Category: HRC Archive

  • Hegel & The Ethical State

    French victory over Prussians at 1806 battle of Jena: Hegel in crowds cheering Napoléon Bonaparte = “World Soul on horseback.” Editor of Bonapartist newspaper in Germany. Brother and brother-in-law killed during 1812 French invasion of Russia. Bonaparte’s liberal dictatorship = third way between Bourbon kings and Jacobin republic. 1789 French revolution = “the end of history”: social and political foundation of human freedom.

    18th century Enlightenment discredited Christian justification for absolute monarchy -> Hegel’s speculative philosophy discovers rational basis for state authority. World Spirit = the inevitable progress of the “idea of freedom” through repeated dialectical contradictions of global history: Asia -> Greece -> Rome -> Germany. 1807 Philosophy of the Spirit: the master-slave dialectic as the primordial struggle for recognition explains pre-1789 class society divided between aristocrats and labourers. 1517 Martin Luther’s 95 Theses = Protestant equality of believers -> 14/7/1789 Storming of the Bastille = Hegelian equality of citizens. Slaves have learnt to beat masters on the battlefield = end of history as feudal class antagonisms. Instability of post-1789 France: Liberalism = atomised individualism into social chaos -> Jacobinism = Absolute Liberty into Absolute Terror. Bonaparte’s 1799 coup d’état -> Napoleonic empire: meritocratic elite = “every soldier has a Marshal’s baton in his knapsack”; mixed form of government = Emperor, Senate, Tribunate & Conseil d’État; and European unity = Code Civil, common currency & single market. 1821 Philosophy of Right: military defeat of Bonaparte -> political victory of Bonapartism. Hegel’s obscure language = Freemasonry’s occult truths: king of Rome disguised as king of Prussia.

    Hegel’s political philosophy = negative freedoms of civil society -> substantive freedoms of the state. Modernity = master-slave dialectic superseded by bourgeois citizenship. Hegel admires liberal economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Private property = externalisation of individual wills. Family = patriarchal contract between two individual wills. Law = universalisation of individual property ownership. Market competition between property owners = multiplication of needs -> one-sided development of bourgeois individuals. Civil society = dynamic and egoistic -> anarchy and collapse. Mass poverty -> violent revolution.

    Bonapartist state imposes political discipline upon capitalist competition. Three estates as intermediary institutions between ruler and ruled: notables, bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Assembly of notables = hereditary or appointed landowners who serve the state and funded by land rent. Corporations of bourgeoisie = urban merchants, artisans and bankers who create both wealth and deprivation. State bureaucracy = meritocratic civil service outside and above civil society. Political supervision of market economy: law, defence, infrastructure, welfare and education. Patriotism = reconciliation of individual wills and collective interests through ethical concept of state. Hegel rejects social contract theory of Rousseau = levelling conformity of Jacobin republic. Hegel advocates mixed constitution with separation of powers between executive = bureaucracy and legislature = notables and corporations. Wealth moderated by wisdom.

    The people’s emperor: formless mass of egotistic individuals united by Great Man who personifies World Spirit of historical progress. Monarchy is single mind above squabbling factions of notables and bourgeoisie. Long-term goals not short-term gains. Political and military leadership for national conflicts for global dominance. Hegel rejects Immanuel Kant’s belief that liberal republics = perpetual peace. Rationality of warfare = world-historical evolution from autonomous states into universal state. 14/7/1789 = realisation of freedom in one nation -> dissemination to all nations. Bonaparte’s downfall = hubris of ignoring intermediary institutions of Napoleonic empire. Mixed constitution enables selfish individuals of capitalist market to be patriotic citizens of ethical state. The end of world-history = “the real is rational” for everyone everywhere.

  • GEORG HEGEL & THE ETHICAL STATE

    French victory over Prussians at 1806 battle of Jena: Hegel in crowds cheering Napoléon Bonaparte = “Word Soul on horseback.” Editor of Bonapartist newspaper in Germany. Brother and brother-in-law killed during 1812 French invasion of Russia. Bonaparte’s liberal dictatorship = third way between Bourbon kings and Jacobin republic. 1789 French revolution = “the end of history”: social and political foundation of human freedom.

    18th century Enlightenment discredited Christian justification for absolute monarchy -> Hegel’s speculative philosophy discovers rational basis for state authority. World Spirit = the inevitable progress of the “idea of freedom” through repeated dialectical contradictions of global history: Asia -> Greece -> Rome -> Germany. 1807 Philosophy of the Spirit: the master-slave dialectic as the primordial struggle for recognition explains pre-1789 class society divided between aristocrats and labourers. 1517 Martin Luther’s 95 Theses = Protestant equality of believers -> 14/7/1789 Storming of the Bastille = Hegelian equality of citizens. Slaves have learnt to beat masters on the battlefield = end of history as feudal class antagonisms. Instability of post-1789 France: Liberalism = atomised individualism into social chaos -> Jacobinism = Absolute Liberty into Absolute Terror. Bonaparte’s 1799 coup d’état -> Napoleonic empire: meritocratic elite = “every soldier has a Marshal’s baton in his knapsack”; mixed form of government = Emperor, Senate, Tribunate & Conseil d’État; and European unity = Code Civil, common currency & single market. 1821 Philosophy of Right: military defeat of Bonaparte -> political victory of Bonapartism. Hegel’s obscure language = Freemasonry’s occult truths: king of Rome disguised as king of Prussia.

    Hegel’s political philosophy = negative freedoms of civil society -> substantive freedoms of the state. Modernity = master-slave dialectic superseded by bourgeois citizenship. Hegel admires liberal economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Private property = externalisation of individual wills. Family = patriarchal contract between two individual wills. Law = universalisation of individual property ownership. Market competition between property owners = multiplication of needs -> one-sided development of bourgeois individuals. Civil society = dynamic and egoistic -> anarchy and collapse. Mass poverty -> violent revolution.

