become true disciples of the esoteric doctrine.

    This elitism is a hallowed tradition of the European avant-garde. For decades, radical intellectuals have adopted dissident politics, aesthetics and morals to separate themselves from the majority of ‘herd animals’ whose minds were controlled by bourgeois ideologies. [25] Despite their revolutionary rhetoric, avant-garde intellectuals fantasised about themselves as an artistic aristocracy ruling the philistine masses. Following this elitist custom, the Deleuzoguattarian champion nomadic minorities from the ‘non-guaranteed’ social movements against the stupified majority from the ‘guaranteed’ sector. Once again, the revolution is the ethical-aesthetic illumination of a minority rather than the social liberation of all people.

    Earlier in this century, this dream of an artistic aristocracy sometimes evolved into fascism. More often, the avant-garde supported totalitarian tendancies within the Left. Nowadays, cultural elitism can easily turn into implicit sympathy with neo-liberalism. The European avant-garde – and its imitators – could never openly support the free market fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. Yet, as TJs cut ‘n’ mix, the distinctions between right and left libertarianism are blurring. On the one hand, the Californian ideologues claim that a heroic minority of cyber-entrepreneurs is emerging from the fierce competition of the electronic marketplace. On the other hand, the Deleuzoguattarians believe that this new elite consists of cool TJs and hip artists who release subversive ‘assemblages of enunciation’ into the Net. In both the Californian ideology and Deleuzoguattarian discourse, primitivism and futurism are combined to produce the apotheosis of individualism: the cyborg Nietzschean Superman.

    ‘…the possibility…to rear a master race, the future “masters of the earth”; – a new tremendous aristocracy…in which… philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will…work as artists on “man” himself.’ [26]

    The Hi-Tech Gift Economy

    Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the contemporary avant-garde must substitute itself for the missing political vanguard. The techno-nomads therefore remix Leninism into Deleuzoguattarian discourse: subversive theory-art ‘deterritorialises’ the semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ controlling the minds of the majority. Lenin is morphed into Nietzsche. In the late-Nineties, revolutionary elitism can only be expressed in the words of May ‘68. Yet, important pioneers of the New Left were highly critical of this tradition of cultural elitism. For instance, the Situationists advocated transforming the social context of cultural production rather than the aesthetics of art. Instead of following the avant-garde elite, everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves. [27]

    Above all, the Situationists looked for ways of living which were free from the corruptions of consumer capitalism. Despite their Hegelian modernism, they claimed that anarcho-communism had been prefigured by the potlatch: the gift economy of Polynesian tribes. Within these primitive societies, the circulation of gifts bound people together into tribes and encouraged cooperation between different tribes. This tribal gift economy demonstrated that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. However, the Situationists believed that here could be no compromise between tribal authenticity and bourgeois alienation. After the social revolution, the potlatch would completely supplant the commodity. [28]

    Following May ‘68, this purist vision of anarcho-communism inspired a generation of cultural activists. Emancipatory media supposedly could only be produced within the gift economy. During the late-Seventies, pro-situ attitudes were further popularised by the punk movement. From then to the present-day, the ‘cutting edge’ of music has remained participatory. Crucially, every user of the Net is now also participating within a gift economy. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. They cooperate together without the direct mediation of either politics or money. Far from being the privilege of intellectuals, anarcho-communism is the mundane activity of ordinary people within cyberspace.

    From the beginning, the gift economy has determined the technical and social structure of the Net. Although funded by the Pentagon, the Net could only be successfully developed by letting its users build the system for themselves. Within the academic community, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists publicise their research results by ‘giving papers’ and by ‘contributing articles’. Despite the dispersed nature of this educational gift economy, academics acquire intellectual respect from each other through citations in articles and other forms of public acknowledgement. The collaboration of many different scientists is only possible through the free distribution of information. [29]

    From its earliest days, the free exchange of information has been firmly embedded within the technologies and social mores of cyberspace. Above all, the founders of the Net never bothered to protect intellectual property within computer-mediated communications. Far from wanting to enforce copyright, they tried to eliminate all barriers to the distribution of information. Within the commercial creative industries, advances in digital reproduction are feared for making the ‘piracy’ of copyright material ever easier. In contrast, the academic gift economy welcomes technologies which improve the availability of data. Users should always be able to obtain and manipulate information with the minimum of impediments. The design of the Net therefore assumes that intellectual property is technically and socially obsolete.

    Even though the system has expanded far beyond the university, the Net remains predominantly a gift economy. From scientists through hobbyists to the general public, the charmed circle of users was slowly built up through the adhesion of many localised networks to an agreed set of protocols. Crucially, the common standards of the Net include social conventions as well as technical rules. The giving and receiving of information without payment is almost never questioned. Even selfish reasons encourage people to become anarcho-communists within cyberspace. By adding their own presence, every user contributes to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return, each individual has potential access to all the information made available by others within the Net. Everyone takes far more out of the Net than they can ever give away as an individual. [30]

    Despite the commercialisation of cyberspace, the self-interest ensures that the hi-tech gift economy continues to flourish. For most users, the Net is somewhere to work, play, love, learn and discuss with other people. Unrestricted by physical distance, they collaborate with each other without the direct mediation of money or politics. Unconcerned about copyright, they give and receive information without thought of payment. In the absence of states or markets to mediate social bonds, network communities are instead formed through the mutual obligations created by gifts of time and ideas.

    The hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. For instance, Bill Gates admits that Microsoft’s biggest competitor in the provision of web servers comes from the Apache program. [31] Instead of being marketed by a commercial company, this program is shareware. Because its source code is not protected by copyright, Apache servers can be modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programming skills. Shareware programs are now beginning to threaten the core product of the Microsoft empire: the Windows operating system. Starting from the original software program by Linus Torvalds, a community of user-developers are together building their own non-proprietory operating system: Linux. For the first time, Windows has a real competitor. [32]

    Beyond the Avant-Garde

    The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture. There could be no compromise between the authenticity of the potlatch and the alienation of the market. Fréquence Libre preserved its principles to the point of bankruptcy. Bored with the emotional emptiness of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are entranced by the uncompromising fervour of Deleuze and Guattari. However, as shown by Fréquence Libre, the rhetoric of mass participation often hides the rule of the enlightened few. The ethical-aesthetic committment of anarcho-communism can only be lived by the artistic aristocracy. Yet, the antinomies of the avant-garde can no longer be avoided. The ideological passion of anarcho-communism is dulled by the banality of giving gifts within cyberspace. The theory of the artistic aristocracy cannot be based on the everyday activities of ‘herd animals’.

    Above all, anarcho-communism exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, the boundaries between the different methods of working are not morally precise. Within the mixed economy of the Net, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial Net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Under threat from Microsoft, Netscape is now trying to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence. Lacking the resources to beat its monopolistic rival, the development of products for the shareware Linux operating system has become a top priority. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital. [33]

    The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. Because the dogmatic communism of Deleuze and Guattari has dated badly, their disciples instead emphasise their uncompromising anarchism. However, the state isn’t just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. Many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. State intervention will be needed to ensure everyone can access the Net. The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is threatened by the miscegenation of the hi-tech gift economy with the private and public sectors. Anarcho-communism symbolised moral integrity: the romance of artistic ‘delirium’ undermining the ‘machinic assemblages’ of bourgeois conformity. However, as Net access grows, more and more ordinary people are circulating free information across the Net. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May ‘68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. In the late-Nineties, digital anarcho-communism is being built by hackers like Eric Raymond: ‘a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons…’ [34]

    Threatened by the banalisation of the hi-tech gift economy, the European avant-garde is surreptiously embracing the capitalist fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. For this convergence to take place, Deleuze and Guattari’s anathema against market competition must be skillfully abandoned. First, their adepts deny the wealth-creating powers of human labour. Then the work of living beings is subsumed within the mobility of dead matter. Finally, far from being condemned as a ‘machinic assemblage’ imposed from above, market competition is sanctified as the apotheosis of self-organising systems. As in the Californian ideology, this Deleuzoguattarian heresy believes that the market is a chaotic force of nature which cannot be controlled by state intervention. Abandoning any residual connections with the Left, these TJs instead celebrate the new aristocracy of nomadic artists and entrepreneurs who surf the ‘schiz-flows’ of the information society. In this bizarre remix, anarcho-communism becomes identical with neo-liberalism.

    As a consequence, the techno-nomads have to ignore the major social transformation catalysed by the new information technologies: the widespread adoption of a new method of working. Rejecting the ‘economism’ of the Left, many TJs have replaced the creativity of human labour on the Net with a digital vitalism inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art. Denying the ability of people to determine their own destinies, these techno-nomads believe that information technologies are the semiotic forces determining culture, consciousness and even the conception of existence. However, there is nothing inherently emancipatory in computer-mediated communications. These technologies can also serve the state and the market. The Net was originally invented for the transmission of orders from the military hierarchy. In the future, electronic commerce will play a significant economic role and public services will increasingly be made available on-line.

    At the same time, millions of people are spontaneously working together on the Net without needing coordination by either the state or the market. Instead of exchanging their labour for money, they give away their creations in return for free access to information produced by others. This circulation of gifts coexists with the exchange of commodities and funding from taxation. When they’re on-line, people constantly pass from one form of social activity to another. For instance, in one session, a Net user could first shop on an e-commerce catalogue, then look for information aon the local council’s site and then contribute some thoughts to a listserver for fiction-writers. Without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy. The ‘New Economy’ of the Net is an advanced form of social democracy. [35]

    The techno-nomads cannot comprehend the subversive impact of these everyday activities of Net users. As members of the avant-garde, they’re looking for the intensity of ethical-aesthetic ‘delirium’ within the flows of vitalist matter. For them, there can be nothing particularly special about the mundane activities of Net users who aren’t producing fashionable theory-art. Yet, at this particular historical moment, market competition is disappearing for entirely pragmatic reasons. While commodified information is closed and fixed, digital gifts are open and changeable. Instead of fixed divisions between producers and consumers, users are simultaneously creators on the Net. Obsessed with immanence of semiotic flows, the Deleuzoguattarians cannot appreciate the deep irony of this contingent moment in human history. This is the point in time when the old faith in the inevitable triumph of communism has completely lost all credibility. Yet, at this very moment, market competition is quietly ‘withering away’ within cyberspace.

    Over the past few centuries, people within the industrialised countries have slowly improved their incomes and reduced their hours of work. Although still having little autonomy in their money-earning jobs, workers can now experience non-alienated labour within the hi-tech gift economy. From writing emails through making web sites to developing software, people do things for themselves without the direct mediation of the market and the state. As Net access spreads, the majority of the population are beginning to participate within cultural production. Unlike Fréquence Libre, the avant-garde can no longer decide who can – and cannot – join the hi-tech gift economy. The Net is too large for Microsoft to monopolise let alone a small elite of radical intellectuals. Art can therefore cease being the symbol of moral superiority. When working people finally have enough time and resources, they can then concentrate upon “…art, love, play, etc., etc.; in short, everything which makes Man [and Woman] happy. “ [36]

    At such a historical moment, the European avant-garde is being made obsolete through the realisation of its own supposed principles. The techno-nomads celebrate digital DIY culture to distinguish themselves from the rest of society. Yet, far from being confined to a revolutionary minority, increasing numbers of ordinary people are now participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Rather than symbolising ethical-aesthetic purity, the circulation of gifts is a pragmatic way of working within cyberspace. Although it is impossible to predict the future of the hi-tech gift economy, one thing is almost certain. The intellectual elitism of Deleuzoguattarian discourse is being superseded by the emancipatory ‘grand narrative’ of modernity. As more and more ‘herd animals’ go on-line, radical intellectuals can no longer fantasise about becoming cyborg Supermen. As digital anarcho-communism becomes an everyday activity, there is no longer any need for the leadership of the cultural avant-garde. The time for the revolution of holy fools has passed. As has already happened within popular music, the most innovative and experimental culture will be created by people doing things for themselves. By participating within the hi-tech gift-economy, everyone can potentially become a wise citizen and a creative worker.

    “…the word ‘creation’ will no longer be restricted to works of art but will signify a self-conscious activity, self-conceiving, reproducing for its own terms…and its own reality (body, desire, time, space), being its own creation.” [37]

    Footnotes

    [1] Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, Pan, London 1947.

    [2] See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    [3] A TJ is a ‘theory-jockey’: Amsterdam slang for intellectuals who cut ‘n’ mix philosophies like DJs in a club.

    [4] DIY stands for ‘do-it-yourself’. See Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle (ed.), Gathering Force: DIY culture – radical action for those tired of waiting, Big Issue, London 1997.

    [5] See the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section on Rhizome (was www.rhizome.com, now www.rhizome.org)

    [6] “May ‘68 was a demonstration, an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state… Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.” Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, Negotiations: 1972-1990, Columbia University Press, New York 1995.

    [7] Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, Black & Red, Detroit 1975.

    [8] See Félix Guattari, Molecular Revolution: psychiatry and politics, Penguin, London 1994.

    [9] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia, Athlone Press, London 1988.

    [10] Alfred Douglas, The Tarot. This Gnostic vision of human freedom is remarkably close to the liberating role of insanity championed by the two philosophers.

    [11] See Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, New Formations, Number 8.

    [12] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’ in Pascal Defrance (ed.), De la Necessité Socio-culturelles de l’Existence de Radios Libres Indépendantes; and his introduction to Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre (translated in Molecular Revolution: psychiatry and politics).

    [13] Jean-Paul Simard, Interview with Author, Fréquence Libre, April 1985; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM: la folle histoire des radios libres, Grasset, Paris, 1986.

    [14] The vanguard was a military term used for the advance guard who opened up the path for the main army. Applied to politics, this phrase emphasised the leadership role of radical intellectuals within revolutionary organisations.

    [15] For a critique of New Left vanguardism, see Jo Freeman, ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’ in CS (ed.), Untying the Knot: feminism, anarchism & organisation, Dark Star/Rebel Press, London 1984.

    [16] See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?: burning questions of our movement, Foreign Language Press, Beijing 1975; and Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, Merlin, London 1968.

    [17] See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, New Left Books, London 1971.

    [18] Above all, anarcho-communism was seen as the heir of those Left Communists who had fought for direct democracy organised through the Soviets against the dictatorship of the Leninist party. See Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks & Workers’ Control: 1917-1921, Solidarity, London 1970; and Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Uprising 1921, Solidarity, London 1967.

    [19] See Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity. Of course, a much diluted variant of this attack on oppressive ‘grand narratives’ later formed the ideological basis for the self-styled post-modernists.

    [20] In classic New Left films like Weekend and Themroc, rebellion against a repressive and alienating urban society was symbolically represented through a return to primitive simplicity. Curiously, both films portrayed cannibalism as the ultimate expression of liberation from bourgeois morality!

    [21] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.

    [22] Apart from its emphasis on peasants rather than nomads, Khmer Rouge ideology was very similar to the anti-modernism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari. See Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982, Allen and Unwin, Hemel Hempstead 1984.

    [23] In contrast, most of their contemporaries gravitated towards either electoral politics or post-modern nihilism. See Jean-Pierre Garnier and Roland Lew, ‘From The Wretched Of The Earth To The Defence Of The West: an essay on Left disenchantment in France’, Socialist Register 1984: the uses of anti-communism, Merlin, London 1984.

    [24] From 1930 to 1933, the Surrealists’ journal was called Le Surréalisme au service de la révolution. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red: the politics of surrealism, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1990.

    [25] According to Nietzsche, the culturally impoverished masses were ‘herd animals’ compared to the ‘eagles’ of the artistic world.

    [26] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Vintage, New York 1968. Deleuze commended Nietzsche for the ‘positive task’ of inventing the reactionary concept of the Superman.

    [27] See Ken Knabb (ed.), Situationist International Anthology, Bureau of Public Secrets, California 1981.

    [28] See Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, Practical Paradise, London 1972. The Situationists discovered the tribal gift economy in Marcel Mauss, The Gift.

    [29] See Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’ in Barry Barnes and David Edge, Science in Context: readings in the sociology of science, The Open University, Milton Keynes 1982.

    [30] See Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets: an economic model for the trade in free goods and services on the Internet’.

    [31] See Keith W. Porterfield, ‘Information Wants to be Valuable: a report from the first O’Reilly Perl conference’.

    [32] See Eric C. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’.

    [33] See Netscape Communications Corporation, ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’.

    [34] Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’.

    [35] Wired uses ‘The New Economy’ as a synonym for its neo-liberal fantasies about the digital future.

    [36] Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY 1969.

    [37] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick NJ 1984.

  • THE HOLY FOOLS (LONG MIX) by Richard Barbrook

    THE HOLY FOOLS

    a critique of the avant-garde
    in the age of the Net

    1: The Lost Utopia

    The Net is haunted by the disappointed hopes of the Sixties. Because this new technology symbolises another period of rapid change, many contemporary commentators look back to the stalled revolution of thirty years ago to explain what is happening now. For instance, the editors of Wired continually pay homage to the New Left values of individual freedom and cultural dissent in their coverage of the Net. Yet, these old hippies no longer believe in political rebellion and collective provision. Instead, in their Californian ideology, they now claim that their youthful ideals will be realised through technological determinism and free markets. The politics of ecstasy have been replaced by the economics of greed. [1]

    Within Europe, it is much more difficult to pull off the Californian scam of camouflaging New Right policies for the Net underneath New Left rhetoric. A long history of class-based politics and compulsive theorising makes such ideological chicanery seem much more implausible. Even post-modernists are much more attracted to pessimism and nihilism than to the reactionary modernism underpinning the Californian ideology. [2] However, this does not mean that Europeans are immune from embracing digital elitism in the name of Sixties libertarianism. Ironically, this bizarre union of opposites is most evident in the writings on the Net by avant-garde intellectuals inspired by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

    Although these two philosophers were overt leftists during their lifetimes, many of their contemporary followers support a form of aristocratic anarchism which is eerily similar to that promoted by Californian neo-liberals. The European avant-garde is rediscovering its elitist traditions through the cult of Deleuze and Guattari. By doing so, the Deleuzoguattarians haven’t just unwittingly exposed the fatal weaknesses within what appears to be an impeccably emancipatory analysis of the Net. Trapped within the precepts of their sacred creed, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari can’t even grasp why the spread of the Net really is such a subversive phenomenon.

    Inside the universities, alternative culture and the art world, the popularity of Deleuze and Guattari is the philosophical equivalent of current nostalgia for Sixties pop music. At the end of the century, the superficiality and detachment of post-modernism are no longer fashionable among radical intellectuals. However, because the Soviet Union has collapsed, the European avant-garde cannot return to its traditional obsession with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Instead, contemporary activists, academics and artists look back to the libertarian spontaneity of the revolutionary Sixties. Just like pop musicians, TJs use samples from this heroic decade to prove their radical credentials. [3] At the peak of the Sixties revolutionary wave, it appeared that old structures were disintegrating and collective subjectivity was about to be realised. During a brief moment, the continent seemed to be on the verge of fundamental social transformation.

    ‘The movement [of May ’68] was a rediscovery of collective and individual history, an awareness of the possibility of intervening in history, an awareness of participating in an irreversible event…It was a generalised critique of all alienations, all ideologies and of the entire organisation of real life…’ [4]

    The great change never happened. Despite marches, strikes, riots, occupations and terrorism, the system was able to defeat the challenge from the New Left. During the Eighties and Nineties, even the social gains of the post-war settlement were being rolled back by triumphant capitalism. Yet, after decades of reactionary rule, the folk memory of May ’68 still remains an inspiration for the present. While ‘really existing socialism’ has imploded, the democratic ways of working, cultural experimentation and emancipatory lifestyles initiated in the Sixties have survived – and even flourished – into the harder times of the Nineties. From raves to environmental protests, the spirit of May ’68 lives on within the DIY culture. [5] Deprived of Leninism, contemporary European intellectuals wishing to revive the revolutionary traditions of the avant-garde are drawn to this legacy of the New Left. However, unlike their hippie mentors, these academics, artists and activists realise that the overthrow of capitalism is not imminent. Apparently unrealisable in practice, social transformation must be turned into theoretical poetry: a revolutionary dreamtime for the imagination.

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is a prime example of this aesthetisation of Sixties radicalism. Their most famous book – A Thousand Plateaus – is a weird pot-pourri of anarchism, therapy, mysticism, art theory, musicology, bizarre science, imaginary history and drug references. Rejecting reasoned sociological arguments, Deleuze and Guattari created free association meditations written in their own inimitable language. As they explained in its opening pages: ‘a book…is a multiplicity – but we don’t know yet what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, after it has been elevated to the status of a substantive.’ [6]

    Despite this warning from its authors, A Thousand Plateaus has become a sacred text: the Kabbala of the techno-generation. This book provides the buzzwords and concepts for a specifically European understanding of the Net. It is the default setting for discussions on nettime and other on-line political-artistic forums. [7] Precisely because it comes from Europe, Deleuzoguattarian theory is now fashionable from New York to Tokyo. On the West Coast, Kevin Kelly and other Wired writers also use an eclectic mix of hippie rhetoric, weird science and pop culture to create the Californian ideology. [8] However, their hard-line neo-liberalism is irrelevant to most European intellectuals – and their imitators overseas. Instead of seeing the Net primarily as a business opportunity, avant-garde academics, artists and activists are much more excited by the cultural possibilities of new technologies. This is not just a reflection of the relative weakness of the European computer industry. For over two decades, a vibrant techno-culture has been developing across the continent. Pioneered by computer-generated dance music, this digital aesthetic now embraces fashion, art, graphic design, publishing and video games. When it emerged in Europe, the Net was not surprisingly pioneered by this already flourishing techno-culture. [9]

    The conservative politics and culture of Wired could never provide a credible explanation of what was happening within this alternative scene. Looking for another approach, TJs have rediscovered the writings of Deleuze and Guattari. [10] Apparently free from the taint of both Leninism and neo-liberalism, these two philosophers seem to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the subversive potential of the Net. While all that remains of hippie ideals in Wired is its psychedelic layout, European cyber-enthusiasts – and their imitators – can still champion the lost utopia of May ’68 by using the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari. The revolution will be digitalised. [11]

    2: Techno-Nomads@Rhizome.Net

    A Thousand Plateaus has achieved such a cult status within the on-line community because Sixties radicalism did fundamentally shape the Net. Despite being funded by the US military, many of its most important aspects came from the hippie counter-culture. Above all, most Net users expect neither to pay for items downloaded nor to be paid for others accessing their sites. This DIY ethic was partially inspired by the New Left. Campaigning against the American invasion of Vietnam, the Yippie movement advocated not paying for any goods or services provided by corporations profiting from the war. Among activists involved in developing the early computer networks, this subversive attitude was expressed in the famous hacker slogan: ‘information wants to be free.’ [12] Although now threatened by state censorship and colonised by commercial interests, the content of the Net is still mainly produced through spontaneous collaboration between autonomous individuals within a hi-tech gift economy. People freely swap articles, music, software, pictures and any other form of intellectual labour which can be digitally recorded. On websites, on-line conferences, listservers, newsgroups and other virtual spaces, they can play, learn and work together outside the control of both state and market. [13]

    Unable to comprehend any form of human sociability except money-commodity relations, the Californian ideology is completely useless for explaining why the hi-tech gift economy is such a fundamental aspect of cyberspace. In contrast, A Thousand Plateaus does seem to provide a credible alternative analysis of the Net. This book contains theoretical metaphors which illustrate how much of the Net’s content is produced without monetary incentives. It even has concepts which can be used to describe some of the more bizarre aspects of on-line culture, such as cybersex. Above all, this sacred text allows the European avant-garde of the late-Nineties to live within a revolutionary dreamtime inspired by the rebellious Sixties.

    For the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari, the rhizome is the key concept found within A Thousand Plateaus. As a metaphor derived from plant roots, this phrase captures how cyberspace is organised as an open-ended, non-hierarchical, spontaneous and horizontal network. Not surprisingly, rhizome has been adopted a shorthand term for websites, listservers, IRC channels, bulletin boards, MOOs and other on-line conferences where people can come together inside the Net without needing the direct mediation of money. [14] One hip New York list server and web site has even adopted Rhizome as its name. [15] According to the Deleuzoguattarians, these non-commodified Net spaces are digital versions of other ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’ liberated by DIY activists, such as squats, pirate radios, illegal raves and environmental protest camps. [16] Far from being the apotheosis of market competition, the Net is seen as heralding a new stage of human civilisation founded on rhizomic collaboration. [17]

    The adepts of A Thousand Plateaus believe that the most utopian demands of May ’68 are about to be realised within cyberspace. Social movements will be able to organise themselves freely using the Net’s decentralised structure. [18] Cyber-feminists will use digital technologies to transcend patriarchal oppression. [19] Community media will be able to distribute their output without fear of censorship or other restrictions. [20] The limitations of representative democracy will be overcome through the creation of the ‘virtual agora’ – a real-time direct democracy made possible through mass participation in social decision-making using the Net. [21] As nations disappear and hierarchies collapse, Sixties radicalism will finally realised within cyberspace.

    The appeal of A Thousand Plateaus lies in more than its poetic recapitulation of New Left communal utopias. In their holy book, Deleuze and Guattari also propagated the myth of the nomad to celebrate hippie tribalism. During the Sixties, many revolutionaries thought that rejecting the dull routines of everyday life was the most effective method of undermining corporate capitalism. Rather than becoming docile workers and contented consumers, ‘…the children of the ants are all going to be tribal people…’ [22] From crusties to cyberpunks, contemporary youth subcultures still retain this hippie belief in the redemptive power of bohemian lifestyles. European avant-garde intellectuals are particularly attracted by the nomadic version of this tradition. Being relatively privileged, they already enjoy greater mobility as employees and as tourists than most of the population of the continent. These academics, artists and activists are making business and forming friendships at conferences, openings, festivals, exhibitions and parties held across the continent and beyond. Now, in their imaginations, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari can even be in motion when sitting in front of their computer screens. They are the ‘hunter-gatherers of CommTech’ – a cyber-tribe who follow the ‘flows’ across the open spaces of the virtual world. [23] Within the rhizomes of the Net, the Deleuzoguattarians are forming their own youth subculture: the techno-nomads. [24]

    There is an eccentric flakiness in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings which fits well with the mood of the times. As in the Sixties, alternative culture has a simultaneous – and contradictory – fascination with mystical beliefs, such as New Age and UFO cults, and with scientific advances, such as quantum physics and genetic manipulation. Among the Californian ideologues, this strange combination of spiritual irrationalism and technical rationalism has been used to justify their neo-liberal analysis of the Net. Using A Thousand Plateaus, TJs have mixed a European version of mystical positivism as wacky as anything found on the West Coast. [25]

    For instance, on-line dating isn’t simply a fun way of meeting new partners and trying to find romance. Someone who talks about sex on an IRC channel or in a MOO is supposedly transformed into a Body-without-Organs – an erotic mind freed by digital technologies from the restrictions of the flesh. [26] According to Pierre Lévy, the Net is forming a ‘collective intelligence’ out of our individual minds – a notion derived by combining neo-Platonist Islamic theology with chaos theory and quantum mechanics. [27] For both Manuel De Landa and Sadie Plant, the self-organising tendencies of the Net are derived from a process of chaotic ’emergence’ which determines everything from hurricanes through living organisms to computer systems. [28] However, even these forms of mystical positivism are not irrational enough for Hakim Bey. Promoting his own incoherent mix of Sufism, acid, anarchism and cyberpunk, this guru openly denounces: ‘…all born-again knee jerk atheists & their frowsy late-Victorian luggage of scientistic vulgar materialism…’ [29]

    The disciples of A Thousand Plateaus are the contemporary version of the European avant-garde. D&G now symbolises more than just Dolce & Gabbana. United by certain ‘signifying practices’, they form an intellectual version of the youth subcultures studied by many of them on Cultural Studies courses. [30] The techno-nomads love computer technologies, they’re fans of techno music, they’re excited by bizarre science, they’re sympathetic to esoteric beliefs, they’re part of the chemical generation and they adore cyberpunk novels. There even is a distinctive Deleuzoguattarian language which is almost incomprehensible to the uninitiated. [31] Above all, the techno-nomads possess a radical optimism about the future of the Net. Intoxicated by reading too much Deleuze and Guattari, these TJs are confident of being able to intervene within cyberspace to maximise its emancipatory social and cultural potential. The development of the Net won’t just undermine the power of the state, but also create a whole new libertarian way of living. The wired future is there for the taking…

    ‘What we want to do is what we can do: cut new channels, create new temporary autonomous zones, defuse cathecting power. More than any other writers, [Deleuze and Guattari] …have developed a coherent set of conceptual tools that help us understand our situation and act upon it.’ [32]

    3: The Politics of May ’68

    As the European universities and art world have long been dominated by French formalist philosophy, it is not entirely surprising that avant-garde intellectuals interested in the Net have elevated A Thousand Plateaus into a cult text. Since Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard and Virilio are no longer the latest thing, they have proclaimed Deleuze and Guattari as the philosophers of the moment. Although sometimes included within the inner circle of French post-structuralism, these two thinkers were until recently considered far too radical to receive official artistic or academic recognition. [33] However, in this current period of rapid social change symbolised by the Net, the subversive ideas contained within their writings now add to their fashionable appeal. The cynicism and detachment of the post-modernists was Eighties style. The techno-nomads need a more passionate approach for the end of the Nineties. Although they’re both dead, Deleuze and Guattari have become the philosophers of the cyber-millennium.

    Far from deterring an audience educated in structuralism, the hermetic language and tortured syntax used within A Thousand Plateaus are seen as proofs of its analytical brilliance. Yet this idiosyncratic Deleuzoguattarian discourse has caused as much confusion as elucidation among their followers. Although the sacred texts are obviously inspired by Sixties radicalism, most of the techno-nomads seem blissfully unaware of what exactly are the theoretical and practical implications of its New Left politics. For instance, the Rhizome website blandly announces that: ‘rhizome is…a figurative term…to describe non-hierarchical networks of all kinds.’ [34] However, at no point does this web site explain either the political meaning of this peculiar concept or how its principles might be applied within the Net. On the contrary, rhizome is simply a hip European phrase borrowed to celebrate the disorganised nature of the New York cyber-arts scene. Some disciples have become even more befuddled by the strange rhetoric of A Thousand Plateaus. For example, Hari Kunzru claims that Deleuze and Guattari are on the same side as the Californian ideologues in the ‘libertarian-communitarian opposition’ within debates about the Net. Just like Wired, these two philosophers are supposedly champions of the ’emergent properties’ of individual initiative against the evils of state domination. [35]

    Such confusion is partially the consequence of political naiveté among many followers of Deleuze and Guattari. Because the two philosophers didn’t use stilted left-wing jargon, most of their followers have avoided understanding the specific political position which informs A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Yet, Deleuze and Guattari weren’t just advocates of avant-garde art – and were certainly never apologists for neo-liberalism. Above all, these two gurus were ‘soixante-huitards’: supporters of the May ’68 revolution. [36] During their lifetimes, they were both participated with high-profile New Left initiatives. Deleuze was actively involved in the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons – the anti-prisons movement led by Michel Foucault. Guattari was the leader of most influential community radio organisation in France. [37] Although it has confused their disciples, Deleuze and Guattari’s idiosyncratic discourse was inspired by their participation in these New Left campaigns. According to the two philosophers, the problem with the ‘wooden language’ of Leninism was that its lack of radicalism not its revolutionary aspirations. [38] In its place, they composed theoretical poetry to express the new subversive practices which developed following the May ’68 uprising against capitalism. Far from supporting Californian neo-liberalism, Deleuze and Guattari actually championed the most revolutionary form of New Left politics: anarcho-communism.

    Like other members of their generation, Deleuze and Guattari wanted to escape from the rigid orthodoxies of Stalinism which had dominated the French Left since the rise of fascism. [39] Trying to find a radical alternative, they took their inspiration from an eclectic range of sources. Along with other young militants, the two philosophers participated in the rediscovery of revolutionary ideologies which had been discarded by their elders, such as anarchism, Trotskyism, Surrealism, council communism and Freudo-Marxism. [40] At the same time, these philosophers also drew on the new ideas and practices which were emerging from the ferment of the New Left, such as Maoism, structuralism, Situationism, urban terrorism, feminism, pacifism, gay rights, community media, psychedelic culture and the anti-psychiatry movement. Despite the profound contradictions between them, all these different currents were united in their disillusionment with the parliamentary parties and trade unions of the mainstream European Left. [41]

    For Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was the most radical expression of New Left politics. As its name suggests, anarcho-communism stood for the destruction of both state power and market capitalism. After bureaucracy and money were abolished, society would be reorganised as a direct democracy and as a gift economy. Initially, anarcho-communists had believed that their utopia would be formed by workers’ councils based in the factories. But, after May ’68, they increasingly identified direct democracy and the gift economy with the social movements and community media created by New Left activists. [42]

    The appeal of anarcho-communism did not only derive from its abstract theory, but also from its concrete practice. During the Sixties, anarcho-communists led the search for radical solutions to the historically novel problems facing young people. Because of the struggle against fascism and the development of Fordism, the babyboomer generation grew up in a period when the Left in Western Europe was dominated by Stalinist and Social Democratic parties. Although divided by the Cold War, both movements prioritised representative politics and economic growth over more radical concepts of human liberation. However, with the arrival of consumer society, the policy of unrestricted modernisation appeared to have reached its limits. Once almost everyone had annual rises in income and mass unemployment had disappeared, the problems of everyday life took on increasing importance, such as restraints on sexual and cultural freedom.

    Above all, many people now wanted a say in the decisions which effected them. They were no longer willing to accept leadership from above without some form of dialogue. Responding to these historically specific circumstances, young militants rediscovered and updated anarcho-communism not just as a theory, but also as a practice. Unlike their parents’ parliamentary parties and trade unions, the New Left could articulate their contemporaries’ demands for more participation. Within the universities, factories, offices and cultural life, young people were no longer content to have others deciding their lives for them in return for the commodities of consumer society. Instead, they wanted to do things for themselves.

    ‘[Anarcho-]communism is not a new mode of production; it the affirmation of a new community. It is a question of being, of life…men and women…will not gain mastery over production, but will create new relations among themselves which will determine an entirely different activity.’ [43]

    4: The Romance of ‘Schizo-Politics’

    In their writings, the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari are invoking this revolutionary spirit of May ’68 to celebrate the libertarian aspects of the Net. Opposed to censorship or commercialisation within cyberspace, they instinctively seize on rhizomes, nomads and Body-without-Organs to attack their statist and capitalist enemies. Bored by the political apathy of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are excited by the subversive attitudes of their two gurus. However, the current aestheticisation of Sixties radicalism makes it difficult to understand the particular political position underpinning Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Because of their idiosyncratic language, the origins of their politics in the historically specific circumstances facing the New Left thirty years ago have been obscured. Yet, when read with knowledge of this past, the free association theoretical poetry of A Thousand Plateaus does reveal its rigid political line: anarcho-communism.

    Like the traditional Left, Deleuze and Guattari also believed that modern society was the culmination of thousands of years of social conflict. However, the two philosophers rejected the policies for economic modernisation championed by both the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties. Growing up during the post-war boom, they thought that poverty and unemployment were no longer urgent social problems. Along with other anarcho-communists, Deleuze and Guattari didn’t just think that this strategy was a betrayal of the revolutionary heritage of the Left. Above all, they claimed that the reformism of the parliamentary parties had become ‘a historical absurdity’ after May ’68. [44]

    While the mainstream Left still sought political power, the Deleuze and Guattari denounced the state itself as the source of all oppression. According to their foundation myth, the state and its allies had been using top-down tree-like structures to subjugate people ever since the dawn of agrarian civilisation. [45] Described as a process of ‘territorialisation’, they claimed that the media, psychoanalysis and language were the primary ‘machinic assemblages’ used by the state to control everyday life in the modern world. [46] For Deleuze and Guattari, economics was only one manifestation of the state’s primordial will to dominate all human activity. [47]

    Facing the transhistorical enemy of the state was a new opponent: the social movements. Both Stalinists and Social Democrats believed that the organised working class was the principle enemy of capitalism. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari thought that this traditional style of left-wing politics was now obsolete. As part of the ‘guaranteed’ sector of the economy, private and public sector workers not only had been bought off by the system, but also had their desires manipulated by the family, the media, the dominant language and psychoanalysis. [48] Like much of the post-’68 New Left, the two philosophers instead looked to the new social movements of youth, feminists, ecologists, homosexuals and immigrants to ‘deterritorialise’ the power of the state. Forming the ‘non-guaranteed’ sector, people in these movements were excluded from the system and were therefore supposedly eager to fight for the revolution. [49]

    While the parliamentary Left wanted to unite all workers around common concerns which could be satisfied through reforms, Deleuze and Guattari advocated a ‘micro-politics of desire’ which resisted such homogenisation of individual needs by the state and its left-wing allies. [50] In A Thousand Plateaus, the nomads poetically symbolised the ‘molecular’ groups who were making this anarcho-communist revolution against the ‘molar’ tyranny of political power. Echoing the hippie fascination with American Indians, the two philosophers claimed that nomadic tribes had prefigured the small-scale and non-hierarchical organisations of the social movements. Far from trying to seize political power, nomads used their mobility to avoid the ‘territorialised’ control of the authoritarian state. [51] Inspired this example, the social movements should therefore reject all attempts to unify them behind the programmes for legislative reforms proposed by the Stalinist and Social Democratic parties. Instead, they should form a multiplicity of tribes which were autonomous from all centralising and hierarchical tendencies, especially those supported by the mainstream Left. [52]

    Like other members of the New Left, Deleuze and Guattari advocated the replacement of the state by direct democracy. However, because they distrusted the organised working class, the abolition of political power was no longer to be achieved through the rule of the factory councils. Instead, the two philosophers believed that the bottom-up organisations of the social movements should supersede the top-down authority of the state. In A Thousand Plateaus, the rhizome therefore acted as a poetic metaphor for this updated vision of direct democracy. Along the ‘lines of flight’ mapped out by the New Left, the oppressed would escape from the control of the authoritarian state into autonomous rhizomes formed by the social movements. While the parliamentary Left was still committed to its arboreal, top-down organisations, the New Left was creating rhizomic, bottom-up movements which prefigured the anarcho-communist future. [53]

    ‘To…centred systems, the authors contrast acentred systems, finite networks of automata in which communication runs from any neighbourhood to any other, the stems and channels do not pre-exist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their situation at a given moment – such that the local operations are co-ordinated and the final global result synchronised without a central agency.’ [54]

    According to Deleuze and Guattari, the overthrow of political power was only the beginning of the anarcho-communist revolution. As ultra-leftists, they didn’t just want to replace one type of social organisation with another more sophisticated form. Above all, they sought to create a fully libertarian way of living. Consequently, these two philosophers advocated the destruction of not only the state and the market, but also the family, the media, the dominant language and the asylum. The only truly free individuals were those who had freed themselves from the ‘common sense’ rationality of bourgeois society. In their critique of official psychiatry, the ‘delirium’ of schizophrenics was something to be celebrated rather than cured. Escaping from their oppressive lives under capitalism, the insane expressed their desires at an intensity which went beyond the social limitations imposed by conventional language. [55] Crucially, this meant that anarcho-communism could no longer be expressed through rational arguments used by the mainstream Left. Because language itself was a form of social domination, ‘schizo-politics’ had to be proclaimed through the ‘delirium’ of theoretical poetry. [56]

    According to Deleuze and Guattari, political domination was only made possible through personal repression. The anarcho-communist revolution therefore had to liberate the libidinal energies of people from all forms of social control. The individual ‘delirium’ of schizophrenics prefigured the chaotic spirit of collective revolution. [57] This meant that radicals not only had to detonate a social uprising, but also personally live out the cultural revolution. The New Left revolutionary was symbolised as the Body-without-Organs: a person whose spontaneous desires were no longer ‘organised, signified, subjected’ by the rationality of the state. [58] Such individuals were forerunners of the new type of human being who would emerge after the anarcho-communist revolution. Liberated from the repressive culture of the old order, this post-revolutionary person would be the New Left equivalent of Nietzsche’s Superman: a sovereign individual who could constantly ‘… create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active.’ [59] For Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was therefore not just the realisation of direct democracy and the gift economy. In their ‘schizo-politics’, the revolution had to include the destruction of bourgeois rationality so each individual could become a holy fool.

    ‘[The Fool]…is the vagabond who exists on the fringe of organised society, going his own way, ignoring the rules and taboos with which men seek to contain him. He is the madman who carries within him the seeds of genius, the one who is despised by society yet who is the catalyst who will transform that society.’ [60]

    5: The Moment of Radio Alice

    After two decades of domination by neo-liberalism, it is not surprising that the followers of Deleuze and Guattari don’t wish to ‘come out’ as anarcho-communists. It is much easier to transform the two philosophers’ theoretical poetry into a revolutionary dreamtime about the Net. However, this fear of being overtly anarcho-communist has led to a curious – and revealing – omission among the exuberant writings of Deleuze and Guattari’s disciples. Although they eagerly adapt the poetical metaphors of A Thousand Plateaus to praise the Net, the techno-nomads almost never mention the enthusiasm of one of their holy prophets’ for the emancipatory potential of computer-mediated communications.

    For, as well as being a philosopher and a psychoanalyst, Guattari was also a prominent community media activist. From the mid-Eighties onwards, he became one of the main proponents of the use of computer networks by the new social movements. Over a decade before the Net became popular in the USA, the French government had set up the world’s first public access computer network: Minitel. [61] Guattari thought that this proto-Net was a harbinger of a new ‘post-media’ civilisation. In his philosophical writings with Deleuze, the media had always been condemned for imposing capitalist subjectivity on people. In particular, Guattari detested television as a ‘hypnotic drug’ which stupefied its audience and cut them off from their fellow humans. [62] However, he believed that the domination of the mass media was almost over. Using a Minitel bulletin board, group Eros – an anti-psychiatry organisation – was already pioneering new interactive forms of communications among its members. [63] Following this example, other social movements would soon be forming their own ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’ over the public computer network. [64] Instead of being brainwashed by a few television channels, people would then be able to participate within a multiplicity of information spaces. According to Guattari, the New Left was imminently going to replace top-down, homogenising media with bottom-up, rhizomic ‘post-media’. [65]

    Given the similarity of Guattari’s utopian vision of computer networks with their own, the absence of almost any mention of his enthusiasm for ‘post-media’ by the techno-nomads is indeed very strange. The reason must be found in their – conscious or unconscious – realisation that an examination of Guattari’s involvement within community media would reveal why their favourite philosophical duo do not really provide ‘a coherent set of conceptual tools’ for understanding the Net. This is because Guattari’s enthusiasm for media experiments by social movements was nothing new. In the late-Seventies and early-Eighties, he was a prominent guru of the community radio movement in both Italy and France. However, when the abstractions of the holy prophets were put into practice, they had disastrous consequences. This is why the techno-nomads have so far studiously avoided mentioning Guattari’s own writings about the impact of computer networks. Once these became known, it would be inevitable that people would then look for their origins in the embarrassing history of the application of Guattari’s theory as practice within the community radio movement. Crucially, it is this anarcho-communist adventure within community radio which – paradoxically – provides the answer to why the disciples of Deleuze and Guattari have developed such a curious affinity with the neo-liberal ideology of Wired.

    Like many other innovations of the New Left, the community radio movement began on the West Coast of the USA. The protests against the American invasion of Vietnam didn’t just politically radicalise a generation, but also popularised the hippie counter-culture. Alongside conventional political activism such as marches, election campaigns and sit-ins, young militants showed their opposition to the murderous policies of the US government in South-East Asia by rejecting the puritanical lifestyle of their parents. This fusion of political and cultural radicalism found its clearest expression in the alternative media. Utilising the latest technologies, hippies created many different forms of counter-cultural expression from underground newspapers to rock bands. [66]

    The development of community radio broadcasting was an integral part of this cultural revolution against the American military-industrial complex. As with many other New Left initiatives of the time, community radio stations were organised in ways which supposedly prefigured the anarcho-communist future. For example, stations democratically elected their managements and all important tasks were rotated among their workers. At the same time, the community radio stations were committed to breaking down the separation between programme-makers and their audience. For instance, stations refused to accept advertising and instead relied on donations from the listeners. In place of money-commodity relations, community stations were run as gift economies. Above all, New Left media activists wanted members of the audience to make radio programmes about their own concerns. By encouraging two-way communications over the airwaves, these hippie radicals believed that community radio stations were creating a truly democratic form of media within the USA. [67]

    Across in Europe, young militants were quick to learn from their American contemporaries. The May ’68 French revolution had catalysed a wave of New Left activism across the continent. In particular, Italy was convulsed by increasingly violent protests against the corrupt rule of the conservative Christian Democrats and their clerical allies. However the mainstream Left could not benefit from this popular desire for change. Because of the Cold War, the Italian Communist Party was blocked from coming to power at a national level and was therefore forced into an implicit acceptance of the status quo. [68] With electoral politics frozen, many young people embraced New Left positions. Rejecting existing party and union structures, they not only organised wildcat strikes and sabotage within the universities and the factories, but also created new social movements of feminists, youth, ecologists, lesbian & gays and other minorities. These hippie radicals sparked off a cultural revolution against the oppressive and patriarchal morality of the Catholic church. By the late-Seventies, the Italian New Left had successfully pioneered a exciting and innovative counter-culture which ranged from national newspapers to community theatres. [69]

    Félix Guattari was closely associated with this political and cultural ferment in Italy. Being a prominent New Left psychotherapist, he worked with the Italian anti-psychiatry movement. More importantly, he was proclaimed as the theoretical guru of the Italy’s most celebrated community station: Radio Alice. [70] For decades, the nationalised broadcasting company had been used to disseminate propaganda from the ruling Christian Democrats. Although they complained about political bias, the Left parties didn’t oppose the state’s monopoly over the airwaves. Instead, they campaigned for more ideological pluralism within the existing nationalised system. Just at the point where the opposing parties were edging towards a compromise, some New Left activists decided to undermine this emerging consensus by setting up their own unlicensed radio stations. When the police tried to close them down, these pirates challenged the legality of the state’s monopoly over the airwaves.

    Much to their delight, the Italian supreme court decided in 1975 that this situation was indeed a violation of the right of free speech guaranteed in the constitution. Following the collapse of the regulations against unlicensed broadcasting, thousands of ‘free radios’ were set up all across Italy. While most of these were commercial, about a fifth of these stations were run by New Left activists. Like their American counterparts, the radical ‘free radios’ not only elected their own administrators, but also encouraged listener participation in their broadcasts. From phone-ins to community programme-making, these stations allowed their audience to describe their own experiences in strikes or other social struggles. Refusing corporate advertising, they survived through gifts of time and money from their listeners. No longer hindered by the state, the Italian New Left had discovered how to propagate the cultural revolution over the airwaves. [71]

    Radio Alice was set up as a political ‘free radio’ in 1976. The station was based in Bologna whose reforming local authority was run by the Communist Party. Its name was an ironic reference to how the city was portrayed as a ‘wonderland’ in the party’s propaganda. [72] Like other radical stations, Radio Alice broadcast news about the social struggles led by the New Left and encouraged community groups to make their own programmes. [73] However, the provision of ‘counter-information’ was not the sole purpose of this station. According to Guattari, Radio Alice was replacing the corrupt system of representative democracy with an electronic form of direct democracy. Instead of having their views represented by politicians or other elected officials, people could now directly express their own opinions on the programmes of the community radio stations. Once the ‘immense permanent meeting’ over the airwaves was formed, Guattari claimed that the social movements would then successfully be able to ‘deterritorialise’ the hierarchical power of the state. Although initially limited to community radio stations, this electronic agora supposedly prefigured the imminent reorganisation of the whole of society around direct democracy after the anarcho-communist revolution. [74]

    ‘The social entity is enabled to speak for itself without being obliged to look to representatives or spokesmen to speak for it.’ [75]

    Even this ultra-left utopia didn’t go far enough for Guattari. The ultimate aim of Radio Alice was the subversion of bourgeois rationality and repressive sexuality within everyday life. When people were able to express their own views over the airwaves, Guattari hoped that the ‘delirium’ of libidinal desire would be released within the population. By encouraging ‘poetical-frenzied’ speech, the ‘free radio’ rhizomes would be laying the foundations for a truly libertarian way of living. [76] Not surprisingly, Radio Alice‘s commitment to converting the inhabitants of Bologna to ‘schizo-politics’ was not appreciated by the reformists at the city hall. When the station helped to organise a student rebellion in the centre of Bologna in 1977, the local Communist council finally had a legal excuse to shut down Radio Alice. The first experiment in Deleuzoguattarian community media was over. [77]

    ‘The police have destroyed Radio Alice – its activists have been hunted down, condemned, imprisoned, its premises have been ransacked – but its revolutionary work of deterritorialisation tirelessly carries on right into the nervous systems of its persecutors.’ [78]

    6: Guattari Goes Bankrupt

    Back at home, Radio Alice‘s dramatic martyrdom had turned Guattari into the putative leader of the ‘free radio’ movement in France. [79] As in Italy, the French electronic media was controlled by a state-owned broadcasting monopoly which shamelessly promoted the interests of the ruling conservative parties. However, like the Italian Communist party, the parliamentary Left in France initially didn’t support opening up the airwaves. On the contrary, they wanted the nationalised broadcasting corporation to be reformed along public service lines. [80] This impasse created an opportunity for direct action by New Left activists. In 1977, some Greens in Paris set up the first pirate radio station in France. Inspired by this example, many other groups started to experiment with unlicensed radio broadcasting. Despite state repression, soon almost every political movement in France had its own pirate station. Even François Mitterrand, the leader of the Socialist party, was busted for illegal radio broadcasting! [81]

    Although some pirates were commercial, most of the ‘free radios’ were run by New Left activists. Before the May ’68 revolution, the Situationists had advocated the replacement of ‘the society of the spectacle’ by the electronic agora. This ultra-left organisation believed that creating direct democracy within the media was the precondition for the victory of anarcho-communism across France. [82] For many members of the New Left, pirate radio broadcasting was the most effective and fun way of putting this revolutionary theory into practice. Instead of being represented by others, people could now express their own views over the airwaves and organise collectively to realise common goals. According to this analysis, ‘free radios’ were prefiguring the electronic agoras which would run society after the coming revolution.

    ‘Free radio has the effect of allowing people to be aware of the upheavals which are about to happen. But it is above all the proof that our fate is not determined and that citizens are able to be actors of these transformations rather than forever being (TV) spectators…’ [83]

    As in Italy, Félix Guattari was associated with one of the leading stations of the ‘free radio’ movement. Along with Gilles Deleuze and other New Left philosophers, he set up Radio 93 in Paris. Like Radio Alice, this radical pirate didn’t just broadcast news about revolutionary struggles and programmes made by community groups. Radio 93 was also committed to the ‘deterritorialisation’ of state power and the subversion of sexual-linguistic oppression. Although repeatedly raided, the fame of Guattari and his colleagues ensured that this radio project received considerable attention from the mainstream media. With all this coverage, Guattari soon became accepted as the ‘voice’ of the radical pirates. Crucially, his celebrity status allowed him to win support for his own particular theories about the media within the French ‘free radio’ movement. [84]

    When pirate radio broadcasting started, the lobbying campaign to open up the airwaves was led by pragmatic members of the Socialist party. Although involved with community radio stations, they were willing to form a tactical alliance with the advocates of commercial broadcasting to obtain licences from a conservative government. But, when this compromise was turned down by the ruling parties, their consensual strategy appeared to have failed. Radicalised by police repression, the surviving pirate radio stations moved towards the policies advocated by Guattari and his colleagues at Radio 93. Rejecting any collaboration with the commercial pirates, these ‘soixante-huitards’ argued that ‘free radios’ should concentrate on prefiguring anarcho-communism within their organisations. Above all, this meant that these stations had to refuse any funding from advertising. In order to consolidate this militant position, the radical pirates came together to form a new lobbying organisation: the Fédération Nationale des Radios Libres (FNRL). [85]

    According to Guattari, the principle task of the FNRL was to make clear the community radio movement’s opposition to ‘advertising pollution’. As the state’s monopoly crumbled, the philosopher feared that control would be reimposed over radio broadcasting by commercial organisations. Instead of electronic agoras flourishing within a gift economy, private corporations and their political allies would dominate the airwaves with ‘disco radios’ promoting the values of consumer society. The ‘free radios’ therefore had to maintain their anarcho-communist principles. In place of advertising, community radio stations had to be funded by donations of time and money from their audience. They could then exist within a gift economy rather than become dependent on the ‘territorialising’ forces of capitalism. For the FNRL, the refusal to take radio advertising became the main symbol of a pirate station’s radical credentials. A rhizomic ‘free radio’ could never compromise with arboreal powers from the commercial sector. [86]

    Yet, despite its New Left politics, the FNRL still welcomed the Socialist victory in the 1981 elections. Because Mitterrand himself had been arrested for radio piracy, the Fédération knew that the new government would rapidly open up the airwaves. When legislation was being prepared, the anarcho-communist FNRL ironically emerged as the principle advocate of tight state regulation over this new sector. Determined to prevent the commercialisation of radio broadcasting, the Fédération argued that only voluntary organisations should be granted licences and all on-air advertising should be banned. Despite warnings from more pragmatic ‘free radio’ activists, the FNRL managed to persuade the Socialist government to include these measures in its 1981 broadcasting law. According to this statute, the new stations could only be run by social movements and organised as gift economies. [87] As well as winning this victory, Guattari and his comrades were also granted one of the much coveted radio licences for Paris once they agreed to fuse their project with other New Left pirate stations. After years of struggle, they now controlled their own legal ‘free radio’: Fréquence Libre. [88]

    While many philosophers have theorised in a vacuum, Guattari now had an unrivalled opportunity to turn his and Deleuze’s abstractions into practice. Fréquence Libre had been granted a licence to broadcast to the millions of inhabitants of Paris. It had its own studios, support from leading members of the New Left and even a small subsidy from the government. This ‘free radio’ was a potential rhizome where social movements could make their own programmes, where the gift economy could be developed and where the ‘delirium’ of libidinal desire could be released. Yet it soon became obvious that turning theory into practice was much more difficult than Deleuze and Guattari had ever imagined. In February 1982, the first major survey was made into the popularity of the new local radio stations in Paris. According to its results, the most successful service was a pop music station with a weekly audience of over 500,000. In complete contrast, Fréquence Libre only had 30,000 listeners tuning in each week. [89] During the next three years, Guattari and his comrades were never able to reverse these disastrous results. By 1985, Fréquence Libre was still only 21st out of a total of 23 independent radio stations in Paris. The two stations below Guattari’s station in the ratings both broadcast in languages other than French! [90]

    According to Guattari, the electronic agora would be built through the participation of increasing numbers of people within community radio broadcasting. However, soon after Fréquence Libre was launched, it was obvious that only a minority of activists from the New Left were interested in making programmes for the station. Crucially, the sectarian politics of these militants actually discouraged other people – including many on the Left – from getting involved in this community radio station. For instance, leading Fréquence Libre presenters insisted on ‘talking the same way as in political meetings’ when they were on-air. [91] Despite the promise of community involvement, Guattari and his colleagues were more interested in lecturing the audience rather than engaging in discussions with them. Instead of encouraging the ‘delirium’ of desire, Fréquence Libre was often broadcasting in its own ultra-left version of Stalinist ‘wooden language’.

    This revolutionary elitism could even be found in the musical policies of the station. Although they were from the baby boomer generation, many New Left activists were hostile towards what they perceived as a mindless and consumerist pop culture. The FNRL habitually used ‘disco radio’ as a dismissive term for commercial broadcasting. So when some rappers approached Fréquence Libre about the possibility of making some programmes, the station’s leadership completely failed to realise why the emergence of this multi-racial style of music in the suburban ghettos of Paris was a major cultural event in France. Unable to appreciate the music, they refused to let any hip-hop crews on-air until their lyrics had been politically vetted! Although much of the station’s airtime was filled with the sounds of punk, reggae and other alternative rhythms, the New Left militants who ran Fréquence Libre never really understood the cultural importance of promoting innovative styles of popular music on their community radio station. [92]

    Although ‘free radios’ were theoretically committed to two-way communications among people, Fréquence Libre had in practice become the megaphone for the viewpoints of Guattari and his disciples. However, the station could not survive in the long-run depending on such a limited number of people. Committed to refusing all advertising, Fréquence Libre had to raise most of its income as gifts from its listeners. As well as help in kind, it needed a constant flow of money to pay for its premises, studios, transmitters and other running costs. The station also had to employ a few people to provide essential engineering, broadcasting and administrative support for its volunteer programme-makers. Out of political commitment, people did work for the station for nothing or for very low wages. However, as they acquired family responsibilities or discovered other interests, the first generation of activists slowly started to drift away. Because they’d alienated most of their potential audience, Guattari and his comrades soon discovered that they could neither raise sufficient cash nor recruit enough volunteers to operate the gift economy successfully within their ‘free radio’ station.

    Fréquence Libre now entered into a vicious circle of decline. Without more resources, the station couldn’t produce better programming. Without an interesting service, more listeners wouldn’t tune into the station. Without more listeners, the station didn’t receive enough donations of time and money to survive. Despite Guattari’s earlier optimism, the gift economy was no longer working at Fréquence Libre. Reluctantly, the station’s management eventually agreed to start raising money from advertising. But this compromise with economic reality had come far too late. Hardly anyone was interested in buying commercials on an anarcho-communist station with a tiny audience. In 1985, Fréquence Libre finally went bankrupt. To complete the humiliation, the station’s frequency had to be sold to a commercial radio network to pay off some of its debts. Guattari’s attempts to turn theory into practice within the ‘free radio’ movement had ended in tragedy. [93]

    ‘…the movement [was confined] within the old methods of militancy which came from ’68, while the radio phenomenon proved on the contrary that these were finished.’ [94]

    7: From Stalin to Pol Pot

    As Fréquence Libre headed towards bankruptcy, Guattari never admitted any responsibility for the disaster. Amazingly, he instead blamed the Mitterrand government for the collapse of the community radio movement in France. Despite being given a statute written to FNRL specifications, a Paris-wide licence and limited subsidies, the philosopher still claimed that the Socialists had deliberately destroyed the ‘free radios’ through the process of legalisation. Being outside the law, the pirate stations had never been forced to compromise with political and commercial interests. But, once the 1981 broadcasting law was passed, the revolutionary purity of the ‘free radios’ had been inevitably corrupted by the state and the market. Whatever the circumstances, DIY initiatives had to preserve their complete autonomy from the rest of society. At the moment of defeat, Guattari portrayed himself as the tragic romantic hero. His ambitious plans had been thwarted, but his revolutionary principles remained intact. By reasserting anarcho-communism in theory, the holy prophet avoided explaining why its application hadn’t worked in practice. [95]

    Yet, elsewhere in Europe and in the USA, community radio stations have managed to avoid going bankrupt. When not dominated by a small group of militants, DIY media projects can be much more tolerant and inclusive. As a consequence, community radio stations are able to recruit enough volunteers, produce popular programming and raise sufficient funding, including even from commercial sources. For instance, Radio Populare in Milan is not just financially viable, but also has been the most popular station in the city on several occasions. [96] However, the techno-nomads are not excited by these more successful – and less utopian – examples of community radio broadcasting. On the contrary, as avant-garde intellectuals, they are precisely attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Guattari. What they are looking for is a revolutionary dreamtime to project onto cyberspace rather than a practical method of extending access to the media.

    Above all, the techno-nomads are unable to realise the failure of Guattari’s ‘free radio’ experiment exposes the severe flaws within the theoretical positions championed by the two philosophers. Far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Fréquence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how the revolutionary rhetoric of Deleuze and Guattari hid some very reactionary concepts. Crucially, the tragic history of Fréquence Libre demonstrated that the two philosophers’ celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. Although formally committed to opening up the airwaves to the oppressed, Fréquence Libre collapsed because only a small minority of committed activists were actually allowed to become involved in the project.

    This elitism was no accident. It came directly from the existential situation faced by much of the baby boomer generation. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people experienced a pronounced ‘generation gap’ between themselves and their parents. As political rebels, New Left activists particularly felt that they had little in common with the rest of the population. This disillusionment extended to left-wing parties and unions which were nominally dedicated to overthrowing capitalism. Feeling so isolated, the ‘soixante-huitards’ not surprisingly valued intense commitment over popular support in their politics. Above all, they believed that society could be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. [97] This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority.

    The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. For over two hundred years, radical politics had been caught inside the contradiction between popular freedom and intellectual authority. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. [98] In the late-nineteenth century, Bakunin had called for a spontaneous uprising of the people directed by a secret conspiracy led by himself. [99] During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy by workers’ councils while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolshevik party. [100] As the experience of Fréquence Libre showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. While community groups were supposedly free to express themselves through the rhizomic ‘free radio’, the New Left vanguard really controlled who could – and could not – broadcast over the airwaves. As in other social movements, the lack of formal structures meant that Fréquence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. On the contrary, anarchy and spontaneity were the preconditions for unchecked domination by the intellectual elite. [101]

    ‘If the movement continues deliberately not to select who shall exercise power, it does not thereby abolish power. All it does is abdicate the right to demand that those who do exercise power and influence be [democratically] responsible for it.’ [102]

    In Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its ‘wooden language’, the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: ordinary people were incapable of determining their own destiny. According to Lenin, the mass of the population were trapped within a ‘false consciousness’ imposed by the media and other ideological institutions. [103] During the early-Sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party. According to his analysis, ideological domination was an inevitable feature of all societies because of its psychological origins in the unconsciousness. [104] For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, the majority of the population supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. [105]

    Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical poetry was therefore impregnated with Leninist assumptions. [106] Like other structuralists, they never accepted that ordinary people could make their own history without leadership from the intellectual vanguard. All theories celebrating individual and collective subjectivity were suspect because they assumed that the mass of the population could possess some form of ‘free will’. Instead, these philosophers claimed that semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ controlled the development of society, including the production of human subjectivity. [107] By adopting this analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only a minority of revolutionaries were capable of freeing themselves from ideological domination. Illuminated by the ‘holy idea’, the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses – without any formal consent from them – in the fight against capitalism. [108]

    ‘…the speculative notion of the domination of the speculative ideal in history [turns] into the notion of the domination of the speculative philosophers themselves.’ [109]

    This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. Yet, as demonstrated by the experience of Fréquence Libre, the philosophical duo did turn the elitist side of their theory into practice. The implosion of this ‘free radio’ was caused by the inability of Guattari and his comrades to expand its support beyond the New Left vanguard. As the rappers who wanted to make a show for their radio station discovered, the Deleuzoguattarian interpretation of anarcho-communism could even involve censoring musicians from the ghettos before allowing them on-air. Although it supposedly prefiguring direct democracy in its internal organisation, the principle role of Fréquence Libre was to propagate the beliefs of the intellectual elite among the unenlightened population of Paris. [110]

    For the mainstream Left, the only way out of this contradiction between participation and elitism was to abandon the concept of violent revolution altogether in favour of electoral reformism. [111] However, the New Left had emerged precisely to combat such parliamentary compromises. For young militants, the problem was how a committed minority could make a revolution without ending up with totalitarianism. Some of the New Left thought that the solution to this dilemma could be found in the heroic leftism of the early Bolsheviks. [112] In France, this Leninist revival often acquired an ‘orientalist’ flavour through the influence of Maoism. [113] For others, only anarcho-communism could express their desire to overthrow both political and economic oppression. [114] However, even this revolutionary form of politics still appeared to many as tainted by the bloody failure of the Russian revolution. Had not the experience of Stalinism proved that any compromise with the process of modernity would inevitably lead to the reimposition of tyranny? In the name of a better future, millions had been slaughtered for resisting the programme of forced industrialisation organised by the totalitarian state.

    Consequently, anarcho-communist thinkers increasingly decided that just opposing the oppressive features of economic development was not radical enough. Desiring a complete transformation of society, they rejected the transcendent ‘grand narrative’ of modernity altogether, especially those left-wing versions inspired by Hegel and Marx. According to these ultra-leftists, the whole concept of progress was a fraud designed to win acquiescence for the intensification of capitalist domination. While the mainstream Left still wanted to complete the process of modernisation, the New Left should instead be leading a revolution against modernity. [115]

    Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For instance, although the chapters of A Thousand Plateaus are named after significant historical dates, these are deliberately not put in sequential order. [116] The philosophical duo instead emphasised moments of ‘delirium’ found in intense political, sexual, chemical, psychotic and mystical experiences. [117] For them, the achievement of these ‘becomings’ wasn’t the result of a Hegelian transcendence across time. On the contrary, the immanence of liberation from social controls was Nietzschean: something which always existed potentially within the here and now. [118] For Deleuze and Guattari, there was a hermetic history of ‘delirium’ which could be found within dissident politics and art. However, these intensities had been experienced as particular moments rather than as steps towards the good society. [119] Anarcho-communism was therefore not the ‘end of history’: the material result of a long epoch of social development. Instead, the liberation of desire was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. [120] With enough libidinal intensity, anyone could overcome hierarchical repression to become a fully-liberated individual: the nomad warrior, the Body-without-Organs, the holy fool, the Nietzschean Superman and the New Left militant.

    ‘Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.’ [121]

    Once anarcho-communism was transformed into an ahistorical ideology, the New Left’s opposition to economic development soon developed into a desire to abandon modernity altogether. This dream of returning to a pre-industrial past had deep roots within the baby boomer generation in France. At the beginning of the post-war era, nearly half of the French population still lived in the countryside working in small businesses or as peasants. During their childhoods, the ‘soixante-huitards’ had lived through the rapid completion of the urbanisation and industrialisation of France. [122] While most of their parents had welcomed the increase in their material well-being, many of the younger generation reacted against the superficiality of the new consumer society. Believing that economic crisis would never return, they created the New Left movement to seek more autonomy within their daily lives and combat the undesirable results of industrialism, such as inequality and pollution.

    As in the USA, this radicalisation of French youth coincided with fierce anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World. During the Fifties and early-Sixties, many French intellectuals had courageously supported national liberation movements in their country’s colonies, such as Vietnam and Algeria. Inspired by Mao, Fanon and Castro, some of them had created ‘Third-Worldism’: a belief that the imperialist sins of metropolitan society would be punished by a revolution of the poor peasants in the periphery. When the USA invaded Vietnam, these ‘Third-Worldists’ were at the forefront of the campaigns against this act of brutal aggression. [123] Following the May ’68 revolution, support for rural guerrillas resisting American imperialism soon became mixed up with hippie dreams of tribalism, green concerns about environmental degradation and nostalgia for a lost peasant past. Disillusioned with the economic progress championed by the parliamentary Left, many on the New Left synthesised these different ideas into hatred of the mass urban society created by modernity. For them, a truly libertarian revolution could only have one goal: the destruction of the city. [124]

    Along with many of their contemporaries, Deleuze and Guattari eagerly supported this anti-modernist interpretation of anarcho-communism. For them, the ‘deterritorialisation’ of urban society became the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into ‘molecular rhizomes’, direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. [125] Like other hippies, the two philosophers dreamed of reviving pre-modern tribalism in a new form. Believing that urban democracy was most advanced form of oppression, they championed the untamed nomads who would eliminate the corruption of the city. [126]

    ‘Make the desert, the steppe grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary. If war necessarily results, it is because the [nomadic] war machine collides with States and cities…from then on the [nomadic] war machine has as its enemy the State, the city, the state and urban phenomenon, and adopts as its objective their annihilation.’ [127]

    For Deleuze and Guattari, the destruction of modern urban society was necessary to free humanity not just from the state and the market, but also from the family, media, language and psychoanalysis. What was only immanent in moments of ‘delirium’ within contemporary society would become a fully libertarian way of living once everyone became a member of the nomadic tribes of holy fools. However, as the experience of Fréquence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom ironically contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. Nowhere was this contradiction more intense than in the two philosophers’ opposition to the process of modernity. Far from expressing the most radical concept of freedom, anti-modernism implied authoritarianism in its most regressive form.

    While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari’s dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge organised a successful peasant revolution in Cambodia against an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the ‘grand narrative’ of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. Determined to eliminate the supposedly corrupting influences of urban living, the Khmer Rouge expelled everyone from the cities and turned them into forced labourers within the countryside. When the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges against real and imaginary enemies until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. As a first step in rebuilding Cambodia, the new government encouraged the surviving city-dwellers to return to their homes. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice had resulted in tyranny and genocide. [128]

    8: The Antinomies of the Avant-Garde

    The exposure of the Khmer Rouge’s crimes precipitated a profound crisis within the French New Left. The end of the long post-war boom had already weakened the credibility of a political movement which assumed that poverty and unemployment were no longer major social problems. Now it was revealed that the anti-modernist revolution had unleashed the barbarism of the ‘killing fields’ rather than liberating humanity. The ‘line of flight’ from Stalin had led to Pol Pot. Disillusioned with ultra-left politics, most activists gravitated towards either parliamentary reformism or post-modern nihilism as the Seventies came to a close. The New Left revolution had failed. [129]

    Ironically, the current popularity of Deleuze and Guattari comes from their stubborn refusal to recognise this defeat. In A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts, Deleuze and Guattari completely ignored the harsher socio-economic climate following the 1974 oil crisis and the disastrous consequences of the anti-modernist revolution in Cambodia. Even when Fréquence Libre went bankrupt, the two philosophers never questioned their strategy of ‘schizo-politics’. Instead, they transformed the historically specific politics of the New Left into theoretical poetry which existed outside history. As opponents of the ‘grand narrative’ of modernity, these holy prophets much preferred the libidinal intensity of revolutionary failure to the limited achievements of parliamentary reformism.

    ‘The victory of the revolution is immanent and consists of the new bonds which it installs between people, even if these bonds last no longer than the revolution’s fused material and quickly give way to division and betrayal.’ [130]

    Because of their ultra-leftism, Deleuze and Guattari remained marginal figures within the pantheon of post-structuralist philosophers throughout the Eighties. Despite supporting social movements and denouncing historical ‘grand narratives’, these gurus were far too closely associated with the defeat of the New Left to be promoted by the fashionable advocates of post-modernism. During the decade of ascendant neo-liberalism, avant-garde intellectuals emphasised formal experimentation over social engagement. [131] However, at the end of the Nineties, post-modernist detachment now seems very dated. Looking for an alternative to Eighties apathy, contemporary intellectuals are rediscovering the revolutionary passion of the New Left. For ‘cutting edge’ TJs, it is now almost compulsory to sample from the writings of Situationists, Autonomists and other ultra-leftists of the period. Above all, they have to embrace the theoretical poetry of Deleuze and Guattari.

    Yet, this revival of New Left theories is taking place in very different circumstances from those which produced the politics of May ’68. For instance, only a few ‘deep greens’ still believe in the anti-modernist revolution. [132] However, the contemporary irrelevance of Deleuze Guattari’s politics does not discredit their theoretical poetry among radical intellectuals. On the contrary, the defeat of the New Left has enabled their disciples to complete the transformation of anarcho-communism from the hope of social revolution into the symbol of personal authenticity: an ethical-aesthetic rejection of bourgeois society. Divorced from its historical context, the New Left is now admired more for its emotional intensity than for its practical achievements. Although defeated in reality, the ideals of May ’68 can be used to imagine a revolutionary dreamtime for the Net. The political vanguard of the Sixties is reborn as the cultural avant-garde for the Nineties.

    The aestheticisation of revolutionary politics is a revered tradition of the European avant-garde. Back in the Twenties, the Surrealists perfected the fusion of artistic creativity with social rebellion. Inspired by Lenin, this avant-garde movement claimed that the consciousness of the majority of the population was controlled by cultural mediocrity and puritan morality. Therefore radical intellectuals had the heroic task of freeing the people from ideological domination. Their innovative art would undermine the repressive cultural norms of bourgeois society. Their bohemian way of living would challenge the dull conformity of everyday life under capitalism. The Surrealists believed that this assault against aesthetic and personal repression would soon culminate in the people rallying to the revolutionary cause. [133] In culture as in politics, the majority of the population would be liberated by following the leadership of an enlightened minority.

    ‘The essential is always to look ahead…toilingly to go onward towards the discovery, one by one, of fresh landscapes, and to continue to do so indefinitely…that others may afterwards travel the same spiritual road, unhindered and in all security.’ [134]

    In this interpretation of Leninism, cultural experimentation became the privileged expression of revolutionary politics. The Surrealists are still praised for their artistic innovations, such as ready-mades, montages, dream imagery and automatism. They are also remembered for their pioneering use of new technologies, such as film-making and photography. [135] Yet, the Surrealists didn’t make their famous artworks just to transgress the formal limitations of Western aesthetics. Above all, they believed that their experimental art would radicalise the consciousness of the people. For instance, this avant-garde movement borrowed techniques from so-called ‘outsider art’ made by tribal societies, the insane, the intoxicated and the uneducated. Although these groups had little else in common, the Surrealists thought that their members lived more passionately and emotionally than those trapped within the rules and regulations of bourgeois society. [136]

    The Surrealists believed that their use of techniques borrowed from ‘outsider art’ would inspire rebellion against the alienation of life under capitalism. Whether from the tribal past or the science-fiction future, any vision of a more authentic life should be used to subvert the cultural philistinism of the bourgeois present. For the Surrealists, breaking the conventions of high art was directly equated with fighting against the ideological domination of capitalism. Their aesthetic eclecticism was always underpinned by a rigid Leninism. According to the Surrealists, innovative paintings, sculptures, photography, films and literature could only be made ‘…in the service of the revolution.’ [137]

    Although its language is idiosyncratic, the cult of Deleuze and Guattari is the latest manifestation of this European avant-garde tradition. After years of post-modern apathy, Nineties intellectuals are rediscovering the joy of aestheticising the revolution. [138] Because Leninism is discredited, they’ve instead seized on Deleuzoguattarian discourse to signify their political, moral and aesthetic dissidence. Ironically, this change in language is necessary to maintain a continuity in practice. For, just like its Surrealist predecessors, the contemporary avant-garde models itself on the political vanguard. Experimental art and bohemian lifestyles are equated with the fermenting of social rebellion. The primitive and the future are still counterposed against the present. [139] Once again, radical intellectuals are leading the cultural revolution against bourgeois society.

    ‘For artistic practice, the adaptation of the model of the [nomadic] war machine can mean that, in order to enhance the transversal tendencies, insecurities have to be triggered, anti-production has to be initiated and parasitic behaviour has to be developed as a series of inversive strategies: infoldings at the boundaries.’ [140]

    Despite their involvement with radio broadcasting and computer-mediated communications, Deleuze and Guattari had still hoped that the ‘line of flight’ from modernity would lead back to the tribal past. In the sacred texts, the holy prophets perpetuated the primitivist traditions of Surrealism by composing myths about nomadic warriors and Bodies-without-Organs. [141] In contrast, their contemporary followers are much more excited by the digital future than by tribal societies. They have no ambiguity about their relationship with modern technologies. Far from desiring the destruction of the city, radical intellectuals now hope that the Deleuzoguattarian utopia will emerge from the process of ‘deterritorialisation’ unleashed by the Net. [142]

    Using intellectual alchemy, the techno-nomads transmute their gurus’ anti-modernist scriptures into a philosophy of hyper-modernism. The rhizome becomes a metaphor for community networks. The nomad warrior is turned into a hi-tech employee who can easily move between jobs and countries. Semiotic structuralism reflects the digital codes of Net software. The Body-without-Organs is used to mythologise cybersex. For their contemporary followers, Deleuze and Guattari’s ultra-leftism is primarily an ethical-aesthetic stance opposing the conformity of bourgeois society. By separating Sixties anarcho-communism from its specific historical moment, New Left vanguard politics can re-emerge as the hip avant-garde style for the Nineties: ‘What is Fashion? A form of utopia.’ [143]

    This aestheticisation of May ’68 is made much easier by the poetical style of Deleuze and Guattari. In A Thousand Plateaus, the ‘schiz-flow’ of the text continually jumps between radical psychoanalysis, art criticism, historical myths, popular science and several other genres. As in modernist painting, the ‘realism’ of the text has been superseded by a fascination with the formal techniques of theoretical production. For Deleuze and Guattari, theory was no longer a tool for understanding social reality. On the contrary, theory became poetry: a piece of literature expressing authentic emotion. Having failed in practice, New Left politics could live on as theory-art.

    ‘The aesthetic power of feeling, although equal in principle with the other powers of thinking philosophically, knowing science, acting politically, seems on the verge of occupying a privileged position within the collective Assemblages of enunciation of our era.’ [144]

    At the beginning of this century, the founders of the European avant-garde pioneered the combination of revolutionary politics and cultural rebellion into the new aesthetic form of theory-art. [145] Faithful to this hallowed custom, techno-nomad TJs now sample Deleuze and Guattari to produce leftfield philosophical writings. Yet, like Britpop bands imitating their heroes from the Sixties, something is lost in these respectful homages to the past. The faithful coping of the holy prophets’ literary style is obscuring their ultra-left beliefs. For Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical positions are being reproduced for their emotional intensity not for their particular politics. In the sacred texts, the rational analysis of society had already been replaced by the literary celebration of irrational desires. The European avant-garde is now discarding the few remaining connections with the social sciences. Deleuzoguattarian discourse can then become cool multi-media theory-art for the age of the Net. [146]

    The techno-nomads are a cultural movement who constitute themselves through Deleuzoguattarian theory-art. Being an avant-garde, they combine revolutionary politics, bohemian lifestyles and experimental aesthetics. Being a sub-culture, they have a distinct set of ‘signifying practices’. Above all, this new generation continues the most hallowed folk custom of the European avant-garde: the cultural revolution. Despite the disappearance of the utopia of total social transformation, academics, artists and activists can still champion the rebellion of holy fools against the oppressive rationality of bourgeois society. Within the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace, the avant-garde uses Deleuzoguattarian discourse to recreate May ’68 as a theory-art project.

    ‘…network-generated operations conclusively undermine political discourses centred on notions such as agency, action, territory, progress and development. Usership, operation, non-linearity, recursivity and chaos appear as traits of computer technology and of cyberspacetime. These are the characteristics of the breakdown of modernity itself.’ [147]

    At the end of the twentieth century, the potential influence of the European avant-garde has never been greater. The small number of individuals involved in subversive artistic movements have already had a disproportionate impact on popular culture. Since the Twenties, radical intellectuals have not only created modernist aesthetics, but also pioneered libertarian politics and hedonistic lifestyles. In the late-Nineties, the avant-garde now has a much larger pool of recruits and a much bigger potential audience. The rapid growth of the Net is the most dramatic manifestation of the increasing importance of cultural innovation. Many more people are going through further and higher education. [148] The creative industries have emerged as major employers. [149] Some commentators believe that the ‘virtual class’ is the most significant sector of the workforce. [150] Even the fine arts are recognised as a catalyst for local and national regeneration. [151] The appeal of the European avant-garde is therefore no longer confined within artistic and academic circles. For an increasing proportion of the population, continual aesthetic innovation is the basis for their livelihoods: ‘the creative industries are where the growth is, where the jobs are.’ [152]

    The avant-garde tradition of cultural experimentation is now at the centre of socio-economic development in the advanced countries. A minority of dedicated and talented artists can benefit the majority of the population by inventing new aesthetic forms, especially using digital technologies. Within an information society, ‘all power to the imagination’ becomes more than just a utopian slogan from May ’68. A profane economic rationale therefore underpins the recent revival of European avant-garde traditions. Although excluded from serious power, academics, artists and activists do acquire increased social status through recognition of their theoretical erudition and creative innovation. [153] Far from marginalising its proponents, European intellectuals long ago discovered that membership of an avant-garde movement can be the precondition of social success. As the creative industries keep expanding, more and more people are choosing this exciting career path. The rejection of post-modern nihilism is not just morally preferable, but also can often be financially more rewarding too. [154]

    The techno-nomads are not surprisingly happy to benefit from the social recognition given to membership of the avant-garde. Although expertise in a particular hardware or software dates quickly, knowledge of an ahistorical ideology can survive across time. After studying the holy prophets, adepts can find employment propagating the sacred creed through teaching, publishing and the media. Sampling from Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art, they can produce journalism, academic texts, websites and fiction celebrating the Net and other aspects of techno-culture. [155] While others fail to adapt to the new technologies, the Deleuzoguattarians are at the ‘cutting edge’ of theoretical and cultural innovation. ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’, collective intelligence, Body-without-Organs and other phrases from their mystificatory jargon are even entering fashionable speech. Once again, the aestheticisation of revolutionary politics is a successful way of breaking into the highly-competitive art, education and media sectors. [156]

    Yet, like the political vanguard, the European avant-garde is haunted by the fatal contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. In their theory-art, the techno-nomads use Deleuzoguattarian discourse to celebrate DIY culture. However, just by adopting its obscurantist style, they are asserting their intellectual authority over this popular movement. According to the sacred creed, most people – including members of the DIY culture – are brainwashed by semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’. But, when illuminated by the teachings of Deleuze and Guattari, radical intellectuals can amazingly cast off the mental shackles of bourgeois rationality and experience the redemption of ecstatic immanence.

    The members of the avant-garde are supposedly the privileged few who can produce the ‘holy idea’ which liberates the people from ideological bondage. However, as shown by the sad history of Fréquence Libre, this theorisation of anarcho-communism justifies the practice of vanguard politics. The continual sampling of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art therefore reflects elitist tendencies within the contemporary avant-garde. The techno-nomads adopt its post-structuralist method and peculiar jargon to intimidate the uninitiated. The success of their philosophical ‘will to power’ is shown by the increasing incorporation of Deleuzoguattarian phrases within the slang of the techno-culture. Although many are called, only few can become true disciples of the esoteric doctrine.

    ‘Beautiful language, artistic style and aestheticism are merely the end-products of…the alienation of the logos, and the artist has become the high priest of the logos, its magus, or simply its mandarin.’ [157]

    Above all, the European avant-garde embraces the Deleuzoguattarian discourse to emphasise its chosen ‘marks of distinction’: revolutionary politics, experimental art and bohemian lifestyles. [158] For decades, radical intellectuals have adopted dissident politics, aesthetics and morals to separate themselves from the rest of society. According to the European avant-garde, the majority of the population were ‘herd animals’ whose minds were controlled by repressive ideologies. Therefore the ethical-aesthetic rebellion against bourgeois conformity could only be led by the privileged few who were free from all forms of cultural conditioning.

    Despite their revolutionary rhetoric, avant-garde intellectuals constituted themselves as an artistic aristocracy separated from the philistine masses. [159] Continuing this elitist tradition, Deleuze and Guattari championed nomadic minorities from the ‘non-guaranteed’ social movements against the stupefied majority from the ‘guaranteed’ sector. As the activists of Fréquence Libre discovered, even having family responsibilities was considered incompatible with personal commitment to the revolutionary cause. [160] In the late-Nineties, Deleuzoguattarian discourse allows the contemporary avant-garde to perpetuate its venerated custom of cultural elitism. Once again, the revolution is the ethical-aesthetic illumination of a minority rather than the social liberation of all people. As Deleuze emphasised: ‘…art realises…the genius of the superhuman.’ [161]

    This form of aesthetic elitism has rapidly lead to overtly reactionary positions. For instance, the Italian Futurists looked to militant nationalism for deliverance from the cultural sterility of bourgeois society. In their theory-art, the holy fool was transformed into the blackshirt. [162] At the end of the century, the techno-nomads remain trapped within the avant-garde contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. Some TJs are even repeating their predecessors’ flirtation with fascist positions. For instance, Hakim Bey still preaches the Nietzschean creed of ‘radical aristocratism’. [163] In his NYC remix of the European avant-garde, this blessed guru urges Net activists to form a holy order of warrior-monks modelled on the medieval Assassin sect! [164] The cultural revolution remains simultaneously primitivist and futurist. [165] Although he praises DIY culture, Bey primarily uses Deleuzoguattarian discourse to uphold the most reactionary legacy of the avant-garde: the artistic aristocracy. Within the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace, the Nietzschean elite of holy fools are leaders of the pack.

    ‘These nomads practice the razzia, they are corsairs, they are viruses… These nomads chart their courses by strange stars, which might be luminous clusters of data in cyberspace, or perhaps hallucinations.’ [166]

    As the Net develops, the antinomies of the European avant-garde are reaching crisis point. It is now increasingly difficult to be simultaneously participatory and elitist. Nowhere is this clearer than within the writings of the techno-nomads. On the one hand, Deleuzoguattarian theory-art is revolutionary: the sanctification of the hi-tech gift economy. Its poetic phrases and bizarre metaphors exalt every communal and libertarian possibility of the Net. Yet, on the other hand, the aestheticisation of May ’68 is also reactionary: the negation of anarcho-communism as a practice within cyberspace. By definition, the existence of the European avant-garde presupposes that the majority of the population can’t participate within Do-It-Yourself culture. If the minds of the people are controlled by ‘machinic assemblages’, only radical intellectuals can supposedly create the future. When they celebrate DIY culture in their theory-art, the Deleuzoguattarians are simultaneously proclaiming their own superior status as Nietzschean Supermen.

    ‘Artists…are..physically…strong, full of surplus energy, powerful animals, sensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system a Raphael is unthinkable…their lives must contain a kind of youth and spring, a kind of habitual intoxication.’ [167]

    This dream of an artistic aristocracy sometimes evolves into fascism. More often, the avant-garde has supported totalitarian tendencies within the Left. [168] Nowadays, cultural elitism can easily turn into implicit sympathy with neo-liberalism. Despite its ultra-left origins, Deleuzoguattarian theory-art is becoming conservative: the European version of the Californian ideology. In the USA, Wired already uses New Left anti-statism to sell New Right neo-liberalism. [169] The rhetoric of individual freedom justifies the removal of welfare benefits and health care. The European avant-garde – and its imitators – could never openly support the free market fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. As self-proclaimed cultural revolutionaries, the techno-nomads must remain faithful to the spirit of May ’68.

    Yet, as the techno-nomad TJs cut ‘n’ mix, the distinctions between right-wing and left-wing versions of libertarianism are blurring. Crucially, both sides share a fashionable fascination with mystical positivism, such as memes, hive minds, cyborgs, chaos mathematics and artificial life. The convergence of technologies around digital protocols is being paralleled by the adoption of scientific rhetoric for social and artistic debates. [170] The European avant-garde has been performing the trick of combining spiritual primitivism with scientific futurism for decades. As Deleuze and Guattari faithfully followed this hallowed tradition, their disciples can easily confuse Bergsonian vitalism sampled from the holy prophets with the Lamarckian fantasies of the West Coast gurus. [171] The semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ of Deleuzoguattarian discourse already echo the denial of human subjectivity found within the theory of memetics. An enthusiastic TJ can rapidly make the two concepts seem indistinguishable.

    ‘From the “bio-adaptor” of language as the proto-meme to the “infosphere” of global networks as the ultimate habitat of the human mind… The possibility of the emergence of a post-biological, cyberorganic line of evolution out of universal binary code, of which the first protozoans have names like Internet, Cyberspace and I-way… Memes…the identification and integration of virtual communities that gather only at the interface.’ [172]

    The collapse of Deleuzoguattarian discourse into the Californian ideology through mystical positivism is no accident. These pseudo-scientific concepts supposedly prove that the majority of the population are controlled by outside forces. Just as in the avant-garde tradition, these theories claim that only the enlightened few can determine the future. The two forms of aristocratic libertarianism now appear to be the same. On the one hand, the Californian ideologues claim that this heroic minority is composed of cyber-entrepreneurs emerging from the fierce competition of the electronic marketplace. The covers of Wired have portrayed corporate bosses as Conan the Barbarian and Mad Max. [173] On the other hand, the Deleuzoguattarians believe that the new elite is formed by cool TJs and hip artists who release subversive ‘assemblages of enunciation’ into the Net. In their writings, avant-garde intellectuals dream of becoming nomad warriors and cyberpunk hackers. In both the Californian ideology and Deleuzoguattarian discourse, primitivism and futurism are combined to produce the apotheosis of individualism: the cyborg Nietzschean Superman. [174]

    ‘…the possibility…to rear a master race, the future “masters of the earth”; – a new tremendous aristocracy…in which… philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will…work as artists on “man” himself.’ [175]

    Amazingly, neo-liberalism and anarcho-communism can now appear to be on the same side of the ‘libertarian-communitarian opposition’ within cyberspace. [176] The re-emergence of the European avant-garde doesn’t just signify the rediscovery of the revolutionary legacy of May ’68. Ironically, the aestheticisation of the New Left is simultaneously a reaction against mass participation within cyberspace. By turning DIY culture into theory-art, radical intellectuals are asserting their superior status over the majority of Net users. Despite the rhetoric of immanence and non-linearity, the social revolution has once again disappeared from the here and now. Instead, the hope of redemption is projected into the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace. [177]

    Within this imaginary future, May ’68 flourishes as a theory-art project. Yet, in this process, the New Left dream of collective liberation is virtualised into ethical-aesthetic salvation for a select band of artistic aristocrats. Deleuzoguattarian theory-art is impaled on the fatal contradiction between popular participation and intellectual elitism. As was demonstrated by the tragic story of Fréquence Libre, the delirious celebration of DIY culture cannot be reconciled with the simultaneous assumption that most people are unable do things for themselves. The writings of Deleuze and Guattari can therefore never provide ‘a coherent set of conceptual tools’ to comprehend the libertarian potential of the Net. As the millennium approaches, the techno-nomads remain trapped within the antinomies of the avant-garde.

    ‘Aetheticisation is an alibi. It pretends to fill the chasm between unsatisfied subjectivities and increasing unattainable accumulation.’ [178]

    9: The Hi-Tech Gift Economy

    Back in the Twenties, the European avant-garde had no doubt about its heroic mission. The enlightened minority could free the people from ideological domination through experimental art and libertarian lifestyles. The cultural avant-garde was an essential element of the political vanguard. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this Leninist myth has lost all credibility. The ‘grand narrative’ of history can no longer be used to justify the leadership of the few. In the late-Nineties, revolutionary elitism must now be expressed in the words of May ’68. The techno-nomads therefore remix Leninism into Deleuzoguattarian discourse: subversive theory-art ‘deterritorialises’ the semiotic ‘machinic assemblages’ controlling the minds of the majority. Crucially, the contemporary avant-garde must substitute itself for the missing political vanguard. Although supposedly possible for everyone, the immanence of ethical-aesthetic ‘delirium’ can only be experienced by radical intellectuals. Cultural rebellion, bohemian lifestyles and ultra-leftism are now the ‘marks of distinction’ for the artistic aristocracy. Lenin is morphed into Nietzsche.

    The current revival of the European avant-garde depends upon the aestheticisation of May ’68. Yet, important pioneers of the New Left were highly critical of this tradition of cultural elitism. Above all, the Situationists attacked aesthetic innovations of the Surrealists for failing to remove the ideological domination of the bourgeoisie. These avant-garde experiments had been too easily incorporated into the fashionable styles of consumer society. The Surrealist experience proved that innovative art could never remain subversive for long. [179] In place of aesthetic experimentation, the Situationists instead advocated transforming the social context of cultural production. Rather than following the avant-garde elite, everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves. [180]

    ‘The situation is…made to be lived by its constructors. The role played by a passive…”public” must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors but rather…”livers” must steadily increase.’ [181]

    The Situationists proclaimed the end of the cultural avant-garde. The New Left didn’t just have to radicalise the content of art. More importantly, young militants had to create opportunities for everyone to express their own hopes, dreams and desires. The Hegelian ‘grand narrative’ could then culminate in the supersession of all mediations separating people from each other. Yet, at the same time, the Situationists never completely escaped from the avant-garde legacy left by their Surrealist predecessors. The movement was predominantly composed of radical intellectuals. [182] This revolutionary minority supposedly prefigured the bohemian lifestyles and ultra-left politics of the future. As with the Surrealists, the ‘holy idea’ of participation for everyone justified unaccountable leadership of the intellectual elite. Once again, the practical transcendence of social oppression had elided into the spiritual immanence of theoretical enlightenment. Despite their invocation of Hegel and Marx, the Situationists remained haunted by Nietzsche and Lenin. [183]

    Unable to break with avant-garde tradition, the Situationists inevitably aestheticised the social revolution. Fearful of repeating the fate of the Surrealists, the movement celebrated cultural activities which couldn’t easily be turned into fashionable commodities. Above all, the Situationists looked for ways of living which were free from the corruptions of consumer capitalism. Like earlier avant-garde intellectuals, they thought that the path into the future was also the return to the past. Despite their Hegelian modernism, the Situationists claimed that anarcho-communism had been prefigured by the potlatch: the gift economy of Polynesian tribes. [184]

    Within these primitive societies, the circulation of gifts bound people together into tribes and encouraged co-operation between different tribes. In contrast with the atomisation and alienation of bourgeois society, these potlatches required intimate contacts and emotional authenticity. According to the Situationists, the tribal gift economy demonstrated that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. Anarcho-communism was therefore a practical possibility. However, the Situationists remained trapped within the antinomies of the avant-garde. Once again, the utopia of mass participation simultaneously justified the leadership of the artistic elite. Unlike the rest of the population, radical intellectuals could supposedly prefigure the libertarian future by producing esoteric theory-art. Anarcho-communism had been transformed into a ‘mark of distinction’ for the New Left vanguard. The giving of gifts therefore became the absolute antithesis of market competition. There could be no compromise between tribal authenticity and bourgeois alienation. After the social revolution, the potlatch would completely supplant the commodity. [185]

    ‘The crumbling away of human values under the influence of exchange mechanisms leads to the crumbling of [commodity] exchange itself…new human relationships must be built on the principle of pure giving. We must rediscover the pleasure of giving: giving because you have so much. What beautiful and priceless potlatches the affluent society will see – whether it likes it or not! – when the exuberance of the younger generation discovers the pure gift.’ [186]

    After May ’68, this purist vision of anarcho-communism inspired a generation of community media activists. For instance, the radical ‘free radio’ stations refused all funding from state and commercial sources. Instead, these projects tried to survive through donations of time and money from their supporters. Emancipatory media supposedly could only be produced within the gift economy. During the late-Seventies, pro-situ attitudes were further popularised by the punk movement. [187] Although rapidly commercialised, this sub-culture did encourage its members to form their own bands, make their own fashions and publish their own fanzines. [188] From punk through rave to the present-day, the ‘cutting edge’ of youth culture has remained participatory. The permanent innovation in styles on the dance floor is driven by people doing things for themselves. [189]

    Crucially, every user of the Net participates within a gift economy. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. They co-operate together without the direct mediation of either politics or money. During the Eighties, post-modern pessimists claimed that the gift economy would always be defeated by market capitalism. [190] Yet, at the end of the Nineties, DIY culture is thriving within the most technologically advanced sector of the economy. Everyday, Net users circulate gifts of information amongst each other. What was once revolutionary has become banal. Far from being the ‘holy idea’ of avant-garde intellectuals, anarcho-communism is now the mundane activity of ordinary people within cyberspace.

    ‘Millions of people have been interacting and participating in what they clearly value… There is no question that there are differences between the economic logic – the application of basic economic principles – on and off the Net. To begin with, most of the economic activity on the Net involves value but no money.’ [191]

    The invention of the Net was one of the greatest ironies of the Cold War. At the height of the struggle of American capitalism against Russian Communism, the US military funded the creation of anarcho-communism within computer-mediated communications! From the beginning, the gift economy has determined the technical and social structure of the Net. Being a military bureaucracy, the Pentagon initially did try to restrict the unofficial uses of its computer network. However, it soon became obvious that the Net could only be successfully developed by letting its users build the system for themselves. [192] Within the scientific community, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists don’t have to turn their intellectual work directly into marketable commodities. Instead, research results are publicised by ‘giving a paper’ at specialist conferences and by ‘contributing an article’ to academic journals. The collaboration of many different academics is made possible through the free distribution of information. [193]

    Within small tribal societies, the circulation of gifts established close personal bonds between people. In contrast, the academic gift economy is used by intellectuals who are spread across the world. Within their peer group, scientists can receive recognition from colleagues who might never meet them in person. Despite the anonymity of the modern version of the gift economy, academics acquire intellectual respect from each other through citations in articles and other forms of public acknowledgement. If someone is often quoted, their career prospects within the university system are usually much enhanced. Scientists therefore can only acquire personal recognition for their individual efforts by openly collaborating with each other through the academic gift economy. Although research is being increasingly commercialised, the giving away of findings remains the most efficient method of solving common problems within a particular scientific discipline. [194]

    When the Yippies proclaimed that ‘information wants to be free’ back in the Sixties, they were preaching to computer scientists who were already living within the academic gift economy. What seemed revolutionary in the rest of the USA was the usual method of working within the university. From its earliest days, the free exchange of information has therefore been firmly embedded within the technologies and social mores of cyberspace. Above all, the founders of the Net never bothered to protect intellectual property within computer-mediated communications. On the contrary, they were developing these new technologies to advance their careers inside the academic gift economy. [195]

    Scattered across the world, scientists from the same speciality needed the Net to disseminate their research results to each other and to work together on collaborative projects. Far from wanting to enforce copyright, the pioneers of the Net tried to eliminate all barriers to the distribution of information. Technically, every act within cyberspace involves copying material from one computer to another. Once the first copy of a piece of information is placed on the Net, the cost of making each extra copy is almost zero. The architecture of the system presupposes that multiple copies of documents can easily be cached around the network. As Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the Web – points out:

    ‘Concepts of intellectual property, central to our culture, are not expressed in a way which maps onto the abstract information space. In an information space, we can consider the authorship of materials, and their perception; but…there is a need for the underlying infrastructure to be able to make copies simply for reasons of [technical] efficiency and reliability. The concept of “copyright” as expressed in terms of copies made makes little sense.’ [196]

    Within the commercial creative industries, advances in digital reproduction are feared for making the ‘piracy’ of copyright material ever easier. Almost everyone already copies music, articles, television programmes and other information products for personal use without payment. The sampling and remixing of other people’s tunes is widespread within dance music. [197] For the owners of intellectual property, the Net can only make the situation worse. In contrast, the academic gift economy welcomes technologies which improve the availability of data. Users should always be able to obtain and manipulate information with the minimum of impediments. The design of the Net therefore assumes that intellectual property is technically and socially obsolete. [198]

    In France, the nationalised telephone monopoly has accustomed people to paying for the on-line services provided by Minitel. [199] Yet, the Net remains predominantly a gift economy even though the system has expanded far beyond the university. The attempt to construct computer-mediated communications around copyright payments ended in failure. [200] The commercial providers of information services have never been able to supplant the free exchange of information amongst the on-line community. [201] Even the porn industry is encountering difficulties in making money on the Net. [202] From scientists through hobbyists to the general public, the charmed circle of users was slowly built up through the adhesion of many localised networks to an agreed set of protocols.

    Crucially, the common standards of the Net include social conventions as well as technical rules. The giving and receiving of information without payment is almost never questioned. Although the circulation of gifts doesn’t necessarily create emotional obligations between individuals, people are still willing to donate their information to everyone else on the Net. Even selfish reasons encourage people to become anarcho-communists within cyberspace. By adding their own presence, every user contributes to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return, each individual has potential access to all the information made available by others within the Net. Everyone takes far more out of the Net than they can ever give away as an individual.