    Bonapartist state imposes political discipline upon capitalist competition. Three estates as intermediary institutions between ruler and ruled: notables, bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Assembly of notables = hereditary or appointed landowners who serve the state and funded by land rent. Corporations of bourgeoisie = urban merchants, artisans and bankers who create both wealth and deprivation. State bureaucracy = meritocratic civil service outside and above civil society. Political supervision of market economy: law, defence, infrastructure, welfare and education. Patriotism = reconciliation of individual wills and collective interests through ethical concept of state. Hegel rejects social contract theory of Rousseau = levelling conformity of Jacobin republic. Hegel advocates mixed constitution with separation of powers between executive = bureaucracy and legislature = notables and corporations. Wealth moderated by wisdom.

    The people’s emperor: formless mass of egotistic individuals united by Great Man who personifies World Soul of historical progress. Monarchy is single mind above squabbling factions of notables and bourgeoisie. Long-term goals not short-term gains. Political and military leadership for national conflicts for global dominance. Hegel rejects Immanuel Kant’s belief that liberal republics = perpetual peace. Rationality of warfare = world-historical evolution from autonomous states into universal state. 14/7/1789 = realisation of freedom in one nation -> dissemination to all nations. Bonaparte’s downfall = hubris of ignoring intermediary institutions of Napoleonic empire. Mixed constitution enables selfish individuals of capitalist market to be patriotic citizens of ethical state. The end of world-history = “the real is rational” for everyone everywhere.

  • THE CLASS OF THE NEW

    Building upon the analysis in Imaginary Futures, this 2006 OpenMute book explains the historical predecessors and later remixes of Daniel Bell’s concept of the knowledge class.

    Download the pdf version for free

  • INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN EDITION

    The email came from the translators in Brazil: “We want you to write an introduction to the Portuguese version of Imaginary Futures – something special for the local readers.” What should I say? My immediate thought was that Suba, Marky and Patife were on the soundtrack during the all-night writing sessions which created this book. Their rhythms contributed to the construction of its sentences and the flow of its arguments. Maybe I should begin the introduction by explaining why these musicians were in the mix? It definitely was no accident. Thanks to my job at Westminster University, I’ve had the pleasure of teaching some very smart Brazilian students over the past decade. Through them and other contacts, I’ve made the long journey south three times to speak at conferences and festivals in Rio, São Paulo, Brasilia and Pipa. I’ve danced at a samba school, in hip nightclubs and under the stars on a beach. I’ve discussed the politics of the Workers’ Party, analysed the global justice movement and debated leftist theory long into the night. I’ve admired the creativity and dedication of Brazilian artists, hackers and activists. Despite the language barrier, I now have dear friends in this fascinating faraway country. Enthused by these visits, I returned the favour by helping in 2005 to organise an event in London where Gilberto Gil talked about the Brazilian Ministry of Culture’s innovative new media initiatives. But, you might ask, what have these reminiscences got to do with this book? Why talk about them in the introduction for the Portuguese translation of Imaginary Futures? It’s because I recall sitting outside the Telecentro cybercafe in Pipa in 2004 when I was asked the all-important question: “Has being in Brazil changed the way that you think about the Net?” My task in this introduction must be explaining why the answer is: “Yes!”

    Imaginary Futures is a book about the political and cultural power of technological prophecies. During the Cold War, the American and Russian empires competed not only to control space, but also to own time. Computers and the Net have long been much more than useful tools. For over half a century, they have also embodied utopian dreams in the service of imperial ambition. The nation that is pioneering the future in the present can claim leadership over the whole of humanity. When I began the research for this book in 2002, my focus was exclusively on the North. I was fascinated by how the imaginary futures of the Cold War still dominated the contemporary world long after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The American empire might have prevailed over its Russian rival, but its boosters remained trapped within an ideological framework devised for this geopolitical conflict. Not surprisingly, this book reflects the times in which it was written: the aftermath of the dotcom bubble and the moment of the US-led invasion of Iraq. Across Europe, political leaders, academic experts and media commentators were convinced that America – the land of cutting-edge computing and the Net – was our tomorrow today. Where the US president led, our countries must follow – even if it meant sending troops into foreign lands where they weren’t welcome. As one of the two million people who marched against this folly in London on 15th February 2003, I wrote this book as a howl of protest. By painstakingly explaining the history of the imaginary futures of artificial intelligence and the information society, I wanted to equip its readers with the knowledge to refute these anachronistic prophecies. The next time that someone told them that the post-industrial utopia was just around the corner, they could reply that this prediction was nothing more than recycled McLuhanism. The Cold War was over – and its made-in-America imaginary futures were too.

    As my questioner in Pipa was wondering, I didn’t need to visit Brazil or know anyone from the country to come to this conclusion. Few of the authors who fill the shelves of my study with their thoughts about computing and the Net are interested the impact of information technologies within the developing world. Like them, I could have said everything that I wanted to say in this book without making any mention of the majority of humanity. Computers and the Net are from the North, so why bother talking about the South? Fortunately, my Brazilian comrades have prevented me from succumbing to this lazy temptation. Their influence has added depth to the analysis of Imaginary Futures. First and foremost, I’ve realised how different the world looks from the South compared to the North. It’s not just the constellations in the sky that are upended, but also geopolitical memory. When I visited Brasilia in 2004, I saw with my own eyes the modernist edifices of a better society that was denied to their country. As the book emphasises, leading intellectuals of the American empire were cheerleaders of the 1964 military coup which overthrew the democratically elected government of João Goulart. The wonders of the US-style hi-tech future to come justified the horrors of the brutal dictatorship that was imposed on Brazil in this period. For those of us who live in Western Europe, it is always a shock to encounter the inequality and violence which resulted from this authoritarian path of development. Because our experience of American hegemony during the Cold War was relatively benign, we only truly understand the human costs of its imperial rule when we come to the South. The concluding chapters of Imaginary Futures reflect what I learnt from my Brazilian trips. When I was writing the book, I knew that the fiercest criticism of these utopian prophecies from the North was explaining how their advocates had tried to realise them in the South. Tellingly, I discovered that the American instigators of the 1964 coup in Brazil were also the architects of their nation’s disastrous invasion of Vietnam. With US-led forces occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, the parallels with the present had to be drawn. The desire to own time is intimately connected with the ambition to control space. When I looked at the world from the South, I could see how easily hi-tech dreams can turn into nightmares of barbarism and cruelty. Going to São Paulo was the precondition for understanding why – in Imaginary Futures – Saigon plays such a key role in the history of the global village.

    When I first visited Brazil in 2002, the importance of envisaging the world from the South when writing this book wasn’t immediately obvious. At the conference at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, our hosts entertained their foreign guests with the sad story of the local version of Californian hi-tech hype. Mesmerised by the late-1990s dotcom bubble, Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration had fantasised about Brazil making a great leap forward from underdevelopment to the information society without having to pass through Fordism. With the inhabitants of the nearby favelas lacking the basic amenities and welfare services which are taken for granted in Europe, we were appalled at how the imaginary futures of the North had given a modernist gloss to the perpetuation of exploitation in the South. When the supporters of the newly elected Lula government told us that reaching Fordism would be a major achievement for the urban poor of Brazil, we couldn’t disagree. Focusing the country’s economic policy on computers, the Net and mobile phones seemed grotesque when so many people lacked water, sewage, electricity, healthcare and education. We’d read our Marx – we knew that the South couldn’t avoid following the North’s slow and painful path to modernity.

    I then had a worrying thought. Ironically, our leftist sympathies for the inhabitants of the favelas might be disguising a dubious assumption of European superiority. With its huge gulf between rich and poor, travelling to Rio in the early-21st century does seem like going back in time to London in the late-19th century. It was certainly true that lots of tourists go to Brazil for a quick dose of exoticism and adventure before returning to their safe European homes. If our motivations for foreign travel were no purer, did this mean that the inhabitants of an underdeveloped country couldn’t tell us anything about computing and the Net that we didn’t know already? Here was another troubling conclusion. Cardoso had been a respected Marxist economist before he sacrificed principles for power. His perverse embrace of dotcom neo-liberalism might be founded upon a kernel of rationality: the South had faithfully to imitate the North in all its vices. With his ambition of jumping over Fordism to post-industrialism, maybe he was the true radical rather than the Lula government with its cautious programme of incremental reforms? Who wants to be Sweden when you could become Silicon Valley?

    Six years later, as the global financial system is wracked in crisis, it seems absurd that Brazil would want to transform itself into California. On the contrary, it’s now widely recognized that many of the elements of the new paradigm of modernity are more likely to be found in this supposedly underdeveloped country than in its advanced neighbour to the north. By the time that Mídia Tática Brasil invited me back for their conference in 2003, Gilberto Gil was already arguing – as a government minister – in favour of an open source vision of the Net. For him, funding community cybercafes and media hotspots complimented the provision of other essential amenities to the underprivileged. Most wonderfully, it was the copyright fetishists of the North who would have to imitate the South’s relaxed attitude to intellectual property not the other way around. The ownership of computers and access to broadband might be much lower in Brazil than Europe and America, but it was here that could be found the precursor of the participatory culture of the Net. Carnival not the market was the Minister of Culture’s model for the emerging information society. True to his roots in Tropicália, Gil is a true cosmopolitan. Imitation isn’t subservience – it’s inspiration and cooperation. Remixing, sampling and quoting are the tools of collective labour in the hi-tech-gift economy.

    In the conclusion of this book, I argue that we must invent new futures. Exorcising the Cold War ideologies of artificial intelligence and the global village is my contribution to mapping out a path through the multiple political, economic, social and environmental problems that now confront humanity. Crucially, as my interlocutor in Pipa guessed, you too have helped to create this text in a small way. Imaginary Futures would have been a different book in many subtle ways if I hadn’t visited Brazil and learnt from the people who I met there. The inhabitants of the North and South are in this venture of modernity together. So let’s continue our collaboration in the common endeavour of making a more equalitarian, sustainable and prosperous world. The drum ‘n’ bass is playing and this book is waiting to be read. Enjoy!

    Richard Barbrook,
    London,
    England,
    16th November 2008.

  • Stuart Hall: Stalinist in theory and Blairite in politics

    I suppose those who make their living out of teaching Cultural Studies have to mourn the demise of Stuart Hall. However, the airbrushing of Hall’s unpleasant politics in his obituaries cannot be allowed to pass without some attempt at correcting the historical record. Here are my thoughts which come from someone who – in more than one period of his life – was on the opposite side of the barricades to this high priest of philosophical confusion.

    Stuart Hall joined the CPGB (British Stalinist party) after the Russian army crushed the 1956 Hungarian revolution and remained a member through the 1968 suppression of the Prague Spring, the breaking of the 1970 Gdansk strikes, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the 1981 Polish military coup and was still there when this shameful outfit finally dissolved itself in 1991 because the Soviet Union had imploded. During these three decades, he never took any public stand against the Russian occupation of Eastern Europe or the vicious repression of workers’ struggles by the Stalinist system. Silence = complicity.

    In the various fawning obituaries of Hall, he has been described as a great ‘Marxist’ thinker. Yet, if you read his publications, there is no evidence that he ever seriously studied Marx’s writings. The only references in them are to:-
    * The CPGB’s bowdlerised version of The German Ideology which carefully removed all of the passages where Marx and Engels gleefully mock the 1840s equivalents of Hall;
    * The chapter on commodity fetishism in Capital Volume 1 which Hall bizarrely mistook for a theory of ideology;
    * The most famous quotes from The Communist Manifesto; 18th Brumaire and The Civil War in France which every CPGB member was supposed to know.