    ‘…the Net is far from altruistic, or it wouldn’t work… Because it takes as much effort to distribute one copy of an original creation as a million…you never lose from letting your product free…as long as you are compensated in return… What a miracle, then, that you receive not one thing in value in exchange – indeed there is no explicit act of exchange at all – but millions of unique goods made by others!’ [203]

    Despite the commercialisation of cyberspace, the self-interest of Net users ensures that the hi-tech gift economy continues to flourish. For instance, musicians are using the Net for the digital distribution of their recordings to each other. By giving away their own work to this network community, individuals get free access to a far larger amount of music in return. Not surprisingly, the music business is worried about the increased opportunities for the ‘piracy’ of copyrighted recordings over the Net. [204] Sampling, DJ-ing and mixing are already blurring property rights within dance music. [205] However, the greatest threat to the commercial music corporations comes from the flexibility and spontaneity of the hi-tech gift economy. After it is completed, a new track can quickly be made freely available to a global audience. If someone likes the tune, they can download it for personal listening, use it as a sample or make their own remix. Out of the free circulation of information, musicians can form friendships, work together and inspire each other. [206] ‘It’s all about doing it for yourself. Better than punk.’ [207]

    Within the developed world, most politicians and corporate leaders believe that the future of capitalism lies in the commodification of information. Over the last few decades, intellectual property rights have been steadily tightened through new national laws and international agreements. Even human genetic material can now be patented. [208] Yet, at the ‘cutting edge’ of the emerging information society, money-commodity relations play a secondary role to those created by a really existing form of anarcho-communism. For most of its users, the Net is somewhere to work, play, love, learn and discuss with other people. Unrestricted by physical distance, they collaborate with each other without the direct mediation of money or politics. Unconcerned about copyright, they give and receive information without thought of payment. In the absence of states or markets to mediate social bonds, network communities are instead formed through the mutual obligations created by gifts of time and ideas.

    ‘This informal, unwritten social contract is supported by a blend of strong-tie and weak-tie relationships among people who have a mixture of motives and ephemeral affiliations. It requires one to give something, and enables one to receive something. I have to keep my friends in mind and send them pointers instead of throwing my informational discards into the virtual scrap heap… And with scores of people who have an eye out for my interests while they explore sectors of the information space that I normally wouldn’t frequent, I find that the help I receive far outweighs the energy I expend helping others; a marriage of altruism and self-interest.’ [209]

    On the Net, enforcing copyright payments represents the imposition of scarcity on a technical system designed to maximise the dissemination of information. The protection of intellectual property stops all users having access to every source of knowledge. Commercial secrecy prevents people from helping each other to solve common problems. The inflexibility of information commodities inhibits the efficient manipulation of digital data. In contrast, the technical and social structure of the Net has been developed to encourage open co-operation among its participants. As an everyday activity, users are building the system together. Engaged in ‘interactive creativity’, they send emails, take part in listservers, contribute to newsgroups, participate within on-line conferences and produce websites. [210] Lacking copyright protection, information can be freely adapted to suit the users’ needs. Within the hi-tech gift economy, people successfully work together through ‘…an open social process involving evaluation, comparison and collaboration.’ [211]

    The hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. For instance, Bill Gates admits that Microsoft’s biggest competitor in the provision of web servers comes from the Apache program. [212] Instead of being marketed by a commercial company, this program is open source software. [213] Like similar projects, this virtual machine is being continually developed by its techie users. Because its source code is not protected by copyright, the program can be modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programming skills. When someone does make a contribution to a shareware project, the gift of their labour is rewarded by recognition within the community of user-developers. [214]

    The inflexibility of commodified software programs is compounded by their greater unreliability. Even Microsoft can’t mobilise the amount of labour given to successful shareware programs by their devotees. Without enough techies looking at a program, all its bugs can never be found. [215] The greater social and technical efficiency of anarcho-communism is therefore inhibiting the commercial take-over of the Net. Open source software programs are now beginning to threaten the core product of the Microsoft empire: the Windows operating system. Starting from the original program by Linus Torvalds, a community of user-developers are together building their own non-proprietary operating system: Linux. For the first time, Windows has a serious competitor. Anarcho-communism is becoming the only alternative to monopoly capitalism. [216]

    ‘Linux is subversive. Who could have thought even five years ago that a world-class operating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?’ [217]

    10: Beyond the Avant-Garde

    The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. Anarcho-communism really did work in practice. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture. According to the ‘soixante-huitards’, the gift was the absolute antithesis of the commodity. There could be no compromise between the authenticity of the potlatch and the alienation of the market. For instance, Fréquence Libre refused to raise money from advertising to prove its ethical-aesthetic integrity. Rather than compromising with the arboreal powers of commercialism, the rhizomic ‘free radio’ station preserved its principles to the point of bankruptcy. The current popularity of Deleuze and Guattari comes from their romanticisation of this uncompromising form of anarcho-communism. What had failed in practice can live on as theory-art.

    Bored with the emotional emptiness of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are entranced by the moral fervour of the holy prophets. In their remixes, the purist interpretation of anarcho-communism is virtualised into the revolutionary dreamtime of cyberspace. However, as shown by Fréquence Libre, the rhetoric of mass participation often hides the rule of the enlightened few. Instead of providing media freedom for all, the hi-tech gift economy becomes the ‘mark of distinction’ for the cultural avant-garde. The ethical-aesthetic commitment of anarcho-communism can only be lived by the artistic aristocracy. In place of the majority doing things for themselves on the Net, the minority of radical intellectuals make cool theory-art about the ‘holy idea’ of digital DIY culture.

    Yet, the antinomies of the avant-garde can no longer be avoided. The rapid growth of the Net is undermining the particular ‘marks of distinction’ adopted by the Deleuzoguattarians. The ideological passion of anarcho-communism is dulled by the banality of giving gifts within cyberspace. The theory of the artistic aristocracy cannot be based on the everyday activities of the ‘herd animals’. Prominent members of the avant-garde are already starting to distance themselves from their earlier enthusiasm for all things digital. Their revolutionary dreamtime may even have to be built somewhere else other than cyberspace. [218]

    Above all, anarcho-communism exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, the boundaries between the different methods of working are not morally precise. Within the mixed economy of the Net, money-commodity and gift relations are simultaneously in conflict and in symbiosis with each other. On the one hand, each method of working threatens to supplant the other. The hi-tech gift economy heralds the end of private property in ‘cutting edge’ areas of the economy. The digital capitalists want to privatise the shareware programs and enclose the social spaces built through voluntary effort. The potlatch and the commodity remain irreconcilable. [219]

    Yet, on the other hand, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial Net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Under threat from Microsoft, Netscape is now trying to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence. Lacking the resources to beat its monopolistic rival, the company is allying itself with the hacker community to avoid being overwhelmed. The source code of its web browser program is now freely available. The development of products for the shareware Linux operating system has become a top priority. The commercial survival of Netscape will depend upon successfully collaborating with hackers from the hi-tech gift economy. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital. [220]

    ‘”Hi there Mr CEO [Chief Executive Officer] – tell me, do you have any strategic problem right now that is bigger than whether Microsoft is going to either crush you or own your soul in a few years? No? You don’t? OK, well, listen carefully then. You cannot survive against Bill Gates [by] playing Bill Gates’ game. To thrive, or even survive, you’re going to have to change the rules…”‘ [221]

    The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. Because the dogmatic communism of Deleuze and Guattari has dated badly, their disciples instead emphasise the uncompromising anarchism of the holy prophets. The techno-nomads can then enthusiastically advocate ‘anti-statism’ as the primary method of enhancing freedom within cyberspace. [222] However, the state isn’t just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. At the same time, the public sector provides essential support for the hi-tech gift economy. For instance, in the past, the founders of the Net never bothered to incorporate intellectual property within the system because their wages were funded from taxation. In the future, governments will have to impose universal service provisions upon commercial telecommunications companies if all sections of society are to have the opportunity to circulate free information. [223] Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari claimed that participatory ‘post-media’ would supplant electoral politics. Yet, when access is available, many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. [224] Within the digital mixed economy, anarcho-communism is also symbiotic with the state.

    The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is threatened by this miscegenation of the hi-tech gift economy with the private and public sectors. Faithful to the traditions of the European avant-garde, the holy prophets proclaimed the purifying ethical-aesthetic rebellion against bourgeois society. Anarcho-communism symbolised moral integrity: the romance of artistic ‘delirium’ undermining the ‘machinic assemblages’ of bourgeois conformity. In their theory-art, contemporary intellectuals remix Deleuzoguattarian discourse to celebrate the experimental and innovative potential of the Net. However, the hi-tech gift economy cannot act as the ‘holy idea’ of the avant-garde minority for much longer. As Net access grows, more and more people are circulating free information across the Net. Crucially, their potlatches are not attempts to regain a lost emotional authenticity. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May ’68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. In the late-Nineties, digital anarcho-communism is being built by hackers like Eric Raymond: ‘a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons…’ [225]

    According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism also symbolised the ethical-aesthetic revolution against the oppressive ‘grand narrative’ of modernity. However, the hi-tech gift economy is formed by the practical activities of people who mainly live in highly-industrialised countries. [226] This libertarian way of working was not an immanent possibility in every age. On the contrary, this really existing form of anarcho-communism could only have been built at the advanced technological and social levels of contemporary capitalism. Back in medieval times, the expansion of feudal society spawned the precursors of the modern market and state. At the end of the millennium, three centuries of capitalist industrialisation are culminating in the emergence of digital anarcho-communism. The market and the state could only be surpassed in this specific sector at this particular historical moment.

    The technological advances catalysed by capitalist modernisation are preconditions for the emergence of anarcho-communism within the Net. Crucially, people need sophisticated media, computing and telecommunications technologies to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. Over the last three hundred years, the reproduction, distribution and manipulation of information have become slowly easier through a long process of mechanisation. A manually-operated press produced copies which were relatively expensive, limited in numbers and impossible to alter without recopying. After generations of technological improvements, the same quantity of text on the Net costs almost nothing to circulate, can be copied as needed and can be remixed at will. The scarcity of information is gradually being overcome within the hi-tech gift economy. [227]

    The utilisation of advanced communications tools presupposes that a large proportion of the population have benefited from capitalist modernisation. For individuals need both time and money to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. While a large number of the world’s population still lives in poverty, people within the industrialised countries have steadily reduced their hours of employment and increased their wealth over a long period of social struggles and economic reorganisations. Ever since the advent of Fordism, mass production has depended upon workers having enough leisure and resources for mass consumption. [228] As spare time grows, people can carve out a personal space for living their own lives, including within cyberspace. [229] With rising incomes, they can afford the ‘self-service’ technologies needed for doing things for themselves, such as equipment for accessing the Net. [230] By working for public institutions or private companies for some of the week, people can enjoy the delights of the hi-tech gift economy at other times. Only at this particular historical moment have the technical and social conditions of the metropolitan countries developed sufficiently for the emergence of digital anarcho-communism. [231]

    Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, almost nobody still believes in the inevitable victory of communism. On the contrary, large numbers of people accept that the Hegelian ‘end of history’ has culminated in American neo-liberal capitalism. [232] Yet, at exactly this moment in time, a really existing form of anarcho-communism is being constructed within the Net, especially by people living in the USA. When they go on-line, almost everyone participates within the gift economy rather than engages in market competition. Even the development of sophisticated software is being organised around the free circulation of information.

    Over the past few centuries, the productivity of labour has increased dramatically through the mediation of money-commodity relations protected by the rule of law. Yet, within cyberspace, the enforcement of private property has become both technologically and socially regressive. Because users receive much more information than they can ever give away, there is no popular clamour for imposing the equal exchange of the marketplace on the Net. For most people, the circulation of gifts is simply the most efficient method of working together within cyberspace. Even the West Coast neo-liberals encounter difficulties in explaining why market prices for information are necessary when the marginal cost of reproduction is nearly zero. [233] Once again, the ‘end of history’ for capitalism appears to be communism.

    ‘Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.’ [234]

    Despite the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy, markets and states remain the primary methods of co-ordinating labour for the production of goods and services in the rest of the economy, including within some parts of cyberspace. Responding to changes in prices and funding, workers and resources are distributed across the various sectors of the economy. [235] Being New Left gurus, Deleuze and Guattari denounced both the market and the state as ‘machinic assemblages’ which controlled the lives of the masses. Fréquence Libre therefore refused to sell advertising and only took a small subsidy from the government. Despite this anti-capitalist position, Deleuze and Guattari still rejected the ‘economism’ of the mainstream Left. According to the holy prophets, society was formed through the self-organising properties of psychic structures rather than through the conscious organisation of practical work. The creative power of human labour was only one expression of the vitalist energy of semiotic flows.

    Observing the hallowed custom of the European avant-garde, the two philosophers had substituted ethical-aesthetic redemption for the social revolution. The New Left no longer wanted to change the methods of production. Instead, its philosophers called for the replacement of disciplined labour by spontaneous desire: the ‘refusal of work’. The proletarian had been turned into the artist. [236] In the Nineties, the techno-nomads need this ultra-left myth to justify their resurrection of the avant-garde tradition. While the majority of the population are supposedly stupefied by the ‘machinic assemblages’ of the market and the state, the artistic aristocracy can form its own ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ around the potlatch. After transformation into an ethical-aesthetic stance, anarcho-communism becomes the signifier of the techno-nomad Supermen. [237]

    Despite their residual ultra-leftism, the cultural elitism of the techno-nomads increasingly merges with the conservative positions of the Californian ideologues. The two forms of Nietzschean philosophy are fusing into one. For this convergence to take place, the holy prophets’ anathema against market competition must be skilfully abandoned. [238] First, the new generation of adepts surreptitiously morphs the ‘refusal to work’ into the denial of the wealth-creating powers of human labour. Then the work of living beings is subsumed within the mobility of dead matter. Finally, far from being condemned as a ‘machinic assemblage’ imposed from above, market competition is sanctified as the apotheosis of self-organising systems. [239] As in the Californian ideology, this Deleuzoguattarian heresy believes that the market is a chaotic force of nature which cannot be controlled by state intervention. [240] Abandoning any residual connections with the Left, these TJs instead celebrate the new aristocracy of nomadic artists and entrepreneurs who surf the ‘schiz-flows’ of the information society. [241] In this bizarre remix, anarcho-communism becomes identical with neo-liberalism.

    Mesmerised by this ecstatic vision, radical intellectuals are now incapable of understanding the actual ‘world-historical’ significance of the Net. For the cultural avant-garde’s recent reconciliation with market competition has obscured the historical novelty of digital DIY culture. If both forms of human activity are simply spontaneous semiotic flows, the exchange of commodities and the circulation of gifts can be easily confused with each other. As a consequence, the techno-nomads miss the major social transformation catalysed by the new information technologies: the widespread adoption of a new method of working. Rejecting the ‘economism’ of the Left, many TJs have replaced the creativity of human labour on the Net with a digital vitalism inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s theory-art. Denying the ability of people to determine their own destinies, these techno-nomads believe that information technologies are semiotic forces determining culture, consciousness and even the conception of existence. Humanity will not be liberated by its own efforts, but by the new Messiah: the self-organising properties of inert metal, sand and plastic transmuted into information technologies.

    However, there is nothing inherently emancipatory in computer-mediated communications. These technologies can also serve the state and the market. The Net was originally invented for the transmission of orders from the military hierarchy. Ever since the Seventies, computer networks have provided the technical infrastructure for global financial markets to impose neo-liberal policies on countries across the world. Nowadays, many government bodies and commercial companies are building Intranets to improve their internal management and Extranets to interact with their clients. In the future, electronic commerce will play a significant economic role and public services will increasingly be made available on-line. Both the market and the state are becoming digital. [242]

    For these purposes, computer-mediated communications can still be organised by public and private institutions. Dependent upon wages, people will move into the new jobs created within expanding sectors of the economy. However, as in older industries, these workers will remain unable to control their own productive activities. Even cyber-entrepreneurs are constrained by the disciplines of the marketplace. In contrast, millions of people are already spontaneously working together on the Net without needing co-ordination by either the state or the market. Instead of exchanging their labour for money, they give away their creations in return for free access to information produced by others. Far from being equivalent types of self-organising systems, market competition and anarcho-communism are actually two contrasting forms of collective labour.

    ‘The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessities and conveniences of life which it annually consumes…’ [243]

    The hi-tech gift economy is not the only way in which labour is organised within cyberspace. The circulation of gifts coexists with the exchange of commodities and funding from taxation. Like successful community radio stations, participatory spaces within the Net can be constructed as labours of love, but still be partially funded by advertising and public money. Crucially, this hybridisation of working methods is not confined within particular projects. When they’re on-line, people constantly pass from one form of social activity to another. For instance, in one session, a Net user could first purchase some clothes from an e-commerce catalogue, then look for information about education services from the local council’s site and then contribute some thoughts to an on-going discussion on a listserver for fiction-writers. Without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy. Far from realising theory in its full purity, working methods on the Net are inevitably compromised. The ‘New Economy’ is an advanced form of social democracy. [244]

    Although the boundaries between the different forms of collective labour are often blurred, working for money is still very different from working for recognition. Doing things on the orders of others is not the same as doing things for yourself. [245] Despite this crucial distinction, the techno-nomads still cannot comprehend the subversive impact of the everyday activities of Net users. As members of the avant-garde, they’re looking for the intensity of ethical-aesthetic ‘delirium’ within the flows of self-organising matter. For them, there can be nothing particularly special about the mundane activities of Net users who aren’t producing fashionable theory-art. Yet, at this particular historical moment, the supersession of capitalism has ceased to be a moral stance. When using the Net, almost everyone prefers to circulate gifts rather than to exchange commodities. Instead of embodying a mystical ‘collective intelligence’, the hi-tech gift economy is precisely a new method of collaborative working.

    Within cyberspace, market competition is disappearing for entirely pragmatic reasons. While commodified information is closed and fixed, digital gifts are open and changeable. Instead of fixed divisions between producers and consumers, users are simultaneously creators on the Net. Obsessed with immanence of semiotic flows, the Deleuzoguattarians cannot appreciate the deep irony of this contingent moment in human history. [246] This is the point in time when the old faith in the inevitable triumph of communism has completely lost all credibility. Yet, at this very moment, market competition is quietly ‘withering away’ within cyberspace. For most Net users, anarcho-communism is simply the most efficient way of working together. A new mode of production is being born alongside market competition and state intervention. [247]

    ‘Shareware is a more highly evolved survival mechanism than [market] competition.’ [248]

    The contemporary avant-garde resurrects the ‘refusal of work’ to symbolise the primacy of its own artistic creativity. Yet, as Hegelians have long pointed out, the only individuals who don’t have to work are aristocrats. In contrast, ordinary people can only free themselves from exploitation by ‘non-workers’ through their own skills as labourers. [249] Over the past few centuries, people within the industrialised countries have slowly improved their incomes and reduced their hours of work. Although still having little autonomy in their money-earning jobs, workers can now experience non-alienated labour within the hi-tech gift economy. [250] From writing emails through making web sites to developing software, people do things for themselves without the mediation of the market and the state.

    As access to the Net spreads, the majority of the population are beginning to participate within cultural production. Unlike Fréquence Libre, the avant-garde can no longer decide who can – and cannot – join the hi-tech gift economy. The Net is too large for Microsoft to monopolise let alone a small elite of radical intellectuals. Art therefore ceases being the symbol of moral superiority. Everyone now has the opportunity to express themselves in all sorts of ways, including aesthetically. When working people finally have enough time and resources, they can then concentrate upon ‘…art, love, play, etc., etc.; in short, everything which makes Man [and Woman] happy.’ [251]

    During the twentieth-century, the European avant-garde championed revolutionary politics, libertarian lifestyles and artistic experimentation. Following in this tradition, the Deleuzoguattarians celebrate the new ethical-aesthetic rebellion centred on the Net. However, by forming an avant-garde, radical intellectuals are attempting to separate themselves from the rest of the population. They want to be artistic Supermen within cyberspace rather than ordinary workers using computer-mediated communications. The very process of romanticising the hi-tech gift economy into theory-art negates most of its subversive potential. For, within the Net, really existing anarcho-communism is a pragmatic method of working. Rather than buying and selling information, people circulate gifts amongst each other. They always obtain much more than can ever be contributed in return. By giving away something which is well-made, they will gain recognition from those who download their work. [252] Anarcho-communism can no longer be confined to the adepts of Deleuzoguattarian theory-art. It has now become a practical way of working for everyone.

    At such a historical moment, the cultural avant-garde is made obsolete through the realisation of its own supposed principles. The techno-nomads proclaim the ‘holy idea’ of digital DIY culture to distinguish themselves from the rest of society. Yet, far from being confined to a revolutionary minority, increasing numbers of ordinary people are now participating within the hi-tech gift economy. For entirely pragmatic reasons, Net users adopt anarcho-communism as the most efficient method of working with each other. Rather than symbolising ethical-aesthetic purity, the circulation of gifts is one way of working within the advanced social democracy of cyberspace. Although it is impossible to predict the future of the hi-tech gift economy, one thing is almost certain. The intellectual elitism of Deleuzoguattarian discourse is being superseded by the emancipatory ‘grand narrative’ of modernity. As more and more ‘herd animals’ go on-line, radical intellectuals can no longer fantasise about becoming cyborg Supermen. As digital anarcho-communism becomes an everyday activity, there is no longer any need for the leadership of the cultural avant-garde. The time for the revolution of holy fools has passed. As has already happened within popular music, the most innovative and experimental culture will be created by people doing things for themselves. By participating within the hi-tech gift-economy, everyone can potentially become a wise citizen and a creative worker. [253]

    ‘… the word ‘creation’ will no longer be restricted to works of art but will signify a self-conscious activity, self-conceiving, reproducing for its own terms … and its own reality (body, desire, time, space), being its own creation.’ [254]

    11: Footnotes

    [1] Louis Rossetto, the founding editor of Wired, aggressively opposes any form of state economic intervention: ‘Keeping the government out of cyberspace is crucial to the Net’s development, and to the development of the New Economy and global consciousness.’ David Hudson, ‘There’s no government like no government’, page 34. For a critique of the neo-liberal politics of Wired, see Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    [2] For instance, see the miserablism about the Net shown by the contributors to Jon Dovey, Fractal Dreams. The denunciation of the emancipatory potential of new information technologies reached its apogee in the work of Baudrillard: ‘…it really seems that interaction, taken in the communications sense, marks the end of action, taken in its political sense.’ Jean Baudrillard, La Gauche Divine, page 142.

    [3] A TJ is a ‘theory-jockey’: Amsterdam slang for intellectuals who cut ‘n’ mix philosophies like DJs in a club.

    [4] Situationist International, ‘The Beginning of An Era’, pages 225-226.

    [5] DIY stands for ‘do-it-yourself’. This slogan is used to emphasise the need for people to tackle social problems through collective direct action rather than to wait for someone else to solve them. See Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle, Gathering Force.

    [6] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 4.

    [7] See archive of contributions to the nettime listserver on its web site.

    [8] See Kevin Kelly, Out of Control; and for a critique of this Social Darwinist manifesto, see Richard Barbrook, ‘The Pinnochio Theory’.

    [9] An American commentator exiled in Berlin notes that: ‘…because Europe is not crowded with netrepreneurs, because the movers and shakers on the business end of the Net are almost all in the US., digital culture in Europe is precisely that: culture…’ David Hudson, ‘The People are the Party’, page 3. Although many of its pioneers were American, the chemical hedonism, sexual tolerance and racial miscegenation inherent in dance music means that this style has never had the profound impact on popular culture in the USA as it has in Europe. See Matthew Collin with John Godrey, Altered State.

    [10] Uncritical enthusiasm for Deleuze and Guattari’s work led one group of DJs to set up a label named after the original French title of the holy book. See Mille Plateaux Records; and David Hudson, ‘The People are the Party’, pages 2-3.

    [11] Not surprisingly, there are many web sites promoting the teachings of the holy prophets, such as Web Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari Homepage; How To Make Yourself a Plane of Consistency; The Deleuzeguattarionary; and WWW Resources for Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

    [12] For an account of scandal surrounding the publication of a Yippie manual of ‘rip-off scams’, see Abbie Hoffman, Soon To Be A Major Motion Picture, pages 228-240. For the influence of anti-commodity attitudes on the early hacker culture, see Bruce Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown, pages 45-47.

    [13] In some tribal societies, social bonds between people were formed through the giving and receiving of gifts to gain recognition from others: ‘The cycling gift system is the society.’ Mary Douglas, ‘Foreword: no free gifts’, page ix. Similarly, within the Net, users collaborate with each other by giving and receiving information without payment. This is the hacker ethic of the hi-tech gift economy: we all give gifts to strangers because everyone else is already doing it. For a more detailed analysis, see chapters 10 and 11 below.

    [14] IRC means Internet Relay Chat: a CB-style channel for text-based conversations. MOO means Multi-User-Dungeon Object Orientated: a text-based 3D virtual environment.

    [15] On its web site, Rhizome describes itself as ‘an organisation dedicated to fostering communication and community in the field of new media art’. See rhizome.com.

    [16] Hakim Bey popularised the phrase ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ as a more comprehensible way of saying rhizome. Although hostile to industrial society, he does include such hi-tech activities as ‘…the BBS networks, pirated software, hacking, phone-phreaking…’ within his definition of a ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’, i.e. as potential rhizomes. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 109. ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ was first widely used as a description of techno parties. For instance, Debbie Stauton – a rave organiser – explains that: ‘The whole point of festivals is that they are temporary autonomous zones…they are self-organising…Nobody is told where to go or what to do, everyone just does their own bit…’ quoted in Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle, Gathering Force, page 89. Ironically, Hakim Bey admits that: ‘…I don’t go to raves and I don’t enjoy the music or staying up all night taking crypto-speed and dancing my head off…’, Geekgirl, ‘Interview with Hakim Bey’, page 207.

    [17] See Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 137-140, 173-176, 183-185, 190-197, 202-207.

    [18] See Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 50-64.

    [19] ‘Feminist women have a long history of dancing through a variety of potentially lethal mine-fields in their pursuit of socio-symbolic justice. Nowadays, women have to undertake the dance through cyberspace…’ Rosa Braidotti, ‘Cyberfeminism with a Difference’, page 11. Also see the sci-fi fantasies in Sadie Plant, Zeroes + Ones.

    [20] See Andreas Broeckmann, ‘Next Five Minutes: Tactical Media’, pages 8-12.

    [21] See Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 65-94. Another optimistic reading of Deleuze and Guattari concludes that: ‘what people are creating on the Internet is a conversational, demassified, non-representational democracy that transcends the nation-state.’ Dan Thu Nguyen and Jon Alexander, ‘The Coming of Cyberspacetime and the End of Polity’, page 111.

    [22] Gary Snyder in 1966 explaining how the USA – dominated by ‘straights’ organised like an ant hill – would be transformed into a tribal society by the hippie counter-culture. See Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven, page 448.

    [23] Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 109.

    [24] One Deleuzoguattarian has proclaimed that: ‘on this plateau, users [of computer-mediated communications] are virtual nomads, phantoms who circulate in the structures of the labyrinth.’ André Lemos, ‘The Labyrinth of Minitel’, page 46. For a metahistorical defence of the techno-nomad myth, see Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 156-157.

    [25] Like other post-structuralist philosophers, Deleuze and Guattari unashamedly used precise scientific terms as dodgy socio-cultural metaphors. See Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Impostures Intellectuelles, pages 141-152. The Californian ideologues also try to reduce the complexity of human society to the simplicities of natural laws. See Kevin Kelly, Out of Control; and Jànos Sugar, ‘Interview with John Perry Barlow’, pages 96-99. The Deleuzoguattarians are now synthesising the two forms of mystical positivism into a single pseudo-scientific discourse. See Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History; Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective; and Sadie Plant, Zeroes and Ones.

    [26] See Mark Lipton, ‘Forgetting the Body: Cybersex and Identity’.

    [27] Pierre Lévy, L’Intelligence Collective, pages 95-117. It is probably no coincidence that his concept of the ‘collective intelligence’ has a strong resemblance to the ‘group mind’ experienced by people tripping together. See Jay Stevens, Storming Heaven, page 276.

    [28] ‘…human culture and society (considered as dynamical systems) are no different from the self-organised processes that inhabit the atmosphere and hydrosphere (wind, circuits, hurricanes), or, for that matter, no different from lavas and magamas…’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, page 55. Also see Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, pages 7-9; and Sadie Plant, Zeroes + Ones, pages 156-164.

    [29] Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 50. The Luther Blissett Project wickedly describe Bey’s style as ‘…one part Hippie bullshit and cheap oriental trinkets, one part Post-structuralism and pithy intricacies, one part cyber-crap…’ Luther Blissett, ‘Why I Wrote a Fake Hakim Bey Book and How I Cheated the Conformists of Italian “Counter-Culture”‘, page 147.

    [30] As Dick Hebdige in his seminal text puts it: ‘…it is through the distinctive rituals of consumption, through style, that the subculture at once reveals its ‘secret’ identity and communicates its forbidden meanings. It is basically the way in which commodities are used in subculture which mark the subculture off from more orthodox cultural formations.’ Dick Hebdige, Subculture, page 103.

    [31] One of the ‘winners’ of third annual Bad Writing competition for academic texts was a fan of Deleuze and Guattari. See David Cohen, ‘Pseuds in a Corner’, page ii. A hilarious example of how Deleuze and Guattari’s jargon can be used to write theoretical gobbledygook is: ‘Antioedipus is an anticipatively assembled inducer for the replay of geohistory in hypermedia, a social-systematic fast feed-forward through machinic delirium. While tracking Artaud across the plane it discovers a cosmic catatonic abstract body that both repels its parts (deterritorialising them {from each other}) and attracts them (reterritorialising them {upon itself}), in a process that reconnects the parts through deterritorium as rhizomatic nets conducting schizogeneses.’ Nick Land, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’, page 191.

    [32] James Flint, ‘Harvesting the Tubers: the Planting of Deleuze and Guattari’, page 15.

    [33] Like other post-structuralists, Deleuze and Guattari were marginalised within the French academic system despite their fame among the reading public both at home and abroad. See Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, page xviii. As a consequence, even after the success of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze could still credibly claim that: ‘…neither Félix nor I have turned into little leaders of a little [philosophical] school.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’, page 9. Ironically, this fate has finally happened to the two philosophers in the late-Nineties.

    [34] This brief description is then supplemented by a series of enigmatic quotations from A Thousand Plateaus. See the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section on rhizome.com.

    [35] See Hari Kunzru, ‘Rewiring Technoculture’, page 10. Kunzru was an associate editor of the short-lived British edition of Wired.

    [36] Guattari described May ’68 as ‘a great awakening, a huge thunderclap’ which sparked off the process of ‘molecular revolutions’ across the world by inspiring the emergence of new social movements, especially feminism. Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 4. Gilles Deleuze also made clear his enthusiasm for this momentous event: ‘May ’68 was a demonstration, an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state… Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, page 171.

    [37] For Deleuze’s involvement in the anti-prisons movement, see Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, pages 224-237. For Guattari’s leading role in the French community radio movement, see chapters 5 and 6 below.

    [38] In colloquial French, the stilted jargon used by the French Communist Party and other Leninists was called ‘langue de bois’.

    [39] It is difficult for us now to comprehend the huge influence which Stalinism exercised over the childhood and adolescence of Deleuze and Guattari – as well as other French structuralist philosophers from the babyboomer generation: ‘In 1947 the PCF [French Communist Party] was a political party claiming close to a million members and the electoral choice of over five million (mostly working class) French voters. Basking in the prestige of its Resistance record, its obvious working class support, and its marxist legacy, the PCF exercised a strong attraction on leftist and liberal intellectuals. It was a political party which confidentially claimed to be in sole possession of a philosophically rigorous and scientific theory of history and society. It was a party that claimed to fight for social justice for downtrodden and social progress for all. And despite its many shortcomings, it was a party that compared quite favourably with the other political groupings of the postwar period.’ Arthur Hirsch, The French Left, page 10. Also see Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes Français; and R.W. Johnson, The Long March of the French Left.

    [40] For the intellectual forerunners of the Sixties New Left, see Arthur Lehring (ed.), Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings; Leon Trotsky, The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International (The Transitional Programme); André Breton, What is Surrealism?; D.A. Smart (ed.), Pannekoek and Gorter’s Marxism; and Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism.

    [41] For an analysis of the New Left as a ‘world-historical movement’, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left. Also see Richard Gombin, Les Origins du Gauchisme; and Arthur Hirsch, The French Left.

    [42] For the historical antecedents of New Left anarcho-communism, see Richard Gombin, Les Origins du Gauchisme, pages 99-151. For its later influence on internal structures of the new social movements, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, pages 204-212.

    [43] Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, pages 35-36.

    [44] Félix Guattari, ‘Institutional Politics and Practice’, page 127. According to the holy prophets, the differences between the Stalinist and Social Democratic strategies for taking state power amounted to: ‘…either the proletariat prevails and transforms the apparatus in conformity with its objective interest – but these operations are carried out under the domination of its consciousness or party vanguard, that is, for the benefit for a bureaucracy or technocracy that stands in for the bourgeoisie as the “great-absent” class – or the bourgeoisie keeps its control of the State and is free to secrete its own technobureaucracy, and above all to add a few more axioms for the recognition of the proletariat as a second class.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 256.

    [45] Crucially, Deleuze and Guattari never offered any materialist explanations of why the oppressive power of the state was created in the first place. For them, the origins of political power were completely mystical: ‘The State was not formed in progressive stages; it appears fully armed, a master stroke performed all at once; the primordial Urstaat, the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 217. Later, they even admitted that the emergence of the state resembled the ‘birth of [the Greek goddess] Athena’ from the head of Zeus, chief of the gods! Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 359. This myth was derived from the writings of Pierre Clastres – the anarchist anthropologist – who claimed that the ‘mysterious emergence’ of the state power had destroyed the egalitarian idyll of primitive societies and instituted a new order based on social oppression. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, pages 189-218. Also see Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics.

    [46] This analysis closely resembled the pessimistic reading of modernity proposed by their close friend and political ally Foucault. Far from being progress towards emancipation, this guru believed that social evolution was the refinement of repressive controls over individual freedom. See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, Discipline and Punish; and History of Sexuality.

    [47] The two philosophers explicitly rejected the ‘economism’ of Marxist analyses of society: ‘We think that the material or machinic aspect of an assemblage relates not to the production of goods but rather to the precise state of intermingling of bodies in a society, including all attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another… An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure nor superficial structure; it flattens all of its dimensions onto a single plane of consistency upon which reciprocal presuppositions and mutual assertions play themselves out.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 90.

    [48] Influenced by Reich’s Freudo-Marxist explanation of the popular appeal of Nazism, Deleuze and Guattari emphasised that: ‘…psychic repression is a means in service of social repression.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 119. Also see Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism.

    [49] ‘[The]…dichotomy between social production and the production of desire must be a target of the revolutionary struggle wherever familialist repression works against women, children, drug-addicts, alcoholics, homosexuals or any other disadvantaged groups.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Molecular Revolution and Class Struggle, pages 257-258. The economic causes of the conflict between the supporters of the mainstream Left in the ‘guaranteed’ sector and those of the New Left in the ‘non-guaranteed’ sector were only finally admitted in the collaboration between one of the philosophic duo and a prominent Italian Autonomist economist. See Félix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us, pages 75-84.

    [50] See Félix Guattari, ‘Social Democrats and Euro-Communists vis-à-vis the State’, pages 242-252.

    [51] ‘If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialised par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialisation afterwards as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary’s relation with the earth is mediatised by something else, a property regime, a State apparatus).’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 381. According to Clastres, nomadic tribes and other primitive societies supposedly organised themselves in ways which prevented the emergence of the only institution threatening their freedom: the state. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, pages 207-212. Similarly, Michel Foucault made an unfavourable comparison between the confinement imposed on the insane by modern mental hospitals with the mobility enjoyed by the mad who sailed around Europe on the Ship of Fools in pre-modern times. See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, pages 3-37.

    [52] A crude polarisation between statism and anarchism underpinned this myth of the nomad: ‘In social terms, the contrast is between authoritarian and libertarian organisations: on the one hand, States with their insistence on centralised power…and their hierarchical separations between States and classes; on the other hand, looser organisations of smaller groups, without territorial limits, without hierarchy. The best example of the latter is a society of nomads, whose main value is not authority (which implies stability and order), but flight.’ Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 169.

    [53] This argument is summarised in the introduction to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 3-25. Like the myth of the nomads, the concept of the rhizome was aimed against the reformist policies of the Stalinists and the Social Democrats. Although Deleuze and Guattari realised that constant changes in production and consumption under capitalism led to the ‘deterritorialisation’ of existing ways of living, they claimed that left-wing attempts to regulate this economic process were simply continuing political oppression in the interests of big business: ‘Never before has a State lost so much of its power in order to enter with so much force into the service of the signs of economic power.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 252.

    [54] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 17. Translation altered.

    [55] ‘…schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence and its death.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 246. The two philosophers derived this vision of the revolutionary potential of schizophrenia from the social explanations for mental illness advanced by Ronnie Laing and other members of the anti-psychiatry movement. See R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise, pages 84-107; and Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation.

    [56] According to Guattari, ‘…there is an urgent need to free ourselves of scientistic references and metaphors [as used by the mainstream Left]; to forge new paradigms which are instead ethico-aesthetic in inspiration.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, page 132. As Lecercle points out: ‘The first comment one can make about délire [delirium] is that the truth of it cannot be grasped from the outside: it requires a degree of involvement and renunciation on the part of the philosopher. He must abandon his normal processes of thought, proceed by paradox…he must become delirious’, Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 165.

    [57] ‘…délire [delirium] is itself a form of political expression, as the history of ranting shows: against political or psychological repression, the exaggerated reaction of délire [delirium] carries with it both the political contents of a revolt and its violence.’ Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 167.

    [58] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 161. Despite their rejection of the economic determinism inherent in Marxism, the two philosophers themselves advocated their own form of libidinal reductionism whereby every aspect of human activity – from personal relationships to capitalist production – could be derived from the direct or indirect expression of sexual desire. See Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, pages 160-194.

    [59] Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 185. Nietzsche proclaimed that: ‘I teach you the Superman. Man is something to be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? What is ape to man? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. And just so shall man be to the Superman… The Superman is the meaning of the earth.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pages 41-42.

    [60] Alfred Douglas, The Tarot, page 43. This Gnostic vision of human freedom is remarkably close to the liberating role of insanity championed by the two philosophers. See Félix Guattari, ‘Students, the Mad and ‘Delinquents’, pages 208-216. Similarly, their colleague Michel Foucault revived the pre-modern myth of the mad being able to comprehend spiritual truths better than the learned: ‘…knowledge, so inaccessible, so formidable, the Fool, in his innocent idiocy, already possesses. While the man of reason and wisdom perceives only fragmentary and all the more unnerving images of it, the Fool bears it all intact as an unbroken sphere: that crystal ball which for all others is empty is in his eyes filled with the density of an invisible knowledge.’ Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, page 22.

    [61] For the origins and development of the Minitel network, see Marcel Marchand, The Minitel Saga.

    [62] When writing about the impact of television, Guattari often sounded like Neil Postman or other patrician critics of this mass medium: ‘The television ends by functioning like a hypnotic drug, cutting people off from their environment, contributing to dissolving family relations which are already very strained, diminishing the role of reading and writing in favour of cultural and information events so superficial that they contribute to a phenomenon which has been characterised as ‘short attention span’.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Pour une Éthique des Médias’, page 6. Later on in the same article, he even claimed that video games and cartoon books were causing ‘psychopathy’ among young people in Japan!

    [63] Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, page 143.

    [64] Félix Guattari, ‘Remaking Social Practices’, page 263.

    [65] For Guattari’s enthusiasm for the use of Minitel by the social movements, see Félix Guattari, ‘Three Ecologies’, pages 142-144; ‘Pour une Éthique des Médias’; and ‘Subjectivities: for Better and for Worse’, page 194. In contrast, Deleuze was much more sceptical about the libertarian potential of the new information technologies: ‘We’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people [in hospitals, schools, factories, etc.] but through continuous control and instant communication.’ Sounding like Baudrillard, he later concluded that: ‘Compared to the approaching forms of continuous control in open sites, we may come to see the harshest confinement as part of a wonderfully happy past. The quest for “universals of communication” ought to make us shudder.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, pages 174-175.

    [66] See David Armstrong, A Trumpet to Arms. The hacker culture was the expression of these hippie attitudes within the computer science departments.

    [67] See David Armstrong, A Trumpet to Arms, pages 74-81; and John Downing, Radical Media, pages 35-157.

    [68] This situation was the specifically Italian reflection of a wider European phenomenon. See Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. As the more perceptive New Left analysts pointed out at the time, the military hegemony of the USA was increasingly being superseded by the more effective disciplines of the global marketplace. For them, this transformation was reflected in the unquestioning acceptance of neo-liberal solutions to the crisis of Fordism in the late-Seventies by all Italian parliamentary parties, including those on the Left. See Sergio Bologna, ‘A Tribe of Moles’.

    [69] See John Downing, Radical Media, pages 215-303; and Red Notes, Italy 1977-8.

    [70] For example, Guattari wrote the introduction and provided the philosophical language for the book summing up the practical and theoretical achievements of Radio Alice. See Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre.

    [71] See Mark Grimshaw and Carl Gardner, ”Free Radio’ in Italy’, pages 14-17; Peter Lewis and Jerry Booth, The Invisible Medium, pages 138-147; and John Downing, Radical Media, pages 273-301.

    [72] For a sympathetic account of the achievements of the Communist local administration in Bologna, see Max Jäggi, Roger Müller and Sil Schmid, Red Bologna. During the Eighties, Bologna city council was a major inspiration for left Labour local authorities in England. For a comparison, see Maureen Mackintosh and Hilary Wainwright, A Taste of Power.

    [73] As well as news reports, Radio Alice also broadcast regular programmes made by feminists, conscripts, lesbians & gays, ex-prisoners, young workers and children. See Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, pages 100-102.

    [74] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’, pages 159-160; and ‘Plan for the Planet’.

    [75] Félix Guattari, ‘The Micro-Politics of Fascism’, page 220.

    [76] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’. The members of Radio Alice declared that they wanted: ‘To break the dictatorship of the Signifier, to introduce frenzy into the order of communication, to speak of desire, anger, madness and refusal. This form of linguistic practice is the only method adequate to the complex practice needed to destroy the dictatorship of the Political, to introduce appropriation, the refusal of work, freedom and collectivism into daily life.’ Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre, page 102.

    [77] The police raid which finally silenced Radio Alice was transmitted live from the station’s studios, see Red Notes, Italy 1977-8, pages 31-32. The closing down of Radio Alice was part of the rapid escalation of the conflict between the Communist party and its left-wing critics which culminated in the almost complete suppression of the Italian New Left by the early-Eighties. See Red Notes, Italy 1980-81 – After Marx, Jail.

    [78] Collectif A/Traverso, Radio Alice, Radio Libre, page 12.

    [79] The example of Radio Alice inspired the first wave of ‘free radio’ pirates in France: ‘Italy is a machine which exports dreams.’ Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, page 22.

    [80] See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 75-90.

    [81] See Collectif Radios Libres Populaires, Les Radios Libres, pages 21-31; Thierry Bombled, “Devine Qui Va Parler Ce Soir?”, pages 77-166; Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, pages 24-42, 109-146; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 9-71.

    [82] See Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, theses 203-211; Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Notes to the Civilised Concerning Generalised Self-Management’, pages 288-289; and Situationist International, ‘The Situationists and the New Forms of Action against Politics and Art’, page 214.

    [83] An activist from Radio Clémentine, a ‘free radio’ pirate in Paris, quoted in Thierry Bombled, “Devine Qui Va Parler Ce Soir?”, page 166. As Collin points out, one important reason for the fascination with radio among New Left militants was the romantic memory of the live broadcasts from the barricades on the Left Bank in Paris during the May ’68 revolution. See Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, page 38.

    [84] See Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 34-36.

    [85] See Claude Collin, Ondes de Choc, pages 26-29; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 49-51, 103-108.

    [86] See Félix Guattari, ‘Les Radios Libres Populaires’, page 160. As another supporter of the radical ‘free radios’ remarked: ‘These electronic “jukeboxes”, far from encouraging creativity and understanding, only promote an ideology of passivity and consumerism.’ Thierry Bombled, “Devine Qui Va Parler Ce Soir?”, page 62.

    [87] See Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM , pages 115-119, 127-132, 139-152; and ‘Loi no. 81-994 du 9 novembre 1981 portant dérogation au monopole d’État de la radiodiffusion’, pages 3,070-3,071.

    [88] See Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, pages 183-188; and Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’.

    [89] Pierre Gavi and Xavier Villetard, ‘La premier hit-parade de la FM Parisienne’, page 9.

    [90] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’.

    [91] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’.

    [92] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’. While avant-garde classical music is discussed in detail, there are no references to any style of popular music within the two philosophers’ sacred text! See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.

    [93] Jean-Paul Simard, ‘Interview with Author’; and Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, page 325. By the time that Fréquence Libre went under, the regulations against commercial broadcasting had also collapsed. See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 109-111.

    [94] Annick Cojean and Frank Eskenazi, FM, page 35.

    [95] ‘I think that if a rightist government had remained in place, we [the ‘free radio’ movement] would have continued to struggle and to achieve things. It sufficed that the Socialists came to power in order to liquidate all that.’ Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 8.

    [96] Radio Populare raises around 40% of its income from local and national advertising with the rest of the money coming from listener subscriptions, fund-raising events and subsidies from left-wing political groups. Despite its success in raising the money, the most important economic resource of this community radio station remains the free labour contributed by volunteers. During the 1991 Gulf War, the station’s campaign against the attack on Iraq led to Radio Populare topping the ratings in the Milan region. See Peter Lewis, ‘Neither Market nor State: Community Radio – a Third Way?’, pages 202-206. For the pragmatic policies which have allowed other community radio stations to thrive, also see Peter Lewis and Jerry Booth, The Invisible Medium, pages 89-162; and Richard Barbrook, ‘Choice or Participation’.

    [97] The vanguard was a military term used for the advance guard who opened up the path for the main army. Popularised by Lenin, the political use of this phrase emphasised the leadership role of radical intellectuals within revolutionary organisations. See V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? For Guattari, the prototype of the New Left vanguard was the Mouvement du 22 Mars which had sparked off the May ’68 revolution by organising the student protests at Nanterre University: ‘With their vanguard action to provide a model, they opened a new path, lifted prohibitions, and opened the way to a new understanding and a new logical formulation outside any framework of dogmatism.’ Félix Guattari, ‘Students, the Mad and ‘Delinquents”, page 215. Crucially, this student movement had no direct connections with any working class parties or unions. See Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative, pages 23-90.

    [98] ‘The principle concern of constitutional government is civil liberty; that of revolutionary government, public liberty…To good citizens revolutionary government owes the full protection of the state; to the enemies of the people it owes only death.’ Maximilien Robespierre, ‘On Revolutionary Government (December 25 1793)’, page 59.

    [99] ‘We…must foment, awaken and unleash all the passions, we must produce anarchy and, like invisible pilots in the thick of the popular tempest, we must steer it not by any open power but by the collective dictatorship of all the [revolutionary] allies – a dictatorship without insignia, titles or official rights, and all the stronger for having none of the paraphernalia of power… If you set up this collective, invisible dictatorship, you will triumph, the revolution, properly guided, will triumph. If not, not.’ Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Letter to Albert Richard, April 1st, 1870’ in Arthur Lehring, Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings, page 180.

    [100] Replying to orthodox Marxist criticisms of the Bolsheviks’ decision to dissolve Russia’s first democratically-elected parliament, Lenin proclaimed that ‘…in an epoch of desperate acute war, when history has placed on the order of the day the question whether age-old and thousand-year-old privileges are to be or not to be – at such a time to talk about majority and minority, about pure democracy, about dictatorship being unnecessary and about equality between exploiter and exploited!!.’ V.I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, page 36.

    [101] While the Stalinists wanted to dominate ‘molar’ party politics and trade union struggles, Guattari advocated that the New Left vanguard should instead exercise its leadership over the ‘molecular’ social movements. See Félix Guattari, ‘Plan for the Planet’, pages 268-272.

    [102] Jo Freeman, ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’, page 13.

    [103] In the founding text of the Bolshevik party, Lenin bluntly stated that: ‘…the spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its becoming subordinated to the bourgeois ideology…for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade unionism…and trade unionism means the ideological enslavement of the working-class by the bourgeoisie.’ V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, page 49. A more sophisticated version of this patrician attitude can be found in Georg Lukàcs, History and Class Consciousness.

    [104] According to Althusser, Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud had provided a supposedly ‘scientific’ explanation of how the ideologies spread by the media and other institutions controlled the minds – and therefore the actions – of the majority of the population. See Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)’ and ‘Freud and Lacan’.

    [105] ‘Psychic repression is such that social repression becomes desired; it induces a consequent desire, a faked image of its object, on which it bestows the appearance of independence.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, page 119. Their uncritical appropriation of Althusser’s theory of ideology can also be seen in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 130, 458-459. Also see the discussion in this book about the supposed ‘desire for fascism’ held by most people, see pages 208-231.

    [106] Along with many other leftists of their generation, Deleuze and Guattari seized on the tortured and obscurantist discourse of Lacan as their replacement for the tired formulas of Stalinist philosophy. As Guattari explained: ‘…it was important for me to have a model of rupture, if I can call it that, all the more so since I was involved in extreme leftist organisations, but still traditionalist from many perspectives. There was all this weight of Sartre’s thought, of Marxist thought, creating a whole environment that it wasn’t easy to eliminate. So I think that’s what Lacan was. Moreover, it’s certain that his reading of Freud opened possibilities for me to cross through and into different ways of thinking.’ Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 10. Yet, as Edward Thompson perceptively explained: ‘I do not wish to be ungenerous to a “post-Stalinist generation”, but it is necessary to be plain…Stalinism as an ideology has continued to reproduce itself long after the particular historical moment of high Stalinism has passed. And so long as it does so in theory, it will tend to reproduce itself in fact – not in exactly the same form, of course, but in a form sufficiently uncomfortable for its human objects, and even for some of the intellectuals who serve as its priests. So far from being a “post-Stalinist generation”, the Althusserians, and those who share their premises and idealist modes, are working hard, every day, on the theoretical production-line of Stalinist ideology. In terms of theory, they are Stalinists.’ E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, page 333.

    [107] As Althusserians, Deleuze and Guattari believed that the creation of subjectivity was a result of psychic control by semiotic structures rather than the self-consciousness of a free citizen celebrated in republican theories. For instance, Deleuze thought that the ‘repetitions’ which shape people’s daily lives were manifestations of Freud’s supposed ‘death instinct’. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pages 16-19. This analysis was developed by Guattari who claimed that: ‘Subjectivity does not only produce itself through the psychogenetic stages of psychoanalysis or the “mathmemes” of the Unconscious, but also in the large-scale social machines of language and the mass media – which cannot be described as human.’ Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, page 9. Later in the book, he described the multiplicity of ‘autopoetic’ structures ranging from economics to music which allegedly shape all aspects of our lives. See Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, pages 33-57; and also Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pages 35-37. Edward Thompson commented on this form of analysis that: ‘None of these ideas is, in origin, absurd, and some rest upon substantial additions to knowledge. But all slip, at a certain point, from sense to absurdity, and, in their sum, all arrive at a common terminus of unfreedom. Structuralism (this terminus of the absurd) is ultimate product of self-alienating reason – “reflecting” the common sense of the times – in which all human projects, endeavours, institutions, and even culture itself, appear to stand outside men, to stand against men, objective things, as the “Other” which moves men around as things. In the old days, the Other was then named “God” or Fate. Today it has been christened anew as Structure.’ E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, page 345. ‘Nuff said!

    [108] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, page 304. Despite their positivist posturing, post-structuralist philosophers advocate the same mystical solutions to practical problems as their Idealist predecessors in the early-nineteenth century: ‘We have seen that the whole problem of the transition from thought to reality, hence from language to life, exists only in the philosophical illusion… This great problem…was bound, of course, to result finally in one of these knight-errant [philosophers] setting out in search of a word which, as a word, formed the transition [to a better society]…which, as a word, ceases to be simply a word, and which, as a word, in a mysterious superlinguistic manner, points from within language to the actual object it denotes; which, in short, plays among words the same role as the Redeeming God-Man plays among people in Christian fantasy.’ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, pages 475-476.

    [109] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, page 144.

    [110] The pride which Fréquence Libre took in its vanguardist politics can be seen by the station’s principle slogan: “plus gauche que moi, tu meurs” (“If you were more left than me, you’d be dead” – i.e. it is impossible to be more left than me). Fréquence Libre, Publicity Poster.

    [111] According to orthodox Marxists, the admirers of the Bolsheviks had confused the violent revolution which overthrew the absolute monarchy with the socialist revolution which would democratise the economy. In the latter case, social transformation would depend upon the majority of the population not only becoming wage-workers, but also supporting the Social Democratic party in parliamentary elections. See Léon Blum, ‘Bolchevisme et Socialisme’, pages 451-460.

    [112] Like many other members of his generation, Guattari was fascinated with ‘the Leninist breakthrough’ which inspired revolutionary politics across Europe after 1917. See Félix Guattari, ‘Causality, Subjectivity and History’, pages 184-195. Although many were sympathetic with Trotskyism, the New Left militants’ hostility against all forms of left-wing reformism in many ways mimicked the ‘third period’ of the Third International. This was the disastrous moment when Stalin asserted his control over the European Communist parties by making them concentrate on fighting against the so-called ‘social fascists’: the orthodox Marxists of the Social Democratic parties. Tragically, in 1933, the result of this sectarianism was the victory of real fascists in Germany. See Franz Borkenau, World Communism, pages 332-385.

    [113] For instance, see the contributions in Patrick Kessel, Le Mouvement “Maoïste” en France.

    [114] Anarcho-communism was seen as the heir of those Left Communists who had fought for direct democracy organised through the Soviets against the dictatorship of the Leninist party. See Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks & Workers’ Control; and Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Uprising 1921.

    [115] For example, one ‘soixante-huitard’ claimed in 1973 that: ‘…Marx’s work seems largely to be the authentic consciousness of the capitalist mode of production… Historical materialism is a glorification of the wandering in which humanity has been engaged for more than a century: growth of productive forces [of industry and science] as the condition sine-qua-non for liberation.’ Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, pages 22-23. Of course, a much diluted variant of this attack on oppressive ‘grand narratives’ later formed the ideological basis for the self-styled post-modernists. See Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition; and David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity.

    [116] For instance, the first chapter is given the date ‘1914’, the next one has ‘10,000 B.C.’, the one after ‘November 20, 1923’, then we jump back again to ‘587 B.C. – A.D. 70’ and so on. See Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus. Lecercle erroneously claims that: ‘Despite their off-hand treatment of history, Deleuze and Guattari’s position is profoundly historical’ because they emphasise the singularity of each instance of ‘delirium’ in time and space. See Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 185. However, as he himself shows earlier in the same chapter, their theoretical oppositions are completely metahistorical, such as ‘territoriality vs deterritorialisation’ or ‘hierarchic (the State) vs nomadic (the tribe).’ See Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass, page 179.

    [117] This ahistorical theorising is clearest in their celebration of the Body-without-Organs – the person ‘…populated only by intensities.’ See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 149-166.

    [118] Deleuze admitted that: “Becomings” are much more important than history in A Thousand Plateaus.’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘From Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus’, page 30. In their writings, the holy prophets denounced the moral emptiness of the ‘grand narrative’ of progress supported by the parliamentary Left: ‘The meaning of history and the [Hegelian] dialectic together is not the realisation of reason, freedom or man as a species, but nihilism, nothing but nihilism.’ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 161. In place of the supposedly oppressive historical analyses of Hegel and Marx, Deleuze and Guattari resurrected the ahistorical theory of ‘eternal return’ proposed by Nietzsche. Over time, the negativity of social controls would disappear as the positive moments of ‘delirium’ came back through the process of ‘eternal return’. See Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’; Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pages 237-238, 244-247; and Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pages 186-194. Above all, this Nietzschean myth enabled the two philosophers to dismiss all evolutionary explanations of human history: ‘…a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure or arrival, origin or destination… A line of becoming only has a middle.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 293.

    [119] There is a particular acid sensibility underlying Deleuze and Guattari’s disdain of modernity as an historical process. As someone peaks, a few hundred years either seems an unimaginably long period of time compared with the next five minutes or ridiculously short compared to the cosmic nature of eternity.

    [120] ‘Irresponsibility – Nietzsche’s most noble and beautiful secret.’ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 21.

    [121] Gilles Deleuze, ‘Control and Becoming’, page 171.

    [122] For an examination of this profound social transformation, see André Gauron, Histoire Économique et Sociale de la Cinquième République – Tome 1, pages 19-47; and Henri Mendras with Alistair Cole, Social Change in Modern France, pages 15-48.

    [123] See Jean-Pierre Garnier and Roland Lew, ‘From The Wretched Of The Earth To The Defence Of The West’, pages 301-317.

    [124] For instance, Jacques Camatte emphasised that: ‘[Anarcho-communism]…is the destruction of urbanisation and the formation of a multitude of communities distributed over the earth.’ Jacques Camatte, The Wandering of Humanity, page 37. In some classic New Left films, rebellion against a repressive and alienating urban society was symbolically represented through a return to primitive simplicity. In Weekend, the heroine finally escapes from road rage, traffic jams and car accidents by joining the hippie rural guerrillas of the Front de Libération de Seine et Oise. Similarly, in Themroc, the eponymous hero turns his flat into a hunter-gatherer’s cave by sealing up its doors and knocking down the outside wall. Curiously, both films portrayed cannibalism as the ultimate expression of liberation from bourgeois morality! See Jean-Luc Godard, Weekend; and Claude Faraldo, Themroc.

    [125] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pages 204, 358, 402-403. According to another student of Althusser, the Cuban revolution had proved that the only true militants were found in the countryside: ‘…any man, even a comrade, who spends his life in city is unwittingly a bourgeois in comparison with a guerrillo.’ Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, page 68. Earlier in this book, Debray praised the ‘hardening’ of revolutionary intellectuals through the ‘absolute nomadism’ adopted by rural guerrilla groups, see page 31.

    [126] In their anti-modernism, Deleuze and Guattari were reviving Nietzsche’s romanticisation of the ‘wild, free, nomadic man’ of tribal society. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, pages 64-65. Yet, in the historical past, nomads were not always natural anarchists, but instead were often the aristocratic warriors who founded the earliest states: ‘…peasants and nomads constitute two factors, the coincidence and collision of which at a certain level of development necessarily resulted in the nomads rendering the peasants subject and tributary to them. Individual tribes of nomads combined numerous local communities or mark communities into a polity that was ruled and exploited by the nomads, who now ceased to be nomads. In this way, the first states were born.’ Karl Kautsky, The Materialist Conception of History, page 281. The original translation uses ‘herdsmen’ for nomads. Given the Islamophilia of many Deleuzoguattarians, it is rather ironic that one of the most famous examples of state-building by nomadic tribes is the creation of the Arab empire by the Prophet and his successors. See Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates.

    [127] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 417. Nietzsche expressed similar anti-modernist sentiments: ‘Woe to this great city! And I wish I could see already the pillar of fire in which it will be consumed!’ Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, page 198.

    [128] Michael Vickery describes the ideology of the Khmer Rouge as ‘Populism’: ‘…a conservative utopianism, a belief in the sacredness of the soil and those who till it, in the quality of the status of all cultivators, a belief that their virtue is endangered by the workings of an active, alien, urban vice. It is apolitical, without a basis for a sustained political party, and its program is one of rough revenge of the verities of the soil on the alien and the sophisticated. It proclaims a sacrifice of freedom in the interests of moral uniformity. There is a distrust of state and bureaucracy, and peasant populists would minimise them before the rights and virtues of local communities.’ Michael Vickery, Cambodia, page 285. Apart from its emphasis on peasants rather than nomads, Khmer Rouge ideology was eerily similar to the anti-modernism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari.

    [129] See Jean-Pierre Garnier and Roland Lew, ‘From The Wretched Of The Earth To The Defence Of The West’, pages 317-322. Despite this defeat at home, Deleuze and Guattari’s faction of the New Left still indulged in ‘orientalist’ fantasies about struggles in faraway countries. For instance, their close friend Michel Foucault enthusiastically supported the 1979 Iranian revolution precisely because it was led by Islamic fundamentalists rather than by the secular Left: ‘Modernisation as a political project and as a principle of social change is a thing of the past in Iran …’ Michel Foucault, ‘Le Poids Mort de la Modernisation’ quoted in Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, page 285.

    [130] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, page 177.

    [131] ‘[The post-modern artist]…gains fame and fortune for no clear accomplishment, but simply for being a stylish symbol, which is all that his production testifies to. Novelty is proof enough of his artistic power and credibility.’ Donald Kuspit, The Cult of the Avant-Garde Artist, page 20. Also see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, pages 39-65.

    [132] The most notorious recent proponent of anti-modernism chillingly threatens that: ‘Whatever society may exist after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people will live close to nature, because in the absence of advanced technology there is not other way that people CAN live. To feed themselves they must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter etc..’ The Unabomber [Theodore Kaczynski], Industrial Society and its Future, page 43. For a critique of the anarcho-primitivist sect which published this manifesto in England, see Luther Blissett and Stewart Home, Green Apocalypse.

    [133] ‘…the liberation of the mind, the express aim of the surrealists, demands as a primary condition…the liberation of man…that today more than ever the surrealists rely entirely, for the bringing of human liberation, on the proletarian revolution.’ André Breton, What is Surrealism, page 115.

    [134] André Breton, What is Surrealism, page 118.

    [135] The European avant-garde is distinguished from earlier art movements by this emphasis on creating modern aesthetics with new technologies: ‘In…earlier periods…there was a strong appeal to revival: the art and learning, the life of the past, were sources, stimuli of a new creativity, against an exhausted or deformed current order… What we now know as modernism, and certainly as the avant-garde, has changed all this. Creativity is all in new making, new construction: all traditional, academic, even learned models are actually or potentially hostile to it, and must be swept away.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, pages 4-5.

    [136] For the influence of ‘outsider art’ on the Surrealists, see David Maclagan, ‘Outsiders and Insiders’. The Surrealists were reflecting the rejection of the positivism and rationalism of orthodox Marxism by many intellectuals following the collaboration of the Social Democratic parties with their national governments during the First World War. Instead of welcoming the opportunties for social change opened up by industrialisation and scientific advances, influential revolutionary thinkers in the ’20s and 30s emphasised the resistance of the human spirit to further reification and fragmentation by capitalist modernisation. See Georg Lukàcs, History and Class Consciousness; and Phil Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School.

    [137] From 1930 to 1933, the Surrealists’ journal was called Le Surréalisme au service de la révolution. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 87-92. As Bürger points out: ‘What distinguishes… [the avant-garde] is the attempt to organise a new life praxis from a basis in art… Only an art the contents of whose individual works is wholly distinct from the (bad) praxis of the existing society can be the starting point for the organisation of a new life praxis.’ Peter Bürger, The Avant-Garde, pages 49-50.

    [138] For instance, the 1997 Documenta festival had texts by Deleuze and Guattari – along with other ‘soixante-huitard’ philosophers – prominently displayed on the walls of its art galleries. In their catalogue, the exhibition’s organisers stress the influence of the New Left on the contemporary European avant-garde. See Documenta X, Politics-Poetics.

    [139] For instance, one disciple first proclaims that: ‘Despotism introduces an organising principle that comes from elsewhere – from ‘above’ – a deterritorialised simplicity or supersoma overcoding the aboriginal body as created flesh. Monotheism…severs the ambivalent integrity of taboo.’ However, a few pages later, he switches from romantic primitivism to delirious futurism: ‘The industrial-information body…operates as an input-output flow-switching nexus, defined by its place among the machines, and redefined ever more exactly by its migration across the mutant sutures in machinic continuum…’ Nick Land, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’, pages 196, 202.

    [140] Andreas Broeckmann, ‘Towards an Aesthetics of Heterogenesis’, page 158.

    [141] For instance, Breton had long ago declared that: ‘The European artist in the twentieth century can ward off the drying up of the sources of inspiration swept away by rationalism and utilitarianism only by resuming so-called primitive visions.’ André Breton, What is Surrealism?, page 263. Similarly, Body-without-Organs was first used as a phrase by Antonin Artaud in articles celebrating the revolutionary potential of the insane for La Révolution surréaliste back in 1925. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, page 30.

    [142] ‘There is always a point at which technologies geared towards regulation, containment, command, and control, can turn out to be feeding into the collapse of everything they once supported…the keystrokes of users on the Net connect them to a vast distributed plane composed not merely of computers, users, and telephone lines, but all the zeros and ones of machine code, the switches of electronic circuitry, fluctuating waves of neurochemical activity, hormonal energy, thoughts, desires…’ Sadie Plant, Zeroes + Ones, page 143.

    [143] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, page 163.

    [144] Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, page 101.

    [145] ‘The novelty of Italian Futurist manifestos…is their brash refusal to remain in the expository or critical corner, their understanding that the group pronouncement, sufficiently aestheticised, can…all but take the place of the promised art work.’ Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Movement, page 85.

    [146] From its earliest appearances, theory-art was always multi-media. This aesthetic form not only involved literature, but also graphic design, typography and public performances. See Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Movement, pages 90-101.

    [147] Dan Thu Nguyen and Jon Alexander, ‘The Coming of Cyberspacetime and the End of Polity’, page 107.

    [148] ‘… the growth in the number of students and also of junior lecturers has been the cause of a quantitative growth in the demand for cultural products, and of a qualitative transformation of this demand: it is certain…that all the intellectual ‘novelties’ find their chosen audience among the students of the new disciplines in the arts field …’ Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, page 119.

    [149] For instance, it is estimated that over 600,000 people are directly employed Britain making cultural products ranging from TV through software to music. See Independent on Sunday, ‘The Cool Economy, pages 2-3.

    [150] The ‘virtual class’ is supposedly being formed by those employed in computing, media, education and similar sectors. See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; Robert Reich, The Work of Nations; and Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein, Data Trash.

    [151] For decades, avant-garde artists have pioneered the reclamation of derelict urban areas for later colonisation by businesses and residential developers. See Armin Medosch, ‘Art and Business’.

    [152] Chris Smith, British Minster of Culture, quoted in Peter Koenig, ‘Is Chris Smith More Vital Than Gordon Brown?’, page 1.

    [153] ‘As the division of labour becomes more general, the artist also turns into a specialist.’ Peter Bürger, The Avant-Garde, page 32. Also see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, pages 11-96.

    [154] Earlier in the twentieth century, one cynical commentator observed that: ‘….there are today two main roads to fortune for a young artist. He may learn to please that still large and naive public that demands a flattering handmade photograph disguised as an old master, or he may squirt his canvas with creosote, scour, scratch, blast and exorciate it, until it hangs in fashionable tatters upon the walls of one of our principal art galleries. The former method may command a steadier sale than the latter, and it calls for less salesmanship; but the latter is the true highway to glory and wealth.’ Quentin Bell, ‘Conformity and Nonconformity in the Fine Arts’, page 699.

    [155] For instance, see the careers of Bruno Latour, Sadie Plant, Nick Land, Manuel De Landa, James Flint, Critical Art Ensemble, Rosi Braidotti, Hakim Bey, Pierre Lévy, the Krokers and many others.

    [156] As Pierre Bourdieu points out, new forms of cultural expression present an opportunity for innovative people to gain a position within the cultural elite: ‘These arts, not yet fully legitimate, which are disdained or neglected by the big holders of educational capital, offer a refuge and a revenge to those who, by appropriating them, secure the best return on their cultural capital (especially if it is not fully recognised scholastically) while at the same time taking credit for contesting the established hierarchy of legitimacies and profits.’ Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, page 87.

    [157] Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, page 176.

    [158] ‘…nothing more rigorously distinguishes the different classes than the…aptitude for taking a specifically aesthetic point of view on objects already constructed aesthetically…’ Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, page 40.

    [159] In the late-nineteenth century, Nietzsche advocated the formation of an aristocracy based on ethical-aesthetic values to replace the declining nobility based on land and finance. Otherwise, democracy, socialism and feminism would impose a morality of ‘timidity’ and ‘mediocrity’ upon society. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pages 120-128.

    [160] ‘…there is a position within the apparent critique of the bourgeois family which is actually a critique and rejection of all social forms of human reproduction. The ‘bourgeois family’…is often a covering phrase for those rejections of women and children which take the form of a rejection of ‘domesticity’. The sovereign individual is confined by such a form. The genius is tamed by it.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 9.

    [161] Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 185. Inspiring this avant-garde demand to turn life into art, Nietzsche claimed that cultural aristocrats shouldn’t just form a new society, but also should become a more advanced type of human: ‘For justice speaks to me: ‘Men are not born equal.’ And they should not become so either! For what were my love for the Superman if I spoke otherwise.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, page 124. Also see Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses.

    [162] What united the fascist Futurists in Italy with the Leninist avant-garde movements was a common commitment to the ‘violent assault on existing [bourgeois] conventions.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 9. In the first Futurist manifesto, Marinetti’s celebration of war and denigration of women was combined with a ferocious assault against failings of the Italian liberal bourgeoisie. See Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Movement, pages 81-92.

    [163] ‘Radical aristocratism’ is one of the ‘Slogans & Mottos for Subway Graffiti & Other Purposes’ in Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 28. This gurus’ desire to become a Nietzschean Superman rapidly turns into unashamed support for reactionary political positions. For instance, Bey claims that the seizure of the Croatian city of Fiume (known today as Rijeka) by D’Annunzio’s supporters in 1919 was a forerunner of contemporary ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., pages 125-126. Yet, the Fiume incident not only pioneered the style and ideology of Italian fascism, but also led directly to the imposition of totalitarianism on Italy. See Laura Fermi, Mussolini, pages 170-184. In his imitation of the European avant-garde, Hakim Bey confuses anarcho-communism with fascism because both positions are opposed to representative democracy and consumer society. Although their colleague Foucault said that Anti-Oedipus should have been subtitled ‘an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life’, Deleuze and Guattari actually revived the discredited Nietzschean myths of the extreme-right in this sacred text. Above all, the holy prophets’ celebration of the untamed nomadic war-machine recapitulated the fascist romanticisation of heroic soldiers who had freed themselves the effeminate morality of bourgeois society. Hakim Bey has simply developed the Deleuzoguattarian myth of the nomad warrior to its logical – and therefore reactionary – conclusion. See Michel Foucault, ‘Preface’, page xiii; Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier, Ecofascism; and Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism.

    [164] Bey claims that imitating the Assassin religious cult would be an ‘interesting…thought-experiment’. Just as the Ismailis hid away from society making magic in their castles, techno-nomads should create ‘Temporary Autonomous Zones’ within the Net to perfect the ‘secret sciences’ of making subversive media. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., pages 98-99; and Peter Lamborn Wilson [Hakim Bey], ‘A Network of Castles’, page 27. For someone determined to confuse anarcho-communism with fascism, the Assassins are an excellent choice. Historically, they simultaneously defended conservative religious values and advocated communist social policies. In modern times, their ideological legacy has been found on both political extremes. While Nietzsche admired their hierarchical conception of freedom, others have compared the Assassins with the Trotskyist Fourth International. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, page 124; Frank Ridley, The Assassins, pages 68, 140-156; and Kenneth Setton, A History of the Crusades, pages 99-132.

    [165] ‘The desire for wilderness will gratified at a level undreamed since the early Neolithic, and the desire for creativity and even co-creation will be gratified at a level undreamed by the wildest science fiction.’ Hakim Bey, Primitives & Extropians, page 3. Of course, this will only happen after the anarcho-fascist revolution!

    [166] Hakim Bey, T.A.Z., page 107.

    [167] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, page 421. According to Deleuze, the Superman represented a ‘new way of feeling…of thinking…of evaluating.’ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, page 163.

    [168] Although critical of Stalin, the Surrealists were members of the French Communist party during the sectarian ‘Third Period’ phase when all other left-wing groups were denounced as ‘social fascists’. Even after Hitler’s seizure of power, this avant-garde movement could still describe the Popular Front of Socialists, Communists and republicans as ‘counter-revolutionary’. See Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red, pages 119-160; and Franz Borkenau, World Communism, pages 332-375.

    [169] For example, in an attack on the ‘content-free’ 1996 presidential elections, a prominent article in Wired uncritically repeated the fraudulent claim that ‘…unless the [American] nation gets a handle on Social Security and Medicare, it faces a future of crushing debt, exorbitant tax rates, or both…’ See John Heilemann, ‘Reality Checklist’, page 54.

    [170] ‘In all fields, but especially in information technology, the strict separation between the technical and the creative has in fact been made redundant by digital images and the skills required by computer-aided design.’ Rosa Braidotti, ‘Cyberfeminism with a Difference’, page 2. For a more critical look at this phenomenon, see Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Impostures Intellectuelles.

    [171] Deleuze and Guattari were inspired by the work of Henri Bergson, a French Catholic philosopher popular in the early-twentieth century. Although mimicking the language of Darwinian biology, this guru believed that there was a divine ‘vital force’ driving the evolution of life. Many decades later, Deleuze and Guattari hoped that ecstatic states of ‘delirium’ would release this spiritual energy from the restraints of semiotic controls. See Paul Douglas, ‘Deleuze’s Bergson: Bergson Redux’. This bizarre mixture of Darwinian rationalism and Christian irrationalism is also found in Kevin Kelly, Out of Control.

    [172] Gerfried Stocker, ‘Memesis – the Future of Evolution’. This was the opening statement for Ars Electronica ’96, which is Europe’s most prestigious digital arts festival. For a dissection of the full statement, see Richard Barbrook, ‘Memesis Critique’.

    [173] Ray Smith, CEO of the Bell Atlantic telephone company, appears as Conan on the front cover of issue 3.02 and John Malone, head of TCI, is morphed into Mad Max for issue 2.07.

    [174] The disciples are reflecting the dubious fantasies of their holy prophets. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari romanticised nomads for having lifestyles which resembled more that of Clint Eastwood than of Emma Goldman: ‘…a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honour, all of which…impedes the formation of the State.’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, page 358. This macho ideal is very similar to the myth of the self-sufficient cowboy which excites the Californian ideologues. Guattari admitted that he and Deleuze had ‘…participated a little in that America, that new kind of West. It was our dream, our very own America.’ Charles J. Stivale, Pragmatic/Machinic, page 15. This shared dream of the heroic individual reflects the privileged socio-economic characteristics enjoyed by avant-garde artists and capitalist entrepreneurs. Unlike most people living within modern societies, both professions have retained control over their own production and property. Despite embracing revolutionary politics and bohemian lifestyles, the artist can therefore still be ‘…the ultimate apotheosis of that central bourgeois figure: the sovereign individual.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 7. Back in the Thirties, Ortega y Gasset hoped that this affinity between aesthetic intellectuals and innovative businessmen would enable them to come together as a liberal aristocracy which would rule over the people through its spiritual excellence: ‘…nobility is synonymous with a life of effort, ever set on excelling oneself, in passing beyond what one is to what one sets up as a duty and obligation.’ Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, page 49.

    [175] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, page 504. Deleuze commended Nietzsche for the ‘positive task’ of inventing the reactionary concept of the Superman. See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pages 162-4.

    [176] This merging of opposites is already implicitly present in Deleuze and Guattari’s own writings. Despite their self-proclaimed ultra-leftism, the two philosophers’ celebration of the ‘deterritorialisation’ of existing social hierarchies by the globalisation of capitalism anticipated the techno-nomads’ reapprochment with neo-liberalism: ‘…there are avant-garde political positions….which can be seen as a genuine vanguard of a truly modern international bourgeoisie which has emerged since 1945. The politics of the New Right, with its version of libertarianism in a dissolution or deregulation of all bonds and all social and cultural formations, in the interest of what is represented as the ideal open market and the truly open society, look very familiar in retrospect.’ Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, page 14.

    [177] The contemporary avant-garde turns art into a ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ which protects the ideals of May ’68 from the corrupting influences of the contemporary world. Despite using digital technologies, this process of aestheticisation is a return to the traditional role of art as spiritual compensation for the sufferings of the material world. Lacking any belief in social revolution, ‘…the neo-avant-garde institutionalises the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely avant-gardiste intentions.’ Peter Bürger, The Avant-Garde, page 58.

    [178] Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, page 217.

    [179] See Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’; and Situationist International, ‘Response to a Questionnaire from the Centre for Socio-Experimental Art’.

    [180] The Situationists were reviving the demand for the abolition of specialisation in cultural production championed by many nineteenth century socialists: ‘In a communist society, there are no painters, but only people who engage in painting among other activities.’ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, page 418. For the origins of this attack on the division of labour, see Jonathan Beecher, Charles Fourier.

    [181] Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’, page 25.

    [182] The founding members of the Situationists were architects, painters and film-makers. According to Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord lived off money from his parents while Michèle Bernstein composed horse horoscopes for racing magazines. See Kristin Ross, ‘Lefebvre on the Situationists: an Interview’, page 70.

    [183] The growing popularity of the Situationists after the May ’68 revolution exacerbated the tension between their theory of mass participation and their practice of intellectual elitism until the movement finally imploded. See Guy Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti, The Veritable Split in the International; and Luther Blissett, Guy Debord is Really Dead.

    [184] The Situationists discovered the tribal gift economy in Marcel Mauss, The Gift. Even before forming the Situationists, Debord and other key members of the movement published an avant-garde art magazine called Potlatch. As its name suggests, this journal was given away for free. See Stewart Home, The Assault on Culture, page 20.

    [185] For instance, in their famous analysis of the 1965 Watts riots, the Situationists praised looting as the supersession of money-commodity relations by a revolutionary form of the gift economy: ‘…the Los Angeles blacks…want to possess immediately all the objects shown [to them by advertising] and abstractly accessible because they want to use them. That is why they reject their exchange-value, the commodity-reality which is their mould, their purpose and their ultimate goal, and which has preselected everything. Through theft and gift they rediscover a use that immediately refutes the oppressive rationality of the commodity, revealing its relations and manufacture to be arbitrary and unnecessary…instead of being eternally pursued in the rat race of alienated labour and increasing but unmet social needs, real desires begin to be expressed in festival, in playful self-assertion, in the potlatch of destruction.’ Situationist International, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’, page 155.

    [186] Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, page 70.

    [187] For the influence of Situationism on the initiators of the punk movement, see Fred Vermorel and Judy Vermorel, Sex Pistols, pages 220-225.

    [188] ”This is a chord,’ wrote the assemblers of Sideburns [a fanzine]…in December 1976, displaying an A, an E and a G: ‘Now form a band.’ Brilliant!’ Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming, pages 280-281.

    [189] For instance, this can be seen in the development of drum ‘n’ bass music. See Martin James, State of Bass.

    [190] For instance, see Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, pages 77-95.

    [191] Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, page 2.

    [192] ‘”Open systems” architecture [of the Net] by its very nature goes against the organisational imperatives of the Defence Department. The threat to this institution from the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons demanded precautions to protect its strategic secrets, its centralised command and control system, and its hierarchical organisation. Paradoxically, the only precaution that could be effective called for a nonhierarchical, decentralised, and essentially egalitarian system.’ Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, page 128.

    [193] Contrary to neo-liberal dogma, money-commodity relations are not always the most efficient way of organising collective production: ‘The rationality of professional services is not the same as the rationality of the market…In the professions, and especially in science, the abdication of moral control would disrupt the system. The producer of professional services must be…responsible for his products, and it is fitting that he not be alienated from them. The scientist, for example, must concerned with maintaining and correcting existing theories in his field, and his work must be orientated towards this goal. The exchange of recognition for gifts tends to maintain such orientations.’ Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’, page 29. Similarly, the donation of blood by volunteers is less wasteful and more healthy than paying for supplies. See Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship.

    [194] This is why the increasing role of private funding can hamper as well as help academic research. See David Noble, ‘Digital Diploma Mills’; and Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’.

    [195] See Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, pages 126-132.

    [196] Tim Berners-Lee, ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’, page 11.

    [197] See John Chesterman and Andy Lipman, The Electronic Pirates; and Matthew Collin with John Godrey, Altered State.

    [198] ‘The logic of digital technology leads us in a new direction [away from the concept of information as a commodity]. Objects, as well as ideas, are no longer fixed, no longer tangible. In cyberspace, there is no weight, no dimensions; structure is dynamic and changing; size is both infinite and immaterial. In this space, stories are written that change with each new reader; new material can be added, and old material can be deleted. Nothing is permanent.’ Neil Kleinman, ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology’, page 76.

    [199] See Marcel Marchand, The Minitel Saga.

    [200] Ted Nelson’s Xanadu project failed for social rather than technical reasons. Unlike the Net, his program was designed to protect intellectual property within cyberspace. For years, Nelson tried to promote his idiosyncratic tracking and payment system for enforcing copyright within computer-mediated communications. However, far from encouraging participation, copyright was a fundamental obstacle to collaboration between on-line users. See Gary Wolf, ‘The Curse of Xanadu’, pages 70-85, 112-113; and Theodor Nelson, ‘Transcopyright’. In contrast, Tim Berners-Lee was able to invent the Web because he didn’t need to include any methods for enforcing intellectual property. As a scientist funded by EU taxpayers, he was already working within the academic gift economy. The design criteria of the first version of the Web therefore included no provisions for copyright protection. See Tim Berners-Lee, ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’, pages 2-4.

    [201] As Mark Stahlman points out: ‘…people are not paying for information, very clearly, which is the substantial problem associated with the economics of the Web – we still haven’t a clue as to the successful business model.’ Mark Stahlman, ‘The Business Tech Interview’, page 4.

    [202] ‘In any new medium, one of the first successful areas of commerce is sex – stag films, X-rated video cassettes, 900 [premium-rate phone] calls. But the bad thing is that sex in a new medium initially sells so well that it sucks in the amateurs as well as the pros in large numbers… If you have a million customers and a hundred sites, you’ve got a thriving retail industry. But if you have a million customers and a hundred thousand sites, many sites are slated for going out of business sales.’ Gerard van der Leun, ‘Trouble in Pornutopia’, pages 1-2.

    [203] Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, page 10.

    [204] As bandwidth and computing power increases, it is becoming much easier to circulate copyrighted pop music within the hi-tech gift economy. See Andrew Leonard, ‘Mutiny on the Net’.

    [205] For instance, a review of the celebrated English hip-hop album Entroducing explains that: ‘[DJ Shadow] …samples wildstyle, stealing from vintage funk, progressive rock, kraut rock (Tangerine Dream etc), acid rock, punk rock (check the drumming on ‘Stem’) and heavy metal. He’ll take anything that’s got a reference, any sound that might mean something when you put it next to another sound, like words making up a sentence.’ Tony Marcus, ‘Shadowplay’, page 61.

    [206] A similar phenomenon can be seen in the growing popularity of listservers. This a form of Net publishing where a group of writers regularly distribute their work to subscribers over email. Most listservers also encourage subscribers to make their own contributions. Because organising a listserver is cheap and easy, any Net user can now potentially become a publisher. Crucially, almost all listservers are organised as gift economies: ‘What is exchanged on a list, where money rarely is the prime measure of success or failure? Ideas, time, and attention…are all part of a complex ecology in an environment remarkably separate from traditional markets… It’s a place where traditional [market] models lose their meaning and power comes not from wealth, but from thought… List publishing is a real example of our idealised picture of the Net as a place where all can speak and ideas flow freely.’ David Bennahum, ‘The Hot New Medium is … Email’, page 3.

    [207] Steve Elliot of Slug Oven quoted in Karlin Lillington, ‘No! It’s Not OK, Computer’, page 3.

    [208] For instance, one of the major components of the 1993 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was increased protection for patents and copyrights, especially with agriculture and medicine. See John Frow, ‘Information as Gift and Commodity’.

    [209] Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pages 57-58. As Mark Geise points out: …if given an opportunity, people will choose to communicate interactively with each other, rather than attend exclusively mass-mediated, one-to-many products as commercial interests might prefer.’ Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, page 139.

    [210] Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’, page 5.

    [211] Bernard Lang, ‘Free Software For All’, page 3.

    [212] Keith W. Porterfield, ‘Information Wants to be Valuable’, page 2.

    [213] Open source software is what was known in the past as freeware or shareware. All these names emphasise that the program is a gift to anyone on the Net, especially those who have the skills to improve its code. See Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’; The Free Software Foundation, ‘What is Free Software?’; and Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’.

    [214] Eric Raymond explains: ‘…like all hackers, my most fundamental motivation is that I want other hackers to think that I’m doing good work. And I want them to believe I’m effective and fruitful and a good designer and so forth.’ Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 4. According to the Free Software Foundation, work done for money and other material inducements is often less productive than the results of voluntary effort. See Alfie Kohn, ‘Studies Find Reward Often No Motivator’.

    [215] Eric Raymond points out that intellectual property is a major obstacle to technical efficiency: ‘The central problem in software engineering has always been reliability. Our reliability, in general, sucks. In other branches of engineering, what do you do to get high reliability? The answer is massive, independent peer review…you wouldn’t trust a major civil engineering design which hadn’t been peer reviewed, and you can’t trust software that hasn’t been peer reviewed either. But that can’t happen unless the source code is open.’ Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 5.

    [216] For instance, the spectacular special effects for James Cameron’s Titanic film were made on Linux machines rather than on those running Windows NT or any other commercial operating system. See Daryll Strauss, ‘Linux Helps Bring Titanic to Life’.

    [217] Eric C. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’, page 1. From the Seventies to the Nineties, shareware projects have steadily evolved from toys and demos through Net applications to the construction of this new operating system. The next stage will be the invention of ‘programs for non-techies’, such as applications for image manipulation. See Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, pages 14-15. At the same time, some ‘non-techies’ are now even inventing their own programs, such as the Web Stalker. See the I/O/D web site.

    [218] For instance, at Cyber.Salon 5 (Sub-Cyberia, London, 22nd April 1998), the pioneering digital artist Heath Bunting claimed that the Net could no longer facilitate social change – and that he was instead going to experiment with bio-technologies! For an analysis of this recent turn by the European avant-garde, see Geert Lovink, ‘Current Media Pragmatism’.

    [219] Some commentators believe that the Net provides the technological basis for the creation of a post-capitalist society. See Nuret Sen, InterNETed. Others believe that the Net must inevitably follow the path of commercialisation experienced in earlier forms of media. See Brian Winston, Media Technology and Society, pages 321-336.

    [220] See Netscape Communications Corporation, ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’. This pragmatic collaboration between hackers and entrepreneurs already exists within the Linux community. See Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, pages 1-3.

    [221] Eric Raymond describing his pitch on behalf of shareware to commercial software companies in Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 8.

    [222] As the ex-associate editor of the UK edition of Wired puts it: ‘…’anti-Statist’ is…’Anti top-down control’… I use ‘The State’ in sense largely derived from Deleuze and Guattari, as a cipher for any power structure which seeks to transcend the social field and channel matter and energy into its singularity, in order to perpetuate itself.’ Hari Kunzru, ‘Rewiring Technoculture’, page 10.

    [223] For a discussion of the possibility of imposing universal service provisions on broadband telecommunications networks within the EU. See Nicholas Garnham, ‘Regulatory Issues’. Government intervention will be particularly needed to extend Net access in developing countries. See Alain Gresh, ‘Et les Citoyens du Sud?’, page 17.

    [224] See Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pages 241-275.

    [225] Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, page 2. Despite the absence of any commodity exchange, Raymond has to describe the hi-tech gift economy as a ‘bazaar’ – or even as a ‘free market in egoboo’ (i.e. respect). See Eric C. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’. Similarly, Ghosh believes that gifts are being circulated within a ‘cooking pot market’ even though he realises that they’re not the same social phenomenon as commodities. See Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’. In both cases, the practice of anarcho-communism is made compatible with the ideology of neo-liberalism.

    [226] Not surprisingly, one of the most connected nations in 1998 is the USA with over a fifth of its population having access to the Net. One tenth are wired in Great Britain while other industrialised countries have slightly smaller proportions of their citizens on-line (with the notable exception of France where people have access to the Minitel system). See Alex Brummer, ‘Dash For Cash in the Online Marketplace’, page 21; and Marcel Marchand, The Minitel Saga. In addition, those who do use the Net in countries from the North are predominantly employed in good jobs and live in the more prosperous regions. For instance, one recent British survey in discovered that: ‘The typical [Net] user is an affluent working father, aged 35 or under, who lives in the South of England.’ Sarah Hall, ‘Britons Log Fears about Threat of Internet’, page 8. Not surprisingly, the proportion of the population with Net connections in South is negligible. See Alain Gresh, ‘Et les Citoyens du Sud?’

    [227] From McLuhan to the Tofflers, technological determinists have used these constant improvements in media, computing and telecommunications machinery to explain much wider social changes. Just like post-structuralism and mystical positivism, this approach also denies that people can consciously determine their own destinies. Feudal society is ended by the invention of the printing press. Fordism is perfected by the television set. Now a new civilisation is being created by the Net. In the writings of the technological determinists, the messy contingencies of human history are replaced by a procession of clean machines. See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; George Gilder, Life After Television; Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society; and many articles in Wired.

    [228] ‘…if effective demand [for commodities] is deficient, not only is the public scandal of wasted resources intolerable, but the individual entrepreneur who seeks to bring these resources into action is operating with the odds loaded against him.’ John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, pages 380-381. Also see Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved, pages 5-42; and Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation.

    [229] ‘A reduction in working hours will allow individuals to discover a new sense of security, a new distancing from the ‘necessities of life’ and a form of existential autonomy which will encourage them to demand…a social space in which they can engage in voluntary and self-organised activities.’ André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, page 101. Also see Paul Lafargue, The Right to be Lazy.

    [230] ‘The growth in consumption of goods represents a fundamental change in the nature of economic activity. Instead of capital investment taking place in industry, and industry providing services for individuals and households, increasingly, capital investment takes place in the household, leaving industry engaged in what is essentially intermediate production, making the capital goods – the cookers, freezers, televisions, motor cars – used in home production of the final product. This is the trend towards the do-it-yourself economy…’ Jonathan Gershuny, After Industrial Society, page 81. Also see André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, pages 153-169.

    [231] ‘Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods.’ Eric C. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, page 9.

    [232] ‘In our grandparents’ time, many reasonable people could foresee a radiant socialist future in which private property and capitalism had been abolished, and in which politics itself was somehow overcome. Today, by contrast, we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist… Other, less reflective ages also thought of themselves as the best, but we arrive at this conclusion exhausted … from the pursuit of alternatives we felt had to be better than [American] liberal democracy.’ Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, page 46.

    [233] The West Coast neo-liberals want to turn the Net into an electronic marketplace where information has to be bought and sold. Trying to explain away the predominance of the hi-tech gift economy, one prominent proponent of the Californian ideology claims that the free circulation of information is only the first stage in developing information goods and services. Over time, there is supposedly an inevitable evolution from the ‘inefficencies’ of the gift economy to the ‘commercial economy’s efficencies’. See Kevin Kelly, ‘New Rules for the New Economy’, page 190. Yet, his own erroneous price theory contradicts this assertion. According to neo-liberal economics, an efficent economic system will price commodities at the cost of producing the last item: ‘Only when prices of goods are equal to Marginal Costs is the economy squeezing from its scarce resources and limited technical knowledge the maximum of outputs.’ Paul Samuelson, Economics, page 462. Since the marginal cost of reproducing information is almost zero, the enforcement of prices within the Net would almost inevitably lead to a greater a waste of ‘scarce resources and…technical knowledge’ than giving away information. Even according to neo-liberal economic theory, the hi-tech gift economy must be operating closer to optimal efficency than the monopoly pricing found in the computer software industry!

    [234] Karl Marx, Grundrisse, page 700. According to nineteenth-century socialists, the regulation of economic activity through individual private property would eventually become obsolete as the productivity of collective labour steadily increases: ‘The mode of production is in rebellion against the mode of exchange, the productive forces are in rebellion against the mode of production which they have outgrown.’ Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, page 327.

    [235] ‘The division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom… It is the necessary…consequence of a certain propensity in human nature…to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another.’ Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, page 117. For a more developed analysis of this interconnection, see Isaak Illich Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value.

    [236] Even before May ’68, Michel Foucault had unfavourably contrasted the rational discipline imposed by work with the libidinal idleness enjoyed by the insane. See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, pages 38-64. Later in the Seventies, the ‘refusal of work’ became one of the principle slogans of the Italian Autonomist movement. While the parliamentary Left still demanded the right to work for everyone, the New Left instead denounced the oppressive discipline imposed in the factories and offices. The Autonomists therefore advocated that people should either disrupt production or avoid employment altogether. See Toni Negri, ‘Capitalist Domination and Working Class Sabotage’. This theoretical turn with the Italian ultra-left reflected the Autonomist movement’s abandonment of labour struggles in favour of organising social movements. See Steve Wright, ‘Negri’s Class Analysis’. Despite certain philosophical incongruities, a common hatred of the ‘workerist’ policies of the mainstream Left later enabled Negri to collaborate with Guattari in a fundamentalist restatement of New Left politics. See Félix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us.

    [237] Inspired by the sacred texts, the Deleuzoguattarians have resurrected the ‘refusal of work’ as an integral part of their nostalgia for May ’68. For instance, in 1997, nettime declared that: ‘We are…rejecting make‑work schemes… Participate in the nettime retirement plan, zero work by age 40.’ As this call for the ‘refusal of work’ was inherently aristocratic, it is not surprising that one of the signatories of this manifesto was the high priest of Nietzschean anarcho-fascism: Hakim Bey. See nettime, ‘The Piran Nettime Manifesto’.
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    [238] ‘Despite the fact that their philosophical work represents an intense movement of destratification, Deleuze and Guattari seem to have preserved their own stratum, Marxism… They retain the concept of…’capitalist system’ defined in a top-down way… It seems to me that it would be useful to push their own line of flight even further, abandoning molar concepts and dealing exclusively with multiplicities…’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, page 331.

    [239] In order to obscure the New Left origins of Deleuzoguattarian discourse, this heresy emphasises the mystical positivism found within the sacred texts: ‘…igneous rocks, ecosystems, and markets are self-consistent aggregates, the result of the coming together and interlocking of heterogeneous elements.’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, pages 66. Hidden under a smokescreen of pseudo-science, Deleuze and Guattari’s anarcho-communism can then be transmuted into classical liberalism. For instance, De Landa distinguishes between the emancipatory effects of rhizomic ‘markets’ (happy peasants buying and selling to each other) as opposed to the oppressive disciplines imposed by arboreal ‘anti-markets’ (militarised labour working in factories and other large institutions). By disaggregating society into multiple flows, De Landa is able to ignore the complete interdependence between the sphere of circulation and the sphere of production. The flow of multiplicities has effectively disguised the most obvious features of contemporary capitalism. See Manuel De Landa, ‘Markets, Antimarkets and Network Economics’. A diluted – and less anti-statist – version of this Deleuzoguattarian analysis is now entering mainstream sociology. For instance, Manuel Castells claims that ‘…society is constructed around flows: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organisational interaction, flows of images, sounds and symbols. Flows are not just one element of the social organisation: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life.’ Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society, pages 411-412.

    [240] ‘…the global economy…[is]…an an assemblage, a cluster…of systems…a vast jumble of processes, actions and decisions, which effect each other in unimaginably..complex ways. …A control system predicated on top-down control is simply not equipped to deal with this speed and complexity, even if it employs computers. The speed will, quite literally, shake such a system apart. The Nation-State…is collapsing.’ Hari Kunzru, ‘Rewiring Technoculture’, page 8.

    [241] Just as the Californian ideologues romanticise the liberal freedoms of the Old South, De Landa also uses Deleuzoguattarian discourse to apologise for earlier forms of aristocratic rule. For instance, he claims that the loss of their land and freedom by the East European peasantry during the proto-industrial period was: ‘…not step down the ladder of progress, but rather a lateral move to a stable state (a stable surplus-extraction strategy) that had been latent in…the dynamical system all the time.’ Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History, page 156. At the time, this semiotic reorganisation in the ‘flow of biomass’ really meant that the peasant who had become a serf was compelled into ‘…devoting a large part of the week to forced labour on the lord’s land, or its equivalent in other obligations. His unfreedom might be so great as to be barely distinguishable from chattel slavery…he could be sold separately from the land.’ E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, page 27.

    [242] For pessimistic interpretations of this process, see Herbert Schiller, ‘The Global Information Highway’; Brian Winston, Media Technology and Society; and James Beniger, ‘Who Shall Control Cyberspace?’.

    [243] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, page 104. All activities on the Net involve work. For instance, ‘…the post [to a newsgroup] – any post, even “junk” and the rudest of “flames” – is a product…’ Therefore ‘…in a knowledge economy, it is reasonable to treat all forms of knowledge – with the broadest possible definition – as economic goods.’ Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, page 2. Even if the content of an item remains the same, the methods of working used for its production can change depending upon socio-historical circumstances: ‘Milton produced Paradise Lost as a silkworm produces silk, as the activity of his own nature. He later sold his product for £5 and thus became a merchant.’ Karl Marx, Capital, page 1044.

    [244] Wired uses ‘The New Economy’ as a synonym for its neo-liberal fantasies about the Net. See Kevin Kelly, ‘New Rules for the New Economy’.

    [245] ‘…to the worker, who appropriates nature through his labour, appropriation [of his labour time] appears as estrangement, self-activity as activity for another and of another, vitality as the sacrifice of life, production of an object as loss of that object to an alien power, to an alien man.’ Karl Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, page 334.

    [246] Being post-modernists, it is difficult for them to realise that: ‘…modernity [could] be the era of irony…’ Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, page 45.

    [247] Far from replacing commodity exchange, the sharing of gifts is now intertwined with commercial activities. This integration of the gift economy with contemporary capitalism parallels the earlier recuperation of economic intervention by the state. During 1848 revolution, strong government action to end unemployment and alleviate poverty was only advocated by a left-wing minority. By 1948, such measures were being applied by even conservative administrations. However, during those hundred years, state intervention had evolved from being the symbol of total social transformation to becoming the reality of partial economic reforms. Instead of abolishing money-commodity relations, the continued growth of the commercial sector depended upon government fiscal and industrial policies. See William Sewell, Work and Revolution in France, pages 243-276; and Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved, pages 5-42. In a similar fashion, what was revolutionary in the Sixties has been realised in a compromised form in the Nineties. Above all, the hi-tech gift economy can only exist in symbiosis with digital capitalism. Anarcho-communism is flourishing, but not in ways envisaged by its New Left founders.

    [248] Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’, page 16.

    [249] ‘In the raw, natural, given World, the Slave is slave of the Master. In the technical World transformed by his work, he rules – or, at least, will one day rule – as absolute Master.’ Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 23. Also see Georg Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pages 111-119; and Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, pages 174-177.

    [250] ‘Work-for-oneself is…what we have to do to take possession of ourselves and of that arrangement of objects which, as both extensions of ourselves and mirror of our bodily existence, forms our niche within the sensory world, our private sphere.’ André Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, page 158.

    [251] Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 159.