    As far as I can make out, Hall never read the rest of Capital, Grundrisse, Theories of Surplus Value or any of Marx’s wonderful journalistic articles. I have taught undergraduate students who’ve read more of Marx’s writings than Hall ever did!

    Instead of Marx, Hall devoted himself to promoting Louis Althusser’s remix of Stalin’s socio-linguistics in the English-speaking world. During the late-1970s and early-1980s, his disciples were the most sectarian of any group on the English Left which – given our long history of Protestant sectarianism – is saying something. If you still need to understand why Hall’s obsession with Althusser was elitist and reactionary, please read Edward Thompson’s and Simon Clarke’s excellent articles which demolish the idiocies of this Stalinist philosophy.

    Since then, we’ve had two generations of academic leftists brought up on Hall who have wasted their energies on the spawn of Althusser: Foucault; Derrida; Deleuze & Guattari; Badiou; Zizek and so on. In this fifth year of the Great Recession, they have nothing sensible to say because they lack the basic theoretical knowledge to refute the propagandists of neo-liberalism. For, as Stalin and Hall argued, Marx’s critique of political economy was only for ‘textualists and Talmudists’ …

    In 1978, Hall and his BCCCS colleagues published Policing the Crisis which claimed that the rise of neo-liberalism was an entirely ideological offensive by the Tory party. Amazingly, this book never discussed Hayek, Mises, Friedman or any of the other bourgeois economists who Thatcher and her allies were loudly proclaiming as their gurus at the time. Then as now, refusing to study value theory was a big mistake. Even worse, Hall’s book splenetically denounced all English Situationists as ‘terrorists’ which – given how many of their ideas he’d stolen for the BCCCS’ work on youth subcultures – was most ungrateful. A year later, Dick Hebdige proved himself a diligent pupil of Hall when he published a book on the punk movement which never mentioned that its founders were English Situationists. Stalin would have been proud of both of them!

    In the early-1980s, Hall rose to prominence as the intellectual maestro of the Eurocommunist faction of the CPGB which controlled the party’s misnamed theoretical journal: Marxism Today. In issue after issue, he and his associates denounced the Labour Left’s struggles against the Thatcher monster as extremist and deranged. We just didn’t understand that the English proletariat was irredeemably racist, sexist and homophobic. It was Thatcher who knew how to appeal to these reactionary impulses – and our attempts to mobilise the working class in all of its diversity against her oppressive regime were doomed to failure. At first, Hall’s faction of the CPGB kept the Althusserian faith by analysing Tory rule solely as a ideological project. After a few years, even they eventually realised that neo-liberalism might have something to do with the despised discipline of political economy. However, instead of reading some value theory, Hall’s faction now proclaimed Thatcher’s regime as the future in the present. Neo-liberalism was the New Times to come which – most conveniently for them – meant that the Labour Left’s resistance to Tory hegemony was futile. Delighted that the local franchise of the Cold War enemy had switched sides in the class struggle, the right-wing press enthusiastically promoted the new party line of (anti-)Marxism Today. They knew that they could rely on the Althusserians to purge the ‘Trotskyist wreckers’ who threatened the bourgeoisie’s wealth and privileges.

    In the late-1980s, I was told by a member of Hall’s faction of the CPGB that they were very pleased that Thatcher had defeated the miners’ strike and crushed the local government Left because the Labour party would now be forced to adopt their centrist political programme. Within a decade, this prognosis was realised when Blair was elected prime minister on a manifesto which assured the bankers that New Labour had no intention of breaking with Thatcher’s neo-liberal settlement. In the early reforming years of this administration, Hall made not one word of complaint about its failure to repeal anti-trade union laws, its attacks on welfare claimants and various other dubious policies. However, when New Labour eventually got old and discredited, he suddenly reappeared as a critic of the neo-liberal government which his faction of the CPGB had helped into power! Of course, we should always welcome someone who recants their past errors. Yet, Hall was still incapable of providing any intelligent analysis of the failings of neo-liberalism because this would have required the one thing that he’d always refused to do: studying Marx’s critique of political economy.

    If there is one lesson to be learnt from this sad tale of political failure and theoretical chicanery, we must not make the same mistake as Hall and his disciples. Comrades – let us become Marxists who’ve read some Marx!

  • Marx on the State

    20th century Marxisms were a theology of state power with Marx’s anti-statist writings as holy texts.

    Social Democracy = parliamentary democracy and the welfare state.
    Bolshevism = totalitarian party and state planning.

    19th century Marxism of Marx proposed two different concepts of state power:
    The Parasite State = “Strong government and heavy taxes are identical”.
    The Class State = “the managing committee of the bourgeoisie”.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels grew up during the post-1815 Restoration.
    Bonaparte’s liberal empire replaced by European Christian monarchies.
    Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1806).
    Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (1820).

    Young Hegelians attacked the reactionary politics of the Prussian monarchy by criticising conservative appropriation of Hegel’s Idealist philosophy.
    Freedom was creating materialist philosophy to discredit the alienated consciousness of religion.
    Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

    Marx and Engels rejected philosophical criticism for the critique of political economy.
    Freedom required a materialist conception of history to end alienated labour under capitalism.
    The grand narrative of history as successive modes of production: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
    Increasing efficiency of labour through specialisation and professionalisation, especially science and technology.
    Egoism of bourgeois individual in market economy reflected one-sided development of modern everyday life.
    Bourgeois private property as expression of alienated labour of capitalism.
    Proletariat was the propertyless class which would liberate all of humanity by overcoming the division of labour.
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845).
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).

    Hegel celebrated the universal class of state bureaucrats who regulated the selfish interests of bourgeois society.
    Marx saw the state bureaucrats as a self-interested caste created by the division of labour within capitalism.
    The common interests of the people transformed into the private property of the government bureaucracy: the parasite state.
    Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843)

    1848 German Revolution: Red republic against Prussian and Austrian monarchies.
    1851 coup d’etat by Louis Bonaparte replaces French republic with new empire.
    State was above and against all classes within civil society.
    The parasite state living off the taxes extracted from the people.
    Oriental despotism: autarchic villages and irrigation schemes
    Absolutist monarchy: declining aristocracy and rising bourgeoisie.
    Bonapartism: economic modernisation and repression of the proletariat.
    Capitalism was authoritarian rule by a liberal oligarchy which feared political democracy.
    Karl Marx, British Rule in India (1853).
    Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
    Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

    Marx and Engels lived most of their lives as political refugees in London and Manchester.
    Great Britain was the first capitalist nation with 50% of global industrial production in 1850.
    Britain was the future of the rest of the world in the present.
    Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845).
    Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (1867)

    Britain was a crowned bourgeois republic: limited franchise, free speech and the rule of law.
    Under the liberal republic, the state acted as “the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”.
    Class violence against internal enemies, including repression and confiscation.
    Rule of law to protect private property: human rights and free contracts enabled class exploitation.
    Public works to support capitalist development, such as canals, railways and education.
    Economic policies favourable to national bourgeoisie, such as free trade in Britain or protectionism in Germany and the USA.
    Imperial conquests to grab resources or exclude competitors from overseas markets, such as the British in Ireland and India.
    The struggle over the franchise was over which class fraction would control British state through parliamentary elections.
    The abolition of the Corn Laws marked the ascendency of industrial bourgeoisie over the capitalist landowners.
    Egoism of civil society undermined political democracy.
    Bourgeois politicians were professional hucksters and swindlers.
    Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Articles on Britain (1971).

    Two-stage revolutionary struggle: political democracy -> social democracy.
    Primary task of the continental European Left was to overthrow parasite state.
    Alliance of proletarians, petit-bourgeoisie and peasantry fighting to create the democratic republic: the 1871 Paris Commune.
    Primary task of British and American Left was to extend the franchise and campaign for social reforms: the Chartist movement.
    Both liberals and socialists believed that universal suffrage would lead to “the dictatorship of the proletariat”.
    Democratic republic under capitalism was inherently unstable as workers can exercise political power while still being economically exploited.
    Universal suffrage secured through participatory politics: abolition of state bureaucracy, official religion, national education, media censorship and professional army.
    Marx had been a newspaper editor in 1840s who opposed press censorship, nationalised media and government press subsidies.
    “The Paris Commune made that watchword of the bourgeois revolution – cheap government – into a reality.” – Karl Marx.
    Participation of citizens in DIY politics ended the division of labour between bureaucrats and people: militia, juries, posses, administration.
    From the Ancient Athenian agora to the Wild West democracy of the USA.
    The dictatorship of the proletariat would use emergency powers against the threat of the “slave owners’ revolt” like the Union against the Confederacy in the American Civil War.
    Karl Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press (1842).
    Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
    Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
    Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

    The self-emancipation of the proletariat through the three wings of the labour movement: mass political parties, workers’ militia and trade unions/cooperatives.
    Revolutionary reformism of Marx and Engels emphasised political campaigns for economic improvements: limiting the working day, factory regulations, consumer protection, regulating banking system.
    Participatory politics abolished politics as a profession: “the withering away of the state”.
    Communism was the overcoming of the division between mental and manual labour within civil society.
    Workers’ cooperatives were prefiguring the democratic organisation of the whole economy.
    “The socialist future will an Athens without slaves.” – Paul Lafargue.
    Communism was the principles of participatory democracy applied to all aspects of life.
    Karl Marx, Capital Volume 3 (1894).
    Paul Lafargue, The Right To Be Lazy (1883).

  • THE MARXIST POLITICS OF KARL MARX

    “The one thing of which I’m certain is that I’m not a Marxist.”- Karl Marx

    Post-Communist nostalgia for 1948 Cold War Marxisms.
    Social Democracy: parliamentary elections, welfare state and US imperialism.
    Bolshevism: totalitarian party, state planning and Russian imperialism.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were ’48ers: the young radicals of the 1848 European revolutions against the post-1815 Christian monarchies and bourgeois liberalism.

    1836 students at the University of Berlin.
    Young Hegelians were critics of Georg Hegel’s Idealist interpretation of history: the World Spirit making the real rational.

    The materialist refutation of religion was the philosophical rejection of reactionary rule in Germany:
    Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

    From the philosophy of intellectual freedom to the materialist conception of history:
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845)

    Liberal concept of socio-economic progress: hunting → herding → agriculture → commerce.
    Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)
    Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).

    1848 European Revolution: the springtime of the peoples.
    Republican democracy, national liberation and socialist reforms.
    Marx was a newspaper editor and Engels was a soldier.
    The German Republic defeated by Prussian monarchy in 1848.
    The French Republic overthrown by Louis Bonaparte in 1851.
    The Russian empire was the leader of European reaction.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).
    Book launch at the Red Lion (aka Be At One), Great Windmill Street, Soho.
    Socialist concept of socio-economic progress: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
    The Left of Red Republicanism: ”The communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties.”

    Liberal concept of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy in the 1642 English Revolution, the 1776 American Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution:
    François Guizot, The History of Civilisation in Europe (1828).
    Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856).