    [252] ‘If he is truly self-conscious, Man who has created a technical World knows that he can live in it only by living in it (also) as a worker. That is why Man can want to continue working even after ceasing to be a Slave: he can become a free Worker. Actually, Work is born from the Desire for Recognition…and it preserves itself and evolves in relation to this same Desire.’ Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 230

    [253] After centuries of wars, revolutions and social struggles, ‘History…ends in the coming of the satisfied Citizen and the Wise Man.’ Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, page 243.

    [254] Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, page 204.

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    I/O/D

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  • THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MEDIA FREEDOM by Richard Barbrook

    Nowadays, almost everybody believes that the freedom of the media is an essential prerequisite of a modern democracy. Yet, at the same time, many people are also convinced that the media are turning democratic politics into a branch of show business. Instead of rational debate between rival ideas, contemporary politics have been trivialised into a series of soundbites and photo opportunities for couch potatoes watching the television news bulletins. Yet, for the Enlightenment philosophers, the struggle for media freedom was fought to create the conditions for the participation of the common people in democratic politics. In their view, citizens of a democratic republic had to decide the issues of the day amongst themselves through public debate, including in print. In the late eighteenth centuries, this participative form of media freedom was put into practice. With the help of a few assistants, revolutionary heroes such as Franklin or Marat were able to print their own publications on their own printing presses. Although the philosophers usually defended media freedom with political or moral arguments, the exercise of this fundamental right was made possible by the widespread ownership of cheap wooden printing presses.

    Despite its libertarian claims, this classical liberal form of media freedom was in reality restricted to a minority of male property owners. With artisanal printing methods, only a limited number of expensive copies of any publication could be produced. However, with the industrialisation of printing, economies of scale allowed printed material to become cheap enough for almost everyone to purchase. When the new electronic media were introduced, the productivity of information production became so great that radio and television broadcasting could be paid for by subsidies from advertisers or the state and provided free to their audiences. But, although the industrialisation of the media made available prodigious quantities of information and entertainment to the public, the end of artisanal methods of production also closed off the possibility of popular participation in the media. Thus neither the direct producers nor their audiences could directly control the output of the media. Instead, its content was determined by the management hierarchies of collective institutions, such as joint stock companies, banks, political parties or the state. As a consequence, the definition of media freedom was fundamentally transformed. While still paying homage to the ideal of active citizens propagating their own thoughts, media freedom was increasingly defined as the representation of actual or supposed views of the audience. Between the Left and Right, there were bitter arguments over what was the correct form of this representation. For some, the interests of the audience were best served by the media being unbiased and truthful in its reporting. For others, the media had to serve the future interests of the people by disseminating revolutionary ideas. According to some, market competition for audiences would make the media respond to the wishes of the public. Despite their real differences, all these political positions assumed the same thing: the complete passivity of the audience. Although almost everyone could receive the output of the media, most people weren’t able to use the media to express their own views. Instead of being actors within the political process, they were only spectators of the pronouncements of professional politicians and media pundits.

    Over the past twenty years, the introduction of new information technologies has intensified this centralisation of the media. For example, using satellites, media corporations are now building worldwide television news services, such as CNN or BBC’s WSTV. Although these new channels can benefit from economies of scale on a global scale, the rise of the multinational media corporations has exacerbated the growing crisis of representation within national politics. Just as the power of the world market restricts the autonomy of national democratic decision making, so the global news media can also escape from any form of influence outside the cash nexus, such as regulations for balance and objectivity. Yet the increasing productivity of the media hasn’t only created the conditions for spectacle politics on a global scale. Over the past thirty years, the spread of new technologies has also encouraged the reemergence of self produced media, such as alternative magazines, community radio stations, access cable television channels and electronic mail systems. Unlike the artisanal methods of eighteenth century printing, the modern access media are centred on collective forms of working and have the potentiality for mass distribution of their output. For example, in the cyberspace of the e mail systems, a single global network is slowly being constructed out of a network of contributors and bulletin boards which even surpasses the centralisation carried out by the most ambitious media multinationals. In recent years, the community media has become an effective source of alternative information to the soundbite politics provided by the media corporations, as during the Gulf war. Even more importantly, this form of media has also partially realised the traditional interpretation of media freedom. But, instead of being restricted to a minority of male property owners, the community media are used by all sections of society as a means of expression, including marginalised groups. According to the visionaries of community media, all citizens will be able to exercise their right to participate directly in political debates within an electronic agora. Only then will the contradictions of media freedom be finally resolved.

  • MEDIA FREEDOM: FROM GUTENBERG TO CYBERSPACE by Richard Barbrook

    Introduction

    Nowadays, almost everybody believes that media freedom is an essential prerequisite of a modern democracy. When an authoritarian regime is overthrown, the first act of the new democratic government is usually the abandonment of direct controls by the state over the media. With the worldwide spread of political democracy, credible politicians can no longer advocate muzzling the media in the name of some higher social goal, such as the defence of the national interest or the liberation of the dispossessed. On contrary, voters rely on the unshackled media to expose the abuses of those with power and wealth. Cynical of the self interest of their rulers, they believe that the media are often the most effective defenders of their democratic rights.

    At the same time, many people are also convinced that the dominance of the media over our societies is slowly destroying democratic politics. Within all industrialised democracies, most citizens feel increasingly powerless to influence political decision making. By turning political conflicts into a branch of show business, the media are often blamed for exacerbating this crisis of representation. For many voters, their feelings of exclusion from the political process are confirmed by the nightly spectacle of self obsessed arguments between professional politicians on the television news bulletins about matters unconnected with the concerns of ordinary people. Instead of providing an opportunity for rational debate between rival ideologies, the media are accused of having transformed contemporary politics into a series of spurious quarrels, mindless soundbites and trivial photo opportunities.

    Yet, the bitter struggles to win freedom for the media weren’t fought to provide an arcane spectator sport for political couch potatoes. For the revolutionary heroes of the past, the fight to abolish censorship and other restrictions was necessary to allow ordinary people to produce their own media. In their view, the involvement of citizens within the media was an integral part of popular participation in democratic politics. Our contemporary unease about the role of the media derives from the contradiction between the rhetoric of the past and reality of the present. In theory, media freedom is needed so that everyone can participate as citizens of a political democracy. However, in practice, the winning of freedom for the media has actually turned most people into spectators of the political process. This pamphlet explores and explains the history of this contradiction within the concept of media freedom. For, if we can understand how we arrived at our current predicament, we can also discover how to resolve the contradictions of media freedom in the interests of the majority of the population.

    Societies Without Media

    There can be no modernity without the media; there can be no media without modernity. Because the media are so pervasive and omnipresent in our contemporary world, it is easy for us to forget that the media are a very recent invention. For the majority of our existence as a species, human beings have lived without any need for newspapers, radio or television. In nomadic tribes, peasant villages or small towns, human societies were organised around groups of extended families. Within their own little worlds, people lived their daily lives isolated from everyone but their immediate neighbours. Although people did move between different places, each human community developed its own specific hierarchies, myths, rituals and languages. Because the lives of nomads, peasants or town dwellers unfolded within limited geographical areas, people directly communicated with one another through words, music or images. In the immediate reality of the present, our ancestors needed either no tools or only the most rudimentary equipment for face to face discussions and live entertainment.

    In this oral culture, the recording of events was hardly known. The history of families, communities or tribes would be recounted in highly romanticised versions by poets and storytellers. But, for the most part, the experience of past generations was passed on directly to young people through working alongside or listening to their elders. The skills of herders, peasants or artisans were never learnt from a textbook. Within these enclosed little worlds, politics was carried out at the level of the tribe, village or town. For most of history, human societies have been controlled by hierarchies derived from the extended family, with power vested in a single patriarch. However this tyranny was sometimes checked by the ordinary people. For example, in classical Athens or medieval Switzerland, the arbitrary authority of monarchs and priests was replaced by the agora, which was the public meeting of the male members of a community. Even in this restricted form, direct democracy was only made possible by the limited geographical area of classical Greek towns or medieval Swiss villages. Because every male citizen could meet in one place for face to face discussions, it was practical to have popular participation in political decision making. Crucially, when all citizens attended the agora in person, there was no need for a mass media to report and comment on the political process.

    While various kingdoms rose and fell, tribal, rural and urban societies continued largely unchanged. Sometimes, after being destroyed in a civil war or foreign invasion, an individual community would disappear. But, for the most part, the great events of history didn’t intrude into the personal lives of ordinary people. Self sufficient within their own communities, they could ignore the tumults of dynastic and religious disputes. However they couldn’t escape from these hierarchies altogether. Both monarchs and priests lived off the systematic expropriation of part of the livestock, crops or money of the people through taxes, rents and tithes. In return, dynastic and religious leaders offered protection from earthly and divine threats to the community. For this task, they created a caste of loyal bureaucrats and priests, who could impose the same social and religious order across many different local communities. Unlike the mass of the population, these servants of the crown and the church needed to communicate across space and time. For their work, it was necessary to record and remember events in writing.

    In the pre modern world, most people couldn’t even read and write. In addition, the holy book, religious commentaries and legal texts were often written in a sacred language which was incomprehensible to the mass of the population. By making legal and sacred knowledge inaccessible to ordinary people, monarchs and prelates asserted their claim to divine authority over many different local communities. In contrast to the public meetings of the agora, the conduct of public affairs was transformed into the private concern of kings and priests. Because monarchical and sacred power was derived from God, there could be no open discussion of the policies of the king by his subjects or matters of religious controversy by believers. Crucially, with the public excluded from political and religious debates, there was no need for the media within this divinely ordained order. For example, even propaganda praising royal decisions was condemned for undermining the power of the absolute monarchy by exposing the reasons for the arbitrary decisions of the king. Not surprisingly, when the first printing presses were developed, both monarchy and church were immediately hostile to the new technology. Frightened of the spread of knowledge outside the chosen few, kings and prelates restricted the ownership of printing presses to their most reliable followers and strictly censored the publications printed. Thus, from the beginning, the use of the media by ordinary people was vigorously resisted by those with political and religious power.

    The Republic of Letters

    The origins of the mass media are inextricably linked with the beginning of social and economic modernisation in Europe. The emergence of the media wasn’t simply the result of the development of innovative techniques of working or the invention of new forms of technology. Long before the end of the medieval period, the principles of printing and the printing press had been known in China without causing a social upheaval. In contrast, the first experiments of the Gutenberg printers had a dramatic impact in Europe because of wider political and economic changes occurring within the continent. Under the divine rule of kings and priests, the public hadn’t been allowed to discuss political or religious controversies. But, when the struggle for democratic liberties started, the demand for media freedom could be articulated for the first time. Above all else, the early radicals championed the rights of individuals to print their own views without interference from the monarchy or the church.

    During the early modern period, the need for the protection of the rights of individuals had been created by the spread of the money economy. In medieval Europe, the countryside was organised as a patchwork of landed estates held together by familial relationships. But, over time, this feudal system slowly started to disintegrate with the emergence of capitalism. At the centre of this social change, there was a profound transformation in the nature of property. Instead of being enmeshed within familial relationships, land and other goods were turned into commodities: the absolute and unconditional property of specific individuals. In turn, the growth in individual ownership of property paralleled the dominance of the money economy over social production. As more and more necessities were produced only for exchange, so society itself became constructed through money. As the influence of the extended family declined, so the social division of labour was created through commodity exchanges. Therefore, with the demise of feudal social relations, atomised individuals increasingly satisfied their collective needs through the spontaneous and reciprocal interconnections created by market competition. As daily life became organised through the market, information about economic and political changes from outside the enclosed world of the village or town was needed to foresee the future movement of prices and the supply of commodities. For the first time, the ordinary people needed to communicate across space and time in their everyday activities. In early modern Europe, the pioneers of the media were ready to fulfill this new social need by reporting important political and economic events in their newspapers and journals.

    The media weren’t only developed to facilitate the functioning of the new economic system. Crucially, the development of the media was also closely connected with the emergence of political democracy on a national scale. Under feudalism, private wealth and political power were simultaneously combined in the hands of the monarchy and aristocracy. In contrast, in early capitalism, a clear separation between the private world of individual property owners and the public sphere of the constitutional state was established. Over time, individual private ownership slowly became the only legitimate form of property. The abolition of feudal property relations created a dialectical separation between the private and public spheres of human existence. On the one hand, the social production of necessities was increasingly privatised by the individual property owners. On the other hand, the rise in individual commodity production undermined the private control of the state by the absolute monarch.

    When social production was organised through market competition, an impartial legal framework was needed to regulate the monetary relations between individuals. In everyday circumstances, isolated producers were linked together in civil society by an endless series of reciprocal business deals. But, when there were disputes, the state had to act as the impersonal interest of the system by arbitrating between litigants through the legal system. By turning the state into an impartial umpire of civil society, political power could no longer be directly connected with the economic relationships between individuals. Instead the dominance of some individuals over others was established through the impersonal relations of exchange, which were backed by the impartial sanctions of the law. Thus the laws of the constitutional state had two dialectical purposes. On the one hand, the legal system defended private autonomy by protecting individual rights, including from arbitrary actions of the state. On the other hand, the law also punished individuals for damaging the interests of the state, which protected the interests of civil society as a whole. The creation of the constitutional state was designed to regulate this separation between the private sphere of individuals in civil society and the public sphere of citizens of the republic. Under the rule of law, the constitutional state became the expression of the private interests of the atomised individuals within civil society in a public form.

    According to the bourgeois revolutionaries, a constitutional state could only be established by the participation of individual property owners within political decision making. In their view, each individual was not only an egotistical, self sufficient property owner, but also a moral, social citizen. In the early modern period, critics of the absolute monarchy created their own meeting places for public discussions of political issues, such as cafés, freemasons’ lodges and salons. Rejecting the hierarchical world of the court, individuals debated as democratic equals within these institutions. By using their reason, the revolutionaries tried to find solutions to their collective problems. Inspired by the classical Greek cities and medieval Swiss villages, Jean Jacques Rousseau claimed that this form of direct democracy should be used to run the constitutional state. In face to face debates in an agora, the individual members of civil society would discover the ‘general will’, which expressed their collective interests. But, in practice, it was impossible to apply the direct democracy of a village or small town to the emerging nation states, such as Britain, France or the USA. Because of their size, political decisions couldn’t be taken by a public meeting of all citizens. As a consequence, Tom Paine and other revolutionaries advocated the creation of a representative democracy. In their view, the ‘general will’ of a large country could be formed by the representatives of local particular interests discovering their common interests in parliamentary debates. Instead of personally attending the agora, individual members of civil society would participate in political decision making by electing representatives to express their views in a parliament.

    With the establishment of representative democracy, media freedom became an essential element in the creation of a constitutional state. Because of physical limitations, every citizen couldn’t personally take part in the discussions of the legislature in the capital city. But, in their debates in parliament, the politicians were guided by public opinion, which reflected the views of the voters. Crucially, citizens could communicate their opinions to their representatives in the legislature by publishing their own newspapers and books. Thus, although the holding of a national agora was physically impossible, two way communications was created between politicians and citizens using the printed word. Despite being dispersed across the country, citizens simultaneously expressed their views through their elected members of parliament and through their own publications. Therefore, as a right of citizens, the freedom of communications was an integral part of the formation of the ‘general will’ of the nation. According to the revolutionaries, individual citizens directly shaped the policies of the state by engaging in reasoned debates over political issues in print.

    Because the written text overcame the physical limitations of face to face discussions, media freedom was vitally necessary to allow the participation of all citizens within political decision making. Therefore one of the first tasks of the bourgeois revolutions was the abolition of censorship and other restrictions on the media imposed by the absolute monarchy. Instead, in bills of rights and republican constitutions, the media were promised their freedom from direct government interference. Under the rule of law, newspapers and book sellers could now print almost anything without the need for prior authorisation. As with other constitutional rights, the absolute freedom of the media was only restricted by the need to protect the rights of other citizens, such as the laws against libel and slander, or to defend the interests of society as a whole, such as the laws against sedition or treason. Even when these laws were defied, the state still encountered great difficulties in punishing miscreant publishers. Because of the need for due legal process, many governments discovered that the bad publicity of court trials often outweighed the benefits of punishing those who broke the law. Except in the most extreme cases, the media had won almost complete freedom from controls over the content of its publications.

    By the late eighteenth century, this participatory form of media freedom had been put into practice. Because hand operated wooden presses were cheap to buy or hire, individual citizens could print their own publications on their own printing presses. During the early modern period, revolutionary heroes such as
    Benjamin Franklin or Jean Paul Marat earned their living by selling their own pamphlets and newspapers to their followers. Not surprisingly, these revolutionaries had a personal interest in preventing any reimposition of censorship and vigorously supported legal guarantees for the freedom of the press. Because they were both journalists and printers, these radicals believed that their political right of the freedom of communications was made possible through their economic right to own their own printing presses as private property. At this moment in history, media freedom was assured by the unity of the social citizen and the private property owner in one person, who was simultaneously a journalist and a printer. Thus radicals not only sold their publications to their fellow citizens as commodities, but also shaped the policies of parliament by their arguments in print. Just as trade and commerce bound together civil society, so competing newspapers and book sellers contributed to the creation of the ‘general will’ of all citizens. In the same way as the division of labour between individuals produced social wealth, so the printing of publications with different viewpoints created a common political culture. The ideological rivalry between different journalist printers was underpinned by a common consensus to respect the economic laws of bourgeois society.

    After the triumph of the bourgeois revolutions, censorship and other restrictions by the monarchy and church were swept away. Instead individual citizens could directly participate in political decision making by publishing their own newspapers or books. Through their reasoned debates over political issues in print, the atomised citizens directly influenced the policies of the state. Thus the views of individuals were not only indirectly represented in the legislature, but also directly expressed in print. As moral citizens, individuals possessed the right of media freedom to shape the policies of the republic. But this political right could only be exercised through the private ownership of printing presses, which derived from their economic rights as members of civil society. By seizing the land of aristocrats or indigenous peoples, citizens in France and the USA temporarily realised this revolutionary aspiration, which was reflected in the legal protection of media freedom in these countries. Yet, even with the widespread ownership of private property, the female majority of the population was still excluded from exercising many of the rights of citizens, including media freedom. According to the bourgeois revolutionaries, the participation of men in the public sphere of the constitutional state depended upon women looking after the children in the private sphere of the household. Thus, although everyone had the formal right to take part in two way communications, only male property owners possessed the means to exercise media freedom in practice. In the republic of property owners, the exercise of media freedom was confined to male members of the bourgeoisie.

    The Industrialisation of the Media

    After decades of struggle, the bourgeois revolutionaries had finally abolished censorship and other restrictions on the press in western Europe and north America. Yet, at the very moment of victory, the ability of male citizens to exercise this media freedom was being fatally undermined by the continued modernisation of the economy. Responding to market competition, entrepreneurs started expanding production by hiring wage workers and introducing new types of machinery. After successive restructurings, innovative capitalists discovered Fordism: the mass production of commodities using semi skilled workers on assembly lines. In turn, the resulting expansion in the number of workers created the consumers for the commodities produced on the assembly lines. Crucially, the successful introduction of Fordism changed the form of property ownership within bourgeois societies. Because of the increased amount of investment needed for mass production, most individuals no longer possessed enough capital to fund their enterprises from their own resources. Instead, individuals had to come together to form collective forms of capital ownership, such as joint stock companies and bank investments. Moreover, as Fordism spread, the production of commodities by individual property owners was increasingly marginalised. Therefore, increasing numbers of individual property owners were forced to join the propertyless working class. With the development of Fordism, the individual owners of private property were gradually separated into a minority of shareholders of joint stock companies and a majority of wage workers.

    Because of the peculiarities of information production, media companies were among the pioneers of Fordism. When a newspaper was published, the majority of the costs of production were incurred in the creation of the first copy of a print run by its journalists and printers. However, unlike other Fordist industries, the owners of newspapers weren’t able to use machinery to replace expensive skilled workers with cheaper semi skilled assembly line operators. Instead they employed the new technologies to displace the costs of their skilled workers through the repeated reproduction of the products of their labour. Because of the dramatic increase in the productivity of media labour, the price of each individual newspaper fell rapidly as further copies were printed. During the bourgeois revolutions, the artisan methods of printing ensured that most publications were too expensive to be purchased by the rural and urban poor. For the first time, after the rapid fall in price caused by the economies of scale of industrialised publishing, almost everyone could afford to buy a copy of a newspaper.

    As in any other sector, the industrialisation of newspaper production involved the simultaneous mechanisation of production and proletarianisation of the direct producers. During the late eighteenth century, individual journalist printers had produced their own newspapers on simple wooden printing presses. But, with the advent of Fordism, newspapers could only be created by the collective labour of large numbers of wage-workers on mechanised presses. Because of this scale of production needed large investments of capital, single individuals could no longer afford to publish their own newspapers. Instead, joint stock companies and large banks took control of the new mass circulation newspapers. Crucially, the industrialisation of publishing didn’t only prevent most individual citizens from expressing their own opinions in print. As mere employees, journalists and printers were only allowed to reproduce views acceptable to their employers within the Fordist media.

    The Fordist organisation of information production was enhanced by the advent of the electronic media. Although originally developed as a new type of point to point communications, amateur experimenters soon discovered that radio communications could also be used to create a new form of media. Within the small world of engineers, radio broadcasting was initially developed as an electronic version of the eighteenth century press. Because everyone owned a transmitter, the broadcaster engineers could simultaneously produce and receive radio programmes. Like the journalist printers of the bourgeois revolutions, each individual could directly exercise their right of freedom of communications over the airwaves. But, this electronic agora did not last long. Using mass production techniques, radio set manufacturers soon started producing simple receivers as consumer commodities. Under Fordism, most individuals could only be listeners.

    In the 1920s, the radio set manufacturing companies were at the leading edge of the second industrial revolution of electronic technologies, which was transforming the economies of the major capitalist countries. The application of scientific advances in production was encouraged by the adoption of the techniques of Fordism. By using Taylorist labour discipline and assembly lines, manufacturers were able to lower the price of radio receivers until almost everyone could afford a set. As in other sectors, the radio receiver was turned into a mass consumption commodity by the dramatic increase in the productivity of labour and capital achieved by the new methods of Fordism. At the same time, the successful adoption of Fordism by radio set manufacturers encouraged companies in other sectors to reorganise their methods of production. In turn, this process transformed more individual private property owners into wage workers, which created more consumers for mass consumption commodities.

    The mass ownership of radio sets formed the basis for the Fordist organisation of radio broadcasting. The industrialization of publishing had been encouraged by the rapid obsolescence of the political news printed by daily newspapers. The advantages of economies of scale in media production were intensified in radio broadcasting. In this new technology, the transmission of music and speech over the airwaves simultaneously produced and distributed the same programme to many different receivers. Instead of printing many individual copies, a radio station broadcast a continuous flow of instantly obsolete programmes. This technical attribute of broadcasting encouraged the industrialisation of programme making by radio stations. With many hours of airtime to fill, radio stations needed paid workers to create a constant flow of programmes for their listeners. As in newspaper publishing, the high costs of employing skilled media workers were displaced by transmitting the same radio programme to many different listeners. Like the mass circulation newspapers, radio stations needed the maximum possible audience for each programme to increase their economies of scale.

    During the bourgeois revolutions, individual journalist printers had both created and owned their own newspapers. Because printing presses were cheap, all citizens could express their own views in print. In the early 1920s, the broadcaster engineers had briefly recreated this two way form of communications over the airwaves. But, with the industrialisation of publishing and broadcasting, individual citizens could no longer directly exercise their right of freedom of speech in print or over the airwaves. This development reflected the changes caused by the spread of Fordism. Because of economies of scale, a clear division between the producers and consumers of the media had been created. In both newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting, large banks and joint stock companies employed paid workers to create information and entertainment for the audiences. Thus, although everyone could now receive the media, the majority of the population couldn’t participate within the production of the media. The Fordist development of the media had restricted the right of freedom of speech in print or over the airwaves to a minority of share holders. As a consequence, both media producers and consumers were prevented from freely expressing their own views. Thus, after industrialisation, there could be no form of two way communications within the media. Instead, there was a one way flow of information and entertainment from the mass circulation newspapers and radio stations. Under Fordism, most individuals could only be consumers of the media.

    The Nationalisation of the Media

    Although it was based upon active participation, the implementation of the eighteenth century model of media freedom was restricted. The journalist printers were only a minority of the population. The publications of the artisan presses were few in number and very expensive. The right of free speech in print couldn’t be exercised in practice by men without property and all women. Out in the countryside, most people couldn’t even read or write. In contrast, after the industrialisation of printing, the majority of the population had access to media products for the first time. Aided by the development of primary education, better transport and the postal services, the mass circulation newspapers soon created a nationwide readership for their publications. Because of industrialisation, individuals could now obtain large amounts of printed entertainment and information at cheap prices. However the greater availability of printed material could only be achieved through the exclusion of the majority of citizens from participation within the media. Because large amounts of capital were needed for industrial production, individual citizens could no longer express their own opinions in print. Within the electronic media, the disappearance of the right of freedom of communications for individuals even became embodied within the new technology. Except for a small number of station owners, the majority of the population could only buy radio receivers. Thus, in both newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting, there could only be a one way flow of communications in the Fordist media.

    Even though it was impossible for most individual citizens to own a printing press, the mass circulation newspapers still enjoyed the media freedom won by the journalist printers. Yet, despite the revolutionary origins of their immunity from state control, the industrialised media quickly abandoned any connection with left wing politics. Under the control of joint stock companies and banks, the mass circulation newspapers were unsympathetic to the emerging socialist movements. In order to win a large readership with a low cover price, these publications relied upon advertising from capitalist businesses and bribes from corrupt politicians. As a consequence, the mass circulation newspapers either promulgated right wing politics or printed only scandal and trivia. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some owners of popular newspapers used their publications to campaign for imperialist foreign adventures and against progressive social policies. For example, the American mass circulation newspapers helped to provoke a war with Spain and the British press denounced any concessions to the trade unions. When radio broadcasting was developed, the new electronic medium was even more dependent upon those with power and wealth. Unable to sell their programmes directly to listeners for technical reasons, commercial radio stations could only fund themselves with revenue from advertising. In the USA, the most popular radio network was owned by a cartel of receiver manufacturers and financed by the leading Wall Street bank. Not surprisingly, the majority of its programmes were devoted to promoting the products of its advertisers and airtime was only available to right wing politicians.

    Because the output of the industrialised media was dominated by advertising and conservative politics, left wing activists soon became disillusioned with the model of media freedom established by the bourgeois revolutionaries. Therefore, in its place, they tried to create a new form of media freedom, which would allow radical views to be expressed in print and over the airwaves. For the bourgeois revolutionaries, media freedom had been founded upon the absence of state controls and the private ownership of printing presses. In their view, the political right of freedom of communications rested upon the economic right of private property. In contrast, left wing politicians believed that the political right of free speech in the media for all citizens was being blocked by the economic right of private property exercised by the owners of mass circulation newspapers and commercial radio stations. Therefore they began advocating increased state controls and the end of private ownership within the media. According to some of the Left, the state had become the protector of democratic liberties, rather than its greatest enemy.

    Ironically, this demand for the nationalisation of the media was a consequence of the development of market competition between private property owners. As the traditional feudal hierarchies collapsed, the state emerged as the defender of the collective interests of the atomised individuals within civil society. Externally, the state protected the people from incursions by foreign enemies. After successive wars, individuals from various villages or towns were transformed into citizens of specific states, which were particular territorial spaces forming separate national markets. Internally, the state also protected the members of civil society by providing the legal framework for market competition. By becoming an impartial umpire in civil disputes, the state slowly developed its own institutional autonomy from the personality of the king. After the bourgeois revolutions, the deprivatisation of political power was accelerated. Under the post revolutionary constitutions, the state was controlled by elected representatives, who could make laws to protect the interests of all citizens from miscreant individuals. Thus, by combating both external and internal enemies, the state emerged as the collective expression of the public interest of the competing members of civil society. Enclosed within the boundaries of a specific state, the inhabitants of different villages and towns had been transformed into citizens of a single Nation People, with its own particular institutions, customs and language.

    According to left wing radicals, the collective equality of citizenship of the Nation People provided the antidote to the selfish privileges of the private property owners. In their view, the contradiction between political and economic rights could only be ended by the nationalisation of all private property. Then, as the embodiment of the ‘general will’, the state would guarantee a reasonable standard of living for all citizens in return for participation in work and political activities. However the radical statism of the early socialists was simply a logical conclusion of the growing autonomy of the state from civil society within contemporary capitalism. As the struggle for democracy was won, a distinct caste of professional politicians and administrators had emerged to administer political power. Because the citizens weren’t able to rule themselves in an agora, the collective needs of the individuals within civil society could only be fulfilled through the actions of the state. Over time, the autonomy of the state bureaucracy slowly increased, especially in periods of national emergency. In the name of protecting the interests of all citizens, the government was able to override the rights of particular individuals. Crucially, with a monopoly over the administration of political power, the politicians and bureaucrats could increasingly run the state in their own interests. Thus, far from guaranteeing the political rights of all citizens, the demand of the Left for the nationalisation of all private property would have completed the process of emancipation of the state from any form of popular control.

    The Totalitarian Media

    The contradiction between the democratisation and bureaucratisation of the state haunted the struggle for media freedom. During the 1789 99 French revolution, the Jacobins pioneered a new definition of the freedom of communications, which extended this right beyond the small number of journalist printers. Ironically, this more democratic form of media freedom was developed during a period of emergency rule, which had been imposed to fight against royalist uprisings and foreign invasions. According to the leaders of the Jacobins, the establishment of a dictatorship in the short term was needed to create the conditions for the foundation of a democratic republic in the long term. As a consequence, the rights of particular individuals could be justifiably violated by the state in the interests of the whole Nation people. Using this argument, the Jacobin government abolished the media freedom of the journalist printers and introduced tight state supervision over all newspapers and other publications. Although censorship had been tyrannical under the absolute monarchy, the republican government believed that the suppression of publications advocating the return of the old order was completely legitimate. As well as these restrictive measures, the Jacobins also used the media for the political and moral education of the people in republican values. In their view, the civil war had been primarily caused by the ignorance of the benefits of democracy among the population. Therefore, alongside the organisation of popular festivals and public education, the Jacobin government subsidised the dissemination of republican propaganda by newspapers and book publishers.

    After the overthrow of the Jacobin government, its supporters were convinced that the experience of these emergency measures had laid the basis for a completely new model of media freedom. According to Babeuf and other radical Jacobins, the freedom of communications for all citizens could only be achieved by the nationalisation of all printing presses. Although they would no longer possess the economic right to own a printing press, the citizens would be able to determine the opinions expressed in the newspapers and books published by the state by exercising their political right to vote for their own parliamentary representatives. Thus, instead of media freedom being restricted to a limited number of journalist printers, all citizens would indirectly have their views expressed in the state owned media by their elected government. However, this new form of media freedom anticipated the limitations of the Fordist media. In Babeuf’s utopia, citizens could only be consumers of the publications of the nationalised printing presses.

    Despite its democratic aspirations, this new form of media freedom was also restricted by the Jacobin belief in the need for a revolutionary dictatorship in the short term to create a democratic republic in the long term. During the 1848 French revolution, Blanqui and his Jacobin supporters called for all political power to be temporarily transferred into their own hands. According to these Jacobins, a revolutionary dictatorship was needed to educate the French people in the values of republicanism. Under the old order, the views of the majority of the population had been corrupted by false ideas, especially by reading newspapers owned by the bourgeoisie. As a consequence, they were incapable of electing a new government in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. Inspired by Babeuf, Blanqui and his followers advocated the nationalisation of all printing presses. Under Jacobin control, the state owned newspapers and book sellers would produce propaganda in favour of the construction of the new society. Thus, in Blanqui’s vision, the citizens would abdicate their media freedom to a temporary revolutionary dictatorship, which would determine the content of all newspapers and books in their long term interests. In the name of democracy, the media was to be controlled by a caste of unaccountable politicians and bureaucrats.

    Although Babeuf and Blanqui influenced revolutionary movements across Europe, these two radical Jacobins were never able to put their version of media freedom into practice. In contrast, after the 1917 revolution, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were able to implement the Jacobin model of media freedom within the Russian Empire. Inspired by Babeuf and Blanqui, Lenin claimed that the old order had ideologically corrupted Russian people, who were consequently incapable of deciding who should control the new republic. Therefore, in his view, a short term revolutionary dictatorship was needed to create the conditions for the establishment of participatory democracy in the long term. Crucially, the Bolshevik leader believed that the primary task of this dictatorship was the elimination of incorrect ideas among the Russian workers and peasants. Therefore, after their seizure of power, the Bolsheviks systematically suppressed all opposition newspapers, including those run by Marxists and anarchists. Alongside these repressive measures, they also greatly expanded their own media to indoctrinate the Russian people in their own ideology. During the early 1920s, the revolutionary dictatorship published national and local newspapers, established the first radio stations within Russia, created a national film industry, organised revolutionary festivals and distributed posters by radical artists. Following the advice of Blanqui, the Bolsheviks were determined to educate the population in the values of the new social order.

    According to the Bolsheviks, the contradiction between political and economic rights within the media had been resolved through the nationalisation of the media. In Lenin’s model of media freedom, the propertyless majority of the population abdicated their political right of media freedom to the minority of professional revolutionaries, who ran the nationalised newspapers and radio stations on their behalf. Crucially, the Bolsheviks derived their claim to absolute political power from their knowledge of the correct revolutionary ideology. Because they had been corrupted by the false ideas of the old order, the Russian workers and peasants were unable to express their long term interests through regular elections. As a consequence, the revolutionary conspiracy had to use the nationalised media for the education of the population in the correct ideas of the new society. Therefore the majority of the population was excluded from any direct or indirect participation within the media. At the same time, media workers were also prevented from expressing their own opinions in print or over the airwaves. In order to guarantee the ideologically correct content of the media, the Bolsheviks turned all journalists, printers, broadcasters and engineers into employees of the revolutionary state. Thus, by the early 1920s, Lenin and his followers had instituted a new definition of media freedom: the one way flow of propaganda from the ruling party to the population.

    Although it was supposed to be only temporary, the Bolshevik dictatorship soon became the permanent form of government of the Russian Empire. Under Stalin, the few remnants of democratic control over the executive were finally abolished. By the early 1930s, the dictator had created a fully totalitarian system of political rule, which completely dominated the lives of the Russian people. Although he relied on state terror to maintain his rule, Stalin also used the nationalised media to mobilise support for the policies of his regime, especially for the rapid industrialisation of the country. Impressed by the success of the Bolsheviks, revolutionaries from around the world imitated their methods of organisation, including their views on the role of the media. As in Russia, the media were used for the one way flow of ideology from the revolutionary conspiracy to the people. Thus, when the Bolsheviks set up the Communist International, the first condition of its membership was that all revolutionary newspapers and other media were to be placed under the complete control of the leaders of the local Bolshevik party.

    Although imitators of the Bolsheviks triumphed in some underdeveloped or colonised countries, the revival of radical Jacobinism encountered greater difficulties within states with democratic constitutions. Ironically, the extreme right opponents of the democratic republic applied the methods of the Bolsheviks with greater success than their left wing opponents. In both Italy and Germany, fascist parties overthrew democratic governments and established totalitarian dictatorships. While the local Bolsheviks had been supported by radical workers, these fascist parties mobilised the discontented members of the petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry, who were either afraid of losing their private property under the rule of the Left or hoped for jobs as functionaries of the new regime. According to the fascists, the ‘general will’ of the people couldn’t be created by democratic elections. Instead the atomised members of civil society needed to be united into a single Nation People by a totalitarian dictatorship under the control of a charismatic leader. By submitting to this leadership, the Nation People would be able to conquer its external and internal enemies, especially those associated with left wing ideas or from different ethnic groups.

    Not surprisingly, the fascists also believed that individuals had to abdicate their political right of media freedom to the charismatic leader of the ruling party, who would express their opinions for them in print or over the airwaves. After their seizure of power in 1933, the Nazis implemented their totalitarian plans for the media through the Ministry of Propaganda, which purged all opponents of the regime from the newspapers, radio stations and the cultural institutions. At the same time, the Ministry also organised the propagation of Nazi beliefs to the German population through the media and the arts. Above all else, the state controlled media disseminated the speeches of Hitler to the people. By listening together to the Nazi leader on the radio, the fascists believed that individual Germans would be transformed into a unified Nation People. As in Bolshevik Russia, the totalitarian organisation of the media in Nazi Germany ensured the complete autonomy of the newspapers and radio stations from any form of popular control.

    Fordism and the Public Service State

    The totalitarian states of Bolshevik Russia and Nazi Germany were the most dramatic examples of a fundamental change in the role of the state within the world economy. In 1914, the global trading system was torn apart by the outbreak of war between the great powers. As the fighting intensified, direct state intervention was needed to organise the production of munitions and other military supplies. In addition, welfare benefits had to be greatly expanded to relieve wartime poverty. Despite some relaxation of controls in the immediate post war period, the advent of the 1930s Depression finally discredited the liberal economic policies of minimal state interference and free market competition. Within the industrialised countries, the slump had been precipitated by the advent of Fordism. By reorganising their methods and technologies of production, companies had greatly increased the quantity of commodities available in the marketplace. However the spread of Fordism didn’t immediately lead to increased prosperity for ordinary people. Instead there was a global crisis of overproduction, which was caused by the lack of profitable markets for the output of the Fordist factories.

    In response, the state was forced to intervene within the economy to ensure that the rapid growth in production was synchronised with a parallel increase in consumption. Without rises in wages and more welfare spending, the expansion of production remained limited by the low living standards of the working class. Without controls over the banks, the bulk of personal savings wouldn’t be invested in industrial production. Under Fordism, the state could no longer simply provide the legal framework for market competition between independent producers. Instead, the state and the joint stock companies had to collaborate in the joint management of the national economy. By the late 1940s, an alliance of politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists had been created to introduce new economic policies, such as the creation of a welfare system, minimum wage laws and controls over the financial sector. Although private ownership remained dominant within western societies, both left wing and right wing governments increasingly used nationalisations and regulations to combat the collapse in production and to direct the modernisation of the economy. In the aftermath of the Second World War, every developed industrialized country depended upon concerted state intervention to create a virtuous circle of rising production and consumption.

    Within western Europe, interventionist economic policies were pioneered by the Socialist parties. In the late nineteenth century, these organisations had been founded by the followers of Marx within the working class movement. According to Marx, the winning of universal suffrage would inevitably lead to a social revolution, which would extend democracy into the workplace. But, by the late 1940s, the Socialist parties had abandoned this revolutionary goal. Instead they adopted their own version of Jacobinism, which was centred on the control of private property by the state. But, in contrast to their Bolshevik rivals, the Socialists rejected the need for a revolutionary dictatorship. Far from leading to the end of political rights, they believed that the nationalisation of private property was needed to protect the democratic republic from the authoritarian ambitions of capitalists and bankers.

    According to Blum, the leader of the French Socialists, the political rights of citizens were being undermined by the industrialisation of capitalism. In the past, the democratic republic had only needed to guarantee the juridical and constitutional rights of the individual property owners. But, with the development of Fordism, the population had been divided into a majority of propertyless workers and a minority of property owning capitalists. As a consequence, political and economic rights were increasingly in contradiction with one another, rather than being in symbiosis. For example, media freedom for all citizens could no longer be realised by the private ownership of printing presses. However, under a democratic constitution, the propertyless citizens could still elect representatives from different political parties to national and local assemblies. According to Blum, the Socialists and their allies had to use political power won in these elections to create the social and economic conditions for the continued exercise of political rights by all citizens. As under the Jacobins, the political rights of the whole Nation People had to take precedence over the economic right of particular individuals. But, in Blum’s version of Jacobinism, the ‘general will’ of the citizens couldn’t only be created by the elected government. Crucially, individual citizens influenced the policies of the democratic republic through the continual electoral competition between different political parties. In contrast with traditional Jacobinism, Blum and the Socialists believed that both government and opposition parties were valid representatives of public opinion. Therefore the state had to act as an impartial umpire between the competing parties.

    In the long term, Blum and other Socialists hoped that the different political parties would reach a consensus over the administration of civil society. Instead of defending the interests of one group, political power would be exercised by a public service state, which would serve all citizens equally. After the liberation from Nazi occupation, left wing and right wing parties across western Europe did cooperate in rebuilding their devastated countries. In particular, this consensus was sealed by the introduction of interventionist economic policies. By regulating Fordism, the public service state could not only raise working class living standards, but also direct the modernisation of the major capitalist companies. Despite the economic benefits of these new policies, the consensus politics of the post war governments only partially advanced the political rights of all citizens. In theory, state intervention imposed the interests of the whole Nation People upon the individual owners of private property. However, in practice, the politicians and bureaucrats increasingly identified their own self interest with the needs of the population. Although they were supposed to be loyal servants of the public service state, these professionals excluded the majority of the population from any involvement in political and economic decision making between elections. Once again, the democratisation of the state had encouraged the bureaucratisation of power. By the late 1940s, most west European states acquired a new type of ruling class alongside the traditional bourgeoisie: the bureaucrats of the public service state.

    Public Service Broadcasting

    The emergence of the public service state in western Europe laid the basis for the creation of a pluralist version of the Jacobin model of media freedom. During the Second World War, most owners of the mass circulation newspapers and the commercial radio stations had enthusiastically collaborated with the Nazis. Fearing the expropriation of their wealth by the Left, these media capitalists had preferred to protect their own individual property rights rather than to fight for the political rights of all citizens against totalitarianism. With private ownership discredited, the consensus governments of the post war period had to find a more democratic method of organising the media. In the 1930s, Blum and his fellow Socialists had advocated that the public service state should directly control the media in the interests of all citizens. In his view, the ideological conflict in the mass media between competing political parties had to be institutionalised through the nationalisation of all newspapers and radio stations by the public service state. Instead of private ownership, Blum proposed that the editorial staff of the different media should be appointed by the various political parties represented in the elected parliament. In this scheme, competing political viewpoints would be expressed in the media in proportion to their popular support, rather than through the wealth of their financial sponsors. Although the public service state couldn’t create two way communications, every citizen could influence the one way flow of communications in the media by choosing between the competing political parties in regular elections.

    Because of the rights won by the journalist printers in the bourgeois revolutions, this new version of media freedom was never applied to the mass circulation newspapers. In contrast, the electronic media within most western European countries were nationalised in the immediate post war period. During the 1920s and 1930s, state broadcasting corporations had been set up to compete with the commercial radio stations. Because of the technical limitations of broadcasting, it was impossible to sell their radio programmes directly to the listeners. But, by imposing an annual charge on the owners of receivers, every listener could be forced to contribute towards the costs of the nationalised radio broadcasting systems. In the same way as advertising provided an income for the commercial radio stations, so revenue from the licence fee created a secure economic basis for the state ownership of the electronic media. Thus, when the commercial radio stations owned by collaborators with fascism were expropriated, these state owned broadcasting corporations had the financial resources to monopolise the airwaves within most western European countries.

    Following Blum’s advice, the post war governments decided that their nationalised broadcasting corporations should be made accountable to their audiences through the direct involvement of the elected parliamentary representatives of the citizens. In many western European countries, the sharing of party control over the state broadcasting corporation culminated in the pillarisation of the electronic media. From top managers to doorkeepers, all jobs within the nationalised radio and television stations were divided among the competing political parties in accordance with their electoral support. Based on the consensus between the different parties, all major political viewpoints were represented within the workforce of the state owned radio and television stations. By having their own supporters within the workforce of the electronic media, both government and opposition parties could use their own members to express their views on the news and other programmes of the nationalised broadcasting corporation. With the adoption of pillarisation, Blum’s version of media freedom was turned into a stable institutional structure for the administration of the state owned radio and television stations. According to its advocates, all citizens could now indirectly express their views within the nationalised electronic media by voting for their political representatives.

    But, in reality, the electronic media were still outside the control of their audiences and workers. As in other institutions of the public service state, the politicians and bureaucrats in charge of the nationalised media increasingly identified their own self interest with the needs of the population. With a monopoly over the electronic media, the main political parties were able to exclude dissidents opposed to the consensus from the airwaves. For example, after the outbreak of the Cold War, the elected representatives of the pro Russian Communist parties were banned from the public service radio and television stations for supporting the totalitarian opponent of the western European countries. Similarly, freed of pressures from advertisers and private owners, the directors of the nationalised media could fill their schedules with educational and cultural programmes. While the majority of the population mainly wanted entertainment shows for their amusement, the state broadcasters primarily catered for the cultural tastes of the most privileged sections of society. Crucially, as members of the bureaucracy of the public service state, the directors of the nationalised media were an integral part of this educated elite. Because media freedom was only seen as a political right, the provision of entertainment programmes could be largely ignored by the nationalised radio and television stations. Instead, following the Jacobin tradition, the dissemination of high culture by the electronic media was encouraged as a means of educating the citizens in correct ideas.

    The process of separating public service broadcasting from any form of popular control was most fully developed in Great Britain. In the early 1920s, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was founded as a nationalised monopoly funded by the licence fee. But, in contrast with the pillarisation adopted by its continental European equivalents, the BBC had complete independence from any direct control by both government and opposition politicians. As the BBC’s first director general, Reith successfully prevented the British political parties from having any day to day involvement in its management. In order to preserve this autonomy, Reith ensured that the leaders of the major political parties regularly appeared on BBC programmes and their views were reported in its news service. By skillful lobbying, Reith persuaded the major political parties to rely on the neutrality of BBC management for the impartial presentation of their views. Yet, within the balanced programmes of the BBC, there were strict limits on political pluralism. During the 1926 General Strike, the leaders of the trade unions and the Labour party were prevented from broadcasting. Even without civil unrest, Communists and fascists were systematically excluded from the airwaves. At the same time, Reith also believed that the BBC had a duty to educate the British population. Under his control, the corporation limited the amount of popular entertainment in its schedules. Instead, the BBC mainly transmitted religious, educational and classical music programmes for its listeners. Above all else, Reith wanted the BBC to impose the culture of the conservative middle classes on the rest of the country. For Reith, the pedagogical role of the corporation even included improving the accents of its working class listeners. By creating ‘BBC English’, he hoped that a standardised southern English accent would be adopted by the whole British population.

    After the industrialisation of the media, the political right of freedom of communications could no longer be foundedupon the economic right of private property. Owned by a minority of share holders, the mass circulation newspapers and commercial radio stations excluded the majority of citizens from exercising their freedom of speech in print or over the airwaves. In response, left wing politicians advocated the nationalisation of the media, which would place the newspapers and radio stations under the control of the ‘general will’ of all citizens. At the end of the Second World War, the collaboration of the commercial media owners with fascism created the opportunity for the introduction of this new model of media freedom. Because the Blanquist and Leninist variants were too authoritarian, Blum’s pluralist version of Jacobin media freedom was adopted for the nationalised electronic media across western Europe. Although public service broadcasting didn’t create two way communications, all citizens could influence the one way flow of communications produced by the state owned media by choosing between the competing political parties in regular elections. However, this democratisation of the electronic media simultaneously led to the bureaucratisation of the airwaves. Because they were only indirectly accountable to the people, politicians and bureaucrats were increasingly able to run the nationalised broadcasting corporations in their own self interest. If all citizens were to be able to express their views in print or over the airwaves, a more radical version of media freedom would be needed.

    The Challenge of the New Left

    By the mid 1960s, both right wing and left wing governments across the industrialised world believed that the adoption of Fordism had removed the main causes of social discontent among their electorates. In national and local contests, the different political parties competed to offer higher wages and more social services to the voters. As their incomes steadily increased, workers were able to buy the consumer goods produced by the corporations, such as refrigerators, record players, vacuum cleaners and washing machines. From the early 1950s onwards, the ultimate consumer commodity became available to ordinary people: the television set. As the ownership of receivers spread, watching television programmes quickly became the most popular leisure activity within Fordist societies. Although they couldn’t escape from the need to work, workers were now entertained and informed by sound and vision in their own homes.

    Despite the rapid rise in living standards, the growth of the consumer society created its own social tensions. During the 1960s and early 1970s, this discontent led to the emergence of the New Left within the leading industrialised countries. Although initially inspired by protests against the American invasion of Vietnam, this movement soon challenged the cultural and sexual conservatism of its own society. In early stages of Fordism, the state and employers had encouraged cultural and sexual repression within the working class to reinforce labour discipline on the assembly lines. Yet, once Fordism was fully developed, the end of unemployment and the spread of mass consumption undermined this puritanical social order. Abandoning the morality of their parents, many young people adopted the hippie lifestyle, which championed sexual and chemical hedonism. By the mid 1960s, this cultural bohemianism had turned into social rebellion. Because they no longer respected the authority of their bosses, young workers instigated a wave of absenteeism, wildcat strikes and sabotage within the factories. While most activists were simply fighting for more wages and better conditions, a revolutionary minority rejected the entire Fordist compromise. While their parents saw televisions, fridges and cars as liberation from poverty, these young radicals believed that the desire for consumer goods had trapped society within the treadmill of wage labour. In their view, cultural liberation was only the first step towards a social revolution.

    Although they were anti capitalist, these young revolutionaries were also critical of the traditional Left parties. Instead of more modernisation, this new generation wanted an immediate revolution against the consumer society. In the early 1960s, this new form of politics was pioneered by the Situationist International, which had been started as a radical art group. According to its analysis, the introduction of mass production and consumption had ended the poverty of the past for the majority of the population. But, in the process of modernisation, the members of civil society had been transformed from individual property owners into wage-workers. Deprived of the ownership of private property, the majority of the population was now unable to control their time at work. With the creation of the consumer society, this alienation had been extended into everyday life. Under Fordism, the workers not only had to labour in factories and offices, but also had to consume the commodities produced by the assembly lines. Because the large corporations tried to manipulate the patterns of consumption, the Situationists believed that the majority of the population was now oppressed in their leisure as well as their work. As passive consumers, workers could only respond to the decisions of others without being able to participate themselves. Using the metaphor of the Theatre, the Situationists denounced Fordism as the ‘society of the spectacle’.

    Rejecting the European Left’s Jacobin traditions, the Situationists claimed that the alienation of work and everyday life could only be overcome by the creation of a direct democracy, which would end the separation of political and economic power from popular control. In the May ’68 Revolution in France, this revolutionary utopia was temporarily realised by the nationwide occupation of factories, universities and other institutions by striking workers and students. Under the slogan of self management, people from many different occupations demanded the extension of democracy into the workplace. But, despite the continuation of industrial unrest throughout the 1970s, the New Left never gained much influence within the labour movement. Instead, across the industrialised world, these young revolutionaries transferred their hopes for the implementation of direct democracy to the new social movements. During the 1960s, American radicals successfully established autonomous campaigns to champion the rights of women, lesbians & gays, ethnic minorities and other communities. Drawing from this experience, many New Left thinkers claimed that the traditional working class parties and unions were now obsolete. In their view, with modernisation completed, the competing classes within capitalism had fragmented into different social groups. Therefore, individuals could only identify with organisations fighting against their own particular oppression as women, homosexuals or members of ethnic communities. Applying this analysis to western Europe, Félix Guattari called for the creation of a ‘micro politics of desire’, which would express these new forms of popular struggle. According to his analysis, revolutionaries could only unite the majority of the population in the fight against capitalism by championing the specific demands of each autonomous campaign. Crucially, Guattari believed that close cooperation between the different new social movements in the revolutionary struggle was made possible by their common commitment to direct democracy within their internal structures. In his view, these autonomous campaigns provided a practical example of the end of the separation of politics from everyday life, which proved that a social revolution was imminent within
    Fordism.

    The Alternative Media

    Because of the New Left’s origins in cultural rebellion, many young revolutionaries were convinced that the spread of the hippie lifestyle was a crucial part of the revolutionary struggle. In their view, the work ethic, patriotism, sexism, racism and other conservative attitudes were cultural defences constructed by the ruling class against the spread of revolutionary ideas among the workers. Like Blanqui and Lenin, most New Left intellectuals believed that the majority of the population had been ideologically indoctrinated in false ideas by the capitalist media. In their writings, these thinkers relentlessly exposed the political biases of the mass circulation newspapers and the electronic media. Inspired by the Chinese Cultural Revolution, some radicals even advocated the creation of new type of totalitarian media, which would educate the whole population in politically correct ideas.

    In contrast, the Situationists rejected the Leninist analysis of the media. In their view, the spread of bourgeois ideologies was only an effect of the power of the media. Instead their analysis emphasised the passivity imposed upon workers by the dominance of the media. According to the Situationists, radio and television broadcasting had to be examined as the primary form of the ‘society of the spectacle’. Crucially, the Fordist organisation of the electronic media prevented any two way communications between the different members of the audience. With their centralised structures, there could only be a one way flow of communications within radio and television broadcasting. With the audience reduced to passivity, the radio and television stations could use their programme schedules to reinforce the daily rhythms of Fordist society. While the morning radio shows encouraged people to go to work, the evening television programmes provided instant relaxation after a tiring day at the office or factory. At the same time, the electronic media also created markets for the consumer goods produced by the Fordist factories by broadcasting advertising and programmes featuring rich lifestyles. Similarly, the electronic media maintained the illusion of choice offered by representative democracy through the provision of airtime for the competing parties. By mesmerising its passive audience, the electronic media had extended the disciplines of the factory into the leisure time of the workers.

    Following the May ’68 Revolution, this Situationist analysis was widely accepted among the most radical sections of the New Left. For example, Guattari thought that the mass media had replaced religion and physical force as the most important method of imposing social discipline within capitalist societies. Using his psychoanalytic studies, Guattari claimed that the electronic media promoted specific forms of ‘desire’ among their audiences. Bombarded by advertisements and mindless entertainment programmes, the majority of the population were being brainwashed into becoming loyal workers and contented shoppers. Crucially, the radical philosopher believed that the effectiveness of this new form of social control depended upon the exclusion of the majority of the population from any participation within the media. According to Guattari and his followers, the New Left had to counter the ideological influence of the newspapers and the electronic media by inventing a new form of media freedom. Rejecting the Jacobin solutions of the past, they called for the application of the principles of direct democracy within the media.

    In the mid 1960s, the American New Left pioneered a self management model of media freedom. Using cheap off set printing techniques, young radicals set up underground newspapers to cover events censored by the mainstream media, such as anti Vietnam war protests, new social movements, rock music and the hippie culture. Unlike their Leninist predecessors, these alternative newspapers didn’t advocate the policies of a single revolutionary party. Instead they tried to provide ‘counter information’ about the activities of all sections of the New Left. Although some were run by hippie entrepreneurs, most alternative newspapers were organised as co operatives. In these self managed newspapers, the journalists not only elected the editors, but also rotated important tasks between themselves. Crucially, these radical underground newspapers allowed their readers to contribute their own articles, poems, photos and drawings. By encouraging participation in the production and management of their newspapers, the American New Left hoped to free people from the passivity imposed upon them by the mainstream media.

    Inspired by the success of the underground press, other New Left radicals began experimenting with community television. In the early 1970s, the first portable video cameras had become available and the price of VCRs had fallen dramatically. According to the community video activists, the skills of television production could be easily learnt by amateurs. Moreover, almost everyone could express their opinions in a television interview. Therefore, these video radicals advocated that the new social movements should make their own programmes about their struggles. Above all else, they wanted to create an interactive television system, which would allow two way communications between viewers. In their view, when everyone was connected to the cable television networks, individuals and groups would be able to speak for themselves without need for representation by politicians or packaging by media professionals. Unfortunately for the community video activists, the construction of an electronic agora within television broadcasting was technically impossible in the early 1970s. With cable networks only available in a few cities, community television broadcasting was restricted to a limited number of experimental channels in the USA and western Europe.

    In contrast, community radio stations were successfully set up across the industrialised world. In the late 1940s, the first community radio stations had been founded by pacifists in the USA. After the emergence of the New Left, these radio stations were rapidly radicalised by their younger members. By the 1960s, the community radio stations were playing a leading role in the protests against the Vietnam war and in the emergence of the new social movements. Like the underground newspapers, these radical stations not only provided ‘counter information’ about dissident political groups, but also were run as self managed organisations. In 1975, this form of New Left media spread to western Europe. After a celebrated court case, the confiscation of the transmitter of a radical pirate radio station was declared unconstitutional in Italy. As a consequence, thousands of unlicenced radio and television stations appeared in all parts of the country. Although most were commercial, a minority of these radio stations were run by revolutionary groups. Using cheaptransmitters, home made studios and voluntary labour, community radio stations were much easier to run than underground newspapers. Crucially, these New Left radio stations not only elected their own administrators, but also tried to break down the separation between media professionals and their audience. From phone ins to programmes made by volunteers, the Italian community radio stations encouraged listener participation in their broadcasts. Above all else, these stations allowed their listeners to describe their own experiences in social struggles or their own opinions on political issues without the interference of parties or journalists. According to many New Left activists, these community radio stations had successfully undermined the domination of the ‘society of the spectacle’ over the electronic media.

    Following the success of community radio broadcasting in Italy, similar stations were set up in most western European countries. Crucially, many New Left radicals believed that the implementation of the self management model of media freedom within radio broadcasting was opening the way for a social revolution. Above all else, the new form of media freedom was the technological fix to the practical problems of creating direct democracy on a national scale. Because every citizen couldn’t personally attend an agora within a large country, the bourgeois revolutionaries had replaced the absolute monarchy with a representative form of democracy. However, although all citizens obtained the vote, the election of professional politicians to run the state exacerbated the separation of political power from civil society. According to the New Left, this alienation could now be overcome by implementing the self management model of media freedom. Within the ‘society of the spectacle’, the centralised radio and television stations only transmitted a one way flow of communications from political parties and media professionals to isolated listeners and viewers. But, after a social revolution, the New Left radicals believed that the electronic media could be used to establish two way communications between localised meetings of workers. With the formation of these horizontal links, direct democracy could be extended electronically beyond the physical confines of a general meeting. Thus, with the establishment of two way communications within radio and television broadcasting, everyone would be able to take part in social decision making by participating within an electronic agora.

    According to some New Left thinkers, the creation of an electronic agora would only be possible once everyone was connected to a cable television network. In contrast, Guattari and other radicals claimed that community radio broadcasting could be used to build the electronic agora. Like other New Left thinkers, they believed that the new social movements had already instituted direct democracy within their own organisations. As a next step, they advocated that feminists, ecologists, lesbians & gays, ethnic communities and other autonomous campaigns should set up their own community radio stations. Then each new social movement could hold its internal discussions on its own radio station. At the same time, a common debate could be conducted between the different communities through the diffuse network of alternative radio stations. According to Guattari and his followers, these specific and general discussions on the community radio stations would be combined into a permanent meeting of the airwaves, which would involve every new social movement and civil society as a whole. Thus the implementation of self management model of media freedom within radio broadcasting would provide the technical fix to overcome the physical limits of direct democracy. Without waiting for the building of a cable television network, the electronic agora could be immediately constructed over the airwaves.

    In the self management model of media freedom, the members of civil society exercised their individual political right of freedom of communications through the collective economic right of ownership exercised by co operatives. Unlike earlier versions, this new form of media freedom didn’t limit participation in production to a minority of male journalist printers or professional politicians and journalists. However the revolutionary hopes embodied in the self management form of media freedom weren’t fulfilled in practice. By the late 1970s, the New Left media had begun to go into decline. During a period of reaction, there was a widespread disillusionment about politics among all sections of the population. Reliant on voluntary labour and funding, most radical publications went bankrupt. At the same time, those underground newspapers with large readerships were slowly transformed into conventional commercial enterprises. Within community television broadcasting, most of the experimental stations never obtained enough support to evolve into permanent channels. Even within community radio, radical stations encountered great difficulties in recruiting new activists and raising revenue. By the late 1980s, much of the alternative media had entered into final stages of collapse, with declining audiences, little money and internal quarrels. Among the survivors, the radical media were usually run by a small minority of New Left activists. With their high level of political commitment, they were often culturally separated from their intended audiences. Under the self management model of media freedom, all individuals were supposed to participate in two way communications. Ironically, in an era of political apathy, most of the New Left media were only providing a one way flow of propaganda from a small group of revolutionary activists. Without the participation of all members of civil society, it was impossible to build the electronic agora. As the utopian hopes of the New Left faded, a new model of media freedom could be tried.

    The Crisis of Fordism

    From the late-1940s onwards, the economies of the industrialised countries enjoyed continuous growth, with wages and profits steadily increasing in parallel. However, in the early-1970s, the rate of growth suddenly went into decline. In part, this slowdown in the economy was caused by the revolt of the New Left against the disciplines of the assembly-lines. At the same time, a rapid rise in the price of oil and other raw materials substantially increased the costs of production for most businesses. As in previous decades, national governments responded to the crisis by adopting reflationary policies. But, unlike in earlier recessions, this Fordist strategy didn’t work. Instead, the world economy entered a period of persistent inflation, currency instability and growing unemployment. This failure in economic policy was caused by the globalisation of production. For over thirty years, American, European and Japanese companies had been slowly expanding to obtain economies of scale on an international level. Outside the control of any one national government, the global trading system created by these multinationals was regulated by the world financial markets. Following the collapse of fixed exchange rates, the international competition between different currencies increasingly determined the internal economic policies of the industrialised countries. For example, reflation in a single country was prevented by balance of payments crises, which forced a return to deflationary policies. Once the governments of the industrialised countries lost control over their own national economies, the virtuous circle of rising production and consumption was broken. Instead of steadily increasing wages and welfare benefits, workers now faced cuts in social benefits, stagnant money wages and mass unemployment. Faced with the reemergence of the social problems of the past, new solutions had to be found to tackle the deepening crisis of Fordism.

    The Post-Industrial Utopians

    After the failure of traditional reflationary remedies, many politicians and intellectuals were convinced that Fordism had reached its inherent social, organisational and technological limits. However, unlike the New Left, they didn’t accept that a social revolution was needed to transcend the crisis of the system. Instead, they believed that a new form of society would spontaneously emerge from the growing convergence of computer, media and communications technologies. Back in the early-1960s, Marshall McLuhan had been the first prophet of a new post-industrial age. According to this guru, the development of human societies was solely determined by their technologies, especially the different forms of media. For example, he claimed that Fordist industrialisation had been caused by the invention of printing, which brought about discipline, individuality and rationality. However, with the introduction of radio and television broadcasting, this industrial society had begun to break down. Because the electronic media were supposed to encourage participation and involvement, the younger generation would no longer accept hierarchies imposed by Fordism.

    For McLuhan, the student revolts and the cultural rebellion of the hippies were simply symptoms of a clash between two rival forms of media. In his view, this crisis could only be overcome by the final triumph of the new information technologies. With the spread of computer automation, Fordist manufacturing would be replaced by information processing. As a consequence, alienating and boring factory labour would be transformed into participatory and enjoyable intellectual work. Similarly, the spread of the electronic media would also overcome national and social divisions among people. When everyone was watching the same television programmes, McLuhan believed that old hatreds and misunderstandings would disappear. As a devout Catholic, this prophet of the information age hoped that the whole world would be united in a mystical version of the electronic agora: the ‘global village’. Inspired by McLuhan’s celebrity status, other intellectuals also started predicting the replacement of Fordism by a post-industrial society. According to these futurologists, the introduction of information technologies would shift employment from the manufacturing and extractive industries towards the service sector, especially its media and high-technology companies. As a consequence, assembly-line workers would be replaced by white-collar professionals. In parallel, bureaucrats and industrialists would lose their political and economic power to scientists and academics, who had the skills to invent the new information technologies. For the futurologists, the crisis of Fordism was proof of the correctness of their analysis. For example, they claimed that the reemergence of mass unemployment was caused by the failure to train workers for the new information age, rather than the loss of control over national economies to the global financial markets. As technological determinists, these prophets believed that the profound economic crisis of the early-1970s was solely caused by the invention of new types of machinery.

    Because of their technological determinism, the futurologists were fascinated by the electronic media. As the personal computer hadn’t yet been invented, radio and television sets were the most important information technologies in daily use. According to these gurus, the electronic media were already pioneering the future information society within the present. For example, with their ever-changing fashions, stars and advertising slogans, radio and television stations demonstrated the obsolescence of the rigid production methods of Fordism. In the future, the futurologists believed that the introduction of satellite and cable television technologies would greatly increase the influence of the electronic media. Crucially, they forecast that the construction of an interactive cable television network would inevitably lead to the development of direct democracy. In the post-industrial utopia, viewers would be able to register their opinions on issues of public concern by simply pressing their remote controls. Thus, without the need for a social revolution led by the New Left, the futurologists believed that the spread of the new information technologies would automatically create the electronic agora.

    Hi-Tech Neo-Liberals

    Despite their utopian conclusions, the prophecies of the futurologists were used by conservative parties to argue for the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by the major industrialised countries. In the early-1980s, led by Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in Great Britain, governments across the world privatised and deregulated their financial and industrial sectors. By abandoning interventionist policies and cutting welfare spending, politicians hoped to revitalise their economies through the rapid integration of their financial institutions and manufacturing corporations within the global marketplace. Crucially, these conservative governments believed that increased market competition would encourage the adoption of the new information technologies. Inspired by the futurologists, they thought that the crisis of Fordism would finally overcome through the emergence of the post-industrial society. Although the futurologists had predicted the imminent advent of direct democracy, neo-liberal governments used their prophecies to defend the creation of greater market competition. Because they limited profits and prevented the entry of new competitors, state regulations were condemned for discouraging companies from taking the risk of introducing new information technologies within their industries. Thus, by accepting the inevitability of the transition to a post-industrial society, conservative governments were able to justify the removal of all regulatory controls over private corporations. Ironically, both Reagan and Thatcher believed that the success of their neo-liberal economic policies was proved by the overexpansion of the service sector and the decline of manufacturing industries in their countries.

    In order to win electoral support for the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, conservative parties appealed to the individual self-interest of the better paid workers. With the advent of the consumer society, the living standards of most people had risen considerably. According to the neo-liberals, workers now had to be encouraged to become individual property owners. By extending the ownership of shares, small businesses and houses, conservative politicians hoped that most workers would no longer support collective solutions to their problems, such as state intervention or democracy in the workplace. Instead, these property-owning wage-earners would be more interested in expressing their individual autonomy, especially within their private lives. Reviving the principles of the bourgeois revolutions, neo-liberals urged that individual citizens should be given legal guarantees of their independence from state controls. While Socialists championed the public service state as the representative of the entire Nation-People, conservatives advocated individual rights for the protection of each citizen against the abuses of political power. Crucially, these rights weren’t only being claimed by individual citizens. With the globalisation of production, corporations also needed guarantees against the arbitrary actions of national governments. As legal persons, joint-stock companies wanted the same juridical rights as individual citizens. Under the slogan of freedom, neo-liberals advocated the protection of the particular interests of private capital in the name of the universal rights of all citizens.

    As a central part of their campaign for more market competition, the neo liberals created a new definition of media freedom. Echoing the prophecies of the futurologists, they claimed that the application of their deregulation and privatisation policies within the electronic media would encourage the rapid construction of an interactive cable network. Once this grid was built, individuals would no longer be passive consumers, who simply watched programmes provided by public or private corporations. Instead, they would become active communicators, who expressed their own opinions over the network. Thus, individual citizens would use cameras, computers and other equipment to engage in two-way communications by producing their own electronic media. Reviving the traditions of the journalist-printers, the neo-liberals claimed that the political right of media freedom could once again be realised through the private ownership of the means of production. Crucially, in contrast with the New Left and the futurologists, these conservatives didn’t believe that the creation of two-way communications over the cable network would lead to the formation of the electronic agora. Instead, they believed that the new information technologies should be used for the construction of an electronic marketplace. In their view, the most important technical advance on the cable network was encryption, which allowed the imposition of a direct price for the consumption of the electronic media for the first time. With the formation of prices, market competition between different electronic media producers could be created within the cable network. Instead of advertising or licence fees, access to the cable network could now be solely decided by market competition. Following the introduction of this technical solution to the social problem of price formation, neo-liberals claimed that state intervention within the electronic media had become obsolete.

    By advocating the creation of an electronic marketplace, conservative governments were able to win the support of both individuals and commercial companies who wanted open access to the media. Back in 1927, the introduction of regulation for radio broadcasting in the USA had been originally justified by the shortage of frequencies on the airwaves. Using their influence over the federal government, the NBC and CBS corporations soon monopolised the airwaves. Although another network emerged, television broadcasting was also dominated by corporate interests. In response, the regulation of the airwaves was gradually tightened to enforce limited pluralism in political reporting, the scheduling of children’s programmes and a few other public service commitments. By the early-1980s, state regulation of the American electronic media was being attacked by both radical groups in favour of more community broadcasting and commercial entrepreneurs calling for the end of expensive public service obligations. Seizing this opportunity, the Reagan government rapidly removed most of the controls over terrestrial and cable television broadcasting. According to the administration, the abolition of regulation would soon lead to the creation of the electronic marketplace, where everyone could take part in two-way communications over the interactive cable network. However, in the short-term, the principle beneficiaries of the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media were the large media companies. Despite the promises of a post-industrial society, economies of scale still favoured the industrialised media controlled by the Fordist corporations.

    Although the new information technologies allowed new services to enter the market, easier access didn’t abolish the influence of first copy costs within media production. Because the tastes of audiences weren’t limited to a specific local community, the same media products were often popular among people from different cultures. For decades, the Hollywood cinema industry had successfully sold its films across the globe and American music companies had marketed their records in many different countries. With the opening up of previously monopolised electronic media to competition, it was now possible to market television broadcasting on an international scale for the first time. For example, wherever they lived, large numbers of teenagers would tune into MTV’s top 40 hit format and many adults would watch CNN’s 24 hour news service. Although language barriers prevented the emergence of a completely global television system, dubbed American series and telefilms still dominated the newly deregulated channels in many countries. By covering its costs across a worldwide audience, a multinational television producer could provide expensively-made programmes at a cheaper price than any local competitor.

    By the early-1990s, deregulation and privatisation had led to the dominance of the global media markets by a handful of American, European and Japanese corporations. These organisations didn’t just extend their control over different types of media, from newspapers through films to television production. At the same time, they also combined with the owners of distribution systems, such as cable television operators or telephone companies. Although these fusions fulfilled the predictions of convergence between different information technologies, the media multinationals weren’t creating enough jobs to replace those lost in the traditional Fordist industries, which had been devastated by the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies. Because of the cheap costs of reproduction, there was an extraordinary disproportion between the small number of workers employed in the media and the large audiences for their output. Despite the promises of the neo-liberals, the overwhelming majority of individuals were still passive consumers, who could only choose between the radio and television channels of the media corporations. Crucially, the rhetoric of two-way communications had been turned into the reality of a greater choice of one-way flows of communications.

    Although market competition had failed to provide much individual access to the electronic media, neo-liberals still believed that deregulation and privatisation would create freedom of communications within radio and television broadcasting. Criticising the public service model, they pointed out that individual citizens could only indirectly express their views over the airwaves by voting for representatives of political parties. In contrast, the neo-liberals claimed that market competition between commercial media corporations directly reflected the wishes of their audiences. Because they wanted to maximise their audiences, competing radio and television stations had to provide the types of programmes desired by listeners and viewers. Therefore, by selecting channels on their radio or television sets, individual citizens determined the content of the programmes within the electronic media. For example, more entertainment programmes were provided for viewers in commercial systems than under a public service monopoly. Crucially, the neo-liberals also claimed that the intense competition for audiences between channels created a diversity of political opinions over the airwaves. Thus, although they couldn’t be active communicators, these conservative gurus believed that individuals had been empowered as channel zappers. In this version of the neo-liberal model, the individual citizens’ political right of freedom of communications was equated with their economic rights as consumers of the electronic media.

    By advocating a free market utopia, the neo-liberals successfully recuperated many of the demands of the New Left. On the one hand, they accepted the opposition of these revolutionaries to cultural puritanism and unaccountable bureaucracies. Thus both sides could oppose the imposition of moral censorship and the monopolisation of the media by the public service state. But, on the other hand, the neo-liberals rejected the demands for the self-management of social and economic institutions, including the electronic media. According to the New Left, individual freedom was only possible through the collective ownership of property by co-operatives, as in the community media. In contrast, for the neo-liberals, individual freedom was the absence of state regulations within the marketplace, as in open competition between different cable television stations. Combating the New Left, the neo-liberals also promised two-way communications and direct democracy for all individuals. Yet, while the electronic agora was supposed to end the alienation of political and economic power from popular control, the electronic marketplace only allowed individuals to realise their needs for information and entertainment through commodity exchange. Above all else, the neo-liberals carefully obscured the consequences of media deregulation and privatisation. Although individuals had the right to produce their own media, the electronic marketplace was dominated by the output of the large corporations. For most people, media freedom was restricted to the right to choose between competing radio and television stations. Instead of being active communicators, they were only channel zappers.

    Infotainment

    Back in the nineteenth century, politicians tried to win the support of voters by holding public meetings, canvassing individual households, recruiting party members and sponsoring newspapers. However, from the early-1920s onwards, political conflicts have been increasingly fought out in the electronic media. For the first time, every citizen not only could receive large amounts of political information, but also were able to hear or see their elected representatives. Once they mastered the techniques of broadcasting, some politicians skillfully used the electronic media to establish an almost intimate relationship with their supporters. Like a trusted friend, these leaders explained the government’s polices to the voters in the privacy of their own homes. Because all citizens now had access to the opinions of their representatives, a few politicians even claimed that their appearances over the airwaves had created the electronic agora.

    Despite these aspirations, radio and television broadcasting have been Fordist media for the last seventy years. Because they were organised as a one-way flow of communications, the electronic media excluded the majority of the population from any direct participation in their output. As the prime example of the ‘society of the spectacle’, radio and television broadcasting reinforced the separation of the state from civil society. During the 1960s and 1970s, the New Left, futurologists and neo-liberals believed that the introduction of the new information technologies would overcome this passivity in both media and politics. But, by the early-1990s, these utopian dreams had failed in practice. Above all else, the implementation of the policies of the neo-liberals had exacerbated the distance between the politicians and their electorates. Just as globalisation of production prevented national governments from controlling their own economic destiny, so the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media had removed the indirect influence exercised by voters in the public service model. Although they had been promised active participation, most people were actually restricted to being couch potatoes zapping between channels.

    Under the neo-liberal model of media freedom, the majority of the population were only offered a choice between almost identical one-way flows of communications. Contrary to the predictions of the neo-liberals, this homogeneity in content had been created by the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media. With a fierce competition for ever higher ratings, news programmes on commercial radio and television stations copied each others’ successful features to prevent viewers from switching to rival channels. Above all else, the rival news bulletins adapted techniques pioneered by the entertainment programmes which filled the rest of the schedules. For example, the lengthy explanations of political situations used by the news programmes of the public services channels were rapidly abandoned., Instead, in imitation of magazine programmes, a quick and sensational coverage of current events was adopted. Copying the talkshows, news programmes started including more gossip about celebrities, sensational court cases and human interest stories alongside their political reports. As competition intensified, television stations increasingly relied on compelling visual images to illustrate their news bulletins. In the ratings war, exclusive pictures of wars, famines, terrorism and natural disasters were proven methods of attracting more viewers. Using live broadcasts, news programmes could even provide the emotional thrill of watching history as it was being made, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the bombing of Baghdad. Imitating the rhythm of sports reports, exciting live coverage of major political crises and foreign wars was now available for viewers in the safety of their own homes.

    By the late-1980s, this combination of information and entertainment in news programmes was known as infotainment. Because it resulted from competition between television stations, this style of news coverage was defended by neo-liberals as an expression of the direct wishes of viewers. Yet, at the same time, the dominance of infotainment within the electronic media exacerbated the crisis of representation within the leading industrialised countries. Unlike its public service predecessor, the neo-liberal model of media freedom no longer guaranteed access to the airwaves for the elected representatives of the voters. Instead politicians could only express their opinions in the form of infotainment which had to attract high ratings among the viewers. In the USA and Britain, Reagan and Thatcher adopted the latest marketing techniques to create publicity stunts and soundbites for the evening television news bulletins. Following their example, both right-wing and left-wing parties across the world soon learnt to sell their political manifestos like consumer commodities. While the public service model was supposed to allow reasoned debate between politicians over the merits of their rival policies, the neo-liberal model turned voters into consumers of the advertising messages produced by the competing political parties. Crucially the use of advertising techniques often allowed the parties of both Left and Right to hide the real consequences of their proposed policies from the voters. Because they were made as infotainment, political advertising campaigns could rely on style rather than on content. But, when the promises of the advertising campaigns couldn’t be fulfilled, the voters became increasingly cynical about their political representatives. Far from ending the alienation of the state from civil society, the neo-liberal model had widened the gap between the professional politicians and their electorates.

    Political Hyperreality

    Following the triumph of infotainment, some intellectuals became disillusioned with the radical possibilities of the media. According to Jean Baudrillard, the mass ownership of computers and television sets had already successfully created the post-industrial society within the advanced capitalist countries. Yet the spread of information technologies hadn’t liberated the population from political and economic alienation. On the contrary, Baudrillard claimed that a new form of domination had emerged: hyperreality. Under Fordism, the electronic media had merely spread incorrect ideas among the people. However, in the new world of post-modernism, all aspects of social life had been transformed into an entirely simulated world of information. Instead of working and playing in the real world, individuals had been sucked into the hyperreality created by computer and television screens.

    For Baudrillard, the domination of infotainment demonstrated the growing power of hyperreality. Once politics had been transformed into show business, the rival social programmes of the Left and Right were only simulations for the news and current affairs programmes of the electronic media. Instead of representing their electors, politicians were now taking part in a form of television gameshow. Therefore, aping the sports commentators, news presenters regularly assessed the latest position of the rival parties by reporting their most recent poll ratings. Moreover, under post-modernism, politicians no longer needed to win the political debate with reasoned arguments. Instead they could use the techniques of political marketing which had won two American presidential elections by selling Reagan’s smile. Similarly, as in the Gulf war, political leaders could embark on foreign adventures to provide thrilling infotainment for the television audiences back home. With the advent of hyperreality, the image of politics had become more important than its real application.

    Crucially Baudrillard asserted that the development of interactive computer and cable television networks wouldn’t free people from the domination of hyperreality. On the contrary, he claimed that two-way communications simply encouraged further involvement in the simulated world of information. Instead of creating a self-managed society, the introduction of new information technologies had ended all opportunities for political and economic participation. While they were watching television or using the Internet, individuals couldn’t act as either citizens or members of civil society. Far from creating direct democracy, the electronic agora was the most insidious form of the new type of oppression. According to this guru, the dominance of hyperreality had ended any possibility of establishing media freedom. Whether indirectly or directly, individuals couldn’t express their opinions through the electronic media. For Baudrillard, the only form of resistance to the oppression of hyperreality was the refusal to participate within the media and politics. In his view, even if they watched television programmes, most people were no longer interested in the political role of the electronic media. At the same time, the rising rate of abstentionism demonstrated increasing apathy among the electorate. Far from condemning the separation of the state from civil society, Baudrillard believed that most people were happy to abdicate their responsibilities as citizens to the bureaucrats and politicians. Freed of their public duties, they could then enjoy the pleasures of private life without disturbance.

    The Reregulation of the Media

    The pessimism of Baudrillard and other post-modernists reflected the growing crisis of representation within the industrialised countries. Although they had perfected their media skills, politicians encountered increasing difficulties in arousing the interests of voters. In the early-1980s, right-wing politicians had claimed that deregulation and privatisation were needed to hasten the adoption of new information technologies. as the old manufacturing industries declined, redundant workers were supposed to find new jobs in the post-industrial sectors, such as computers and the media. Yet the electronic media and other information sectors only created a limited number of new jobs. Instead a two-tier society emerged within many advanced capitalist countries. Following Japanese and Third World examples, the labour force was slowly polarised into a core of full-time employees and a periphery of part-time or unemployed workers. Unable to meet the needs of all the electorate, politicians concentrated on winning the votes of core workers through tax cuts and abundant credit. Even when left-wing governments were elected, the domination of the world financial markets prevented any attempts to isolate a single national economy from the crisis of Fordism. Deprived of any chance to improve society, politicians and bureaucrats concentrated on enjoying the perks of power. Not surprisingly, many voters reacted with a combination of apathy and anger. With seemingly no possibility of radical change, they now believed that elections could no longer accomplish anything.

    Faced by a disillusioned electorate, western European Socialist parties advocated the revival of state controls over the economy in a new form. In their view, government intervention could mediate between the conflicting interests of corporations, small firms and employees. Although integrated within the world market, they believed that the state could use regulations to improve competitivity and accelerate technological innovation. As representatives of the ‘general will’, the elected government had to override the particular interests of capital in the interests of all citizens. Inspired by this analysis, Socialist parties also reasserted the need for state regulation over the electronic media. In their view, the failure of media deregulation proved that the political right of freedom of communications couldn’t be solely guaranteed by the economic right of private property. Instead they argued that the state had to intervene within radio and television broadcasting in the interests of all citizens. Although the economic impact of the electronic media was marginal, their cultural and political impact was immense. Because of the dramatic economies of scale in information production, thousands of media workers could provide an increasingly wide range of radio and television channels to millions of listeners and viewers. By the late-1980s, many people within the advanced capitalist countries were spending more time watching television than working.

    Despite supporting state controls, the Socialists didn’t advocate a return to the system of pillarisation within a single public service monopoly. Instead the Socialists wanted a new form of regulation which would enforce political pluralism across a mixed economy of nationalised and private electronic media providers. Using regulatory bodies, governments would ensure that internal pluralism was respected within the news and current affairs programmes of the major radio and television channels. By issuing licences to an ever larger number of stations, the state could also create external pluralism between competing providers of the electronic media. According to its supporters, this regulation model of media freedom combined the best elements of the public service and neo-liberal models by providing guaranteed access to the airwaves for the competing political parties and a choice of services for the listeners and viewers. Using limited government subsidies, the surviving examples of the self-management model could even be incorporated within this new media consensus. For some, the creation of internal and external pluralism within radio and television broadcasting led to a limited version of the electronic agora. Under the supervision of the state, a combination of pluralism within the electronic media and regular sampling by opinion polls had established a permanent dialogue between citizens and their representatives. But, in reality, this form of two-way communications was very indirect. Crucially, without full employment, the implementation of the regulation model couldn’t end the growing crisis of representation within the advanced industrialised countries.

    The Revival of the Media Utopias

    In the late-1980s, the collapse of the credit boom sent the world economy back into recession. Despite integrating their economies within the world market, governments across the world were now faced with the threat of continual economic stagnation and permanently high rates of unemployment. As core workers realised that the days of easy credit were over, the economic crisis slowly led to political instability. With a few exceptions, ruling parties within the advanced industrialised countries were decisively defeated in elections. However, trapped within an increasingly integrated world economy, the new administrations encountered great difficulties in abandoning neo-liberal economic policies. Yet, without new solutions, popular disillusionment with the main political parties would increase further and the voting patterns of the electorate would become even more volatile. Harking back to the early-1970s, some leading politicians decided to revive the media utopias of the futurologists. For example, they held up the success of Internet system as proof of the long awaited convergence of computers, telecommunications and the electronic media. After the election of Clinton, the American government increasingly used the construction of ‘information superhighways’ not only as an excuse for state intervention within the economy, but also as a potential technological fix for the country’s intractable social problems. Once again, leading politicians were claiming that the solution to the crisis of Fordism was the construction of an interactive fibre-optic network which would create two-way communications among its users.

    Encouraged by government support, the major telephone and cable television companies embarked on a series of mergers and alliances to mobilise the capital needed for this infrastructural project. In parallel, the media corporations combined film studios, record companies, video games developers, television stations and newspapers within one organisation to provide a full range of services for the emerging ‘information superhighway’. As other countries developed their own interactive networks, the media multinationals hoped to take advantage of economies of scale on a global scale. By eroding cultural differences between nations, they dreamt of an international electronic marketplace where all forms of information would be traded under their control. Not surprisingly, these corporations saw the installation of secure encryption systems and enforceable copyright laws as the key to the further development of the network. Once electronic commodity exchange was fully established, they hoped that the final vestiges of the public service model could be removed from a globalised electronic media system outside the control of any national regulatory body. Far from increasing political diversity, this international media oligopoly threatened to turn all news and current affairs programmes into infotainment.

    Ironically this further development of the media exacerbated the crisis of representation across the developed world. As shown by the sudden success of fringe parties, there was a desperation for some magical solution to the political and economic impasse. Echoing the New Left, some politicians called for the creation of direct democracy over the network. Bypassing the discredited politicians, voters would be able to make their own political decisions in ‘electronic town halls’. The revival of this utopian vision demonstrated that the new networks didn’t have to be solely used for the sale of information commodities by the media corporations. Whether adopted by underground magazines, community radio stations, access cable television channels or electronic bulletin boards, the self-management model provided the only clear alternative to the dominance of the world information economy by an oligarchy of a few corporations. While conventional capitalist companies were limited by the constraints of price formation and copyright controls, musicians and other artists had already demonstrated how the new digital technologies were breaking down the rigid divisions between the production and consumption of information. In addition, Minitel in France and the Internet in the USA showed how a simple e-mail system could be turned into a participatory medium by its users. Although initially limited to text, these networks allowed individuals to carry out both point-to-point communications and the mass distribution of information. In a developed interactive system, every user was not only a receiver, but also a transmitter. By combining different systems, a single global network could be created from the different servers and contributors. Although reliant on subsidies from the American defence budget and universities, the success of the Internet system was based on the spontaneous collaboration of its participants on a global scale. Dubbed cyberspace, this fusion of networks could centralise the production and distribution of media on a scale surpassing the ambitions of the most predatory multinationals. Alongside the international electronic marketplace, a global electronic agora is waiting to be born as well.

    Conclusion

    In the late-medieval period, the emergence of the capitalist economy destroyed the intimacy of village and urban life. As people needed to communicate across time and space, the media were invented to carry news of economic and political events. At the same time, the creation of civil society also led to the overthrow of the absolute monarchies. From the beginning, the struggle for media freedom has been synonymous with this formation of the democratic republic. However the further development of capitalism has exposed the contradictions at the heart of modern politics and media: the need for representation. Although media freedom was originally defined as the right of journalist-printers to express their own opinions in print, the media freedom of the owners of printing presses presupposed the exclusion of most of the population. The propertyless majority may have possessed media freedom in theory but were unable to exercise it in practice. Not surprisingly, as in politics, most people were willing to accept representation as a substitution for participation. Just as parliamentary democracy created the conditions for universal suffrage, the industrialisation of the media reduced the price of information to levels affordable by all sections of the population.

    Ever since the disappearance of the traditional interpretation of media freedom, there have been repeated attempts to reconcile the rhetoric of participation with the reality of representation. In the various Jacobin models, the views of the majority of the population were more or less successfully articulated by political parties. With the advent of the crisis of Fordism, there have been both left-wing and right wing attempts to surpass the limitations of the indirect forms of media freedom. Despite the failures of the New Left and the neo-liberals, the current revival of interest in the electronic marketplace and electronic agora demonstrates the persistence of this central contradiction within media freedom. Just as the crisis of representation within the state can only be resolved through the end of the separation of politics from control by civil society, so the construction of the electronic agora offers the democratic solution to overcoming domination by the ‘spectacle’. Until everyone can participate freely in the production and consumption, the struggle for media freedom cannot be over.

  • FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: DIGITAL WORK by Richard Barbrook

    * How does digital work differ from its analogue forms?

    Increasingly people would like to enjoy the dignity of artisan labour without losing the material benefits of Fordism. Over the past two centuries, industrialisation has slowly replaced skilled craft labour with repetitive factory and office work. In the Fordist factory, even the pace of working can be determined by the speed of the assembly lines. For most of this century, people have grudgingly accepted the boring nature of their jobs. In return, they have been given enough wages to buy large amounts of goods and services produced by Fordist industrialisation. However, once their living standards are sufficient, many people would also like to rediscover satisfaction in their work. In sectors such as the media, people can already combine skilled labour with high productivity. Because each extra copy can be reproduced at a very low price, the high costs of employing craft labour for making the first copy of a film, programme or recording are economically viable. With the advent of the Net, the potential productivity of creative work is even greater. Like the artisans of the proto-industrial epoch, digital workers have to use craft skills to produce quality artefacts. Like labourers in a Fordist factory, they can reproduce multiple copies of the same product. In the age of the Net, digital work could synthesise the best features of its analogue predecessors: the high skills of the artisans and the high productivity of the factory hands.

    * How can digital work be creative?

    In a capitalist society, paid work is performed to produce goods and services which can be sold in the marketplace or will be purchased by the state. Like other products, hypermedia products also have to be made to the specifications of others. For most of their clients, digital artisans use standardised software packages and mainstream graphic designs to get the job completed on time and within budget. Their creativity is restricted to producing a quality product which will satisfy the needs of its users. However, the constant changes in hypermedia software and design fashions have also opened up opportunities for more innovative and experimental types of work. With clients seeking products which realise the full potential of new technologies, skilled workers can push forward the technical and aesthetic limits of their craft. Instead of continually repeating what has already been done, digital artisans can demonstrate their creativity by producing wonderful artefacts which have never been seen before.

    * What skills are involved in digital work?

    In many sectors, the introduction of computer and Net technologies hasn’t abolished Fordist methods of working. In financial institutions, much of the labour remains tedious data-processing. In call-centres, each moment of an individual’s working-day is still closely supervised. Even within new media, many people primarily carry out routine coding and design for their jobs. Yet, despite these continuities with Fordism, the production of digital artefacts also encourages new methods of working. Because of the ease of reproduction, most of the costs of manufacture are no longer expended making multiple copies of the same product. Instead, investment is concentrated upon the design and building of the first copy of a digital artefact. Because such tasks are difficult to mechanise, this form of production must be carried out by craft labour. In order to make useful and beautiful products, digital artisans need both technical and aesthetic skills for their work. Because different people’s abilities are often combined to complete a specific job, these workers must have social skills to collaborate easily with each other. Above all, digital artisans must possess the self-confidence to run their own working lives.

    * What distinguishes digital artisans from dotcom entrepreneurs?

    According to neo-liberal cyber-gurus, the dissemination of computer and Net technologies will create a completely ‘new paradigm’ where everyone can become a dotcom entrepreneur. Yet, despite some important changes in the methods of working, the divisions between management and workers persist. Above all, the most important social question within capitalism remains: who controls economic institutions? Within many sectors, the ‘new paradigm’ is obviously just a trendy Californian buzzword. Although the personal relations between management and employees are less formal, the old Fordist techniques for supervising and controlling all aspects of production from above persist. Yet, the increased importance of craft labour within the digital economy has forced even long-established corporations to change their methods of management. Rather than directly supervising skilled workers, large companies increasingly prefer to sub-contract their tasks either to small companies or directly to artisans. Instead of bureaucrats directing people to perform tasks, market competition for short-term contracts instead controls workers who couldn’t be disciplined by other means. Like their proto-industrial predecessors, self-employed digital artisans can earn high wages and control the pace of their work. Compared to those in traditional jobs, they are members of a new ‘labour aristocracy’. However, most of these skilled workers still have little or no say in the companies which employ them. If they own a few shares, they usually have little influence over the strategy of the firm. Even those artisans who do control their own companies remain subordinate to market disciplines imposed by their corporate clients. Needing to ensure products are delivered on time and within budget, they are either forced either to become managers themselves or sell their companies to someone else so they can still engage in creative work. Despite the rhetoric of the ‘new paradigm’, the old class divisions of capitalism persist.

    * What are the common interests of digital workers?

    Whether working as an employee of a Fordist corporation or as an artisan carrying out a contract, all digital workers need good conditions to carry out their jobs. Their place of work should be safe, comfortable and healthy. The technologies used in production should not harm their users over the long-term. Work patterns should not lead to people getting industrial illnesses. As in other industries, digital workers also need to advance their economic position as a group. Within corporations, they must jointly negotiate their terms and conditions of employment. Within contract work, they must establish industry agreements on rates for jobs and common business practices. Above all, data-processors and digital artisans must develop political solidarity between each other as workers. They all have a common interest in ensuring that the state advances the legal, welfare and other interests of employees rather than hinders them. 

    * How can digital workers organise to advance their common interests?

    For generations, workers formed trade unions to bargain with their employers and to campaign for political reforms. As in other industries, workers in the emerging digital economy also need to defend their common interests. However, most of the existing labour organisations are not responding quickly enough to the changes in people’s working lives. Although formed to fight the employers, industrial trade unions were also created in the image of the Fordist factory: bureaucratic, centralised and nationalist. For those working within the digital economy, such labour organisations seem anachronistic. Instead, new forms of unionism need to be developed which can represent the interests of digital workers. As well as reforming the structures of existing labour organisations, digital workers should start co-operating with each other using their own methods. As they’re already on-line, people could organise to advance their common interests through the Net. Formed within the digital economy, a virtual trade union should emphasise new principles of labour organisation: artisanal, networked and global.

  • THE NAPSTERISATION OF EVERYTHING by Richard Barbrook

    Review of John Alderman, Sonic Boom: Napster, P2P and the battle for the future of music, Fourth Estate, London 2001.

    “They just don’t get it.” During the dotcom boom of the late-1990s, this catch phrase was a popular way of dismissing anyone who expressed doubts about the world-historical significance of the Net. How could someone be so out-of-touch as not to realise that this technology was transforming everything: business, politics, culture and even personal relationships? The future would belong to those did “get it.” Yet, only a couple of years later, such optimism about the potential of the Net already sounds dated. How can anyone still believe that this technology will change anything after the implosion of the NASDAQ share bubble and the collapse of so many dotcom companies. Surely the wild times of the Net were only a temporary aberration? As Microsoft, AOL-Time-Warner and the other big corporations take over cyberspace, it will soon be back to business as usual. There is no longer any necessity to “get it.” The Net will change nothing.

    John Alderman’s new book – Sonic Boom: Napster, P2P and the battle for the future of music – is a useful correction to this new consensus. Just as it was once necessary to criticise dotcom boosters, it is now important to challenge the Net pessimists. In Sonic Boom, John Alderman tells the cautionary tale of a rich and powerful industry which was determined not to “get it” – and how it suffered the consequences of this mistake. During the late-1990s, while so many others were succumbing to dotcom hype, the music business stubbornly resisted any accommodation with the new technology. Its corporate leaders used all of their lobbying power and legal resources to attack the Net. They had the copyright laws strengthened, blocked software development and closed down websites. They even successfully prosecuted Napster – one of the most popular services on the Net. Yet, despite these triumphs, all their efforts could only delay the inevitable. For while others might comfort themselves that nothing much has changed, the music industry is finally realising – much to its horror – that the Net is transforming everything.

    Sonic Boom is a journalist’s account of this transitional period in media history. In the best tradition of the genre, John Alderman provides a well-paced narrative of the key events and insightful descriptions of its leading players. Above all, he explains why the music business has been so determined to resist the Net. From its earliest days, the new communications system was organised around the sharing of information between its users. Despite its recent commercialisation, this gift economy remains at the heart of the Net. People build their own websites, contribute to listservers, send emails and take part in chatrooms. If someone asks for some information, they are usually happy to give it to them. As long as the Net was only used by a minority of enthusiasts, the music industry could ignore what was going on in cyberspace. However, complacency was no longer an option when advances in hardware and software meant that large numbers of people started sharing music files with each other. Meeting through services such as Napster, Net users could usually find someone who would give them copies of tunes which they are looking for – and, in return, they were delighted to send out tracks from their own collections to those who requested them.

    For music fans, file-sharing is a dream come true. From the latest releases to deleted rarities, everything is available for only the cost of connecting to the Net. Someone somewhere must have made a copy of that sought-after track from their CD and vinyl collection – and, more than likely, lots of other people will have copies of their copy. But, for music industry executives, file-sharing is their worst nightmares about home-taping from the 1970s come back to haunt them. Although accessing Net still costs money, downloaded music is free. Worst of all, this hi-tech gift economy isn’t just a short-lived phenomenon. One of the main reasons why the Net was invented in the first place was to allow file-sharing between computers in different locations. Over thirty years later, this concept is at the centre of another wave of technological innovation: peer-to-peer computing (P2P). Contemporary developers are enabling computers, mobile phones, games consoles, and all sorts of other devices to interact with each other. Everything linked with everything. Everyone swapping files with everyone.

    As Sonic Boom emphasises, this utopian vision of ubiquitous peer-to-peer computing inspired the emergence of a new youth subculture in the late-1990s. Exemplified by the founder of Napster, talented school kids and university students wrote many of the pioneering P2P programs. Their contemporaries were the first to realise the potential of this code – and were the people who turned peer-to-peer computing into a global phenomenon. Napster was the icon of this new generation. As John Alderman points out, the music business has long prided itself in its skill at spotting the latest trends and its ability to make money out of the most subversive forms of youth subculture. Back in the 1960s, the hippie generation had called for political revolution – and broke almost every aesthetic and social taboo. Yet the music industry was still able to profit from its cultural creativity. Compared to their predecessors, the ambitions of the Napster generation seemed much more modest: sharing cool tunes over the Net. Ironically, it was this apparently apolitical youth subculture which – for the first time – confronted the music industry with an impossible demand. Everything is permitted within the wonderful world of pop with only one exception: free music.

    Unlike earlier forms of youthful rebellion, peer-to-peer computing is a direct threat to the economics of the music industry. Despite the rapid changes in musical tastes over the decades, the fundamentals of its business structure have remained the same. Musicians are contracted to make recordings. Music is sold on bits of plastic to consumers. Copyright laws ensure that no one can distribute recordings without paying their owners. Everyone supposedly benefits from this arrangement. Fans are offered a wide choice of many different types of music. Musicians are able to earn a living – and a few can become seriously rich. Small companies can survive by selling niche styles of music. Large corporations can own profitable music companies as part of their multi-media empires. Having recuperated successive cultural revolutions, this business structure appeared to be immutable. It took the arrival of P2P to prove otherwise.

    The author of Sonic Boom argues that the collapse of the traditional economics of the music industry wasn’t inevitable. If different decisions had been made at particular moments, it might have been possible to preserve copyright within cyberspace. For instance, in the mid-1990s, it seemed obvious to some dotcom pioneers that the music industry would quickly embrace the Net. Up to then, the business had thrived on technological innovation. The electric guitar had inspired rock music. The CD had given new life to old tunes. Like these earlier inventions, the Net was simply another improvement in the production and distribution of music. Learning from experience, these dotcom entrepreneurs were convinced that old economics would inevitably be replicated in new technologies. All that would happen is that music would be sold as digital files over the Net rather than as bits of plastic through record shops. Encryption would prevent any unauthorised copying of these music files.

    As John Alderman relates, these dotcom start-ups were surprised when the music industry fiercely opposed their plans. Despite the Net hype of the period, many executives still hoped that the digital future implied nothing more serious than producing more sophisticated bits of plastic: CD-roms or DVDs. They were worried that on-line distribution systems would wipe out their substantial investments in disc pressing plants. Others feared that a virtual music marketplace would lead to the ‘disintermediatisation’ of the industry. The Net might allow musicians to sell tunes directly to their fans across the world without needing to sign with a major record label. Either way, these dotcom schemes sounded dangerous. It was much easier to ignore the Net and hope that it would go away. The music industry was determined not to “get it.”