    Socialist concept of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the 1848 European Revolution:
    The limitations of bourgeois liberalism: property franchise, media censorship, regressive taxation, state bureaucracy and professional army.
    Bourgeois fear of republican democracy caused the defeat of the 1848 Revolution.
    Bonapartism was the parasite state dominating civil society in its own interests.
    Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
    Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
    Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

    The proletarian struggle for political democracy: Paris sans-culottes (1792-1794), Polish nationalists (1830/1863), English Chartists (1838-1848), Irish Fenians (1848/1867) and American Unionists (1861-1865).
    Red republicanism: universal suffrage, participatory politics, media freedom, low taxes, socio-economic reforms and citizen militia.
    1871 Paris Commune held multi-party elections while under siege by the Right.
    “Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat.” – Friedrich Engels.
    Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
    Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
    Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

    1864 International Working Men’s Association: trade union cooperation, solidarity with the North in the American Civil War and supporting Polish nationalism.
    1872 Hague Congress: the split in the First International between the Marxist Socialists and the Bakuninist Anarchists.
    Marxists symbolised their victory by moving the headquarters of the First International to New York: the USA was the most advanced capitalist economy which would be the first communist country.

    Anarchism: select conspiracy of intellectuals who wanted to be the ‘invisible dictatorship’ directing the spontaneous revolution of the masses.
    Pre-1914 Anarchism: Bonnet gang, CGT, CNT and the IWW.

    Socialism: mass party of industrial and office workers seeking control of the democratic republic which was the political basis for creating social democracy.
    Pre-1914 Socialism: British Labour Party, German Social Democratic Party and French Socialist Party.
    Political economy of labour over the political economy of capital: 8 hour day, workers’ cooperatives, left culture and community organisations.

    1889 foundation of the Second International: political democracy, trade union cooperation and world peace.
    1914 was the end of Second International Marxism: reformism and nationalism had prevented the socialist revolution.
    The Russian reinterpretation of Marxism: the Bolshevik vanguard party.
    1917 Russian Revolution: the Congress of Soviets not the Constituent Assembly.
    Direct democracy and vanguard party not representative democracy and mass party.
    1917-21 Russian Civil War: one-party state, secret police, ideological mobilisation and professional army.
    1921 Kronstadt Rebellion: Soviets without Bolsheviks.

    20th century Marxisms without Marx’s 19th century politics: Social Democracy, Leninism, Council Communism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Austro-Marxism, Maoism, New Left, Situationism and Autonomism.
    1989-91 Georg Hegel’s end of history was representative democracy and neo-liberal globalisation.
    2008 financial crash and the Occupy movement have popularised David Harvey’s course on Karl Marx’s Capital.
    2015 election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader: the 21st century revival of Second International Marxism.

  • Internet Ideology

    REFF: Most of the technologies which are arising in these years are about knowledge and information. Do you think that they are the most revolutionary technologies of the last centuries? What do you think about it?

    RB: The first thing I would say is that if you look at the last century, the key technologies are probably antibiotics and the contraceptive pill. These are actually the most important technologies ever invented. Also maybe mass transit, as cars and above all airplanes. These are technologies that really have transformed people’s lives but it’s interesting that the convergence between computing media and telecommunications is actually seen as the societal shift in technology. You have these technologies which maybe are not the most important but, because they were given this theoretical and ideological role of bringing on the new society, they are seen as the most important technology even if we could argue that they’re not. I personally work with these technologies so obviously I have an interest in saying that Internet is a very good thing. I am also a writer and the fact that I can distribute my writings, I can put up videos and Flash presentations and I can access so much stuff on the Internet, is fantastic. But I doubt that these technologies are important as antibiotics or contraceptive pill. For instance now days you may not die by a minor infection and women would not die giving birth; actually women can control their own reproduction. And what about the fact that you can travel from country to country by airplane very cheaply now? Those things are probably much more life-changing than information and communication technology. It’s not that information and communication technologies are a bad thing or that we should dismiss them, it’s just that I think that we should be sceptical about the way they have been used for ideological purposes. There is a real positive benefit in the convergent technologies, but we should be sceptical about the ideological use that has been made of them. The ideology of Internet comes before its invention; both Russians and Americans thought the Internet was going to create a new society and they both wanted to claim that their empire was building the new society; therefore the Internet took on this much more exaggerated role. The other thing is that if you are a writer or you are involved in the media or you are a journalist, obviously you are going to think that these technologies really affect you as the most important technologies. People that are working in the communication and information industry, or the intellectuals, those people are obviously going to be obsessed by this technologies, but they tend to exaggerate their own technologies and forget about these other things because they can just take antibiotics!

    REFF: One new thing is the example that technologies may give to other disciplines, as, for example, does the open source, which is not only about software, it can be applied to agriculture, politics, everything. Is there a real opportunity?

    RB: I think it is the other way around. It’s not that the technology has created a culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities and technology express them. Guy Debord and Gil Wolman wrote a famous essay on ‘Methods of Détournement’ in 1957 [1] saying what artist should do in this mass media culture. Artists should be able to appropriate the mass media culture, artefacts, cartoons, films, advertising and then remix them – that’s what detournement really means. Debord was right in saying that since we live in this mass media culture, actually making art about it or being creative about it, implies that artist have to continually refer to it. When Debord made his film, The Society of the Spectacle [2], he had to get a very generous patron who allowed him to buy a film, cut it up, and then go to the studio and re-record it and re-dub it, a very laborious, difficult process. When we made Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War [3], we managed to do it with a very small grant from the Arts Council of England, a Mac laptop, Final Cut and we only had to go to the studio to record the voiceover. We can mix the voiceover into the whole, mix the images into the voiceover through one Laptop. It has taken 50 years for the technology to catch up with what someone has done in 1957. Someone would argue that this is actually what the Cubists were doing when Picasso was making collages putting a socialist newspaper into the collage. In a sense Picasso was already doing those things in 1910; now we can do this because of these digital technologies, we can take other people’s films, we can put our own performances together. I think it is the other way around it’s not that the technology has created the culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities, these technologies that actually were often developed for other things. I remember an old hippie from the 1960s who said that he would always remember when he used to build disco sound systems which cut off the sound from one turntable when switching between two records – people had just never thought of that use, taking the two records and playing them together as if they were music. So you are taking a technology and using it for something it shouldn’t be used for.