    According to John Alderman, this failure to create a virtual marketplace for selling music was a fatal error. Deprived of a legal method of obtaining music over the Net, people began swapping digital copies of their CD and vinyl collections with each other. Since payment wasn’t required, these music files were usually formatted in MP3 – an open standard without any copyright protection. Like other Net obsessions, sharing music soon developed into a fun way of meeting people on-line. Fans could chat about their favourite musicians while giving away tunes. This underground scene was given a massive boost by the invention of Napster. Written by an MP3 collector, this program created a virtual meeting-place where people into swapping music files could find each other. From the moment of its release, the popularity of Napster grew exponentially. Early adopters recommended the program to their friends who, in turn, passed on the good news to their mates. What had begun as a cult quickly crossed over into the mainstream. For the first time, rebellious youth were identifying themselves not by following particular bands, but by using a specific Net service: Napster.

    A new generation gap had emerged. Each youth subculture achieves notoriety by antagonising its elders. Just like hippies smoking dope, the users of Napster were united through a minor form of civil disobedience: breaking the copyright laws. As in the past, their youthful cool was confirmed when out-of-touch oldies tried to stop them from misbehaving. But what was different this time around was that the music industry was leading the persecution of the new subculture. Outraged at young people getting music for free, its down-with-the-street rebels quickly mutated into tight-arsed-corporate conservatives. They compiled long lists of names of fans who had to be prevented from sharing music files with each other. They hired expensive lawyers to scare the youth into obeying the law. Rock ‘n’ roll had declared war on the Net.

    Sonic Boom takes the reader through the twists and turns of the celebrated court case against Napster. Having persuaded the political establishment to tighten the copyright laws, the music industry decided to close down the most prominent threat to its profits. Since the Napster service had become a dotcom company, it was an easy target. Here was a commercial operation hoping to benefit from the theft of intellectual property by its users. The music industry eventually won its case. Napster was ordered to prevent its users from sharing tunes without paying their owners. However winning a battle isn’t the same as winning the war. Crucially, Napster was an underdeveloped form of peer-to-peer computing. When it was disabled, people were forced to move their music file-sharing to more sophisticated P2P programs: Gnutella, Aimster, Morpheus, Freenet. Ironically, the court case has provided the opportunity to fix the social and technological flaws within Napster. A proprietary program requiring a central meeting-place was being replaced by open source software directly connecting users with each other. One court case couldn’t destroy the hi-tech gift economy.

    In his book, John Alderman remembers attending one of the first on-line music conferences in the mid-1990s where an industry executive declared that the Net should be immediately closed down. Copyright protection had to take precedence over technological innovation. In contrast, the author of Sonic Boom – then and now – does “get it.” The music industry has no veto over the future. Its lobbyists and lawyers can only slow down the spread of peer-to-peer computing. Sooner or later, file-sharing over broadband networks will become as unremarkable as making a phone call, watching television or using a computer today. The utopian vision of the Napster generation is technically feasible: every tune – ever made – for free. Quite rightly, what worries John Alderman is how anyone can earn a living from making music in such circumstances? While almost every other sector of the economy will be profiting from peer-to-peer computing, the music industry will have lost its major source of revenue: selling bits of plastic. Who then will pay the piper?

    Sonic Boom begins with an introduction by Herbie Hancock who – not surprisingly – emphasises this problem. Like so many others, this great musician knows how the industry has always cheated and exploited both artists and audiences. Yet, he fears that the cure of the youth might be worse than the disease of their elders. Musicians could end up the biggest losers if all music files are free. At the end of his book, John Alderman outlines some possible solutions to this dilemma. Even if it might have been possible in the mid-1990s, it is now too late to replicate the buying and selling of music imprinted on bits of plastic in virtual form. Big mainframes serving encrypted tunes to passive consumers is a science-fiction fantasy from the Fordist past. Instead, the music industry must find some way of commercialising peer-to-peer file-sharing. Even before the Napster case was concluded, the Bertelsmann corporation broke ranks with the other major record companies to buy a stake in this P2P pioneer. For a small monthly subscription, Napster users would be allowed to break the copyright laws. Soon afterwards, its competitors announced their own plans for on-line music services. Yet even this compromise may have come too late. Why would anyone pay for music which is easily available for free? The old tunes are all available on unencrypted formats and the protection on new tracks is quickly broken. Once they have experienced digital abundance, why would anyone welcome the forced imposition of analogue scarcity upon the Net?

    John Alderman believes that more inventive methods must be found to finance on-line music. Like so many other Californian analysts of the Net, the author looks back to the West Coast’s hippie past for potential solutions. For instance, the Grateful Dead – a prominent late-1960s psychedelic rock band – pioneered one promising way of creating an alternative economic relationship between musicians and their audiences. Although signed to a major label, its members encouraged their fans to make and trade tapes of their live performances. Contrary to free market orthodoxy, these altruistic ethics proved to be financially rewarding. While their contemporaries faded into obscurity or lost all credibility, the Grateful Dead are still worshipped by a devoted community of fans long after the demise of the band’s charismatic leader. Any money lost from bootlegs has been more than compensated by increased sales of their commercial recordings and of tickets for their live concerts. The Grateful Dead proved that musicians could earn a good living out of free music.

    John Alderman proposes that the music industry should learn from this tried and tested example. For a start, swapping MP3s should be accepted as the contemporary equivalent of trading bootleg tapes. Instead of fighting this phenomenon, corporate executives should realise that giving away music can be another way of making money. For instance, a tune available for free over the Net could persuade someone to buy a concert ticket or, as long as the sound quality remains superior, to purchase CD or DVD versions. Above all, the music industry must move from selling tunes to servicing fans. Although young people are reluctant to buy individual tracks over the Net, they have already shown willing to pay for a more intimate relationship with their heroes. New releases, concert tickets, celebrity gossip, chat zones and other goodies can be made available on-line for a monthly fee. From being little more than a sideline, fan clubs could become the major source of revenue for the music industry in the future. As one way of making money disappears, another may be opening up.

    Being a journalist’s tale, Sonic Boom can’t be expected to provide a sophisticated theoretical analysis of the economics of the Net. Neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx were ever likely to appear in its index. Yet, John Alderman’s populist account is still much more perceptive than most books or articles on the subject published by academics. Above all, this author does “get it.” No copyright law or encryption system is going to stop the swapping of music files between consenting adults in the long-run. There can be no return to business-as-usual for the music industry. It’s over, it’s finished. The ideological shibboleths of neo-liberal economics have been broken. Just as importantly, John Alderman knows that money can be made inside the hi-tech gift economy. Free music on the Net will provide wages for musicians – and profits for their employers. A more evolved form of capitalism will emerge from the advent of ubiquitous file-sharing.

    Living in California, the author of Sonic Boom has to concentrate on the economic consequences of peer-to-peer computing. What has happened within the music industry is already beginning to spread to Hollywood. With a broadband connection, sharing movies becomes almost as easy as swapping music. Lots of jobs and money could be at risk on the West Coast if the leaders of the movie business repeat the same mistakes made by the CEOs of the music industry. Sonic Boom has an important lesson to teach them. However, John Alderman’s fascination with the economic impact of the Net sidelines any consideration of its cultural meaning. Over the past few decades, musicians have been using computer technologies to change music itself. Long before people were swapping MP3s, sampling, remixing and home studios had already redefined the sounds heard in the clubs and on the airwaves. Above all, these new ways of creating music anticipated many of the contemporary changes in the economics of music caused by the advent of peer-to-peer computing. The fixed product has long been mutating into a fluid process within house music. Despite living near San Francisco’s famous rave scene, John Alderman never discusses this socio-cultural revolution. While the Grateful Dead may have pioneered new methods of rewarding artists, their music never evolved beyond the aesthetics of the electric guitar. Yet, as was pointed out long ago, radical changes in the economic base of society are paralleled within the cultural superstructure. By transforming the ways of distributing music, peer-to-peer computing will also inspire new forms of music.

    No book can predict the exact shape of the P2P future. Rather Sonic Boom should be praised for providing some important lessons from its recent history. Although they were a minority even among Net users, the Napster subculture successfully pioneered peer-to-peer computing for the masses. As increasing numbers go on-line and connections speeds keep rising, more and more people will come to discover the wonders of swapping information over the Net. The secret is out. However, as Sonic Boom recounts, there are powerful interests who are terrified of the social upheaval being unleashed by peer-to-peer computing. The prosecution of Napster has encouraged more attempts to reverse the evolution of the Net. Repressive legislation and technological fixes are still being used to inhibit the spread of file-sharing. There are even plans to outlaw all computers which aren’t hardwired to protect copyright material! What Sonic Boom does so well is demonstrate is the futility of these schemes in the long-term. Digital files can’t be confined inside bits of plastic for ever. Instead the music industry – and other creative industries – will just have to develop more sophisticated ways of doing business. For peer-to-peer computing isn’t simply a technological leap forward. More importantly, it is also the catalyst of economic innovation. Now do you “get it?”

  • NEVER MIND THE CYBERBOLLOCKS… by Richard Barbrook

    After the Wall 

    As this century draws to its close, the rapid development of the Net has rekindled a sense of optimism within the developed world. For almost two decades, we have been facing a failure of imagination and creativity. Despite the end of the Cold War, Western societies haven’t even been able to protect their existing welfare provisions let alone advance further towards the good society. As expressed in the nihilism of post-modernism, we have lost faith in the universal values which were to be realised through the ‘grand narrative’ of history. Rejecting praxis, commitment and hard thinking, intellectuals have instead proclaimed the triumph of fatalism, apathy and triviality. All that was left for us to do was “play with the pieces” inherited from earlier and more inventive times.

    Suddenly, after the long night of neo-liberalism, the arrival of the Net has signalled the recommencement of the emancipatory project of modernity. As the process of digital convergence accelerates, divisions between different professions are being broken down. The structural rigidities of Fordism are being replaced by more flexible and informal methods of working. People are acquiring new skills and creating innovative forms of artistic expression. With cheaper global communications, they are discovering how easy it is becoming to work and play together across time and space. Even the right of every citizen to disseminate their own media is in the process of finally being realised.

    Hard Work

    Hypermedia is being developed through the collective effort of many millions of people. Despite its hi-tech basis, the construction of cyberspace in part depends on some very traditional forms of working. For instance, large numbers of semi-skilled manual workers have to dig holes in the road so that the fibre-optic grid can be built. Other people need to labour on assembly-lines making the computers needed for receiving, manipulating and transmitting information. Yet, at the same time, hypermedia also is facilitating the emergence of innovative ways of working. Much of its content is being produced by digital artisans. By spending many long hours in front of their screens, these artist-engineers are creating the aesthetics and writing the code for the new hypermedia products and services. Their design skills and cultural imagination are now at the centre of the process of making hypermedia part of everyday life.

    As with other sectors of cultural production, digital artisans are faced with the problems of working within a late-twentieth century capitalist economy. They have to negotiate their way through the maze of interlocking corporations, state regulations, copyrights, health & safety issues, legal contracts, tax demands and so on. At this stage of modernity, we only seem to be able to work together successfully through the mediation of reified social relations. Yet, hypermedia does facilitate more flexible ways of organising our labour. The Net itself is the result of a synergetic miscegenation of state, corporate and d.i.y. initiatives. The importance of artisan labour within the virtual economy demonstrates how hypermedia is helping to break down the previously rigid polarisation between commercial and community, state and market, proletarian and bourgeois.

    The digital artisans do not labour simply to support themselves financially. Their days and nights of creative effort are slowly integrating hypermedia into the daily lives of everyone within the developed world. At some point in the near future, the hype over hypermedia will disappear. A minority of people are already sending e-mail, using CD-roms and browsing the Web on a regular basis. Over the next few years, many more will be using the Net and other digital technologies for work, entertainment and education. As Buckminster Fuller said, a good technology is successful when it has become transparent. The skilled work of the digital artisans is slowly transforming hypermedia into an essential part of our everyday lives. They will have succeeded in this task when people use hypermedia without noticing how strange and wonderful these new tools are. One day, hypermedia will be as prosaic and banal as the electric light, the washing machine or the vacuum cleaner.

    Mystical Positivism

    Yet, at the very moment when hypermedia is becoming an everyday tool, there are increasing numbers of people who are turning digital convergence into a new religion. For them, hypermedia is no longer simply a useful and beautiful tool for work, entertainment or education. Instead, it is the focus for their mystical fantasies. Confusing science fiction with science fact, they believe that new silicon forms of life are being born and/or that humans are about to be transformed into cyborgs. Like earlier attempts to fuse science and religion, this new cyber- faith does contains elements of insight into the contemporary condition. From fractal geometry to evolutionary progress, digital technologies do simulate aspects of the natural world. From consumer goods to medical technologies, humans do live in symbiosis with their machines.

    Yet, the new believers are not really interested in how nature can inspire the making of good hypermedia or how we can invent technologies for better living. Even John Perry Barlow’s crazy scheme to declare the independence of cyberspace is far too utilitarian for them. Instead, they want to be present at the apocalypse itself – the end of time, the world and the human race. For intellectuals, artists and ordinary punters alike, this millenarian vision can be both romantic and intoxicating. If they’re really lucky, they won’t just witness the dawning of a new epoch, but also might even get absorbed by the Net into the Godhead or be turned into immortal post-humans!

    Ironically, one of the key concepts of this new cyber-faith is the old enemy of religious belief: Darwinism. Back in the nineteenth century, evolutionary theory didn’t just discredit the literal truth of the holy texts. It also provided a rational basis for understanding the human condition. From Spencer on the right to Marx on the left, Darwinism acted as an inspiration for social thinkers to examine human society without being trapped within the confines of religious belief. Yet, nowadays, it is evolutionary theory itself which is being used to proclaim the imminent arrival of the God-Man. Nowhere is this clearer than in the popularity of the concept of the meme – the cultural form which self-replicates using human society like DNA reproducing itself through a species. Because this theory already uses the computer virus as an analogy, the existence of memes has become a central article of faith for the cyber-mystics. For what are the new Gods emerging from digital convergence but memes embodied in silicon and metal?

    The Fallacies of Memetics

    Although we may still hunger for spiritual meaning, it is almost too easy to debunk the positivist mysticism of memes. Firstly, the meme theory is dud philosophy. As Feurbach pointed out, all religion inverts reality. The creative powers of the human species are projected onto a divine being which we then bow down to worship. As Christianity and other religions went into decline, this swapping of subject and object has been rehashed by all the most dubious trends in social theory. Over the last seventy years, psychoanalysis, neo-classical economics, Leninism, structuralism, semiotics, post-modernism and technological determinism have been used to deny the Promethean powers of human labour. Whatever their formal differences, these various ideologies are all profoundly anti-democratic. Crucially, they deny that ordinary people – although limited by their circumstances – can influence their own destiny. Instead, the advocates of these theories claim that we’re simply passive objects of impersonal forces outside our control, such as the unconscious, market forces, ideologies, structures, languages, discourses or technologies. In all these theories, there is no dialectic between free will and necessity.

    The meme theory is yet another attack on human subjectivity. Our complex social development is first simplified into technological progress, then reduced to culture, and finally explained away through the biology of memes. Our creativity and imagination as humans is once again denied. Translated from bio-babble, meme is simply another word for the all-powerful idea, ideology or sign. It is the Platonic deity reborn. Yet again, we’re supposed to believe that we’re simply empty vessels manipulated by mysterious outside powers. As Feurbach said, when illusion becomes sacred, truth is rejected as profane.

    Secondly, the meme concept is bad science. It is the revival of the discredited theory of Lamarck in a new form. Because people will no longer believe that learnt behaviours can be actually embedded in our genes, we’re now told that the development of human societies can be explained by a hybrid of DNA and memes. Yet, like the unconscious in psychoanalysis or utility in neo- classical economics, the concept of memes is completely unprovable. No one has ever seen a meme. You cannot examine one under a microscope. You cannot measure its impact on the social world. Lacking any credible scientific evidence, acceptance of the meme theory can only be a pure act of faith. Yet, on this flimsy assertion, we’re called upon to reject all previous research into the development of human societies. Although social science may not appear as positivist as biology, at least many people working in this field have recognised the fundamental specificity of the human species. Unlike other animals, we not only possess consciousness, but also are capable of acting collectively to change our own circumstances.

    Lastly, the meme concept is reactionary politics. Earlier in the process of modernisation, other versions of biological reductionism – Social Darwinism and Nazi race science – were used as a pretext to reverse social progress. Although great human suffering was justified by these ideas, we’re now once again being called upon to believe in biological reductionism. Despite the denials of the Californian ideologues, the theory still contains a strong smell of fascism. In the USA, some sections of the white ‘virtual class’ dream of embodying their racial privileges in a cyborg form. For others, the meme theory promises a more subtle justification of their social position. Using memetic theory, they claim that unregulated trade between competing companies is the same thing as the circulation of genes between members of a species. As in Spencer’s Social Darwinism, any attempts to alleviate poverty or correct other market failures can then be denounced as contravening the immutable laws of nature.

    Whether in its racist or neo-liberal variants, the popularity of the meme concept thus expresses a deep fear of the emancipatory process of modernisation. Even when hidden behind sci-fi fantasies of artificial intelligences or post-humans, this theory denies the ability of people to invent themselves in ways which go beyond the particular situations in which they find themselves in. The process of modernity has often been cruel and wasteful, but it has also involved a liberation of our Promethean powers. Despite wars and genocides, we have been able to civilise our societies in this century through introduction of universal suffrage and the creation of welfare states. The rapid development of hypermedia is a sign that this process of enlightenment is not over. For instance, it is now conceivable that one of the founding principles of republicanism – media freedom for all citizens – is on the verge of being achieved through the two-way communications made possible by the Net. By escaping into sci-fi fantasies, the adepts of the cyber-faith avoid facing the difficult problems of how the democratic potential of hypermedia can be realised in practice. It is much less strain on their brains to regurgitate mystical mantras than to think hard about how we can provide access for all to the Net, build a fully two-way communications system, invent systems of payment for digital work, decide who has property rights in cyberspace, debate the role of state regulations over the virtual world and so on. The building of the infobahn will never be accomplished by divine revelation. It can only be achieved through the pragmatic application of our collective imagination and effort.

    In The Beginning Was The Deed

    Given that the meme concept is nothing more than hip bio-babble, what is interesting about this theory is why anyone would want to believe in such an intellectually dubious proposition in the first place. The meme concept is therefore important as an object of social anthropology rather than as a credible way of understanding human history. Alongside the Californian ideology, the positivist mysticism of memes is a discourse designed to sooth the existential confusion of the ‘virtual class’. In the USA, the development of the digital economy has exacerbated the racial polarisation between the largely white professionals and the mainly black ‘underclass’. The removal of this archaic social divide will only come about through the difficult task of reviving the New Deal in the USA, especially its policies for the redistribution of wealth. In contrast, the new cyber-faith offers a much lazier way of dealing with the guilt of privilege suffered by the ‘virtual class’. Like Christianity in earlier times, positivist mysticism promises to resolve all earthly problems through magical means: the birth of the God-Man. By postponing any solutions to the apocalypse, this theory has the advantage of allowing its adepts to avoid actually doing anything practical to improve the everyday lives of people. It even allows members of the ‘virtual class’ to vote for Newt Gingrich and his “kill-the-poor” policies with a clear conscience.

    The reactionary basis of positivist mysticism is often hidden behind radical rhetoric about the imminent arrival of the cyber- utopia. The belief in the imminent paradigm shift is one of the enduring cliches of modernity. Over the past two centuries, each successive generation has believed that it was on the brink of entering a new world. The continuous process of change within modernity gives the illusion that we’re always about to make the great leap forwards. However, for inhabitants of the developed world, the truth is rather more prosaic. The hoped-for revolution has already taken place! We’re no longer peasants scratching a subsistence existence in the countryside. Instead, over the past two centuries, we have turned ourselves into wage-workers living within an urban consumer society. If we wish to be poetic, we can commemorate the actual moment of our liberation from serfdom and slavery as dating from 14th July 1789: the storming of the Bastille. But this crucial historical event was only the birth of the emancipatory project of modernity. Being the heirs of the French Revolution, we face the more pragmatic problems of realising and universalising its abstract principles in practice. As Hegel pointed out, we have to make the rational into the real.

    The meme concept can only obscure this long-term process of enlightenment. Hypermedia is important not because it is giving birth to the God-Man, but because it is helping to actualise the principles of 1789. For instance, the French revolutionaries promised that every citizen would have the opportunity to exercise media freedom. For the first time, this right could finally be realised within the developed world through the spread of hypermedia. But, this goal can only be achieved by overcoming many practical difficulties, including the rebuilding of the telecommunications networks and making the ownership of computers more widely available. Above all, the digital artisans will have to design useful and beautiful hypermedia which will allow people to work, learn and play together. Memetic theory can contribute nothing towards the resolution of these practical problems. Instead, we need to examine what are the political, economic and social obstacles to building a democratic and inclusive cyberspace – and how we can then overcome them. The refusal to be duped by false promises of the memetic nirvana is an important step towards ensuring that hypermedia is used to improve the daily lives of everyone. The emancipatory project of modernity has recommenced – and it is our task to contribute towards its realisation in practice.

  • PINNOCHIO THEORY by Richard Barbrook

    Review of Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: the New Biology of Machines, social systems and the economic world.

    At the end of the twentieth century, the USA finds itself the winner of the Cold War, but the loser of the subsequent peace. On one side, America’s hundred year superiority in industrial manufacturing has been overturned by Japan and the other Asian ‘tigers’. On the other side, the country’s claim to be the centre of democracy has been superseded by the reunification of Europe. At such moments of national crisis, the market for millennial prophecy and mystical cures is buoyant. Based on the West Coast – the home of both the computer industry and hippiedom – Wired magazine has recently spun the most sophisticated apologies for the supposed superiority of the American way of life. Now, in the new book by its executive editor, comes the blockbuster defence of the indefensible. In a burst of almost Victorian self-confidence, Kevin Kelly is determined to prove that the historically specific society created in the USA is the only possible outcome of millennia of natural evolution.

    In essence, ‘Out of Control’ argues that American-style ‘free market’ capitalism is not a peculiar social creation, but an ahistorical natural eco-system. The ‘invisible hand’ of the marketplace and the blind forces of Darwinian evolution are one and the same thing (pp. 27-32, 509). As proved by the collapse of the USSR, any attempt by the state or the community to plan or regulate the development of capitalism is against the laws of nature (pp. 52-3). The social can only be produced as “spontaneous order” – the emergent property of individual consumers and producers pursuing their own self-interests in an unregulated marketplace (p. 157). Like members of a swarm of bees or a flock of birds, people cannot influence their own destiny (pp. 6-14). The future is ‘out of control’.

    This analysis is hardly new. Herbert Spencer argued for a similar form of ‘Social Darwinism’. For him, the laissez-faire economic policies of late-nineteenth century Britain reflected the ‘tooth and claw’ struggle for survival within the natural world. In his book, Kelly has simply updated this theory for the age of computers and the Net. ‘Social Darwinism’ no longer just reflects the natural laws of past evolution, but also the science fiction future foretold by the new information technologies. The evolutionary pressures of the marketplace are bringing forth the post-human world of artificial life and digital cyborgs (p. 61). Far from being overtaken by its rivals, the USA is still the future.

    Kelly’s book presents itself as an entertaining and accessible overview of the influence of natural systems on ‘cutting edge’ scientific research into artificial life, the Net, computing, the biosphere and so on. Yet, despite its Darwinian rhetoric, this book has actually nothing to do with biology at all. What it is about is the use of mathematics for building models of the natural and human world. Ever since the end of the Second World War, American academics have been very good at procuring grants to use each new generation of computers as research tools. As computing power increased, they were able to build ever more complex simulations. Mesmerised by the beauty of their own creations, these scientists have been increasingly sucked into the hyperreality of their own models. Led by the advocates of ‘Artificial Intelligence’, gullible scientists started believing that their mathematical simulations were actually alive. As in the old folk tale, Pinnochio came alive.

    The philosophical weakness of this position is clear. We use abstractions to understand the concrete world. A model – however sophisticated – is not the same thing as the real. A mathematical equation mimicking natural evolution is not actually alive. The idiocy of Kelly’s argument is most obvious when he starts talking about the film fantasy of Toon Town as if it will soon really exist: “…someday Disney will have to deal with an autonomous out-of-control Roger Rabbit” (p. 424). But behind this apparent foolishness lurks something much more dangerous: the irrationality of neo-Platonism. Kelly is promoting a form of cyber-astrology. He believes that “…there is a mathematics of life” (p. 498). For him, underneath the chaos of the everyday experience of society and nature, mystical equations lie hidden which explain everything. By using better maths and bigger computers, the cabalistic secret of the universe is waiting to be discovered. As he himself concedes, Darwinian positivism is simply the path towards a “new spiritualism” (p. 260).

    At this point, the reactionary heart of Kelly’s work is exposed. The mathematical model is no longer a way of examining the world. It has ceased even to be a substitute for the real. It is now a way of not understanding what is going on. By accepting mathematical simulation as the only method of analysis, Kelly can uncritically take over the most blatantly ideological form of social theory: neo-classical economics. Within this discipline, mathematical models are widely used by tenured professors to avoid any examination of actually existing capitalism. Its primary theoretical concepts – ‘free markets’, ‘market equilibrium’, ‘marginal utility’ and ‘marginal cost’ – can only exist within the fantasy world of simulation. For instance, any company which actually did try to sell its goods or services at ‘marginal cost’ would go bankrupt almost immediately! Even Kelly is forced to admit that the central concept of neo-classical economics – ‘market equilibrium’ – has no factual basis. Despite this limited insight, he thinks that a hefty dose of non-linear equations will mysteriously reveal the order beneath the chaos of competition (pp. 119-21).

    This uncritical belief in neo-classical economics is most evident in Kelly’s analysis of the impact of the new hypermedia. According to him, the Net is the iconic example of the creation of the unregulated ‘free market’ through the fusion of nature and technology. Invoking Adam Smith, Kelly claims that the Net “…is the mystery of the Invisible Hand – control without authority” (p. 33). Yet, until recently, commercial interests have only played a secondary role in the development of on-line services. The Net was largely built with taxpayers’ dollars from the American defence and education budgets. Many of its key programs were written by state-funded academics. Blinded by the mathematical beauty of economic models, Kelly simply ignores this well-known history of government involvement altogether! Instead, he bizarrely asserts that the global network of computers emerged entirely spontaneously from the actions of disparate individuals – like a synthetic version of a swarm of bees or a flock of birds (pp. 33-6). Similarly, Kelly can only conceive of the future of the Net as an electronic marketplace. He enthuses about the potentiality of encryption, digital money and other programs needed for on-line commodity exchange (pp. 262-96). Undoubtedly, private companies will increasingly advertise and sell their goods and services over the Net. However, Kelly’s obsession with the ‘free market’ sidelines the other non-commercial uses of computer networking made by people, from public education and political campaigning to flirting and making friends. The price mechanism is not the only reason why humans like coming together in groups – whether off- or on-line!

    As a rich white American, it is not surprising that Kelly uncritically regurgitates Cold War ideology in his analysis of the current wave of scientific innovation. Newt Gingrich – the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives – regularly claims that the advent of ‘Third Wave’ information technologies justifies his programme for cutting welfare spending and removing economic regulations. What is strange about Kelly is his attempt to reconcile a blind faith in the ‘free market’ with an ecological sensibility. In the past, most laissez-faire ideologues have tried to ignore the criticisms of the Green movement altogether. Some thoughtful neo-classical economists have admitted that the unfettered price mechanism ignores ‘externalities’: the market cannot cost the damage to the environment of everyone by the actions of individuals. But, once problems such as pollution and resource depletion are recognised, the case for state and community intervention becomes unquestionable. From the acceptability of environmental regulations, it is then but a short step to further un-American activities, such as socialised medicine, vibrant trade unions, nationalised utilities, gun control and all the other features of the successful mixed economies of the European Union. Fearing this challenge to the American dream, Kelly is ready with the mathematical equations of ‘Social Darwinism’ to fend off the horrors of European civilisation.

    This slight of hand is done with ease. By reducing the natural world to a mathematical model, it is easy to make a direct leap from biological simulations to the algebraic fantasies of the economics departments. Reflecting the mystical equations of nature, the unfettered marketplace can now be described as a self-regulating eco-system (pp. 29, 92-3, 155-7). Far from being a threat to nature, unrestrained industrialism becomes the most evolved expression of the biological world (pp. 227-8, 240-50). Crucially, for his analysis, Kelly adopts the hardline form of neo-liberal economics promoted by Freidrich von Hayek and other members of the ‘Austrian School’. Back in the 1920s, these economists launched the ‘calculation debate’ with the erroneous claim that it was impossible to run an economy without prices being formed by spontaneous market competition. Although ostensibly aimed at Soviet state planning, their immediate target was the Austrian Social Democratic Party with its proposals for social housing, a national health service and state economic intervention. In exile in the West, these ideologues continued their attacks on welfare provision and mixed economies throughout the post-war period.

    With the arrival of the crisis of Fordism in the ’70s, their analysis was taken over by the most reactionary political forces within the Western democracies: the British Conservatives and the American Republicans. During the ’80s, using Hayek as justification, both the Thatcher and Reagan governments attacked the social gains of the post-war period with a vengeance. Faced with the failures of these regimes, many people are now looking for other ways of understanding how capitalism actually works. The rise of the Green movement throughout the world has been one response to the inadequacies of neo-classical economics. Yet it is precisely the failed ideology of Hayek and his followers which lies at the centre of Kelly’s social analysis. In his weird hippie Republicanism, it is Hayek’s unfettered ‘free market’ which becomes the epitome of ecological thinking. Yet, in the ’90s, what is needed is a revived ‘calculation debate’ to show how the neo-liberal price mechanism cannot cost environmental damage. The ‘free market’ is not some spontaneous self- regulating product of nature. As shown by American big cities, it can simply be a dumb way to run a modern industrialised society.

    At the back of his mind, even Kelly realises this. With no sense of irony, he quotes the examples of Danish and German firms who have adopted more ecologically-friendly forms of industrial production (pp. 228-36). Yet this was not achieved by the spontaneous working of the ‘free market’. On the contrary, it is a product of two decades of passionate campaigning by the European Green movement. With their long tradition of Social Democracy, the people of these countries have forced companies through state regulation and public pressure to change their ways of doing things. Undoubtedly, many industrialists believed that this was an unwarranted interference in the spontaneous workings of capitalism. Yet, with the subsequent economic gains produced by these policies, most companies now realise the short-term losses incurred have led to long-term advantages for European industries. As with the creation of socialised medicine, public transport and other features of the welfare state, actually existing capitalism works better within the social discipline of the mixed economy than through the selfish anarchy of the Hayekian ‘free market’.

    It is this practical success of European Social Democracy which drives Kelly towards mathematical mysticism. For the first time in their history, Americans are no longer clearly better off than their European cousins. A combination of stagnant pay levels, long working hours, minimal holidays, unsafe streets, declining welfare services, rampant racism, poor education and many other problems have tarnished the American dream. For a nation founded as a utopia, this is causing a major existential crisis. Kevin Kelly’s own magazine – Wired – regularly features denunciations of the French, the Chinese, the Singaporeans or anyone else who dares not to be American. In ‘Out of Control’, this sneering at funny foreigners is elevated to an eternal struggle between the divine and the profane. Unable to abandon its Cold War ideology, the USA must justify itself as the realisation of Nature, Mathematics and even God himself. The historically specific path taken by the development of capitalism in the USA has become the sacred fruit of eternal principles. The creation of ‘Artificial Life’ – the God-Man – will be the final proof of the superiority of the American way (pp. 441-53).

    The descent of Kelly’s analysis into cyber-spiritualism demonstrates the unscientific basis of his fusion of Darwin and Hayek. The mathematical simulation of reality cannot be substituted for the actual examination of nature and humanity. Above all, what is completely missing from Kelly’s analysis is history. He escapes into the eternal verities of mathematical equations as a means of avoiding the messy temporality of human life. Kelly yearns for complexity, quantum jumps, paradigm shifts and even for Lamarckian self-evolution. Yet, his vision of human society is impoverished and one- dimensional – there is no alternative to the racially-polarised ‘free market’ capitalism of late-twentieth century America. But the present-day circumstances of the USA aren’t simply the emergent properties of the ‘invisible hand’ of the marketplace. It is the result of specific decisions taken in series of unique historical circumstances. If American capitalism is faltering, it is because the political and economic elites are incapable of adopting policies to improve the conditions of the majority of the population. If, in contrast, German capitalism is thriving, it is because alternative policies were implemented within central Europe.

    Crucially, in many European countries, citizens have used the democratic republic to impose the ‘general will’ on the egoism of the entrepreneurs, such as environmental regulations and welfare provisions. Conscious decisions are needed to manage nature and help the needy. Even Kelly’s own iconic technology – the Net – is proof of the need for a mixed economy. The state, private businesses and d.i.y. culture have all made their own unique contributions to its successful development. Similarly, in the future, the imposition of social duties – such as universal Net access – on telcos and cable companies will benefit not only the poorer members of society, but also commercial companies. There will never be a mass market for on-line services without the masses being connected to the Net. Rather than abandoning ourselves to the spontaneous working of market forces – however lifelike mathematical models of the price mechanism might appear – what is needed is democratic debate amongst an informed citizenry about the direction in which they want to evolve. Far from wanting to be mindless members of a bee hive, we need to assert our rights to determine our own destiny. Rather than being ‘out of control’, humanity in the modern age needs to be in control. Let’s seize the time…

    Download Kevin Kelly’s book

  • REVIEWING REWIRED by Richard Barbrook

    Review of David Hudson in association with eLine Productions, Rewired: a brief (and opinionated) net history, Macmillan Technical Publishing, Indianapolis IA 1997, pp. 327, US$ 29.99.

    The publication of Rewired represents a new phenomenon: the book-of-the-web-site. Successful films and TV series have long been repackaged into books. Now, for the first time, popular web sites are spawning hardcopy versions of themselves. For over two years, the Rewired e-zine has been publishing articles and holding discussions on the social and cultural issues affecting the Net. As its name suggests, Rewired has particularly targeted the wacky positions championed by Wired magazine, the mouthpiece of the West Coast cyber-elite. By publishing Rewired, David Hudson has provided a clear and well-argued summary of what has been happening on the Rewired web site during the last couple of years. For this reviewer, there even is the peculiar pleasure of seeing my own personal appearances in Rewired once again!

    The traditional form of the book has one major advantage over the web site: a clear narrative structure. Although some commentators celebrate the non-linear nature of hypertext, users are often overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of interlinked information available on the web. Hudson has usefully edited the large amount of material found on the Rewired site into a linear analysis of the history and politics of cyberspace. However, unlike other Net books, Rewired is not a tale of specific technologies or particular companies. Above all, the author doesn’t claim that the development of the Net is realising some science fiction dream, such as the creation of ‘artificial life’. On the contrary, Hudson has written his history to demonstrate the importance of ordinary people in the construction of cyberspace.

    As the author explains, individuals have been subverting the official purposes of the Net from its very beginning. The U.S. military initially funded the early experiments in network communications to enhance its nuclear war fighting capabilities. Yet academics involved in these pioneering developments quickly transformed the new communications system into a tool for working, playing and gossiping together. Even in the present age of glossy corporate web sites, the success of an e-zine like Rewired demonstrates how the Net still retains its hacker roots. As Hudson points out, the “killer app” of cyberspace is not a particular piece of software, but the people who inhabit it.

    This humanist history of the Net has a definite political purpose. Hudson wants to refute the mystical positivism championed by Wired magazine. For instance, its editors believe that the latest developments in genetics prove that our minds are controlled by memes: the biological equivalents of self-propagating computer viruses. This pseudo-scientific nonsense would be simply laughable if it did not hide a particularly nasty form of politics. As Hudson shows, what appears to be 21st century biobabble is really the revival of 19th century Social Darwinism. In issue after issue, the editors of Wired have claimed that historically specific phenomenon of market capitalism is founded on ahistorical natural laws. Crucially, they predict that the spread of the Net will remove any need to compromise the purity of neo-liberal economics with state intervention, including help for the sick and needy. While posing as radical futurists, the editors of Wired act as cheerleaders for the reactionary policies of Newt Gingrich, the conservative Congressional leader.

    For anyone who still has illusions in the progressive nature of Wired, the most revealing section of Hudson’s book will be its truly scary interview with Louis Rossetto, the founder of the magazine. Sounding like a West Coast version of Mussolini, Rossetto rants against the corrupting effects of electoral democracy, minimum wages, welfare provisions and other collectivist iniquities introduced by the Left. In their place, he celebrates the victory within the marketplace of the heroic cyber-capitalist: a Nietzschean Superman emerging from the fusion of information technologies with biological advances. Although wrapped up in science fiction rhetoric, Rossetto’s politics are thus completely atavistic. As Hudson exposes in great detail, this authoritarianism is not simply ideological. Within Wired, writers who have dared to question its neo-liberal ‘party line’ quickly found out that their articles were censored – and that they were purged from the magazine’s staff. Fearful of serious debate, Rossetto ensured that all his critics were silenced.

    Because so few people within the USA challenge the conservative politics of Wired, the publication of Rewired is an important event over there. For instance, Hudson’s historical approach is useful for reminding Americans that the Net was invented using their tax dollars rather than through market competition. Above all, the author shows how Wired magazine’s vision of the future is really a return to an imaginary past. However, even after exposing such intellectual flaws, Hudson’s book has one dehabilitating weakness: its pessimism about any Left alternative to the retro-futurism of Wired. Despite ending Rewired with a look at the potential of community networks, Hudson accepts that cyberspace will inevitably be swallowed up by commercial interests. Much worse, he remains mesmerised by the sheer ideological fervour of the hi-tech neo-liberals. In an interview included in the book, Hudson agrees with Pauline Borsook – a Californian critic of Wired – that the neo-liberal ideologues face no serious opposition within cyberspace. Tortured with self-doubt, the American Left is incapable of imagining any future other than being defeated again and again.

    Such profound pessimism disables the power of Hudson’s trenchant criticisms of Wired magazine. Rossetto may be a dangerous fanatic, but it is his crazy opinions which are shaping the digital future. This lack of self-confidence shows how Rewired is a deeply Californian book. When myself and other European leftists appear in the book, our more optimistic views are largely marginalised simply because we are not from the West Coast. Even the political terms used to describe people’s opinions will disorientate many non-American readers. In this book, libertarians are not anarchists, but loopy neo-liberals; liberals are not Thatcherites, but confused leftists; and communitarians are certainly not communists! Beneath the peculiarity of American political descriptions lies a deeper confusion which disables the radical aspirations of this book. How can anyone take a Left seriously which erroneously calls itself liberal because it doesn’t dare even to be rhetorically socialist? Hudson may denounce the evil consequences of the neo-liberal economics championed by Wired magazine, but he possesses no social democratic alternative to such regressive policies. Despite all the evidence which he himself produces, Hudson is forced to accept that the Net must be the apotheosis of the free market. As a patriot, he certainly cannot find solutions in the Europe which so many emigrated from in search of the American dream.

    The author’s Californian parochialism seems very strange as he lives in the heart of Europe in Berlin rather than somewhere out on the West Coast! Yet, like so many exiles, Hudson ignores his physical surroundings in favour of his lost homeland. Of course, the Net has made such dislocations between mind and body much easier. As Hudson recounts, he uses local bulletin board services to remain an active participant within San Francisco cyber-culture without actually having to live there. However, it is still very odd that the author avoids any real comparisons between the USA and the EU. For Wired magazine has no such inhibitions. Articles regularly appear denouncing the sins of Europeans against the holy precepts of neo-liberalism. Rossetto even has a personal grudge against the continent because an earlier version of Wired flopped when it was launched in Amsterdam. Above all, him and his fellow editors have a deep fear that the welfare states of Europe may be a preferable place to live than their free market dystopia in California.

    Even with cyberspace itself, the lack of any real comparison between the two continents severely weakens the book. For the American experience is only one aspect of the history of computer networks. Crucially, Hudson fails to pick up on one particularly dumb assertion made by Rossetto in his interview for the book. The editor of Wired falsely claims that Minitel set back the development of the Net in France by ten years. Yet, in reality, French people were building virtual communities, enjoying cybersex and assuming false identities on-line over ten years before most Americans had even heard of computer-mediated communications. As a narrow-minded ideologue, Rossetto could never admit that a European nationalised telephone monopoly successfully pioneered the hi-tech future before the neo-liberal Californians. More importantly, this West Coast guru has to avoid facing the strangest paradox of all. While it remains difficult to sell on-line services over the Net, France Telecom has created a vibrant commercial sector within Minitel by using premium phone lines to charge consumers. Even commodity exchange works better on Minitel than the Net!

    The complete absence of any discussion of Minitel in Rewired is the clearest example of this book’s Californian parochialism. Although operating in a country adjacent to his own residence, Hudson – like Rossetto – thinks that Minitel is simply an obsolete technology which will have to conform to the Californian model of computer-mediated communications. Yet, the Minitel terminal is the precursor of the much heralded Network Computer. Furthermore, its different trajectory of development does demonstrate that there is no inherent neo-liberal logic at work in the emergence of the Net. Like many other sectors in France, Minitel grew through a creative synergy between the state, private companies and community initiative. The history of this parallel computer network is important because it illustrates how the Net too is the product of a similar miscegenation between different sectors of society.

    Rather than the realisation of free market ideology, the Net is therefore – if anything – proof of the inevitability of the mixed economy in the contemporary world. Far from becoming more pessimistic, the spread of computer networks should now be making the American Left increasingly optimistic. As neo-liberal ideology cannot be realised within cyberspace, the way will eventually be opened up for more radical uses of interactive technologies. Above all, the global nature of the Net will slowly break down the isolation of Americans from other people’s experiences, including those of the wicked Europeans. Hudson maybe won’t have to be so reticent about sharing his overseas experiences with the folks back home. As their circumstances improve, American leftists in time might acquire the self-confidence to call themselves social democrats rather than liberals! The future will be wired, but certainly not in ways imagined by Wired – or even, at this point, by Rewired…..

  • GIVING IS RECEIVING by Richard Barbrook

    One of the most striking features of the Net is the ubiquity of its hi-tech version of the gift economy. When you go on-line, most information is available for free. Other users are happy to share music, movies and software with you. People spend hours building websites which they don’t charge you for visiting. You are invited to join listservers which will fill your in-box with e-mails every day. Compared to the media developed during the past 200 years, what makes the new media into something new is the vitality of these non-commercial activities. Information is for sharing not for selling. Knowledge is a gift not a commodity. The Net is a strange and novel form of mass communications.

    Yet, during the late-1990s dotcom boom, politicians, CEOs and experts tried to convince us that the Net was simply technological upgrade of the old media system – or even just an electronic mail-order catalogue. The convergence of computing, telecommunications and the media was supposedly creating the “information superhighway”: a distribution system for commercial producers to sell their goods and services to passive consumers. Any misuse of the network could easily be prevented by an irresistible combination of strong encryption, intrusive surveillance and draconian copyright laws. Corporate brochures, government pronouncements and media reports repeatedly told us that the Net was the technological apotheosis of neo-liberalism: a global electronic marketplace where individuals and companies could trade with each other unfettered by state regulations, trade unions or national boundaries. Books, films, music and software were in the process of losing their material form and would inevitably be transformed into virtual products. Paying for things would be replaced by paying for downloads. In the dotcom future, every piece of information would be a commodity and everyone would be a media entrepreneur.

    At the time, there seemed little reason to doubt this conventional wisdom. There was no alternative to free market capitalism. America had triumphed in the Cold War. The Left had learnt to love big business. The stock markets were booming. Above all, bitter experience had taught us that the radical potential of new technologies is always short-lived. For instance, instead of overthrowing the ‘society of the spectacle’, the opening up of the FM spectrum by community radio stations in the USA in the 1960s and in Europe in the 1970s rapidly led to the monopolisation of the airwaves by commercial operators on both continents. Why should anyone expect things would be any different on the Net? Academics, nerds and enthusiasts may have invented this new form of communications. But who could doubt that their time was now over? Rich and powerful media corporations were already moving in to remould the Net in their own interests. Although there would be plenty of opportunities for new businesses to prosper within the electronic marketplace, any different way of doing things would be marginalised. The hi-tech gift economy was finished. The triumph of the dotcoms was assured.

    How wrong can you be? Only a few years later, everything seems very different. Leading Net companies have gone bust. Their CEOs are disgraced – and some are even on trial for fraud. The speculation in dotcom shares has tipped the global economy into recession. In contrast, the hi-tech gift economy has not only survived, but is also flourishing. Far from disappearing, this sector is still at the forefront of innovation on the Net. Peer-to-peer computing. File-sharing. Wi-fi. Network communities. The dotcom boosters have been proven to be mistaken. The monopolisation of the Net by commercial interests wasn’t inevitable. What happened in the old media didn’t have to be repeated in the new media. Of course, money is being made on the Net. People buy products from e-commerce sites. Books. Videos. Fridges. Computers. Motor cars. Plane tickets. Companies purchase goods and services from on-line suppliers. Corporate intranets. E-business extranets. Component auctions. B2B networks. However, the electronic marketplace is missing what was once predicted to be its principle function: the buying and selling of information in virtual forms.

    Although old media is bought over the Net, it has proved almost impossible to persuade people to pay for downloading their digital equivalents. With the exception of the real-time services provided by pornography and financial websites, it is now almost universally assumed that information should be available for free on the Net. Pirate MP3s. Morpheus. “E-mail this text to a friend.” Why should I pay for a tune, a movie or a text when someone somewhere will give it to me for free? It can be technically difficult for people to learn how to swap files. But the rewards for knowing how to use these programs are almost immediate. Welcome to the free world – a world where everything is for free! The media corporations are incapable of reversing this decommodification of information. Encryption systems are broken. Surveillance of every Net user is impossible. Copyright laws are unenforceable. Even on-line advertising has been a disappointment. This time around, community has trumped commerce.

    Crucially, the hi-tech gift economy isn’t just a method of pirating commercially-available media. It has also proved to be an excellent method of working together without the immediate mediation of markets and bureaucracies. We can collaborate in creative projects with people from across the world. We are able to publish our own media without needing prior approval from corporate bosses or state regulators. Websites. Open source software. “Join our listserver.” The Net is the do-it-yourself technology for the DIY culture. As well as its altruistic appeal, contributing time and effort to the hi-tech gift economy is in our egotistical self-interest. However much of our own work we give away, we will always get more information back in return from all the other people who are on the network. Who wants to engage in equal exchange within an electronic marketplace when we receive more than we donate within the hi-tech gift economy? As the Enlightenment founders of liberal economics pointed out, private vice is the firmest foundation for public virtue.

    Who is threatened by this outbreak of selfish altruism on the Net? Anyone who has profited from information scarcity in the past. Copyright emerged in a world with only limited media. Granting a monopoly over each piece of information created markets for cultural commodities. The writer, the artist and the musician – and their employers – had something to trade with the farmer, the clerk and the factory worker – and their employers. Over the past few centuries, the dynamic development of capitalism has – slowly but surely – ended the scarcity of information. Printing and broadcasting technologies enabled the mass production of knowledge and culture. Information has become ever cheaper. The Net is now completing this process. It costs almost nothing to make perfect copies of digital data. Information really is free. The owners of copyrights are desperately trying to slowdown this process of decommodification. They have lobbied and browbeaten politicians to introduce repressive laws to protect the source of their wealth and power. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The EU Copyright Directive. Anyone who distributes unauthorised copies of copyright material over the Net must be punished. Anyone who invents software potentially useful for on-line piracy should be criminalised. But state power is a limited tool against the logic of social evolution. Individuals may suffer, but progress can’t be stopped altogether. Sooner or later, even the most technologically illiterate politician will realise that it is impossible to enforce information scarcity in an age of information plenty.

    The triumph of the hi-tech gift economy is the return of the repressed. Sharing information is exactly what the Net was invented for. Scientists needed unhindered access to each other’s research. Hackers enjoyed writing code together. Activists wanted to promote their causes. These pioneers hardwired their own social mores into the technical protocols of the Net. Unlike media corporations, they did not make their living from buying and selling information. On the contrary, they were already living within real-life gift economies. Scientists achieve fame by contributing to journals and giving papers at conferences. Hackers gain respect from their peers by improving open source programs and cracking encrypted software. Activists win support for their political positions by publicising their ideas to the widest possible audience. If in no other way, the pioneers of the Net were all in agreement about one thing: copyright laws and proprietary formats are obstacles to their preferred ways of working. No wonder that they believed “information wants to be free” in the most literal economic sense of the word…

    During the past few years, over-exuberant investors in dotcom start-ups have tried to ignore the non-commercial origins of the Net. Yet the widespread popularity of swapping information is a reminder of what the system was designed to do. Almost every academic discipline, political cause, cultural movement, popular hobby and private obsession has a presence on the Net. Whether for work or for pleasure, people are creating websites, bulletin boards, listservers and chat rooms. Although only a minority are now engaged in scientific research, hacking or political activism, the overwhelming majority of Net users participate within the hi-tech gift economy. Quite spontaneously, most people have opted to share knowledge rather than to trade media commodities when on-line. This is why – instead of the concept of the electronic marketplace – the community vision of its originators still drives forward the technological development of the Net. Every computer is a server. The browser is an editor. Information is a process. Knowledge is for sharing. The hi-tech gift economy is a future which is still under construction.

    For you ain’t seen nothing yet. The Net is in the early stages of its development. The hardware is too expensive and the software is too clunky. Most users still lack the skills and technologies to take full advantage of its potential. This is why the sharing of MP3s is only a taster of what is to come. The music corporations can close down Napster and try to flood its successors with spam files. But what they can’t do is make people forget that they are able to share and modify information with each other. All the copyright owners can do is slow down history. As bandwidth increases and interfaces improve, the prevention of media piracy will become ever more difficult. No copyright law or encryption system is going to stop the swapping of information between consenting adults in the long-run. The media corporations will even find themselves increasingly isolated from their fellow capitalists. For anyone selling material goods and services, the spread of peer-to-peer computing is an opportunity not a menace. Flexible working. Knowledge dissemination. Flattened hierarchies. Consumer participation in production. Why should most capitalists care about copyright infringement if they are making money on the Net in other ways? Copyright laws become an anachronism when the ‘cutting-edge’ of hardware capitalism is software communism.

    Despite its many benefits in the wider economy, the greatest impact of the hi-tech gift economy will still be cultural. The information society is built upon information. The Net already provides the structure for realising an unfulfilled revolutionary demand: media freedom for all. Authors can publish their writings on their own websites. Musicians can release their tunes on MP3 first. Film-makers can distribute digital files of their movies. Not just the right to consume media, but also the right to produce media too. Even better, the Net is inspiring novel forms of expression. Things beyond the delights of making and distributing old media in improved ways, Net.Art. Blogging. Webcams. These are the first experiments in a new aesthetics – an aesthetics which reflect the social mores and technical protocols of the Net. Interactive. Modifiable. Accessible. Communal. Democratic. Upgradable. We can only imagine what our imaginations will be able to create once the Net begins to reach its full potential. We can only dream what happens when the hi-tech gift economy makes possible the flourishing of a socially advanced gift culture:

    “We must rediscover the pleasure of giving: giving because you have so much. What beautiful and priceless potlatches the affluent society will see – whether it likes it or not! – when the exuberance of the younger generation discovers the pure gift.”  Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, page 70.

  • THE DIGITAL ECONOMY by Richard Barbrook

    Commodities or Gifts?

    The Net is now the iconic technology of our age. From California, Wired magazine has achieved global notoriety through its claims that the Net will create the sort of free market capitalism until now only found in neo-classical economics textbooks. Everyone will be able to buy and sell in cyberspace without restrictions. States will no longer be able to control electronic commerce which can cross national borders without hinderance. The Net will allow the whole world to realise the American dream of material riches. Coming from California, this neo-liberal fantasy has even acquired a mystical dimension. By releasing the supposed laws of nature immanent in unregulated capitalism, the information technologies will allegedly lead to the birth of a new race of ‘post-humans’: cyborg capitalists freed of the restrictions of the flesh. Like Victorian factory-owners, hi-tech neo-liberals believe that their narrow self-interest represents the pinnacle of Darwinian evolution.

    The Californian ideology is the fantasy of the ‘virtual class’: the West Coast entrepreneurs and engineers who hope to make their fortunes out of the Net. Yet, Europeans are not immune from the influence of this Californian dreaming. With the collapse of Stalinism, many intellectuals have adopted a stance of post-modern nihilism which offers no alternative to neo-liberalism. Some on the Left even take a masochistic pleasure in seeing all forms of technological innovation as the triumph of capitalist domination. According to these pessimists, the cause of labour is lost in cyberspace. Yet, the hi-tech neo-liberalism championed by the Californian ideologues is itself an attempt to control the Promethean power of human creativity. As global communications have improved, the wider availability of capital and materials has undermined social power based solely on the monopoly control of wealth. Above all, constant technological innovation makes success in the marketplace increasingly dependant on the skills and enthusiasm of the workforce. In the emerging digital economy, nothing is more precious than human ingenuity.

    For over two hundred years, the boredom and discipline of the factory system were accepted as the only possible methods of increasing our material wealth. Under Fordism, workers could live better than medieval aristocrats. However, once the consumer society was no longer a novelty, many people started looking for something beyond money. Ever since the ’60s, workers have been seeking more autonomy in their jobs and more freedom in their personal lives. Abandoning traditional conservatism, neo-liberals have used marketisation and privatisation to recuperate these aspirations. For instance, talented workers within the hi-tech industries are promised the possibility of running their own companies and enjoying the independence bought by great wealth. If you have a good idea and lots of luck, you too can become a member of the ‘virtual class’.

    However, this hi-tech neo-liberalism is a false dream for most people. In the USA, average wages have been falling for twenty years. In the EU, mass unemployment has become a permanent phenomenon. Even the lucky few of the ‘virtual class’ cannot completely isolate themselves by hiding in their gated suburbs and encrypted cyberspace from the social and ecological problems exacerbated by neo-liberalism. Above all, free market solutions cannot remove alienation within the workplace. Under neo-liberalism, individual autonomy is only expressed through deal-making rather than making useful and beautiful artifacts. The history of computing and hypermedia is filled with sad tales of engineers and artists who have sacrificed their creativity to the demands of paper-shuffling. In place of the Californian ideology, what is now needed is a more profound understanding of the impact of the Net on our society. For, instead of being the technological expression of neo-liberalism, the emergence of the digital economy demonstrates the need to create a twenty-first century form of social democracy.

    The origins of the Net itself exposes the fairy tale quality of the Californian ideology. Far from being the product of the free market, it was created as one part of a huge military research programme funded by American tax-payers to counter the threat posed by the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union. Like many Cold War inventions, the Net could have remained a official secret. However, when it was being developed within the universities, academics and students hijacked the new technology for their own purposes. From on-line discussion groups through electronic mail to the Web, the most popular features of the Net were developed by enthusiasts. This non-commercial ethos attracted others who began to develop the Net as a new form of community media. Even today, the majority of the material available on the Net is made by amateurs. Although they have produced much of the hardware, it is the entrepreneurs who were the last people to comprehend the potential of the Net. The reason that Microsoft and other corporations are pouring billions of dollars into cyberspace is precisely because they have to catch up with the widespread use of the Net by state-funded institutions and by DIY culture.

    The Net, therefore, is not the harbinger of a globalised unregulated marketplace. On the contrary, its profane history exemplifies the miscegenation of state, commercial and community interests within the emerging digital economy. Each sector will have its part to play and each cannot exist without the other. For example, public intervention is needed to ensure that a broadband network linking all households and businesses is built. If left to unregulated market forces, universal access to the new information services will be very slow in arriving. Yet, the commercial potential of the Net can only be fully realised through the construction of the fibre-optic grid which covers the whole population. As with earlier types of utilities, profitable on-line businesses will only flourish through state regulation – and even ownership – of the digital infrastructure.

    Similarly, the further development of DIY culture is also necessary. As the history of the Net demonstrates, hacking, piracy, shareware and open architecture systems all helped to overcome the limitations of both state and commercial interests. Whether for political or profit-making reasons, large institutions are still trying to impose their own proprietary controls over cyberspace. Yet, one of the major attractions of the Net for its users is that it is not tightly controlled by any major public or private bureaucracy. Already, a minority of the population can use the Net to inform, educate and play together outside both the state and the market. Once a broadband network is built, everyone will have the opportunity to join this hi-tech gift economy. Most current Net users don’t simply download other people’s products. They also want to express themselves through their own web sites or within on-line conferences. Unlike traditional media, the Net is not just a spectacle for passive consumption but also a participatory activity.

    Ironically, this DIY culture is also one of the essential preconditions for the development of a successful commercial sector within the Net. By allowing people to acquire some basic knowledge of making hypermedia, the hi-tech gift economy is helping to create a skilled and innovative digital labour force. However, it is very difficult to adapt the traditional factory system to managing these new workers. The rapid spread of personal computing and now the Net are the technological expressions of the desire of many people to escape from the petty controls of the shopfloor and the office. Despite the insecurity of short-term contracts, they want to recover the independence of craft labour which was lost during the process of industrialisation. Because of rapid technological innovation, skilled workers within the hypermedia and computing industries are precisely those best able to assert this desire for autonomy.

    While neo-liberals can only can promise success to a privileged few, the reemergence of artisanal methods offers a way of working within the commercial sector which most creative labourers can adopt. Already, digital artisans are the people pushing the cultural and technical limits of hypermedia as far forward as possible. Crucially, their virtual artifacts can be easily reproduced and distributed through the Net. For the first time, artisans can take advantage of the economies of scale up to now only enjoyed by factory-owners. Far from being a return to a low-tech and impoverished past, the contemporary revival of artisanship is therefore at the ‘cutting edge’ of the development of post-Fordism.

    The evolution of capitalism has been reflected through the process of technological advance. While classical liberalism depended on coal-mining and metal-working, Fordism produced electro-magnetic and chemical technologies. At the end of the twentieth century, it is now claimed that the Net is creating a new economic paradigm. However, the full benefit of an innovative technology can only be realised by changing the ways of working. The rise of Fordism didn’t just depend on the invention of the motor car and other mass consumer goods. Above all, this form of capitalism relied on the adoption of assembly-line methods of production. Even the Californian ideologues argue that the expansion of the Net depends upon the subordination or cooption of workers by unregulated markets. Despite their overt technological determinism, they implicitly accept that the organisation of labour is at the centre of the emerging digital economy.

    However, in practice, hi-tech neo-liberalism is hindering the development of a thriving digital economy. For instance, only a small minority can be lucky enough to become members of the ‘virtual class’. The creative potential of most makers of hypermedia will still be limited by Fordist methods of production. This is why we should not be intimidated by simple-minded slogans from California. Instead, we need to comprehend the complexity of the mixed economy being produced by post-Fordism. Above all, we have to recognise that human ingenuity is the most important feature of this emerging digital economy. The state, commercial companies and DIY culture are all different ways of realising the Promethean spirit of human creativity. Under Fordism, the factory worker was seen as a heroic figure – the embodiment of hope of a better future. In contemporary society, the digital artisan has taken over this role. Whether producing inside the public, money-commodity or gift economies, digital artisans represent a future centred on skilled, creative and autonomous labour. The promise of the digital economy lies not just in the practical potential of the new information technologies, but, more importantly, in the emergence of this new type of worker. This is why the digital artisans are pioneers of a social democracy fit for the twenty-first century.

    A translated version of this article appeared in Freitag, 18th July 1997.

  • ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY by Richard Barbrook

    An Analysis of On-Line Representation

    The Limits of Representation

    At the end of the twentieth century, the advocates of liberal democracy are faced with a strange paradox. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, its ideological ascendancy across the world has never been more complete. Yet, at the same time, voters within the industrialised countries are increasingly disillusioned with the political process. Tarnished by broken promises and widespread sleaze, the present British Conservative government is held in contempt even by its erstwhile supporters. In the recent French presidential elections, the eventual winner – Jacques Chirac – was the first choice of only a fifth of the electorate. In the USA, the situation is even worse. In successive elections, a majority of Americans haven’t bothered to vote at all.

    The Technological Fix

    As the alienation of voters increases, technology is increasingly been touted as a magical cure for this pressing political problem. Mesmerised by the rapid convergence of telecommunications, the media and computing, many people now believe that the ‘information superhighway’ will create the conditions for the direct participation of all citizens in political decision-making. (For instance, see the writings of Howard Rheingold). Back in the ’60s, this technological utopia was first propounded by the Situationists and other New Left groups. Rejecting distrusted party politicians, these young revolutionaries wanted people to run their own lives through a hi-tech form of direct democracy – the electronic agora. Inspired by this vision, activists across the world set up a wide variety of radical media from pirate radio stations to hackers’ bulletin boards. (See my article on Media Freedom).

    In a bizarre twist, this left-wing anarchism is now being echoed by free-market zealots within the American Republican party. Newt Gingrich – the Speaker of the House of Representatives – believes that the Internet will create ‘electronic town halls’ where voters can directly participate within the political process. Fearful of big government, American conservatives hope that information technologies will allow them to return to the simple days of the early Republic when hard-working white folk solved their own problems through public meetings rather than relied upon the impersonal aid of the welfare state. (See the publications of the Progress and Freedom Foundation).

    Whether from left or right, these techno-utopians hope that the gulf between the electorate and their representatives can be overcome by connecting them together electronically – or by bypassing the politicians altogether. However, up to now, the reality of electronic democracy has been rather more prosaic. Soon after he was elected, President Bill Clinton set up a Web site for the White House where government documents can be downloaded and e-mail can be sent. Following this precedent, other American politicians and foreign governments have also established their own Web sites to promote their views. Some politicians have even taken part in discussions within newsgroups or in on-line conference. Yet, in reality, these experiments have not lived up to the hype of the utopians. Tapping furiously on a keyboard to your M.P. can’t suddenly overcome decades of cynicism about the political process. More seriously, the membership of this embryonic electronic agora has so far been limited to a privileged minority of engineers, academics and professionals who have access to the Net.

    Yet, even when the whole population is eventually wired up, the utopia of direct democracy will still face the most important obstacle of all: the problem of how large numbers of people can make communicate and take decisions together. However good it is, a new technology cannot solve fundamental social and political problems by itself. Back in the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau – the Enlightenment philosopher – believed that democracy could only be created through a public meeting of all citizens – as happened in Swiss villages or New England towns of the period. However, with the emergence of modern nation states, it was no longer possible for every citizen to meet in one place at the same time. Even if the electronic agora eliminates the physical limitations on citizens gathering together in one place by creating virtual spaces, it cannot remove the entirely social problem of how large groups of people can successfully interact with one another. As shown by existing Net conferencing programs, it becomes very difficult to hold a meaningful conversation if everyone is talking at once. Unless an electronic agora only consists of a small number of people, some form of representation will have to be used to mediate between the different social, cultural and geographical groups wishing to shape political decision-making. Despite the dreams of the techno-anarchists, wiring up the country wouldn’t get rid of the need for professional politicians.

    What Can Be Done

    Yet, despite its limitations, the Net can still improve the dissemination of political information and improve the accountability of elected representatives. For example, the Zapatista rebels in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico have been using Web sites and newsgroups to call for support for their struggle for land reform. Jose Angel Gurria – Mexico’s Foreign Minister – recently acknowledged that the government had been forced into half-hearted negotiations with the insurgents only because of the power of local and global public opinion mobilised by the Net. It is becoming much more difficult for those in authority to look the other way when news reports made by those people suffering from economic exploitation and corrupt officials are being sent directly into the homes of their electorates.

    Despite not realising the direct democracy dreamed of by left or right-wing anarchists, this more limited version of the electronic agora will play a key role in revitalising our democratic institutions. As the Demos think-tank has recently pointed out, electronic democracy will only be useful as one part of an overall modernisation of the political process – along with electoral reforms, protection of civil liberties, curbs on corruption and an end to official secrecy. Technology cannot cure political or social problems by itself, but it can be used to reinforce human solutions. Back in the late-eighteenth century, republican philosophers called for the creation of an informed citizenry who would possess the knowledge needed to make those political decisions affecting their own lives. Maybe, as we enter the twenty-first century, the Net will help to realise this democratic ideal for the first time.

    A shortened version of this article appeared in New Scientist, 29 July 1995.

  • THE SACRED CYBORG by Richard Barbrook

    The Search for Meaning

    ‘Religion is a dream, in which our own conceptions and emotions appear to us as separate existences, beings out of ourselves.’ – Ludwig Feurbach, The Essence of Christianity.

    During the Cold War, we were told that we had a stark choice between two incompatible ideologies: liberal democracy or totalitarian socialism. However, as the decades of struggle for world domination continued, people became increasingly reluctant to sacrifice themselves for the utopias championed by the competing superpowers. By time the Cold War ended, it was very difficult to believe that either the American or Soviet empires provided a universal model for human development. The ‘grand narratives’ of both liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism had been discredited by the actions of their superpower patrons. As the post-modernists eagerly pointed out, philosophies of liberation had turned into ideologies of domination.

    Yet the end of the Cold War has not led to the demise of ideology. On the contrary, other ‘grand narratives’ have rapidly filled the gap left by the implosion of liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism. Because the secular utopias of the Cold War are no longer credible, many of the contemporary ideologies have a strong spiritual component. From the USA to Iran, religious fundamentalists dream of returning to an imaginary past. However, the acolytes of these reactionary movements have great difficulty in reconciling the pre-modern tenets of their spiritual beliefs with the modern reality of their everyday lives. This has opened a space for more syncretic belief systems. Ever since the advent of modernity, there have been a succession of new faiths which tried to combine religion with science. Freemasonry, Saint-Simonism, Christian Science, Freudianism and Scientology are only the most well known attempts to reconcile these two opposites. But, despite their ingenuity, all these cults have been surpassed by the relentless process of modernisation. What many people now want is a more up-to-date, hi-tech way of combining religion and science.

    Responding to this spiritual hunger, many different varieties of mystical positivism are now flourishing. From the mathematics of chaos to the development of hypermedia, the latest advances in science and technology are raided for their magical significance. For instance, some gurus are championing the concept of memes: the self-replicating cultural entities which supposedly control our destiny. This new faith claims inspiration from the latest researches in evolutionary theory, which used to be the fiercest opponent of religion. Yet, at the same time, the memes cult also believes that matter is controlled by spirit, which has been the basis of religion for thousands of years. While many people find it impossible to accept that gods and angels could control their lives, they are happily able to believe in exactly the same concept as long as these spirits are renamed memes.

    According to some acolytes of this new faith, the ghostly memes are even about to take physical form. As in the New Testament, the spirit will actually become matter. However, the new saviour will not be in human form. Instead, in the age of the Net and the PC, the God-Man must emerge from silicon, plastic and metal. Far from being an isolated fantasy, this is now one of the most popular manifestations of contemporary mysticism. For decades, governments and corporations have been funding lots of expensive research into Artificial Intelligence and sentient robots. As Shoshana Zuboff points out in The Age of the Smart Machine, the simulation of human reasoning by machines underpins much of the rapid increase in economic productivity now occurring within certain industries. However, the disciples of Hans Moravec, Marvin Minsky or other proponents of artificial life aren’t really interested in how smart machines can make cheaper commodities or provide better services. Instead they are searching for spiritual salvation in machine form. Above all, they dream of witnessing the birth of the silicon God-Man.

    Like the Christian Apocalypse, the arrival of this Artificial Intelligence is perpetually postponed. Yet, it remains a powerful contemporary myth. In science fiction, conscious computers and sassy robots are essential elements of the genre. From Rachel in Bladerunner to Data in Star Trek TNG, sci-fi stories use the fantasy of artificial life to express the modernist dilemma: what makes us truly human? Yet, when embraced by mystical positivism, this sci-fi anthropomorphism ironically becomes the repository of some very pre-modern desires. As in traditional religion, the cult of Artificial Intelligence feeds off atavistic fantasies: making babies without sex; being the master of slaves; achieving immortality; and even turning into pure Spirit. With secular utopias discredited, old myths are reborn as sci-fi monsters.

    Fantasy 1: Men Having Babies

    ‘A new species would bless me as their creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs.’  Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus.

    The creation of life without sex is an ancient patriarchal myth. In Christianity and other pre-modern religions, the God-Man was conceived without the need for the messy emotions aroused by sexual desire. Because pregnancy by divine intervention is no longer credible, we now have virgin births produced through science. By pretending human consciousness is like a computer program, some scientists claim that they can build machines which will think for themselves. This wild assertion seems like a radical feminist parody of the masculine bias of science. Gripped by womb envy, male scientists try to make a form of life without emotion, empathy and sociability.

    In contrast, in her pioneering story of artificial life, Mary Shelley portrays the monster as a tragic figure precisely because his crimes are a reaction against his exclusion from the emotional warmth of human society. Lacking Mary Shelley’s political convictions, the boosters for Artificial Intelligence miss this fundamental point. Human consciousness isn’t simply the product of electrical pulses within the brain. It is also the culmination of a long process of social development. Our intelligence is not only individual, but also collective. At the moment, we form a species of around 5 billion conscious beings on this planet. But many of these autonomous intelligences are having a bad time. About half the world’s population live in poverty and almost a quarter are destitute. Rather than dream of building God-Men, we should instead be working out how smart machines can help us to look after one another and to care for our planet. The heirs of the ‘modern Prometheus’ haven’t yet implemented the republican ideals championed by Mary Shelley in Frankenstein.

    Fantasy 2: Loyal Slaves

    ‘”The tv set shouted, ‘- duplicates the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War Southern states! Either as body servants or tireless field hands, the custom-tailored humanoid robot – designed specifically for YOUR UNIQUE NEEDS, FOR YOU AND YOU ALONE – given to you on your arrival absolutely free, equipped fully, as specified by you before your departure from Earth…”‘ Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electronic Sheep?.

    The search for artificial life involves another retrogressive fantasy: the desire for slavery without guilt. Many white Americans are still nostalgic for the Old South. Some Europeans and Asians dream of returning to the feudal past. The advocates of Artificial Intelligence promise to realise these reactionary fantasies in a hi-tech form. In their sci-fi future, the privileged will enjoy unquestioning service from robot slaves. Programmed to obey without question, artificial life will always be content with its menial status. No Spartacus or Toussaint L’Ouverture will ever threaten the pleasures of these masters of robot slaves.

    However, in reality, it is impossible to enjoy the benefits of slave labour without the reality of human bondage. Even if work is carried out by robots, humans are needed to invent, build and maintain machines. Technology is never simply a thing. It is also the crystallisation of social relationships between people. For instance, in the early-twentieth century, the technologies associated with manufacture on assembly-lines paralleled the imposition of Taylorist labour discipline within factories. Over the past few decades, the spread of the PC and the Net within the workplace has reflected the emergence of post-Fordist methods of organising work. As Douglas Landauer points out in The Trouble With Computers, the technical potential of information technologies can only be fully realised through maximising the creative imagination of humans. Rather than dream about robot slaves, we instead need to celebrate the inventive powers of the digital artisans. By acquiring new craft skills, they use hardware and software to create useful and beautiful hypermedia. For them, technology is a tool rather than a servant. The emergence of digital artisans is the latest manifestation of the Hegelian project of modernity. In this vision of the future, the rule of the masters is inevitably doomed because only slaves understand how to transform the world through hard work.

    Fantasy 3: Cyborg Immortality

    “You wanted to know who I am. I gave you one answer. A robot-remote. A servo-unit operated by a program stored in a bopper spaceship. But…I’m still Misty-girl too. The soul IS the software, you know. The software is what counts, the habits and the memories. The brain and the body are just meat, seeds for the organ-tanks.” – Rudy Rucker, Software.

    The most potent fantasy of traditional religion was its promise of eternal life. By claiming to possess the magic needed to overcome death, priests soothed our fear of inevitable physical annihilation and made bearable the loss of our loved ones. However, this false promise has long been discredited by the advance of science. This makes people yearn for a hi-tech way to avoid bodily disintegration. Like the Ancient Egyptians mummifying their dead, Marvin Minsky and others now advocate making digital simulacra of the deceased. They even believe that they will live on after death through computer or robot models of themselves. Instead of waiting for divine resurrection, their souls will be instantly reincarnated within new silicon bodies.

    Ironically, this new spiritualism is inspired by the profound transformation of our everyday lives by technology. We take it for granted that we can have light at night, fly across oceans and communicate with people on the other side of the world. Above all, we expect medical science to postpone our mortality. Unlike our ancestors, we’re unlikely to die in early childhood, almost certainly survive giving birth and will probably live for many decades. From glasses to pace-makers, we’ve invented an array of technologies to compensate for our bodily weaknesses and to prolong our physical existence. In the modern world, we’re all cyborgs now. Yet, despite these technical advances, we still remain flesh ‘n’ blood humans. We’re profane rather than sacred cyborgs. We have to accept our own mortality. As in the past, the search for the chimera of immortality distracts us from the practical problems of improving the years of life which we do have. There are no mystical solutions to the existential dilemmas of the human condition.

    Fantasy 4: Becoming Pure Spirit

    ‘”There’s a great burning column, like a tree of fire, reaching above the western horizon. It’s a long way off, right round the world. I know where it springs from: THEY’RE on their way at last, to become part of the Overmind. Their probation has ended: they’re leaving the last remnants of matter behind.”‘ Arthur C. Clarke, Childhood’s End.

    The desire for a silicon body usually leads to an even more primitive form of mysticism: the fantasy of the separation of mind from matter. According to the Gnostics, religious fervour would allow the pure soul to leave the corrupt flesh and to merge with the God-head. In the modern world, we can’t believe that our spirits can ascend to heaven by magical means. Instead, we’re urged to fantasise about abandoning our bodies to live in cyberspace. Already, if we use Minitel messageries, IRCs or MUDs, we can adopt virtual identities distinct from our everyday selves. The adepts of mystical positivism wish to take this process to its illogical conclusion. Our avatars will no longer be simply means of role-playing. They will become our sole form of existence. They will even allow us to fuse together into a cyber-version of the Overmind.

    As with its other fantasies, this manifestation of the artificial life cult partially draws on our experiences of modern life. People living in modern societies are dependent on information technologies to overcome the limitations of time and space. Both in work and at play, we spend increasing amounts of time in cyberspace. But digital technologies cannot eliminate the interdependence of our minds and bodies. Even when we’re being avatars in cyberspace, our physical beings remain sitting in front of the screen. The PC, the Net, the telephone and the media are tools which enhance our ability to work and play together. Believing that these technologies can lead to a digital nirvana simply obscures the crucial question: how can hypermedia be used to improve the lives of the majority of people on the planet. Half the world’s population hasn’t yet got access to a telephone let alone the Net. Mystical answers do not provide practical solutions to our problems.

    The Modern Condition

    ‘Modernity caricatures and cashes in on the total revolution which never happened.’  Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity.

    Although post-modernists denounce ‘grand narratives’, the popularity of the Artificial Intelligence myth demonstrates our deep desire to understand our historical past and our likely future. Far from slowing down, the recent rapid spread of PC ownership and Net usage shows that the pace of change is speeding up again. Old industries have gone into decline and new ways of working are emerging. But neither liberal democracy nor totalitarian socialism are able to explain what is going on. Because these tired political ideologies are no longer credible, an opening has been created for new explanations by non-politicians. Freed from the necessity of studying past and present human societies, priests and scientists are able to advocate fantastic explanations of human destiny. In mystical positivism, the errors of both are combined together to form a potent ‘grand narrative’ for our age. With the aid of rational science, we will fulfill our irrational fantasy of becoming Gods.

    For, despite its futurist rhetoric, mystical positivism is really a restatement of very traditional ideas: virgin birth; slave-ownership; life after death; and the existence of spirits. In the writings of Hans Moravec, Marvin Minsky and others, the robot is the fetishised expression of pre-modern desires. Old religious myths materialised in silicon, plastic and metal. New Age illusions expressed in the language of hard science. But, even if they are fundamentally crazy, the dreams of mystical positivism do answer the human need for some kind of ‘grand narrative’. Because the ideologies of liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism are defunct, biological reductionism and cyber-utopianism can create a new vision of our future.

    However, the main effect of this mystical positivism is to hinder clear thinking about how to build a better future. As in the past, a fervent belief in supernatural nirvana is a good excuse to avoid doing anything practical about mundane earthly problems. In the USA, the ‘virtual class’ of hi-tech entrepreneurs and skilled workers is already withdrawing into its gated suburbs and encrypted cyberspace. The myth of artificial life reflects this social autism. Obsessed with creating the God-Man, the privileged can ignore the continued existence of arbitrary power and economic injustice. Believing that they’re about to become post-human, members of the ‘virtual class’ are able to suppress their troublesome feelings of solidarity with humanity as a whole.

    Yet, in reality, we cannot create the good society and maintain environmental stability without a more equitable distribution of wealth and power. We therefore need a SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ‘grand narrative’ which can inspire people to overcome the many obstacles to human happiness. The failure of the secular ideologies of the Cold War is not an excuse to abandon all rationality. On the contrary, the demise of liberal democracy and totalitarian socialism is an opportunity to revitalise the project of modernity. The principles of the French revolution – freedom, equality and solidarity – are still relevant. What we need now is some hard thinking and practical work on how these ideals can be realised within a contemporary context. Rather than using information technologies to form a new religion, we should be exploring how they can be used as tools for completing the modernist project. The introduction of smart machines will liberate us from much of the mundane work which we still have to do. The deepening of our skills in using digital technologies will allow us to invent new goods and services for ourselves. However, women will give birth to babies, slaves won’t do all the work, we can’t live forever and we will remain flesh. The rejection of the myth of artificial life is a necessary step towards the improvement of the reality of human lives. We will not be freed by any sacred cyborg. We can only liberate ourselves through intelligent thinking and hard work. We still have a really existing world to win…

  • THE MEMESIS CRITIQUE by Richard Barbrook

    A critique of the Memesis statement of Ars Electronica ’96

    ASSERTION 1

    >The human being, characterized by a remarkable ability to process information…

    In the first subclause of the opening sentence, the human ability to communicate complex thoughts to each other is elevated above all other aspects of our existence. Although expressed in computer jargon, this separation of thinking from doing is one of the oldest inversions found in philosophy, as in Plato’s parable of the cave. For centuries, it was used the conjuring trick of the priestly caste – elevating the speaking of sacred words above physical toil on the earth of the peasants. After over two centuries of modernity, it is surprising to find this ancient idea at the beginning of a declaration supposedly describing the future. But, as we will see, the process of seeing the world upside down is one of the most important failings of the whole Memesis statement.

    ASSERTION 2

    Let’s start again:

    >The human being, characterized by a
    >remarkable ability to process information,
    >has extended his phenotype further than any
    >other species. Complex tools and
    >technologies are an integral part of our
    >evolutionary “fitness”. Human evolution is
    >fundamentally intertwined with technological
    >development; the two can not be considered
    >apart from one another. Humanity has
    >co-evolved with its artifacts; genes that
    >are not able to cope with this reality will
    >not survive the next millennium.

    The other major error in the Memesis statement is its use of dodgy biological analogies. The discovery of evolution was one of the key intellectual moments in the development of modern society. By offering a rational understanding of the origins of humanity in nature, it destroyed the intellectual basis of revealed religion. Crucially, evolutionary theory was conceived in the first truly modern society: Great Britain. The rapid economic and social changes taking place in this first industrial society enabled Darwin to understand that nature itself was also in flux.

    However, problems arise when the relationship is drawn in the other direction: when natural evolution is used to explain social development. In this century, millions of people were shoved into gas chambers because it was believed that they possessed ‘genes that are not able to cope’ as the Memesis statement puts it. Following the defeat of fascism, the biological metaphor is now more often used to revive an earlier illegitimate use of Darwinian theory for political purposes: Social Darwinism. As championed by Herbert Spencer, this theory claimed that unregulated market competition between private property owners was a natural phenomenon rather than a social one. The moral claims of liberalism were restated in positivist language. For instance, Spencer even opposed the installation of municipal sewerage systems to prevent cholera and other diseases as an obstruction of the natural laws of the market!

    Although discredited in the early part of this century, the globalisation of capitalism over the past few decades has been accompanied by a renewed faith in the simplicities of liberal economics. In turn, the idiocies of Spencer have been revived in an updated form – as can be seen in Kevin Kelly’s book ‘Out of Control’. By adopting the rhetoric of biology, the Memesis statement is not simply trying to reduce the complexities of millennia of social development to the self-replication of DNA proteins. It is also implicitly supporting the failed social and economic policies of the 1980s.

    ASSERTION 3

    >As an analogy to the building blocks of
    >biology, the genes, memes describe cultural
    >units of information, cognitive behavioral
    >patterns that propagate and replicate
    >themselves through communication. From the
    >”bio-adapter” of language as a proto-meme to
    >the “infosphere” of global networks as the
    >ultimate habitat for the human mind.

    If you combine two errors, you go further into confusion. Having separated thinking from doing and reduced society to biology, the Memesis statement now goes on to assert that human consciousness is an autonomous gene! Dressed up in newly fashionable biospeak, what we have here is a garbled fusion of:

    * the old Stalinist lie that history is a process without a subject;
    * the old post-structuralist lie that language speaks us;
    * and the old McLuhanite lie that technology shapes our minds.
    For if memes ‘replicate themselves’, what are humans doing in the meantime? We’re not the blind objects of genes or memes. Rather, whether using language or global networks, humans transform themselves and nature through our own activity. We are the subject of history – even if it is not always in circumstances of our own choosing.

    ASSERTION 4

    >The discussion is intended to probe specific
    >segments of the techno-cultural revolution
    >against the background of the idea of a
    >”culturally based history of creation”.

    So now we get to the core of the Memesis statement. The current process of the convergence of telecommunications, the media and computing is to be explained through the dubious biological metaphor. The prosaic task of developing the hardware and software for an integrated communications and information network is to be transformed into a positivist mysticism: the fulfillment of our pre- programmed genetic destiny. Henri Lefebvre remarked that structuralism, semiotics and psychoanalysis were usually used by intellectuals as ways of avoiding examining the social relations of capitalism. Now we can add biology to the list.

    ASSERTION 5

    …and also science fiction!

    >This is not to develop new utopias, but
    >rather to critically assess the current
    >scenario, which promises the fulfillment of
    >long prophesied visions of the future. The
    >possibility of the emergence of a post-
    >biological, cyberorganic line of evolution
    >out of universal binary code systems, of
    >which the first protozoans have names like
    >Internet, Cyberspace and I-way.

    The Memesis statement is certainly not advocating a ‘new utopia’. It is instead repeating one of the oldest plots in science fiction: the Frankenstein monster, Hal in 2001, the Terminator and so on. But, whereas in the past we were supposed to fear the destructive powers of technology, we’re now invited to celebrate ‘the emergence of a post- biological, cyberorganic line of evolution’. The ending might be more optimistic, but we’ve read the book and seen the film before.

    And where is this new life form supposed to come from? Allegedly it emerges from the ‘Internet, Cyberspace and I-way’. Yet the Net is a creation of human labour. Someone has to dig holes in the road to lay the fibre-optic wires. Someone has to work on the production line building the PCs. Someone has to design the hardware which will control the flow of data across the networks. Someone has write the software to enable people to use the Net. And all of us participate in communicating across cyberspace with one other. Without human activity, the Net is nothing but an inert mass of metal, plastic and sand. We are the only living beings in cyberspace.

    ASSERTION 6

    >As the biological body coincides with its
    >mechanical and now informational clone as
    >well, neurobionic, robotic prosthetics
    >question our relationship to the body and to
    >gender; cyborg theory and cyberbody fetish
    >as response.

    If the Net can be explained by Social Darwinism, why not recent advances in medical science also? In an orgy of hyperbole, people with pacemakers – or even glasses – can become characters from science fiction tales: the cyborgs. Deprived of the consolation of religion, we can now rediscover the promise of eternal life in a new hi-tech form.

    But by embracing this positivist mysticism, we ignore the creative powers of our own species to transform its own conditions of existence. Above all, it is not technology by itself which has changed our perception of gender relations. Rather the possibilities of modernity have been grasped by women – and some men – to transform the limitations on human existence imposed by patriarchal societies and biological necessity. It might seem deliciously wicked to indulge in ‘cyborg fetish’, but worshiping the machine and the gene obscures past and present struggles of flesh ‘n’ blood humans to civilise social relationships between the genders.

    ASSERTION 7

    >Media memory – the collective memory and
    >experience of humanity externalized in
    >world-wide networks. Memes, as a “mass
    >crystal”, the identification and integration
    >of virtual communities that gather only in
    >network interfaces.

    After repeatedly claiming that memes are self- replicating, the Memesis statement suddenly announces that ‘media memory [is] the collective memory and experience of humanity externalised in world-wide networks’. So the memes are actually our own creation. But, if there is active human involvement in the construction of cyberspace, how can technology and genes be autonomous forces outside our control? The fetishistic conception of technology and information within the Memesis statement is now openly revealed for the first time. What we’re dealing with here is a moment of Feurbachian revelation: the Memesis statement now admits that it wants us to worship the magical power of graven images built with our own labour.

    The central error of the Memesis statement has become obvious. It regards machines and information as autonomous things outside our control. Yet, in reality, both technology and culture are expressions of the social relationships between individual humans. It is human activity which is crystallised into machines and information, not memes which create ‘mass crystal’. Crucially, by denying the Promethean power of collective creativity, the Memesis statement ignores one of the central questions of modernity: how are the rewards of labour to be divided among the different groups involved in the social production of machines and information? Ah, but the social question is so unfashionable nowadays…

    ASSERTION 8

    >Memes, the cognitive pixels as a blueprint
    >for the cultural practice of sampling, of
    >the universal “copy and paste”, which has
    >emerged from the new conditions of media.

    Having briefly admitted that humans are the subject and culture is the object of their labour, the Memesis statement quickly reverts to its favourite philosophical inversion dressed up in computer jargon. Once again, it is not clever artists, musicians or designers who use digital technologies to create innovative new forms of cultural expression. On the contrary, the software mystically writes itself!

    Moreover, the practice of sampling the work of others is hardly new. For centuries, artists have plagiarised their predecessors and contemporaries. All collective endeavours involves a constant process of sampling and ‘copy and paste’. What the new information technologies have done is make the process much easier and more aesthetically pleasing. Above all, they have enhanced and deepened the possibilities of strange juxtapositions and hallucinatory combinations. The Futurists could only dream of machine music. Jungle musicians can now actually create the digital rhythms of drum ‘n’ bass.

    ASSERTION 9

    >Memesis: a synonym for the current process
    >of compression, for the convergence of
    >various developmental vectors, which achieve
    >a breakthrough as a whole.

    Exhausted, we at last reach the end of this journey through intellectual confusion. Assuring that this was all just a ‘synonym’ for the process of convergence, the statement concludes with the promise of imminent rapture: ‘a breakthrough as a whole’. But, at best, the Memesis statement is a piece of bad poetry. At worst, it is an apology for the defunct neo-liberalism and tired post- modernism of the last decade. The Memesis statement presents a Californian Ideology for Europeans: radical rhetoric hiding conservative ideas.

    The real crime of the Memesis statement is the way that it willfully obscures the process of human innovation and creativity under a mass of dodgy biological metaphors. In contrast, we must celebrate the Promethean power of humans to create – and recreate – themselves. It is precisely our refusal to accept our biological destiny which makes us more than insects. Unlike our fellow species, we can transform ourselves through thought and action.

    The advent of modernity has radically accelerated this process of human self- transformation. The ‘convergence of various developmental vectors’ – as the Memesis statement so inelegantly puts it – is only the latest stage in this process of modernisation. What is interesting about our present situation is how imaginative people are using new technologies to push forward the limits of social and cultural creativity. Instead of being mesmerised by memes, what we should be doing instead is celebrating the achievement of these digital artisans – the artist- engineers who’re pioneering the ways in which everyone will be able to participate within cyberspace in the future.

  • A REVIEW OF PIERRE LÉVY’S COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE by Richard Barbrook

    A review of Pierre Lévy, Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace, Plenum, New York, $27.95, ISBN 0306456354.

    The Net has become our symbol for the future. Like clocks, steam engines and nuclear power for earlier generations, we use this icon of technology to imagine what will result from our current period of rapid social change. In Collective Intelligence, Pierre Lévy provides a French vision of what will happen when everyone can participate within cyberspace.

    Up until now, because the Net was mainly developed in California, it is not surprising that our view of the digital future has long been dominated by gurus from this state. So far, the Californians have proved to be better at making virtual machines than social analyses. Some of their cyber-theories promise not just the invention of synthetic life, but even immortality through uploading our brains into cyberspace.

    But lurking behind this techno-mysticism is something much more sinister. In Wired magazine, John Perry Barlow, Kevin Kelly and other Californian ideologues assert that the Net is the sort of unregulated marketplace up to now found only in economics textbooks. Instead of supporting a caring society, they hope that technological progress into the 21st century will inevitably lead back to 19th-century tooth-and-claw capitalism. Their utopia looks like most other people’s dystopia.

    Lévy’s book is important because it advocates an alternative future for the Net. As a French intellectual, he doesn’t accept free market dogmas. This approach is not simply morally preferable. It is also a precondition for any coherent analysis of what’s really happening in the Net. Contrary to the predictions of Wired, it has proved difficult to create a profitable digital economy. While existing products can be promoted or sold online, most Net users are reluctant to pay for visiting Web sites – or even to click on the advertising links placed on them. So why can’t the dotcom capitalists easily turn the Net into another form of commercial media?

    This is because the entrepreneurs were the last people to arrive in cyberspace. Originally invented for military purposes, the Net was quickly hijacked by academics and amateurs as a cheap – even free – method of distributing information and communicating with colleagues. Within cyberspace, most users participate in discussions or publish their work for the pleasure of others recognising their efforts. When Net enthusiasts proclaim that “information wants to be free”, they mean it literally.

    Rather than being just a business opportunity, Lévy claims instead that the Net is a qualitatively new way of living. In the tradition of French philosophy, he explains this insight with a grand abstraction. Inspired by the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Lévy describes how four types of social spaces have emerged that allow us to live in different ways. Back in the distant past, we wandered the open space of the Earth as nomads. With the emergence of agriculture, we then built the fixed space of the Territory. For the past couple of centuries, increasing numbers of us have survived within the industrialised space of the Commodity. Now we are witnessing the emergence of a fourth way of living: the space of Knowledge formed by cyberspace. Within this virtual world, individuals can think and discuss with each other freely. Once everyone is wired up, we will come together as the “collective intelligence”: an inclusive society borne out of the Net. Cyberutopia is imminent.

    Lévy’s visionary anthropology is therefore diametrically opposed to that of the Californian ideologues. Instead of forming a perfect market, the Net opens the space of Knowledge. Crucially, this new space is completely distinct from the space of the Commodity. When we are on-line, we want to learn, play and communicate with one another rather than to make money. Above all, we want to participate within the “collective intelligence” because we suffer from individual alienation caused by capitalism. Like many of the West Coast gurus with whom he takes issue, Lévy can become mystical about his vision of cyberspace.

    Inspired by Islamic theology, he says in one chapter that the “collective intelligence” is rather similar to God. This New Age rhetoric disguises, however, a specific form of politics. Nearly thirty years on, Lévy still champions the most radical demands of the New Left of the Sixties. Back then, these revolutionaries believed that replacing governments or nationalising industries would change very little. Instead, they thought that the ills of modern society could be cured only by everyone directly controlling their own lives. In the industrialised countries, this was prevented by the professionalisation of politics and the passivity of watching television. The New Left therefore demanded the simultaneous creation of direct democracy and interactive media. Once people were no longer represented by others, everyone would be able to participate in the running of society. According to Lévy, the Net is about to realise this 1960s revolutionary dream. What proved to be impractical in the past is now possible with new digital technologies. Once we all have access to cyberspace, we will be able to determine our own destiny through a real-time direct democracy: the “virtual agora”. According to Lévy, cyberspace therefore is the online version of a hippie commune.

    While emphasising the Net’s noncommercial aspects is preferable to Californian free market platitudes, this New Left cybertheory has its own problems. Above all, the formalist method of French philosophy obscures as much as it illuminates. By abstracting too far into theory, Lévy avoids examining the messy nature of human activity. For instance, there is in reality no clear separation between the Net and the rest of industrial society. Over the past few centuries, the development of both the market and the state has only been possible through constant improvements in the technologies of physical and symbolic communications. The Net itself is created out of the convergence of already existing industries: telephony, media and computing. What is happening in cyberspace is the intensification of previous trends rather than something completely new. If the Californian ideologues think that the Net can only be a market, then Levy makes exactly the opposite error.

    Despite its noncommercial aspects, the Net isn’t a world completely separated from money-making. Big corporations contribute to the Net from building PCs to laying networks. Small companies help from writing software to making Web sites. Because the Net has to be a total break with the past, Lévy can never admit that one of its major uses is for business communications.

    By ignoring the world of work, Lévy crucially cannot explain why the Net was developed as a hi-tech gift economy in the first place. Invented by scientists, this technology was originally designed to facilitate a specific way of working. In their specialist fields, the direct application of markets hampers research. Instead of trading with each other, scientists distribute their findings for peer review, present papers at conferences and contribute articles to journals.

    Now scientists are no more moral than anyone else. In their professions, the gift economy is adopted because it is a more effective way of working. When the Net expanded beyond its founders, its new users have unconsciously adopted this scientific behaviour. Although commercial interests are using the Net, many others have discovered the benefits of working within the hi-tech gift economy. Rather than forming a “collective intelligence”, cyberspace is facilitating new types of collective labour.

    Despite these faults, Lévy’s book is still a useful corrective to the free-market orthodoxy coming out of the West Coast. It is preferable to overemphasise the role of the gift economy within cyberspace than to ignore it altogether. However, both the Californian and French visions of the digital future do share a common vice: the desire to impose a rigid model on an evolving social phenomenon. Yet, the Net precisely encourages the hybridisation and intermixing of different ways of behaving. If we really want to comprehend the digital future, we will have to move beyond the abstractions of both California and France.

    The book review first appeared in the New Scientist, 13th December 1997.

  • MARXISM AND THE VISUAL ARTS by Richard Barbrook

    It is the opening plenary of an academic conference on Marxism and the Visual Arts being held at a magnificent lecture theatre in University College London. After the organisers have had their say, the chair proudly announces: “…the next speaker is Nicos Hadjinicolaou – the author of The History of Art and the Class Struggle and other books on…â€? Who cares what else he has written? Nothing since has matched the sheer chutzpah of this title. The 120 people in the hall aren’t here to listen to Hadjinicolaou’s subtle analysis of Goya. They want him to remind them that – in the early-1970s – making radical art was an integral part of making the revolution. Above all, they want him to be an unapologetic Marxist.

    Only a few years ago, things were very different. There was nothing more unfashionable than books with titles like The History of Art and the Class Struggle. Marxism had disappeared along with the Soviet Union. Semiotics, structuralism and psychoanalysis were the only ways to explain the multiplicity of identities found within the post-modern world. It was the emergence of the global justice movement which shattered this academic consensus. Cultural studies simply didn’t have the theoretical tools to challenge free market orthodoxies. In contrast, Marxism was founded upon a critique of capitalist economics. Even better, this intellectual current could explain how market competition shapes modern culture, including the rarefied world of the arts. At this conference, some of its younger participants started hissing in disapproval when one of their elders praised Foucault and Kristeva. What had once seemed so subversive is now the epitome of conservatism.

    In the early-2000s, Marxism symbolises a break with the immediate past. Anti-capitalism is much more modern than post-modernism. At the same time, this theory also connects contemporary intellectuals with an impressive revolutionary tradition. For instance, one speaker at this conference celebrated the fabulous life of Ralph Rumney: the English abstract artist who helped to found the Situationist International. As another contributor emphasised, here is one avant-garde group which art galleries and art history departments have found very difficult to domesticate. Instead its legacy lives on in the playful tactics of the global justice movement. As if to prove this point, one of the audience was wearing a red t-shirt which proclaimed ‘anti-capitalist’ in the style of the Coca-Cola logo. The history of art can inspire the class struggle…

    Ironically, this revolutionary tradition is also the major obstacle to the renewal of Marxism. Unlike the Situationists, most radical intellectuals and avant-garde artists in the last century were – more or less – supporters of Russian totalitarianism. Despite the implosion of the Soviet Union over a decade ago, their interpretations of Marxism still dominated this conference. Sometimes this influence was benign. In one session, academics from the former Eastern bloc gave an historical overview of the artistic movements of the old system and attacked attempts to downplay their achievements. However much you dislike Stalin, it is impossible not to admire Mukhina’s giant Worker and Collective Farmer statue.

    What was much more problematic was the uncritical attitude of many Western academics towards Russian totalitarianism. At this conference, the Marxist theory of art was – once again – defined by two infamous fellow-travellers of Stalinism: Georg Lukács and Theodor Adorno. Although they argued over whether Socialist Realism or high modernism was the politically correct style, these two mandarins agreed that the proles had no taste. Hadn’t Marx proved in Capital that their brains were confused by commodity fetishism? Like helpless children, they needed rescuing by the enlightened few.

    During the conference, some of the audience pointed out that Karl Marx himself had written about art. Far from being an elitist, he had consistently argued for the democratisation of knowledge and culture. Anyone who reads Capital soon realises that Lukács and Adorno deliberately misinterpreted his analysis of commodity fetishism to fit their own dubious politics. How outrageous! Speaker after speaker emphasised that Marxist theory of art was what Lukács and Adorno said it was. Marx never wrote anything serious about art. The vehemence of these responses had been anticipated by Nicos Hadjinicolaou at the opening plenary. During his speech, he commented that the conference would have to confront two crucial questions: “Who is a Marxist? Who decides?â€? From the evidence of this academic gathering, neither can yet be answered. For some, the exhaustion of post-modernism means the revival of totalitarian ideologies. For others, Marxism is the theory of participatory democracy and DIY culture. Which interpretation will prevail? Just like art in Hadjinicolaou’s classic text, the evolution of Marxism is now part of the class struggle…

    The Marxism and the Visual Arts  conference ’ took place on 8th–10th April 2002 at University College London, London, England.

    This article was first published in Mute magazine.

  • CHOICE OR PARTICIPATION?

    An Analysis of British Radio in the 1990s

    Radio in the Recession

    In January 1991, the Bristol radio station For The People (FTP) was relaunched as Galaxy. Instead of a name promising community service, the Bristol station now shares the same trademark as a chocolate bar. This change in image symbolised the final stage in the corporate takeover of the station. Originally, FTP was a pirate station broadcasting to Bristol’s black community. After obtaining the licence, FTP was set up as a commercial station playing black music. But, FTP retained many of the ideals of its pirate days, such as the provision of speech programmes for the local Afro‑Caribbean community. However, in the current slump, FTP was unable to raise enough advertising revenue to pay its bills. Therefore, the black founders of FTP have lost control of the station to a local commercial radio group, Chiltern Radio. As Galaxy, the Bristol station has adopted a pop‑orientated dance music format and its community programmes have been axed. (Kavanagh 1991; 1991a) The collapse of FTP is only one of many failures among the incremental radio stations recently licenced in Great Britain. In almost every case, existing commercial radio stations have taken control from the original owners of the incremental licences. The change in management is soon followed by the abandonment of minority programmes and the introduction of a more mainstream music format. (Goodwin 1991) Even in London, Kiss‑FM has only escaped a corporate take‑over by watering down its dance music format with more chart hits. (Now Radio 1991)

    The incremental radio licences were originally introduced by the IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority) to provide extra specialist stations for areas with an existing commercial radio station. (IBA 1989: 7). Over the last two years, the IBA has awarded 21 incremental radio licences across the country. (IBA 1988; IBA 1988a) These incremental stations were the ‘forerunners’ of the ‘hundreds’ of new stations envisaged under the 1990 Broadcasting Act. (IBA 1989a: 1) For many years, neo‑liberal pressure groups within the Conservative party have demanded the reorganisation of British radio broadcasting along American lines. In their view, listeners would prefer a choice of many different stations operating under deregulated market competition, rather than the limited number of regulated channels offered by the existing radio system. (Adam Smith Institute 1984) But, with the economy in recession, commercial radio stations are sacking staff and combining into larger groups to survive the fall in advertising revenue. (Goodwin 1991) In its first stage, the neo‑liberal strategy for the expansion of radio broadcasting is already failing.

    The Rule of the Duopoly

    The major reason for the weakness of commercial radio in Great Britain is the popularity of the stations run by the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). During 1990, the BBC stations obtained just under 60% of the total radio audience. (Kavanagh 1991c) The predominance of the BBC dates back nearly seventy years. During the 1920s, the BBC was set up as a broadcasting monopoly by the radio set manufacturers. Under pressure from the newspaper proprietors, the British government decided radio broadcasting couldn’t be funded by advertising. Instead, a licence fee was levied on all radio set owners to pay for the BBC’s services. (Barbrook 1985) Although the licence fee was a price for listening to radio programmes, the state collection of money for a private company was opposed by many politicians. (Sykes 1923; Crawford 1926) Therefore, the Conservative government decided to turn the BBC into a nationalised corporation. With no competitors and secure funding, the BBC was more insulated from the preferences of its listeners than foreign stations funded by advertising. Instead of maximising its audience, the BBC had political and cultural goals. Reith, the BBC’s first Director‑General, centralized most programme‑making in London. Under his control, radio broadcasting was used to impose the culture of the ruling class of South‑East England on the rest of the country. For example, ‘BBC English’ was created out of the Home Counties dialect. In its schedules, the BBC provided a choice of programmes, which covered the different tastes of the social classes. But, Reith only provided ‘cheap and catchy music’ to encourage radio listening by working class people. But, once these new listeners were tuned in, Reith believed that they could be led to an appreciation of ‘good music’ by inserting the classical concerts in the schedules. (Reith 1924: 174) Eventually, Reith hoped radio broadcasting would unite the British nation around a common method of speech, musical taste and political views: ‘the same music rings sweetly in mansion as in cottage.’ (Reith 1924: 217)

    Since Reith’s days, the BBC has grown into the largest electronic media corporation in Great Britain. Nowadays, the two television channels have displaced radio broadcasting as the centre of the BBC’s activities. During the 1980s, only one‑third of total BBC expenditure was spent on radio broadcasting. (Peacock 1986: 13). However, the BBC still remains the dominant company within this sector. The corporation controls five national networks, regional services and 38 local stations. The national networks are divided into 5 specialist services:

    • Radio 1: Pop music and youth programmes;
    • Radio 2: Easy listening and nostalgia;
    • Radio 3: Classical music;
    • Radio 4: News, drama and ‘meaningful speech’;
    • Radio 5: Education, sport, youth and general.

    Through these channels, the BBC provides a choice of programmes for listeners of all ages and classes. The national networks are aimed at specific demographic groups. While Radio 3 has a music service for the richer and older audience, Radio 1 broadcasts records favoured by poorer and younger listeners. Over the decades, the BBC has created a distinct style of public service broadcasting. As under the Reith, the corporation tries to provide a ‘universal service’ for all British listeners. But, instead of providing a mix of programmes for all types of listeners on one channel, the BBC now produces a choice of specialist services covering various audiences formed by the age and class differences within British society. Moreover, the corporation hasn’t lost its bias towards high culture over the years. Thus, despite having one‑fifth of its audience, Radio 3 receives twice as much income as Radio 1. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 15; Peacock 1986: 13).

    Yet, the committment to provide programmes for different types of listeners has resulted in a wide variety of programmes in the BBC schedules, from drama to reggae music. In addition, the necessity of winning listeners from different backgrounds has created a limited form of political pluralism within the BBC’s news and current affairs programmes. During the 1980s, Thatcher’s hostility towards the corporation was caused by the BBC’s unsycophantic coverage of her policies. For the BBC, the creation of public service broadcasting has been a great success. This is not only reflected in the high ratings of BBC radio stations, but also in the high levels of satisfaction with the corporation’s performance discovered in listener surveys. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 34‑5) During Thatcher’s rule, this public support protected the BBC from schemes for the privatisation and commercialisation of the corporation, which were advocated by neo‑liberal pressure groups. When the Peacock committee examined broadcasting, it recommended not only the privatisation of Radios 1 and 2, but also the introduction of advertising on BBC local stations. However, fearing public opposition, these proposals were subsequently rejected by the Thatcher government. (Peacock 1986: 140‑1; Home Office 1987: 21) With a loyal listenership, the BBC remains the dominant force in British radio broadcasting.

    In contrast, commercial radio broadcasting has remained the weaker sector within the British radio system. During the 1960s, the BBC’s monopoly over radio broadcasting in Great Britain was ended by offshore pirate radio stations operating from the North Sea. Because of cultural elitism, the BBC refused to create an all‑day pop music service for young working class listeners. Instead, by using a top 40 format, the pirate stations gained the large audience for this type of music. In turn, companies seeking younger consumers started advertising on these illegal stations. With the popularity of the pirates increasing, the Labour government decided to close down the pirate ships by cutting off their advertising revenue. Simultaneously, the BBC was authorised to set up a pop music service, known as Radio 1. This station not only copied the top 40 format of the pirates, but also employed most of its DJs from the outlawed stations. (Chapman 1991)

    Although Radio 1 provided the choice of a pop music service for young listeners, the companies interested in running commercial stations were still prevented from obtaining licences. In 1972, a Conservative government decided to licence commercial radio stations. Under new legislation, the IBA was established as the regulatory authority and transmitting company for the new commercial stations. After rival bids were considered, the IBA was empowered to award only one commercial radio licence in each city or area of Great Britain, with the exception of two stations for London. Under the law, all commercial stations were only allowed to broadcast as the ‘IBA’s agents’. (IBA 1989: 4) In theory, this dependence on IBA transmitting facilities ensured the observance of various public service requirements by the franchise‑holders. In their franchise bids, the new commercial radio stations promised to provide a wide range of programmes in their schedules. However, soon after winning the licences, most commercial radio stations adopted the top 40 format of the pirates and Radio 1.

    Despite having a local monopoly over radio advertising, the British commercial stations have never been financially successful, except in the major cities. Although a large number of British people listen to the radio, only a minority tune into the commercial stations. (IPA 1987a: 6; Kavanagh 1991c) In turn, the low listenership of commercial stations has reduced the amount of advertising money spent in this sector of the mass media. While over 10% of advertising money is spent on radio commercials in France or the USA, only 2.3% of the agencies’ campaigns goes into this medium in Great Britain. (Peacock 1986: 69) Among advertising agencies, radio broadcasting is disparagingly known as the ‘2% medium’. (IPA 1987a: 14) Thus, the commercial radio sector has never raised enough advertising revenue to challenge the BBC’s dominance over radio broadcasting. Without money, the commercial stations couldn’t produce enough quality programmes to gain audiences. But, without a large listenership, the advertising agencies weren’t interested in using radio for their campaigns.

    The Challenge of the Pirates

    What is more, the commercial radio stations weren’t only financially unsuccessful. The top 40 format adopted by these stations excluded many other types of music, especially those favoured by ethnic communities. As in the 1960s, the refusal of licenced stations to play certain styles of music created an audience for pirate stations. During the early‑1980s, land‑based pirate stations appeared in London and other major cities. Soon, illegal broadcasting evolved beyond the craze of a few hobbyists into a serious challenge to the BBC and commercial radio stations. The new microelectronic technologies had created cheap radio transmitters, which could cover a whole city for only £250. By promoting their own clubs, DJs and engineers could survive the regular confiscation of their transmitters by the DTI (Department of Trade & Industry), which was responsible for policing the airwaves. By the late‑1980s, the pirate radio stations had become an integral part of the ‘ragamuffin’ economy, which ranged from drugs to warehouse parties. (Barbrook 1987: 96‑9; 1988: 82‑4)

    Unlike other European Community countries, there have been few political pirate stations in Great Britain. Instead, the major pirate stations have won substantial audiences by playing black dance music. In the early‑1980s, this music was usually African‑American in origin. However, in the last few years, the pirates have helped to popularise British and European dance music records. Since the arrival of Afro‑Caribbean immigrants in the 1950s, British popular music has evolved through different cross‑fertilisations of black and white influences. (Hebdige 1979: 46‑70) Moreover, because of the ‘morbidity of English culture’, black styles of music have been adopted as a mark of ‘distinction’ by large sections of the British working class. (Gilroy 1989; Bourdieu 1984) In the late‑1980s, house music emerged as the dominant sound within British clubs. As with previous musical styles, house music was denounced by the right‑wing newspapers for encouraging sexual and chemical hedonism. Once again, young workers were castigated for being more interested in short‑term pleasure than long‑term responsibilities. However, house music wasn’t simply a moral panic. The new musical style was created by the availability of cheap computer technologies, such as samplers and MIDIs. This was part of the long‑term shift within popular music away from live performances towards studio production and DJ-ing. (Frith 1988; Franklin 1991) As with radio transmitters, cheap microelectronics dramatically lowered the price of computer and studio technologies. This fall in the price of electronic instruments encouraged more people to make their own recordings. In turn, these new musicians relied on the pirate stations to popularise their records. For example, most house music records have only been included in the top 40 formats of BBC and commercial radio stations after becoming hits on the pirate stations. Contrary to the low‑tech image of radio, both the hardware and software used by the pirates were on the leading edge of the new microelectronic technologies.

    In one week of the summer of 1989, there were 35 pirate stations broadcasting in London, 8 of them in stereo. (Anoraks 1989: 3) By the late‑1980s, it had become very cheap to set up an unlicenced radio station. For example, Centreforce, a London house music pirate, started broadcasting for only £1,300. (Heley 1989: 15) The further proliferation of pirates was only checked by the DTI confiscations of illegal transmitters. However, because of the cheapness of transmitters, the policing of the radio spectrum became increasingly expensive. Between 1985 and 1988, the DTI spent £2,000,000 enforcing the broadcasting law. (Butcher 1988) By the late‑1980s, it became obvious that the DTI’s efforts were doomed to failure. The pirates were earning enough money from advertising and clubs to cover the costs of transmitters removed by the DTI. In effect, the impossibility of enforcing the ban on unlicenced broadcasting had created a form of radical deregulation. Although the DTI could harry individual pirates off‑air, new illegal stations quickly emerged to replace them. In turn, the continued existence of the pirates created public pressure for legal stations playing black music. For example, in one London survey of radio audiences, nearly half of Afro‑Caribbeans were found to be regularly listening to the pirate stations. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 78‑9) Thus, the government was forced to admit that the popularity of pirates had demonstrated the demand for a wider choice of radio services. (Home Office 1987: 14)

    The Neo‑Liberal Solution

    As in other European Community countries, pressure for the expansion of commercial radio broadcasting in Great Britain didn’t only come from the pirate stations. During the 1980s, the media corporations and the advertising agencies were lobbying for the deregulation of radio broadcasting. (Barbrook 1988) In this campaign, the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) has played a leading role. In its view, there needed to be not only a rapid growth in the number of local commercial stations, but also the licencing of National Commercial Radio stations (NCRs). Within the IBA system, eleven regional conglomerates of local commercial stations had already been formed. These amalgamations were sanctioned by the IBA to prevent the weaker members of the commercial system from bankruptcy. (Vick 1988) At present, FTP and other failing incremental stations are being incorporated into these commercial radio groups. According to the IPA, this process of concentration should be taken further by licencing national networks. The creation of the NCRs and more local stations was designed to create a ‘critical mass’ of commercial radio listeners for the advertising agencies. With a greater choice of services, the commercial radio system could gain larger audiences. In turn, this should increase substantially the amount of advertising money spent on radio commercials. (IPA 1987: 4) According to the IPA, a significant rise in the number of listeners to commercial radio stations could double the percentage of total advertising revenue received by this sector of the mass media. (IPA 1987: 12) For many commercial radio companies, a large increase in radio’s share of advertising spending was the only guarantee of long‑term financial success for their stations. (Goodwin 1991

    The Conservative government also saw the licencing of more commercial stations as a solution to the collapse of the laws against illegal broadcasting. By filling up vacant frequencies with legal services, radio piracy could be made technically impossible. For example, the NCR service on the FM band will exclude many local stations from the airwaves by occupying many different frequencies across the country. (Home Office 1987: 43) In addition, the  legalisation of pirate radio broadcasting will dramatically increase the costs of becoming involved in operating a station. Outside the law, the pirates didn’t have to pay copyright fees, wages and other overhead costs. Even with lighter regulation, it will be very much more expensive to run a legal local station than a pirate operation. This financial barrier is be even higher for the NCRs. Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, a NCR licence‑holder has to be rich enough not only to construct a nationwide network of transmitters, but also to bid for the franchise in a competitive auction. (Broadcasting Act 1990: 88‑96) In the first franchise contest, the NCR FM licence was initially awarded to Showtime. But, when this group failed to raise enough money, the licence had to be reallocated to Classic FM, which did have the necessary investment. Despite this drama, the auction system successfully restricted the NCR franchise to commercial companies financed by the major financial institutions. (Kavanagh 1991d; Now Radio 1991a)

    At present, determined people can participate in radio broadcasting by setting up a pirate station. Once there are no vacant frequencies, only groups with enough money to run a station along business lines will gain access to the airwaves. However, despite the discriminatory intentions of present government policy, many pirate stations still support the expansion of commercial radio proposed in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. Because most pirates are already run as small businesses, their owners are as much yuppies as ragamuffins. Moreover, for many within the Afro‑Caribbean community, the pirates are an integral part of the construction of an independent black business sector. Ironically, this oppositional nationalism has created the conditions for the assimilation of black pirates within the commercial radio system. For FTP and other ex‑pirates, the legalisation of the pirates as commercial companies was welcomed as long as the majority of shares were owned by black people. (Gilroy 1989)

    The planned future of British commercial radio is based on the system of competing stations with different formats developed in the USA. Because they are funded by advertising, these American stations try attract those audiences which can be sold to advertisers. Using careful research, each station’s format is constructed around a particular playlist of records. (Barnes 1988: 43) Within a station’s service area, the potential listeners are already segmented by the division of labour under capitalism into classes and class fractions. The various classes and class fractions within industrial societies use music and other forms of culture as a way of marking themselves out from each other. Moreover, within the individual classes, the different generations also have their own cultural preferences. (Bourdieu 1984: 60, 83‑4, 326‑7) The programme controllers of format stations use these musical marks of ‘distinction’ to create an individual playlist suited for a particular audience. If successful, the style of music used in the format will attract the desired section of the radio audience.

    In theory, the format radio system should give the widest possible choice of services for listeners. As more licences are given out, so stations will provide increasingly specialised services for specific sections of the radio audience. If a commercial station broadens its format to gain a larger audience, it is in danger of losing its existing listeners to rivals who provide a more specialised service. (Routt, McGrath and Weiss 1978: 35‑7) As competition increases, the radio audience will be increasingly fragmented into different classes and age‑groups. On the one hand, the classical music stations will attract the richest and oldest audience. On the other hand, dance music stations will have the poorest and youngest listeners. The stations with other formats will be position in-between these economic and cultural poles. (Barbrook 1990: 210) In place of broadcasting a mix of programmes for listeners from different classes and ages, each format radio station narrowcasts a specific service for each section of the radio audience. Under this system, a single public service broadcasting corporation is no longer needed for the provision of specialised formats. Instead, competition between different commercial stations for specialist audiences ensures that every major group of listeners will have a format provided for their cultural needs. (Routt, McGrath and Weiss 1978: 33)

    Although the advocates of format radio promise a variety of specialised services, the results of competition between many commercial stations are different in practice. In the USA, the format radio system doesn’t provide programmes for all sections of the audience. Because they are funded by commercials, American radio stations won’t adopt formats aimed at poorer listeners. Instead, successful formats will be duplicated across several channels, especially if they attract high‑spending audiences. Thus, market competition in radio broadcasting can only create a limited choice between formats aimed at the larger and richer demographic groups in society. In its recent broadcasting legislation, the British government has recognised these limits on the adoption of laissez‑faire policies in the electronic media. Despite rhetoric of deregulation, there has not been any substantial weakening of controls over radio broadcasting. Because of the sector’s past economic difficulties, the IBA had already lifted most of the public service commitments of the commercial radio stations. In the 1970s, the commercial stations were allow to abandon their minority programmes for a narrow top 40 format. In recent years, the rules over networking of programmes, sponsorship and the concentration of station ownership have been relaxed as well. (Barbrook 1988: 73‑7)

    In the 1990 law, the major change carried out in radio broadcasting was the replacement of the IBA by a new regulatory body, called the Radio Authority. (Broadcasting Act 1990: 76‑9) After this reorganisation, the radio regulatory body no longer acted as the transmission company for the commercial radio franchise‑holders. However, the new Radio Authority still retained extensive powers over the commercial radio stations. When the incremental stations were licenced, each franchise holder had to sign a ‘promise of performance’ as part of its licence contract with the IBA. (IBA 1989: 7) This statement pledged the station to produce only ‘…programmes aimed to appeal within an identified geographical area either to a specialist need or interest or community…’ (IBA 1989b: 1) If a station failed to fulfill this promise, the radio regulatory body could impose fines and other sanctions on the offending franchise‑holder. Now the 1990 act has been passed, all commercial radio stations will have to give a ‘promise of performance’ as part of their licence agreement. As a choice of services can’t be ensured by competition, the Radio Authority uses regulation to ensure a diversity of formats across the commercial radio stations licenced in each city or region.

    The duplication of the same format by different commercial stations hasn’t been outlawed solely to preserve the choice of services for radio listeners. The close regulation of radio broadcasting is also needed to protect the shaky finances of the existing commercial radio stations. Despite having a local monopoly over the sale of radio advertising in its own transmission area, most commercial stations have been almost continual financial difficulties since their launch. During the 1981‑2 ‘monetarist shock’, many stations were severely weakened by the collapse in advertising spending, which led to cutbacks and redundancies. (Peacock 1986: 20) Along with the rest of British industry, the finances of commercial radio broadcasting slowly improved in the mid‑1980s. But, even then, nearly one‑quarter of the stations were still running at a loss. (Phillips 1985; Phillips 1986; Phillips 1987) Finally, when the Lawson credit boom had overstimulated the whole economy, there was a substantial rise in the advertising revenue of all commercial radio stations. For a brief moment, the commercial stations enjoyed windfall profits, with even the weakest stations making money. (Deloitte, Haskins and Sells 1988)

    Because of the optimism generated by Lawson’s ‘economic miracle’, the Conservative government assumed that there would be no difficulties in expanding the number of commercial radio stations. However, the passing of the new Broadcasting Act has coincided with the arrival of another economic slump. During 1990, there was a large decline in advertising revenue, which sent many commercial radio stations back into losses. FTP and other incremental stations were among the first victims of the recession in the commercial radio sector. (Goodwin 1991) With many incrementals being taken over, the ‘promise of performance’ has become the crucial method of regulating radio broadcasting. In the USA, a failed station can abandon its old format and introduce a more popular service. But, in Great Britain, the ‘promise of performance’ inhibits an owner of a loss‑making radio station from adopting a radically different format. In effect, the ‘promise of performance’ prevents any competition with the top 40 and oldies formats provided by the original commercial radio stations. Similarly, the recently awarded NCR FM franchise has been forbidden from playing any pop records made after 1960. (Kavanagh 1991b) By preventing duplication of the most successful formats, the Radio Authority can protect the main commercial radio stations from insolvency. After a decade of neo‑liberalism, British commercial radio broadcasting still depends for its survival on close regulation of the sector by the state.

    While radio broadcasting remains the ‘2% medium’, tight regulation will be needed to protect this sector from too intensive competition. But, a rapid expansion in commercial radio broadcasting is still planned. For many commercial radio operators, only a ‘quantum leap’ in the number of listeners will finally make the sector profitable. (Goodwin 1991) However, their dreams of a virtuous circle of growing audiences and advertising revenue aren’t only threatened by the recession, but also by the continuing dominance of the television sector. Because they were licenced first, the commercial television stations already had a strong position within the advertising market when the commercial radio franchises were awarded. (Peacock 1986: 94) The expansion of both terrestrial and satellite commercial television broadcasting will further intensify the competition for corporate advertisers between the two types of electronic media. In this struggle, commercial radio broadcasting also suffers from the hostility of many listeners to radio advertising. Unlike television advertising, many British people think radio commercials are annoying and unpleasant. This widespread view not only reduces the potential audience of commercial stations, but also their usefulness of their advertising slots for the agencies. (Barnett and Morrison 1988: 46) Thus, even without a slump, there are severe economic limitations on the expansion of commercial radio broadcasting in Great Britain. Although frequencies remain unused, the shortage of sufficient advertising revenue will hamper the rapid growth of the commercial radio secto

    The Community Radio Alternative

    With the expansion of commercial broadcasting stalled, the British government can only prevent more radio piracy by repression. During 1991, the increased penalties for running a pirate station in the recent broadcasting legislation have temporarily checked the increase in illegal stations. However, the repression of the pirate stations is a costly solution to the problem of illegal broadcasting. Hence, for the Conservative government, the granting of more commercial radio licences was never a form of deregulation. Instead, this policy was introduced to re-regulate a section of the electronic media outside all government controls. But, without sufficient commercial radio licences, there will still be space on the FM band for pirate stations. As a consequence, other ways of expanding radio broadcasting are being examined again. In 1986, the Home Office [Ministry of the Interior] almost licenced a number of community radio stations across the country. (Barbrook 1987) Although this scheme was abandoned, 3 of the later incremental stations were members of the community radio movement. In Great Britain, the Community Radio Association (CRA) has been campaigning over many years for the establishment of a third tier of radio broadcasting, organised differently from both BBC and commercial services. For the CRA, community radio stations must be non‑commercial organisations, such as co‑operatives or voluntary organisations. Using overseas experience, the CRA has lobbied for the recognition of this new sector of radio broadcasting. (CRA 1987; Jones 1987/8) Over recent years, the CRA has had an ambiguous relationship with the pirates. On the one hand, many CRA members disapprove of the illegal tactics of the pirates. But, on the other hand, some CRA activists are involved in pirate stations. But, with the limitations of commercial radio stations becoming apparent, there has been a gradual convergence between the two different groups fighting for access to the airwaves.

    Crucially, both pirate and community radio stations share one fundamental characteristic: they are do‑it‑yourself media. Although it is an old discovery, radio has benefited from the latest advances in microelectronic technologies. With contemporary recorders and mixers, it is nowadays cheaper and easier for amateurs to make radio programmes than in the past. Moreover, participation in radio broadcasting is encouraged by developments in other communications technologies, as with the homemade house music records played by British pirate stations. In turn, these advances in media technologies can help to transform the methods of production as well. The weakening of skill hierarchies within radio broadcasting facilitates the creation of internal democracy within a community radio station. Thus, the CRA stresses the need for all community radio stations to be organised as co‑operatives or voluntary organisations. By participating in programme‑making, listeners can become involved in the management of their community radio station. For the CRA, community radio stations act as focal points for those listeners ignored by the state and commercial radio stations, such as ethnic communities or neighbourhoods. In addition, this type of station can provide a space for cultural experimentation. Contrary to the promises of the neo‑liberals, format radio stations are usually culturally conservative. With the need to win ratings, format stations wouldn’t risk alienating existing listeners with new styles of music. In contrast, community radio stations can take more risks in their musical and other programmes. Moreover, the creation of community radio stations is closely connected with the wider struggles for more democracy within capitalist societies. Once they can run their own radio station, people are encouraged to demand participation in other social institutions. (Barbrook 1987: 117‑26)

    According to one unlicenced broadcaster, ‘the real reason for pirate radio lies in a basic ethos, which is “knowledge is power”.’ (Holiday 1990: 48) For those excluded by the mainstream media, pirate radio stations offered a means of participating in the production of information and entertainment within British society. Already, the pirates have already helped to change British culture by popularising house music. As in the new forms of music, the pirates have appropriated the technological advances of microelectronics for their own purposes. Under capitalism, new technologies are only integrated within society through social struggles. In each case, capitalists and workers fight over who gains from the introduction of new technologies, especially when methods of working are changed by these advances. (Preteceille and Terrail 1985: 125‑6; Aglietta 1979: 165) As electronic media, radio and television broadcasting are being dramatically changed by the new information technologies. However, many socialists fear these technological changes are leading to the domination of the mass media by large multinationals. But, the success of the pirate radio stations proves that microelectronics can also create opportunities for the Left. The pirates not only used cheap transmitters to survive repeated raids by the DTI, but also played music made on the latest computers.

    As technological advance quickens, the rapid pace of social change within capitalist societies can only be managed through increased participation by the working class. However, the involvement of workers in this process can undermine the social division between labour and capital. For the neo‑liberals, deregulation policies were a solution to this dilemma. In their view, the creation of competition would turn the innovators within the dominated classes into small entrepreneurs. Moreover, the ending of existing cartels would bring more choice of goods and services for the rest of the working class. In radio broadcasting, the application of these neo‑liberal policies has created a greater choice of services, especially for dance music fans and the ethnic communities. However, this diversification of services was started by the BBC, the nationalised broadcasting monopoly. While the BBC broadcast a mix of programmes for different listeners in its early years, nowadays the corporation narrowcasts a range of services for the main demographic groups. The success of the BBC’s strategy has considerably weakened the commercial radio sector in Great Britain. Upto the licencing of the incrementals, most commercial radio stations have been poor copies of BBC Radios 1 or 2.

    Nowadays, there are commercial radio stations providing services for previously excluded audiences, such as from the ethnic communities. But, although a few pirate operators have turned into legal entrepreneurs, the majority of radio listeners remain as much passive consumers as in Reith’s days. Yet, the musical innovations of the pirates were largely created by amateurs. By allowing DJs and musicians to experiment on‑air, the pirate stations changed the rhythms of British popular music. With microelectronic technologies, it is very easy for most listeners to participate in radio programme‑making. In any society, it is unlikely the majority of listeners will want to be involved in broadcasting. But, communications within communities and cultural experimentation involves creating the conditions for the participation in radio broadcasting by an active minority of listeners. As more frequencies are used up, the campaign of the CRA for a ‘third tier’ of radio broadcasting becomes more important. By being organised as co‑operatives or voluntary organisations, community radio stations can offer a legal method of listener participation in broadcasting. As the pirates have shown, without participation in radio broadcasting, it is impossible to know what choices of services will be needed for the future.

    Publication Details: ‘Choice or Participation: British Radio in the 1990s’, Science as Culture, No. 15, Vol. 3, part 2, 1992, pp. 240-262, (ISSN 0950 5431).

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  • MISTRANSLATIONS: LIPIETZ IN LONDON AND PARIS by Richard Barbrook

    Introduction

    The latest buzzword on the British Left [in 1990] is post-Fordism. This a theory which is being used to justify the ‘New Times’ politics promoted by Marxism Today. This article examines the origins of this concept in the French Regulation School of political economy. In particular, it looks at the work of one of this group’s leading members: Alain Lipietz. He has used these theories to argue for a Red/Green political programme for the Left in Europe. This strategy is inconsistent with that put forward by the advocates of post-Fordist theories in Britain. On each side of the English Channel, the same theoretical language is used to justify very different political programmes.

    Past, Present and Future

    While the tenth anniversary of Thatcher’s victory is a cause for celebration among the British ruling class, the anniversary is an unwelcome reminder of a decade of defeats for the British Left. The Labour Party has not only lost three successive General Elections, but also its local powerbases have been undermined through the centralisation of government. The trade unions have seen unemployment reduce their membership, repressive laws restrict industrial action and their General Secretaries are no longer welcome in the councils of state. Even the National Union of Mineworkers has been defeated. If the traditional organisations of the Labour movement have had problems, the ‘new social movements’ have fared no better. The peace movement is confused by the new detente in Europe and the women’s movement has fragmented. With all alternatives discredited, Thatcher is able to determine the terms of the debate within British politics. Nowadays even the opposition parties support the economic restructuring of the country by big business through market competition. Britain seems set to become the Alabama or Queensland of Western Europe.

    This period of defeat has created an opening for the politics promoted by Marxism Today. This magazine originated as the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Great Britain. During the 1980s, as the Communist party disintegrated into various competing factions, Marxism Today survived this debacle by turning itself into a think tank for the Left. In the early 1980s, the magazine called for a ‘Popular Front’ of anti-Thatcher parties and movements against the Conservative government. (Hall and Jacques 1983) This strategy was rejected by most of the British Left because it abandoned any commitment to explicitly socialist solutions to the country’s problems. However, repeated defeats have made Marxism Today‘s project seem more credible. The political initiative has now passed from the Trotskyist sects and the supporters of Tony Benn to Marxism Today and the followers of Neil Kinnock. Nowadays there are no longer even rhetorical promises of socialist solutions.

    Marxism Today doesn’t just offer an electoral strategy for removing Thatcher. Its theorists are trying to redefine the whole outlook of the British Left. The magazine asserts that Britain is entering ‘New Times’. The old debate between Left and Right is being replaced by a new opposition between the past and the future. This conceptual shift reflects the changed aspirations and expectations within British Left. Especially among the Left’s metropolitan and white collar supporters, there has been a rejection of the traditional version of Socialism as a combination of the paternalist state, centralised institutions, heavy industrial technologies and a collectivist proletarian culture. Marxism Today wants to portray this vision as not only undesirable, but also as historically obsolescent. In this new era, the task of the Left is to adapt the technological and institutional developments within capitalism for progressive ends. In part, these ‘New Times’ politics are only a repackaging of the Communist party’s old strategy of a crossparty coalition for the 1990s. But Marxism Today has also rediscovered technological determinism with a vengeance. It now believes that technology and therefore history is on its side. The theory which proves the inevitability of the success of the magazine’s politics is known as post-Fordism.

    The New Times are Here

    Post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-Marxism, post-feminism… and now post-Fordism. Like its etymological antecedents, post-Fordism is defined as the antithesis of its predecessor. In the issue of Marxism Today announcing the advent of the ‘New Times’, the new credo is described by Robin Murray (1988), the ex-Chief Economic Advisor to the Labour Group on the Greater London Council. The past was Fordism, an age of mass production and consumption. It was characterised by:

    • the standardisation of commodities;
    • the mechanisation of production;
    • the Taylorist division between conceptual and manual work;
    • the use of assembly lines in factories.

    For Marxism Today, the impact of Fordism was not just limited to the workplace. The magazine uses Fordism and Taylorism to analyse all areas of the politics and culture. These concepts become catchphrases, indiscriminately applied to all aspects of the past. Therefore the mass class-based parties and the industrial trade unions are simply seen as reflections of the monolithic organisation of labour found in the factories.

    According to Murray (1988), even the arts were shaped by the disciplines imposed by the rhythms of mass production: ‘…Diaghilev was a Taylorist in dance…’ The first break with Fordism came from within the Left, especially in the worker and student revolts from 1968 onwards. In computer networks or worker cooperatives, these activists pioneered the earliest experiments which broke with the Taylorist division of labour. But, in recent years, the initiative has passed to private capital. Especially in Japan, companies have replaced the old methods of standardised and rigid production with new specialised and flexible systems. Both the Taylorist separation between conceptual/manual labour and assembly lines are abandoned. These are replaced by quality circles and information technology: ‘the guerrilla force takes over from the standing army.’ This is the preordained future and its name is post-Fordism.

    The importance of this article lies less in what it says, but where it is. Robin Murray wants the Left to campaign for shorter hours, more flexible shifts, local and central government economic intervention and campaigns to unite full-time and part-time workers. These are modest reforms designed to take advantage of the impending and inevitable future. But Marxism Today is not primarily interested in specific proposals. It wants theoretical proof for the magazine’s overall political strategy. The distinction between Fordism and post-Fordism is useful for the magazine because it makes a clear separation between the past and the future. After interpretation by Marxism Today, post-Fordist theories can explain:

    • why the Left suffered a series of defeats;
    • why these defeats were inevitable;
    • why these defeats were the Left’s fault;
    • why these defeats were a good thing.

    Marxism Today sees Thatcher’s victories as a result of the Left’s defective strategy. In the early 1980s, many socialists thought the Tories could be defeated by a class struggle waged by the Labour Party and the trade unions. For Marxism Today, this approach was doomed to failure. The Left was fighting for the past and not the future. The mass party and mass unions were products of the centralisation and standardisation of the Fordist era. (Benton 1989; Bassett 1989) Above all else, these organisations were fatally contaminated by the authoritarianism of the factory system. This made the victory of the old-style Left not only impossible, but also undesirable as well. Therefore Marxism Today rejects class politics in both its Social Democratic and Leninist vanguard party forms. These are the politics of the old Fordist Left.

    Instead, the magazine calls a rebirth of the Communist party’s old strategy of a multi-party coalition in combination with the ‘new social movements’. (Leadbeater 1988; Hall 1988) But this strategy is not a different way of reaching the old destination of Socialism. For Marxism Today, political pluralism and social diversity have now become goals in their own right. The breakdown of the monolithic Fordist methods of production within the factories is seen as inevitably leading to the success of these post-Fordist political and social aims.

    Not suprisingly, many on the Left have reacted strongly against the ‘New Times’ debate. For example, the Trotskyist journal Socialist Organiser described the ‘New Times’ as ‘old rubbish’ because the Communist party had called for cross-class alliances since the 1930s. (Bradley 1988: 67) Others have gone beyond attacking the particular political proposals of Marxism Today. Increasingly, those who disagree with the magazine’s politics are also rejecting the determinist explanation of its inevitable triumph. (Clarke 1988)

    Because Marxism Today popularised this approach, the Fordist/post-Fordist analysis now suffers from “guilt by association”. Many think that it is necessary to debunk this theory as a way of discrediting the magazine’s strategy. Amongst the furore of these British quarrels, the specific origins of the post-Fordist debates within the French Left are completely forgotten. Marxism Today borrowed wholesale the language and concepts of French theorists. But there are crucial contrasts between the use of the post-Fordist approach in the two countries. Using similar theories, Alain Lipietz and other leading French analysts of post-Fordism have drawn very different conclusions from those of Marxism Today. Moreover, they have been very active in combating the ideological equivalents of Marxism Today in France! Thus it is necessary to turn to the French originals if the British Left is to find anything useful in these theories.

    La École de la Régulation

    In France, Lipietz is a member of an intellectual movement known as the Regulation School. The origins of the Regulation School can be traced to a group of economists based at Grenoble University in the early 1970s. Like many others, these intellectuals were radicalised by the political and social upheavals of the period. The earliest regulationist studies were a combination of Marx’s political economy with structuralism, systems theory and Keynesian macroeconomics. (Boyer 1987: 257, 98) The crucial step in the emergence of the Regulation School was the publication of its seminal text: Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme [A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience] by Michel Aglietta. (1979) This book did not simply draw on the researches of the Grenoble founders of the School, it also popularised the terminology of future regulationist studies, such as Fordism, mode of regulation, regime of accumulation and so on. Hence Lipietz uses Aglietta’s book as a starting point for his own researches. Such is the influence of Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme that some critics claim Lipietz and other regulationists are doing nothing more than popularising Aglietta’s findings! (Clarke 1988: 90)

    Aglietta used this new terminology because he wanted to expand the analysis of capitalism beyond the basic social relations of the commodity and wage labour. He did not see these social relations as fixed and immutable, but as subject to continuous evolution and increasing complexity. Capitalist societies could successfully develop only by transforming these fundamental social relations over time. For Aglietta, a regime of accumulation was an ‘intermediary concept’ used to explain the connection between abstract Marxist theories of capital accumulation and specific historical periods. (Aglietta 1979: 68) The distinguishing feature of the different epochs of capitalism was the organisation of the process of production. Thus Aglietta saw the modern era was begun by the introduction of Taylorist labour disciplines into the factories. Through the separation of conceptual and manual labour, Taylorism was able to increase the productivity of labour by using close supervision to compel continuous working. In turn, this reorganisation of the process of production developed into Fordism. The Taylorist organisation of production was complemented by the introduction of assembly line production. Now the pace of working was determined not only by labour discipline, but also by the speed of the machinery used in production.

    But Aglietta saw Fordism as more than a specific type of factory mechanisation. The large increase in labour productivity led to a wider transformation of society. Aglietta characterised the earliest stages of capitalism as the extensive regime of accumulation. This was because capitalism expanded by reorganising production while leaving the traditional way of life untouched. But the success of this type of growth led to the emergence of the intensive regime of accumulation. Slowly, but surely, capitalism created a new way of life for the working class by replacing communal interpersonal relations with the individual consumption of commodities. Therefore Fordism represented a simultaneous increase in the productivity of labour and the consumption of commodities.

    ‘Fordism is…the principle of an articulation between process of production and mode of consumption, which constitutes the mass production that is the specific content of the universalisation of wagelabour.’  (Aglietta 1979: 117)

    But Aglietta’s book was not just a work of theory. He integrated his analysis with an empirical history of the development of capitalism in the USA. Aglietta wanted to prove his theoretical concepts through an examination of specific changes in the USA in the types of capital, the organisation of labour, and the introduction of new technologies. For Aglietta, the importance of this historical study was as a way of understanding the contemporary economic crisis. As the book’s name suggests, it was written during the years when the postwar boom ended. Aglietta wanted to know why thirty years of uninterrupted growth had suddenly faltered. His analysis showed how the Fordist form of capitalism was reaching its structural limits. In the early 1970s, most Marxist economists thought the crisis could be simply explained as a consequence of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. (Boyer 1987: 77) But this approach failed to tackle the real historical uniqueness of crises in different countries and in different epochs. The crisis of the 1970s was not the same as that of the 1930s.

    For Aglietta, the history of capitalism was composed of alternating periods of growth and crisis. During certain times, a specific combination of capital, production process and technology led to years of successful accumulation. But, at other times, capitalist societies entered crises which could only be resolved by reorganising the established forms of capital, production and technology. This approach borrowed from the structuralist schema of alternating stages of social integration and disintegration. Aglietta used this model to show the specificity of each epoch of capitalism. He wanted to find the inherent social, organisational and technical limitations within each particular era of capitalism. The individuality of a crisis was determined by the particular structures of each regime of accumulation. Aglietta was one of the few Marxist economists who could show why the tendency of the rate of profit to fall manifested itself as inflation and stagnation in the 1970s, instead of deflation and unemployment as in the 1930s. The credibility of his explanations meant Aglietta’s book soon acquired cult status.

    This analysis was not simply theoretical. By describing contemporary capitalism as Taylorist and Fordist, Aglietta also showed how working class resistance was taking new forms. In the 1970s, many strikers did not want just better wages and conditions, but also an end to the Taylorist organisation of work. Similarly, as Fordism spread commodity relations across all of society, struggles over consumption also became increasingly important. For Aglietta, this heightened class antagonism exposed the fundamental nature of the crisis of the 1970s. Capitalism was about to undergo a radical and irreversible transformation so that a new period of growth could start. Aglietta predicted that the next stage of capitalism would be Neo-Fordism. As in earlier times, this new era would be characterised by a restructuring of production. The most advanced factories were already experimenting with an abolition of Taylorism. Semi-autonomous work groups were taking over many supervisory functions. These teams increased productivity by switching workers between different tasks. This had become possible because of increased automation in production control technologies.

    This forecast of Neo-Fordism seems very similar to the post-Fordism proclaimed by Marxism Today. Both analyses see the restructuring of production around flexible working and new technologies as transforming capitalist society. However, Aglietta’s vision of the next stage of capitalism was very different from that of Marxism Today. In the first place, Aglietta did not see the new reorganisation of production as a complete end of Taylorism and Fordism. In a large part, it was the continuation of the old methods without their inefficient rigidities. This similarity meant Neo-Fordism was on the same trajectory of growth as Fordism. Aglietta did not see a decentralised and pluralist future. Instead, he predicted a growing disjuncture between private consumption and social production. Far from promoting decentralisation and competition, labour flexibility and new technologies were accelerating the process of concentration and monopoly. The institutional limits to Fordism could only be overcome by increased socialisation of production and consumption. Neo-Fordism meant the triumph of corporate and state control. Therefore, in 1976, Aglietta predicted that:

    ‘It would be quite illusory to believe that recourse to market mystique and private initiative could magically limit the take-over by the state of the social cost engendered by the expansion of commodity relations.’ (Aglietta 1979: 245)

    and also:

    ‘The coming massive socialisation of the conditions of life will destroy free enterprise as the pillar of liberal ideology.’ (Aglietta 1979: 385)

    This spectacular failure of prediction was shared by the entire French Left of the 1970s. Both the Communist Party and their Maoist rivals believed the crisis would lead to the growing statisation of the economy. Their theoreticians foresaw the tendency to the rate of profit to fall being countered by the state socialising the costs of the crisis through nationalisations and increased government expenditure. Aglietta faithfully reproduced this prognosis in his book. It was left to the next generation of regulationists to understand why this confident prediction failed to come true. This would lead to a further development in the Regulation School approach in understanding the history and trajectory of the crisis of Fordism.

    Lipietz as Regulationist

    A major problem with making prophecies is that they often don’t come true. The work of Lipietz and other contemporary regulationists is an attempt to understand the disjuncture between Aglietta’s past predictions and presentday reality. Aglietta foresaw more statisation and monopolisation, but the 1980s have seen a growth in the power of private capital and an increased use of market forces. Aglietta was following the ‘scientific’ tradition established by the IInd and IIIrd Internationals. Both Social Democrats and Leninists agreed on a predetermined teleology within capitalism. Family firms evolved into joint stock companies, then into large corporate monopolies and, finally, into state capitalism. This prediction derived from the common interest of both reformist and revolutionary party bureaucrats in substituting the statisation of capital for the self-emancipation of the working class. This vision of the future was reproduced by Left intellectuals as a theoretical view of history as a machine working towards an inevitable statist future. In 1960s France, the high priest of this approach was Louis Althusser.

    After 1968, French Left intellectuals were highly influenced by the work of Althusser, especially the Maoists. The Regulation School was no exception to this fashion. Aglietta even wrote his classic text in the same style of convoluted prose! Althusser started from the primacy of theory over empirical investigation. (Thompson 1978: 205-229) In turn, this method asserted the dominance of social structures over human actions. This meant that history became a ‘process without a subject’ because people were merely fulfilling their preordained destiny. Therefore, for Althusser, the centre of any examination of capitalism was the reproduction of the social structures which determined social actions by individuals. The Regulation School borrowed heavily from this method. It allowed them to understand how forms of capital, types of labour process and technologies were combined to form an interdependent structure. Althusser’s work also showed the regulationists how the internal contradictions of these social structures led to moments of disintegration and crisis. (Jessop 1988: 149-150; Clarke 1988: 68) However, by being influenced by Althusser’s method, Aglietta also absorbed his ‘scientific’ statist teleology. This was the ultimate source of Aglietta’s wrong predictions.

    What distinguished the Regulation School theorists from their contemporaries was their dislike of Althusser’s ‘anti-historicism’ and ‘anti-economism’. For the regulationists, a purist application of Althusser’s approach could not explain actual crises within capitalism. Althusser dismissed empirical historical research and reduced economics to the ‘last instance’. In contrast, the regulationists embraced the study of both history and political economy. Thus Aglietta’s Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme was a combination of theory with an economic history of twentieth century USA. Though this seminal study was still influenced by Althusser’s determinism, later regulationists were able to rid themselves of these false prophecies as well. Increasingly, empirical investigations were showing the ‘…historically contingency of the forms of organisation’. (Boyer 1987: 1212) The Regulation School were no longer treating political economy as a proof for statism.

    In the late 1970s, many French intellectuals broke with their traditional role as apologists for state socialism. For a majority, this took the form of an espousal of the benefits of capitalist democracy. (Garnier and Lewis 1984) Lipietz is an exception to this recuperation of the May ’68 generation. In 1983, he headed an electoral list called ‘Ecologie 93: Les Verts, les Alternatifs, les Autogestionnaires’ [Ecology 93: Greens, Alternatives, Self-Management Supporters]. This is a continuation of a lifetime of political activism, which began in Gauche Ouvriere et Paysanne [Worker and Peasant Left], a 1970s Maoist sect within the ultraleft Parti Socialiste Unifie [Unified Socialist Party]. (Biard 1978: 161-2) Despite their mistakes, Lipietz still defends the Maoists as the only section of the French Left who opposed the capitalist ‘modernisation’ of France. (Lipietz 1984: 10-34)

    Lipietz acknowledges a large theoretical debt to Althusser. (Lipietz 1985a: 159) This influence can be seen in Lipietz’s partial continuation of Althusser’s ‘scientism’. He affirms his belief in the construction of a ‘scientific project for understanding history’ by the Regulation School. This is ‘…the study of the regularities which past struggles have imposed upon human relations…’ and how these ‘regularities’ evolve and develop into crises. (Lipietz 1987: 12) However Lipietz has abandoned Althusser’s ‘scientific’ certainties over the direction of history. Institutional stability within capitalist societies is the result of ‘chance discoveries’ and is inherently transient. (Lipietz 1987: 15)  For Lipietz, political economy cannot be a set of fixed and immutable laws. Instead he puts history in the centre of the comprehension of the laws of political economy. Because capitalist social relations are in a state of constant flux, uncertainty and evolution, the prime task of political economists is to understand this process of change. (Lipietz 1989: 1)

    Lipietz uses regulationist theories as a way of examining recent history. Aglietta’s work is the starting point for his studies. He examines contemporary capitalist societies as products of the Fordist regime of accumulation. He echoes Aglietta when he defines a regime of accumulation as: ‘…the fairly longterm stabilisation of the allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation. This implies a certain correspondence between the transformation of the conditions of production and the transformation of the conditions of the reproduction of wagelabour, between certain of the modalities in which capitalism is articulated with other modes of production within a national economic and social formation, and between the social and economic formation under consideration and its ‘outside world’.’ (Lipietz 1987: 14)

    What Lipietz stresses in Aglietta’s approach is the concept of the mode of regulation. The word ‘regulation’ has a much wider meaning in French than in English. Régulation does not simply describe certain types of law or bureaucratic watchdogs; it also covers the culture, manners, myths and dreams of a society. In other words, the mode of regulation is a way of understanding many aspects of society which are usually seen as ‘non-economic’ are, in fact, deeply bound into the processes of capital accumulation. For example, Fordism depended upon workers internalising social and sexual disciplines outside work as part of their submission to the rhythms of the assembly line. The mode of regulation is ‘the regime of accumulation… materialised in the shape of norms, habits, laws and regulating networks…’ (Lipietz 1987: 14) This concept is a way of overcoming the polarisation between economics and politics/ideology found in most structuralist theories without abandoning the distinction altogether.

    The Golden Years of Fordism

    For Lipietz, the breakdown of the mode of regulation lies at the heart of the present crisis of Fordism. But, to understand this crisis, it is necessary to understand the birth of Fordism. The pre-Fordist regime of accumulation is called competitive regulation. This describes not only the era of family firms, the Gold Standard, free trade and the British Empire. It also signifies a specific stage in the organisation of work. In this period, capitalists intensified exploitation mainly by lengthening hours or cutting pay. Following Aglietta, Lipietz sees competitive regulation as an extensive regime of accumulation. Capital was primarily accumulated through an expansion in the scale of production, rather than altering the way production was carried out. However, at the leading edges of the economy, firms were increasing profits through reorganising work patterns and mechanising production. (Marx 1976) As in Aglietta, this is seen as leading to an intensive regime of accumulation characterised by constant reorganisation of the means and methods of production. (Lipietz 1987: 33)

    Lipietz’s definition of Fordism follows the regulationist orthodoxy. He sees Fordism as ‘…first of all a form of the organisation of labour…’ (Lipietz 1984: 16) Fordism emerged as a distinct regime of accumulation because these new techniques of production systematically spread across the leading capitalist countries. Therefore Fordism primarily took the form of a two-stage transformation of the production process:

    • Taylorism: first of all, the workforce was divided into three: managers/ technocrats; skilled workers; and semiskilled or unskilled workers. The separation of conception and execution led to rigid division and specialisation between workers.
    • Mechanisation: the second stage was the systematic incorporation of the skills of the workers into the machines used in production.

    The adoption of Fordism was a dynamic process which involved a continuous restructuring of the process of production. This led to a long-term rise in the productivity. (Lipietz 1985: 15) More and more commodities could be produced with less and less labour. By 1929, this increase volume of commodities led to a crisis of overproduction. According to the Regulation School, this occurred because the mode of regulation was still shaped by the era of competitive regulation while the regime of accumulation was already Fordist. (Lipietz 1987: 334) Under competitive regulation, competition forced firms to keep wages down. Yet, without higher wages, there could be no mass consumption of the commodities produced by the new methods. Failure to resolve this contradiction led to a financial crisis and the Great Depression. During the 1930s and 1940s, there were fierce conflicts within and between states as the different strategies were tried for escaping from the crisis. In the end, the Keynesian policies of the New Deal and Social Democracy were able to pioneer a new mode of regulation which assured the continuing expansion of the Fordist regime of accumulation.

    The new mode of regulation primarily involved the introduction of new policies by the nation state, such as a welfare system, minimum wage laws and credit money. (Lipietz 1987: 359; Lipietz 1989: 36) The successful combination of a Fordist regime of accumulation with a mode of regulation didn’t just depend on the skills of the ‘hegemonic bloc’ controlling power in particular states. (Lipietz 1985: 11) It also was a victory for working class resistance to the low wages and bad conditions of competitive regulation. In turn, underlying social conditions had to be sufficiently developed. This maturity was not simply the growth of a powerful Labour movement. For example, it also included the establishment of paper money, regular employment, an established banking sector and state economic intervention. (Lipietz 1985a: 845) For the Regulation School, the process of Fordism may have had its genesis within the production process, but its continued success depended on the reorganisation of society as a whole. The ‘real subsumption of labour to capital’ spread to all areas of social life.

    When societies fully adopted the new forms of regulation to complement the new production processes, a ‘Golden Age’ of Fordism occurred. There was a ‘virtuous circle’ of falling costs of fixed capital preventing mechanisation being halted by the price of machinery; consumption rising in parallel with productivity increases through increased wages and welfare provisions; and cyclical fluctuations within production being mitigated through fiscal regulation. (Lipietz 1987: 369) The ‘regularity’ of Fordism was also ensured by trapping workers into a cycle of ‘métro-boulot-télé-dodo’ [commuting-work-TV-sleep]. (Lipietz 1984: 233) However, this ‘ideal type’ of Fordism only existed for a limited period and in a few countries. Lipietz is interested not just in understanding Fordism’s era of (relative) stability, but also why its internal makeup led to revolt and crisis.

    The Crisis of Fordism

    ‘Fundamentally, the researchers have one single conclusion, repeated and multiplied in a flowering of overlapping citations: the rupture with the economic tendencies prior to 1973 comes from the crisis of Fordism, as the principal technical, social and economic form of organisation.’ (Boyer 1987: 35)

    In common with the rest of the Regulation School, Lipietz believes that Fordism reached its economic and social limits during the 1970s. Nowhere was this clearer than at the foundations of the whole regime of accumulation: the production process. As Lipietz puts it: ‘at the root of the current economic crisis, there is the crisis of labour.’ (Lipietz 1989: 18) Each new round of restructuring resulted in fewer gains in productivity. (Lipietz 1984: 424) This was not due solely to the re-emergence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall because of rising costs of fixed capital. It was also connected with the ‘…counteroffensive of the semi-skilled worker…’ which occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Lipietz 1984: 41) The workers were no longer overawed by the disciplines of Taylorism and the controls of mechanisation. Absenteeism, wildcat strikes and sabotage were all forms of resistance against the alienation of the assembly line. This showed how the rigid divisions of labour under Taylorism were themselves becoming a source of inefficiency.

    But this crisis of Fordism was not caused solely by internal difficulties within the regime of accumulation established in the advanced capitalist countries. There were external reasons as well. The mode of regulation developed by nation states began to break down because of the internationalisation of capital. (Lipietz 1986: 23) As key areas of production became organised on a global scale, it became increasingly difficult to regulate the economy on a national level. (Lipietz 1989: 11) Crucially, the global market was not subject to any minimum wage laws. This allowed certain countries to ‘cheat’ by benefiting from mass consumption without themselves paying the wages needed to make this possible. Within nation states, Fordist regulation was successful when wages and productivity rose in parallel. Yet the international competition between national economies was preventing the rise in wages necessary to prevent a crisis of overproduction. (Lipietz 1985: 17)

    The first phase of the breakdown of Fordism covered the period of from the first Oil Crisis of 1974 to the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Lipietz describes this as the era of the ‘Social Democratic management of crisis’. (Lipietz 1984: 456) The remedies discovered after the 1929 Crash were applied within the metropolitan countries to offset the growing profits crisis. Most notably, this strategy involved the rapid expansion in creditmoney. Governments gambled on expanding their way out of the crisis. But the mode of regulation was no longer able to postpone the crisis. Instead the ‘social democratic’ policy led to stagflation: a combination of rapid inflation and stagnating production. (Lipietz 1987: 136) Stagflation was only the ‘symptom of the disease’, demonstrating that the mode of regulation could no longer resuscitate an exhausted regime of accumulation. Inflation was simply displacing the problems of profitable production into the future. (Lipietz 1985a: 1356)

    Thus the crisis of Fordism became obvious once the traditional countermeasures were a failure. There were no longer any ‘social democratic’ solutions to the crisis. Lipietz sees capitalism seeking new ways out of the crisis. This was a restructuring of labour disciplines and the introduction of new technologies in the production process. Within the Western industrialised countries, capitalist companies ended the Fordist compromise. In the 1970s, strikers had demanded more wages without corresponding increases in productivity. Now managements were refusing wage rises for greater productivity. Companies were demanding that workers accept new flexible work patterns and the introduction of new technologies. Both these moves were designed to be internal counter-tendencies against declining productivity and falling profits. Companies also took advantage of the external causes of the crisis of Fordism by exporting semi-skilled and unskilled production processes to the Third World. (Lipietz 1984: 468)

    In his formative study, Aglietta apologised for deliberately avoiding the issue of imperialism and the world market. Lipietz’s principal contribution to the Regulation School is the use of regulationist theory to analyse capitalism on an international scale. This allows Lipietz to criticise his own Maoist past. The Maoist sects believed that the world revolution would be a repeat of the Chinese Revolution. Rebellion would first be successful in the countryside (the Third World) before spreading to the cities (the West). This analysis asserted that the Third World was being ‘underdeveloped’ by Western imperialism. Therefore industrialisation was impossible without a Maoist revolution. Moreover this belief was not limited to the Maoists, but was widespread on the Left during the 1960s. In Latin America, a whole school of ‘dependency theorists’ arose to defend this thesis. (Lipietz 1987: 64) However, these analysts ran into trouble when reality did not conform to their theories. During the 1970s and 1980s, the impossible occurred.  ‘Real capitalist industrialisation’ started in those Third World countries which had not experienced a ‘socialist’ revolution. This was the era of the emergence of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), such as Brazil, South Korea or Taiwan. (Lipietz 1987: 23, 131)

    In his book, Mirages and Miracles (1987), Lipietz uses regulationist theory to rethink the history of the relationship between the First and Third Worlds. He links the emergence of Fordism on a global scale with the postwar dominance of the American empire. This led to a new international division of labour centred on the USA. Successive American governments oversaw the dismantling of the old European empires. In the stage of competitive regulation, these had been semi-autarkic blocs connecting the metropolitan power with its dependent colonies in the periphery. But, under American protection, the spread of Fordism across the old imperial nations led to a metropolitan-centred regime of accumulation. Trade between the First and Third World dropped dramatically, reaching an all-time low in the mid 1960s. Despite the claims of the Maoists and dependency theorists, the exploitation of the periphery played little part in the success of the Fordist countries of the centre. The South only began to play an important part in the world economy again when Northern Fordism entered into crisis.

    The internal crisis within the Fordist regime of accumulation in the metropolitan countries encouraged the internationalisation of production. The Taylorist division of labour had already separated workers into managers, skilled labour, and semiskilled/unskilled labour. Therefore companies began to subcontract labour-intensive production processes to Third World countries. These factories used unskilled labour in conjunction with low levels of fixed capital. Lipietz calls this ‘primitive’ or ‘bloody’ Taylorism because it involved the super-exploitation of workers. Repressive Third World regimes denied union and political rights to enforce labour discipline and low wages on their workers.

    But the industrialisation of the South did not stop simply at the level of factories using semiskilled or unskilled labour. Central to Lipietz’s analysis is the rise of peripheral Fordism within the NICs. While ‘bloody’ Taylorism was labour intensive, the next stage of growth in many Third World countries was increasingly capital intensive. As more fixed capital was invested, workers were disciplined by the speed of the machinery rather than just by supervision. The rise of the NICs was partially encouraged by the stagnation of the Fordism in the centre which encouraged the multinationals to switch investment to these new areas of growth. But Lipietz stresses that the international corporations have only played a limited part in the rapid development of the NICs. The most important part of their growth has come from internal demand. The arrival of ‘peripheral Fordism’ within the NICs depended on the emergence of the top two layers of the Taylorist division of labour: managers and skilled workers. This not only allowed the NICs to export more capital intensive commodities, but, more importantly, created a growing internal market. The success of certain NICs has broken down the old homogeneity among the excolonies of the European empires. There is now a new division of labour within the South between industrialising and nonindustrialising countries. This has even led to the emergence of some NICs as regional imperialists.

    Despite the ‘miracle’ of industrialisation in the South, the international system was still unstable. For Lipietz, a central problem was that the spread of Fordism to the Third World has undermined the state-based mode of regulation. Third World factories could produce cheaper commodities by paying low wages and welfare benefits to their workers. But First World workers provided a market for these commodities only if they had the wages and welfare benefits imposed by the Fordist compromise. Third World competition created a dilemma for First World companies. They needed to cut prices by lowering wage costs while simultaneously needing high wages to sell their commodities. Unfortunately, none of the international institutions were able to impose the Fordist mode of regulation on a global scale. During the 1970s, the banks and finance houses recycled OPEC’s oil rents to the NICs. But this meant that international regulation took place through the financial markets and not through any global Fordist institutions. For example, the shifting of work from First to Third World workers was carried out to cut wage bills. But, in turn, without these workers as consumers, the spectre of overproduction would return.

    This source of instability in the world market was closely linked with the lack of the key institutions of Fordism within the NICs. (Lipietz 1985: 256) To compete internationally, corporations relied on their cheap labour. There are no minimum wage laws or welfare state. However, there are plentiful supplies of credit. The NICs have set up an exclusionary version of the Fordist regime of accumulation. The old oligarchy, the capitalists and more skilled workers were well paid. On the other hand, the semiskilled and unskilled workers were pauperised. They were excluded from the high wage and welfare benefits given to workers in the First World. (Lipietz 1987: 149) Because of competition from the NICs,  this exclusionary version of Fordism has spread into the centre during the 1980s. Now it threatened to supplant altogether the old inclusionary regime of accumulation, with its welfare state and minimum wage laws.

    This is how Lipietz explains why Aglietta’s prophecies did not come true. Nationalisation and centralisation could act as counter-tendencies to the crisis of Fordism only at the level of an individual state. However, these states were part of an expanding global market. Once Fordism spread to the Third World, national attempts at intervention in the metropolitan countries were checked by the dynamics of an international system organised through market competition. This is how the 1980s became an historical break with the supposedly inevitable advance of statisation and monopolisation. The fatal flaw of Aglietta’s book was his failure to see national economies can exist only as part of a global economy. This is why the crisis of Fordism did not lead to more nationalisation and monopolisation, but instead to privatisation and market competition.

    Which Post-Fordism?

    Lipietz has seen a vision of the future and it is called Brazil. This is a world where the crisis of Fordism has been resolved by organising the economy through the exclusionary regime of accumulation. Society is divided between a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’. The core consists of socially integrated, high-paid, skilled and fulltime workers. In contrast, the periphery is composed of marginalised, lowpaid, unskilled and part-time menials. This polarised society combines hitech consumer goods with urban deprivation. Lipietz is not alone in this nightmare. It is the ‘cyberpunk’ backdrop to many science fiction films, such as Bladerunner and Robocop. The potency of this image is strengthened by the spread of this type of society from the Third World into the First World. Lipietz (1987) sees the Reagan years in the USA as having a ‘…bizarre similarity with Brazil in the seventies’. The economy was expanded by redistributing wealth from the poor to the rich and the widespread availability of credit. The consequences were a bizarre combination of rapid technological advance with growing social deprivation.

    But Lipietz thinks this post-Fordist dystopia is not the inevitable future for all countries. Within each country, there are competing ‘hegemonic blocs’ offering alternative solutions to the crisis. Some parts of the Left want to defend the old Fordist order, while some sections of the Right dream of a revival of pre-Fordist society. However Lipietz thinks that any return to the Fordist or pre-Fordist past is impossible.  Therefore the central question within contemporary capitalism is: which type of post-Fordism will be adopted? Unlike the determinism promoted by Marxism Today, Lipietz does not believe there is only one way out of the crisis of Fordism.

    As shown in the diagram ‘The Psychogeography of the Left’, he sees there are two diverging types of post-Fordism:

    • Liberal productivism: This strategy resolves the crisis in the interests of capital. The production process is restructured by the introduction of new technologies and the division of the labour force into core and periphery workers. The state no longer guarantees mass consumption through minimum wage laws and the welfare state. This is post-Fordism for states who want to be Japan, but could end up like Brazil.
    • Alternative: This approach wants to discover a way out of the crisis which will benefit labour. The production process is restructured using new technologies, but in ways which preserve the unity of the working class. The benefits of increases in productivity continue to be shared between capital and labour. This is post-Fordism for workers who want to combine socialism with ecology. (Lipietz 1989a)

    As the crisis of Fordism was caused by the declining productivity of labour, Lipietz (1985) thinks that the introduction of both types of post-Fordism can only occur through a fundamental restructuring of the production process. A new type of labour organisation is needed if there is to be a new type of regime of accumulation. This can only be achieved through the introduction of new types of machinery and types of labour management. Computer technology can create flexible machines, which are used in many different ways in production. If these new machines are introduced, flexible workers are also needed. This new type of production process is called flexible specialisation. The successful introduction of post-Fordist production methods depends upon the enthusiasm and skills of all grades of workers being devoted to raising productivity. Increasingly, new technologies are more productive when they are used for reskilling workers, rather than deskilling them. As with other commentators, Lipietz finds the best examples of this new type of labour process in Japan. But, unlike them, Lipietz does not want the European Left to model their countries solely on Japan. The Left’s main task is to ensure the benefits of the new types of production are not limited to the core workers.

    Liberal Productivism in Rocard’s France

    Lipietz agrees with the analysis put forward by Robin Murray and Marxism Today on the introduction of flexible specialisation at the leading edge of capitalist production. But he does not think that the reorganisation of the production process leads inevitably to a single variant of post-Fordism. Lipietz thinks there are two possible ways out of the crisis. This means he draws very different political conclusions from the arrival of flexible specialisation. Most importantly, Lipietz doesn’t support the type of political strategy espoused by Marxism Today. He thinks the Left should be fighting for a more radical solution to the crisis of Fordism. Moreover, coalition politics are not an oppositional policy in France as this is the official programme of the government! Under the leadership of Michel Rocard, the Socialist party administration has adopted a policy of ‘opening’ towards the centre parties. The Socialist party also wants to form a new ‘social compromise’ between capital and labour for the ‘modernisation’ of France. (Rocard 1986: 3649; 138205) Lipietz believes the Socialist party is introducing the liberal productivist version of post-Fordism. Not suprisingly, this type of ‘modernisation’ involves the working class paying the costs of resolving the crisis of Fordism. Lipietz challenges these political and economic policies which support liberal productivist post-Fordism.

    This submission to liberal productivism resulted from the failures of the first Socialist party government. In 1981, Mitterrand won the presidential election ending two decades of rightwing rule. He came to power on a programme which promised a ‘…radicalised perfection of Fordist compromise.’ (Lipietz 1986: 3) France was going to expand its way out of economic difficulties through rises in welfare, cuts in hours worked and extensive nationalisations. When this approach led to trade deficits and a franc crisis, the Socialist party decided to change course. With the old Left discredited, policies promoted by Rocard became the new Socialist party orthodoxy. This culminated in his elevation to the premiership after Mitterrand’s re-election in 1987. Since the mid 1970s, Rocard has led a faction of the Socialist party known as the deuxième gauche (second Left). This group campaigned to replace the old models of statist socialism with a new approach based on the experience of the leading industrial sectors in Japan, California and Northern Italy. (Lipietz 1984: 801) The deuxième gauche were among the earliest proponents of the type of liberal productivist post-Fordism. Their proposals included:

    • the quick introduction of high technology in industry and society;
    • the replacement of the nation by the firm in economic policy;
    • an emphasis on individual rights as opposed to class solidarity;
    • the reorientation of state aid from welfare to investment.

    The adoption by the Socialist party of a version of liberal productivism resulted from the breakdown of the old social democratic compromise. During the 19816 Socialist party government, these policies started creating an exclusionary regime of accumulation on the Brazilian model. There was a fall in real wages and a rise in unemployment as the costs of the crisis were off-loaded onto labour, especially the weakest sections of the working class such as women, immigrants and part-timers. (Hall 1987) Lipietz (1984) describes this strategy as ‘social sadism’ because suffering was imposed on workers in the name of liberty. Pluralism and diversity became justifications for unfettered exploitation.

    The deuxième gauche opposed state controls over the economy and society in the name of liberty and democracy. Instead, Rocard’s tendency saw capitalist companies as the leading instruments of social change. The role of the Socialist party government was to support and regulate this dynamic private sector. The deuxième gauche believed the Socialist party could channel the private egoism of capitalists towards fulfilling the public good. The rise of Rocard and the deuxième gauche to power is an integral part of the recuperation of the generation of ’68. Those who once were Maoists calling for a social revolution in France are now advocating a policy of ‘modernisation’. As Lipietz sardonically comments: ‘the Japanese Left have beaten the Chinese Left’. (Lipietz 1984: 273)

    The Alternative Compromise

    As shown in the diagram ‘The Psychogeography of the Left’, Lipietz believes there is another way out of the crisis of Fordism. For Lipietz, regulationist studies can show how the Left can propose a policy of modernisation which benefits the working class. This strategy is the only way of regaining the political initiative from the Right. At present, Lipietz sees an ‘absurd polarisation’ within the European Left. (Lipietz 1985: 24) This sterile division is reflected within the different parties of the French Left:

    • the Communist Party wants to preserve the old Fordist compromise. This involves not only defending the welfare state, but also opposing the restructuring of the traditional organisation of production in the factories.
    • the Socialist party is following policies described above which are designed to encourage liberal productivist post-Fordism.

    Neither party’s strategy is credible. The Communist party’s strategy is doomed to failure because the old Fordist order cannot be revived, while the Socialist party ‘s policies cannot succeed because liberal productivist post-Fordism is already reaching its social limits. (Lipietz 1989a) The escalating ecological crisis is the most dramatic proof of the long-run unsustainability of liberal productivism’s ‘…reckless unplanned accumulation…’. (Lipietz 1987: 192) What is more, liberal productivism is also discovering that its restructuring of the production process has not even solved the crisis of Fordism. It has only provided a short-term reversal of the long-term decline in the growth in productivity. The problem is that liberal productivism finds difficulties in mobilising workers behind the goals of capital. It can only bribe core workers with more money and terrorise periphery workers with the threat of unemployment. Lipietz believes the faltering of liberal productivism gives an opening to a more radical solution to the crisis of Fordism. He thinks the Left should put forward a new type of compromise, distinct from both the Fordist and liberal productivist models. (Lipietz 1985: 29)

    Lipietz believes this strategy is credible because it expresses certain possibilities apparent within the restructuring of the production process around flexible specialisation. The alternative compromise is based on growing need by capital for workers’ conscious involvement in the process of production. The most productive use of information technologies and flexible working leads to continuous innovation within the production process. In turn, this can only happen when the close supervision of the Taylorist division of labour is abandoned. Line workers have to take over many of the functions of management. With the removal of traditional types of labour disciplines, workers must become self-motivated behind the aim of continuously increasing productivity. For Lipietz (1989), this is the only long-term solution to the falling growth in productivity. This makes an alternative compromise attractive to sections of capital as well as labour. Therefore Lipietz thinks the working class is in a strong position to extract a compromise in the interests of all workers in return for rising productivity. Lipietz thinks the workers should extract a high price for its enthusiasm in this process of constant organisational and technical restructuring. He suggests some fundamental demands for the working class during these negotiations:

    • guaranteed lifetime employment in the workers’ home town or area;
    • workers’ involvement in the pace and direction of technological
      change;
    • new technology to be used for reskilling rather than deskilling;
    • constant retraining of workers in new skills;
    • a reduction in hours worked with each new increase in productivity;
    • ecologically sustainable production processes.

    Above all else, the primary goal in the negotiations for this new compromise would be the abandonment of Taylorism within production. Lipietz (1989; 1989a) sees this as the major gain for the working class in any negotiations. The need to involve both skilled and unskilled workers within the process of change means the old hierarchies are impossible within any sophisticated version of post-Fordism. Lipietz sees this unification of skilled and unskilled workers as a vital first step towards realising full self-management within production. The negotiations themselves will act as ‘schools of self-management’ for the workers as they become involved in issues outside basic pay and conditions.

    The workers will not gain solely from the end of the rigid Taylorist division of labour within production. Lipietz is convinced that another important gain of the new compromise will the shortening of the hours worked. Therefore a primary demand in the new compromise will be a trade off between increased productivity and greater free time. This is necessary because there are increasing ecological limits on the production of more and more commodities. It is already impossible for everyone in the world to consume as wastefully as First World inhabitants.

    Therefore Lipietz (1989b) sees that ‘the only long-term ecologically sustainable growth is the growth in free time and individual autonomy’. This analysis sees a cut in working hours as not just ecologically justified. A shorter working day is also needed if workers are to achieve individual autonomy by discovering a life beyond work. This demand is made by other radical economists who also see freedom for the working class can only come once it frees itself from alienating, but socially necessary, labour. (Gorz 1985) Thus Lipietz’s short-term compromise between labour and capital is based on the long-term goal of liberating the working class from the necessity for wage labour.

    For Lipietz, Marxism Today and the deuxième gauche have abandoned solidarity between social individuals in favour of competition between asocial individuals. In contrast, Lipietz thinks that class solidarity is the only guarantee of autonomy for individual workers. The aim of the new compromise is to strengthen the power of the working class so it can democratically define its own social needs. For example, only when freed from the fear of unemployment, workers will no longer find it necessary to defend unecological or dangerous jobs, such as work in nuclear power stations or mines. Also the introduction of flexible technologies and working patterns can be used to lessen the sectional interests within the working class. When workers are less tied to particular trades, they can be more easily united around their common status as workers. Lipietz wants this process taken even further within the institutions of the welfare state.

    In the Fordist era, most welfare services were organised along Taylorist principles. Lipietz (1989) thinks this sector could be an area where self-management could be introduced immediately. He envisages replacing services provided by the welfare state or domestic labour with a new sector organised as self-managed enterprises. He thinks this section of the economy could employ around 10% of the workforce. These welfare providers would not be organised in a Taylorist hierarchy, but be accountable to their workers and clients. This would allow them to respond more closely to the needs of the communities which they would serve. Lipietz (1984) hopes this would form a vital part of the ‘…the collective management of the reproduction of the labour force’ by the workers themselves.

    Finally, Lipietz believes that this internal compromise must have an external component as well. This does not simply involve an ending of the debt burden on the NICs and the rest of the Third World. It also must involve the ending of the ‘beggar my neighbour’ policies encouraged by the lack of regulatory institutions on a global level. To prevent the importing of the Brazilian model into the First World, it is necessary to spread the alternative compromise to Brazil itself. This can only happen if the Third World’s debt and trade dependency is alleviated. Above all else, Lipietz (1989) believes First World countries should discriminate in their trade in favour of those countries which guarantee democratic social and political rights for their citizens. This is in the self-interest of the Northern working class. It will make it difficult to undermine the new compromise through competition from super-exploited workers.

    The Alternative Movement

    In France, Lipietz is politically active in building the Alternative. This is composed of Left groups able to seize the opportunity for a new compromise in labour’s favour. But, as the last elections showed, the French Left is still dominated by the liberal productivist Socialist party and the Fordist Communist party. For Lipietz (1986), the problem is to create a movement which is neither the Left of liberal productivism, nor the Left of Fordism.

    Here Lipietz is faced with an ambiguity central to the experience of his generation. He wants the Alternative movement to be both Green and Red. On the one hand, he is inspired by the new social movements which arose outside the traditional party and union structures after the May ’68 Revolution. Thus he sees the political nucleus of the Alternative in the ecologist, immigrant and feminist movements. In contrast to his sharp analysis of Left parties, Lipietz is entirely uncritical of the new social movements. Here, as with the German Greens, his vision of the new Left is as a continuation of the old counterculture of the 1960s. This is Gorz’s new historical subject: the ‘non-class of post-industrial proletarians’. (Gorz 1982) On the other hand, Lipietz’s new compromise is rooted in the persistence of the class struggle within modern capitalist societies. The alternative compromise over the restructuring of the production process is reached in negotiations between capital and labour as contending classes.

    For the Left, this strategy can only succeed if the Alternative overcomes the divisions among the working class and creates the basis of class unity. The Socialist party’s liberal productivist strategy can appeal to skilled core workers if they are rewarded with more pay and greater autonomy. The aim of the Alternative must spread the benefits of restructuring to those in  unskilled, semi-skilled and part-time jobs. In this case, the Red/Green movement is appealing to women, immigrants and youth primarily as workers, as part of a coalition which must cover all sections of the oppressed. (Lipietz 1986: 5) This strategy is underpinned by the form of restructuring created by the alternative version of post-Fordism. If the long-term decline in productivity is to be halted, then all workers have to be reskilled if they are going to use the new technologies. For the Left, the major advance in the alternative compromise is the creation of a highly skilled and selfconfident ‘new working class’. (Mallet 1975)

    Lipietz doesn’t believe that the Alternative can be limited to one particular political party or social organisation. Instead, he is looking for a family of currents, both  inside and outside the Old Left. (Lipietz 1986: 10) In France, this is expressed through les Verts [Greens], the Nouvelle Gauche [New Left] of Pierre Juquin, dissidents within the Communist or Socialist parties, and people simply active in local campaigns. Though Lipietz is conscious of the need for state intervention to help new initiatives, he also stresses the necessity to build a wide social base for the Alternative. What is more, this movement cannot be limited to one country. The common problems of Western European countries demonstrate the need for cooperation among movements throughout the European Union. The peace and ecological movements have shown the power of organising campaigns on a global basis. Now it is necessary to extend this solidarity further. It is increasingly in the interests of workers in the North to help in stopping super-exploitation in the South, if only to protect their own conditions in the metropolitan countries. (Lipietz 1987: 191) In a sense, Lipietz is proposing a return to the Maoist strategy of an international workerpeasant alliance, but in a more radical and ecological form.

    Lipietz and the British Left

    In contemporary Britain, the writings of Alain Lipietz suffer from guilt by association with the policies promoted by Marxism Today. The magazine shares the same theoretical language, but uses it to draw different conclusions from those proposed by Lipietz. Marxism Today sees its primary task as reclaiming the future from the Tories. Therefore the magazine rejects the traditional centralised and statist model of socialism. For Marxism Today, this abandonment of the belief in state socialism means that the old divisions between Left and Right are no longer relevant. Now there is only a post-Fordist future. The reorganisation of production around the new methods of flexible specialisation is supposed to bring greater individual freedom and the end of centralised bureaucracies. But it also involves the abandonment of collectivist struggles in favour of modest reforms and coalition politics as ends in themselves.

    This analysis is overly determinist about the future of capitalism. In the past, from the IInd and IIIrd Internationals to Aglietta, the Left believed in a statist teleology. Nowadays, Marxism Today promulgates the inevitability of the liberal productivist version of post-Fordism. But is the new determinism any more accurate than the old version? By reading Lipietz’s work, the British Left can learn to take a more critical view of both present day developments and over-optimistic predictions of the future. For a start, Lipietz shows how the post-Fordist future might not be a more humane version of California, but a Northern copy of Brazil’s polarised society.

    For Lipietz, historical changes in all areas of social life are shaped by changes in the production process. The development of labour disciplines and assembly line technologies formed the heart of Fordist society. But Lipietz is not just interested in the subordination of the workers to the factory system. He is also interested in the cross-class collusion necessary for the long boom of Fordism. The working class gained from rising social and real wages under Fordism. However, these gains are now under threat because of the end of Fordism. The fundamental cause of the crisis lies within the production process. By the late 1960s, additional mechanisation was failing to keep pace with previous gains in productivity. This problem was exacerbated by the growing revolt by workers against the disciplines of Taylorism.

    The policies promoted by Marxism Today accept to capital’s solution to the crisis of Fordism. Nowadays, the leading companies are adopting flexible specialisation as the method of organising their production processes. In turn, this is leading to the restructuring of the whole of society around the liberal productivist model of post-Fordism. As an exclusionary regime of accumulation, this type of post-Fordism cuts back on the regulatory mechanisms of Fordism, such as the welfare state and minimum wage laws. However, Lipietz argues that this liberal productivist solution to the crisis of Fordism cannot succeed. It is already reaching its institutional limits because it cannot solve the problem of productivity which lies at the heart of the crisis of Fordism. Liberal productivism cannot continuously advance labour productivity because it can only incorporate the core workers through money and periphery workers as superexploited subcontractors. Therefore it is pointless for the British Left to support any humanised version of this type of post-Fordism.

    Lipietz places the need to raise labour productivity at the centre of the current crisis. The new information technologies and flexible working practices are making the Taylorist division of labour obsolete. Even from the capitalists’ viewpoint, the rule of fear is economically inefficient. Instead, modern production process can only fulfill their potential with a self-disciplined and reskilled working class. The crucial finding of Lipietz for the British Left is that there is choice over the type of post-Fordism adopted. The introduction of flexible specialisation can represent an opportunity for the working class to drive a hard bargain with their employers. If the workers are in a strong situation, Marxism Today‘s capitulation to liberal productivist post-Fordism is unnecessary. The working class can exact a far better deal from the capitalists. This is Lipietz’s alternative compromise. He is not just interested in the shortterm benefits from a new settlement. Lipietz calls for the cutting the working day as ecologically, economically and psychologically necessary. He also sees the reduction in the working day as a step towards the escape from wage work for everyone.

    Therefore the British Left can learn from Lipietz’s analyses that there is a different way out of the crisis of Fordism. After the defeats of the past decade, it often seems that the working class is in a very weak position. The present government seems determined to resist all forms of compromise. Therefore Marxism Today‘s policies of modest reforms seem like the only feasible strategy, especially if the success of liberal productivist post-Fordism is inevitable. But Lipietz’s work shows the British Left that these changes within the production process are actually leading in another direction. In time, this will result in a strengthened and more powerful working class. But the alternative compromise will not lead to the immediate end of the alienation of wage slavery. This makes the alternative compromise only a lesser evil than its liberal productivist rival. However the potential gains of the compromise could be major steps towards lessening the daily exploitation of workers, especially if they include cutting the hours of work; reskilling the working class; ending Taylorism and the core/periphery division; stopping discrimination against women and immigrant workers; and encouraging ecologically sound production. The greatest lesson the British Left can learn from Lipietz is his optimism about the emerging historical opening for successful class solidarity politics.

    ———————————————————————————–

    Thanks to Les Levidow, Alain Lipietz and the Centre for Communication and Information Studies, Polytechnic of Central London.

    First Publication:
    ‘Mistranslations: Lipietz in London and Paris’, Science as Culture, No. 8, 1990, pp. 80-117, (ISSN 0950 5431).

    Re-Publication:
    ‘Mistranslations: Lipietz in London and Paris’ in Bob Jessop (ed.), The Parisian Regulation School: regulation school and the crisis of capitalism volume 1, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2001, pp. 303-340, (ISBN 1-840664-651-9).

    Corrected: 5th May 2007.

    Check out Alain Lipietz’s website: <lipetz.net>

    Bibliography

    Aglietta, M. (1979) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the US Experience, London: New Left Books

    Bassett, P. (1989) ‘All Together Now’, Marxism Today, January.

    Benton, S.(1989) ‘The Party is Over’, Marxism Today, March.

    Biard, R. (1978) Dictionnaire de l’Extrême-Gauche de 1945 à Nos Jours, Paris: Belfond.

    Boyer, R. (1987) La Théorie de la Régulation: Une Analyse Critique, Paris: Editions La Découverte.

    Bradley, C. (1988) ‘Marxism Today: New Thoughts or Old Rubbish’, Socialist Organiser, 27th October.

    Clarke, S. (1988) ‘Overaccumulation, Class Struggle and the Regulation Approach’, Capital and Class, Number 36.

    Gorz, A. (1982) Farewell to the Working Class, London: Pluto.

    Gorz, A. (1985) Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from Work, London: Pluto.

    Hall, P. (1987) ‘The Evolution of Economic Policy Under Mitterand’, in G. Ross, S. Hoffman and S. Malzacher (eds.), The Mitterand Experiment, Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (1983) The Politics of Thatcherism, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

    Hall, S. (1988) ‘Brave New World’, Marxism Today, October.

    Jessop, B. (1988) ‘Regulation Theory, post Fordism and the state: more than a reply to Werner Bonefeld’, Capital and Class, Number 34.

    Leadbeater, C. (1988) ‘Power to the Person’, Marxism Today, October.

    Lew, R. and Garnier, JP. (1984) ‘From the Wretched of the Earth to the Defence of the West: An Essay on Left Disenchantment in France’, in R. Miliband, J. Saville and M. Liebman (eds.), Socalist Register 1984: The Uses of Anti-Communism, London: Merlin.

    Lipietz, A. (1984) L’Audace or l’Enlisement, Paris: Editions La Découverte.

    Lipietz, A. (1985) ‘Le National et le Regional: Quelle Autonomie Face à la Crise Capitaliste Mondiale?’, Seminar Paper, Lesvos Spatial Structure and Social Process, 26-30 August.

    Lipietz, A. (1985a) The Enchanted World: Inflation, Credit and World Crisis, London: Verso.

    Lipietz, A. (1986) ‘Les Conditions d’un Mouvement Alternatif en France’, Seminar Paper, A.E.R.I.P. “Les Enjeux Institutionnels et Politiques de Mars 1986, 31st January1st February. [Shortened and translated version in Socialist Alternatives, Volume 1, Number 2, October/November 1986]

    Lipietz, A. (1987) Mirages and Miracles, London: Verso.

    Lipietz, A. (1989) An Alternative Design for the Twenty First Century, Paris: photocopy.

    Lipietz, A. (1989a) Talk given at Polytechnic of Central London, 27th January.

    Lipietz, A. (1989) ‘Le Printemps Vert de l’Europe’, Libération, 24 Mai.

    Mallet, S. (1975) The New Working Class, Nottingham: Spokesman.

    Marx, K. (1976) Value Studies, London: New Park Publications.

    Murray, R. (1988) ‘Life after Henry (Ford)’, Marxism Today, October.

    Rocard, M. (1986) A l’Epreuve des Faits, Paris: Editions du Seuil.

    Rowbotham, S., Mitter, S. and Murray, R. (1989) ‘A Step Ahead: Combining Economic Strategy and Vision’, Interlink, February/March.

    Thompson, E.P. (1978) The Poverty of Theory and other essays, London: Merlin.

  • BROADCASTING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN IRELAND

    Broadcasting was Invented in Ireland

    On Tuesday, 25th April 1916, a transmitter from the School of Wireless Telegraphy in Dublin started sending messages across the airwaves. The morse code signals announced to the world that a combined force of armed nationalists and socialists were occupying central Dublin and had proclaimed an Irish Republic, independent from the British Empire. (Mulryan 1988: 1‑2) According to legend, this transmission was the world’s first radio broadcast. Before April 1916, radio technology had been used primarily for point‑to‑point communications between ships and shore bases. In contrast, the Irish rebels didn’t transmit to any particular recipient, but to anyone who happened to be listening. They hoped their messages would be picked up by a passing ship and news of the uprising relayed to the American press. Easter 1916 not only marks the birth of the Irish Republic, but also the invention of broadcasting. (McLuhan 1964: 304)

    From the beginning, the independence of the modern Irish state has depended on control over its own electronic media. In the early years of independence, radio broadcasting was committed to the preservation of Ireland’s distinct national culture. Hence, Irish governments denounced the ‘spill‑over’ of signals from British stations within southern Ireland as a form of cultural imperialism. However, in recent decades, a new generation of Irish politicians has adopted completely different attitudes towards broadcasting. In their view, the national survival of Ireland depended on its successful integration within the European Community. Thus, Irish politicians have encouraged the electronic media to bring the ideas and cultures of the wider world into the homes of Irish people. Recently, the Irish government has even introduced a new means of television transmission to relay British stations to those regions outside their present coverage area. In turn, the rejection of cultural separatism also has created major changes in the structure and regulation of Irish domestic broadcasting. Therefore, in contrast to most other European Community countries, the development of the Irish electronic media is still heavily influenced by national policies for political, economic and cultural self‑determination.

    A New State for an Old Country

    The Irish Republic is the larger of the two states on the island of Ireland. In the north‑east, there is the British province of Northern Ireland, with a population of approximately 1,500,000. The rest of the island forms the territory of the Irish Republic, which has around 3,500,000 inhabitants. (Department of Foreign Affairs 1990: 2‑3) Within the European Community, Ireland forms part of the periphery of poorer states and regions which surround the rich core of southern Britain, northern France, northern Italy, western Germany and the Low Countries. As the European Community moves towards economic and political union, this uneven development between members states is a formidable obstacle to further integration. Along with Greece, Portugal or southern Italy, the Irish Republic has the classic problems of a peripheral region, such as lower living standards, state corruption, economic domination by foreign multinationals and overdependence on peasant agriculture. The creation of a federal European state may offer a solution to these difficulties through interventionist regional policies. But, as well as being a peripheral region, Ireland faces its own specific problems inherited from its unequal relationship with its closest neighbour: Great Britain. For centuries, Ireland was under British colonial rule. The present‑day Irish Republic was created by the independence movement against British domination. However, political independence hasn’t removed the large difference in the relative size of the two countries. Because southern Ireland has a much smaller economy and under a tenth of the British population, every Irish government must adopt policies to protect the nation’s autonomy from the hegemony of its powerful neighbour. Even the surrender of national independence to federal European institutions is only supported by most Irish politicians because integration will further weaken Britain’s influence over Ireland.

    If Great Britain was the first nation state, then Ireland was the first colony of the modern epoch. Although British domination over Ireland can be traced back to the Norman conquests in the twelfth century, it was the Tudor and Cromwellian settlements which turned Ireland into an agricultural colony of Britain. From the sixteenth century onwards, the occupation of Ireland ensured rents were paid to foreign landlords and produce was provided for British cities. In addition, the Irish people became a source of cheap labour for the British army, factories and colonies. Ireland provided a large part of the money and people needed for the birth of industrial capitalism in Britain. The industrial prosperity of nineteenth century Britain was based on agricultural poverty in Ireland. The 1840s Irish Famine demonstrated the human cost of the British occupation of Ireland. In a few years, over a million Irish people starved to death while food was being exported to pay rents to British landlords. (Burns 1974: 22‑3) The inaction of the London government during the Famine also demonstrated the failure to integrate Ireland within the British state. In 1800, Ireland had been politically absorbed into Britain through the union of the parliaments of the two countries. But, unlike Scotland or Wales, the political fusion of the two nations didn’t result in the disappearance of the colonial status of Ireland.

    During the nineteenth century, there was a rapid growth in Irish nationalism among all sections of the population. After the devastation of the Famine, there was widespread rural poverty throughout Ireland. From 1860s onwards, Irish nationalists organised campaigns for the ownership of land among the peasants. The nationalists saw the expropriation of the foreign landlords as the first step towards the achievement of political independence. After years of violent and constitutional agitation, the British government slowly conceded ownership of the land to the Irish peasantry. Between 1881 and 1903, a series of Land Acts gave security of tenure, fair rents and loans for land purchase to the tenants of the British landlords. (Lyons 1973: 160‑223) Before independence was achieved, the Irish peasantry had already won the social revolution in the countryside. The British government hoped the granting of land ownership would weaken the Irish peasantry’s support for political independence by encouraging social conservatism. Instead, the creation of a society of rural family property‑owners provided the economic basis for political separation from the urban industrialised economy of Great Britain. Moreover, social conservatism among the peasantry actually created more support for political separatism. The further development of capitalism in Ireland could only be accomplished by the replacement of individual property with more collective forms of ownership, such as joint‑stock companies. Thus, the Irish peasantry needed political independence to protect their individual property against the threat of economic modernisation from Britain. As in France, Malthusian attitudes among the peasantry created not only social conservatism, but also political radicalism.

    Although they formed the backbone of Irish nationalism, the peasants were incapable of controlling the struggle for independence. As in other emerging countries, the urban intellectuals provided the political leadership for the peasant revolution. Therefore, the Irish nation was invented as a distinct political and cultural entity by nationalist intellectuals. (Anderson 1983: 66‑79) However, during independence struggle, this urban intelligentsia created two distinct forms of Irish separatism: secular republicanism and Catholic nationalism. Although many Irish revolutionaries attempted to combine these two strands of the separatist tradition, both forms of nationalism were based on fundamentally incompatible world‑views. The ideas of secular republicanism were imported from Jacobin France during the struggle against the enforced political union of Britain and Ireland. According to this political theory, the Act of Union was unjust because the Irish people hadn’t given their consent to the loss of their independence. For secular republicans, the democratic state could only be created through the active participation of its individual citizens. Therefore, the inhabitants of Ireland possessed the democratic right to form their own nation state, independant from Great Britain.

    Many Irish nationalists were also attracted to secular republicanism as a way of overcoming the sectarian differences between the Protestant settlers and Catholic natives encouraged by the British colonial authorities. In republican theory, individuals became citizens through their membership of civil society rather than through their religious or ethnic origin. In Ireland, as in other parts of Europe and in the USA, secular republicans advocated the separation of church and state in an independent republic. By the late‑nineteenth century, most secular republicans were members of a Jacobin revolutionary conspiracy, called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This organisation wanted an armed insurrection to expel the British and to establish a completely independent Irish Republic. Because of this revolutionary strategy, the IRB’s form of separatism became known as ‘physical force’ nationalism. (Lyons 1973: 131‑3)

    In contrast, ‘moral force’ nationalism was represented by the reformist Irish National Party (INP) in the late‑nineteenth century. Instead of armed resistance, the INP participated in elections to the British parliament. The party wanted to use its pivotal position within the House of Commons to win home rule for Ireland. The INP was descended from the campaign against the institutionalised discrimination against Catholics in British‑occupied Ireland. As a parliamentary party, the INP encouraged and benefited from the gradual extension of the franchise within the British state. (Farrell 1988: 18‑9) As the majority of these new voters were peasants, the ‘moral force’ separatists created their own form of nationalism to win their votes. During the struggle for land ownership, there was a strong Catholic revival within rural Ireland. The Church introduced new rituals and cults from continental Europe to encourage the public expression of piety. (Brown 1981: 27‑8) For many peasants, Catholicism acted as a mark of national ‘distinction’ between the Irish people and the inhabitants of the rest of the British Isles. (Bourdieu 1984; Brown 1981: 28)

    But, Catholic nationalism was popular among the peasantry for more than separatist reasons. The Church also provided wider social regulation for the emerging economy of small property‑owners. The preservation of subsistence family farms depended on the successful transfer of ownership to the succeeding generation without excessive division. This problem was partially overcome by the massive emigration of younger children to the USA, Britain and other countries. The repressive sexual morality of the Church also helped to prevent the break‑up of rural property through premature marriages or divorces. The observance of pre‑marital chastity by the Irish peasantry expressed the Malthusian limits of a society based on individual land ownership. (Brown 1981: 19‑21) By the end of the nineteenth century, the faith in the Church of the peasantry was turned into Catholic nationalism by the INP. By cultivating a close relationship with the ecclesiastical hierachy, the party won support from pious voters for the campaign for Irish home rule. However, under this arrangement, the INP needed approval from the Catholic Church for the central parts of its political programme. Despite their committment to constitutional politics, the party’s leaders defered to the undemocratic authority of the clergy. In contrast to the IRB’s secular republic of equal citizens, the INP believed popular sovereignty would create a state representing the interests of the majority of Irish people: the Catholic peasantry. Even before partition, the dominant form of Irish nationalism not only excluded the Protestant minority for its pro‑British sympathies, but also for its heretical religious beliefs. Subjectively, the INP believed in a united Ireland, while, objectively, the parliamentary party was almost exclusively the representative of the Catholic population of Ireland.

    The limitation of Irish identity to the Catholic inhabitants of the island was a reflection of the failure to find alternative marks of cultural ‘distinction’ between the Irish and the British. In other parts of Europe, nationalist intellectuals transformed local peasant dialects into formal languages to separate members of oppressed nationalities from their Austrian, Turkish or Russian masters. (Anderson 1983: 69) In Ireland, both secular republicans and Catholic nationalists tried to use the Irish language in a similiar fashion. From the late nineteenth century onwards, the Gaelic League campaigned for the revival of the local language, games, customs, place‑names and surnames in Ireland. These cultural nationalists saw themselves participating in a ‘Battle of Two Civilisations’ between native Irish and foreign British influences in Ireland. The Gaelic League and similiar organisations called for the ‘de‑Anglicising’ of Ireland as a central part of the liberation of the country from British imperialism. (Lyons 1973: 231‑3) However, although Irish was an ancient language, the long British occupation of Ireland had turned English into the first language of the majority of the population. At the beginning of the twentieth century, less than a fifth of the population used Irish in everyday life. (Lyons 1973: 635) Instead, most Irish people spoke a vernacular, creole version of English adapted from the official language of their colonial overlord. With its many borrowings from the old language, Irish‑English became the medium for many globally successful writers, from Oscar Wilde to James Joyce. However, the cultural nationalists rejected the new creole language in favour of traditional Irish. (Lyons 1973: 224, 238‑9) In contrast to the successful promotion of living vernaculars by East European nationalists, the Gaelic League and its allies were defending a dying language.

    The idealisation of the peasantry by the cultural nationalists strengthened the role of Catholicism within the Irish independence movement. For secular republicans, the Gaelic revival was another way of creating a common identity outside religion which could unite both Catholic and Protestant Irish. But, instead of returning to the old language, the Irish peasantry expressed their cultural nationalism through the affirmation of their distinctive faith. Because of this weakness in Gaelic revivalism, the romanticisation of the peasantry evolved towards Catholic nationalism. In continental Europe, the Church’s intellectuals were advocating rural authoritarianism as an alternative to the urban ideologies of liberalism and socialism. The Irish Catholic nationalists attacked both Protestants and leftists as representatives of the foreign culture which was oppressing Ireland. In their view, the refusal of these groups to observe the national religion and culture threatened the natural social cohesion created in rural Ireland. This desire for cultural uniformity reflected the Malthusianism of Irish society after the Land Acts. The cultural nationalists created the romanticised Gaelic past as a metaphor for the emerging society of peasant property‑owners. In their de‑anglicised utopias, cultural homogeneity created a harmonious society without class or other social divisions. For them, the traditional Irish peasant lifestyle was ‘… a primal innocence miraculously preserved from the contaminating influences of civilisation.’ (Davis 1974: 235; Brown 1981: 92) This idealisation of rural life was a reaction against the slow spread of more advanced forms of capitalism from Great Britain into Ireland. In the view of many nationalists, the preservation of family property in land from industrialisation was the same as the protection of an Irish Catholic identity from foreign cultural influences. In both economics and culture, the assertion of national independence was encouraged by the fear of further social change.

    During 1916‑21, both the IRB and the INP were eclipsed by the emergence of Sinn Féin, which successfully combined violent and constitutional methods of resistance to win independence from Britain. Before the War of Independence, Sinn Féin had already developed a synthesis of the two traditions of secular republicanism and Catholic nationalism. In its programme, the party rejected home rule within the British Empire and called for absolute political independence. Moreover, Sinn Féin didn’t just advocate political and cultural separatism, but also economic nationalism. It wanted an independent Irish state to develop local agriculture and manufacturing by imposing tariffs on goods imported from Britain and elsewhere. Crucially, this rejection of economic free‑trade also involved the abandonment of the liberal individualism defended by most secular republicans. For Sinn Féin, Ireland’s claim for independence wasn’t derived from the popular sovereignty of individual Irish citizens. Instead, the party asserted that the existence of the Irish people as a distinct race since the Dark Ages justified the independence of Ireland. In this argument, the collective needs of the Irish nation took precedence over the individual rights of any of its citizens. For many contemporaries, Sinn Féin’s advocacy of complete independence from Britain made the party closer to the IRB than the INP. However, the party’s policies of economic and cultural separatism were heavily influenced by the Catholic proponents of an authoritarian rural society. Thus, Sinn Féin’s separatist vision of Ireland implicitly excluded the Protestant minority as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the Irish nation. As with the INP, Sinn Féin was partitionist in practice, if not in theory. (Davis 1974: 127‑9, 151‑2)

    National Independence and the Nationalisation of Broadcasting

    The goal of ending British rule over Ireland was partially achieved during the Irish War of Independence of 1916‑21. Through a combination of Sinn Féin election victories and guerilla warfare, the London government was forced to recognise the secession of Ireland from Britain. The present‑day Republic of Ireland is the direct descendent of the Irish Free State created by the War of Independence. However, the British government only agreed to withdraw from the southern 26 counties of Ireland. In the 6 northern counties, the Irish Protestant minority remained part of Great Britain. The partition of Ireland not only removed most Irish Protestants from the Free State, but also the most important industrial region in the country. As a consequence, the large majority of citizens of the southern state were both Catholics and peasants. Thus, the political partition of Ireland entrenched existing social and economic divisions between the two parts of the country. The influence of Catholic nationalism over the southern nationalist movement weakened opposition to partition within the Irish Free State. Although two factions of Sinn Féin fought a vicious civil war over the degree of Irish independence from Britain, neither side advocated ending partition by force. Despite rhetorical denunciations of the division of Ireland, the Catholic nationalism of both Sinn Féin factions had already excluded most Protestants from membership of the Irish people.