    REFF: We may say that now days tools are available, if you just have money you get them, but in another way these tools are controlled, e.g. platforms, iPhone, Facebook, lots of stuff. Do you think that there is a paradox out there?

    RB: Well, that is the paradox of capitalism – it is our labour, we are all variable capital, our labour builds capitalism, capitalism has to organise itself to appropriate the collective to make it so sure that we can only work collectively as through the capitalist social innovation. It’s not a new thing, capitalism’s greatest achievement is that it allows people to work together collectively on a global scale but of course people can only do it in a social relationships which individualizes, atomizes. We’ve been in capitalism three or four hundred years, now we have this very intense socialization but people is trying to cooperate in a different way. I think Facebook is really interesting – I mean it is dotcom capitalism in way, they’re making money out of the advertising but they’re giving people all of this service space for free and they’ve made all this very nice interface, easy to use software. I haven’t uploaded things on my own website because I know it is much easier doing it on Facebook then you can share them with your friends. YouTube is amazing as well. You can just stick up videos, the whole world is sticking up videos and as far I can tell they are not making any money off it. They’re making all sorts of money off Google searches and they’re subsidizing our free distribution of videos to enjoy. And if you think if Facebook did try to control the content people would just migrate to another service because they know what happened to MySpace, and then it just got covered with advertising and they tried to make it too corporate and apart from musicians, everybody, all these 18-20 year olds they’re on Facebook now. In a way they are making money out of this but on the other hand they’re providing us with a free service that’s easy to use. Take the bad with the good.

    Let’s answer the question about what happened to the avant-garde movement, I mean I think that’s the interesting. Because fifteen years ago making new media was avant-garde by itself; actually doing anything with a screen was really radical. It is interesting now that that avant garde is being historicised. In the last five years or so people have been writing books about Internet art and they have a lot to look at concerning the last 10 or 15 years. It is interesting because actually just doing something with a screen is considered radical anyway. It is like the Cubist avant-garde, where just making a collage was exciting. You had to make a good collage for people to see, or making a ready-made by itself seemed to be exciting just because you have done it. After a while people said “so what”. Once you’ve got over the ‘shock of the new’, that favorite phrase in art history, you then have to start deciding whether its good or bad, interesting or an absurd concept. So I think to do something avant-garde and new is not going to be necessarily on the screen – it can be partly on the screen or use the screen or it will be collaborative culture. Last Christmas, I met this woman who works at Battersea Arts Theatre in London and she was saying all the most radical wacky ideas of 1960s and 1970s theatre are now mainstream because they have an Internet generation audience. They expect to be able to interact with the play they don’t like just standing there, sitting there, watching the play on a stage. It’s like in the 60s there were people walking through the audience, they want like actors in the audience, you know this guy sitting next to you and he suddenly actually is really an actor gets up after half an hour and starts acting, getting the audience to vote and all this stuff is cause they’re used to participating. And say something that was once seen as wacky extremism, loony stuff, is now mainstream theatre so again that’s the interesting thing about how it does affect the different culture.

    REFF: How do you feel with the fact that Joi Ito the founder of Creative Commons, is a venture capitalist and the intellectual property laws in general?

    RB: Well, there are two ways in which we could look at it. If you are a vulgar Marxist, as I am, you can say that it is the classic examples in Marx: forces of production develop and in relation to production they eventually become a barrier to the development itself. In this sense intellectual property has become a barrier to setting up this network communications system and actually intellectual property is becoming a barrier to how we use it. It’s like the laws against recreational drugs the bad thing about these laws it’s not just that they’re stupid but it’s that they make people disrespect the law. And the same point can be made about copyright, these too are laws that people don’t obey. Politicians can’t enforce laws that most people spontaneously don’t obey: when a law does not work it is like there is no law at all. It seems to me that a big problem with this copyright law is that everybody is expected to pay for every tune that they ever listen to. On the one hand, you have music as a commodity, on the other, it is a gift. If you want to get a tune for free, you can with a bit of effort. But lots of people don’t have the time to look for free tunes, so they buy it on iTunes just because it is easier to do. However what they are paying for now is not the tunes themselves, it is the simplicity of getting hold of them. This a small example of the weird nature of any intellectual property: the copyright owners sell it to you but you don’t really own it. It is not a fully bourgeois form property (bourgeois property means that you can alienate property and do what you like with the property you bought); with intellectual property is much more like feudal property where the king would deem you a land but you could not do what you like with it you could not sell it. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that people can so easily spontaneously ignore the dictates of these copyright laws!

  • CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY: IL DOGMA LIBERISTA DELLA CLASSE VIRTUALE

    “Non mentire sul futuro è impossibile e uno può mentire su esso a proprio piacimento”.
    Naum Gabo [1]

    COME IL CONTENUTO IDRICO DI UN SERBATOIO TRABOCCA …

    Alla fine del ventesimo secolo, la convergenza a lungo predetta dei media, del computer e delle telecomunicazioni nell’hypermedia finalmente si sta verificando. Ancora una volta, il movimento inesorabile del capitalismo per diversificare ed intensificare i poteri creativi del lavoro umano si trova sul punto di trasformare qualitativamente il modo in cui lavoriamo, agiamo e viviamo insieme. Tramite l’integrazione di tecnologie differenti intorno a protocolli comuni, qualcosa sta per essere creato che è più della somma delle sue parti. Quando l’abilità di produrre e di ricevere quantità illimitate di informazioni in qualsiasi forma è combinata con la portata delle reti di telefonia globale, le forme esistenti di lavoro e di piacere possono essere fondamentalmente trasformate. Nasceranno nuove industrie ed i favoriti del mercato azionario attuale saranno spazzati via. In tali momenti di profondo cambiamento sociale, tutti coloro che possono fornire una semplice spiegazione di ciò che sta accadendo saranno ascoltati con grande interesse. In questo frangente cruciale, una libera alleanza di scrittori, hackers, capitalisti e artisti dalla West Coast degli Stati Uniti d’America è riuscita a definire una ortodossia eterogenea per l’era dell’informazione che sta per sopraggiungere: la Californian Ideology.