    Despite the influence of church hierarchy, the political institutions of the Irish Free State were inspired by secular republicanism. The Irish nationalists had participated in the struggle for political democracy within Great Britain. In the War of Independence, Sinn Féin used these democratic rights to assert the right of the Irish people to national self‑determination. The will of the British government to maintain its rule over southern Ireland was destroyed by both Sinn Féin election victories and armed resistance. Therefore, when independence was won, the new state was established as a representative democracy with universal suffrage. As in Britain or France, the Irish Free State was ruled by a cabinet system of government, which derived its authority from a directly elected legislature. Similiarly, the new nation almost entirely recruited its civil service from the old colonial administration. (Farrell 1988: 20; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 23) This institutional continuity reflected the political nature of the Irish revolution of 1916‑21. Despite the violent struggle for independence, there was no social upheaval after the departure of the British. The radical political changes in Ireland were underpinned by the stability of the country’s social structures. During the earlier phase of the nationalist struggle, the Irish peasantry had already the obtained ownership of the land. Therefore, the achievement of political independence was the culmination of the rural social revolution which had been won in the late‑nineteenth century.

    Despite the pioneering transmissions of the Easter rebels, radio broadcasting almost disappeared in Ireland of the following years. By the end of the Irish War of Independence, radio stations were already broadcasting speech and music programmes to large audiences in the USA and elsewhere in Europe. While Ireland was winning its independence, the electronic media had been born. Once the civil war was over, the Free State government was able to tackle the country’s economic and social problems, including radio broadcasting. By the mid 1920s, the BBC was transmitting across mainland Britain and had started a regional station in Northern Ireland. But, the poor reception of contemporary radio sets prevented most people from listening to BBC programmes in southern Ireland. However, the example of British broadcasting encouraged enthusiasts in the Irish Free State to campaign for their own radio service. In their view, an Irish radio station would aid the revival of the ‘national spirit’ taking place in newly independent Ireland. (Cathcart 1984: 40‑2) From its moment of birth, the primary role of Irish broadcasting was defined as the defence of the cultural autonomy of Ireland.

    The importance of cultural separatism for the nationalist parties created a specifically Irish model of public service broadcasting. In Great Britain, the BBC was dedicated to the education of its listeners and the creation of a political consensus between the main parties. In contrast, the Free State government nationalised radio broadcasting to protect the national culture against foreign influences. At first, the government proposed granting a licence to a commercial consortium. However, it was soon discovered that a British newspaper company was a major shareholder in the proposed commercial station. Because the Free State government didn’t want the Irish radio station owned by a British company, its plans for commercial broadcasting were abandoned. (Bell 1985: 34‑5) Instead, the politicians decided that radio broadcasting should be organised directly by the state. In 1926, the Free State government passed the Wireless Telegraphy Act, which empowered the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs to set up radio stations across the country. Under the 1926 Act, the stations were staffed by civil servants and the Minister was given ultimate control over what was broadcast. (Saorstát Éireann 1926: 27‑9). Before the Act was passed, the Irish Post Office had started broadcasting a limited service in Dublin. The Post Office now proceeded to open radio stations in other urban areas across the country.

    Unlike other European countries, radio broadcasting was slow to develop in the Irish Free State. In 1929, just 30,000 receiving licences were issued for the whole country. By 1941, only 183,000 people were paying the licence fee out of a population of 3 million. The low number of licence‑holders was partially caused by widespread evasion of the charge, especially in rural areas. In addition, radio sets remained a luxury item for most peasant families throughout the first decades of Irish independence. (Fisher 1978: 20‑2; Brown 1981: 153; Cathcart 1984: 44) Because the licence fee was its major source of income, the restricted number of licence payers hampered the growth of the national broadcasting service. During the inter‑war years, there was only a small amount of advertising on the Irish radio station. The government was also unwilling to provide extra money to extend the service more quickly. Therefore, radio broadcasting only reached most rural areas with the opening of a long wave service in 1933. Although the Free State government saw the construction of a national broadcasting system as a central part of building a new nation, the radio stations weren’t used as direct agitational or propaganda instruments by the state. Instead, the Irish radio station concentrated on broadcasting educational, farming and music programmes, with only a limited news service. The Post Office’s radio station acted as a branch of the civil service and tried to avoid political or moral controversies. The distinctively nationalist form of public service broadcasting was created in the cultural programmes transmitted by the Irish radio station. From the beginning, the station transmitted programmes in Irish and provided education in the old language. In addition, traditional folk singers and bands dominated the schedules of the national radio station. (Mulryan 1988: 8; O Tuathaigh 1984: 102‑3)

    The Irish Free State didn’t develop its own form of public service broadcasting for only cultural reasons. The nationalisation of radio broadcasting in Ireland also reflected the growing importance of state intervention throughout the whole economy of southern Ireland. As in radio broadcasting, the Free State government set up other nationalised companies to reduce Ireland’s economic dependence on Britain. Although the landlords and colonial officials had departed, Irish farmers still needed to export to the British market for their economic survival. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 106) The Irish economy remained predominantly agricultural, especially as partition had removed the main industrial region from the new state. In 1926, half the population owned or worked on family peasant farms. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 3) Ironically, one immediate effect of political independence was to reinforce the economic dependence of Ireland on Britain. In response, the Free State government established various nationalised companies to compensate for the lack of domestic investors in farming and manufacture. For example, state credit institutions made loans to peasant farmers, while the nationalised Electricity Supply Board extended the grid into rural areas. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 26) The nationalised radio station was a pioneer of this parastatal sector in the Irish economy. Crucially, this state interventionism was primarily Malthusian in intent. Because the majority of voters were peasants, the Free State government couldn’t industrialise Ireland by dispossessing the peasants of their land along Bolshevik or Fordist lines. As in the French 3rd Republic, the Irish state only intervened to protect the existing economy of small property‑holders from more advanced forms of capitalism.

    National Autarchy and the Radio Monopoly

    Although socialists had played a leading role in the 1916 Rising, the dominance of agriculture within the economy ensured that the Labour party never developed into an effective political force within the southern state. Instead, the defeated anti‑treaty nationalists emerged as the main opposition to the Free State government during the late 1920s. Under Éamon de Valera, the majority of the anti‑treaty nationalists decided to contest elections in a new party called Fianna Fáil. While the Free State government drew its support from the large farmers, professionals and capitalists, Fianna Fáil became the representative of the peasants, shopkeepers, artisans and some workers. (Lyons 1973: 524) In 1932, the party won a general election and immediately began dismantling the treaty settlement with Britain. During the 1930s, de Valera’s government removed the remaining constitutional and symbolic links with Britain, culminating in the adoption of a new constitution. (Boland 1982: 8‑10) By achieving the major objectives of the anti‑treaty nationalists through constitutional means, the Fianna Fáil government incorporated the defeated side of the civil war within the political institutions of southern Ireland. By abolishing the Free State in name, the partition state finally won the support of the mass of the southern Irish people. The reconciliation of the two sides in the civil war was completed by a government formed with Free State supporters. In 1948, this administration passed an act renaming the southern 26 counties as the Republic of Ireland. (Lyons 1973: 567)

    The Fianna Fáil government didn’t just want to achieve complete political separation from Britain. The party was also committed to implementing Sinn Féin’s programme of economic autonomy as well. The Fianna Fáil government not only expanded state intervention into the economy to create Irish substitutes for foreign goods, but also introduced tariffs and quotas against British imports. (Lyons 1973: 614‑5) In response, the London government restricted Irish agricultural exports to Britain. The ‘Economic War’ between Ireland and Britain damaged the large farmers who supported the Free State, but helped the local businesses and peasants who voted for Fianna Fáil. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 28‑9) De Valera hoped these protectionist policies would isolate Ireland from the world economy and achieve national self‑sufficency in basic goods. In the first programme of Fianna Fáil, he had advocated an ‘economically self‑contained and self‑sufficing’ country based on peasant farming and rural industries. (Boland 1982: 36) This demand was an idealised vision of the everyday existence of the peasants and shopkeepers who supported the party. Furthermore, the protectionist policies of Fianna Fáil were also derived from the Malthusian fear of the emergence of Fordism held by these small property‑owners. Under De Valera, Irish nationalism became defined as ‘… preferring an Ireland of frugal God‑fearing country folk to any absorption of the country into industrial Europe.’ (Brown 1981: 145)

    By implementing Sinn Féin’s programme of political and cultural autonomy in practice, Fianna Fáil finally codified the synthesis between secular republicanism and Catholic nationalism created in the years before independence. The clearest expression of this compromise between the two traditions within Irish nationalism was the 1937 constitution. De Valera introduced this new fundamental law to remove the remaining political links with Britain and to abolish the Free State in name. (Fanning 1988: 34) But, the 1937 constitution wasn’t only concerned with external affairs. It also legally defined the comprise between popular sovereignty and theocratic authority developed by Sinn Féin and supported by Fianna Fáil. Because this synthesis was successful, the 1937 constitution is still supported by all major political parties and remains the basic law of the Irish Republic. Thus, in the 1960s, a Supreme Court judge could speak of ‘the Christian and democratic nature of the state’ without seeing any contradiction between these two traditions. (Kelly 1988: 169)

    During the nineteenth century, IRB had fought for a secular republic on French or American lines. In 1916, the Proclamation of the Irish Republic not only declared the independence of Ireland from Britain, but also promised civil and political rights to all of its citizens. (Lyons 1973: 369‑71) During the War of Independence, Sinn Féin supported these basic democratic liberties as an integral part of the struggle for national self‑determination. After independence was won, the Free State government was organised as a parliamentary democracy, with civil and political liberties guaranteed in the constitution. (Farrell 1988: 28) De Valera continued this republican committment to popular sovereignty and political rights in the 1937 constitution. Most of the document established the framework for the election and functioning of an executive elected by the universal suffrage of all adult citizens. Furthermore, under article 40, legal protection was promised for the ‘fundamental rights’ of each Irish citizen. (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1980: 126‑36) Thus, the 1937 constitution institutionalised the democratic demands of the secular republican tradition.

    However, the 1937 constitution was also heavily influenced by the Catholic nationalist tradition of the INP. After partition, over nine‑tenths of the inhabitants of the Irish Free State were followers of the faith. (Brown 1981: 30) Moreover, the division of the country ensured that the Catholic faith remained one of the primary expressions of Irish nationalism. By the 1930s, both southern nationalist parties had become ‘… deeply partitionist in nature.’ (Coulter 1990: 18) Although Fianna Fáil believed its policies of complete Irish independence from Britain were a step towards a united Ireland, its policies of political and economic autonomy further entrenched the border between the two parts of Ireland. (Boland 1982: 7‑8) The creation of a socially and racially homogeneous southern state encouraged the cultural nationalists to campaign for a purge of the remaining British influences in Ireland. During the 1920s, the Free State government tried to revive the Irish language, especially through the education system. But, despite these political initiatives, there was a continuing decline in the numbers of Irish speakers in southern Ireland. (Brown 1981: 60‑2) The failure of this state‑sponsored Gaelic revival opened the way for a further intensification of Catholic nationalism. Without the Irish language as a mark of ‘distinction’, Catholicism became the major expression of the Irish national identity. According to de Valera, Ireland had a spiritual mission to save ‘Western Civilisation’ from the scourge of materialism by constructing a moral christian society. (Brown 1981: 36‑8)

    During the 1930s, Catholic nationalism also acquired a distinct political ideology, known as Vocationalism. In his 1931 Quadragesimo Anno encyclical, Pope Pius XI rejected both liberalism and socialism in favour of a corporate society, modelled on elements of Fascist Italy. For the Pope, neither hedonistic individuals nor the nation state could create a moral society. Instead, the family and the clergy had to act as essential intermediaries between citizens and political power. Under Vocationalism, the needs of these social institutions took priority over the abstract rights of individual citizens. (Lyons 1973: 544‑6; Brown 1981: 160‑1) In southern Ireland, this political theology was taken up by some supporters of the defeated Free State party, who founded the fascist Blueshirt movement. Although this organisation soon collapsed, Vocationalism did win wider support among the southern Irish population. The frugal life of rural family farms and urban small businesses had already found expression in the ascetic morality and sexual repression of Catholicism. (Coulter 1990: 10, 18) After 1931, Vocationalism provided a specific political theory for Catholic nationalists who idealised southern Ireland as a society of self‑sufficent families united in submission to the one true faith.

    In the 1937 constitution, de Valera successfully defused the conflict between secular republicanism and Catholic Vocationalism. On the one hand, the new constitution asserted the democratic nature of the Irish state against the threat of fascism from the Blueshirts and other authoritarian clericalists. On the other hand, the 1937 constitution also recognised the primacy of the Catholic religion over the southern Irish people. In a contradictory synthesis, the social and moral teachings of the Church were incorporated as part of the ‘fundamental rights’ of citizens. Alongside the equal rights of women as citizens, the 1937 constitution institutionalised the authoritarian power of fathers over the female members of their families. (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1980: 136‑52) Under the fundamental law of the southern state, popular sovereignty could only be exercised within the limits of the moral totalitarianism of the Catholic Church.

    The influence of Catholic nationalism substantially weakened the protection of the freedom of communications in the 1937 constitution. Before the adoption of the new constitution, political instability within the southern state had already curbed the right to free speech in practice. From the 1916 Proclamation to the 1922 Free State constitution, Irish nationalists had defended the freedom of expression as an abstract democratic right of all citizens. But, during the civil war, the Free State government had imposed censorship as part of its struggle against the anti‑treaty faction. After the civil war, overt political censorship was gradually relaxed. However, both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments continued informal restrictions over opposition publications. During the Second World War, de Valera used the international crisis to impose formal political censorship on all publications once again (Murphy 1984: 59) But, because secular republicanism enshrined free speech as a fundamental democratic right, no southern Irish government was able to silence its political rivals completely. For example, de Valera was able to set up his own paper under the Free State government and the other major national newspapers continually criticised the subsequent Fianna Fáil adminstration.

    These restrictions on political speech were minimal compared with the moral censorship imposed in southern Ireland. In 1925, the Free State government established a censorship board for all films exhibited in the country. This legislation was followed by the 1929 Censorship of Publications Act, which set up a similiar institution for the vetting of all books and magazines distributed within southern Ireland. (Lyons 1973: 686‑8) According to the Free State government, these laws were only designed to prevent the distribution of pornographic and family planning material. However, in practice, these censorship boards banned all types of films and literature on grounds of immorality. Between 1930‑9, the literature censorship board outlawed over 1,200 books and 140 magazines. Along with pornographic works, the list of forbidden books contained almost every major novel written by an Irish authors in the inter‑war years. (Brown 1981: 149; Carlson 1990: 1, 3‑4) Under these laws, cultural and political dissidents within the Irish Free State were the primary target. Because of Catholic nationalism, the observance of the faith had become the major expression of Irish cultural identity in the southern state. For many nationalists, artistic modernism and socialist politics threatened to the cultural self‑determination of the Irish people by questioning the repressive morality of the Church. In their view, the freedom of communications could only be exercised within the narrow limits of the teachings of the Catholic Church. According to the Bishop of Cork, the freedom of the press was defined as a ‘press that is legally free to print whatever is morally justified.’ (Murphy 1984: 60)

    But, moral censorship wasn’t only aimed at dissidents within the Irish Free State. Many Catholic nationalists also wanted to remove the cultural influence of Britain within southern Ireland. Because of the common language, Irish people could easily understand films, books, magazines and other forms of cultural expression imported from other English‑speaking countries. The Catholic hierachy was convinced that the British media encouraged the spread of ‘pagan’ ideas among the Irish population. By reflecting the attitudes of an industrial society, foreign films and literature undermined the strict sexual morality of rural Ireland. (Brown 1981: 39‑40; Murphy 1984: 51) The Church’s campaign against moral corruption from Britain echoed the demand for cultural self‑sufficency by the Irish nationalist movement. Many secular republicans also believed in an ascetic morality, inspired by the French Jacobin’s vision in the 1790s of a Republic of Virtue. (Murphy 1984: 52) Even for those opposed to the Church hierarchy, the protection of repressive Catholic morality became a symbol of Irish self‑determination. For the Free State government, the censorship of British media was a declaration of cultural independence from the old colonial master. (Brown 1981 67‑70)

    After its election, the Fianna Fáil government didn’t abolish the censorship of films and publishing. For de Valera, support for moral censorship was one means of synthesising the Catholic nationalist and secular republican traditions within his political movement. In his view, the Irish government ‘… should not give to the propagation of what is wrong and unnatural the same liberty as would be accorded to the propagation of what is right.’ (Pine and Thomas 1986: 7) Under de Valera, the freedom of communications of individuals remained limited by the moral values of the Irish people as a whole. Moreover, Fianna Fáil’s policies for economic autonomy encouraged further cultural protectionism in southern Ireland. The censorship of imported films and publications paralleled the imposition of tariffs against British manufactured goods. When de Valera wrote the 1937 constitution, he incorporated the existing forms of censorship within the right of freedom of communications. In article 40. 6.1 of the constitution, the freedom of communications was guaranteed as part of the ‘fundamental rights’ of every Irish citizen. But, compared with article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in France or the 1st Amendment of the American constitution, article 40. 6. 1 provided a very narrow definition of the freedom of communications

    ‘The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality:‑
    i ‘The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions. The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State. The publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with law.’ (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1980: 133‑4)

    This constitutional guarantee entrenched the restrictions on the freedom of communications for reasons of both national security and Catholic morality. In turn, the censorship of films and literature was also applied to the programmes of the state broadcaster. Under the Free State government, the national radio station never transmitted programmes offensive to the Catholic morality of the Irish population. Moreover, under the 1926 Wireless Telegraphy Act, the Post Office’s service station was banned from broadcasting not only obscene material, but also ‘… any message subversive of public order’. (Saorstát Éireann 1926: 23) This legal censorship of radio broadcasting was supplemented by adminstrative arrangements. Under the 1926 act, the national radio station was constituted as part of the civil service. (Saorstát Eireann 1926: 27‑9) Therefore, the Irish government could supervise the finances of the radio station, deciding the level of the licence fee, the price of advertising, appointments of managers, wages of the staff and the amount of capital spending.

    When it was elected, Fianna Fáil used these administrative and financial powers to take control over the state radio station. Almost immediately, the Director‑General of the national broadcaster was sacked and replaced with a party loyalist. Like its predecessor, the Fianna Fáil government ensured the impartiality of the radio news service was tempered by censorship on behalf of the ruling party. (Cathcart 1984: 44, 48‑9) During the 1930s, Fianna Fáil expanded the services of the state radio station by collecting more licence fees. The national broadcaster also was given a more prominent identity by being named Radio Éireann. During the ‘Economic War’ with Great Britain, de Valera increased the radio news service to win support from the voters for his resistance to British pressure. The Fianna Fáil government was also interested in the further development of the cultural nationalist role of Irish public service broadcasting. Therefore, the state radio station increased the numbers of Irish language and traditional folk music programmes in its schedule.

    In addition, the Fianna Fáil government funded a series of regional studios for the broadcasting of programmes made in the rural areas. The ruling party hoped that the decentralisation of broadcasting would remove the corrupting influence of urban culture from Radio Éireann. In the countryside, radio broadcasters would reflect the values of the peasants, who represented the centre of the Irish identity for most nationalists. (Cathcart 1984: 45‑6) The political importance of cultural autarchy also forced the cancellation of plans to establish a commercial radio service aimed at a British audience, along the lines of Radio Luxemburg. Because this money-making enterprise needed urban and working class British listeners, it was proposed that the radio station would play mainly jazz music. However, the cultural nationalists opposed the broadcasting of ‘alien’ music from by the proposed radio station because its programmes would be heard by Irish listeners. For them, it was necessary to prevent the emergence of any alternative to their preferred style of traditional folk music. (Cathcart 1984: 43‑4)

    This increased committment of the Irish government to public service broadcasting was encouraged by the reception of BBC radio signals in parts of southern Ireland. As radio set technology improved during the 1930s, Irish listeners were able to hear programmes broadcast by British and other European stations. During the Second World War, the BBC started making special programmes for listeners in southern Ireland. The British hostility to Irish wartime neutrality made these programmes appear politically threatening. In order to meet this challenge, de Valera’s government decided to set up an Irish international radio station, broadcasting on short wave. This external radio service was designed to present southern Ireland’s viewpoint to a global audience, especially listeners descended from Irish emigrants. However, before these plans came to fruition, the Allies defeated Nazi Germany and the war was over. Therefore, the extra money allocated to this international broadcasting project was redistributed to the domestic radio service. For the first time, Radio Éireann received sufficent funding to provide a comprehensive news service, classical and light music orchestras, theatre and mobile recording studios. Faced with potential competition from BBC stations, the Fianna Fáil government decided that the Irish national radio station should provide a comprehensive service for its listeners. (Cathcart 1984: 47‑8)

    Under both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments, a specifically Irish form of public service broadcasting was created. The central difference between the Irish model and its European equivalents was the importance placed on the defence of the national culture from foreign influences. Under the British rule, the assertion of cultural autonomy was an integral part of the struggle for national self‑determination. Once independence was achieved, the existence of a common language between Ireland and its old colonial master maintained the political pressures for cultural separatism. The imperative of cultural nationalism shaped Irish public service broadcasting in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, the national radio station helped to reverse centuries of British repression against Irish political and cultural life. In its broadcasts, Radio Éireann presented news and current affairs programmes about the personalities and parties of the independent southern state. Thus, when de Valera spoke to his listeners, they were constituted as citizens of a distinct Irish national community. Moreover, Radio Éireann also created programmes aimed specifically at Irish listeners, from information for farmers to broadcasts in the old language. The Irish language and folk music programmes expressed a committment to preserving the traditional rural culture with the new electronic mass medium.

    On the other hand, this committment to cultural nationalism by Irish public service broadcasting also had negative consequences. Underlying the defence of traditional peasant culture was a Malthusian fear of the modernisation of Irish society. This social conservatism not only led to cultural protectionism against media from the outside world, but also censorship of any opinions challenging the nationalist consensus. Radio Éireann never presented the work or views of artistic modernists or urban socialists. Above all else, as with films and literature, the questioning of the repressive morality of the Catholic Church was strictly forbidden. In the Irish version of public service broadcasting, the national radio station had to reflect the restricted political and sexual outlook of the peasant and petit‑bourgeois majority of southern Ireland. For Irish politicians, the freedom of communications of secular republicanism was always limited by the moral totalitarianism of Catholic nationalism. Hence, Irish public service broadcasting maintained cultural and intellectual poverty among the population by not presenting a more diverse range of programmes for its listeners. In Ireland, the state broadcasting monopoly was not only an expression of national self‑determination, but also of cultural exclusion.

    The End of Autarchy

    During the Second World War, Ireland stayed neutral throughout the conflict. With the rest of Europe engulfed by war, the country was forced to survive on its own resources. Although Britain continued to be the major overseas market for Irish food exports, De Valera’s vision of Ireland as a self‑sufficent nation of frugal and devout peasants was temporarily realised through the breakdown of the world system into armed conflict. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 4) However, once the war was over, the revival of the West European economies soon undermined the limited economic and cultural autarchy achieved by the southern Irish state. Despite protectionism and a world war, southern Ireland had neither industrialised nor urbanised its economy. Instead, Ireland remained a mainly agricultural economy composed of small family farms and businesses. As the techniques of production had changed little since the nineteenth century, the standard of living of the Irish peasantry remained low. (Lyons 1973: 603‑4) In contrast, the introduction of Fordist methods of production and economic regulation created rapid industrial growth in the rest of Western Europe. The workers in these countries were rewarded through higher wages and more welfare spending. During the 1950s, there was a growing disparity between the living standards of the Irish peasantry and the British proletariat. For the first time in Irish history, many rural proprietors decided working in a factory overseas was preferable to owning land at home. Soon, emigration to Britain, America and Australia was no longer confined to the younger children deprived of land under the primogeniture system. The departure of the inheritors of peasant farms from the countryside threatened the long‑term viability of the southern Irish state. (Brown 1981: 186; Wickham 1980: 57) By the end of the 1950s, the continued political independence of Ireland required the abandonment of the nationalist programme of economic and cultural self‑sufficency.

    In 1958, the Fianna Fáil government accepted the recommendations of the Whitaker Report on Economic Development. This commission proposed that the Irish state should adopt the policies of ‘peripheral Fordism’ policies to speed up the modernisation of the country. (Lipietz 1987) At the centre of this strategy was an economic plan for the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of southern Ireland. Under the plan, the state made grants to attract investments from foreign multinationals, carried out infrastructure projects and developed the nationalised industries. For the Whitaker commission, the survival of Ireland as an independent nation depended on its integration within the European and global economies. In its view, Irish businesses could only prosper by having access to a larger market than their domestic customers. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990:35‑40) By accepting the Whitaker commission’s proposals, Fianna Fáil adopted a new goal of transforming Ireland into a prosperous industrial region of Europe in place of its old aim of encouraging ascetic rural self‑sufficency. Moreover, Fianna Fáil not only abandoned the goal of economic autarchy championed by Sinn Féin and de Valera, but also their dream of cultural isolation. Once the Irish economy was opened up to the outside world, it would be impossible to prevent foreign media from reaching the Irish people. From now on, the prevention of mass emigration through rapid economic growth took priority over the protection of Ireland’s Gaelic and Catholic traditions. (Brown 1981: 214)

    Ironically, Fianna Fáil’s success in completing the political independence of Ireland created the conditions for the abandonment of its own protectionist and Malthusian policies. By abolishing the Free State, de Valera created a stable political system within the southern partition state. By the 1950s, elections between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (the old Free State party) were fought over the economic prosperity of the voters, not the constitutional status of the state. Both nationalist parties had created electoral strongholds across Ireland by building patronage networks. As the dominant party, Fianna Fáil was more successful in making voters dependent on favours from its parliamentary representatives, especially in rural areas. (Coulter 1990: 9‑13) But, Fianna Fáil didn’t just help its traditional supporters among the peasantry and shop‑keepers. Under its new leader Seán Lemass, Fianna Fáil also became the party of the ‘mohair suits’, the new capitalists recruited as leading members of the party. (Lyons 1973: 584‑5) This transformation within Fianna Fáil’s leadership paralleled the dramatic switch in the party’s economic policies from national autarchy to integration within the European and global markets. Moreover, under the new planning system, Fianna Fáil had many more opportunities to use the nationalised industries and other forms of state intervention to reward its supporters throughout the country. The increased scope for patronage by the ruling party compensated for any loss of support caused by its ideological apostasy in abandoning de Valera’s dream of national self‑sufficency.

    The opening‑up of the economy encouraged a campaign against the strict censorship of the arts and media imposed in the first years of independence. Throughout the 1950s, the Archbishop of Dublin was still organising the banning of books by internationally acclaimed authors – including many from Ireland – who offended his fundamentalist interpretation of Catholic morality. (Carlson 1990: 113) However, the end of economic autarchy had undermined the rationale for restrictions on cultural influences from abroad. In addition, the call for tolerance and modernisation by the 1962 Second Vatican Council further weakened the Irish Church’s moral authority over the arts and media. (Brown 1981: 198‑200, 294‑6) Although the strict controls weren’t abolished altogether, cultural censorship was slowly weakened during the 1960s. Many previously banned books were now allowed to be printed and sold. However, the Irish government didn’t abandon its attempt to control over local artists. In place of the direct censorship of culture, the Irish state created a system of informal supervision such as tax exemptions for artists and grants from the state‑funded Arts Council. (Brown 1981: 297, 315‑6)

    The relaxation of cultural censorship was speeded up by the reception of British television programmes in parts of southern Ireland. After the war, the BBC restarted television broadcasting and rapidly built up a service covering both Britain and Northern Ireland. The programmes transmitted by the BBC and, later on, the ITV stations could be picked up on television sets owned by people living in the north and east of the Irish Republic. Because they were produced for an urban consumer society, these British television programmes challenged the rural Catholic morality of southern Ireland. More importantly, the advent of television broadcasting exacerbated the rural discontent over low living standards, which was already being helped by the availability of other British media throughout southern Ireland. The Irish peasantry knew about the higher incomes of workers elsewhere in Europe not only through the experience of emigrants, but also through British newspapers, magazines and radio or television programmes. (Brown 1981: 184‑5, 216‑7) By encouraging the exodus from the land, the British electronic media played a major role in ending Fianna Fáil’s policies of economic and cultural protectionism. In turn, the availability of British radio and television programmes in northern and eastern areas of the Republic foreshadowed the opening‑up of the whole Irish economy to European and global competition.

    The Limits to Irish Public Service Broadcasting

    Unlike radio in the 1920s, the Irish government was forced to create a national television service in response to the reception of British signals within the boundaries of the southern state. As a first step, the Fianna Fáil government established an independent commission to find a method of establishing an Irish television service without spending a large amount of public money. In 1959, the Murnaghan commission proposed that a commercial television station should be licenced under close state regulation. However, the Fianna Fáil government decided the new station would be easier to supervise as a nationalised industry. Therefore, Radio Éireann was transformed into RTÉ (Radio Telefís Éireann), a state‑owned monopoly providing radio and television broadcasting throughout southern Ireland. (Fisher 1978: 23; Bell 1985: 40‑1) At the same time, the government removed the state radio and television stations from civil service control in the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act. During the early 1950s, a coalition government had already set up an advisory council for Radio Éireann, which partially limited the control of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs over the state radio station. (Mac Conghail 1984: 65) Building on this experience, the 1960 Act turned the national broadcasting monopoly into an autonomous state‑owned company. Like the BBC, the state broadcasting company was run by an independent board of management, called the RTÉ Authority. This body appointed the organisation’s Director‑General, other leading members of staff and supervised the management of the broadcasting corporation. (Irish Republic 1960: 16‑7)

    Even after the opening‑up of the economy, the Irish cultural nationalist version of public service broadcasting still heavily influenced the development of RTÉ. Under the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act, the state broadcasting institution remained committed to the defence of the national culture and language. Under section 17 of the 1960 Act, RTÉ was charged with helping in ‘…the national aims of restoring the Irish language and preserving and developing the national culture…’ (Irish Republic 1960: 23) This duty was reinforced by the report of the 1974 Murnaghan Broadcasting Review Committee, which more closely defined the content of the national culture preserved by the Irish form of public service broadcasting. The Committee urged RTÉ to produce more programmes on the religion, languages, folklore, work and leisure activities of the country. (Howell 1980: 230) While the spread of the electronic media was a central part of the modernisation and urbanisation of Ireland, RTÉ was still legally committed to preserving the disappearing culture of the rural areas.

    The growth of the electronic media particularly threatened the survival of the remaining Irish‑speaking areas. The traditional culture of the Gaelic peasantry couldn’t compete with the innovations coming in from the anglophone world, especially television and pop music. In 1958, a government commission had called for a new government initiative to preserve the language, including the provision of electronic media in Irish. Because the number of native Irish‑speakers had declined to around 50,000, RTÉ had to finance these services with hardly any money from advertising. Raidió na Gaeltachta, the Irish language radio station, didn’t start broadcasting until 1972. Although this service only attracted about 2% of the total Irish radio audience, RTÉ did obtain a substantial listenership among the Irish‑speaking minority. But, despite repeated promises, the lack of resources prevented the state broadcaster from establishing a television service for Irish‑speaking viewers. (Howell 1982: 41‑4; Kelly and Truetzschler 1986: 153) Even so, the setting‑up of a specialist radio service for the small minority of Irish‑speakers was given priority over demands by much larger groups for pop music, local and community stations. This decision demonstrated the continued importance of preserving the old language in the Irish version of public service broadcasting.

    The influence of cultural nationalism also limited RTÉ’s committment to the West European public service broadcasting values of political pluralism and impartiality. In theory, the nationalised electronic media in Ireland were supposed to be unbiased and objective in their political coverage. Under section 18 of the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act, RTÉ had to ensure its news and current affairs were ‘… presented objectively and impartially and without expression of the Authority’s own views.’ (Irish Republic 1960: 23) The regulation of impartiality was strengthened by an obligation to respect political pluralism in the 1976 Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act. Under section 3, RTÉ was required to ensure that news and current affairs programmes were ‘fair to all interests’ in their reporting. (Irish Republic 1976: 5‑7) This legal regulation was reinforced by the internal regulations for broadcasters drawn up by the management of the nationalised broadcasting corporation. According to these rules, RTÉ was legally required to include the opinions of all major political parties and social groups within their programmes.

    ‘The requirement to be “fair to all interests” is seen as requiring the programme‑makers to present in an equitable manner the views of persons or interests involved in a significant way in a particular issue.’ (RTÉ 1989a: 53)

    However, this committment to political and social pluralism was much more limited in practice. As in Radio Éireann, the freedom of expression by broadcasters working for RTÉ was restricted by the continuing influence of Catholic nationalism in Ireland. Thus, the state broadcaster wouldn’t broadcast programmes which offended against the conservative morality of the majority of the population. In its editorial guidelines, the RTÉ management stated that the corporation’s programmes ‘… must generally reflect the mores and repect the values of the society in which it operates, acknowledging its standards of taste, decency and justice.’ (RTÉ 1989a: 51) Radio and television programmes weren’t only censored by the defenders of the sexual and cultural mores of Catholic nationalism. The state broadcasting corporation also had to reflect the secular values of republican democracy. The constitutional dispute between the two major nationalist parties was ended by their mutual acceptance of the democratic constitution of an Irish Republic restricted to the southern 26 counties. As employees of the Irish national broadcasting organisation, RTÉ workers had to be impartial between the mainstream political parties, but they couldn’t be ‘neutral’ in their ‘basic philosophy and attitudes’. (RTÉ 1989a: 51) Thus, political and cultural pluralism with Irish broadcasting was limited by conformity to both Catholic nationalism and secular republicanism.

    The prohibition against attacks on republican democracy has often been used as justification for control over broadcasting by the ruling party. In Lemass’ view, RTÉ was ‘an instrument of public policy’, which had a duty to explain the policies of the government to the Irish people. (Pine and Thomas 1986: 7; Bell 1985: 45) Despite separating the national broadcasting organisation from the civil service, the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act continued the political controls established for Radio Éireann. In southern Ireland, the electronic media remained under the control of the ruling party. Under sections 4‑7, the government could appoint or dismiss the chair and members of the RTÉ Authority at will. (Irish Republic 1960: 9‑10) The representation of opposition political parties or social organisations on the management board depended upon the benevolence of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Furthermore, the government also had control over the finances of RTÉ. Under the 1960 Act, the RTÉ Authority needed permission from the Ministers of Posts and Telegraphs and Finance before deciding on the amount and times of advertising, the level of the licence fee, capital investments or any borrowing. (Irish Republic 1960: 25, 29‑35)

    This combination of political and financial controls ensured that RTÉ remained subservient to the ruling party. For example, in the 1960s, Fianna Fáil helped de Valera’s campaign for re‑election as president by concealing his physical incapacity from the voters through their control over the corporation’s news service. The same government also covered up personal scandals involving its ministers and banned protesting farmers’ leaders from current affairs programmes. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 32, 49‑51, 175) In turn, Fine Gael and Labour also exerted their political control over RTÉ when they were in power. In 1984, the Coalition government prevented the RTÉ Authority from nominating a new Director‑General for the corporation because its members had been appointed by Fianna Fáil. (Coogan 1987: 124‑5) These formal powers over the RTÉ news service have been reinforced by informal links between journalists and politicians, especially as the ruling party could favour certain reporters with leaks of official information. With this strong influence over the national broadcaster, Irish politicians of all parties expected deferential and respectful coverage from its reporters.

    As well these adminstrative and informal controls over RTÉ, Irish governments also retained powers of direct political censorship over the programmes of the state broadcasting organisation. Under section 31 (1) of the 1960 Broadcasting Authority Act, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs could order RTÉ ‘… to refrain from broadcasting any particular matter or matter of any particular class …’ (Irish Republic 1960: 35) In this wording, the law gave unlimited censorship powers to the Irish government over radio and television broadcasting. But, in practice, section 31 remained dormant until the outbreak of political unrest in northern Ireland. During the late 1960s, the Fianna Fáil government had supported the campaign to prevent discrimination against Catholics in the northern partition state. But, the alliance between the southern Irish government and the northern nationalists was ended by the descent of the north into civil war. After the peaceful campaign for civil rights was suppressed by force, the northern nationalists started violent resistance against British rule, led by the Provisional IRA. However, the southern Irish government refused to support the armed struggle of the northern nationalists. Despite the Republic’s constitutional committment to reunification, the Irish government wanted to prevent the civil war spreading south and to avoid a confrontation with Britain.

    In the early 1970s, the Fianna Fáil government introduced a series of repressive measures against the supporters of the Provisional IRA and other ‘physical force’ republican groups in Ireland. As part of this clamp‑down, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs used section 31 of the 1960 Act to forbid the appearance of anyone advocating political violence on RTÉ’s programmes. However, there was no attempt to ban newspapers or other publications supporting the armed struggle in northern Ireland. The management and staff of RTÉ protested against this discriminatory censorship of news and current affairs programmes. In 1972, the corporation decided to challenge the section 31 ban by broadcasting an interview with the military leader of the Provisional IRA. After this programme was screened, the Fianna Fáil government reasserted its control over the nationalised broadcasting corporation. The entire membership of the RTÉ Authority was sacked by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs for supporting their news staff’s defiance of section 31. (Mac Conghail 1984: 71‑2)

    At the time, the opposition parties protested against the arbitrary and unlimited powers of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs under the 1960 Act. But, when Fine Gael and the Labour party formed a new government, they didn’t abolish the political censorship of RTÉ’s radio and television programmes. Instead, the Coalition government introduced the 1976 Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act to limit ministerial discretion over the censorship of radio and television programmes. In the Coalition Minister of Posts and Telegraphs’ view, the aim of the legislation was the replacement of the ‘absolute power’ of censorship over any matter with a narrower restriction on the appearances by members of ‘armed conspiracies’ on RTÉ programmes. In his view, continued censorship of the electronic media was needed because interviews by the national broadcasting corporation gave ‘legitimacy’ to the views of the Provisional IRA and similiar organisations. (O’Brion 1975: 39‑40; Mac Conghail 1984: 72‑3) Therefore, under the 1976 Act, the government introduced a system of approval by the Irish parliament for the banning of specific groups from the airwaves. (Irish Republic 1976: 31‑3) From 1976 onwards, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs has issued annual directives to all radio and television stations to censor any appearances by members of the Provisional IRA and other named groups. Thus, the legal restrictions on the expression of political opinions in the programmes of RTÉ and other broadcasting organisations were the joint creation of both Fianna Fáil and Coalition governments.

    For the Provisional IRA, the broadcasting ban was a capitulation by the southern nationalist parties to pressure from the nation’s colonial oppressor, Great Britain. For example, under the section 31 restrictions, any group declared a ‘proscribed organisation’ in Northern Ireland by the British government was also banned from the Irish Republic’s radio and television stations. (RTÉ 1989a: 59) But, for the southern Irish nationalists, the section 31 restrictions weren’t simply a panic measure enacted under foreign influence. In their view, the censorship of political speech in RTÉ programmes was an integral part of the Irish version of public service broadcasting. As part of its national role, RTÉ had to uphold the principles of republican democracy. Therefore, the national broadcasting organisation couldn’t transmit the opinions of revolutionary groups dedicated to overthrowing the constitutional system of the Irish Republic by force. For southern nationalists, the Provisional IRA’s armed struggle against partition was also an attack on the constitutional settlement agreed between the main political parties within the Irish Republic. This revolutionary organisation not only wanted to end British rule over the north of Ireland, but also to abolish the southern partition state as well. Under section 31, the constitutional protection for the freedom of speech in radio and television broadcasting was restricted to those people who participated in politics within the rules laid down by the constitution of the Irish Republic.

    In 1982, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs banned RTÉ from transmitting any party political broadcasts for the general elections by Sinn Féin, the legal political party of the Provisional IRA. (RTÉ 1989a: 59‑60) In response, Sinn Féin challenged the constitutionality of this directive under article 40.6.1 of the 1937 constitution, which guaranteed the freedom of speech. (Bunreacht na hEireann 1980: 133‑4) In their submission, Sinn Féin argued that the prevention of their party political broadcasts was ‘… inconsistent with the democratic nature of the State’ because the party was prevented from expressing its views to the voters through radio and television programmes. (Supreme Court 1982: 5‑6) However, the Supreme Court judges ruled that the section 31 restrictions were consistent with the ‘democratic nature’ of the Irish Republic. In their view, article 40.6.1 not only guaranteed the freedom of speech in the mass media, but also placed specific obligations on the ‘organs of public opinion’, such as radio and television broadcasting. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional provision prohibited any individual or group from using the electronic media ‘… to undermine public order or public morality or the authority of the State.’ (Supreme Court 1982: 11; Bunreacht na hEireann 1980: 133‑4) Because the leaders of Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA called for the abolition of the southern partition state, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs was justified in banning members of these organisations from RTÉ programmes as a subversive organisation. (Supreme Court 1982a: 11‑3) Thus, in their judgement, the Supreme Court judges reiterated the established view of southern Irish secular republicanism, where the defence of republican democracy for all citizens was more important than the right of free speech of individuals.

    ‘A democratic State has a clear and bounden duty to protect its citizens and its institutions from those who seek to replace law and order by force and anarchy.’ (Supreme Court 1982a: 13)

    By declaring the section 31 ban to be constitutional, the Supreme Court confirmed that Sinn Féin supporters had no right of free speech in radio and television broadcasting. Under Irish broadcasting law, they could be not only prevented from arguing for support for the armed struggle in northern Ireland, but also from expressing an opinion on any other matter as well. During the 1970s and 1980s, Sinn Féin members were banned from participating in radio phone‑ins, giving eye‑witness accounts of events or even reading the lesson for a televised mass. (Irish Reporter 1990: 13) Moreover, the section 31 restrictions didn’t just affect members of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin. The ban was also used to impose a ‘total blackout’ on the coverage of the civil war within Northern Ireland in RTÉ news and current affairs output. Because of section 31, all programmes on the north had to be supervised by the highest levels of RTÉ’s management. (RTÉ 1989a: 60) Through fear of direct intervention, successive Irish governments restrained broadcasters from making critical programmes about the problems of northern Ireland. In the opinion of many people, ‘… a credible and comprehensive programme about the political situation in the North could not be made today [in the 1990s] by RTÉ.’ (Irish Reporter 1990: 14)

    After the introduction of the section 31 controls, Sinn Féin spokespeople continued to be interviewed on the BBC’s and ITV’s news bulletins, which were widely available in southern Ireland. However, in 1988, the British government introduced its own ban on appearances by Sinn Féin members on British radio and television programmes. The British censorship of Sinn Féin ended this major loophole – and removed any embarassment for the Irish government over its own media clampdown on supporters of the Provisional IRA. Ironically, the tightening of censorship during this decade coincided with the increasing participation in electoral politics by Sinn Féin, with the 1984 party conference recognising the constitution of the southern partition state. But, these changes in strategy did not remove Sinn Féin’s intimate connection with the Provisional IRA, which acted outside the Irish constitution. The overt imposition of political censorship clearly distinguished the Irish version of public service broadcasting from its equivalents in most West European countries, which instead emphasised political pluralism over internal security. However, since the 1970s, the radio and television stations in most other members of the European Community hadn’t had to deal with armed revolutionary groups with a substantial political base operating in their territory. As with other institutions, the specificity of Irish public service broadcasting was shaped by the persistance of the colonial past in the present.

    The Modernisation of Ireland

    Although Fianna Fáil remained formally committed to ending partition, the introduction of repressive measures against the Provisional IRA and its supporters finished any real attempts to achieve reunification by the party. When Fianna Fáil was founded, its members believed that the full political and economic independence of Ireland could only be achieved by the end of British rule over the northern counties of the country. (Boland 1982: 7‑14, 140‑2) But, after many years of government, Fianna Fáil’s committment to Irish reunification had become rhetorical. The constitutional settlement had not only reconciled the party’s members with the southern partition state, but also attracted a new generation of supporters. In the 1920s and 1930s, Fianna Fáil had been run by the ‘comrades in arms’ from the Civil War period. By the 1960s, Lemass had transfered power within the party to the ‘mohair suits’, who were close friends of the rising capitalists of southern Ireland. The end of help for the northern nationalists was a crucial victory for these new members over the republican old guard within Fianna Fáil. For the ‘mohair suits’, Fianna Fáil was an electoral machine, which delivered patronage to its voters and power to its politicians. In modern Ireland, winning elections and making money were more important than fulfilling republican aspirations. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 39; Coogan 1987: 20‑3, 40) While the Provisional IRA continued the fight for complete national independence, Fianna Fáil wanted to run southern Ireland as a thriving region of the European Community.

    The shift in political position by Fianna Fáil also reflected the rapid modernisation of southern Ireland. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Irish Republic had the highest growth rate in Western Europe. After the end of protectionism, foreign multinationals invested heavily in the Irish economy as a low‑cost, English-speaking base within the European market, especially in engineering, pharmaceuticals and electronics. By the 1980s, over half of the businesses operating within the Irish economy were subsidiaries of foreign multinationals or banks. In turn, the opening‑up of the Irish economy encouraged some local firms to expand into overseas markets. Soon, there were multinational companies owned by Irish entrepreneurs, notably in food‑processing and construction. Underpinning this rapid expansion of the economy was the strategy of peripheral Fordism followed by the Irish state, which helped foreign investors through grants, taxbreaks and infrastructural investments. However, this state aid for industrial investments was financed through ever increasing foreign loans and budget deficits. (Coogan 1987: 4‑5, 126; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 74)

    In 1972, over two‑thirds of the electorate voted in favour of membership of the European Community by the Irish Republic. (Lyons 1973: 588) For most Irish people, the goal of an autarchic nation state was no longer credible or desireable. What is more, the abandonment of protectionist policies had actually lessened Ireland’s economic dependence on Great Britain by creating new export markets in the other West European countries. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 39) The acceptance of European integration by the Irish voters also reflected the rapid fall in the number of self‑sufficent farmers within the country. From the 1960s onwards, there was a massive shift in employment from farming into industrial or office jobs. Although the European Community’s agricultural policies subsidised agriculture, Ireland rapidly changed from a nation of peasants into a society of wage‑workers. In parallel, individual property in land ceased to be the dominant form of wealth. Instead, manufacturing and financial joint‑stock companies were at the centre of the economy. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 54‑9) While agriculture remained an important employer and exporter, the majority of jobs and overseas trade were within the manufacturing, food‑processing and service sectors. (Department of Foreign Affairs 1990: 8‑10) This modernisation of the economy had rapidly diminished the numbers of self‑sufficent peasants and shopkeepers, who were the social basis of de Valera’s autarchic nation‑state. Ireland was turning into a Fordist industrial country, with a growing class division between the owners of joint‑stock companies and the workers who were employed by them.

    Accompanying the growth in wage‑labour was the decline of the rural population. Whereas only one‑third of the population lived in towns in the 1920s, over half of southern Irish people were living in urban areas by the 1970s. This urbanisation was concentrated in a few cities, with over a third of the population living in the Dublin area. (Brown 1981: 257‑8) The spread of wage‑labour and urban living started changing the social attitudes of the Irish people. Instead of the peasant extended family, the Irish started living in urban nuclear families. In turn, there was a slow increase in the number of women entering paid employment. In place of frugal rural living, these new wage workers could enjoy the commodities of the consumer society. As Irish Catholicism had been built around the puritan morality of the peasantry, the Church’s teachings on sexual morality and personal frugality were increasingly ignored by the urban population, especially among younger people.

    By 1990, three‑quarters of teenagers approved of sex before marriage and nearly two‑thirds agreed with the right to divorce. (Black 1990) Although the Church had slowed down this process of secularisation by building strong congregations in most urban areas, it was unable to reverse the slow decline in the faith. (Brown 1981: 219‑21) Moreover, the modernisation of Ireland led to a dramatic fall in the number of clergy and nuns. Without their cheap labour, the Church slowly had to relinguish some of its control over the education and health services to the state. All these developments combined to spread secular attitudes within the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish Republic. For example, in an important hearing on the legality of contraceptives, the Supreme Court ruled that the individual rights of citizens took precedence over the Church’s teachings on sexual morality. Within the southern partition state, the process of modernisation was strengthening secular republicanism at the expense of Catholic nationalism. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 108‑11)

    Modernisation as Commercial Broadcasting

    The availability of the electronic media encouraged these social and cultural changes in Ireland. Although set ownership spread slowly in rural areas, almost everyone in urban areas soon had a television. The rapid success of television reflected the changing lifestyles of the Irish people. The television set was the centre of the new urban household. Watching the box had become the favourite leisure activity of the Irish, with the average viewer consuming around 3 hours each night. (Brown 1981: 261; Ox Pictures 1990) In their programmes and adverts, the radio and television stations usually reflected urban life, rather than the rural concerns of traditional culture. According to Bishop Cathal Daly, any foreign visitor watching RTÉ television wouldn’t guess that Ireland had the highest rate of church attendance in Western Europe. (O’Tauthaigh 1984: 100) However, unlike the Church, the Irish electronic media were able to articulate the new cultural and moral world of an urban Ireland. For example, in many people’s view, Gay Byrne’s radio and television programmes played a major role in encouraging the emergence of more liberal social and sexual attitudes in the south. (Coogan 1987: 2)

    The modernisation process also changed the nature of the Irish electronic media. Over the decades, RTÉ had created a specifically Irish model of public service broadcasting based on the defence of the national culture. The electronic media had been nationalised to provide Irish programmes reflecting the distinct world‑view of the country. However, from the 1960s onwards, RTÉ steadily increased the proportion of imported programmes in its schedules. The corporation continued to provide a comprehensive news service, but increasingly relied on imports for its entertainment programmes. In 1978, this process was accelerated by the launching of the second RTÉ television station, Network 2. While the corporation produced nearly 60% of its own programmes in 1965, the number of home‑made shows fell to below 40% in 1980. By this date, RTÉ was showing more imported programmes than any other television company in European Community. (Howell 1982: 46) The existence of a state monopoly over broadcasting was no longer restricting the influence of foreign ideas on Irish society. On the contrary, the RTÉ was spreading the consumer culture of the USA, Australia and Britain throughout the country.

    For the RTÉ management, the abandonment of the basic tenets of Irish public service broadcasting occured for pragmatic reasons. The introduction of television had been initially financed by the licence fee. But, after the early years of rapidly rising revenues as set ownership spread, the growth in income for RTÉ was limited to increases in advertising revenue. In this new situation, the corporation had to transmit programmes which would attract audiences for their advertisers. As in other countries, most Irish viewers wanted to watch many hours of entertainment programmes. Hence, RTÉ filled its schedules with soaps, dramas, comedies, films and game shows. With the introduction of Network 2, the corporation didn’t have the resources to fill the increased hours of broadcasting with its own programmes. As a result, its management decided to buy cheaper American, Australian or British entertainment programmes to fill the gaps in their schedules. By stages, RTÉ had changed the definition of Irish public service broadcasting from defending cultural separatism to pleasing the Irish viewers and advertisers. In place of national identity, the corporation embraced the logic of commercial competition.

    In 1978, RTÉ launched both Network 2 and 2FM, a second national radio station. The new television channel mostly transmitted entertainment programmes and gave little airtime to educational or minority interests. Similiarly, 2FM provided a Top 40 format for younger listeners with only minimal speech content. (Mulryan 1988: 60‑1) Both these stations reflected the transformation of Irish public service broadcasting during modernisation. From the 1920s to the 1950s, Radio Éireann had provided a variety of programmes for the whole Irish nation. Insulated by state funding, the corporation’s success was judged by its contribution to national cultural self‑sufficency. But, by the 1970s, RTÉ’s reliance on advertising for half its revenue had changed these goals. The management of Network 2 and 2FM were aiming to win the maximum possible audience. Instead of uniting the Irish people within a common national culture, RTÉ started segmenting its audience into distinct target groups. The adoption of a Top 40 format by 2FM was a recognition of the generational and class divisions appearing within Irish society. Unlike de Valera, the ‘mohair suit’ politicians were unwilling to fund RTÉ adequately from the licence fee or taxation to maintain the cultural unity of the nation. With protectionism over, they were happy for the state broadcaster to divide its audience into distinct groups if this policy increased the amount of money raised from advertising.

    Despite commercialisation, RTÉ encountered a growing financial crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When the recession restricted advertising, the corporation was unable to cover its increased costs by selling more commercials. By 1982, RTÉ had deficit of I£2.8m out of a total income of I£56.4m. (Bell 1985: 28) Without help and reorganisation, the Irish state broadcasting organisation was heading towards bankruptcy. The financial crisis speeded up the development of commercial attitudes within RTÉ. In response to the global recession, the Fine Gael and Labour coalition government restructured all Irish nationalised companies to prevent further losses. (Mitchell 1990a) The Minister of Communications commissioned independent consultants to examine the ‘efficency’ of the corporation. In this report, the defence of the national culture took second place to the ‘value for money’ of RTÉ. (SKC 1985: 3) The consultants recommended cutting 15% of the staff, as well as raising advertising rates and introducing sponsorship. (SKC 1985: 20‑1, 25) In addition, they proposed that RTÉ should extend its involvement in other media ventures, such as cable television systems, local radio stations and broadcasting to Great Britain. (SKC 1985: 23) By internal restructuring and diversification, the corporation was able to recover its profitability by the late 1980s. The corporation was even able to increase the number of home‑produced programmes to half of its schedule in primetime. (RTÉ 1989: 2) But, this financial recovery was achieved through further commercialisation of this national institution. By the late 1980s, RTÉ was not only a public service broadcaster, but also an entrepreneurial multi‑media company.

    In other European countries, the funding of radio and television stations by advertising had also encouraged commercialism within public service broadcasting organisations. In Ireland, the pressure to win large audiences was intensified by competition from British television stations. Because of a mountain range in the middle of the country, only viewers in northern and eastern Ireland were able to receive the signals from these foreign stations. Intensifying existing social divisions, the country was separated into urban ‘multi‑channel’ and rural ‘single‑channel’ areas. (Howell 1980: 227) Facing competition from British stations in the richer urban areas, RTÉ orientated its programmes towards the town‑dwellers. As Radio Éireann, the state broadcaster had tried to preserve the traditional culture of the peasantry. However, RTÉ could no longer transmit this type of programmes against competition from British stations. The need to win mass audience marginalised previously revered types of programmes, such as broadcasts in the Irish language. (Kelly and Truetzschler 1986: 155)

    During de Valera’s rule, leading nationalists had denounced the influence of foreign broadcasting in Ireland as a form of cultural imperialism. Once autarchy was abandoned, most Irish politicians completely changed their attitudes towards foreign cultural influences. From the 1960s onwards, they started welcoming the availability of British television stations within southern Ireland. Many believed exposure to programmes from an industrialised country would help the development of Ireland by encouraging an urban outlook. In the mid‑1970s, the Coalition government proposed relaying the programmes of BBC1 in the ‘single‑channel’ areas of the Irish Republic. In part, Conor Cruise O’Brien, its Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, was trying to win permission from the British government to broadcast RTÉ signals across Northern Ireland. (O’Brion 1975: 40‑1) But, he also wanted to expose the Irish people to the cultural influences of British television. In his view, BBC programmes were an antidote to the parochial and insular attitudes of many inhabitants of the Irish Republic. For O’Brien, the English language was no longer seen as a barrier to national identity, but a means of participating in the wider world. (Moran 1990) In a parliamentary debate, the Minister completely repudiated the old arguments in favour of cultural protectionism:

    ‘…I believe that to open windows rather than to close them is the more natural function of broadcasting and television and also the one of which our national culture, generously interpreted, stands the more in need.’ (Howell 1980: 231)

    Because of this ‘open window’ policy, the Irish government tolerated the growth of cable systems relaying British television services in the urban areas. (Moran 1990) During the late 1960s, private cable operators started building primitive networks to distribute British television signals to homes with reception difficulties in the ‘multi‑channel’ areas. In 1974, the government introduced regulations for cable operators and imposed a 15% levy on subscriptions to compensate RTÉ for the increased competition. (Kelly and Truetzschler 1986: 160) By the early 1980s, the desire to watch British television stations had created the highest density of cable users within the European Community in Dublin. However, RTÉ didn’t suffer because of the loss of its viewers to British stations. As part of its policy of diversification, the corporation took over the major private cable operators, including the largest cable network in Dublin. (Moran 1990; Bell and Meehan 1989: 99) Thus, through its cable subsidiary, RTÉ introduced satellite television stations for its subscribers in the late 1980s. Once again, instead of protecting an autonomous Irish world‑view, the corporation extended the availability of foreign influences for commercial reasons.

    Despite the popularity of British programmes, Irish viewers consistently showed a strong demand for home‑produced programmes. When a referendum was held on the proposal to relay BBC1 programmes to the ‘single‑channel’ areas in 1975, a two‑thirds majority opted for a second RTÉ station instead. (Howell 1980: 234) Similiarly, in the late 1980s, no satellite television service was able to build up a dedicated audience apart from MTV. There was even only a limited demand for the premium satellite services, such as film channels. (Bell and Meehan 1989: 102‑4) The favourite programmes of Irish viewers tended to be Irish programmes, with nine out of the ten top shows on RTÉ1 being home‑produced in 1988. (RTÉ 1989: 15) Responding to its audience’s tastes, the state broadcaster reduced its use of imported material in its schedules during the late 1980s. This policy increased RTÉ’s share of the audience in ‘multi‑channel’ areas from 40% to 45%. (RTÉ 1989: 2, 9) When it led to higher ratings, the corporation was willing to fulfill its traditional public service committments.

    But, RTÉ was less successful in dominating the expansion of radio broadcasting in Ireland. For decades, there was only one radio station within the Irish Republic, which aimed to produce programmes for the whole nation. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the modernisation of the country created the social conditions for a home‑grown variant of the global youth culture. Van Morrison and other Irish rock pioneers were laying the foundations for the later international success of Planxty, U2 and other local bands. Interestingly, the popularity of many Irish artists was based on their synthesis of traditional folk music with modern African‑American styles. Before the advent of 2FM, the RTÉ national radio station was unable to satisfy simultaneously the conservative tastes of their older audience and the desire of a new generation for pop music. The pirate radio stations soon won the younger listeners by adopting a Top 40 schedule. (Mulryan 1988: 22‑3) With a growing listenership, the music pirates attracted advertising from companies selling to this lucrative market. Once illegal broadcasting became profitable, the hobbyist stations were replaced by commercial operations in Dublin and other big cities. Although outside the law, these ‘superpirates’ used large transmitters, introduced formats for their programmes and employed professional presenters. By 1983, the most successful Dublin unlicenced station had reached a turn‑over of around I£1m a year. Four years later, another ‘superpirate’ became the most popular station in the captial city among listeners under 50. With the industry still illegal, commercial radio stations were earning over I£2.5m each year in Dublin alone. (Mulryan 1988: 87‑144)

    The pirate radio stations were able to evade the law against illegal broadcasting through loopholes in the 1926 Act. Over time, inflation had weakened the fines imposed for defying the law. In 1983, a major attempt to close down the pirates ended in failure because of these light penalties. (Mulryan 1988: 10, 112‑3) But, the survival of the pirates also depended on their popularity among potential voters. No Irish government was strong enough to close down the pirates before providing an alternative service for their listeners. (Mitchell 1990a) In 1978, RTÉ set up a second national station with a pop music format. However, the corporation had difficulties adopting the techniques of commercial music radio in its most traditional sector of activities. For years, many listeners thought 2FM ‘… was like a priest running a disco.’ (Mulryan 1988: 76) Once RTÉ had failed to stop the rise of the ‘superpirates’, many politicians decide to tolerate the illegal stations. In the 1981 elections, all major parties contributed to programmes on the major Dublin pirates. (Mulryan 1988: 77‑8) Some pirates were even more closely involved with the political parties. During the 1982 election, a Dublin ‘superpirate’ not only campaigned for Fianna Fáil, but also set up a unlicenced propaganda station for the party. (Mulryan 1988: 91‑3)

    Throughout the 1980s, successive Irish governments attempted to pass new legislation on radio broadcasting. On the one hand, these bills were designed to repress the pirates by raising the penalties for transmitting without official permission. On the other hand, these laws also legalised these illegal operations by providing licences for more radio stations. Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael supported the legalising commercial stations under some form of regulatory body. While a Fianna Fáil government tried to establish an Independent Radio Authority in 1981, a Fine Gael minister introduced legislation for a Local Radio Commission in 1985. (Mulryan 1988: 65; Pine and Thomas 1986: 13) But, each party was unable to pass an act through the Dáil Éireann, the Irish parliament. During this period, Fianna Fáil never stayed in power long enough to complete its legislation and Fine Gael’s attempts to introduce an act were blocked by its Labour coalition partners.

    In the 1985 Local Radio Bill, the Fine Gael Minister for Communications proposed the granting of licences for both commercial and community stations. However, the Labour Party sabotaged the introduction of legal commercial radio stations. In their view, commercial operators were just interested in quick profits and would only provide ‘lowest common denominator’ programmes for the listeners. (Mulryan 1988: 110, 153) Instead, the Labour party wanted to restrict licences to community stations, owned by voluntary organisations or co‑operatives. During the 1980s, a few pirates were run as community radio stations, giving access to the airwaves to many groups for the first time. (Mulryan 1988: 81‑3) Represented by the National Association of Community Broadcasters (NACB), these stations campaigned the licencing and regulation of community stations as part of any expansion of radio broadcasting. However, although unimpressed by the ‘superpirates’, the NACB didn’t oppose the licencing of all commercial stations. Instead, the main oppostion to commercial radio stations came from RTÉ, which was afraid of losing its advertising revenue to increased competition. The corporation wanted to take a leading role in any new radio stations, by running their technical facilities and having a substantial share‑holding. However, the Fine Gael Minister for Communications was not prepared to allow RTÉ to dominate the new independent stations. In his view, ‘I would prefer to do nothing and sit and wait until the time was opportune to do something rather than do something that I didn’t believe in’. (Mitchell 1990a) With Labour party refusing to compromise, the Minister for Communications tolerated the existence of 70 illegal stations within the Irish Republic. (Pine and Thomas 1986: 13; Mulryan 1988: 117‑8)

    The success of the ‘superpirates’ effectively broke the RTÉ’s monopoly over the Irish‑owned electronic media. The emergence of a commercial sector of broadcasting was the culmination of the decline of the specifically Irish version of public service broadcasting. Once protectionism was ended, the policy of cultural separatism was also doomed. In competition with British stations, RTÉ could have emphasised the national distinctiveness of Ireland, especially its Catholic heritage. But, because it needed to large audiences to raise advertising revenue, the corporation offered a similiar mix of urban entertainment programmes as its foreign rivals. Far from insulating the Irish people from alien ideas, RTÉ became a major supplier of imported programmes and foreign television stations to the Irish viewers. During the 1970s and 1980s, RTÉ had evolved from a defender of the national culture into a semi‑commercial multi‑media corporation, with limited public service committments. However, the commercialisation of the state broadcasting company made the continuation of its monopoly increasingly unteneable. For most Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael politicians, there was little difference between 2FM and a ‘superpirate’ as both were playing pop music and were funded by advertising. The successful adoption of commercialism by RTÉ opened the way for a fully independent commercial broadcasting sector in the Irish Republic.

    The Neo‑Liberal Consensus

    Like other members of the European Community, the Irish Republic was severely affected by the ‘monetarist shock’ of the early 1980s. The international recession exacerbated internal economic problems caused by rising foreign debts and continuous budget deficits. When the world economy faltered, the strategy of peripheral Fordism followed by successive Irish governments was already reaching its fiscal limits. In response, Irish governments adopted the neo‑liberal policies introduced in other industrialised countries, such as the USA, Great Britain and France. Under a Fine Gael and Labour coalition government, public spending was reduced and the nationalised industries were restructured to cut their losses. These deflationary policies were coupled with ‘supply‑side’ measures to encourage new private enterprises, such as financial services. In opposition, Fianna Fáil defended its traditional sources of patronage by advocating increased support for the nationalised industries and more welfare spending. However, after its victory in the 1987 election, the party implemented the same neo‑liberal economic policies as its Coalition predecessor. As in 1958, Fianna Fáil abandoned its fundemental principles to retain its dominance over Irish political life. With increasing support from private enterprise, the party was no longer dependent on its traditional patronage networks in the government bureaucracy and the nationalised industries. Instead, Fianna Fáil created business opportunities for its richer supporters through the deregulation and privatisation of the economy. by the late‑1980s, there was a complete consensus within the Irish political establishment over the adoption of neo‑liberal economic policies for the southern state. (Breen, Hannan, Rottman & Whelan 1990: 209‑221; Coogan 1987: 71‑3)

    The change in policies by Fianna Fáil reflected the urbanisation of the Irish population, which undermined the social basis of the division between the two nationalist parties. As the mass of the population were turned into wage‑workers, the traditional competition between the two ‘cross‑class’ parties became increasingly anachronistic. From the 1960s onwards, the Labour party tried to move Irish politics towards the European system of antagonistic class‑based parties. In the 1970s, a split within the revolutionary nationalist movement led to the creation of the Workers’ Party, which also campaigned on a socialist programme. However, the class polarisation of Irish politics between conservative and social democratic parties was never fully achieved. The Left has never become either the government or the main opposition within the Irish Republic. Instead, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Labour party participated in coalition governments with Fine Gael. Although its leaders became ministers, the unpopularity of these governments delayed the achievement of the Left’s long‑term goal of creating a social democratic alternative within Irish politics. However, the neo‑liberal consensus between the two nationalist parties in recent years has increased pressures for a realignment within the political system. (Coogan 1987: 14, 62‑8) In November 1990, an alliance between Labour and the Workers’ Party secured the victory of Mary Robinson in the election for the presidency of the Irish Republic. Although the president’s powers were limited, the polarisation of voters between conservative and social democratic candidates in the presidential election weakened – if only temporarily – the old system of two rival nationalist parties.

    For the Right, neo‑liberalism was a replacement for the traditional synthesis between Catholic nationalism and secular republicanism. In 1983 and 1986, fundamentalist Catholic pressure groups won two referendums in favour of constitutional prohibitions on abortion and divorce. As in the past, voters supported the repressive morality of the Church to protect the family ownership of land and other property. (Coogan 1987: 81, 97‑111; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990: 108‑11) However, while few nationalist politicians openly opposed the Church, all right‑wing parties continued the economic policies which were undermining the social basis of repressive catholic morality. Since 1958, no major conservative party had advocated a return to economic and cultural separatism. But, if Catholic nationalism was unable to supply a coherent economic or social programme for the southern nationalists, secular republicanism also couldn’t provide a distinctive right‑wing programme. With failure of the Provisional IRA to secure the support of more than a committed minority in the south, all major parties within the Irish Republic were advocates of a republican democracy limited to the 26 counties. In place of these traditional ideologies, the Irish conservative parties followed their American and European colleagues by adopting neo‑liberal economic policies of deregulation and privatisation. From the 1950s onwards, both nationalist parties sought political power through raising the living standards of Irish voters by increased economic growth. Although Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had abandoned peripheral Fordist economics, the party leaderships maintained their political strategy of winning votes through increasing the incomes of the electorate. As in 1958, the national autonomy of Ireland took second place to the need for economic development.

    But, the neo‑liberal consensus between the nationalist parties disguised the instability within these political organisations. The social democratic alternative could only be created by the realignment of all right-wing parties into one block. During the 1980s, leading nationalist politicians competed to build a conservative alliance based upon the common programme of neo‑liberalism. With increased urbanisation and the privatisation of the economy, the traditional networks of state patronage run by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael were weakened. Instead, both conservative parties became increasingly reliant on their supporters within corporate and small business sectors. With the end of ideological differences, competition between these two party machines was reduced to a battle between celebrity leaders and their financial backers. Despite the split by the Progressive Democrats, Fianna Fáil reemerged as the dominant party within the Irish political system. As a ‘catch‑all’ party, Fianna Fáil retained most of its support among the peasantry and petit‑bourgeoisie while implementing the economic policies of big business. Moreover, under Charlie Haughey’s leadership, the party was able to carry out the ‘strokes’ and ‘deals’ needed to hold onto political power during a series of indecisive elections during the late 1980s. (Coogan 1987: 46‑7) After national autarchy and peripheral Fordism, Fianna Fáil had now become the champion of deregulation and privatisation.

    Controlled Liberalism in Broadcasting

    The decline in the traditional patronage networks of the nationalist parties lessened the dependence of voters on personal favours from politicians. Instead of direct contacts, politicians increasingly had to win support through appearances on the electronic media. Many Irish politicians had an ambiguous relationship with radio and television broadcasting. On the one hand, they needed to appear on the electronic media to win elections. On the other hand, they didn’t trust the state broadcaster to treat their party favourably in its news and current affairs programmes. These contradictory attitudes were particularly held by Haughey when he led Fianna Fáil. During elections, he ran presidential‑style campaigns centred on the electronic media. Yet, Haughey also resented the decline in deference among radio and television journalists. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 175) During the 1960s, Haughey had censored RTÉ news and current affairs programmes for Fianna Fáil. However, by time he had become party leader, Haughey could no longer directly control the nationalised broadcasting corporation. By winning autonomy from the politicians, RTÉ began setting its own news agenda in the coverage of national political life. Imitating the journalists of other European public service stations, ‘most [RTÉ] reporters will go for the story and not for the political niceties of the time.’ (Gagan 1990)

    Because he never accepted the independence of journalists, Haughey continually came into conflict with the mass media. In 1982, a Fianna Fáil minister was discovered to be tapping the telephones of reporters working for newspapers hostile to the government. During the Progressive Democrats’ split, Haughey blamed the internal crisis of Fianna Fáil on a ‘media conspiracy’ led by RTÉ. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 191‑8; Coogan 1987: 50) According to Haughey, the corporation’s news team was dominated by members of the Workers’ Party, ‘Dublin 4 intellectuals’ and trade unionists. Because of their left‑wing sympathies, the RTÉ journalists had formed an alliance with two national newspapers to discredit the government in their political coverage. (Ryle Dwyer 1987: 201; McCann 1990; Mulryan 1988: 139) For Fianna Fáil supporters, these accusations were proved by the stories covered in RTÉ’s news programmes. Many Fianna Fáil members blamed television coverage of the cuts in health spending for preventing an outright victory in the 1987 election. This controversy was soon followed by an accusation of corruption against the Minister of Tourism and Transport made by a RTÉ journalist during a radio interview. For Fianna Fáil supporters, one of the main tasks of the Haughey government was ending the left-wing bias of the corporation’s news programmes. (Dempsey 1990; Gagan 1990)

    Despite appointing an RTÉ Authority dominated by Fianna Fáil supporters, it was no longer possible to impose direct political censorship over news and current affairs programmes on the state-owned channels. Looking for another solution, the Haughey government decided to end the corporation’s monopoly over the coverage of national politics by licencing new commercial radio and television stations. (Murphy 1990) According to Ray Burke, the Minister for Communications, the ‘fundamental objective’ of Fianna Fáil’s media policies was to create alternative sources of news and current affairs programmes outside the control of RTÉ. (Burke 1990: 1571; Burke 1990c) To achieve this goal, the Minister didn’t just create licences for local commercial stations, as in the previous Coalition bill on broadcasting. Ignoring the advice of his officials, Burke decided to award franchises for a national radio station and a national television service as well. (Moran 1990) The Fianna Fáil leadership believed the introduction of commercial broadcasting would politically benefit their party in two main ways. Firstly, commercial radio and television stations were more likely to provide sympathetic coverage of the neo-liberal politics of Fianna Fáil than the ‘left‑wing’ news team of RTÉ, especially if these new media outlets were owned by members of the party. Secondly, the competition from these new commercial stations would bring pressure for a more ‘balanced’ news coverage by the state broadcasting corporation. In the past, Fianna Fáil had tried to control the electronic media through the nationalisation of broadcasting. Under Haughey, the party hoped to achieve the same aim through the privatisation of radio and television broadcasting.

    In Fianna Fáil’s media policy, the political goal of news services outside RTÉ control took precedence over any consideration of the economic constraints on commercial broadcasting in southern Ireland. (Hogan 1990) At the same time, the introduction of commercial broadcasting formed part of the neo‑liberal economic policies adopted by the Fianna Fáil government. According to the Irish Development Agency, southern Ireland needed to create a ‘post‑industrial’ economy based on the information technology sector, including the electronic media. In its view, the success of this post-industrial strategy could only be secured by the further integration of the Irish economy within the world market through deregulation and privatisation. (Bell and Meehan 1989: 106‑7) Similarly, Burke argued that the dismantling of the state monopoly over broadcasting and the licencing of new commercial stations was an integral part of the liberalisation of the wider Irish economy. In adopting this strategy, the Minister was inspired by the examples of other European Community members, who were licencing commercial stations as part of their neo‑liberal economic policies. (Burke 1990b: 1148; Burke 1990c) Moreover, Burke believed that the recent history of Irish broadcasting had created the conditions for the introduction of commercial radio and television stations. In his view, the success of the ‘superpirates’ had already demonstrated ‘… a dissatisfaction with the monopolistic state‑run broadcasting services and a failure on their part to respond and adapt to public demand.’ (Burke 1990: 1571) The Minister claimed that a greater choice of services for Irish listeners and viewers could only be created by the application of neo‑liberal policies in the electronic media. (Burke 1990c) As in other areas of the economy, the needs of consumers could only be satisfied by market competition between different producers.

    In accordance with the principles of ‘supply‑side’ economics, Burke initially wanted to introduce a mainly ‘self‑regulatory’ system of commercial broadcasting in southern Ireland. In his view, the financial dependence of commercial stations on advertising largely removed the necessity for close regulation by the state. Instead, the competition between the stations for an audience would make the new services respond to the needs of the public. (Mulryan 1988: 151) However, even in this deregulatory approach, it was necessary to outlaw pirate radio stations altogether. With the support of all parties, the Minister for Communications introduced legislation which closed all loopholes in the 1926 Wireless Telegraphy Act. Under articles 6 and 12 of the new law, the size of fines was substantially increased and the number of offences connected with unlicenced broadcasting considerably extended. In addition, in articles 4, 5 and 7, the 1988 Broadcasting Act prohibited the provision of a wide range of services to pirate radio stations, including electricity, telephone lines and premises. Crucially, the buying of advertising on unlicenced stations was outlawed by the new law. (Irish Republic 1988: 5‑18) After a decade of tolerance, the 1988 Broadcasting Act signalled the end of pirate radio stations in southern Ireland. Within months of the passing of the legislation, most unlicenced stations had closed down and were preparing to apply for one of the new commercial radio franchises.

    Although there was little opposition to the law against the pirates, the Minister for Communications encountered more difficulties in winning support for a second piece of legislation implementing his proposals for lightly regulated commercial stations. At first, Burke decided against setting up any form of supervisory body for this new type of broadcasting. As part of his scheme of minimum regulation, the Department of Communications would oversee the commercial sector itself, including the distribution of franchises for the new stations. However, the opposition parties strongly denounced these proposals. Under the Coalition government, a Local Radio Commission had been established to licence and regulate stations during its abortive broadcasting bill. According to Fine Gael and Labour, an independent regulatory authority was necessary to prevent the Minister for Communications awarding licences his friends or ignoring infractions of the law in return for political favours. (Mitchell 1990a) Under pressure, Burke agreed to abandon his scheme for deparmental control over the commercial sector. Instead, the Minister established an autonomous regulatory body, called the Independent Radio and Television Commission (IRTC).

    Under article 4 of the 1988 Radio and Television Act, the IRTC was set up to licence and regulate the new commercial stations. (Irish Republic 1988a: 4‑5) The new law protected the autonomy of the IRTC by preventing the Minister from sacking its members without the approval of both houses of parliament. (Irish Republic 1988a: 16) As with the RTÉ Authority, the institutional self‑awareness of the IRTC prevented its complete subservience to the ruling party. Moreover, the IRTC had inherited its officials from the Department of Communications, who had been trained the civil service tradition of impartiality. These bureaucrats also acted as a partial check on overt political favouritism by the IRTC commissioners. But, despite these arrangements, this regulatory body was not really independent of the ruling party. Under the second 1988 law, the members of the IRTC board were directly appointed by the government for a period of 7 to 10 years. The Minister for Communications was under no obligation to nominate representatives of the opposition parties or autonomous social groups as IRTC commissioners. (Irish Republic 1988a: 16) The Fianna Fáil government rejected proposals for the appointment of the IRTC members by the independent Local Appointments Committee. (McCartan 1990) What is more, Burke had no scruples about using these powers of appointment in the 1988 Radio and Television Act. Although its first chairman was a Supreme Court judge, the 9 other members of the Commission were avowed supporters of the government. (Connelly 1990) In the words of Dick Spring, the Labour party leader, ‘… with the exception of the chairman, [the IRTC] was loaded to the gills with prominent Fianna Fáil activists.’ (Spring 1990: 1603)

    The Legalisation of Commercial Radio Broadcasting

    The IRTC was kept under close political control because of its extensive powers over commercial broadcasting. The Minister for Communications did retain some important powers over this new legalised sector, such as choosing the number and location of the radio franchises across the country. (Irish Republic 1988a: 6) However, all other important decisions were delegated to the IRTC, including the licencing and regulation of every commercial station. Under article 6 of the 1988 Radio and Television Act, this regulatory body was charged with awarding radio franchises to the ‘most suitable applicant’. The law defined ‘suitability’ in two distinct ways. On the one hand, candidates for radio licences had to possess the money and expertise to run a station. On the other hand, the aspiring operators had to promise to observe various public service committments, such as making their programmes for a specific locality or interest group. (Irish Republic 1988a: 8 ) In addition, the 1988 Act retained many elements of the Irish model of public service broadcasting. The IRTC was supposed to award franchises to those stations which could produce programmes on ‘Irish culture’ and provide ‘new opportunities for Irish talent in music, drama and entertainment.’ (Irish Republic 1988a: 7) After the franchise was awarded, the IRTC was charged with enforcing these public service duties on the commercial radio stations, including any committments made for the ‘quality, range and type of programmes’. Furthermore, the IRTC was empowered to remove the licence of any station which committed ‘repeated breaches of his obligations’. (Irish Republic 1988a: 13‑4)

    But, unlike previous broadcasting legislation, the regulation of commercial radio stations wasn’t really centred on the promotion of the national culture. These obligations under the 1988 law were largely decorative. For the Minister, the principal aim of the legislation was the requirement to provide a news and current affairs service alongside any entertainment programmes. (Burke 1990c) In article 9, the 1988 Act stated that ‘not less than 20 per cent. of the broadcasting time’ of commercial radio stations had to be devoted to news coverage. Furthermore, the fulfillment of this quota had to include at least two hours of news and current affairs during the primetime of listening between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.. (Irish Republic 1988a: 9) The Minister didn’t only want to create an external pluralism of news between RTÉ and commercial stations, but also to ensure that there was internal pluralism on the new stations as well. Under the 1988 law, the IRTC regulated the content of the news and current affairs programmes on the new commercial stations as well. Each franchise-holder had to ensure that the news was presented in ‘objective and impartial manner’. (Irish Republic 1988a: 9) The IRTC also had to draw up a code of practice which regulated the availability of party political broadcasts on stations and ensured balanced coverage for elections. (Irish Republic 1988a: 10; Connelly 1990)

    As with RTÉ, the freedom of communications on the new stations was limited for reasons of public security and Catholic morality. The section 31 censorship of members of Sinn Féin and other revolutionary nationalist organisations was extended to the news coverage of the commercial radio stations. In addition, no programme could present ‘anything which might be regarded as offending against good taste or decency’. (Irish Republic 1988a: 10) Through regulation, the IRTC forced the new stations to copy the public service rules securing and limiting political pluralism established by the public service broadcaster for their own news coverage. The enforcement of these requirements on commercial stations realised Fianna Fáil’s ambition of creating sources of radio and television news outside the control of RTÉ. While the protection of national culture was left to self‑regulation, the Minister was determined that the private operators would be obliged to broadcast large amounts of political speech. Crucially, the obligations to respect internal pluralism between the parliamentary parties ensured would report the viewpoints of Fianna Fáil.

    After a period of IRTC consultation, the Minister for Communications announced that 25 local radio licences would be granted alongside a national commercial radio service. By creating so many franchises, Burke ignored the research carried out for the Coalition government, which had shown only a few regional stations could be economically viable. (Moran 1990; Mitchell 1990a) Instead, the Minister decided to licence one station in every city or rural area within the Irish Republic. During 1989, there was fierce competition between the rival applicant groups for the franchises. On the one hand, voluntary organisations and the Church supported bids from the community radio movement. On the other hand, former pirate operators and local business people wanted to set up commercial radio stations. Unlike the Coalition’s broadcasting bill, the 1988 law had not distinguished between commercial and community radio services. According to the IRTC chairman, despite the existance of successful pirates and the NACB, there were no coherent principles for the creation of a non-profit-making independent radio sector in Ireland. Moreover, because they could attract the audiences of commercial broadcasters, he refused to provide for a special tier of community radio stations in addition to the existing 25 franchises. (Kenny 1989a: 6)

    The IRTC decided between the competing commercial and community applicants in a series of public hearings. While this procedure limited overt favouritism towards Fianna Fáiil supporters, the national franchise and 22 of the 25 local radio licences were awarded to the commercial radio applicants. Not suprisingly, many of the businessmen involved in the successful commercial applications happened to be supporters of the ruling party. (Murphy 1990) Although the IRTC was supposed to favour candidates who promised to respect public service principles, the community groups were largely seen as interlopers into commercial radio. In the opinion of the IRTC chairman, the new radio stations were simply ‘… a new form of commercial industrial activity.’ (Kenny 1989a: 6) For Fianna Fáil, the predominance of private operators ensured that the new stations would be more friendly to the neo-liberal attitudess of the party than the more radical community radio groups. For example, during the first year of broadcasting, Horizon was the only station which ‘stretched the limits’ of the 1988 act by transmitting a programme by gays and lesbians. (Connelly 1990) Unlike most other licensees, this station in Bray was run by a community group. In addition to the formal censorship of the 1988 act, there was now also the ‘self‑regulation’ of the commercial radio stations by their private owners.

    The Dismantling of the National Television Monopoly

    The spread of cable television systems and the ‘spill‑over’ from British transmitters had already ended RTÉ’s monopoly of television broadcasting in the northern and eastern counties of the Irish Republic. However, the nationalised broadcasting corporation had offset the effects of this competition by taking over the private cable companies in Dublin and elsewhere. In the view of Burke, the ownership of the Dublin cable network by RTÉ was slowing down the expansion in the system. Therefore, in 1990, the Minister forced the corporation to sell its cable interests to Telecom Éireann, the nationalised telecommunications corporation. (Spandler 1987: 13; Sheeney 1990) Although the new owner promised to invest heavily in its acquisition, the rapid growth in cable television couldn’t remove the unequal availability of television stations across the Irish Republic. In 1990, over half the southern Irish population could still only receive the signals of RTÉ 1 and Network 2. Furthermore, less than 10% of the population was able to watch satellite or cable channels on their television sets. (Ox Pictures 1990) As in the 1970s, this division in the provision of television services mirrored the social divide between the cities and the countryside. While most urban viewers were able to watch British and satellite stations, the country‑dwellers were largely restricted to the RTÉ stations. Because the party still received strong support from the rural areas, the Fianna Fáil government was determined to end this division in the availability of television channels. However, it was too expensive to provide cable television networks for the sparsely populated country areas. Therefore, the Minister for Communications decided to introduce a multiple microwave distribution system (MMDS) network to provide British, satellite and cable stations for the rural population.

    In some country areas, British television stations were already supplied to subscribers using illegal transmitters, known as ‘deflectors’. While these pirates relayed the British channels for as little as I£5 a year, the proposed annual subscription for the MMDS service was around I£100, with extra charges for watching any film channels. (Ox Pictures 1990) For the ‘deflector’ viewers, the new distribution system was a ‘big step up in cost’ compared with their existing service. (Connelly 1990) Despite protests from the pirates and their viewers, the Minister pressed ahead with the introduction of MMDS. As soon as each microwave transmitter started operating, he promised to close down any ‘deflector’ systems in its area. Because the pirate transmitters only covered around 80,000 homes, Burke was determined to introduce MMDS to cover the more than 500,000 households with only RTÉ television channels. (Spandler 1988: 12; Ox Pictures) In his view, ‘… MMDS is the only practical and legal method by which multi‑channel television can be brought to the rural communities.’ (Burke 1990c) Once every MMDS transmitter was operational, British and other foreign television stations would be available across the whole of the Irish Republic. Far from defending the national culture, the Fianna Fáil government now was determined to ensure that the remotest rural areas of southern Ireland would be able to watch stations from Great Britain or other countries. The old fear of cultural imperialism has been replaced by the desire to win rural votes by providing more television channels.

    The Minister for Communications tried to offset the extended coverage of foreign broadcasters by granting a licence to TV3, a third Irish television channel run by a commercial operator. For Burke, this new television station would ‘balance influences coming in from abroad’ by providing an alternative source of Irish programmes for the viewers. (Ox Pictures 1990) Originally, TV3 was going to be distributed only on the cable and MMDS networks. However, the new television station’s owners complained that only 50% of households were likely to subscribe to either a cable or MMDS system. Therefore, Burke allowed the new television station to broadcast using terrestial transmitters as well. But, these frequencies granted to TV3 were supposed to be allocated to an Irish‑speaking television service. Once again, the protection of the national culture took second place to the development of commercial broadcasting. (Moran 1990; Spandler 1988: 13; Ox Pictures 1990) Yet, under the 1988 Radio and Television Act, the IRTC could only grant the commercial television licence to a contractor who would ‘… have special regard for the elements which distinguish [Irish] culture and in particular for the Irish language …’ (Irish Republic 1988a: 15) The new television station wasn’t only supposed to promote the national culture, but also fulfill other public service committments, such as encouraging the ‘liberty of expression’. However, in practice, these public service committments were understood to be largely rhetorical. As in commercial radio broadcasting, the principle aim of the Fianna Fáil government was the provision of ‘a reasonable proportion of news and current affairs programmes’ on the new television station. (Irish Republic 1988a: 15)

    Under the 1988 Act, the news and current affairs programmes of TV3 were subject to the same rules on internal pluralism and censorship of subversive or immoral views as the commercial radio stations. (Irish Republic 1988a: 14) Although the franchise was granted to an entrepreneur associated with Fine Gael, the regulation of commercial television ensured that the views of Fianna Fáil would still be represented on the station’s news coverage. Furthermore, as RTÉ’s ratings demonstrated, TV3’s owners knew that it would need news and current affairs programmes to win a large audience for its advertisers. As Irish‑made entertainment programmes were also more popular than imports, it would also be forced to transmit a wide range of domestically made material. In imitation of Channel 4 in Great Britain, TV3 intended to commission the majority of its home‑produced programmes from independent television producers based in southern Ireland. The franchise‑holders claimed that the independent sector could provide new programmes more cheaply than the in‑house production system used by RTÉ. (Ox Pictures 1990; Connelly 1990) Yet, although the creation of a sector of independent television companies was an integral part of the post‑industrial economic policies of neo‑liberalism, this economic aim was only a secondary goal of the Fianna Fáil government. Instead, the political goal of establishing a source of television news outside the control of RTÉ remained the primary aim of the 1988 Radio and Television Act.

    The Limitations of Commercial Broadcasting

    Before awarding the licences, the IRTC researched the radio audience across Ireland. The Commission wanted to ensure that the commercial radio stations reflected the musical tastes of their audiences in their formats. In the IRTC’s view, Ireland was divided between the rural and urban areas. While the country‑dwellers preferred listening to either traditional or ‘Country and Irish’ music, the city listeners wanted to hear pop and rock songs on the airwaves. (Connelly 1990) What is more, this difference in tastes extended across the whole radio schedule. In the countryside, there was a strong demand for speech radio among the listenership of the new stations. As one owner put it, ‘country people like to talk. On MWR, we have successfully recreated the western “rambling house”. Guests drop into the studio unannounced to discuss life, sex or whatever springs to mind.’ (Curran 1990: 11) Not surprisingly, the rural commercial radio stations had little difficulty in meeting their 20% target for news and current affairs. (Connelly 1990; Murphy 1990) In contrast, fulfilling this quota presented far more problems for the urban commercial stations, especially in Dublin. The ‘superpirates’ had broadcast a continuous music format based on the constant rotation of the most popular records, which was very successful with the urban audience. According to Capital Radio in Dublin, the 20% news quota discouraged listeners from tuning into the new legal services. In the city, listeners wanted continuous music services, rather than the speech‑orientated radio of the rural areas. (Hogan 1990; Ox Pictures 1990)

    Despite the news quota, the urban commercial stations continued the music formats pioneered by the ‘superpirates’. In Dublin, Capital played contemporary hits aimed at listeners in their teens and twenties, while 98FM used a classic pop format to attract an older audience. Using overseas experience, these formats were constructed by careful research of the tastes of the target audience. (Hogan 1990; Barbrook 1990: 205‑7) As with 2FM, the division of listeners by age and class was a rejection of the old vision of a homogeneous Irish audience united in a common national culture. Moreover, the Dublin commercial stations won large audiences by playing mainly Anglo‑American pop music. Both Capital and 98FM also refused to follow the self‑imposed quota of domestic music adopted by RTE for fear of losing listeners. In 1990, 2FM played more records by Irish artists than 98FM, Capital and the national commercial radio station combined. (Playback 1990)

    During the 1980s, the internationalisation of Irish rock music gathered pace through the success of Sinéad O’Connor, the Hothouse Flowers and other bands. However, the Dublin commercial stations played little part in nurturing this growth in local rock music. Because of the intense competition between stations, the commercial stations didn’t promote records by new Irish artists. (Hogan 1990) Although their music policy pleased the listeners in the short‑run, some commentators believed that the conservative programming policies of the new radio stations was causing long‑term damage to the Irish music industry. (Grahem 1990) The Anglo‑American and Irish records played by the Dublin commercial stations were firmly within the rock tradition, which was partially derived from Celtic folk music. But, in the 1980s, new forms of popular music were emerging in the USA and Europe, such as rap and house. Yet, the rigid observance of formats excluded even pop‑orientated dance records from the playlists of contemporary hits stations, such as Capital. (Hogan 1990) While other European musicians were experimenting with computers and house rhythms, the formats of the Dublin stations were perpetuating the old-style rock within Irish popular music. In turn, this musical insularity lessened the chance of local artists achieving international popularity in the future. (Grahem 1990) Ironically, commercial radio stations playing imported music proved to be as culturally protectionist in their own way as Radio Éireann was in the past.

    Under the 1988 Act, a greater choice for listeners was supposed to be created by the IRTC licencing specialist music services, such as a jazz or dance station. (Irish Republic 1988a: 14) In Dublin, at least 4 FM frequencies were available for more city‑wide stations, along with space for local community radio services as well. However, whether in Dublin or elsewhere, the major limitation on the number of commercial or community radio stations was financial. Compared with piracy, the overhead costs of legal radio broadcasting proved to be two or three times greater. In part, this inflation in costs was caused by the much higher royalty payments and wages needed for running a licenced station. Above all, the sheer amount of news and current affairs coverage also dramatically increased the costs of the commercial stations. To fulfill the news quota, the legal stations had to employ many more journalists and presenters than their pirate predecessors. (Curran 1990: 8; Hogan 1990) Because the news quota was imposed for political reasons, the Fianna Fáiil government failed to examine the economic feasibility of their plans for commercial radio broadcasting.

    As in other European Community countries, the Fianna Fáil government discovered the financial constraints on the expansion of broadcasting funded by advertising. Although commercial radio attracted just under a quarter of all Irish advertising revenue during 1990, this revenue was insufficent to maintain all licenced stations in profit. (Curran 1990: 8 ) In the view of one commercial operator, the Minister for Communications ‘… overestimated the amount of money in the marketplace to operate the radio stations.’ (Hogan 1990) Most advertising agencies also thought that there wasn’t enough money from advertising to support the large expansion of commercial radio broadcasting envisaged by the ruling party. (Curran 1990: 9‑10) Moreover, these new private stations were faced with the prospects of even greater competition for advertising revenue from a third television channel. According to one commentator, a successful TV3 would ‘suck up all the advertising’ and send the commercial radio sector into a financial crisis. (Hogan 1990)

    Already, by 1990, Radio West Galway had gone bankrupt and been taken‑over by 98FM, a Dublin station. (Playback 1990a) In the view of one station owner, only 7 out of the existing 25 commercial radio licence‑holders were likely to survive until 1992. As with Radio West Galway, the unsuccessful stations would be absorbed in a series of regional networks run by the more successful commercial radio operators. (Hegarty 1989: 17; Curran 1990: 11) In part, the concentration of ownership within commercial radio was a response to the increased costs of legal broadcasting, especially the news quota. However, it was also caused by continuing popularity of RTÉ’s stations among Irish listeners. Despite commercial competition, RTÉ Radio 1 still had half of the total listenership in Ireland. As a consequence, it could sell more advertising slots than any other station in the country. (O’Regan 1990; Kenny 1990: 6) When it was started, Century, the national commercial radio station, planned to compete for listeners with Radio 1. Unfortunately for its owners, this scheme failed when Century was unable to persuade Gay Byrne to leave the RTÉ station. Having failed to poach this major star, Century was forced to reorientate its service towards the pop music audience served by RTÉ’s 2FM. (McCann 1990) However, most of the local commercial radio stations were also trying to attract the same listeners, especially in the urban areas. Moreover, 2FM was in a strong position to defend its ratings, with an established audience and popular presenters. Both the national and local commercial stations encountered great difficulties in taking both listeners and advertising money from RTÉ. When Radio West Galway collapsed, its owners partially blamed its demise on ‘unfair competition’ from its public service rival. (Playback 1990a)

    While the Fianna Fáil government expected some local stations to go bankrupt, the financial crisis of the national commercial radio station was far more politically serious. From the begining, Century encountered major engineering and programming problems. In turn, poor reception and unfocused formating resulted in low listening figures. In Dublin, Century not only failed to beat the RTÉ radio stations, but also came behind Capital and 98FM in the ratings. (McCann 1990; Kenny 1990: 6) By the end of 1990, Century had already lost around I£4m in capital and running costs. (Fox 1990: 13) Faced with financial disaster, Century’s owners attempted to blame their own failings on RTÉ. According to them, the reason for Century’s low advertising revenue was predatory pricing by their public service competitor. Using licence fee money, RTÉ was subsidising 2FM to undercut Century’s rate card. However, these charges were not only rejected by RTÉ’s management, but also by the advertising agencies. In their view, Century was failing because ‘2FM still delivers better audiences and better coverage than its competitors.’ (Kenny 1989: 1‑2; Kenny 1990: 7) However, despite these rebuttals, Century continued with its campaign against RTÉ. Its owners called for intervention from the Fianna Fáil government to save the national commercial radio station. In their view, there was a ‘need to equalise the situation’ between the licence‑funded RTÉ and its competitors dependent upon advertising revenue alone. (Kenny 1989: 1) What is more, Century was supported by TV3 in its demands for government action. Just as Century was being squeezed by Radio 1 and 2FM, the commercial television operators feared strong competition from RTÉ 1 and Network 2 would wreck their business plans. (Kenny 1989: 1)

    In 1989, RTÉ was still winning nearly half the audience among households connected to cable television networks. Ironically, despite this ratings success, its share of national advertising spending in Ireland fell during the late‑1980s. Contrary to Century’s claims, new commercial radio stations and publications had already eroded the state sector’s dominance over the Irish advertising market. But, although the corporation faced increased competition and a freeze on licence fee rises, RTÉ increased its profits during the late‑1980s, with around a 5% annual surplus by the end of the decade. (Fox 1990: 13; AAI 1990: 2; RTE 1989: 2) During this period, RTÉ had been effectively transformed from a public service broadcaster into a multi‑media corporation. For example, it had formed a partnership with RTL, a major European commercial operation based in Luxemburg. In 1989, the two corporations collaborated in launching Atlantic 252, a long‑wave pop music station aimed at listeners in northern Britain. Unlike the 1930s, there was no opposition to the national broadcaster making programmes for a British audience. Acting like a commercial multi‑media company, RTÉ set up Atlantic 252 to generate profits from advertising for the corporation as a whole. After its restructuring during the 1980s, this public service broadcaster was a powerful and determined competitor for the private radio and television station owners. Moreover, with advertising revenue limited, the success of the corporation created financial difficulties for its commercial rivals. In turn, the fear of bankruptcy created growing pressures from the private operators on the Fianna Fáil government for some action against RTÉ. Unless the competitive power of the public service provider was curbed, the commercial broadcasting sector was heading towards some embarassing financial failures.

    In order to save his overambitous plans for commercial broadcasting, the Minister for Communications rapidly started searching for methods of restricting RTÉ’s dominance over Irish broadcasting. Above all, there were strong political reasons for Burke to save Century in particular. The two owners of the national commercial radio station were close friends of the Fianna Fáil leadership. (McCann 1990) Soon, the Minister was repeating the charges against RTÉ made by his political allies at Century. According to Burke, the corporation was using the licence fee to sell advertising at ‘below cost’ rates. RTÉ had adopted this strategy to dominate the advertising market and remove any competition from the commercial sector. In his view, Century’s difficulties weren’t caused by the incompetence of its owners, but by the impossibility of ‘fair competition’ under the existing arrangements. Because of its dual funding from the licence fee and advertising, RTÉ had become too competitive for its commercial rivals. (Burke 1990: 1573; 1990c) To tackle this problem, the Minister proposed introducing measures to create a ‘level playing field’ between the public service and commercial broadcasting sectors. In place of his earlier enthusiasm for ‘self‑regulation’, Burke now claimed that tighter legislation was needed to create ‘fair competition’ within Irish radio and television broadcasting. (Burke 1990c; Burke 1990: 1573; Ox Pictures 1990)

    ‘Examination of the process of transistion from monopoly control or dominant market share to competition in any sphere…will show that it requires an increase in regulation and not deregulation.’ (Burke 1990: 1572)

    In its 1990 legislative programme, the Fianna Fáil government had planned to introduce a new broadcasting bill. Originally, this law was only intended to ‘tidy up’ various omissions in the 1988 laws, especially the remaining loopholes in the legislation against unlicenced broadcasting. However, with Century in financial difficulties, the Minister suddenly decided to add new clauses curbing the power of RTÉ into the bill. In a few weeks, the officials of the Department of Communications drew up some ‘hasty proposals’ to curb some of the financial advantages enjoyed by the nationalised broadcasting corporation. At first, the Minister proposed to remove around one‑fifth of the licence fee revenue from RTÉ. Instead, this money would be given to the IRTC for dispersal to the national and local commercial radio stations. According to Burke, the licence revenue was being reallocated to subsidise the public service requirements imposed on the commercial radio stations, especially the news quota. In addition, the Minister suggested that 2FM should cease being a pop music station. Because the commercial stations were already providing this type of service, the RTÉ radio station should concentrate on broadcasting education and farming programmes. (Moran 1990; Fox 1990: 12)

    Not suprisingly, both RTÉ’s management and the opposition parties strongly attacked these proposals. In their view, the reallocation of licence fee revenue ‘… was making a gift of a large amount of public money to some of the wealthiest business people in the country.’ (De Rossa 1990: 1615) Because many of these owners of commercial stations were supporters of Fianna Fáil, the public subsidy of private radio services was denounced as a form of political corruption. However, the opponents of this proposal were too successful in their campaign to preserve the income from the licence fee exclusively for the nationalised broadcasting corporation. In the view of one commentator, the RTÉ management ‘shot themselves in the foot’ by creating a major scandal over Burke’s original scheme. (Moran 1990) Under political pressure, the Minister was forced to abandon his plans for the redirection of licence fee revenue to the commercial radio stations. Instead, he decided to introduce new clauses into the 1990 broadcasting bill, which restricted the amount of advertising raised by RTÉ. Under article 3 of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, only 7.5% of total broadcasting time on its radio and television stations could be used for advertising, with a maximum of five minutes of commercials in any one hour. The only service exempted from this limit was Atlantic 252, the long‑wave station aimed at a British audience. In addition to this curb on the number of commercials, article 3 also restricted the total amount of advertising revenue raised by RTÉ in any one year. To ensure compliance, any excess income in one year would be deducted from the corporation’s budget for the next year. (Irish Republic 1990: 4) Under this clause, the Minister limited RTÉ’s total income from advertising to the amount of money granted to the corporation from the collection of licence fees.

    ‘…it shall be the duty of the Authority to ensure that the total revenue derived by it from advertising, sponsorship or other forms of commercial promotion in broadcasts in any year does not exceed the amount paid to the Authority…[from licence fees].’ (Irish Republic 1990: 4)

    According to Burke, the advertising restrictions on RTÉ were an anti‑trust measure designed to prevent the former broadcasting monopoly from driving its commercial rivals into bankruptcy. The Minister claimed his new legislation was based on the terms of the recently passed European Community Directive on Television Broadcasting. Under its provisions, the individual governments of European Community states were obliged to ensure the ‘freedom of expression’ within television broadcasting by preventing ‘the creation of dominant positions which would lead to restrictions on pluralism’. (European Community 1989: 23‑4) Citing this obligation, the Minister argued that his 7.5% limit on advertising time on RTÉ stations was derived from the 15% restriction laid down in the European Community directive. (European Community 1989: 28‑9) Since half of its budget came from the licence fee, the corporation was only being allowed to sell half the advertising time available to commercial television stations under the European Community directive. (Burke 1990a: 1264) These tougher restrictions on RTÉ advertising income were justified by the duty to ensure political pluralism imposed by European legislation. For the Minister, the diversity of opinions within the electronic media could only be created by external pluralism between many competing radio and television stations. In his view, he had a duty to ensure that there were sources of radio and television news outside the control of RTÉ. Restricting the dominance of the public service broadcaster over the Irish advertising market would guarantee the freedom of communications within the Irish Republic.

    ‘The whole principle behind this legislation is the need for pluralism of information and of the media generally and of entertainment within this country coming from Irish sources.’ (Burke 1990a: 1240)

    According to Burke, the 7.5% limit on RTÉ would divert around I£12m from the nationalised broadcasting corporation to the commercial radio and television stations, as well as the newspaper industry. This figure was considerably larger than the amount of licence fee money which was to have been diverted to the commercial radio and television stations. (Moran 1990) In his view, commercial broadcasting and newspapers needed increased revenue from advertising to survive the strong competition coming from RTÉ. (Ox Pictures 1990; Burke 1990c) Moreover, the Minister claimed that the cuts in the corporation’s income wouldn’t effect the quality or range of the corporation’s radio and television services. He believed that RTÉ could make substantial savings by cutting the costs of programme‑making through the better management of its resources. (Burke 1990c; Ox Pictures 1990) However, the RTÉ management strongly disagreed with this optimistic view propounded by the Minister. According to its Director of Television Programmes, the corporation had entered a period of ‘structured decline’ caused by rising costs and falling income. With licence fee frozen and advertising revenue capped, the only source of increased income was an effective clampdown on those people who weren’t paying their licences. (O’Brien 1990) But, despite this campaign against defaulters, RTÉ was still unable to raise its income in line with inflation. Soon after the 1990 Broadcasting Act was passed, the corporation announced 200 immediate job losses among its staff, with another 350 redundancies to follow shortly. An extension of European and international news coverage on RTÉ’s stations was also abandoned. (Ox Pictures 1990; Dowling and Moloney 1990; McCartan 1990) In turn, both the reduction of RTÉ’s budget and the fall in the number of commercials screened severely impacted upon the independent television companies. Working on short‑term contracts, they were the first victims of any cut‑backs. (Fox 1990: 13) Contradicting Burke’s optimistic prognosis, the decline in RTÉ’s income inevitably led to an erosion in the quality of the radio and television programmes broadcast by the nationalised broadcasting corporation. (Gagan 1990)

    As a state‑owned institution, RTÉ was prevented from too strongly criticising the government. Moreover, the RTÉ Authority was almost entirely composed of supporters of Fianna Fáil. (Mitchell 1990a) However, the opposition parties had no such inhibitions. For some politicians, setting up a third private television channel was like a ‘cargo cult’ for the Fianna Fáil government. Because TV3 represented the application of neo‑liberal policies to the electronic media, Burke was willing to sacrifice RTÉ to prevent the failure of their plans for commercial television. The Fianna Fáil government was afraid that a major bankruptcy within the commercial broadcasting sector would discredit not only Burke’s media legislation, but also Haughey’s whole economic strategy. (Higgins 1990: 584) What is more, as with Burke’s original proposals, the charges of ‘political cronyism’ and ‘moral turpitude’ were repeated in attacks against the revised broadcasting bill. (Spring 1990: 1608; Higgins 1990: 584) For many opposition politicians, the capping of RTÉ was a repetition of the Ryan Air scandal when the Fianna Fáil government had also intervened to curb competition from a nationalised industry against one of their supporters. According to the leader of the Labour party, the advertising restrictions on RTÉ were introduced solely to help a ‘failing commercial enterprise … run and managed by political associates of the ruling party.’ (Spring 1990: 1608; Kenny 1990a) Moreover, many opposition politicians linked the restrictions on RTÉ with the long‑standing hostility between the corporation and the ruling party. In an infamous incident, the Minister had promised to ‘screw’ RTÉ on the night of the 1987 election count because of its coverage of the health issue during the campaign. (Mitchell 1990: 1585) For the opposition parties, the 1990 Broadcasting Act had turned this threat into reality.

    In addition to the criticism from opposition politicians, the new broadcasting act was also attacked by the advertising industry. In its view, the advertising restrictions on RTÉ were unworkeable in practice. According to the main agencies, the financial difficulties of the commercial stations were caused by the limited size of the Irish economy. As they pointed out, the Irish Republic only had the same population as Greater Manchester in Great Britain. Yet, the Minister expected this small economy to support 3 television stations and numerous radio services mainly through advertising. Moreover, the spending on all forms of advertising by Irish companies was lower as a proportion of national expenditure than in most other European Community states. If other sources of broadcasting finance weren’t found, there were too many stations to be supported by the small economy of southern Ireland. (AAI 1990: 1; Fox 1990: 12; Hogan 1990)

    The advertising industry also believed that the Minister had wrongly forecast the consequences of the capping of RTÉ. Ironically, the first effect of the restrictions was to increase the corporation’s dominance over the Irish advertising market. With the supply of RTÉ advertising limited, the big advertisers would be forced to compete for the available commercials, especially within highly rated programmes. As a consequence, there would be a large increase in the price of commercials on public service stations. Because RTÉ could raise its permitted advertising income more quickly, the corporation would have greater control over the advertising market by being able to offer free commercials to clients who were not using other radio or television stations. (AAI 1990: 2; Dowling and Moloney 1990) Moreover, even if RTÉ didn’t engage in such aggressive tactics, there was no guarantee that the restrictions would make advertisers switch their spending to TV3, the commercial radio stations or the newspapers. Much of advertising was specific to a particular type of mass medium. For example, food companies tended to buy television commercials, while the housing industry advertised in the local press. If the main television advertisers were prevented from buying commercials on RTÉ, it was unlikely that they would purchase airtime on the commercial radio stations or space in the national newspapers instead. (AAI 1990: 3; Ox Pictures 1990)

    although the 1990 Broadcasting Act restricted advertising on RTÉ, there was no alternative source of television advertising in southern Ireland. Although the restrictions came in force in October 1990, TV3 had still not started broadcasting. There was also no guarantee that this new commercial station would win a large audience for the commercials shown within its schedule. Instead, the advertising industry predicted that many advertisers would switch their spending to Ulster Television (UTV), the British commercial station based in Northern Ireland. Already, UTV could reach half of the southern Irish population and had more potential viewers within the Irish Republic than within the north. Using the cable and MMDS networks, UTV was already planniing to increase its coverage to the rest of the Irish Republic. Withprogrammes from other ITV regions, UTV was well placed to challenge TV3 for its place as access to third television channel within southern Ireland. In the advertising industry’s view, UTV was becoming a very ‘cost‑effective and attractive alternative option’ for advertisers from the Irish Republic. (AAI 1990: 2‑3; Playback 1990b) Ironically, one of the unintended effects of Fianna Fáil’s broadcasting act might be the ending of partition within television broadcasting!

    If advertising revenue did move mainly to UTV, the economic aim of the 1990 Broadcasting Act would have failed. For both advertisers and opposition politicians, this possibility demonstrated that external pluralism within Irish broadcasting was more likely to come from British or other foreign television stations than from another domestic channel. (Mitchell 1990: 1244; Fox 1990: 12) In fact, the establishment of TV3 threatened to strengthen the influence of these outside stations by weakening the national broadcasting corporation. Instead, the advertisers prefered one strong domestic broadcaster with a large audience to two television companies with weaker ratings. (AAI 1990: 1) In response to Burke’s policies, there was a rehabilitation of the traditional Irish view of public service broadcasting as a defence of national culture. No mainstream party or major lobbyist was advocating a return to the old forms of cultural protectionism. Yet, both politicians and advertisers wanted the nationalised broadcasting corporation to have adequate funds to produce programmes of sufficent quality. Then, RTÉ could compete sucessfully against the challenge from British and satellite television stations. Furthermore, for many politicians, the creation of a stable domestic broadcasting system was a prerequisite of reversing the flow of electronic media between the Irish Republic and Great Britain. In this view, the common language between the two countries was no longer a threat to Irish cultural identity. Instead, because English was the dominant global language, the Irish broadcasting industry could export its programmes to audiences in the wider world. The nurturing of national broadcasting was also necessary for the success of Irish radio and television stations among international audiences in the future.

    ‘Are there any steps we can take to allow RTÉ, TV3 and Century to penetrate the British market in particular, or do we have to sit back while they rape our market, leaving us with no hope of access to theirs.’ (Mitchell 1990: 1598)

    The National Question and the Electronic Media

    The 1990 Broadcasting Act was the result of a long process of change within the Irish electronic media. Long before the 1916 Uprising, the existence of autonomous Irish-owned forms of cultural expression has been closely associated with the political independence of Ireland from Great Britain. In the first years of independence, most Irish nationalists feared the continuation of ideological domination by old imperial master. Despite the end of direct British rule, southern politicians believed that its larger neighbour could influence the opinions of the Irish people through the mass media. Moreover, as the population of both countries spoke English, there was no linguistic barrier preventing the comprehension of British publications and programmes by Irish audiences. Under both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments, the southern Irish state adopted a policy of cultural protectionism against this perceived threat from Great Britain, including the establishment of a nationalised broadcasting monopoly. However, from the early 1960s onwards, this isolationist model of public service broadcasting has been slowly abandoned. By the 1990s, no major party within the Irish Republic was arguing for a return to the cultural protectionism of the past, especially within the electronic media.

    However, there was no agreement on the future development of Irish broadcasting among the conservative and social democratic parties within southern Ireland. On the one hand, the Fianna Fáil government licenced commercial radio and television stations alongside the existing RTÉ services. In its view, new sources of news and current affairs had to be established outside the control of the nationalised broadcasting corporation. Although the Fianna Fáil government was criticised by other conservative parties for favouring its political friends, both Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats advocated similiar schemes for a duopoly of private and public broadcasting organisations. Moreover, all conservative politicians believed that competition between the two sectors would increase the freedom of communications within the Irish Republic. For them, this political right was guaranteed by the external pluralism of competing radio and television stations. However, few conservative politicians supported the undiluted adoption of neo‑liberal policies within the electronic media. The Fianna Fáil government abandoned its lightly regulated broadcasting policy for tighter controls over the electronic media. In its place, new laws were enacted to ensure the provision of news and current affairs programmes by the new commercial stations, as well as to limit the dominance of RTÉ over the Irish advertising market. But, some consistent neo‑liberals did argue against interventionist policies for the electronic media. In this view, the freedom of communications promised in article 40.6.1 of the 1937 constitution could only be guaranteed by competition between radio and television stations under minimal regulation.

    ‘This Article does not permit legislative provisions seeking to make broadcasting the preserve of the State. Under the freedom of expression provision, there is an open market to publish or broadcast.’ (ILT 1990)

    On the other hand, the social democratic parties championed the adoption of the West European version of public service broadcasting in southern Ireland. In their view, the licencing of commercial radio and television stations had only partially increased the freedom of communications. Because stations were dependent on selling commercials, the advertisers could control the content of programmes more fully than old forms of state censorship. (Gilmore 1990: 969) In the battle for ratings, controversial views or unfamiliar musical styles were shunned as threats to the audience share of the new stations. Despite the regulation of commercial broadcasting, both Labour and the Workers’ Party doubted that external pluralism between competing stations could fully protect the freedom of communciations. Instead, they believed that this political right had to be guaranteed by a strong nationalised broadcasting corporation. In the West European model of public service broadcasting, freedom of communications was created through internal pluralism within its programmes. Already, RTÉ claimed to reflect ‘the diverse factors and views of a pluralist society’ in its schedule. (RTÉ 1989: 3) For the social democratic parties, this committment could only be fulfilled in practice when public service broadcaster was not only adequately financed, but also democratically accountable to its audience and workforce. (Workers’ Party 1990: 4)

    In addition, as defenders of RTÉ, the social democratic parties also retained some allegiance to the Irish version of public service broadcasting. With British and other foreign stations available across most of southern Ireland, many on the Left were convinced that a strong domestic broadcasting organisation is needed to produce programmes expressing Irish culture. Because of commercial pressures, RTÉ’s domestic rivals were unlikely to include many cultural programmes in their schedules. Therefore, ‘… the protection of our culture can only be achieved by a state broadcasting institution.’ (McCartan 1990) However, for the Left, this promotion of Irish culture didn’t involve a return to protectionism. Instead, the RTÉ stations guaranteed the expression of the national culture within a multi‑channel radio and television system, which includes stations from other countries. The social democratic parties didn’t support public service broadcasting as a defence against moral corruption from abroad, but as part of their committment to the freedom of communications for Irish citizens. For them, this political right included not only the right to receive a variety of radio and television stations, but also the ability of Irish citizens to express their opinions on the airwaves. This definition of the freedom of communications as access to the electronic media was championed by the community radio movement in southern Ireland. In this form of broadcasting, local people were encouraged to participate directly in both programme‑making and administration. (Murphy 1990) For the NACB, the freedom of communications was transformed into the right to communicate.

    ‘…The achievement of a two‑way flow of information, of free exchange, of access and full participation, opens up a wide new and exciting media dimension to us.’ (Byrne 1990)

    Although their rhetoric often hid self‑interest, both conservative and social democratic parties used a common ideological discourse to argue about the future of the electronic media in the Irish Republic. Both sides claimed that their media policies would increase the freedom of communications for the Irish people. As in other areas, the underlying ideological consensus within the Irish media debate reflected the dominance of secular republicanism over Catholic nationalism within the southern partition state. By the 1990s, no major party was committed to defending the moral economy of the peasantry and petit‑bourgeoisie through censorship and protectionism against British cultural imperialism. Yet, in 1921, the independence of southern Ireland was soon followed by the establishment of a state monopoly over radio broadcasting, which was designed to provide specifically Irish programmes for the domestic audience. This cultural nationalist version of public service broadcasting reflected the partition of the island of Ireland. In the south, a homogenous society of small property‑holders was created, centred on family farms and small businesses. For the peasantry and petit‑bourgeoisie, Catholic nationalism provided a Malthusian moral code, which protected their family property against subdivision.

    After the failure of the language movement, the Catholic faith also became the national mark of cultural ‘distinction’ against the British. (Bourdieu 1984) In the independence movement, both secular republicans and Catholic nationalists worked for the cultural separation of the Irish people from British influences as part of the struggle for political self‑determination. The Irish nationalists demanded a sovereign nation‑state, completely separate from the rest of the world. Along with other European nationalists, the Irish independence movement believed that ‘as a single individual, [the nation‑state] is exclusive against other like individuals.’ (Hegel 1971: 275) Across Europe, nationalist intellectuals fostered cultural distinctiveness to create their own ‘historic people’, each needing a separate state. (Hegel 1971: 275‑6; Hegel 1975: 124‑51; Anderson 1983) Thus, the struggle for cultural and political separation by the Irish nationalists was part of a wider process encompassing the whole of Europe. As the continent was divided into competing nation‑states, each political unit based its claim to political independence on long‑standing cultural differences from its neighbours.

    ‘A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make‑up manifested in a community of culture.’ (Stalin 1936: 8 )

    Despite the constitutional basis of the new state, Catholic nationalism expressed the desire for complete separation from Great Britain more effectively than secular republicanism. The creation of an Irish version of public service broadcasting was an integral part of this quest for national autarchy. In its early years, Radio Éireann’s programmes reflected a distinctively Irish culture, centred on frugal rural living and Catholic spirituality. For Catholic nationalists, the freedom of communications was only tolerated within the confines of the moral totalitarianism of the Catholic church. In turn, this censorship justified direct political controls by the ruling party. Both Free State and Fianna Fáil governments believed that there was a single homogenous Irish audience, which could be served by a national broadcasting monopoly. But, this Irish model of public service broadcasting slowly disappeared after the end of 1950s. With the spread of Fordism across western Europe, the old policy of national autarchy was no longer credible. From the Whitaker Report onwards, the southern nationalist parties decided to encourage the modernisation of the Irish economy. Whether using policies of peripheral Fordism or neo‑liberalism, successive governments integrated the Irish economy within the European and global market‑place. In the 1970s, the Irish government simultaneously refused to support the armed struggle of the northern nationalists against British rule and decided to enter into the European Community. These two choices were symbolised by the abandonment of the traditional goal of complete national sovereignty by southern Irish politicians.

    Although independence was only won after a long struggle, the Irish Republic encountered less difficulties in pooling national sovereignty than the old imperial states like Great Britain. In part, this embrace of federalism was caused by the economic benefits of membership, such as gaining access to a wider market and subsidies from the Community’s agricultural or regional policies. As a result, European Community membership reduced Ireland’s economic dependence on Britain more effectively than the former strategy of national autarchy. As a small state, the national interests of southern Ireland were best served inside the framework of collaborative European institutions. (Wickham 1980: 69) In addition, the Irish Republic’s enthusiasm for European federalism reflected the appropriateness of its political structures for further integration. According to the principles of ‘subsidiarity’ espoused by the European Commission, ‘… we never entrust to a bigger unit anything that is best done by a smaller one.’ (Delors 1989: 1) In this approach, the larger nation‑states have to be broken down into smaller federal units for complete European unification. While the British state was too large, the Irish Republic was already the correct size for a region‑state of a future European Federation. (Fouéré 1980: 78, 115‑29) Under this form of European unification, southern Ireland not only would maintain control over its domestic concerns, but also would be able to participate fully in decisions which have to be taken at a federal level. For both the president of the European Commission and most Irish politicians, this type of federalism was:

    ‘…a way of reconciling the irreconcilable…the need for a European power capable of tackling the problems of our age and the absolute necessity to preserve our roots in the shape of our nations and regions…’ (Delors 1989: 1)

    The goal of transforming southern Ireland into a region‑state of the European Community was based on its economic integration within the wider continental economy. The urbanisation of the Irish economy had already changed individual property‑holders into wage workers or capitalists. The development of the electronic media was closely connected with this modernisation process. From the 1960s onwards, the television set was not only a Fordist commodity in its own right, but also helped to spread the new culture of consumerism among the Irish people, especially in its commercials. The electronic media helped to open up the Irish economy by spreading urban secular attitudes among the rural Catholic population. The Irish radio and television stations disseminated foreign culture throughout the country, whether through imported television programmes shown by RTÉ or Anglo‑American pop music played by commercial radio stations. Moreover, the British electronic media were no longer seen as forms of cultural imperialism, but as a window on the wider world. The common language between the two countries ceased to be a threat to cultural independence and became a means of reaching global anglophone audiences. In turn, the end of cultural separatism changed the nature of the nationalised broadcasting corporation, which evolved from the protector of traditional culture into a multi‑media corporation, with some public service committments. Faced with competing domestic and foreign stations, RTÉ no longer addressed a homogneous audience united by its Catholic nationalist culture. As elsewhere in Europe, the nationalised broadcasting corporation segmented its audience by class and age to maximise its ratings. Instead of creating national unity through its output, the 1990s RTÉ aimed to satisfy the information and entertainment needs of its diverse Irish audience. The Europeanisation and modernisation of southern Ireland was reflected in the common ideological discourse used for debates on the development of the electronic media by both conservative and social democratic parties. In modern Ireland, secular republicanism provided the inspiration for political arguments, rather than Catholic nationalism. Both Right and Left claimed that their media policies were based on extending the freedom of communications for the Irish people. On one hand, the conservative parties argued for the application of neo‑liberal policies in the mass media, with regulation to prevent monopolies and to protect political pluralism. On the other hand, the Left parties advocated the application of social democratic policies in the media, including a revitalised public service broadcasting corporation, community stations and tighter regulation. By becoming a region‑state of the European Community, the Irish Republic was no longer committed to the achievement of complete national sovereignty. By the early 1990s, the protection of the national culture had ceased to be a major aim of the broadcasting policies of the southern Irish state. Instead, the political debate over the future of the electronic media was conducted between different methods of ensuring the freedom of communications for Irish citizens within the limits of the constitution, such as the Section 31 restrictions. As in other member countries, policies for the electronic media were justified in terms of democratic rights, not national self‑determination. With the emergence of media regulation by the European Community, the broadcasting policies of the Irish Republic had to be consistent with those adopted by other member states. The freedom of communications had replaced the struggle for national cultural identity in Irish broadcasting policy. From now onwards, the rights of Irish citizens would take precedence over the need to create a nation‑state for Ireland.

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  • DIGITAL RHYTHMS by Richard Barbrook

    Amongst all the different forms of mass culture, music is the most personal and emotional. Almost everyone can identify certain songs with particular moments in their life. The rites of passage from childhood to adulthood usually involve joining a musical subculture. We fall in and out love to the accompaniment of the latest hits. In the modern world, a major way of creating our identity as individuals is through our own musical tastes. If you criticise your friends’ record collection, you can be attacking their worth as a human being! What is more, in contrast to movies or television, many people are very conservative in their musical taste. My mother watches the same films as me, but doesn’t listen to the same records. For lots of people, their basic likes and dislikes in music are fixed during their teenage and twenties. It is a true cliché that many people’s record collection stops when they start having children. This can be seen in the popularity of radio stations which play nothing but oldies and the successful repackaging of old hits on CD. Despite the rapid changes in musical fashions, it seems that many listeners think music represents something transcendental and eternal‑ even if this is only the memory of their own youth.

    This cult of nostalgia means most people live in a musical timewarp. This ranges from the classical music buffs stuck in the nineteenth century to the indie rock fans wishing to revive the 1960s. This cultural conservatism means many people have hardly noticed the rapid technological changes taking place in music. Many listeners have purchased the latest hardware and enjoy the better reproduction offered by the new recording techniques. However the newly purchased CD is often used to play old music performed on obsolete instruments. There is something absurd about the latest microelectronics being used to make a faithful reproduction of the music of the last century. The distinctive sounds of a particular style of making music are closely connected with the machines which help humans create music. Each major style of music is connected with earlier technical advances in instrument‑making. The violin and the piano were new instruments which created the particular sound which we now recognise as classical music. In the same way, jazz music is unthinkable without the technology which produced the saxophone and other sophisticated metal wind instruments. Similarly, rock music is identified with the invention of the electric guitar and amplification. Our emotional response to these styles of music is closely connected with the distinctive sounds of the weeping violin, wailing sax or screeching guitar. Now the new microelectronic instruments are creating their own distinctive sounds and styles of music.

    Electronic music is already decades old. The Futurists and Surrealists dreamed of a music which would match the aspirations of the machine age. This influenced avant‑garde classical composers, like Stockhausen, to experiment with the earliest synthesisers. Out of these early efforts came Kraftwerk, the first musicians to popularise synthesisers. In their use of heavy rhythms and everyday sounds turned into music, Kraftwerk pioneered many contemporary sounds. In the early 1980s, English bands were the leading edge of electronic music, with groups such as the Human League, Heaven 17, Cabaret Voltaire and Depeche Mode. In turn, they influenced musicians in the USA. In the work of Afrika Bambaataa and many hip‑hop records, computer music came to dominate large sections of black American music. In the last few years, these new technologies have helped create house music, especially those records influenced by the Detroit techno sound. As this style has crossed the ocean back to England and the rest of Europe, so new musicians have emerged to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the new instruments. What is interesting about the development of music made by computers is how its success has depended on the falling price of the technology. Despite the French government squandering large amounts of money on Boulez’s electronic music lab in the Centre Pompidou, it has had no cultural impact at all. Only when the music computers escaped from the academy into the ghettos did the real possibilities of the new technologies become apparent. Today, Todd Terry and Juan Atkins are far more musically innovative and experimental than Boulez can ever hope to be. This is because the spread of the new musical technologies is intimately connected with the growing global dominance of west African rhythms over all other styles of music. The new technologies are ideally suited to a heavily rhythmic music which uses multi‑layered, complex and repetitive patterns. African‑originated music has proved its ability to absorb all other styles of music within its beats, from celtic through flamenco to bhangra. The future of music may derive from the villages of ancient Ghana, but it will be played on the latest computer musical technologies.

    These new ways of producing music are part of the global transformation of the technological basis of capitalist societies. Economists see the introduction of microelectronic technologies as the movement from Fordism to post‑Fordism. Musicians are no different from other workers in finding their old skills are becoming rapidly obsolete. The post‑Fordist economy reduces all labour to the generic ability to work‑ as a computer operator! Therefore the musicians of the future will work on computers too. This has been made possible by the introduction of digital recording techniques. By reducing all sounds to numbers, digital recording does not just create the ‘perfect’ reproduction of music. It also allows musicians to manipulate sounds using computer technology. By using a sampler, the computer can mimic other instruments or play snatches taken from other recordings. This not only allows these computers to copy existing sounds, but to create completely new forms of music. The distance between playing and recording music is blurred in these new technologies. But importance of these new instruments does not lie simply in their technical capacities, but also in the rapid fall in their price. The early synthesisers were American or European and very expensive. As in many other areas, the Japanese corporations have turned the playthings of the rich into everyday consumer durables. A musical computer which cost £30,000 in 1984 is now available for £3,000. Casio are even offering a cheap sampler for only £99! It is the cheapness of these microelectronic instruments which is revolutionising modern music. In recent years, the government monopoly of radio broadcasting has been broken by the availability of very cheap transmitters. The increasing spread of these powerful, easy to use and flexible new instruments among the population is already allowing many more people to become musicians and make records.

    These new technologies are a nightmare for the defenders of the traditional craft skills of musicians, such as the Musicians’ Union (MU). This organisation was founded in the factory‑like organisation of the classical orchestra. The MU never really adapted itself to the more anarchic world of jazz combos or rock bands. The campaign to “Keep Music Live” demonstrated its dislike of the gramophone, let alone any more advanced technologies. The new computer technologies confirm the worse fears of the MU. Now one musician can reproduce a whole orchestra using the new instruments. This threatens the jobs of skilled musicians as live orchestras become too expensive for film scores or other session work. Nowadays, the trained violinist is like a hand‑loom weaver competing against the latest computer‑operated mill. Even worse, a computer system is already cheaper than a good violin. The MU faces catastrophe because it does not know how to cope with the long‑term trend away from live music. On the one hand, the reproduction of the same piece in live performances has become economically ‘inefficient’. On the other, it is also increasingly difficult to reproduce many types of modern music in ‘real time’. More and more, musicians are famous for being producer‑DJs, rather than as live performers.

    The more pessimistic defenders of traditional music believe that the computers are taking over. However, these new computer‑based instruments are still musical instruments. At the end of the day, they are only as good as their programmers. The potentialities of the new musical technologies will only be realised if there are musicians who know how to use them creatively. Learning how to play music on the new technologies is involves acquiring skills as much as learning the violin or guitar. Computer technologies do not just abolish old skills, but also create new ones. Already some rich rock stars have made terrible records using all the latest instruments and recording equipment. In contrast, some of the most innovative records of the last twenty years were made by dub reggae musician‑producers using the most basic recording techniques. As in other areas being restructured by microelectronic technologies, the central question is whether the machines will dominate us or whether we will control the machines. As DJ Keith Franklin puts it: “We need to know how to combine the human feel with digital sounds”.

    But the new musical technologies are not just causing problems for the musicians with traditional skills. The big record companies are also worried about the long‑term trends involved in the introduction of microelectronics into music production and recording. This is one of the reasons behind the recent mergers between the hardware and software branches of musical production, as can be seen in the recent takeover of CBS by Sony. What the record companies fear is a break‑down of the commodity form within music. This is a common problem across the information economy. Music is like any other piece of software: it is expensive to make the first copy, but extremely cheap to reproduce every extra copy. In earlier stages of the industrialisation of music, the record companies thrived because they could lock a particular song onto vinyl in the shape of a record. In turn, this allowed the record companies to set up a system which sold musicians as individual ‘artists’, not as members of a collective culture. Nowadays, already this commodification of music is threatened by the home‑taping of records. The introduction of digital technologies makes things even worse for the record companies. Not only can perfect reproductions be easily made, but even the fixed shape of the record is being blurred. For example, many modern hits rely on sound samples lifted from other records. This has created innumerable copyright problems as the lawyers argue over who owns a ten second ‘break’. But this is only the start of a process which is unraveling the whole relationship between songs, records and the commodity form. In house music, the same rhythm will appear in many different remixes and samples. In this endless cycle of innovation and plagiarism, where does one musicians’ contribution stop and another’s begin? In the near future, you may no longer buy records as a fixed piece of music. Instead you could be purchasing a piece of ‘rhythm software’ mixed into various versions by different people. Moreover, as software, you will also be able to create your own versions of the rhythm if you want to! These advances open up interesting opportunities for reducing the separation between musical production and consumption. In turn, this will further blur the distinctions between musicians and listeners.

  • AMERICAN THEORIES OF MEDIA DEREGULATION

    ‘Television is nothing more than a toaster with pictures’ – Mark Fowler 1981

    The mass media in contemporary Western Europe has been undergoing a period of profound transformation. For some, this involves a ‘paradigm shift’ from public service to free market broadcasting. (Hoffman‑Riem 1986: 126‑9) After the Second World War, most national broadcasting systems were organised on ‘public service’ lines based on the example of the BBC. This state capitalist model was sometimes modified during the years of the long boom by the addition of regulated commercial services. This oligopoly took different forms, from the supervised independent stations of Britain to the hidden state ownership of the French ‘radios périphériques’. However government supervision was maintained even in the commercial sector. But, as Fordism faltered, this ‘duopoly’ model was increasingly seen as an obstacle to the successful operation of national broadcasting systems. Instead, an extension of commercial ownership and advertising funding, coupled with less state supervision, was proclaimed as the only way forward for the mass media. For example, in Britain, cable and satellite television were developed by corporate investors with only weak regulatory supervision. There are now plans to auction off both radio and television franchises to the highest bidder. In France, state‑owned radio and television stations have been privatised and a subscription television service has been introduced. It is generally accepted that any expansion of the mass media in Western European countries will take place through further commercialisation and market competition. (Hoffman‑Riem 1986: 129)

    ‘The fundamental aim of broadcasting policy should…be to enlarge both the freedom of choice of the consumer and the opportunities available to programme makers to offer alternative wares to the public.’ (Peacock 1986: 125)

    This change in strategy is described as deregulation. It is justified by the work of economists and others writing in the USA. The policies adopted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also provide a potent example of what deregulation looks like in practice. Under the influence of their ‘big brother’ across the Atlantic, most West European states have begun to follow each other down the road of deregulation. But, they are applying policies and theories derived from a very different economic, political and legal system to their own countries. However, the urgencies of the crisis of Fordism are forcing changes in the most deeply revered shibboleths of the nations of Western Europe. The methods and technologies of production are undergoing a period of profound restructuring, leading to corresponding changes in the types of state regulation.

    The Origins of Deregulation Theories

    In the USA, the theories and practice of media deregulation originated from a reaction against the system of broadcasting regulation established in the late 1920s. But, in turn, this regulatory system in the USA was started as method of dealing with the ‘chaos’ of the pioneering days of American broadcasting. The failure to establish definite property rights on the airwaves led to the cuthroat competition of ‘transmitter wars’ between rival stations on the same frequencies. (Davies 1928) The resulting mutual interference and ‘anarchy’ was a major justification for the state capitalist solutions adopted first in Britain and later in the rest of Western Europe. (Briggs 1961: 103‑4) However, the laissez‑faire period of American broadcasting did not last more than a few years. In 1927, the US Congress passed a Radio Act which nationalised the airwaves and set up the FCC as the body to allocate radio licences. (Rothbard 1972: 124; Barnouw 1966: 195‑8) But, unlike the BBC, the radio stations themselves were not nationalised. Instead, the FCC became the method of monopolising the airwaves on behalf of big business. (Brindze 1937: 11) The myriad of independent stations were transformed into the giant networks of NBC and CBS. (FCC 1940) As with the earlier Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the effect of regulation by the FCC was to consolidate control in the hands of the Morgan, Rockefeller and other financial houses which controlled the American economy. (Brindze 1937: 31‑56; Kolko 1965: 231‑5) The Radio Act was a forerunner of the 1930s legislation which controlled both the prices and production levels of many sectors of American industry. Following the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the American government not only adopted Keynesian policies of deficit spending and wage rises to stimulate consumerdemand, but also used government regulations to cartelise key branches of production to prevent ‘overcompetition’. The ‘transmitter wars’ were seen as one of many examples of laissez‑faire liberalism leading to economic instability. State fiscal and legal intervention of the New Deal was perceived as the only way of controlling the crisis‑ridden path of capital accumulation.

    The early stages of American radio broadcasting seemed to have discredited market competition on the airwaves both in the USA and elsewhere. According to the conventional wisdom, radio and television broadcasting were ‘natural monopolies’ and ‘common carriers’ which justified cartelization backed by state regulation. (Tunstall 1986: 38) As long as the regulatory bodies supported the major networks owned by big business, then the power of the FCC was not challenged. But, during the social turbulence of the 1960s, the role of the FCC began to change. This was part of a more ‘activist’ approach to regulation resulting from the campaigns of Ralph Nader and other consumer activists. They hoped to use the regulatory bodies to control the more antisocial activities of the large corporations. Under the chairmanship of Newton Minow, an appointee of US president John Kennedy, the FCC began to become more than just a defender of corporate interests. It tried to impose content restrictions on broadcasters, quotas for childrens programmes and encouraged the hiring of staff from ethnic minorities. (Tunstall 1986: 247) However, as the long boom faltered, the close regulation of the mass media and other sectors of production came under increasing attack in the USA.

    The defeat of the US military in Vietnam and the growing economic crisis at home led to a reaction against the activist politics of the 1960s. This led to the emergence of the New Right as the major force in American politics. This was the beginning of a period of dominance of the Republican Party unparalleled since their disgrace following the 1929 Crash. Like its New Left opponent, the New Right was a heterogeneous coalition. It consisted of a melange of corporate funders, religious groups, ex-leftist academics and professional lobbyists. (Phillips 1982: 43‑52) This was a consequence of the coalition building necessary to elect Republicans to Congress and the Presidency. The bizarre nature of this alliance was expressed in its contradictory economic and social policies. Its avowed aim of fiscal rectitude resulted in an expanding budget deficit, while its pro‑family policies included cutting back on welfare payments. However, as the Reagan presidency demonstrated, ideological consistency was less important than political success.

    The Ideologues of the Right

    The theorists of deregulation in the mass media and other sectors must be located as one part of this coalition. They consisted of economists, lawyers and politicans who worked for large corporations, think‑tanks or academic institutions. The think‑tanks were a product of the lobbying system within American politics. For example, the American Enterprise Institute commissioned research to prove the need for deregulation policies, including the mass media. (Tunstall 1986: 11‑2) Therefore these theorists were academic entrepreneurs, producing intellectual justifications of the policies of the large corporations and financial institutions. The major theorists of deregulation, including the mass media, were:

    • George J. Stigler: Professor of American Institutions at the University of Chicago.
    • Ronald H. Coase: Professor of Law at the University of Chicago and an editor of The Journal of Law and Economics.
    • Sam Peltzman: Professor of Business Economics at the University of Chicago.
    • Richard A. Posner: Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
    • Roger G. Noll: Professor of Social Science at the Californian Institute of Technology and associated with the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy.
    • William G. Shepherd: Special Economic Assistant at the US Department of Justice 1967‑8, Ann Arbor and Stanford Universities and associated with the Brookings Institute.
    • Bruce M. Owen: lawyer, anti‑trust economist and associated the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy.
    • James Q. Wilson: Institute of Politics at Harvard University and the Workshop on Industrial Organisations at the University of Chicago.
    • William J. Baumol: Professor of Economics at Princeton University, AT&T advisor and associated with the Brookings Institute.
    • Mark V. Nadel: associated with the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy.
    • Arthur S. De Vany, Ross D. Eckert, Charles J. Meyers, Donald J. O’Hara, Richard C. Scott: employed by General Electric.
    • Mark S. Fowler: Chairman of the FCC 1981‑6 and ‘small‑town southern radio advertising salesman’. (Tunstall 1986: 239)

    The University of Chicago was the centre of pre‑Keynesian liberal theory in the USA. In 1958, its Economics Department had founded The Journal of Law and Economics. However its ideas remained on the fringes of American politics during the long Fordist boom. The 1930s Slump was blamed on the policies of the Republican governments which preceded it. Laissez‑faire liberalism seemed condemned by the memory of past disasters. But, in turn, the crisis of the early 1970s discredited Keynesian economics. The collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and the quadrupling of the oil price threatened the dominant role of the USA in the global economy. Government intervention and deficit spending were no longer able to solve the problems of capital accumalation. Republican politicans now portrayed the America of the 1923-9 US president Calvin Coolidge as a ‘golden era’ of business expansion and small‑town virtues, rather than as the harbinger of the 1930s Great Depression. (Phillips 1982: 12‑3, 131‑2) The old dogmas of laissez‑faire were now rehabilitated. For the Republican Party, these theories offered an alternative to the exhausted remedies of the Keynesians.

    The University of Chicago was home to two schools of conservative economics: monetarism and supply‑side. Both were committed to market capitalism and took inspiration from the neo‑classical fundamentalism of the ‘Austrian School’. (Littlechild 1978: 17‑9) However, these schools were often advocating contradictory policies. The fiscal rectitude of the monetarists was an obstacle to the tax‑cutting policies of the supply‑siders. (Phillips 1982: 129‑30) The deregulators were overwhelmingly supply‑siders. They wished to rehabilitate Say’s Law, which saw that the demand for commodities derived from the production and supply of the same goods. (Hutt 1974: 24‑9) This theory saw the market as a self‑correcting mechanism which would enter a depression only if outside interventions prevented its operation. Through this approach, the supply‑siders had ‘… shifted focus from the sufficiency of effective demand to the productive capacity of the economy and the willingness of firms to use it and to expand it.’ (Rinder 1984: 17) Deregulation was justified through Say’s Law as removing barriers to the supply of goods and services, thus stimulating the economy more effectively than Keynesian interventionism.

    But the supply‑siders did not want just to undermine the intellectual defenders of the 1930s New Deal policies of US president Franklin Roosevelt and the 1960s Great Society programme of US president Lyndon Johnson. The Keynesian orthodoxy was already under attack from the anti‑capitalism of the New Left. Its anti‑capitalism was combined with the individualist populism of earlier American radicalism. (Zane Mairowitz 1976: 164‑72) The New Right also had roots in the anti‑elite rhetoric of populism, rather than traditional Republicanism. (Phillips 1982: 46‑50) The religious revivalists derived their moral and cultural authoritarianism from the ‘outsider’ campaigns of Barry Goldwater and George Wallace in the 1960s. The populism of the supply‑siders and other right‑wing economists was very different from their religious allies. They wanted to use the widespread discontent with state bureaucracy to reassert the necessity for market capitalism. This approach took the anarchic individualism within the 1960s counterculture and harnessed it to the changes necessary for the next stage of Fordism. Whereas the New Left saw individual freedom was possible only through participatory democracy and cooperative production, the New Right economists saw the same goal as achievable through market competition and consumer choice. Some theorists even claimed the distinction between Right and Left itself was obsolete and should be replaced by the divisions between libertarians and collectivists. As one convert from the New Left to the New Right put it:

    ‘In some basic sense…the new supply‑side doctrine was but a reincarnation of my old social idealism in the form of a new and, I was inclined to think, more mature ideological garb. The world could indeed be started anew. Its current, accumulating economic and social breakdowns could be repaired and its older, inherited ills of racism and poverty vanquished by sweeping changes in the policies which caused or prolonged them.’ (Stockman 1986: 42)

    The Supremacy of the Market

    The American deregulation theorists saw their work as a refutation of the ‘public interest’ defence of state regulation. (Wilson 1974: 138‑9; Stigler 1971: 3; Noll and Owen 1983: 5‑6; Peltzman 1971: 109‑10; Posner 1974: 336‑7) This theory had acheived prominence after the 1930s Slump as the theoretical justification for the New Deal. It showed why the market and private property alone were not able to guarantee prosperity and social welfare for most people. State intervention into the economy was necessary to correct ‘market failures’. The deregulation school wished to demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that state regulation could not achieve the goals which it proclaimed. Instead the supply‑siders wanted to prove that only through a competitive market economy could the interests of the public be achieved. Say’s Law demonstrated that state controls would prevent the formation of ‘market‑clearing prices’, leading to depression and unemployment. (Hutt 1974: 89‑102) State intervention was characterised as both inefficient and counterproductive. A theoretical assault on the shibboleths of the New Deal was one part of the more general attack on the old orthodoxies. It was the academic front of an overall attempt to undermine public support for the Fordist consensus.

    This critique rested on an idealisation of the market as a method of socio‑economic organisation. New Deal theorists had seen the government as securing the ‘public interest’ through interventions to correct the workings of the market economy. In turn, the politicans were accountable to the public through elections. In contrast, the neo‑classical economists claimed that the people could only express their economic needs and desires through the market. They saw themselves as the theorists of ‘self‑interest’ rather than ‘public interest’. (Wilson 1974: 138) As consumers, individuals showed their wants and desires through their choice of commodities produced by competing capitalists. Price competition was seen as the best method of determining what people really wanted.

    ‘We increase social utility by promoting competition, removing artifical barriers to entry, preventing any one firm from controlling price or eliminating its competitors, and in general establishing conditions that allow the price of goods to be as close as possible to their cost of production.’ (Fowler and Brenner 1982: 210)

    The supply‑siders’ claimed that the ‘public interest’ was best secured, not through government regulation, but through market competition. The market was the only true indication of the ‘public interest’ in a society of customers, especially as lower prices and greater consumption resulted from increased economic efficency. (Noll and Owen 1983: 6) This approach assumed that the market expressed ‘rational choice by individuals’ who were able to optimise their own self‑interests. (Mithick 1980: xxi) It portrayed people as almost always determining their social behaviour and actions in response to monetary incentives. (Rinder 1984: 17‑8) Society was no more than a collection of atomised and self-seeking individuals.

    As the market was seen as the primary method of economic organisation, the supply‑siders theorised the state as divorced from the rest of capitalist society. Politics was founded upon the use of force against the spontaneous development of the market system. (Von Mises 1947: 27) Regulation was state coercion against capitalist enterprises. (Stigler 1971: 4; Mithick 1980: 8 ) For conservatives, regulation was characterised as the political control over individuals and companies in a market. (Nadel 1983: 221) But, for some supply‑siders, state intervention into economic life was not itself illegitimate in the American context. It was sanctioned by the US Constitution which was the basic law of the land. The very specific origins of the American state provided the inspiration for the generalised abstractions of the supply‑siders about the role of government. The Founding Fathers had wanted a limited state which would guarantee a private capitalist economy. (Beard 1969) The protection of the independence of newspapers through the First Amendment showed how the Constitution provided a legal framework for the ‘free trade’ in ideas. The American state was created as an institution which was not strong enough either to nationalise industries or to impose a totally free market. This resulted in a state which ‘… may own fewer businesses, but regulates more business practices than most other democracies.’ (Wilson 1974: 152)

    But the supply‑siders had to explain not only why there were regulations over the economy, but also why their number had multiplied during the previous century. Through a theoretical analysis of this process, the supply‑siders hoped to show that controls were not introduced to benefit consumers. This allowed them to campaign for their replacement by market competition. A major defence of regulation within the USA was as a method of dealing with ‘externalities’ which occured when prices and property rights couldn’t deal with the side‑effects of market competition. (Mithick 1980: 4, Nadel 1983: 21‑3) The classic example was pollution. Both producers and consumers often found it easier and cheaper to damage the enviroment because it was difficult to identify the costs of their harmful activities to ‘third parties’. Government regulations to limit pollution were defended as a method of controlling these ‘externalities’ of the market economy. In the mass media, interference of broadcasts by competing signals was the ‘externality’ which justified the powers of the FCC. If the deregulation school wished to criticise the effectiveness or necessity of such regulatory bodies, they had to discredit the statist solutions to the problems of ‘externalities’. Therefore, they claimed that the best way of correcting the ‘unintentional’ side-effects of competition was not state intervention, as it added ‘intentional’ inefficiencies into the marketplace. Instead, legislators should make a more effective use of the market mechanisms. (Mithick 1980: 4) For example, the supply‑siders saw that a clear definition of private property rights in the spectrum would allow the courts to deal with interference of a signal by other broadcasters. (Littlechild 1978: 65‑8) According to this analysis, interference became a form of trespass on private property in the electro-magnetic spectrum. (De Vany et al 1969: 1538) The defence of property rights was seen as the key role of the state within the market economy. If this duty was successfully carried out by the government, then further interventions into the media or other sections of the economy would be unnecessary.

    ‘The chaos of the airways … demonstrated why capitalism is incompatible with anarchism, why men do need a government and what is a government’s proper function. What was needed was legality, not controls.’ (Rand 1967: 125)

    From ‘Regulatory Capture’ to ‘Public Choice’

    The supply‑siders saw other less benign reasons for regulatory growth. The New Right echoed the populism of their New Left contemporaries by adopting the theory of ‘regulatory capture’. This analysis saw state regulation as the enforcement of cartels and price‑fixing. (Wilson 1971: 43; Wilson 1974: 157‑8; Posner 1974: 337‑8) Oligopolies had a major problem with ‘free riders’, who wished to benefit from monopoly pricing without restricting their own competitive activities. By controlling market entry and setting prices, a regulatory agency acted as the political enforcer of the rules of a cartel. (Stigler 1971: 3)

    ‘… in a subtle process of interaction with the regulators, the regulated party succeeds (perhaps not even deliberatly) in coopting the regulators into seeing things from their own perspective and thus giving them the regulation they want …’ (Mithick 1980: 95)

    The ‘captured’ regulatory agency acted as the planning agency for long‑term corporate strategies in each regulated sector. (Noll and Owen 1983: 32‑3) This view of regulation as a monopolists’ conspiracy was inspired by the work of the New Left economic historian Gabriel Kolko, who, as his conservative admirers admitted, was a self-acknowledged ‘Marxist’. (Kolko 1965; Noll and Owen 1983: 155) He saw ‘regulatory capture’ as big business using the state to monopolise branches of production under a smokescreen of reformist rhetoric. The supply‑siders’ populism was most evident in their appropriation of this New Leftanalysis. However, these conservatives were also worried about ‘agency capture’ of the regulated industry by big government. For them, political controls were was a surreptious form of nationalisation. (Wilson 1971: 46‑7) The right‑wing libertarians wished to direct public anger against the ‘new class’ of state bureaucrats rather than the old populist enemies of industrial monopolists and Wall Street bankers. They were critics of state controls, not the private corporations who benefited from them. (Phillips 1982: 42, 131‑2)

    Because the analysis of ‘regulatory capture’ was potentially anti‑capitalist, the supply‑siders tried to build a ‘… refined version of the capture theory.’ (Posner 1974: 343) They wanted to show that there was not a simple monopolists’ conspiracy to manipulate the regulatory agencies. Instead there was competition between different economic interest groups to control the agencies. (Wilson 1974: 159) This continual bargaining ensured that there could be no one permanent winner from regulatory controls. (Noll and Owen 1983: 158‑9) Moreover, this analysis allowed the supply‑siders to further develop their attack on state regulations. The establishment of regulatory agencies created competing interest groups by establishing a substitute for the market. (Noll and Owen 1983: 5) Competition was displaced from the market into the state. This allowed industries to buy from politicans those regulations which suited their interests. (Stigler 1974: 12‑3) There was a supply and demand for government action, controlled by the costs and prices of regulations. Industries were willing to pay so they could gain the benefits of cartelisation without the problems of ‘free riders’. These costs were passed onto the voter‑consumers in the form of monopoly prices.

    ‘Viewing regulation as a product allocated in accordance with basic principles of supply and demand directs attention to factors bearing on the value of regulation to particular individuals or groups, since, other things being equal, we can expect a product to be supplied to those who value it the most.’ (Posner 1974: 344)

    According to the supply-side theorists, companies used the legal forms of regulation as a substitute for market competition. (Baumol and Ordover 1985: 50) Each industry or company tried to obtain the regulatory structure which most benefited their economic interests. The supply‑siders had extended their analysis of market competition into the state itself. If political intervention shaped or ‘distorted’ market competition, then politics became a form of economics by other means. Competing industries were transformed into rival lobby groups. (Nadel 1983: 242‑3)

    ‘The industry which seeks regulation must be prepared to pay with the two things a party needs: voters and resources.’ (Stigler 1971: 12)

    Because they too were entrepreneurs, politicans were not always bribed by the corporate lobbies. Instead, by exploiting scandals to promote new regulations, politicans won votes from the disgruntled consumers of corporate commodities. (Wilson 1974: 144‑6) Sometimes, campaign contributions were not enough. This was an entrepreneurial analysis of political action. It showed that politicans and bureaucrats were not disinterested public servants, but were motivated by self‑interest. In other words, they were no better than the capitalists which they sought to regulate. This analysis drew on the work of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, both of whom had studied at the University of Chicago – the high temple of neo-liberal economics. Their approach was known as the ‘public choice’ school. They saw that, as ‘utility‑maximising individuals’, politicans wanted to be re‑elected and bureaucrats wished to maximise their power. Corporations could make bargains with the state because politicans needed campaign contributions and bureaucrats wanted promotion or easy work.

    ‘… students in this … economics of politics assume that all the individuals in government aim at raising their own utility, that is, serve their own interests within certain institutional limitations, and then inquire what policies they can be expected to pursue.’ (Tullock 1976: 2)

    By demonstrating the selfish motivations of the political entrepreneurs, these theorists promised both a more ‘realistic’ view of the state and reasons for limiting its power. For the electorate also was composed of rational individualists, who acted as both voters and consumers. They needed a ‘constitutional contract’ to provide a framework for the enforcement of property rights and the provision of public goods. But they also needed legal limits on the self‑interest of politicans and bureaucrats so that voters would benefit as consumers through the workings of the marketplace. (Locksley 1981) The discrediting of government actions was necessary for this renewed belief in effectivity of market competition. The supply‑siders wished to demonstrate by the ‘interest group’ theory of the state that the whole political process was not about service to the public, but a form of organised corruption.

    ‘[The American government’s] projects and ministrations were not spawned from higher principles, broad idealism or even humanitarian sentimentality; they were simply the flotsam and jetsam of a flagrently promiscuous poltics, the booty and spoils of organised thievery conducted within the descrated halls of government.’ (Stockman 1986: 35)

    Despite this denunciation of state intervention, the supply‑siders’ state theories in many ways paralleled those of the earler ‘pluralist’ school of American political scientists. (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1963) These had seen competing interest groups as the great achievement of the USA, especially when compared with the USSR. The supply‑siders created a more ‘economistic’ version of the work of these Cold War apologists. What they did reject was the political scientists’ New Deal reformism. For them, only the market could guarantee freedom and ‘choice’, not the mediation of the political process. This theoretical approach allowed the supply‑siders to explain the growth of regulation within the American system. Regulations which prevented competition and fixed prices acted as hidden taxes and subsidies. (Wilson 1974: 155) For instance, the content regulation of radio and television was seen as a hidden tax on the owners of stations. (Fowler and Brenner 1982: 220) This regulation also increased prices for advertisers. But the extent of this taxation or subsidy was limited by the willingness of the voters to pay for particular regulations. However, different interest groups could make agreements to support each others’ regulations or subsidies. This was known as ‘log rolling’, as agreement to inact one law was only possible through the passage of other pieces of legislation. ‘Public choice’ theorists were able to construct cost‑benefit analyses of whether a particular interest group would participate in such legislative coalitions. The tax cost of one measure to an interest group would be offset by the subsidy inherent in another law. This was seen as the basis of most politics within democratic states. Even the alliances which were necessary to create political parties were examples of this process. (Tullock 1976: 41‑51)

    Campaign contributions could encourage people to vote for particular candidates. But there were limits to how far money could buy votes. As self‑interested individuals, consumers voted for the combination of regulation and taxation which benefited them most. (Locksley 1981: 41‑5) Therefore the growth of regulation was limited by the ‘vote‑maximising price changes’ which any public agency could impose on the voter‑consumers. (Peltzman 1971: 119‑21) These prices could include non‑monetary rewards. But, because the politics of regulation had such economic benefits, they were shaped by those groups who gained most from them. Using a cost‑benefit analysis, it was proved that where the benefits were concentrated and the costs diffused, then regulations were more likely to be adopted. Smaller lobby groups had organisational advantages as they had less problem with ‘free riders’. (Wilson 1974: 140‑2; Noll and Owen 1983: 41‑3) This mathematical analysis was a neo‑classical economist’s proof of Robert Michels’ infamous ‘iron law of oligarchy’, expressed as the ‘… lower internal costs of organising political power’ in small groups. (Peltzman 1971: 127)

    Anarcho‑Capitalism

    The theorists of regulatory capture demonstrated that ‘market failure’ was matched by ‘government failure’. (Coase 1970: 55) Also that ‘imperfect markets’ were regulated by ‘imperfect governments’. (Wilson 1974: 137) Therefore most supply‑siders supported the call for a ‘minimal state’ which would only provide protection for property and defence against other countries. (Nozick 1974; Rand 1967) But some theorists rejected even this pessimistic view of state intervention. They were influenced by the ‘anarcho‑capitalist’ currents within the American Right. The espousal of anarchism by right‑wing economists was the logical conclusion of advocating market solutions to all social problems. The closeness of this type of New Right analysis to sections of the New Left was shown by the joint authorship of a book criticising the American state by anarchists of both varieties. (Radosh and Rothbard 1972) This type of supply‑siders wanted to show that state regulations were always unworkable, seeing that ‘… much of regulation appears to be a particularly cruel hoax.’ (Noll and Owen 1983: 155) They saw the state as the source of all social problems. Thus it was necessary to prove that the state could never regulate in the ‘public interest’.

    ‘Regulation may be a ritual in which the participants make a noisy but empty show of adversity in order to assure their respective constituencies of zeal, and then compromise at a level not far different from what the free market would have dictated.’ (Posner 1970: 35)

    Some theorists showed how the regulatory agencies could not limit even monopoly prices or profits. If prices were fixed, the quality of the service would decline instead. (Posner 1970: 32‑8; Stigler and Friedland 1970: 43‑8) They wanted to demonstrate that political decisions were less effective than even monopolistic price competition. Others took a less dramatic view, they saw regulatory agencies as simply incapable of carrying out their allotted tasks. The agencies could not know all the information which they needed successfully to regulate. Only the owners of an enterprise possessed such knowledge. The patriarchs of the ‘Austrian school’, such as Friedrich vHayek and Ludwig von Mises, emphasised price competition was the best method of overcoming the problems of information costs within the economy. Market competition was seen as a process of discovering the needs of consumers and the cheapest methods of supplying them. (Littlechild 1978: 23‑4) Therefore regulatory discretion was seen as a major problem of interventionist agencies. The FCC was presented as a major culprit in this arbitrary decision‑making. (Wilson 1971: 51‑4) In the American legal system, there was the added complications of enforcement, with regulatory judgements having to be carried through ‘due process’ if they were to be enforced in the courts. (Stone 1976: 189‑90)

    The Costs of Regulation

    The supply‑siders’ critique was not solely of the failures and inabilities of governments. Also they emphasised the various economic costs of regulation. The ‘public interest’ theorists claimed that regulations were used to control corporations, giving tangible benefits for the voter‑consumers. The supply‑siders wished to prove that these benefits were only short‑term, if not completely illusory. For them, only the market could produce the greatest benefits for people in the long‑term. They proved the ‘inefficency’ of non‑market decision making through its imposition of increased costs on consumers. (Wilson 1971: 44‑6) This analysis rested on a tautology: only competitive marginal prices could allocate resources in an optimal way for society as a whole. As regulation involved limiting market entry and price‑fixing, it stopped marginal pricing occuring. Therefore, by definition, regulated industries were ‘inefficient’, as non‑marginal prices were effectively taxes on the voter‑consumers. (Shepherd 1975: 254‑6) These sectors were misallocating resources because they were not maximising the potential benefits of consumers. (Baumol and Ordover 1985: 250) Moreover, especially when revenues derived from a percentage of investment, regulated industries overused capital as well. (Shepherd 1975: 243‑5) This analysis was a direct refutation of ‘public interest’ analyses. The supply‑siders had changed the definition of what was the interest of the public. They constructed a circular argument whereby market competition both defined and created the needs of people.

    For the supply‑siders, the necessity for marginal pricing lay in technological innovation and change. A regulated industry was ‘anti‑Darwinian with a vengeance’. (Shepherd 1975: 233) Regulations created inertia and rigidities because they prevented market entry and limited profits. (Wilson 1971: 57‑8; Peltzman 1971: 121‑2) As their profits and markets were secure, regulated companies introduced new technologies slowly and did not take risks. Regulations had to be weakened if technological innovation was to be encouraged.

    ‘The presence of regulation…confers benefits on those who have an incentive to resist economic change.’ (Owen 1983: 137)

    Some theorists argued that even limitations on monopoly profits were undesirable because this discouraged innovation in these types of companies! (Baumol 1975: 189‑91; Posner 1970: 37) Without the incentive of ever higher profits, monopolies delayed the introduction of new technologies. The long‑term costs of slow technological innovation outweighed any short‑term benefits of regulation, even in monopolised industries. The supply‑siders saw technological changes as the solution to the problem of ‘natural monopolies’, such as public utilities. Historically, this had been one of the ‘public interest’ defences of regulation. However, the introduction of new technologies was undermining these old monopolies and removing the justification for regulation. (Shepherd 1975: 226‑7; Noll and Owen 1983: 37) The media and telecommunications were prime examples of this process for the deregulators. The new forms of production undermined the old boundaries between industries. Technological innovation was removing the necessity for the regulation even of utilities. Theorists constructed a life‑cycle of regulatory agencies. They saw their rise and fall in response to the development of a sector of production. (Shepherd 1975: 227‑9; Stone 1976: 187) The importance of this approach was its prophecy of the death of agencies. This occurred when new technology allowed an industry to be ‘returned’ to the market. Deregulation was an act of euthanasia.

    Both for government and corporations, the removal of ‘obsolete’ regulations was a cost‑cutting measure. The supply‑siders emphasised the large costs for companies involved in complying with regulations. They believed that market prices alone could determine the production of commodities. The law was the only workable defence against unwanted ‘externalities’, not state intervention. The major target of the deregulators was the growth of the state itself. The campaign against big government included cutting back on the costs of the regulatory agencies. The restriction of agency budgets ensured they would not have the staff or resources to moniter corporations too closely. The economic crisis of the 1970s gave the opportunity for the supply‑siders to put their theories into action.

    ‘… the rising costs of regulation have collided with incomes that may have become stationary under inflation … the common interests of government and business in economic development have diverged over the costlines of some of the social regulation.’ (Mithick 1980: 424)

    The supply‑siders’ theories justified deregulation as a return to market freedoms. But, for their corporate backers, it represented ‘… a return to the days before Ralph Nader.’ (Phillips 1982: 51) It was estimated that the abolition of regulatory controls under the first Reagan administration saved the corporations $11 billion in ‘one‑time’ benefits and over $10 billion annually as well. (Weidenbaum 1984: 36‑7) Though less important to the corporations than Reagan’s tax cuts and deficit spending, it did represent a considerable boost to corporate profits at a period of crisis. (Jasinowski 1984: 46) Deregulation was part of impetus for the ‘Reagan boom’ which occurred during the late 1980s.

    Regulating for Free Markets

    But most supply‑siders did not simply want to abolish or cripple the regulatory agencies. They wished to move towards a new type of regulatory body. This was to be not only cheaper to run, but also to have very different goals. If the pioneer regulatory agencies had been designed to enforce cartels and price‑fixing, the new style agencies were to encourage market competition. Deregulation should involve the control of industries by the market, instead of politicans. The supply‑siders were influenced by the need for incentives for entrepreneurship advocated by the ‘Austrian School’. Removing barriers to entry, along with tax cuts, were seen as encouraging capitalists to seek out ‘profit opportunities’ and invest in innovation. (Littlechild 1978: 30)

    ‘… incentives are a powerful force for serving the interests of the general public and can be effectively channelled to that end by enlightened, procompetitive regulatory policies.’ (Noll and Owen 1983: 161)

    The survival of the regulatory agencies was necessary only to enforce competition policy. Continued support in US Congress for the agencies was conditional on their adoption of deregulation policies. (Nadel 1983: 224‑30) The marginal pricing of all commodities was the most overt aim of this change in regulatory policy. The state was now seen in an anti‑trust role, rather than as the organiser of cartels. Deregulation was the method of encouraging market entry by new competitors. The remaining regulations were to be designed to help new companies enter previously protected markets. The regulatory agencies were to become the watchdogs of market competition, preventing industries succumbing to inertia through monopoly domination. Especially in the introduction of new technologies, market entry was the method of ensuring that there was market change. Consumers would benefit through lower prices and new products. (Noll and Owen 1983: 60‑3) The only limitation seen for this strategy was how far entry could be successfully arranged. But, it was hoped, new technologies would make the remaining ‘natural monopolies’ more competitive, even if the new entrants did not suceed. (Shepherd 1975: 238)

    Deregulating the Mass Media

    The deregulation of the mass media was a major objective of the supply‑siders. This was because the media was seen as one of the new ‘sunrise’ industries which were changing the nature of American capitalism. It was a key sector of the emerging ‘post‑industrial’, ‘technetronic’ or ‘third wave’ society. (Bell 1973; Brzezinski 1970; Toffler 1980) But attempts to introduce deregulation by revising the 1934 Communications Act were blocked in the US Congress, with the notable exception of the 1984 Cable Act. However, even though the legislation could not be changed, deregulators were successfully nominated as FCC commissioners. (Tunstall 1986: 220‑257) By the late 1970s, the FCC had taken a ‘leadership role’ in deregulation in the USA. (Noll and Owen 1983: 157) This was not simply a result of a change of personnel, but also because of the new advances in media and telecommunications technology. The FCC supply‑siders wished to take advantage of technological advances to bring about market competition. They wanted to end the anomaly of a regulated electronic media and an unregulated newspaper industry. They thought radio and television broadcasting should benefit from the First Amendment. This constitutional guarantee gave the right of the ‘free trade’ in ideas without government interference to media capitalists. The FCC had always used the First Amendment to justify regulatory policy. In the 1960s, the FCC had interpreted the First Amendment as the right of access for all citizens. But, by the late 1970s, the FCC took a more ‘literalist’ approach, taking the Founding Fathers’ nostrums at their word.

    ‘..those who would justify regulation by pointing to a programme’s potential to offend viewers stand the First Amendment on its head… Only words and ideas that trouble or confound need the special aid of constitutional protection.’ (Fowler and Brenner 1982: 229)

    But this support for ‘free speech’ was somewhat disingenuous. In practice, it meant supporting rights of station owners to broadcast more than the FCC permitted amounts of advertising, rather than encouraging political radicals to make programmes! (Tunstall 1986: 145‑7) Also the First Amendment was used as a justification for enforcing the market allocation of stations and frequencies. The ‘public interest’ was now to be served by competition between stations. The American network television was seen as superior to the British state capitalist model. As a monopoly, the BBC was paternalistic, elitist and unresponsive to the desires of its viewers. In contrast, competition for advertising meant that the American television networks provided popular programmes to attract a mass audience. Moreover, whatever its contemporary drawbacks, commercial ownership would lead to technological innovation in the long‑term. (Coase 1970: 96‑8) Therefore the regulation of the airwaves was ‘inefficient’. Instead of licencing stations as ‘public trustees’, the FCC should be promoting the exclusive ownership of frequencies and making them into tradeable commodities. The mass media was a capitalist enterprise like any other.

    ‘For a variety of reasons, the Commission [the FCC] has traditionally refused to recognise the undeniable fact that commercial broadcasting is a business. But it is a business, one that faces increasing competition in the years ahead for the eyes and ears of its audience.’ (Fowler and Brenner 1982: 210)

    The supply‑siders claimed that market competition was the only way to optimise the use of the spectrum. (De Vany et al 1969: 1505‑7; Fowler and Brenner 1982: 210‑12) US president Ronald Reagan’s head of the FCC saw frequencies as commodities which should be treated like any other economic good: owned as private and alienable property. He dismissed the frequency shortage arguments for regulation because neo‑classical economics saw ‘… virtually all goods in society are scarce.’ (Fowler and Brenner 1982: 221) Price rationing encouraged greater use of the limited resources than government protectionism. For some supply‑siders, the best way to encourage the optimal use of the spectrum was to auction frequencies to the highest bidder. This ensured both the transformation of the spectrum into private property and encouraged its greatest possible use. (Wilson 1971: 56; Coase 1970: 100; Fowler and Brenner 1982: 221) No longer would the FCC allocate frequencies ‘gratuitously’ to its friends, but instead would have to sell them in ‘… an objectively defined, open, impartial process.’ (Rand 1967: 127, 129)

    The FCC’s role would become the enforcement of the market in property rights over the spectrum. (De Vany et al 1969: 1507‑8, 1529‑31) It would create legally enforceable property packages within the spectrum. These should consist of designated ‘rights’ over the time, area and spectrum used for broadcasting. This would create clear boundary lines between the owners of broadcasting frequencies. Any inflexibility in the original division of the airwaves would be overcome through subsequent recombinations during successive sales and purchases. This meant the FCC had also to lay down clear rules for the exchange of frequencies between owners. (De Vany et al 1969: 1505‑18, 1551‑2, 1538‑40) Only as private property would the scarcity of frequency space encourage technological innovation. Then the spectrum could be utilised for as many different services as possible. It even opened up the broadcasting frequencies for use by non‑broadcasting services. (Fowler and Brenner 1982: 224‑6) In the last resort, the broadcasting deregulators advanced the ‘technological fix’ as the solution to any market imperfections. The long‑term benefits of competition would outweigh any short‑term losses from lack of regulatory oversight. The introduction of pay television by cable companies was seen as the major solution to the problems of limited programme choice in commercial broadcasting. The ‘distortions’ caused by indirect funding by advertising would be overcome once television and radio programmes could become properly tradeable commodities. (Wilson 1971: 56)

    ‘…consumers who were willing to pay more for resources used in the broadcasting industry than were the advertisers could secure the kind of programs they wanted.’ (Coase 1970: 101)

    The Limitations of the Supply‑Side Theories

    The supply‑side approach demonstrated, and even magnified, the indequacies of neo‑classical economics. This type of analysis ‘… is characterised by extreme individualism in methodology, by an unhistorical point of view, and by taking consumption as its point of departure.’ (Bukharin 1972: 36; Littlechild 1978: 20‑3, 28) It was based on a concept of value which ignored the specificity of capitalism as a mode of production. Instead, neo‑classical economics drew on an ahistorical and eternal relationship between people and nature. (Hilferding 1984: 133‑4; Bukharin 1972: 46‑54) Its ‘individual‑psychological’ theory of price was fundamentally unscientific as it was derived from the use value of commodities, rather than their exchange values. (Marx 1973: 267‑8) But the supply‑siders were not just wrong in theory, they were also utopians. They dreamt of a capitalism without slumps, unemployment and wars. The supply‑siders believed that if reality could be made more like their theories, then all would be well. They resembled an earlier believer in the benificence of the stateless market.

    ‘Instead of saying like everyone else: when the weather is fine, a lot of people are to be seen going out for a walk, [this type of theorist] makes his people go out for a walk in order to be able to ensure them fine weather.’ (Marx 1978: 55)

    The supply‑siders were entrepreneurs, working as academics directly or indirectly for the large corporations. They made their living out of producing theories which pleased their patrons. (Marx and Engels 1970: 65) However, it is important to understand why the large corporations decided to fund these theorists and bring them in from the fringes of American intellectual life. This patronage of the supply‑side theorists represented a change in the attitudes of big business towards state regulation. In the 1920s and 1930s, corporations like General Electric (GE) supported government intervention into the economy. In broadcasting, its RCA and NBC subsidaries were the major beneficaries of the FCC’s cartelisation of the airwaves. But, by the 1960s, GE was funding the economists and engineers who were advocating the deregulation of broadcasting. (De Vany et al 1969) GE wanted to break down the regulatory barriers to technological innovation, as well as seeking a domestic regime which would justify global ‘free trade’ in the media and other communications services. This change in the direction of corporate lobbying was a major contributory factor to the rise of the New Right economists.

    By the early 1980s, their views were the ‘official economic theology’ of US president Reagan’s administration and many other Western governments. (Phillips 1982: 50) Some analysts have seen the rise of the New Right primarily in political and ideological terms. (Hall and Jacques 1983) This approach theorised the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state from the accumulation of capital in production. But the New Right itself had a more sophisticated approach than the political scientists and Eurocommunists. In their hero Coolidge’s famous words, they saw that “the business of government is business”. Sometimes politicans and bureaucrats were the competitors of private capitalism, especially when the state owned and controlled sectors of capital. But they were also the hirelings of the large corporations. Nowhere was this more true than the USA. The ‘realism’ of the ‘public choice’ examination of the state lay in this school’s attempts, however schematically, to chart this close interconnection between the public and private sectors. The examination of ‘log‑rolling’ showed how different groups allied to utilise the state to further their own interests, rather than helping to advance some abstract ‘public interest’. These theorists even claimed that this approach was inspired by Marx’s political analysis! (Tullock 1976: 1)

    The supply‑siders attempted to construct a political economy of the state with the limited tools of neo‑classical economics. They concentrated on the key questions of who paid for state intervention and how it was organised. Cost‑benefit analysis allowed them to see beyond the wishful thinking of the New Deal apologists. The supply‑siders wanted to know who gained and who lost financially from political struggles. Moreover, they showed how regulations emerged as the result of struggles between different interest groups. Therefore the supply‑siders could construct an analysis of the bureaucratic politics of regulatory agencies. No longer were they seen as disinterested public servants, or even a conspiracy of monopolists. Instead they were a method of ‘log‑rolling’ between different factions of capital. However, this analysis was an abstraction of American politics in one period. The historically specific nature of the American state was eternalised as an abstract theory of all states in all times. As neo‑classical economists, they were completely ahistorical. These advocates of the ‘nightwatchman state’ could not explain why the policies of the Coolidge era were ever abandoned, or even why these orthodoxies came back into fashion. Ironically, their greatest weakness was their inability to understand their own sudden success as academic entrepreneurs. They could not explain why their theories were at the centre of public policy after years of neglect.

    The rise of the supply‑siders was based on their use value for the large corporations. They may have been theoretically wrong, but they could provide intellectually coherent defences of the policies adopted by the new wave of conservative governments. The dissection of their explanations of social reality explains less than an examination of the social changes inherent in accepting their analysis of the crisis of capitalism. The adoption of supply‑side nostrums was a response to a profound crisis with the predominant regime of accumulation adopted in response to the Despression of the 1930s. The return to the old orthodoxies of the 1920s was not simply amnesia concerning the last economic catastrophe. This was because the doctrines of laissez‑faire were not simply reactionary by the late 1970s. In many ways, they abstracted new tendencies within Fordism in crisis. In the early 1970s, the long boom was coming to an end. The hegemonic power of international Fordism, the USA, was losing its predominant position to its erstwhile allies, Japan, France and West Germany, while simultaneously being challenged in the peripherary by the growth of Third World nationalism. The post‑war order was reaching its limits, not only as an international system of states, but also as a particular stage in the history of capitalism. Governments attempted to use the standard methods of Keynesian ‘pump‑priming’ to escape from the crisis, only to find themselves faced with the problems of low growth coupled with inflation: ‘stagflation’. At this point, the Keynesian orthodoxies came increasingly under question. As the 1980s began, the ‘monetarist shock’ took place.

    ‘…a decision to open up the crisis, to challenge the distribution of value‑added between capital and wages, and to refuse credit to insolvent capitals and consumers.’ (Lipietz 1987: 159)

    The transformation of the supply‑side theorists into gurus of the new order, along with other New Right neo‑classical economists, must be put in this context. As the post‑war system broke down, it was thought that American capitalism needed a period of crisis to restructure itself. The old boundaries between different branches of production were being broken down by new technologies. The pace of such technological change was slowed down by regulatory restraints. For the backers of the New Right, market instability became preferable to ‘regulatory overload’ and economic stagnation. The supply‑siders did not just share Say’s schematism, but also Bakunin’s belief that the urge to destroy was a creative one! It was in this way that supply‑side economics, for all its mathematical charts, was truly post‑modernist in its ‘…affirmation of human and irrational qualities.’ (Phillips 1982: 142)

    The ‘monetarist shock’ did cause a major international crisis, which could only be reversed through a new period of credit expansion and deficit spending. It was at this point that supply‑side economics became the major theology of New Right governments. It provided the justification for the Reagan government’s policies of tax‑cutting. (Stockman 1982) The supply‑siders also offered other antidotes to the crisis of Fordism. They emphasised microeconomic solutions to macroeconomic problems. As governments had already applied Keynesian countermeasures, the crisis did not take the form of overproduction, but of profitability. (Lipietz 1987: 43) Measures such as tax cuts, defence spending and deregulation were methods of raising the rate of profit for corporate capitalism. (Lipietz 1987: 168) Therefore the embracing of supply‑side remedies by corporate funders and governments must be located in this historically specific crisis of Fordism. The theoretical justifications of deregulation are only one part of a wider attempt to construct countertendencies to the crisis.

    Nowhere is this clearer than in the advocacy of marginal pricing in the supply‑siders’ schemas. Average pricing rested on cross‑subsidisation between different sectors of production. This encouraged the formation of monopolies through the subsidisation of price wars in potentially competitive areas. Through state validation of credit, mass production of consumer commodities became the basic form of capitalism under Fordism. (Aglietta 1979) Also it allowed the long‑term planning of capital accumulation by these monopolies. A major theme of the ‘Austrian School’ was how this planning through ‘just prices’ and ‘fair wages’ was the first step towards the totalitarian state. (Hayek 1962: 76‑88; Stalin 1952: 26‑9) The neo‑classical economists were right when they saw the theories of ‘natural monopoly’, ‘common carriers’ and ‘public service’ as the ideological expressions of corporate or state cartelisation of production. But, on the other hand, the supply‑siders themselves were providing theorical justifications for the next stage of capitalism.

    In reality, marginal pricing often only was a ‘doctrinal principle’, as it was based on personal judgements on the choices open to capitalist firms. (Melody 1974: 289‑90, 296‑7) But its adoption still encouraged market competition in all sectors of production. A lowering of the costs of market entry meant that large corporations would no longer cross‑subsidise across society to protect a monopoly position. This intensified the pressure to lower the socially necessary labour‑time embodied in commodities through a restructuring of the means and methods of production. Deregulation represented the enforced maximisation of profitability in each branch of capitalist production, even at the expense of successful accumulation across society as a whole. The corporations abandoned their less profitable markets in favour of concentrating on the core consumers. More choice for some led to less for others. This was the ‘Brazilian solution’ to the crisis of Fordism, as it was a recovery in profitablity which did not cover the whole population. Whereas earlier stages of Fordism had produced mass consumer goods for all wage‑earners, this solution threatened to create an ‘underclass’ which was outside the benefits of capitalist growth. There was a more restricted distribution of the fruits of capital accumulation in ‘technetronic’ civilisation. The new stage of Fordism was ‘exclusionary’. (Lipietz 1987: 169) Therefore the solutions of the supply‑siders threatened to be destabilising.

    ‘… supply‑siders … focus on short‑term growth and earnings with little concern for long‑term social and economic by‑products.’ (Rinder 1984: 27)

    But this period of instabilty was seen as necessary to beat the USA’s international rivals. This was crisis as restructuring. Marginal pricing would wake up the corporations from their inertia and rigidity. It would speed up the main areas of restructuring: technological innovation and changes in working patterns. The ‘information revolution’ was designed to break down boundaries between cartelised sectors, allowing new entrants into hitherto protected markets. New types of work practices, such as ‘flexible specialisation’, were to be introduced.

    The adoption of the practice and theories of deregulation was the political expression of this process of restructuring production. The Fordist regime of accumulation had to change its mode of regulation as it adapted itself to its exclusionary form. This Brazilian solution seemed to be inevitable within the evolution of the production process. But the policies of deregulation helped speed up this developemt. The internationalisation of production was undermining the possibilities of national regulation of the crisis. (Lipietz 1987: 42) However, the state was used to encourage market competition within hitherto protected branches of production. This showed that the transformation had local roots as well. The double move towards privatisation and globalisation attacked the National Fordist state both internally and externally. Deregulation may have presented itself as a return to the virtues of the past. But it was actually a possible solution for the failures of the Keynesians to avert the crisis.

    ‘Legislation, whether political or civil, never does more than proclaim, express in words, the will of economic relations.’ (Marx 1978: 76)

    The changes in media regulation policy illustrate the parallel transformation of media production. The first stages of Fordism in the media were systems based on funding by licence fees or mass advertising. These types of broadcasting corporations created the demand for mass produced radio and television sets. They provided programmes for the mass audiences who owned these commodities. The state regulated broadcasting to form public or private monopolies to provide radio and television broadcasting on a national basis. This type of regulation was typical of Fordism in its inclusive stage. The moves towards deregulation illustrate the changes in media production. Mass advertising and licence fees started to reach their limits during the peak of the post‑war boom. Also new technologies allowed for an increase in the number and types of stations which could be provided. The introduction of subscription television channels and targeted advertising illustrated the possibilities of new developments in broadcasting technology and funding. These new services were no longer designed to be consumed by the whole population. Instead, the tiered market was to be introduced into the electronic media, creating the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’.

    Some of the solutions of the supply‑siders were difficult to apply to the media. It was not easy to adopt the marginal pricing of radio or television programmes when their cost of reproduction was almost zero! There were also the technical problems of turning each programme into individual commodities within the broadcast media. Therefore the advocates of deregulation concentrated on the removal of regulatory restrictions on the provision of new radio and television services. The auctioning of frequencies was the ultimate expression of the supply‑side policies for the restructuring the mass media. No longer were these vital means of production to be owned by the state. As privatised property, they would only be used for services which could be profitably provided. Even on frequencies assigned for the media, non‑broadcasting services could be substituted if they produced more revenue than radio or television programmes. This was a vision of a Brazil in the media. The ‘exclusionary’ stage of Fordism was introduced into broadcasting through these developments. The structures of state intervention were changed to encourage this market competition. But this process of deregulation occured because of the more profound problems within the production of media. The new types of regulatory agency were an expression of this process, not its cause.

    But it is unwise to see the deregulation of the mass media as necessarily the future of broadcasting. The governments of Western Europe have followed the American example as the only way to reach the promised ‘post‑industrial’ society. Deregulation is seen as the best method of creating ‘national champions’ which can successfully compete in the global media market. The British government is proposing to try supply‑side remedies which even the FCC has not adopted, such as the auctioning of frequencies. However, as with other theories of ‘post‑Fordism’, this vision of a deregulated media ‘… involves a selective description of the past and an abstract norm for the development of the future.’ (Bonefield 1987: 121) Not only does it ignore that deregulation is only one possible solution to the restructuring of the media, it also does not take into account possible changes in the wider regime of accumulation. The solutions of the New Right will not necessarily provide a permanent solution to the crisis. The financial crash of 19th October 1987 (Black Monday) highlighted that the boom and bust cycle still ruled over capitalism. The revival of protectionism and the retreat from internationalisation of production was always a possible alternative. National Fordism could yet reappear, relegating the supply‑siders once again to the fringes of economic theories. This is why the emergence of fibre optic networks shows how even subscription television could herald a different future for broadcasting. These networks could act as a new ‘common carrier’, providing a host of media and interactive services. Is a new period of state regulation and inclusive Fordism ready and waiting? Only time will tell…

    =============================================================

    Thanks to: Vincent Porter, Geoff Mulgan and Gareth Locksley.

    This paper was written in March 1988 for the Centre for Communication and Information Studies, Polytechnic of Central London, London, England.

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  • THE POLICEMAN OF THE ETHER

    An Analysis of State Regulation and Intervention in American and British Radio Broadcasting in the 1920s and 1930s 

    Under the Thatcher government, the mass media has not been often at the centre of political debate. Despite lobbying from right‑wing think‑tanks and commercial interests, present policies are marked more by confusion and paralysis than by ‘the resolute approach’. The Tories are caught in an insoluble contradiction between the desire to deregulate in favour of market provision of media and a fear of the anarchic consequences of abandoning state control. The forthcoming Broadcasting Bill will force the government into some hard choices. But this not a new problem in the history of the electronic mass media. This branch of production originated from a close and intimate relationship between commercial interests and the state. An examination of radio broadcasting during the inter‑war period shows this clearly. In both the USA and Britain, the state intervened in the nascent broadcasting industries to facilitate the establishment of a successful sector of production. The different solutions to the problems posed by the introduction of radio broadcasting adopted in both countries served as models for subsequent developments in the electronic mass media, most notably television. In fact, the present debate between the advocates of market choice and public service is an ideological expression of these rival models of broadcasting organisation.

    However the vigour of the debate has obscured the close similarities which link both systems. An analysis of the genesis of commercial and state broadcasting systems shows that their origins were not the result of any coherent planning by the state. Instead its interventions were ad-hoc and contradictory, responding to the contemporary crisis by adopting solutions which were seem as pragmatic. Only after both methods of organising broadcasting proved successful, were apologists for ‘free speech’ and ‘public service’ employed to justify the broadcasting status quo in Britain and the USA. Today, these national systems of broadcasting are challenged from both inside and outside their domains. Therefore, it is now necessary to construct a more materialist approach to the origins of commercial and state broadcasting systems. Above all, such an analysis must be based in history. The relationship between the state and the media must be placed in its context. The most basic reasons for the emergence of the mass media must be understood before the specific relationships between the state and broadcasting in individual countries can be examined

    The mass media have only existed in capitalist societies. Newspapers, radio, television and the other cultural industries emerged as part of a more general transformation of social existence. Capitalism is distinguished from all previous modes of production by its relentless innovation in both the methods and methods of production. (Marx and Engels 1975: 36) This involves not only changing the way of creating existing use values, but also the introduction of completely new goods and services. (Marx 1973: 409) The mass media is a prime example of this process. For example, radio first appears at the end of the nineteenth century. It was one result of an extensive exploration of the uses of electro‑magnetism during this period. Scientific labour was organised to produce the knowledge needed to create electric motors, lights, trams, telephones, telegraphy and many other innovations. (Dunsheath 1962) Electro‑magnetism could only be discovered as a series of commodities, including radio. The first use for radio was as wireless telegraphy in long‑distance and marine communications. (Sturmey 1958: 61, 87‑8) As such, it played a key role in binding together the European empires of the period. (Headrick 1981: 207‑8)

    But neither the wireless telegraphy companies nor their governments foresaw the emergence of a new use value for radio. It was the amateur ‘experimenters’ who discovered the joys of radio broadcasting. (Barnouw 1966: 27‑8; Briggs 1961: 53‑5; S. Briggs 1981: 26‑30) In turn, corporations engaged in radio set or related areas of production saw the opportunity to open up a completely new market. By turning the radio set from the toy of amateur scientists into a household commodity, the corporations built up one of the leading industries of the inter‑war period. (Sturmey 1958: 155) Along with automobiles, radio sets ‘…were the brightest flowers of the Coolidge prosperity.’ (Allen 1931: 410) By the 1930s, almost every household in the USA and Britain owned a radio set. (TNEC 1940b: 120; Coase 1950: 199) The radio industry was the hi‑tech sector of its era. This was shown in various ways:

    • It relied on constant technical innovation both for its existence and continued expansion;
    • It used the most advanced means of production, especially assembly‑line methods;
    • It adopted the methods of Taylorism in organising its workers, as demonstrated by its hierarchy of administrative/scientific, skilled and semi/unskilled workers;
    • It was owned by corporations organised into cartels and controlled by the bankocracy;
    • It was supported and aided by the state as a key national industry.

    During this period, the American and British states aided their radio manufacturing interests in a number of ways. They preserved capitalist property from external and internal enemies. They also provided the legal framework necessary for commodity circulation. Beyond this, the law also gave the manufacturing cartels protection through guaranteeing their ‘patent pools’. This allowed them to dominate their smaller rivals. (TNEC 1940a: 158‑60; Sturmey 1958: 214‑34) Furthermore, both states levied tariffs on imported radio sets to protect their home industries. (TNEC 1940: 290; Sturmey 1958: 145; Briggs 1961: 115‑6) The American state intervened even further. It forced the ‘foreign’ Marconi company to sell its American assets to its rival: the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). The creation of the American radio trust was initially the work of the U.S. Navy! (Hammond 1941: 376) But if both countries’ manufacturing industries were very similar, their broadcasting industries took different paths of development. Radio manufacturing became a boom industry. The radio set was a veritable commodity, which could be bought and sold like any other. The problem of commoditising electro‑magnetism was solved in the receiver industry. But radio broadcasting was entirely different. The very success of the transformation of radio sets into commodities undermined the turning of radio programmes into commodities.

    ‘…the greatest advantage of radio‑ its universality and, generally speaking, its ability to reach everybody everywhere‑ in themselves limit, if not completely destroy, that element of control essential to any program calling for continued payment by the public.’ (Sarnoff 1939: 106) 

    This problem appeared as a limitation in the material‑technical basis of radio broadcasting. Programmes could not be sold individually or as a service in the market place. However the difficulty of commodity‑formation in broadcasting was wholly social in origins. It is only under capitalism that production can only be carried out as a valorisation process, as the accumulation of capital as capital. The role of state intervention into radio broadcasting in this period was shaped by this fundamental problem facing radio broadcasting. The different national solutions adopted in the USA and Britain resulted from the same problem of commodity‑formation.

    In the USA, the amateurs were the first people to open up the airwaves for broadcasting. They were rapidly followed by universities, churches, political groups, municipal administrations and others. (Eoyang 1937: 155) Even when they were commercial companies, what united these early stations was that they did not see radio broadcasting as profit‑making. There appeared to be no way of charging for programme reception, so these stations were run as philanthropic organisations. But as set ownership spread, the problem of financing radio broadcasting grew. The investment in studios and professional workers demanded a steady source of income. (Sarnoff 1939: 186) The manufacturing industry was initially interested in broadcasting as an after‑sales service. It was necessary to preserve the use value of sets after purchase by providing programmes for listening to. Early suggestions for funding American broadcasting included levies on set sales, charitable donations, municipal funding and taxes. (Barnouw 1966: 109, 155‑7)

    But it was the discovery of selling airtime for advertising which solved the problem of commodity‑formation in American radio broadcasting. If the programmes could not be sold to the listeners, then the listeners could be sold to the programmers instead. There were specific reasons why advertising could provide the revenue for radio broadcasting in the USA, such as the lack of national newspapers, the growth in the consumption of mass produced commodities and so on. (Boucheron 1928) The importance of this discovery for radio broadcasting was that it turned radio stations into businesses. There were immediate consequences of the transformation of broadcasting. First, the number of stations increased rapidly. Many different entrepreneurs wanted a share of the lucrative urban advertising markets. This resulted in ‘transmitter wars’ as rival stations sought to drown out their competitors with ever more powerful equipment. In turn, the radio manufacturing cartel no longer saw broadcasting simply as an after‑sales service for their sets. It was now a lucrative sector of production which RCA wished to dominate.

    The strategy of the cartel to monopolise radio was based on overturning the existing regulatory structure in broadcasting. This had emerged haphazardly during the previous two decades. The first radio legislation in the USA was the 1912 Radio Act. (Davies 1928: 163) This had been passed before the emergence of radio as a mass media. It was designed to prevent naval and amateur broadcasters from interfering which each others’ broadcasts. It was primarily a registration act, which gave the Department of Commerce only limited powers. (Davies 1928: 165) With the growth in radio broadcasting, the American government was faced with new problems which could not be solved under the old legislation. The 1912 Radio Act did not clarify who owned the airwaves. The consequence of this situation was the ‘transmitter wars’, which caused mutual interference between the competing stations. There was public pressure for regulation to prevent listening being ruined by ‘whistles and squeals’ caused by overlapping signals. (Davies 1928: 170) Clear property rights needed to be established over frequencies and locations. But when the Department of Commerce tried to control the number and power of radio stations, it was challenged in the courts. The American state was subject to its supreme law: the Constitution. This had been written to prevent government restrictions on free competition. (Beard 1969) Therefore the courts upheld the rights of individual capitalists to enter this new and lucrative market. (Davies 1928: 169) Furthermore, the First Amendment specifically guaranteed the right of every capitalist to ‘free trade’ in ideas. The ‘independent’ radio stations sought the same privileges as their newspaper rivals. By the mid‑1920s, it seemed as if the USA was setting up the first ‘deregulated’ electronic media. If individual frequencies and positions could have been protected, then radio stations would have become fully integrated into the market economy.

    However, though the courts guaranteed free entry into the marketplace, they did not divide up the airwaves into private bourgeois property. As the number of stations increased, so did the interference. Therefore the politicians decided to act. The result was the 1927 Radio Act, one of the most important pieces of American legislation of this era. The 1927 Act was ‘…the most severe, the most drastic, and most confining which was ever imposed upon any American business.’ (Davies 1928: 171) It expropriated millions of dollars of private property. Investments in studios and staff became worthless overnight. (Davies 1928: 172) This legislation laid the basis for state regulation by nationalising the airwaves. It gave the American government the power to decide who should broadcast. It set up a Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to divide up the frequencies and broadcast areas among the competing stations. This guaranteed interference‑free broadcasting for the listeners.

    The 1927 Act was presented as a ‘progressive’ measure with state regulation ensuring private interests provided the American listeners with adequate services. It was also a precursor of the policies of the New Deal. During the 1930s, the state regulated other sectors of the economy to prevent the unfortunate consequences of ‘too much’ competition. But the 1927 Act was not simply an act of regulation. Though it established bourgeois property rights on the airwaves, it also represented a massive redistribution of these frequencies from the ‘independents’ to the corporations. (Brindze 1937: 28; FCC 1940: 10) The FRC was modeled on the commission established to prevent monopolies under the Clayton Act. (Eoyang 1937: 197) This was very ironic, as the FRC is one of the first and best examples of ‘regulatory capture’. This occurs when a regulated industry uses the state to exclude competitors. 

    If the USA had adopted a more laissez‑faire approach to organising broadcasting, then the radio cartel could have slowly bought‑out its ‘independent’ rivals. But using the FRC was quicker and cheaper. The FRC harried the ‘independents’ either into closure or onto the margins of the broadcasting system. Licences were refused, frequencies continually changed and transmitter power restricted. (Barnouw 1966: 258‑60) The technical problem of allocating specific frequencies and locations to individual stations was used to mask a political economic decision. On the surface, 1930s American radio appeared as 600 local stations, many owned by small capitalists. But this diversity masked a uniformity created by the networks of RCA/NBC and CBS. These local stations were contracted as franchises for the programmes of the broadcasting corporations. (FCC 1940: 71) This allowed the networks to centralise most radio production in one city: New York. (Brindze 1937: 54; FCC 1940: 11) A few thousand workers could broadcast to millions of listeners through three key stations and AT&T’s telephone lines. (Eoyang 1937: 163) Through the FRC, the networks obtained a near monopoly of urban advertising, both local and national. (FCC 1940: 77) This centralisation and cartelisation led to extraordinary profits, making the radio industry one of the few success stories of the Depression. (FCC 1940: 17‑22)

    The programmes of the networks reflected this devotion to profit‑making. Jack Benny’s comedy show was ‘…sinking in a sea of Jell‑o.’ (Brindze 1937: 89) Politically, the programmes were anti‑Left and anti‑union. (Brindze 1937: 181, 242, 247‑8; Barnouw 1966 86‑7) Even jazz music was banned because it was played by black musicians. (Brindze 1937: 186‑7; Barnouw 1966: 128‑31) The content of programmes was determined by the need to sell advertising. Most programmes were made by the ad agencies themselves. 

    ‘The advertiser is…the first censor. His influence is only indirect on the programs sponsored by the stations, but for the programs which arranges and pays for, he determines exactly what the public may or may not hear.’

    Here the networks resisted any FRC intervention on behalf of educational or cultural broadcasts in the name of the First Amendment. (Sarnoff 1939: 61‑72) However the 1927 Radio Act overturned the rights of free trade embodied in the Constitution. Common law property rights were abolished in favour of state planning on behalf of the corporations. Not surprisingly, the Chairman of General Electric, one of the members of the RCA cartel, wanted the New Deal administration to adopt similar policies of compulsory cartelisation in all leading industries. (Rothbard 1972: 142) The shift in radio regulation away from laissez‑faire towards state‑sponsored monopolisation reflected more general changes in the relationship between the state and capital in inter‑war USA. If state intervention changed the organisation of American radio broadcasting, then the problems of radio broadcasting themselves helped transform the American state.

    In Britain too, the emergence of radio as a mass media paralleled new types of relationship between the state and capital. The British state was forced to respond to the same difficulty of funding stations. But it adopted very different solutions. However the British radio manufacturing industry did develop along similar lines to its American counterparts. It too was dominated by a cartel protected by patent rights. (Plummer 1937: 47) By the 1930s, these companies had amalgamated to form a single monopoly: Electrical and Musical Industries (EMI). (Plummer 1937: 49; Sturmey 1958: 176) Radio manufacture was a leading industry in Britain, pioneering the new disciplines of Taylorism and techniques of Fordism. (Plummer 1937: 58‑66; Llewyn‑Smith 1931: 128‑31) Moreover, British manufacturers also started radio broadcasting as an after‑sales service. Initially, the government was very reluctant to licence anything as ‘frivolous’ as radio broadcasting. But pressure from the manufacturers and amateurs, combined with fear of Russian broadcasts, convinced the government to allow the new service to start. (Briggs 1961: 93‑134) British broadcasting never went through a phase of ‘chaos’ such as that experienced in the USA. This reflected the very different types of state in both countries. Britain had no supreme law embodied in a Constitution and therefore no appeal could be made to challenge the sovereignty of Parliament. (Harvey and Bather 1963: 10)

    The British state had used its powers to nationalise the airwaves as far back as 1904. This was enacted to protect the telegraph monopoly owned by the GPO. (Briggs 1961: 95) Therefore, in Britain, the state had a leading role in deciding the future of broadcasting. The 1904 Act could not be challenged in the British courts. This allowed various key groups with influence on the politicians to set clear limits on the emergence of British broadcasting. The military wished to keep as many of the key frequencies as possible. The Post Office wanted a monopoly as it wished to avoid choosing between rival broadcasting groups. The powerful Newspaper Proprietors Association wanted advertising banned from a potential competitor. The protection of the interests of these various groups led to a very particular compromise. (Briggs 1961: 93‑134; Coase 1950: 33‑5) The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) was set up as a private monopoly licenced by the state and dominated by the leading manufacturers. It was financed by set royalties and licence fees. Its monopoly powers were restricted by a limit on its profits. (Briggs 1961: 123‑6; Coase 1950: 16‑7; Sturmey 1958: 161)

    This privileged private monopoly was both a success and failure. BBC broadcasts stimulated a boom in set sales during the 1920s. (Williams 1933: 286) But set royalties and licence fees were dodged by many listeners. (Briggs 1961: 128‑9, 145‑6; Coase 1950: 34; Sturmey 1958: 149) This problem of establishing the preconditions for successful capital accumulation in broadcasting forced more state intervention. This was done in a very specific way, by establishing two Parliamentary committees. This was a method of incorporation. All political parties (except the Communists) and interest groups, such as the military, GPO and NPA, had representatives on one or both committees. (Coase 1950: 199‑200) This ‘political cartel’ sought a solution to the financing and control of the BBC which would be acceptable to all its members. In the USA, local capitalists were incorporated into the national networks through the franchise system. In contrast, the British state confined its consensus seeking to the national state’s policy‑making process. In this way, the Sykes and Crawford committees could plan the structure of broadcasting of the 1930s.

    They did this by creating agreement around two key decisions: the funding of the BBC by the licence fee and its ownership by the state. Licence fees were originally just registration charges. But after the Sykes and Crawford reports, they became the price levied for listening to BBC programmes. The state instituted the compulsory sale of radio programmes to the owners of radio sets.

    ‘We are clear, on the one hand, that if funds are required to pay for the broadcast programme they should be contributed by those who in fact receive it, rather than by the general taxpayer…’  (Sykes 1923: 20)

    In this way, the material‑technical problem of commodity formation was solved by state intervention. The BBC’s output could now be valorised. This allowed the corporation to become a business. The nationalisation of the BBC was a consequence of the transformation of the licence fee into the price of broadcasting. The BBC’s success in promoting radio set sales meant the interests of manufacturers and broadcasters began to diverge. (Coase 1950: 57) Once the BBC could finance itself, then the manufacturers were guaranteed broadcasting as an after‑sales service. Moreover, the BBC’s ban on advertising and limits on profits prevented the vertical integration between the two sectors of production along American lines. Though the cartel lost control of the BBC’s assets, the corporation continued to support the interests of the manufacturers after nationalisation. Long Wave services were introduced, which could not be received on many imported sets. (P.P. Eckersley 1941: 78) Both ‘the trade’ and the BBC waged a joint campaign against the relay services. This is why there was little opposition from the Right when the BBC was taken into state ownership. For it was a Conservative government which nationalised the BBC. (Coase 1950: 51) It was a forerunner of a more general adoption of the policies of ‘Social Imperialism’ after the Slump. Whether through the Imperial Preference or the agricultural marketing boards, even Conservative governments were forced to intervene to prevent ‘unhealthy’ competition. In this way, the private monopoly set up as a bureaucratic convenience became a public corporation. No wonder Herbert Morrison saw the takeover of the BBC as an example of ‘…Socialist legislation which is respectable if introduced by a Conservative government, but is Bolshevism if introduced by a Labour government.’ (Morrison 1933: 153)

    As the BBC was neither commercially owned nor reliant on the market, some contemporaries saw the corporation as being outside economics. (O’Brien 1937: 45) This perception was incorrect. The BBC was a state‑owned branch of capital accumulation. It was only after nationalisation that the BBC became very profitable. In 1931, the Treasury received 41% of the BBC’s licence fee receipts! (Gordon 1939: 184) The corporation was also one of the pioneers of new technologies and management disciplines. As with the American networks, the BBC used the telephone lines to centralise broadcasting. (P.P. Eckersley 1941: 127) A few thousand wage labourers produced programmes listened to by millions. Their work was closely supervised through the vetting of all scripts and even the standardisation of pronunciation. (Boyle 1972: 256‑9; P.P. Eckersley 1941: 169) This combination of Fordism and Taylorism shaped the content of BBC programmes. Whereas the exchange value of American programmes expressed itself in advertising, the BBC earned its money by propagating the culture of its political paymasters.

    ‘The loudspeaker is the voice of God suggesting moderation.’ (P.P. Eckersley 1941: 155)

    The most notorious example of this was the BBC Sabbath. Programmes broadcast on Sundays were mainly religious or educational. (Briggs 1961: 273‑4) By the late 1930s, 70‑80% of British listeners were tuning into Radio Luxembourg. (R.R. Eckersley 1946: 163‑4) At least here listeners were provided with the use value of dance music in return for listening to the exchange value of advertising. The close link between the compulsory sale of programmes and a monopoly backed by nationalisation was demonstrated by this threat of commercial competition. Again, the state was called upon to intervene. The foreign music stations could not be touched, despite the Foreign Office’s efforts. But the BBC was determined to attack the local suppliers of commercial radio. Though cable television is seen as a recent phenomenon, 1930s Britain saw a quick growth in radio programmes delivered by cable. These were known as the radio relays. (Coase 1950: 70, 76, 80) Their appeal lay in the cheapness of the receivers (which were little more than loudspeakers) and the provision of Radio Luxembourg and other commercial stations. Once again, a Parliamentary committee was used as the method of creating a consensus for broadcasting policy. A grand alliance was constructed against the radio relays. The BBC wanted to protect its broadcasting monopoly. The GPO feared for its telegraph monopoly. The NPA wanted to prevent the loss of advertising to commercial radio. EMI disliked the creation of a market for cheap sets. (P.P. Eckersley 1941: 23) Again these monopolists used the tactic of nationalisation in their own interests. The Ullswater committee recommended the state take‑over of the radio relays. (Ullswater 1936: 39‑40) Though not implemented, the threat was sufficient to halt the growth in relays. (Coase 1950: 80) This policy was supported by Clement Attlee, a member of the committee, who wanted to protect the state broadcasting monopoly. Other members of the Labour Party were more perceptive about the BBC’s position. When the Popular Front government was elected, they approached French commercial stations to purchase airtime! (Coase 1950: 114) The BBC had actively supported the Establishment’s position during both the 1926 General Strike and the 1931 ‘Great Betrayal’. (Boyle 1972: 191‑206; Briggs 1961: 361‑84; Lansbury 1936: 916) Top Labour politicians were incorporated inside the BBC during quiet times so they could be more easily excluded at times of crisis.

    Therefore in funding, ownership, programme content and style, the BBC appeared very different from its equivalents in the USA. But, in many ways, the history of broadcasting during this period shows the very close similarities between both systems.

    • Both the NBC and BBC were established by set manufactures as an ‘after‑sales service’;
    • Both used the technology of telephone wires to centralize programme production in one city;
    • Both had small staffs of wage labourers broadcasting the same programmes to millions of listeners nationwide;
    • Both adopted programme‑making policies which turned the use value of entertainment into exchange value, whether through advertising or licence fees;
    • Both owed their existence to close and continual state intervention.

    This did not mean just that left‑wing or radical ideas were marginalised or vilified. It also meant that the working class as a whole was excluded from radio broadcasting. The conversion of electro‑magnetism into a commodity principally took the form of the receiver. The subsequent transformation of broadcasting into a valorisation process reinforced this process of separation. There were to be no pirate radios during the 1926 General Strike or the CIO‑led strikes of the 1930s! Thus a divergence of media organisation hid an identity of purpose: the establishment of radio broadcasting as a site of capital accumulation.


    This is especially true of the specific types of state regulation and intervention adopted in the USA and Britain. The state’s considerable power over radio broadcasting rested on the material‑technical limitations of the media. The two intertwined problems of commodity‑formation and frequency allocation needed state involvement to designate both sources of revenue and property rights. Specific solutions were adopted to turn broadcasting into an autonomous site of capital accumulation, whether through advertising or licence fees. The particular decisions taken reflected the various pressures brought to bear on the state form, whether from bankers or newspaper publishers. But such regulation also had to create in a legal form the necessary preconditions for capital accumulation. Analysts, such as Aglietta and Lipietz, use the term regime of accumulation when describing successful periods of growth in capitalist economies. (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1987) These occur when a ‘virtuous circle’ of technologies, labour disciplines, social forms of capital and so on create a period of sustained growth. Though each historical period shows general characteristics, regimes of accumulations are ‘chance discoveries’ which take different forms in various countries. (Lipietz 1987: 15) This is also true when examining specific branches of production, such as radio broadcasting. The history of radio broadcasting during the 1920s must be seen as the struggle to discover the methods by which a successful regime of accumulation could be established in radio broadcasting. In this process, the state played a major role.


    This is because every specific regime of accumulation acquires a mode of regulation which is a key component of the continued expansion of capital. (Lipietz 1987: 33‑4) This was especially true of the inter‑war period, which saw the bloody and slow emergence of Fordism as the major regime of accumulation. During the nineteenth century, Marx analysed capitalism under the system of competitive regulation. But this type of capitalism was changed by the continuing evolution of the mode of production. This transformation was not, as the theorists of ‘monopoly capital’ supposed, simply a change in the forms of capital ownership. It also saw the introduction of mass consumer commodities, assembly lines, Taylorism, organised scientific research and many other features. A key element of this restructuring of bourgeois society was the closer involvement of the state in capital accumulation. (Aglietta 1979: 237) Where corporate ownership prevailed, this usually took the form of Keynesian fiscal policies and indicative planning. But its state capitalist manifestations were not limited to the USSR. The ‘mixed economy’ needed its public corporations. Even in the USA, nationalisation was used when it was in the interest of the bankocracy, such as ownership of the airwaves.


    Thus the specific forms of regulation and intervention adopted in the USA and Britain during this period must be located within the more general emergence of Fordism as the primary regime of accumulation. Both RCA/NBC and the BBC were at the leading edge of industrial innovation within their respective countries. They were pioneering new labour disciplines and technologies. RCA/NBC was the model for the whole New Deal attempt to introduce indicative planning and compulsory cartelisation into American industry. The BBC was the prototype for later public corporations, which combined state ownership with management prerogatives of capital. Whether in the American move from laissez‑faire in broadcasting to the network cartel, or the transformation of the BBC from a private monopoly into a public corporation, state regulation and intervention were designed to introduce the most advanced methods and means of capitalist production into radio broadcasting. The mode of regulation was dependent on the success of the regime of accumulation. These changes in regulation, or even ownership, were specific and various methods of adaption to the more general needs of Fordism as a regime of accumulation. A restructuring of the international capitalist world‑market forced the emergence of National Fordism in different forms with each state. (Aglietta 1979: 235‑51; Harris 1986: 155‑60) The needs of accumulation changed the nature of the state itself. Radio broadcasting played a leading role in this growing integration of the state within capital accumulation, as both the 1927 Radio Act and the nationalisation of the BBC demonstrate. Therefore the state could alter the course of capital accumulation, especially through different types of commodity‑formation, but it could not abolish the need to accumulate capital. What is more, even the specific type of regulation adopted had to be congruent with the needs of Fordism as the basis of all advanced regimes of accumulation during this period. This why regulatory structures initially proved so unstable and adhoc. A stable set of state policies depended upon the success of the valorisation processes which they shaped and guaranteed.

    It is precisely these Fordist regimes of accumulation within the mass media which are being undermined by the present crisis. This encompasses both commercial and state‑owned institutions.National Fordism in the mass media are threatened by two complementary phenomena:

    • The globalisation of the media, both in programme production and transnational stations. This is accompanied by the emergence of new types of media corporations, technologies and labour practices.
    • The divergence and diversity of the media within national markets. This is coupled both with rising living standards and new forms of self‑organisation within the working class.

    As the present crisis began in the early 1970s, the long‑established media corporations found themselves under attack. The policies of incorporation and consensus had broken down as the boom faltered. For example, Italy saw an unholy alliance between the Far Left and commercial interests against the state broadcasting institutions controlled by the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party. This coalition was expressed in the policy of deregulation. This was the abandonment of the state’s support for the monopolization of radio and television broadcasting. Though both anarcho-communists and capitalists gained out of the licencing of new stations, their aspirations were very different. On the one hand, deregulation created the Berlusconi networks. On the other, many radical community radio stations came into existence. The dystopia of the media multinationals was intertwined with the utopia of media self‑management.


    In Britain, these contradictory consequences of deregulation have paralysed Conservative media policy since 1979. In 1986, the community radio experiment was abandoned because of the fear of unregulated stations being owned by black and ethnic minorities. The government found it difficult to give up one of the welcome side effects of Fordism in the media: close political and cultural censorship. This was a political bonus derived from the need to construct monopolies or cartels within the national market. The breakdown of Fordism threatens this particular privilege, both through the importation of ‘foreign’ programmes and through the emergence of new voices on the airwaves. For the Home Office, this problem expresses itself as the continuing contradiction of deregulation and reregulation.


    But this is not an isolated phenomenon. The restructuring of the media is only one part of a more general transformation of all sectors of production during the current crisis. The outlines of the post‑Fordist regime of accumulation are by no means clear. The specific forms taken by individual countries or branches of production are even less certain. As in the 1920s and 1930s, there will be experiments in many different types of media regulation. These various modes of regulation will also reflect the specific characteristics of each nation and its pre‑existing media. But until the new media regime of accumulation is established, there will be a period of instability in regulation. Though the Tories have postponed many difficult choices concerning the present media system, they are now being forced to encapsulate their ideas within next year’s broadcasting bill. However, unlike the inter‑war period, the future of the media will not be agreed by an all‑party consensus. Instead there will be confrontation and conflict. What is more, no one can be certain such deregulation or reregulation of the media will collapse as it did in 1920s USA and Britain, or if it will be successful as in these countries during the 1930s. It remains to be seen if the new mode of regulation will fit the emerging regime of accumulation.
     

    [Swiss Cottage, London, England :: June 1987]

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    TNEC (1940a) Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Monograph No. 21 . Temporary National Economic Committee, Washington DC.

    TNEC (1940b) Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Monograph No. 1. Temporary National Economic Committee, Washington DC.

    J. Williams (1933) ‘The Radio Industry’ in ed. H. Schonfeld, The Book of British Industries. Denis Archer, Edinburgh.

  • F.M. Fatale

    Pirate Radio in 1980s London

    It is 1.00 a.m. on a hot Saturday night at London’s King’s Cross station. Outside there is a traffic jam like the middle of a weekday rush hour. The northbound road is partially blocked by people dancing in the street. House music is being pumped out by a very loud car stereo. Outnumbered, the police look on with sullen faces. Suddenly an address is given out to members of the street party. Everybody is going to the rave!! Ten minutes later, the jam has disappeared and the station is deserted apart from the drunks and the queue for the late night bus. Why were all these people dancing in the road outside King’s Cross Station? Because they had heard on Sunrise Radio that this was the meeting point for the night’s entertainment.

    Sunrise Radio is an illegal radio station which broadcasts on 88.75 FM from a tower block somewhere in East London. Along with Centreforce Radio on 88.3 FM, Sunrise is one of the leading stations in the new wave of pirate radio stations in London. At the end of 1988, the major London pirates stations stopped broadcasting so they could apply for new licences being offered by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). However, the listeners to pirate radios did not go away and they have transferred their loyalties to the stations which have continued on‑air. Over the last decade, the music pirates have been the central link in a network of venues, shops, musicians, DJs and drug dealers which make up the city’s club scene. These stations have popularised the new musical styles which only many months later make it onto mainstream radio. At present, the most popular London pirates devote themselves to non‑stop house music. This is a syncretic mix of disco, dub reggae and electronic pop created by the introduction of new computer technologies in the production and recording of music. The new pirates have not simply adopted a new style of music. They have also started to dispense with the old types of music radio inherited from the 1960s.

    From the days of Radio Caroline onward, British radio adopted the American style of personality DJs playing records. The time‑checks, news, dedications, inane chat and bad jokes were an integral part of the show as the music. On the BBC, there even developed a more educated version of the same style where catalogue numbers and music information replaced the usual patter. Despite years of piracy, most DJs on the illegal stations have up to now followed the same format. At their worst, the pirates’ presenters sounded like bad imitations of mainstream radio. At best, they resembled a knowledgeable friend taking you through their record collection. But, nowadays, this personality DJ style is becoming as redundant as the 1920s BBC’s announcers in dinner‑jackets. When Sunrise Radio and Centreforce Radio are peaking, it is like having a sound system coming out of your radio. No dedications, no chat, no artist credits, no time checks, just records mixed into and on top of each other, with added sound effects and jingles. The occasional burst of ads is the only break in the music. The distance between club and radio DJ styles has disappeared.

    This experimentation in music radio is possible because the government has been unable to stop pirate radio. The laws against illegal broadcasting are expensive to enforce and have crucial loopholes. For example, it is still legal to advertise on pirate stations. It only costs a few hundred pounds to buy a transmitter and makeshift studios are cheap. Creating music programmes is inexpensive as the major recording costs are paid for by the musicians themselves! Once on‑air, there is also the opportunity to make big money by using the station to promote clubs and events. As there are still dozens of spare frequencies, there is no technical barrier stopping people setting up their own pirate. With haphazard enforcement, nowadays most stations are more likely to lose their transmitters to gangsters than to the law.

    Above all else, there is a growing audience for the pirates. The mainstream radio stations aren’t interested in updating either their tunes or their feel. For many years, the Home Office believed that the demand for pop music radio had been satisfied by BBC Radio 1 and the commercial stations. After a decade of piracy, they now know better. The Tory minister responsible for broadcasting has recently announced that British radio should move towards the USA’s free market model. Yet, despite its neo-liberal rhetoric, Margaret Thatcher’s government has carried out very little deregulation in the electronic media. In practice, it has wanted more centralised control over radio and television. Even when the Tories have encouraged new media, their initiatives have not been very successful. The recent opening up of cable and satellite television has already disappointed the hopes of many investors. Now the government is planning to licence hundreds of new commercial radio stations. But this too could quickly run into difficulties in this current period of high interest rates and falling advertising revenues. In the forthcoming Broadcasting Bill, the Tories are promising a ‘light touch’ regulatory authority for radio. Yet, the chair of this new body is to be Lord Chalfont who is a friend of Thatcher, MI5 and apartheid South Africa! Not surprisingly, the Tories’ plans for radio are much more focused on promoting profits than fostering free speech.

    The Home Office envisages a move from a few stations broadcasting to large audiences to many stations narrowcasting to specialised audiences. Of course, in practice, simply adding to choice of outlets might worsen some existing services. For example, additional Top 40 stations could force Radio 1 adopt a more cautious musical policy. There is also the crucial question of whether there is enough money to run all of these new stations. The truth behind the hype will only be discovered as new stations come on‑air. The IBA has just started the process by licencing 21 new stations, including LJR (London Jazz Radio). This is the first specialist music channel in London and two more are promised soon. This franchise award has caused a minor scandal because leading members of LJR were seen wining and dining with Lord Chalfont before the announcement in the House of Lords restaurant. LJR also has a list of shareholders consisting of M.P.s, Peers, generals and other such people. This licence award may be dubious, but some more radical stations have been given franchises away from the capital.

    However, this jazz station was not picked simply because it had powerful friends. It was also a compromise choice. Since the early-1980s, pirates have been playing a wide variety of black musical genres, including jazz. As the decade has progressed, their DJs have helped to start a minor jazz revival within London. For its licence bid, LJR recruited Gilles Peterson who is a veteran of many London pirates. For the IBA, jazz is black music, but only just. Nowadays it has become art and even high‑brow. But can the IBA also incorporate the more ragamuffin end of the pirates into the commercial system? So far the only licences given to ex‑pirates have been on low‑power or outside London. It is rumoured that the IBA still fear that black music stations could be used to ferment riots in this city! Groups associated with ex‑pirates, such as Kiss‑FM, Rhythm Radio, Horizon and JBC, have all sought the respectability of licences. But, in their bids, they all faced the problem of explaining how their proposed services could win over the listeners of the new wave of pirates.

    Sunrise Radio, Centreforce Radio and their peers have fundamentally changed the sound of music radio in ways that the earlier pirates never did. This wasn’t just changing the groove from funk to house, but also the transformation of the DJ from personality to mixer. In Ondes de Choc, Claude Collin argued that innovative radio can only be created by stations as ephemeral as medium itself. The experimentation on London’s pirates took place because it is cheap and easy for amateurs to get on‑air. The institutionalisation inherent in licencing pirate radio might kill off their DJs’ creativity. In its licence bid, Rhythm Radio proposed a Channel 4 model of commissioning music programmes to try to square this circle. Yet, this approach does not satisfy the audience’s desire to listen to continuous house music on stations such as Sunrise Radio or Centreforce Radio. The reorganisation of the music industry around computer technologies and the convergence of the roles of DJ, musician and producer have concentrated the cutting edge of popular music in the rhythms of the sound system. Back in the 1960s, the Situationists believed that the supersession of art would only occur when everyone is an artist. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Sunrise and Centreforce is proving that anyone with two turntables, a fader and a microphone can now become a broadcaster …

  • IPE ESSAY QUESTIONS

    1. Why does international political economy determine the way that you live your life?

    2. From the black ships of 1853 up to the bubble of the late 1980s, Japan’s path to modernity has been more exogenous (externally driven) than endogenous (internally generated). Discuss.

    3. In what ways did Nationalism and Marxism offer persuasive theoretical alternatives to Liberalism in the 19th century?

    4. Leninism, Keynesianism and Neo-Liberalism are all economic determinist theories. Discuss.

    5. Why is Korean history so divisive and what actual systems developed out of the division? Can these entrenched divisions be overcome?

    6. How does the concept of the “imperialism of free trade� explain the rise and fall of the British empire?

    7. The global economic hegemony of the American empire was founded upon the military confrontation with its Russian rival. Discuss.

    8. Does instability in the international financial system stimulate or hinder global economic growth?

    9. Global warming is a price worth paying to raise the majority of humanity out of poverty. Discuss.

    10. Why is the Net described both as the apotheosis of free market capitalism and as the harbinger of cybernetic communism?

    11. Does the global justice movement propose any credible economic alternatives to the neo-liberal paradigm?

  • IPE LECTURE 11

    You can’t understand where you’re going to without knowing where you’re coming from…

    Adam Smith’s theory of social evolution = the greatest intellectual achievement of the 18th century Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment.

    140,000 years ago: hunter-gatherer tribes;
    12,000 years ago: agricultural villages;
    4,000 years ago: market towns;
    300 years ago: capitalist cities.

    The duration of each successive stage of human civilisation has been shorter than its predecessor. The distinctive features of capitalism are rapid economic growth and accelerating technological innovation. The Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Alice Through the Looking Glass: running fast to stay still. Driving forces for the emergence of the next stage of growth = social and ecological limitations of global neo-liberal capitalism: poverty, boredom, stress, insecurity, pollution and climate change. Evolutionary theory = promise of better future.

    Three centuries of the grand narratives of history explained:

    • Smith’s 1776 liberal original: hunting -> herding -> agriculture -> commerce.
    • Friedrich List’s 1830s nationalist version: nomadic wandering -> agricultural settlements -> liberal capitalism -> state industrialism.
    • Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ 1848 socialist remix: tribalism -> feudalism -> liberalism -> democracy -> communism.
    • Rudolf Hilferding’s 1910s update: liberal capitalism -> organised capitalism -> proletarian communism.
    • John Maynard Keynes’ 1920s mandarin mix: feudalism -> free markets -> bureaucratic regulation.
    • Joseph Stalin’s 1930s murderous version: monarchy -> totalitarianism -> industrialisation -> utopia.
    • Walt Rostow’s 1950s CIA mix: traditional society -> “take-off” -> industrial society -> mass consumption society.
    • Marshall McLuhan’s technological determinist version: oral culture of religious communities -> print culture of industrialised nation states -> Net culture of the global village.
    • Daniel Bell’s 1970s computerised update: traditional society -> industrial society -> post-industrial society.
    • George Gilder’s 1980s Silicon Valley version: Fordist big business and big government -> post-Fordist small firms and deregulated markets.
    • Wired magazine’s 1990s dotcom hype: Wild West pioneers -> hippie radicals -> Net entrepreneurs.

    The Establishment orthodoxy: “there is no alternative” to the Washington Consensus, privatisation, deregulation, welfare cuts, anti-union laws and the American way. Ideological crisis of the Left: 1970s disillusionment with Third World revolutions -> 1980s post-modernist pessimism -> 1989-91 implosion of Russian Communism -> 1990s Third Way, Clintonomics and the Californian Ideology. Neo-liberal globalisation = culmination of grand narrative of human progress: the digerati, evolutionary biology and post-humans.

    Forward into the past: 2001 dotcom bubble bursts -> 9/11 Al-Qa’ida attacks v. USA -> 2002 invasion of Afghanistan -> 2003 invasion of Iraq -> neo-con dream of perpetual confrontation v. jihadist enemy. War on Terror as new Cold War: political repression, imperialist adventures, subservient satellites, military Keynesianism and cultural conformity. Neo-con boosters and leftie opponents believed that Iraq war = refighting the American-Vietnamese war. Hollywood geopolitics: Osama Bin Laden as evil mastermind in mountain hideout and Tony Blair as loyal sidekick with posh accent.

    “Sir? Do we get to win this time?” Sylvester Stallone in Rambo 2 (1985).

    1st January 1994: Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico v. NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement between USA, Canada and Mexico) = symbol of the end of the End of History. EZLN as revival of old Left: revolutionary intellectuals, rural guerrillas and armed struggle -> EZLN as pioneer of new Left: Subcomandante Marcos, base communities and Zapatista website. Escaping from the Cold War zero-sum game: Chiapas rebellion = hypermodern mash-up of Cuba and California.

    Learning the painful lessons of the previous generation: Bolivia, Uruguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Peru. Chiapas uprising = military actions -> media coverage -> international solidarity -> political negotiations -> social experiments -> global alliance v. neo-liberal capitalism. Local difficulties in the South: land ownership, elite violence and endemic poverty -> world problems also afflicting the North: neo-liberal restructuring, crony capitalism and US imperialism. Rand Corporation’s dire warning: reemergence of old commie enemy in new hi-tech form. Pop icons of the funky revolution: Che Guevara = 1960s intransigent Leninism -> Subcomandante Marcos = 2000s poetic pragmatism.

    John Holloway and Eloina Pelaez, Zapatista!: reinventing the revolution in Mexico (1998).
    David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham Fuller, Melissa Fuller, The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico (1996).

    ‘The Zapatista Army of National Liberation speaks to all individuals, groups, collectives, movements, social, civic and political organizations, neighborhood associations, cooperatives, all the lefts known and to be known; non-governmental organizations, groups in solidarity with struggles of the world people, bands, tribes, intellectuals, indigenous people, students, musicians, workers, artists, teachers, peasants, cultural groups, youth movements, alternative communication media, ecologists, tenants, lesbians, homosexuals, feminists, pacifists.’ EZLN, 1st Declaration of Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and against Neo-liberalism (1996).

    Zapatismo in the North = romantic fantasies: guerrilla war, rural primitivism and revolutionary tourism v. political inspiration: mass participation, Net activism and international solidarity. Learning the painful lessons of the previous generation: Maoism, anarchism and Trotskyism -> defeat and disillusionment -> post-modernism, neo-liberalism and managerialism. The 1990s revival of the 1960s New Left: direct action, tactical media and single issue campaigns v. corporate crimes and state repression. 1994 Chiapas uprising v. NAFTA -> 1999 Battle of Seattle v. WTO -> 2001 1st World Social Forum in Porte Alegre, Brazil v. Washington Consensus -> Global Justice movement = dialogue of North & South; workers & peasants; and reds & greens. Key divisions within alter-globalisation: development v. ecology; protest v. policy; intellectuals v. activists; and accountability v. spontaneity. 21st century socialism: Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela -> ‘pink tide’ governments in Latin America -> regional political and economic cooperation. The 2002-6 waxing and waning of the European Social Forums: ATTAC, Black Block anarchists, Trotskyist sects and Rifondazione Communista. Riots of disaffected youth: 2001 Genova -> -> 2007 Copenhagen -> 2008 Athens. Top achievements of the Global Justice movement: ideological pluralism, media attention and political optimism. 2003 international protests against the US invasion of Iraq: mass critical intelligence of demonstrators overwhelms ideological dogmatism of left sects. Open source software = prototype of open source politics.

    John Barker, Frankenstein and the Chickenhawks (2003).

    Seductive message of best selling alter-globalisation theory books: specific local struggles of social movements -> common global struggle of the new subject of history: the Multitude. The 1990s dotcom bubble as revolutionary politics: Fordism = nation states, factory proletariat and parliamentary reformism -> Post-Fordism = world empire, knowledge workers and community activism. Temporary Autonomous Zones: squatting, hacking, fanzines, festivals, cafes, raves and rioting = subversive premonitions of the new society in the present. Marxism-McLuhanism: the technological prophecy of the inevitable victory of the global multitude v. multinational capital.

    Toni Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire (2000).
    Naomi Klein, No Logo (2000).
    Hakim Bey, T.A.Z. (1991).

    ‘The 1960s New Left might have lost the economic argument, but the Hippies had won the cultural war.’ Richard Barbrook, The Class of the New (2006).

    Cognitive capitalism: DIY culture, alternative media, leftfield theories and participatory media = unpaid pioneers of new commercial products. Follow the free and self-managed exploitation = post-Fordist business strategy for cutting edge firms. The contradictions of copyright: intellectual property as essential and anachronistic within the knowledge economy. The antinomies of precarious labour: bohemian lifestyles as both neo-liberal exploitation and communist emancipation.

    Financial and ecological crises in 2000s = political opportunity to question the dominant economic paradigm. Rethinking the grand narrative of history: sustainable development = escape from poverty in the South -> social liberation = escape from alienation in the North. Adam Smith’s 18th century organisers of collective labour = market/commodity and factory/orders -> 21st century emergence of new model = network/gifts. Is it now possible for humanity to realise the modernist dream of moving from realm of necessity into realm of freedom?

  • IPE LECTURE 10

    “At the height of the Cold War, the US military funded the creation of the only working model of communism in human history. It’s called the Internet.” – Richard Barbrook, The Legacy of McLuhan, Fordham University, New York (1998).

    1998 Wall Street dotcom bubble: new economy stocks = 225% price rise v. old economy stocks = 17% price rise. Hi-tech neo-liberalism: the New Paradigm, the Long Boom and friction free capitalism. Cyber-entrepreneur: nerd teenager -> good idea -> office in garage -> venture capital funding -> first mover advantage -> media hype -> IPO (Initial Placement Offering) -> wealth and fame. The American dream: Amazon and Yahoo -> e-Bay and MySpace -> YouTube and Facebook.

    Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy (1998).
    Peter Leyden, Peter Schwartz and Joel Hyatt, The Long Boom (2000).
    Jehane Noujaim (director), startup.com (2001).

    Norbert Wiener: 1930s MIT mathematician -> 1941-5 anti-Nazi weapons researcher -> 1946 Macy Conferences guru -> 1948 best selling author -> 1950s Cold War dissident -> 1960 guest star in Moscow. Cybernetics as meta-theory of biological and mechanical systems: feedback, information and anti-entropy. Cybernetics without Wiener: Johnny von Neumann and the cult of artificial intelligence. IBM (International Business Machines) = computer corporation of the military-industrial complex. The war machine: 1952 Defence Calculator -> 1958 SAGE command & control system. The office machine: 1930s analogue tabulators -> 1964 System/360 mainframes and peripherals. IBM pavilion at the 1964 New York World’s Fair: technology of genocide and domination sold as Robby the Robot.

    Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (1950).
    Fred Wilcox (director), Forbidden Planet (1956).

    Cybernetics in the service of communism: Wiener from zero to hero in Russia. The despotic limits of the Stalinist model = ideological rigidity, inflexible planning and party autocracy. The libertarian legacy of the 1917 Revolution: Marxism, workers’ self-management and Soviet democracy. Axel Berg, Oskar Lange and the cybernetic communist movement: intellectual freedom -> economic efficiency -> participatory politics. Moscow computer network v. US nuke attack -> Unified Information Network = terminals in every factory, office and classroom. 1961 Nikita Khrushchev at 22nd CPSU Congress predicted Russians building cybernetic communism within a decade. 1968 Prague Spring: industrialism = Stalinist totalitarianism -> post-industrialism = socialism with a human face. Totalitarian Communism v. cybernetic communism: 1964 Khrushchev overthrown -> 1968 Russian army invaded Czechoslovakia.

    “Where is the leading role of the Communist Party in your cybernetic machine?”

    Radovan Richta, Civilisation at the Crossroads: social and human implications of the scientific and technological revolution (1968).
    Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak (2002).

    1957 Sputnik = 1st satellite in space -> 1961 Yuri Gagarin = 1st human in space. The Red Moon = Russian propaganda triumph in Cold War -> 1958 ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) = US hi-tech champion -> John F. Ford and CIA warning of ‘cybernetics gap’: Unified Information Network = 2nd Sputnik -> 1962 J.C.R. Licklider @ ARPA funding Net research -> 1969 ARPANET went live. Official rationale: Net = time-sharing computers between research laboratories and communications system for fighting nuclear wars. Hindsight scepticism: scientists don’t like sharing computers and cheap switches are more reliable than expensive mainframes.

    Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications (1964).
    J.C.R. Licklider, The Computer as a Communications Device (1968).
    Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (2000).

    1964 Bell Commission: multi-disciplinary research to devise the American version of the Net utopia. Cold War struggle over the imaginary future: owning time = controlling space. Marshall McLuhan as 1st prophet of the information society: religious community (oral) -> Gutenberg Galaxy (printing) -> Global Village (Net). Technological determinism: convergence of media, telecommunications and computing = national rivalries, class conflicts and alienated individuals -> world peace, cooperative production and community participation. Stages of growth: industrialism -> mass consumption -> post-industrialism. Marxism without Marx -> McLuhanism without McLuhan: Tom Wolfe -> -> Herman Kahn -> Zbigniew Brzezinski -> Daniel Bell. Fordism: factory as social model -> Net: university as social model. Capitalists and labourers = makers of things -> knowledge class = creators of ideas. USA as builder of ARPANET = prototype of post-industrial civilisation.

    Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (1964).
    Herbert Kahn and Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000 (1967).
    Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973).

    Licklider’s subversive moment: US military funded scientists to build the Net in their own image. The academic gift economy: presenting papers, contributing articles and peer review. Communism in the service of capitalism: pure research -> military and commercial applications. The treachery of the knowledge class: Free Speech Movement -> anti-war protests -> Weather Underground. Universities as Red Bases: academics and students = precursors of the information society. Hippie counterculture prefiguring the global village: underground newspapers, progressive rock bands, community radio stations, independent films and hippie festivals. The Hacker Ethic: 1973 Community Memory -> 1974 Ted Nelson, Computer Lib -> 1975 Homebrew Computer Club. “Information wants to be free” = academic ethos: knowledge =/= commodity. Community media -> interactive networks.

    ‘As I talked to these digital explorers … I found a common element … It was a philosophy of sharing, openness, decentralisation, and getting your hands on machines at all costs – to improve the machine, to improve the world.’ Steven Levy, Hackers (1994).

    Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community (1994).

    The Silicon Valley model: VC = Vietcong -> venture capital. Fordism: big business and big government -> post-Fordism: techie entrepreneurs and neo-liberal economics. CEO heroes: Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction -> George Gilder’s celebration of transformative technology. Hip capitalism: 1960s Homebrew Computer Club -> 1970s Apple Computers. The Californian Ideology: 1970s Whole Earth Catalog promoted rural communes -> 1980s The Well pioneered network communities -> 1990s Wired boosted dotcom capitalism. John Perry Barlow: Grateful Dead lyricist and Dick Cheney’s campaign manager. Right into Left: Jeffersonian democracy, the digital citizen and geek libertarianism.

    Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology (1995).
    John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace (1996).
    Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture (2007).

    Net as corporate capitalism: building infrastructure, business intranets, e-commerce and interactive media. The information superhighway: buying and selling information products as commodities. 1920s radio broadcasting = development path for 1990s Net: university and hobbyist stations -> corporate networks. Academic gift economy -> commercial commodity markets: AOL, MSN and Prodigy. Net as precursors of interactive television.

    Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Technologies of Freedom (1983).
    Bill Gates, The Road Ahead (1995).
    Robert McChesney, Corporate Media and the Threat to Democracy (1996).

    “Free but not free.” Marc Andreeson (1995).
    “Follow the free.” Kevin Kelly (1998)

    1990 Tim Berners-Lee @ CERN (European Centre for Nuclear Research) wanted cross-platform information sharing -> 1992 html mark-up language and browser-editor -> 1993 Marc Andreeson @ NCSA (National Centre for Supercomputing Applications), University of Illinois created Mosaic browser -> 1994 Andreeson formed Netscape with Jim Clark from SGI and released Navigator 1.0 -> 1995 Netscape IPO -> Microsoft bundled Explorer 1.0 with Windows ’95 -> 7/12/95 memo: Bill Gates declared Netscape as Microsoft’s No. 1 enemy -> 1996 Netscape = 80% of browsers -> 1997 Explorer = 50% of browsers -> 1998 AOL bought Netscape -> 2000 Explorer = 90% of browsers.

    Tim Berners-Lee with Mark Fischetti, Weaving the Web (1999).
    Michael Cusamo and David Yoffie, Competing on Internet Time (1998).

    Netscape as epitome of dotcom bubble: selling shares not products. The dream of being the next Microsoft: cutting edge technology -> natural monopoly. Tulipomania: dodgy accounting, insider dealing and day traders. Boo.com binge = 4 Cs: champagne, caviar, cocaine and Concorde. 107 months of dotcom bubble = longest boom in US history. 2001 share crash: e-Toys $80 -> 9c. Enron: smartest guys in the room -> massive bankruptcy -> executives imprisoned. Top website of 2001: www.fuckedcompany.com.

    John Cassidy, dot.con: the greatest story ever sold (2002).
    Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room (2004).

    1970s Ted Nelson’s Xanadu Project: transclusion as information marketplace -> 1980s Silicon Valley model -> 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act and 2001 EU Copyright Directive. Net as P2P: Napster -> Kazaa -> Morpheus -> Pirate Bay. 1999 Wall Street Journal argued that music industry = handloom weavers of information economy. 2007 80% of music downloads = illegal. Michael Dertouzos of MIT Media Lab argued that copyright is over: entertainment = 5% of US economy v. office work = 50%. Net as community media: academics -> hobbyists -> amateurs. Net as DIY technology: open source, open architecture and open access. Linux and Firefox v. Windows and Explorer. Dotcom capitalism in the service of cybernetic communism: Google, MySpace, YouTube and Facebook. Free software and servers for DIY culture = big profits from advertising. Smashing the spectacle: revolutionary politics -> everyday activity. 2003 anti-war protests: mass collective intelligence v. government spin.

    John Alderman, Sonic Boom (2001).
    Richard Barbrook, The Hi-Tech Gift Economy (1998).
    Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (1998).

    ‘‘What are we fighting Communism for? We are the most Communist people in world history.” Marshall McLuhan (1969).

  • IPE LECTURE 9

    “And was Jerusalem builded here, among these dark Satanic Mills?”
    William Blake, Jerusalem (1804)

    Romantic critique of industrialisation: oppressive, alienation, pollution and philistine. Alternatives to capitalism: Luddites -> Owenite agricultural colonies -> Cooperative Movement -> Guild Socialism. William Wordsworth = 1790s revolutionary republican -> 1843 Poet Laureate. Tory Radicalism: countryside = feudal hierarchy and religious order v. city = utilitarian individualism and social unrest. Gothic Revival: medieval beauty and craft skills v. utilitarian “uglification” and factory production. Mohandas Gandhi: moral Indian villages v. immoral British industrialism. German fascism: Aryan peasantry v. Jewish-Marxist workers.

    John Ruskin, Unto This Last (1862)
    William Morris, News from Nowhere (1890)
    Walter Darre, A New Nobility of Blood and Soil (1929)

    Malthusianism = liberal economics and social conservatism: geometrical growth in population v, arithmetical growth in agricultural production. Raising wages and providing welfare -> poor have more children -> overpopulation -> unemployment and starvation -> fall in population of poor.

    Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798)

    Social Darwinism = “survival of the fittest” (Herbert Spencer). Biological determinism: 19th century laissez-faire economics -> 20th century racial imperialism. Cold War economics = rival models of industrial growth. Fordism: production for the sake of production. The affluent society: motor cars, suburban homes and television sets.

    Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962)

    The downsides of agribusiness: DDT and other pesticides killing wildlife and entering food chain. 1960s anti-pollution campaigns -> 1970 US Environmental Protection Agency. Keynesian regulation of industrial waste: polluter pays; precautionary principle; and state-business cooperation.

    “Why can’t we have blue skies over the Ruhr?” – Willy Brandt (1966)

    1972 Club of Rome report: positive feedback loop of industrialisation -> negative feedback loop of ecological crisis. MIT computer model: falling infant mortality and longer life spans -> rapid growth of global population -> increased consumption of finite natural resources -> inflation in food and raw material prices -> falling profits on investment -> economic crisis -> industrial collapse -> fall in agricultural output -> mass starvation and welfare cuts -> more infant mortality and reduced life spans -> big drop in global population.

    “Our world [computer] model was built specifically to investigate five major trends of global concern – accelerating industrialisation, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of natural resources, and a deteriorating environment.’ – Dennis Meadows et al, The Limits to Growth (1972)

    MIT computer model = “Malthus in, Malthus out.” Chris Freeman (1973) Club of Rome forecast of raw materials inflation confirmed by 1974 Oil Crisis. Higher oil prices -> energy conservation -> investment in renewable energy. Eco-economic paradox of 1980s: Japan and Europe = higher energy costs and more economic growth v. USA/USSR = cheaper energy costs and lower economic growth. Discrediting of Club of Rome: 1970s raw materials cartels = higher prices -> 1980s neo-liberalism and new technology = 50% collapse in commodity prices. Neo-liberal environmentalism: “the market is an ecosystem just like the rain forest.” Kevin Kelly (1995). Private ownership = preservation of nature.

    Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons (1968).

    Market failure: prices can’t measure ecological damage. Neo-classical economics admits problem of externalities: hidden costs of production dumped on general public, environment and future generations. Short-term profits = long-term losses. 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: 2/3 of global natural resources already gone.

    Soil erosion: 1930s US Dust Bowl -> 1950s Virgin Lands Project in Kazakhstan -> 2000s desertification in Africa, China and East Asia.

    Overexploited fishing grounds: 1992 Newfoundland cod collapse -> 2000s EU fishing crisis.

    Mass extinction: 25% of mammals and 33% of fish species are under threat.

    Water deficits: over pumping of aquifers and river extraction in USA, Africa and East Asia.

    Unsustainable cities: urban sprawl, commuting gridlock and obesity epidemic = 60% in USA and 50% in EU. World population: 1 billion in 1900 -> 6 billion in 2000. England = 50% urban in 1760 -> world = 50% urban in 2007.

    Global warming: industrial carbon emissions x4 in 1950-2000 and deforestation in the South for agricultural land and wood products. Strange weather: major storms, droughts and flooding. Higher average temperature -> melting of Artic ice sheet -> rising sea levels -> threat to coastal cities and farmland. Nightmare scenario as Hollywood blockbuster: Roland Emmerich, The Day After Tomorrow (2004)

    Deep Greens, neo-luddism and anarcho-primitivism. 1960s hippie counter-culture: student protests -> rural commune movement -> New Age mysticism. Ecological crisis = Nature’s revenge on human hubris. Return to pre-agricultural hunter-gather societies = 90% cut in human population.

    “The entire range of living matter on Earth from whales to viruses and from oaks to algae could be regarded as constituting a single living entity capable of maintaining the Earth’s atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts…” James Lovelock, Gaia (1979).

    John Zerzan, Future Primitive (1994)
    Ted Kaczynski, The Unabomber Manifesto: Industrial Society and Its Future (1995).

    Easter Island as historical symbol of ecological suicide: tropical forest with flourishing land and sea birds -> Polynesians arrive in 300 -> humans hunt wildlife and clear forest for agriculture -> trees = huts, canoes & transporting statues -> population explosion -> deforestation of island -> topsoil erosion, no fishing and statues can’t be erected -> starvation, war and cannibalism -> population collapse -> Europeans find near deserted island in 1722.

    Jared Diamond, Collapse: how societies choose to fail or succeed (2005)

    “I can’t stop wondering what were the words of the Easter Islander who cut down the last palm tree. Did he shout “jobs, not trees”? Did he invoke private property rights, a plea to keep big government of the chiefs off his back, the uncertainties behind the extrapolations of fear-mongering environmentalists, and technology’s power to somehow solve all problems?” – Jared Diamond, Ecological Collapses of Pre-industrial societies (2000).

    The good example: 1950s CFCs in refrigerators and spray cans -> 1960s hole in ozone layer -> 1980s rise in skin cancer -> 1990s international ban on CFCs -> 2000s closing of ozone hole.

    1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro: EU and South v. USA over climate change -> 1992 Climate Framework Convention -> 1997 Kyoto Protocol = stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions -> 2007 UN Climate Panel -> Brown promises 50% cut by 2050.

    Eco-taxes = fiscal signals for restructuring economy. 1990s EU states begin taxing “bads”: carbon emissions, traffic congestion, landfill and water pollution. Removing subsidies from intensive agriculture, private transport and polluting industries. Costing pollution: “cap and reduce” through tradable permits. Changing public behaviour: eco-labelling, media publicity and environmental campaigns. Eco-economics = state pricing of environmental externalities.

    David Roodman, Natural Wealth of Nations (1998)

    Alternative energy: windmills solar, tidal, geothermal and bio-fuels with hydrogen as storage medium.

    Jeremy Rifkin, The Hydrogen Economy (2002)

    Green economy for North: stable population, renewable energy, public transport waste recycling, organic agriculture, reforestation, fish farming, cuts in working week and community participation.

    South v. North’s eco-imperialism: USA = 5% of global population and 25% of carbon emissions. Environmentalism = neo-Malthusian curbs on South’s economic modernisation. Industrialisation of North -> longer life span, health care and cheap food -> wealthier population -> environmental legislation -> falling pollution, reforestation, fish farming and wildlife protection. South must prioritise feeding poor and fighting disease not tackling global warming.

    Bariloche Foundation, The Limits to Poverty (1974).
    Bjorn Lomborg, The Sceptical Environmentalist (2001).

    Sustainable development: 1984 World Commission on Environment and Development -> 1992 UNCED (UN Conference on Environment and Development) Agenda 21 -> 2005 Make Poverty History @ G8 Edinburgh.

  • IPE LECTURE 8

    John Maynard Keynes in 1930s predicted the “death of the rentier”: finance capital -> state capital.

    Washington Consensus of 1990s founded upon the free flow of “hot money”: state capital -> finance capital.

    Different forms of money: exchange -> store of wealth -> capital = money making money. Pre-modern economies: wealth as flocks and land -> wealth as taxes and rents. Moral economy: local markets = selling agricultural surplus and buying luxuries -> merchant capital = buying cheap in one place and selling dear in another. Long distance trade: profiting from connecting separated local markets: the Silk Route and the Spice Trade. Merchant families and trading peoples lived inside a subsistence agricultural economy. Religious taboos against usury: Catholic prohibition and Sharia law = protecting the feudal moral economy. Money lending delegated to a pariah group: Jews in Europe and Armenians in Caliphate. Anti-semitism = “socialism of fools” (August Bebel).

    Money = universal commodity. Money as measure of social wealth: cattle -> grain -> precious items -> metal currency. State power = market peace: royal coins and civil law (Eugeny Pashukanis). Evil rulers = clipped coins and insecure property. Bastard feudalism = rent in kind -> money rents. Absolute monarchy = feudal host -> professional army. Proto-industrialism = just prices and artisan production -> market prices and factory production. Transition to modernity: direct dependence -> indirect dependence.

    “He must be rich or poor according to the quantity of labour which he can afford to purchase.” Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).

    Max Weber: modernisation = predatory capital -> productive capital. Capitalist version of pre-modern imperialism: tax revenues -> professional military -> territorial expansion -> more taxes. 16th and 17th century Spanish and Portuguese conquest of Central and Latin America = looting -> mining -> agricultural rents. British empire: Caribbean slave plantations -> Indian Raj -> Scramble for Africa. 1940s Nazi Germany looting European and Russian conquests.

    Productive capital = exploitation by force -> exploitation by consent. Capitalism = “community of money” (Karl Marx). 15th century Renaissance Italy: merchant princes, banking houses, double-entry bookkeeping, bills of exchange, heroic artists and humanist philosophy. 16th century Dutch Golden Age: nation state, insurance markets, joint-stock companies, financial speculation, printing presses and puritan morality. 17th century English Revolution = political revolution -> financial revolution -> industrial revolution. Liberal individualism destroys monarchical absolutism: Whig oligarchy, commercial media and Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment. End of ban on usury: Bank of England, Lloyd’s and Royal Exchange. Rise of agribusiness: land enclosures, day labourers and agricultural improvement. Emergence of proto-industrialism: mechanical power, factory workers and scientific innovation.

    “Private vice is public gain.” Bernard de Mandeville, Fable of the Bees (1714).

    Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture of Capitalism (1991).
    Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (1985).

    Money as finance capital = liquid and abstract v. money as industrial capital = concrete and fixed. Market freedom and consumer choice -> factory discipline and exploited workers. Adam Smith: profits = rewards for investment -> David Ricardo: profits = deduction from wages -> neo-classical orthodoxy: profits = reward for “abstinence” from consumption. Finance capital: mobilisation of surplus social wealth for investment in industrial production. Family firm -> joint-stock company -> Fordist corporation = separation of owner/rentier v. manager/entrepreneur Rudolf Hilferding; Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means). Stock markets = buying and selling claims to profits from dividends and capital gains. Equalisation of rate of profit between different sectors of production = driving force of scientific innovation by redistributing wealth from labour intensive firms -> capital intensive firms. Bond markets = buying and selling claims to tax revenues. Equalisation of income from different financial investments = individual indifference to sources of social wealth. Commodity fetishism: social relations between people mediated through money and capital.

    Karl Marx, Capital Volumes 1-3 (1867-94)
    Alain Lipietz, The Enchanted World (1985).

    1815-1914 Gold Standard = self-correcting regulatory mechanism for global economy. Too many imports and too few exports -> trade deficits -> outflow of gold -> scarcity of credit -> higher interest rates -> economic recession -> business bankruptcies and rising unemployment -> price cuts and falling wages -> reduction of imports and increase in exports -> inflow of gold -> trade balance -> economic prosperity. Imperialism of free trade: Spanish rule over Latin America = direct exploitation -> 1820s wars of independence -> voluntary submission to British domination = indirect exploitation. British empire: global liberal economics still needs nation state violence. Gunboat diplomacy to open up foreign markets: 1838-42 & 1856-60 Opium Wars v. China. Armed expeditions to intimidate debt defaulters: 1882 invasion of Egypt. Military mobilisation to secure gold supply: 1899-1902 conquest of the Boer Republics.

    1914 = collapse of Gold Standard -> 1914-8 = credit money -> wartime inflation -> 1918-29 = failure to resurrect Gold Standard. 1924 Dawes Plan: American loans money to Germany -> Germany pays war reparations to France and Britain -> France and Britain pay off war debts to America. 1925 British return to Gold Standard = economic deflation -> 1926 General Strike -> 1931 abandonment of Gold Standard. Roaring Twenties in USA: 1920s property and share speculation -> 1929 Wall Street Crash -> 1930s Great Depression = global market -> state planning. Eclipse of US finance capital: New Deal regulation of banking sector and 1929 share prices only recovered in 1954.

    J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill (1926).
    J.K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929 (1954).

    1944 Bretton Woods Agreement = US supervision of global financial system. British empire -> American empire = Gold Standard -> Dollar supremacy. National credit money convertible at fixed rate into international currency: dollar/gold. US regulated global financial markets: too many imports and too few exports -> trade deficits -> outflow of dollars -> scarcity of credit -> IMF loans -> economic modernisation and currency devaluation -> increase in exports -> inflow of dollars -> trade balance -> affluent society. Building the dollar zone = US loans for US exports: 1947 Marshall Aid in Europe -> USAID to South. Dollar power in 1956 Suez Crisis = disciplining disobedient Britain and France. Collapse of Bretton Woods Agreement: 1965 American invasion of Vietnam -> US public deficits -> US trade deficits -> foreign dollar holdings -> global inflation -> outflow of US gold -> 1971 breaking dollar/gold convertibility -> floating currencies -> 1974 Oil Shock -> 1970s stagflation = Crisis of Fordism.

    Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (1976)
    Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles (1987)

    The monetary counter-revolution: fixed exchange rates and regulated financial markets -> floating exchange rates and offshore banking business. Dollar seniorage: US deficits = inflationary in 1960s/1970s -> global effective demand in 1980s/1990s. The dominance of Wall Street -> revival of the City of London: 1960s Eurodollar markets -> 1970s recycling oil rents -> 1986 Big Bang deregulation -> 1990s neo-liberal globalisation -> 2006 City overtakes Wall Street. Exclusive services: nominee holdings, political corruption, tax havens, property speculation and money laundering. 24/7 banking: New York-London-Tokyo handover, removal of capital controls, computer trading, 1979-87 Margaret Thatcher as prophet of TINA (there is no alternative): Washington Consensus, the End of History, McKinsey management theory, yuppie entrepreneurs and the masters of the universe. The neo-liberal paradigm: liquid global financial capital rules over fixed national industrial capital. The tyranny of hot money: decline in profits -> outflow of foreign capital -> currency collapse -> IMF intervention -> debt dependency -> privatisation and deregulation -> reduction in welfare and wages -> rising profits -> inflow of foreign capital. The race to the bottom: outsourcing, tax holidays, anti-union laws and sweat shops. Global bankocracy: manufacturing in South -> profits in North.

    Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999)
    Jeffrey Robinson, The Sink: how banks, lawyers and accountants finance terrorism and crime – and why governments can’t stop them (2003).
    John Gray, False Dawn: the delusions of global capitalism (1998)

    Neo-liberal instability: declining profits in industry -> rise of financial speculation. US financial sector = 5% of investment in 1980 -> 40% in 2007. Risk management: futures, derivatives and bundling. Keynesianism = state guarantees the future -> neo-liberalism = financial market guarantees the future (Dick Bryan). 1996-2001 dotcom bubble: venture capital -> vapourware -> IPO. Financial crisis as neo-liberal discipline: 1982 monetarist shock -> 1997 East Asian financial crisis -> 1998 Russian financial collapse -> 2001 Argentina = pegging currency to dollar -> looting of savings by financial institutions. Washington Consensus blames crony capitalism and state controls in South. Crony capitalism in North: 1998 Long-Term Capital Management bailout and 2001 Enron bankruptcy. US wages stagnant while profits rising = lack of effective demand -> financialisation of everyday life: mortgages, credit cards and student fees. 20% of US workers’ incomes = debt financing. Credit crunch 2007-8 = crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism: Northern Rock -> Bear Stearns -> Lehman Brothers -> IndyMac -> Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac -> Lehman Brothers -> Washington Mutual, Merrill Lynch & AIG -> HBOS -> $700 billion bail-out.

    Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty, The Capitalism with Derivatives (2006).
    Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble (2002).

    Revival of managed capitalism in South: 1997 China and Malaysia escape crisis -> 2000 Vladimir Putin takes over Russia. The pink tide in Latin America: 1998 Venezuela -> 2003 Brazil -> 2002 Argentina -> 2006 Bolivia -> 2007 Ecuador -> Paraguay 2008. Mercosur trade bloc and trade with China. The return of Keynesianism in USA & Europe: nationalisation and regulation of banks -> public works and tax cuts -> lower interest rates and printing money.

    Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World (1987)
    Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: the rise of disaster capitalism (2007).

    British empire in 1900s = rentier economy. American empire in 2000s = money-dealer economy. The threat to dollar seniorage = emergence of alternative global currency: 1944 Bretton Woods rejection of bancor -> 2002 launch of euro -> 2008 G20 meeting. US government and trade deficits -> credit crunch -> bigger deficits and falling interest rates -> declining dollar -> flight into euro, yen and yuan -> stagflation in USA -> declining US wages and profits -> fall in US imports -> global deflation -> European Central Bank and/or World Central Bank create effective demand -> EU trade deficits and/or World Bank prints money -> global economic recovery -> seniorage of euro or new global currency.

  • IPE LECTURE 7

    August 1914: implosion of global liberal economy. 18th and 19th century wars of British empire v. European and Asian rivals = opening up foreign markets to British goods and investment. Imperialism of free trade: British industrial products traded for raw materials and luxuries from agricultural nations. Political independence = economic dependency.

    1776 American Revolution = Whigs v. Tories in Britain. The fatal flaw of American liberalism: George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison are Southern slave-owners. “The heroes of Africa persecuted by the rubbish of the jails of Europe.” (Adam Smith) South = free trade, agriculture and slave labour. North = protectionism, industry and free labour.

    Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913).

    Jeffersonian democracy -> Andrew Jackson’s Democratic Party: agricultural interest alliance of Southern slave-owners and Western farmers. Manifest Destiny: ethnic cleansing of indigenous population -> cheap land for family farms and slave plantations. American continental expansion: 1803 Louisiana Purchase -> 1832-7 Seminole War -> 1836 Texas secession -> 1846-8 American-Mexican War. The American Dream: individualist, pious and self-sufficient Western pioneers.

    Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893).

    1861-5 American Civil War: North/free labour v. South/slave labour over who controls the Western frontier. “A house divided against itself cannot stand” Abraham Lincoln (1858). Abolitionist movement -> 1854-8 Kansas land war -> John Brown’s 1859 Harper’s Ferry raid -> 1860 US presidential election -> 1860-1 secession of slave-owning states -> 1862 Emancipation Proclamation -> 1865 13th Amendment.

    Gilded Age 1870s-1900s. Closing of Western frontier in 1890. Reconstruction = Jim Crow laws for South and economic protectionism for the North. Second Industrial Revolution: armaments, chemicals, steel, electrification, telephones and petrol engines. The “robber barons”, Wall Street bankers and the 200 families: John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan and Henry Ford. Poverty of immigrant urban masses v. conspicuous consumption of WASP business elite.

    Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899).

    US economy as pioneer of Fordism: finance capital, bureaucratic corporation, horizontal & vertical integration, time & motion studies, semi-skilled labour, assembly line production, scientific research, mass marketing and franchise operations. Thomas Edison/Menlo Park and AT&T/Bell Labs.

    Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (1911).
    Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).

    Yankee imperialism: 1823 Monroe Doctrine -> 1898 Spanish-American War: conquest of Cuba, Philippines and Puerto Rico -> 1902-14 construction of Panama Canal -> 1912 occupation of Nicaragua.

    “Speak softly and wield a big stick” US President Theodore Roosevelt (1901).

    The First War of the British Succession (Immanuel Wallerstein). 1914: British empire = No. 1 global producer -> 1918: USA = No. 1 global producer. House of Morgan = monopoly of British war bonds in USA. Woodrow Wilson: 1916 peace candidate -> 1917 declaration of war -> 1918 Treaty of Versailles -> 1919 League of Nations. Wilsonian idealism = dollar diplomacy.

    Woodrow Wilson and 14 Points = US-led global liberalism v. V.I. Lenin and 3rd International = Russian-inspired revolutionary nationalism.

    Wilson’s failure to rebuild world market: American elite rejects League of Nations and war reparations destabilise Germany.

    John Maynard Keynes, Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919).

    Roaring Twenties in USA: liberalism at home and isolationism abroad. The 1st consumer society: automobiles, movies, fridges and wireless. 1924-9 mass speculation in bubble stocks.

    “The chief business of the American people is business” US President Calvin Coolidge (1925).

    1929 Wall Street Crash -> 1930s Great Depression. Fordist crisis of overproduction & underconsumption: collapse in stock prices -> monetary deflation -> falling sales -> lower prices -> decline in tax receipts -> government spending cuts -> increase in business bankruptcies -> rising unemployment -> bank failures -> breakdown of world market -> mass poverty -> social unrest -> fascism, war and genocide.

    1933-45 US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1933-7 New Deal = rising working class living standards as creation of “effective demand” through welfare Keynesianism: deficit spending, banking regulation, price controls, public infrastructure investment, job creation schemes, social security, import tariffs and trade union recognition. Tennessee Valley Authority builds Hoover dam: nationalised industry as hi-tech economic icon.

    The Second War of the British Succession = warfare as creation of “effective demand” through military Keynesianism. 1939-40 Armed Neutrality -> 1941 Lend Lease Act -> 1941 Pearl Harbour -> 1941-5 USA & Britain & Russia & China v. Japan & Germany & Italy. American lorries, aluminium and canned food speed up Russian victory over Nazi Germany. 1941 Manhattan Project -> 1945 nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: nationalised industry as hi-tech military icon.

    1944 Yalta Agreement: fall of British empire -> condominium of American and Russian empires. 1945 United Nations -> 1948-9 Berlin blockade -> 1949 NATO -> 1949 formal division of Germany into BDR and DDR -> 1955 Warsaw Pact -> 1961 Berlin Wall.

    “I like Germany so much that I’m glad that there’s two of them.”

    1944 Bretton Woods Conference: collapse of British world market -> construction of US-led world market. Rejection of Keynes’ proposal for World Central Bank and Bancor as global currency -> US insistence on dollar supremacy: IMF (International Monetary Fund), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). 1947 Marshall Aid -> 1948 WEU (Western European Union) -> 1951 European Coal and Steel Community -> 1957 Treaty of Rome sets up European Economic Community.

    Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (1967).

    American liberalism: planned capitalism at home and free trade abroad. Big government and big business = rational and efficient management of “technostructure” (J.K. Galbraith). Econometrics, cost-benefit analysis and computer modelling: US economy as programmable machine. The Affluent Society = welfare Keynesianism and warfare Keynesianism.

    “History is likely to impose a larger version of [American] continental politics as a working basis for international life.” W.W. Rostow (1960).

    Cold War: peace in Europe = conflict in South. 1949 Chinese Revolution: nationalist peasant revolution v. US-led world market. CIA ‘dirty tricks’: 1948 Italian and French elections -> 1953 Iran -> 1954 Guatemala -> 1960 Congo. Extending NATO across the South: Rio Pact, ANZUS, SEATO, CENTO and Baghdad Pact. Walt Rostow, Peace Corps and MIT modernisation theory: Communism = “disease of the transition to industrialism”. South must follow American path of economic development. USA v. 1959 Cuban Revolution: 1961 Bay of Pigs -> 1964 military coup in Brazil -> 1967 execution of Che Guevara -> 1973 military coup in Chile -> 1976 military coup in Argentina.

    “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its people.” Henry Kissinger (1973)

    Vietnam: 1954 Geneva Agreement -> 1965 American invasion -> 1968 Tet Offensive -> 1975 liberation of Saigon. The electronic battlefield: search & destroy, body counts and mass bombing. Loss of US government’s ‘credibility’: military defeat in Vietnam -> political and economic crisis at home. New Left, black power & hippie counterculture v. military-industrial complex. The crisis of global Fordism: inflation -> social discontent -> dollar crisis -> 1971 collapse of Bretton Woods -> 1974 Oil Shock. The commodity cartels: OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) -> UN New World Economic Order. Worker-student rebellion: May ‘68 Revolution in France, 1972/4 miners’ strikes in Britain and 1977 ‘Hot Autumn’ in Italy.

    The Empire Strikes Back: 1976 Angola -> 1979 Afghanistan -> 1981 Nicaragua -> 1981 Iraq invades Iran. Thatcher in Britain and Gladio/P2 in Italy: “there is no alternative”. The Second Cold War: Cruise missiles, Star Wars, Mujahideen and Contras. The End of History: 1989-91 collapse of Stalinism in Russia and Eastern Europe -> reunification of the world market. The Washington Consensus: Arab oil rents -> US banks -> loans to South and East -> 1982 monetarist shock -> IMF intervention -> privatisation, deregulation and free trade. Brazilianisation of South = First World elite and Third World masses. 1980s and 1990s = “lost decades” in Latin America.

    Francis_Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).
    John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (2004).

    NICs (Newly Industrialising Countries): 1960s Japan -> 1970s Taiwan -> 1980s South Korea -> 1990s China -> 2000s India. State-directed export-orientated industrialisation within the world market. Fordism in South: authoritarian government, national planning, industrial/financial cartels, capital controls, anti-union laws, technical education and scientific research. EPZs (Export Processing Zones): “Bloody Taylorism” -> local manufacturers -> multinational corporations.

    Reaganomics: public deficits, tax reductions, welfare cuts and military spending. Industrialisation in East Asia = deindustrialisation in the USA. American working class incomes stagnate 1974-96. Rustbelt industrial companies (steel, cars and clothing) -> Silicon Valley post-industrial companies (computing, media and finance). Brand labels: subcontracting of manufacture to South -> management, research, design and marketing in North. Wall Street: USA as rentier nation within global economy. Seniorage: dollar as world currency -> US consumer debt and public deficits = effective demand for Asian and European exporters.

    Neo-liberal globalisation: 1994 TRIPS (intellectual property) -> 1995 WTO (World Trade Organisation) -> 1995-8 MAI (Multinational Agreement on Investment). Multinational corporations and financial institutions = crony capitalism, corporate welfare and tax avoidance. 1999 Battle of Seattle: ‘Turtles and Teamsters’ v. WTO -> World Social Forum and global justice movement.

    Alain Lipietz, Miracles and Mirages: the crises of global Fordism (1987).
    Naomi Klein, No Logo (2000).

    1995-2001 dotcom bubble: the new paradigm, IPOs (Initial Public Offering) and the weightless economy. US financial markets = prototype of worldwide on-line marketplace. Bay Area start-ups = digital perfection of free market capitalism. Neo-liberal ideology founded upon US military budget.

    “Promoted in magazines, books, TV programmes, websites, newsgroups and Net conferences, the Californian Ideology promiscuously combines the free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies. This amalgamation of opposites has been achieved through a profound faith in the emancipatory potential of the new information technologies.” Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron (1995).

    John Cassidy, dot.con: the greatest story ever sold, (2002).

    2001 dotcom crash -> 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks v. USA -> US invasion of Afghanistan -> 2003 US invasion of Iraq. War on Terror = military Keynesianism at home and show of force abroad. Axis of Evil = rogue states (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) v. the international community (USA and its allies). Neo-conservative lobby = American imperial unilateralism: hi-tech weaponry -> military invincibility -> pro-US Middle East. Portents of the new Time of Troubles: defeat in Iraq, Chinese industrialisation, ‘pink tide’ in Latin America, creation of euro, New Orleans flood, sub-prime mortgage debts, falling dollar, trade deficits, healthcare costs and anti-Americanism.

    Relative decline of US manufacturing compared to Europe and East Asia: 1945 = 50% of world industry -> 45% in 1955 -> 30% in 1980 -> 20% in 2005. Conservative Keynesianism: diversion of public spending into warfare rather than welfare. USA = 50% of global military spending. Imperial overstretch: American empire in early-21st century = British empire in early-20th century. Asian savings finance American deficits. The US credit crunch as the crisis of rentier capitalism: “The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers is to the American empire what the fall of the Berlin Wall was to the Soviet Union.”

    Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (1987)
    Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civlisations (1996)

    November 2008 = election of Barack Obama as US president and G20 meeting to plan for a reformed world financial system. “The Asian creditor nations – China, Japan and India – will write the new rules of the game for their American and European borrowers.” – Meghnad Desai

    In the 21st century, does the world system still need a Universal State to rule over it?

  • IPE LECTURE 6

    30th January 1649: public execution of Charles 1st – “the man of blood” – for high treason in Whitehall, London. English Civil War as struggle between rival paths to modernity: Catholic absolute monarchy (France) or Protestant commercial republic (Netherlands).

    The Levellers and the 1647 Putney Debates: male suffrage; parliamentary democracy, political rights; and religious toleration. Oliver Cromwell as republican monarch 1649-53: liberalism at home and imperialism overseas. The consolidation of the British Empire: conquests of Scotland 1650-1; Ireland 1649-50; and Jamaica 1655 -> victory in the 1st Anglo-Dutch War 1652-54.

    The 1688 Glorious Revolution: the crowned republic. Liberal politics: the prime minister, the Whig oligarchy and 1689 Bill of Rights. Liberal economics: the foundation of Lloyds in 1688 and the Bank of England in 1694. Liberal culture: Isaac Newton; the Royal Society; and freemasonry.

    Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (1651). John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, (1689). David Hume, The History of England. (1754).

    The two models of British imperialism: Ireland and Jamaica. The Cromwellian Settlement in Ireland: dispossession of indigenous population -> cheap land for English farmers. Catholic land ownership falls from 2/3 to less than 1/5 in 17th century Ireland. The Cromwellian Settlement in Jamaica: dispossession of indigenous population -> cheap land for slave plantations. British colonies in America: North = Irish model and South = Jamaican model. King Philip’s War 1675-6: ethnic cleansing of New England.

    Britain rules the waves: the Royal Navy secured monopoly over the slave trade; Caribbean and American colonies produced sugar, tobacco, coffee and cotton; London acted as financial and commercial hub of Atlantic economy. 18th century London was largest city in most urban country in the world. Slavery in colonies = liberalism in England: free speech; religious toleration; and public sphere.

    The development of underdevelopment: imperialism in the South as the precondition of the industrial revolution in the North. Colonial profits created rapid economic growth and technological innovation in Europe. Caribbean plantation owners funded James Watt’s invention of the steam engine.

    Andre Gundar Frank, Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology, (1971). Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (1972)

    The 1756-63 Seven Years’ War = 1st world war (Winston Churchill). Prussia v. Austria fighting for control of Silesia -> British v. French struggling for global dominance. British propaganda = Protestantism and liberalism against Catholicism and mercantilism. The two key British victories: the 1757 Battle of Plassey in South Asia and the 1759 Battle of the Plains of Abraham in North America.

    The irony of history: victory over France leads to fall of 1st British empire. 1775-83 American Revolutionary War: “no taxation without representation”. Liberalism in England -> independence in America. Tom Paine, Common Sense. (1776) Thomas Jefferson, The American Declaration of Independence. (1776) “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” = minimal government, the rule of law and laissez-faire economics. The other irony of history: Jefferson was a slave owner. Freedom for white folks = slavery for black people. John Miller, The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery, (1977).

    1789 French Revolution -> 1806 Continental System: blockade of British goods from other European markets. Royal Navy & British bribes v. Grande Armée & French terror. 1805 Battle of Trafalgar is more decisive than Battle of Austerlitz. 1808 invasion of Spain and 1812 invasion of Russia -> overthrow of Napoléon in 1814-5. Simón Bolívar and 1813-25 Latin American Wars of Independence. Final triumph of “imperialism of free trade” over military mercantilism.

    British Abolitionism: slave rebellions; liberal economics; Christian morality; Napoleonic wars; and anti-Americanism. The 1807 Slave Trade Act -> 1833 Slavery Abolition Act. Royal Navy: protector to opponent of Atlantic slave trade. Compensation for slave-owners not slaves.

    The white colonies: Canada; Australia; and New Zealand. Conquest -> settlement -> self-rule within British empire. Economic dependence limited political independence. Colonies exported agricultural products and raw materials in exchange for industrial goods from British factories.

    The British empire as epitome of modernity for rest of world. Economic hegemony: the Gold Standard; the City of London; Manchester cotton factories; 1851 Great Exhibition. Cultural hegemony: English language; Shakespeare; the novel; common law; the suit; Darwinism and football.

    Bill Warren, Imperialism: pioneer of capitalism. (1980)

    “Whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that [social] revolution.” Karl Marx, ‘British Rule in India’. (1853)

    The 2nd British empire = East India Company 1660-1858. Trading monopoly -> imperial power. Importing Indian cotton -> exporting British cotton. Industrialisation in England = deindustrialisation of India. The conquest of Bengal and Mysore: 1757 victory at Plassey -> defeat of Tipu Sultan in 1799. Profits from trade -> profits from taxation. East India Company = private colonial power. Bribery and corruption of British politicians prevented parliamentary oversight. Desire for money and glory led to creeping colonisation. British cartoon on 1843 conquest of Sindh: ‘Peccavi’. 1857 Sepoy Revolt = 1st Indian War of Independence. 1858: abolition of East India Company -> creation of British Raj. Collapse of “imperialism of free trade” -> imposition of direct political rule. Acquiring colonies created markets for British firms. Financial investments overseas paid for imports of foreign goods and services.

    The British empire = “the empire upon which the sun never sets.” The largest empire in human history: ¼ of global population and ¼ of world’s surface area. The Scramble for Africa: 1882 conquest of Egypt -> 1896-8 occupation of Sudan -> 1880-1 1st Boer War -> 1889-1902 2nd Boer War -> 1901 control over Nigeria. Indian model of British imperialism: white elite; institutionalised racism; local landlord allies; military force; professional civil service; economic protectionism; exploitation of raw materials; heavy taxation of the peasantry; rule of law; puritan morality; team sports; cultural philistinism. Victoria the Queen-Empress as icon of British empire; the Home Counties as the rentiers of the world; and the cult of the English gentlemen.

    J.A. Hobson, Imperialism. (1902) Great Britain: 50% of global industry -> 50% of global finance. World system: single global market -> rival imperial powers.

    H.G. Wells, The War of the Worlds, (1898): Martians do to the English what the English had done to the rest of the world. The human cost of the Atlantic slave trade (3 million) and the Irish famine (1 million dead).

    August 1914: the arrival of the Time of Troubles which would lead to the birth of a new Universal State.

  • IPE LECTURE 4

    1642 English Revolution: liberalism; 1789 French Revolution: nationalism; 1848 revolutions: Marxism.

    1851 Great Exhibition in Hyde Park, London, as the high point of liberalism: steam engines; telegraphy; “perpetual peace”; gold standard; Royal Navy; imperialism of free trade.

    August 1914: the collapse of the Victorian world system. The Universal State -> the Time of Troubles (Arnold Toynbee, The Study of History). The decline of Britain leads to the rivalry of Germany v. USA to become the new Universal State.

    V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism. (1916) The First World War is caused by the export of capital and rivalry for foreign markets. Capitalism is permanent war between the great powers.

    October 1917 Russian Revolution is “the revolution against Capital.” (Antonio Gramsci) The election of the Constituent Assembly -> the rule of the vanguard party; war production -> War Communism; the militarisation of politics -> the militarisation of labour; one party rule -> one man management. State capitalism, Taylorism and the factory society. Nikolai Bukharin and Eugeni Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism. (1920)

    “I have seen the future and it works.” Lincoln Steffens (1920). The breakdown of the world market -> the rise of national autarchy. The Russian empire -> the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Socialism in One Country: state capitalism; central planning; nationalisation; protectionism; literacy campaigns; modernist art; feminism; anti-clericalism. The 1928-9 “scissors crisis”: too expensive industrial goods and low prices for agricultural products. The solution of Joseph Stalin: forced collectivisation; rapid industrialisation; slave labour; the Great Purge; ideological uniformity. Feudalism -> totalitarianism -> utopia. The Great Patriotic War 1941-5. The Russian becomes 2nd nuclear power in 1949.

    Mao Zedong, Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society. (1927). Chinese Communist Party: defeat in the cities -> guerrilla warfare in the countryside. 1949 Revolution is the precursor of the world revolution of the peasantry in the South. Peasant communes, self-sufficiency and the Yenan model v. American imperialism, Russian revisionism and “the capitalist roaders”. William Hinton, Fanshen. (1966) The 1958-60 Great Leap Forward and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Che Guevara, guerrilla focos and the 1959 Cuban Revolution. The Vietnamese war of independence against French and American occupation 1945-75.

    Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital. (1910) Liberal capitalism -> organised capitalism -> proletarian communism. The boom-and-bust business cycle: overproduction of capital and underconsumption of the workers -> the problem of “effective demand”. The 1929 Wall Street Crash and the 1930s Great Depression. Capitalism = poverty, unemployment, fascism, war and genocide. Social Democracy = the third way between liberalism and totalitarianism.

    The rise of the welfare state: mixed economy; health care; education; culture; housing; transport. The “exercise of power” -> “the conquest of power” (Léon Blum) 1930s capitalist statism: British Conservatives; German Nazis; Japanese militarists. Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal in the USA. Michael Kalecki: welfare or warfare = rival solutions to the lack of “effective demand”.

    John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (1936) Reforms without revolution: pump-priming, the multiplier effect, public spending. Liberalism -> Fordism. Small firms and minimal state -> big business and big government. Second World War -> Cold War: the welfare-warfare state. The USA = the Third Way between chaotic markets and totalitarian planning. J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society. (1958)

    W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-communist manifesto. (1960) Traditional society -> “take-off” -> industrial society -> mass consumption society. US president John F. Kennedy’s government: “the best & the brightest”. The American economy is a programmable machine.

    Bretton Woods: fixed currencies; IMF; World Bank: BIS; GATT. MIT modernisation theory: the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps and counter-insurgency. The North today is the South tomorrow.

    The 1965 American invasion of Vietnam -> 1971 dollar inconvertibility -> 1974 Oil Shock -> the liberation of Saigon 30/04/1975. Stagflation and the crisis of Fordism -> the rise of Neo-liberalism.

    Austro-Marxism v. the Austrian School in the land of Catholic fascism. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: a treatise on economics. (1940) The “calculation debate”: state planning is irrational and wasteful -> market prices optimise the allocation of scare resources. War and socialism v. liberty and liberalism.

    Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. (1944) Welfare spending is precursor of totalitarian repression. Freedom is spontaneous order of atomised individuals trading in the marketplace. Prices are information. Minimal state, limited democracy and the rule of law.

    Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. (1942) Capitalism = “creative destruction”. Entrepreneurs innovate new techniques and new technologies within the economy. Desire for increased profits = discovery of more efficient allocation of the factors of production.

    The Chicago School; Milton Friedman; George Gilder. National autarchy -> global marketplace. Bretton Woods -> floating currencies. Monetarism v. inflation. Unemployment v. labour unrest. Tax cuts v. welfare spending. Entrepreneurs v. activists. Privatisation v. nationalisation. Free trade v. protectionism.

    Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet 1973-90; British prime minister Margaret Thatcher 1979-90; US president Ronald Reagan 1981-89. Strong state and free market. The end of the Cold War 1991 -> the epoch of globalisation. Russia and China take the capitalist road. The NICs of South East Asia. The Washington consensus: IMF and World Bank impose free movement of capital and privatisation on the South. Crony capitalism and off-shore banking business. The Silicon Valley model: information technologies; start-ups; IPOs; dotcom capitalism.

    VC = Vietcong -> venture capitalist.

    The Credit Crunch: Enron & WorldCom -> Bear Sterns -> Lehman Brothers -> the $500 billion bank bail-out. October 2008: Alan Greenspan (ex-head of US Federal Reserve Bank) admits that there could be something wrong with his ideology.

  • IPE LECTURE 3

    There is no international political economy before 1492 – only long distance trade routes.

    Feudalism is the aristocracy appropriating the agricultural surplus of the peasantry. Money is for fighting wars, saving souls and buying luxuries. The measure of wealth is the number of dependents: soldiers, servants, priests and entertainers.

    The aristocratic household is the prototype of the national economy. The King is the top warrior. The Pope is the top priest. The Caliph is both. Bastard feudalism: the monetarisation of labour dues and payments in kind. Trading monopolies and commercial privileges. The measure of wealth is the amount of gold in the royal treasury.

    The Physiocrats in late-18th century France: François Quesnay and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot. Economic policies to aid agricultural production: low taxes, minimum regulation and efficient bureaucracy. The cities are parasitical on the countryside. The measure of wealth is the size of the grain harvest.

    Liberalism: England is the first industrial nation. The 1707 Act of Union turns England and Scotland into Great Britain. The Scottish Enlightenment pioneers the materialist conception of history. Adam Smith’s theory of historical evolution: hunting -> herding -> agriculture -> commerce.

    Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Volume 1 & Volume 2. (1776)

    The factory is the division of labour. The market is the distribution of labour. The specialisation of individual tasks underpins the collectivisation of the economic production. Aristocrats and servants are unproductive labour. Slavery is an anachronism. Artisans and farmers are productive labour. Free trade is choosing your own trade. The “hidden hand” of the market turns private ambition into public benefit. Liberalism is market competition, minimum government and the rule of law. The independent citizen is a bourgeois property-owner. The measure of wealth is the output of human labour.

    David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. (1817)

    Ricardo is an immigrant Londoner banker: Portuguese Jew into English Quaker. The countryside is parasitical on the cities. Rent is a deduction from profits and wages. The benefits of free trade inside a national economy are amplified with the world economy. The comparative advantage of nations is the distribution of labour on a global scale. Portugal sells port to the English to pay for its imports of English manufactured goods. The Atlantic triangle: England sells cotton and weapons to buy sugar and tobacco -> West Africa sells slaves to buy cotton and weapons -> the Caribbean sells sugar and tobacco to buy slaves. English merchants profit at each point in the triangular transaction.

    The 1776 American Revolution. Thomas Jefferson and the Democrats: minimum state, free trade, agriculture and slavery. Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists: strong state, protectionism, industry and wage labour.

    The 1789 French Revolution. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate? The Girondins are liberals: constitutional monarchy, limited suffrage and free trade. Men with property are the shareholders of the nation. Saint-Domingue is the richest colony of France. The Jacobins are democrats: the republic, male suffrage and protectionism. Men without property are citizens of the republic. Toussaint L’Ouverture and the 1791 Haitian Revolution. C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins. Revolutionary war as national autarchy: the maximum, forced requisitions and state industries. Gracchus Babeuf and the 1797 Conspiracy of Equals. Revolutionary war as foreign plunder: Napoléon Bonaparte as Emperor of the French 1804-1814/1815, the Continental System, the 1812 invasion of Russia.

    Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy. (1841). Free trade is British rule over the global economy. Political independence requires economic independence. Protectionism, state regulation and class harmony. Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. (1821) The state bureaucracy as the universal class.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. (1848) The pamphlet was launched at the Red Lion pub, Great Windmill Street in Soho. The red republicans: Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Henri Saint-Simon and Auguste Blanqui. The manifesto of the 1848 Revolutions: feudalism -> liberalism -> democracy -> socialism. The workers and capitalists against the aristocrats and clergy evolves into the workers against the bourgeoisie. Democracy is the precondition of socialism in politics: the 1871 Paris Commune, the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and the German Social Democratic Party. Liberalism is the precondition of socialism in the economy: the cooperative commonwealth. Capitalist globalisation is the precondition of world socialism: the 1st and 2nd Internationals.

    Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1. (1867): surplus value, business cycles, new technologies and commodity fetishism. Unalienated labour is self-expression. Paul Lafargue, The Right to be Lazy. (1883) The measure of wealth is free time.

  • IPE LECTURE 2

    What is IPE and why Japan?

    Is Japan irrelevant or ‘nothing’, as Francis Fukuyama indicates in his book, The End of History and The Last Man?

    Japan may not have become Number One, in Ezra Vogel’s words, but does that mean it is ‘nothing’? The Number Two political economy in the world cannot be ignored or marginalised. Ignorance is not bliss; it is both Eurocentric and dangerous.

    David Williams’ two books: Japan: Beyond the End of History and Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science.

    James Fallows: Japan as well as the rest of what he calls the ‘New East Asian Economic and Political System’ is neo-mercantilist or practises economic nationalism (economics as a kind of war) à la Friedrich List.

    Revisionism. Van Wolferen’s The Enigma of Japanese Power.

    Brian McVeigh’s work on The Nature of the Japanese State.

    Class and other subject positions such as gender and ethnicity are crucial here in enunciating a properly inclusive socially scientific investigation.

    There is no outside political theory.

    Is all criticism of Japan ‘Japan-bashing’, as some Japanese elites seemed to imply back in the late 1980s? Of course not, but we have to be careful to be equally sceptical of ‘our own’ presuppositions, whoever ‘we’ are. Hegemonic Western discourses are not neutral either…

    De-colonising the mind and taking the Rest of the World, not just the West, seriously: Japan is only one among many paths that need to be looked at more systematically and more frequently in mainstream disciplines such as IPE.

    Lessons from History: An Outline of Japan’s Path to Modernity

    Reading the world system from the geo-political margins: Japan’s ‘ascent’ to modernity and how it occurred.

    Into The Meiji Period (1868-1912)

    In the beginning came Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships’ (1853). The American naval commander, Commodore Perry, imposed unequal treaties, involving the so-called Treaty Port System, upon Japan. The Japanese reluctantly signed up to it in 1858 due to military force majeure.

    Radical structural continuity in the international capitalist system? America still telling the rest of the world what to do: to open up to trade, to liberalise, to become more like it … One crucial question is: whose interests does this serve?

    What Richard Barbrook said about Adam Smith being quite different from his ideological use at the hands of neo-liberal and New Right economic theorists who came to fame especially in the 1980s like Milton Friedman (he of the Chicago School) is borne out by the famous and prolific political radical and anarchist Noam Chomsky, who often refers to Adam Smith’s Vile Maxim of the Masters of Mankind, ‘All for ourselves and nothing for other people’.

    What the case of the black ships shows is that one crucial strand of Japan’s modernization was exogenous, in short externally driven and coerced. If Japanese elites were to maintain control over the country, they would have to modernise, to adopt at least the outward trappings of Western political and economic institutions.

    So catch-up was forced upon Japanese elites who inevitably did not want to lose their grip upon the political system. It took a revolution for the system to gain some real reformist (yet in many other ways a still very conservative and controlled) dynamism and flexibility. The Meiji Restoration Revolution of 1868 (or ishin kakumei in Japanese) was the result.

    A bourgeois revolution? Ann Waswo’s book, Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994 calls Japan in the 1920s the NIC (Newly Industrialising Country) of that day.

    John Crump has argued in his writings on Japan that although the revolution may not have been a classic bourgeois revolution executed by an obvious merchant or capitalist class, a long capitalist revolution far-reaching in its transformatory effects was at length achieved by the end of the 19th century nonetheless.

    Modernisation or Westernisation?

    One unique thing about Japan that W.G. Beasley is right to stress (but is arguably not elaborated in an adequate way theoretically) in his standard text on Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 is that it was at once a semi-colonised and oppressed nation on the one hand and a nation that then almost immediately went on to semi-colonise/oppress its fellow East Asian states (by means of its own lurch towards imperialism in the late 19th century) on the other.

    Japan chose the path of modernisation in a way that mimicked the West, as Eskildsen indicates. In short, Japanese elites chose datsu-a nyu-ou (the policy of leaving Asia and joining the West), as the famous Japanese educationalist and founder of Keio University Fukuzawa Yukichi articulated this notion in the 1880s. Fukuzawa is so famous in Japan that his image even adorns the 10, 000 yen note.

    The Post-1945 System

    I jump now to the American Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952. More liberal beginnings, then a definite shift towards the right occurs. The general strike of February 1st 1947 is banned by MacArthur, Japan’s American shogun.

    The reverse course also led to a police reserve force that was actually a Japanese army by just another name.

    Partly initially under the stimulation and spurt of growth prompted by the Korean War, partly arguably via largely sensible guidance from the elite bureaucracy (see Chalmers Johnson’s seminal book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle) and partly again due to the economic and military security, assistance and help from the Americans that the alliance with the US brought into play for them, Japan’s economy entered on a period of high-speed growth especially from the 1960s up into the 1970s.

    Some have argued that Japan, like Germany, benefited from the lack of a need to buy war materiel, given its peace constitution as well as its support under American security arrangements. It has sometimes been phrased that the Russians lost the Cold War, but that it was not America but Japan that ultimately triumphed from that particular conflict.

    From the 1970s onwards, growth in Japan was beginning to slow from its highest points of spectacular expansion but it was still achieving growth rates unseen in the industrialised West at the same time.

    Around precisely this time such books as Herman Kahn’s The Emerging Japanese Super-state and Ezra Vogel’s already mentioned Japan as Number One became bestsellers. Japan must have truly looked then as if it would rocket towards global domination. But then this is sometimes precisely the problem with direct extrapolations from past trends to present, as history involves rupture, not only continuity.

    The Bubble Economy: Some Theoretical Preliminaries

    A former elite bureaucrat from the Ministry of Finance called Sakakibara Eisuke (I follow throughout the Japanese convention of placing family names or surnames first, by the way) argued at the high point of the bubble in the late 1980s that Japan had transcended or overcome modernity and capitalism with its new economic system and its new logic.

    It was not just Japanese (like Sakakibara) who seemed to suffer from a kind of feverish bubble mania writ nationalistic. The revisionist school among Western scholars tended to take very seriously the notion that the Finance Ministry would never need to burst the bubble, that a new paradigm with differing assumptions meant that there was no necessity for Japanese land to go down unless the Finance Ministry wanted it to. Van Wolferen argued as much at the time.

    What van Wolferen and co were right about surely was that not all brands of national capitalism need to follow, nor even at some (later?) stage need they converge upon, the American model.

    However, it need not follow from this, nor does it in fact, that ‘our’ (I mean Western here) concepts or perceptions are essentially incapable of capturing the nature of Japanese or other East Asian or indeed African or any other actively marginalised, non-Western reality.

    The Bubble Economy and Japanese Capitalism: where American Pressure Strikes Again

    Christopher Wood’s account of the bubble economy is well worth reading, or at least a few chapters of it to get the gist of the situation that he presents very succinctly. It lays out quite clearly how the bubble did indeed become just that, albeit one adapted to Japanese conditions. He may not always be very sophisticated theoretically in the way he formulates his propositions in regard to Japan, but underlying his account is an element of deep-seated truth. He is committed to trying to uncover what was at play in Japan’s economic malaise, albeit his implicit concept of convergence may well be naïve and rather flawed.

    The yakuza.

    Kodama Yoshio, the infamous yet massively rich, highly effective and largely successful yakuza kingpin. He was let out of jail in 1948 by the occupying forces so that he could unite the yakuza and thus take the fight to left-wing radicalism in Japan. He had until that time been classed as an A-class war criminal. He left jail essentially an ally of the Americans.

    Historically, although the price of land is of course very high in Japan, between 1965 and 1985 the price of land kept track with and proportionate to the rises that were made in the stock market. From 1985, a de-linking began to occur in what had been this previously connected relationship.

    The Plaza Accord was an agreement signed up to in September 1985 at the Plaza Hotel, New York, which committed the five nations present at this G-5 meeting to embark on a policy of dollar devaluation in relation to Japan’s yen and also to the West German deutsch mark.

    Given the now far more expensive nature of Japanese products in the aftermath of a massive 51% depreciation of the dollar as against the yen within the space of a mere two years, the export out of a recession kind of a strategy was no longer an easy option for Japan’s economy.

    The Baker-Miyazawa agreement of October 1986 was signed one year on from the Plaza Accord. Japan agreed there to initiate specific measures to stimulate the Japanese economy: such as to make a discount rate cut (on the money banks loan to businesses, for example, to make the cost of borrowing cheaper; hence it is stimulative in nature) as well as a stimulus package for the economy.

    The Louvre Accord came about in September 1987 due to the fact that the dollar had gone into freefall and the G-6 now wanted to make sure that the dollar would not fall through the floor and thus affect world economic growth very adversely.

    The context of the real fear of a global slowdown, especially on the part of the US, coupled with Japan’s own worries about the yen spiralling out of control (thus making Japan’s exports increasingly uncompetitive in US markets), had resulted in Japan succumbing to pressure to stimulate the economy via successive cuts in the discount rates, namely in the cost of borrowing.

    Christopher Wood writes: “Between January 1986 and February 1987, the Bank of Japan … lowered the official discount rate from 5 percent to 2.5 percent. As a consequence, bank loans were available for as little as 4 percent to their best corporate customers. Even better than that, publicly quoted companies could exploit a rising stock market by raising money using the neat trick of issuing Eurobonds with warrants attached in London’s offshore Euromarket, the world’s largest debt market, and swapping the dollar exposure back into yen. Money became virtually free in Japan…”

    Stiglitz agrees with revisionists like Fallows and van Wolferen both that the East Asian system can be called a system in some sense and also that it is clear that this system has been uniquely successful until it was interfered with and disrupted by outside forces, whether by the Plaza and Louvre Accords and the US administration’s strong dollar depreciation policies back in the late 1980s or whether later on in 1997-98 in terms of the financial speculators who took it upon themselves to make attacks on the dragon or NIC economies of East Asia and who were effectively supported by the IMF and the US Treasury. These speculators in 1997-98 precipitated the crisis Stiglitz examines in a highly recommended chapter in his Globalization and Its Discontents.

    But the weakness, I think, of Stiglitz’s analysis is that, somewhat naively, he does not see the zero-sum or competitive core at the heart of the world capitalist leviathan. Any system that expands without end is by that very reason a colonising presence in one sense of the word or another…… If this is true, and it seems very obvious that this is so, the perpetual expansion of East Asian economies, willy-nilly, implies the capture of greater and greater market power as against that of others…… It is this that the revisionists understand all too acutely, albeit their nationalistic and chauvinistic neo-Listian identification of the source of the problem means that they cannot comprehend that the truest zero-sum contest, that between global labour and global capital, is the one that truly defines the real and ever-new fights to come in the 21st century.

    Hence, Stiglitz, in rightly identifying the essence of the East Asian crisis as deriving from the predatory interests of global financial speculators and the way that the IMF and the US Treasury both effectively collude with these speculators, albeit that is not Stiglitz’s word of course but mine, he somewhat naively goes on to idealise the nature of East Asian politico-economic systems and societies. Elites there are, after all, (just as elsewhere) acting in their own class interests, too.

    It is just not the case that the poor have not suffered in specific ways in these systems, not least because, for a start, there is very little if any social insurance in East Asia. There is of course often the informal or even direct suppression of certain freedoms that, albeit dwindling in Western countries especially in the aftermath of 9/11, nonetheless attests in many Western contexts at least to the prior history of the many great struggles won through victorious and sometimes even bloody battles with the authorities over decades or more. In East Asia, social freedoms for the individual have all too frequent a tendency in some countries to be either profoundly underdeveloped or even directly repressed.

    That is to say that the East Asian systems have a level of ‘cost’ that must be measured in a truly holistic fashion and not merely at the level of narrow economic advance or benefit, albeit of those there have been many instances, too. To imagine, however, that, for example, lifetime employment systems were prevalent throughout the Japanese system rather than true of only about a quarter of the workforce is to engage in a degree of submission to Japanese or other East Asian state or elite propaganda that totally misses the fact that these systems have always had another darker or more underprivileged side to their working practices. This very partial, even marginal side (given it is only 20 to 25% of the workforce) was often believed to epitomise Japanese or East Asian systems of social harmony (one Japanese’s concept of ‘harmony’ might represent to another person a case of repressive social restriction or control) and to constitute a characteristic instance. In Japan, this split has been somewhat anaemically captured under the label of the ‘dual economy’. The sometimes twilight world of arubaito (from the German word for work, Arbeit, that in Japan refers to informal or part-time labour) has involved occasions where workers were being sent home when not wanted for work and being called back in again when then suddenly needed. In the recessionary 1990s, such practices became even more widespread of course but they certainly pre-existed by a long way the bursting of the bubble. It is this kind of thing of which Stiglitz needs perhaps to take more account.

    For all these reasons, Stiglitz’s seeming advocacy of the basic health of the East Asian system and of its miracle growth as largely beneficial appears at times a little arbitrary and naïve. It tends to forget or sideline the experience of many East Asians who feel repressed or stifled in their societies and who have suffered profoundly in varying ways, labouring terribly under conservative or authoritarian systems that allow little space for them to be what they are or want to be.

    To return to the question of the Japanese bubble, which actually cannot be separated from the wider economy and its dysfunctionalities, Not only did the discount rate go down to 2.5%, as Wood indicated but it remained at that level for two years and three months: from February 1987 until May 1989. As Geoffrey P. Miller has written, “The money supply was growing at over 10 percent a year, much faster than GDP which grew between 4.8 and 5.9 percent between 1987 and 1989.” Despite the strong Japanese currency, Japan’s exports as well as its trade surplus with the US kept on climbing.

    The Japanese stock market began to rise. Again Geoffrey Miller explains this well: “Starting at about 20,000 at the beginning of 1987, the Nikkei 225 rose quickly through much of the year. The rally was interrupted by the worldwide share price collapse of October, 1987, but by the spring of 1988 the market had recovered and was surging to new highs. In 1988 the Nikkei set new records and rose 39.9% in local currency terms, closing at over 30,000. By the beginning of 1989, Japanese share markets accounted for more than 42 percent of the value of all markets worldwide, up from 15 percent in 1980.”

    In real estate markets, dizzying heights were achieved whereby, especially in Tokyo, prices more than doubled in the space of four years, taking the starting point as 1986. With residential price rises in Tokyo doing so on an annual basis of about 70% in 1988, and Tokyo commercial real estate rising by nearly 80 %, prices were shooting through the roof.

    Many of the problems stemmed from the fact of far-reaching deregulation in the system, as both Wood and Stiglitz have argued cogently. Liberalisation, especially if put into place speedily, creates all kinds of deep instabilities in the system. In Japan’s case, the financial system had been undergoing many changes since 1984.

    Many other irrationalities overcame the system: from crazily expensive golf memberships that acted as shares, to real estate purchasing in California and other parts of the US and the building of massive luxury hotels, particularly in Hawaii, that very few would be able to afford to stay in and which, to remain solvent required something in the region of 75% occupancy rates (and that would surely soon go bust on precisely that account), to the building of masses and masses of new golf courses in Japan.

    Eventually, the Bank of Japan, in Miller’s words once more, “began to act against the land and share price bubbles in 1989. It tightened monetary policy in a mild way at the end of May, 1989, when it raised the official discount rate for the first time in nine years – from 2.5 percent to 3.25 percent… short term interest rates rose a full percentage point between January and June, 1989. On October 11, 1989, the BOJ raised the discount rate again, from 3.25 percent to 3.75 percent, following rate rises by the Bundesbank and other central banks. The indications of a more restrictive monetary policy at the BOJ could be seen in short term rates, which climbed throughout the Fall of 1989, closing the year at 6.25 percent.” Irrespective of the rising discount rates, the stock market continued to stay at near-record levels. At the end of August, the Nikkei 225 posted 35,000 levels. The property boom continued for the rest of the year, as did the stock markets, which rose further right through to the end of the year. By this time, the Nikkei was posting levels in excess of 38,000 and the market was euphoric. No wonder, you might well say, because Japan had seemingly reached the top with all the indicators so well-balanced and perfectly attuned. Unemployment was a low 2.2-2.3 percent; there was low inflation with high economic growth, underpinned by a large trade surplus and supported in turn by huge rises in property and share values. The sky was halcyon with seemingly no storm clouds brewing. The only worry might be that all this, in Miller’s words, was simply “too good to be true”. Tokyo, however, as well as Japan more broadly, was at this stage in no mood for such sober reflections. The market, mad beast that it is when everything is going up, was rather more consumed by what John Maynard Keynes referred to as ‘animal spirits’, which indicates something of the nature of the madness that infects markets at their dizzy peak of speculative insanity, that highpoint in anarchic capitalist irrationality.

  • IPE LECTURE 1

    Globalisation; world market; global capitalism; world economic system; international financial markets; global money markets;
    TNCs; multinational corporations; global brands;
    G8; IMF; World Bank; WTO; TRIPS; United Nations; Davos;
    World Social Forum; ILO; NGOs; Greenpeace; Amnesty International.

    Modernisation: urbanisation; development; industrialisation; democratisation; feminism; civil rights.

    Empire: imperialism; neo-colonialism; Americanisation; Coca-colonisation; North v South; proletarianisation.

    Neo-classical economics: demand-and-supply curves; marginal utility; mathematical illusion; ahistorical theory; rational bourgeois egoist; “private vice is public gain” (Bernard Mandeville).

    Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Volume 1 & Volume 2. (1776)
    Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society.

    Aristotle, The Politics.
    Muhammad Ibn Khaldûn, The Mugaddimah.

    The Scottish Enlightenment 1707-1789; David Hume; Liberalism; the materialist conception of history; social evolution; grand narrative of human progress; social organisation of human labour.

    Adam Smith’s theory of historical evolution: hunting -> herding -> agriculture -> commerce.

    140,000 years ago: hunter-gatherer tribes;
    12,000 years ago: agricultural villages;
    4,000 years ago: market towns;
    300 years ago: capitalist cities.

    Politics and economics are phenomena of the last 4,000 years of human history, i.e. one 35th of the total.

    Pre-modern tribal and agricultural societies are non-monetary patriarchal societies: subsistence; sharing; gifts; tribute; slavery; serfdom; plunder.

    Money is surplus production: politics; taxes; war; religion; bureaucracy; art; festivals; trade; luxuries.

    Feudalism: the moral economy; just prices and just wages; divine law; taboo on usury; artisan guilds and merchant fraternities; apprenticeships; pilgrimages; the Caliphate; the Silk Route; the spice trade.

    Capitalism is a phenomenon of the last 300 years of human history, i.e. one 466th of the total.

    Christopher Columbus “discovers” America in 1492 and shifts the centre of the world to Western Europe: Spain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands and England.

    Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History.

    Imperialism: looting; slave trade; monopolies; concessions; colonies; protectorates.

    Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy.

    World systems theory: Baghdad -> Cairo -> Venice -> Cadiz -> Amsterdam -> London -> New York

    “The world presents itself as a fantastic array of commodities” (Karl Marx)

    The evolution of money: merchant capital -> industrial and financial capital.

    The evolution of politics: warriors and priests -> bureaucrats and propagandists.

    The evolution of labour: peasants in countryside -> workers in cities.

    The world market creates the nation state – and vice versa.

    Plassey 1757: the East India Company defeats the Nawab of Bengal;
    New Delhi 1947: the Indian Republic ends the British empire;
    London 2007: the GLA celebrates Indian independence.