    La nuova fede è emersa da una bizzarra fusione del boemianismo culturale di San Francisco con le industrie hi-tech della Silicon Valley. Promossa su riviste, libri, programmi televisivi, siti Web, newsgroups e conferenze in Rete, la Califonian Ideology combina promiscuamente lo spirito a ruota libera degli hippies e lo zelo imprenditoriale degli yupppies. L’amalgamazione degli opposti è stata raggiunta tramite una profonda fede nel potenziale emancipatorio delle tecnologie della nuova informazione. Nell’utopia digitale, tutti saranno all’ultima moda e ricchi. Non sorprendentemente, questa visione ottimistica del futuro è stata entusiasticamente abbracciata dai fanatici del computer, dagli studenti fannulloni, dai capitalisti innovativi, dagli attivisti sociali, dagli accademici all’ultima moda, dai burocrati futuristi e dai politici opportunistici degli Stati Uniti. Come al solito, gli Europei non sono stati lenti nel copiare l’ultima moda bizzarra dall’America. Mentre un recente rapporto della commissione europea raccomanda di seguire il modello del “libero mercato” californiano, per costruire la “super-autostrada dell’informazione”, artisti all’avanguardia e accademici imitano con entusiasmo i filosofi “post-umanistici” del culto dell’Extropian della West Coast [3]. Senza alcun rivale evidente, il trionfo della Californian Ideology sembra essere completo.

    L’ampio fascino di questi teorici della West Coast non è semplicemente il risultato contagioso del loro ottimismo. Soprattutto essi sono difensori appassionati di ciò che sembra essere una forma impeccabilmente libertaria di politica – essi vogliono che le tecnologie dell’informazione vengano usate per creare una nuova “democrazia Jeffersoniana” in cui tutti gli individui saranno in grado di esprimersi liberamente nel cyberspazio [4]. Tuttavia, difendendo questo apparentemente ammirevole ideale, questi tecno-pubblicitari stanno allo stesso tempo riproducendo alcune delle più ataviche caratteristiche della società americana, specialmente quelle derivate dal penoso legame della schiavitù. La loro visione utopistica della California dipende dalla ostinata cecità verso le altre – molto meno positive – caratteristiche di vita sulla West Coast: razzismo, povertà e degradazione ambientale [5]. Ironicamente, nel passato non troppo distante, gli intellettuali e gli artisti della Bay Area erano appassionatamente interessati a tali questioni.

    RONALD REAGAN VERSUS GLI HIPPIES

    Il 15 maggio 1969, il Governatore Ronald Regan ha ordinato alla polizia armata di effettuare un raid all’alba contro i contestatori hippie che avevano occupato People’s Park, vicino al campus di Berkley dell’Università di California. Durante la battaglia che ne conseguì, un uomo venne ucciso ed altre 128 persone necessitarono di cure ospedaliere [6]. Quel giorno, il mondo “onesto” e la contro-cultura sembravano essere implacabilmente contrastata. Da una parte delle barricate, il Governatore Regan ed i suoi seguaci difendevano la libera iniziativa privata e sostenevano l’invasione del Vietnam. Dall’altra parte, gli hippies difendevano una rivoluzione sociale in casa e si opponevano ad una espansione imperiale all’estero. Nell’anno del raid al People’s Park, sembrava che la scelta storica tra queste due opposte prospettive del futuro dell’America poteva essere stabilita solo tramite il conflitto violento. Come Jerry Rubin, uno dei leaders degli Yippie, disse allora:

    “La nostra ricerca dell’avventura e dell’eroismo ci porta fuori dall’America, verso una vita di auto-creazione e ribellione. In risposta, l’America è pronta a distruggerci …” [7].

    Durante gli anni ’60, i radicali della Bay Area hanno aperto la strada alla prospettiva politica ed allo stile culturale dei movimenti della Nuova Sinistra nel mondo. Rompendo con la ristretta politica dell’era post-bellica, essi hanno lanciato campagne contro il militarismo, il razzismo, la discriminazione sessuale, l’omofobia, il consumismo irrazionale e l’inquinamento. Al posto delle rigide gerarchie tradizionali della sinistra, essi hanno creato delle strutture collettive e democratiche che, presumibilmente, prefiguravano la società libertaria del futuro. Soprattutto, la Nuova Sinistra californiana ha combinato la lotta politica con la ribellione culturale. Al contrario dei loro genitori, gli hippies rifiutavano di conformarsi alle rigide convenzioni sociali imposte sull’’organizzazione dell’uomo’ dall’esercito, le università, le corporazioni e persino i partiti politici dell’ala sinistra. Invece, essi dichiaravano apertamente il loro rifiuto del mondo onesto, per mezzo dei loro abiti casual, la promiscuità sessuale, la musica ad alto volume e le droghe ricreative [8].

    Gli hippies radicali erano liberali nel senso sociale della parola. Essi hanno difeso ideali universali, razionali e progressivi come la democrazia, la tolleranza, l’autorealizzazione e la giustizia sociale. Incoraggiati da oltre venti anni di crescita economica essi credevano che la storia stesse dalla loro parte. Nei romanzi di fantascienza essi sognavamo una ‘ecotopia’: una California del futuro in cui le auto erano scomparse, la produzione industriale era ecologicamente vitale, le relazioni sessuali erano egualitarie e la vita quotidiana era vissuta in comunità. Per alcuni hippies, questa prospettiva poteva essere realizzata solo rifiutando il progresso scientifico come un falso Dio e ritornando alla natura. Altri, in contrasto, credevano che il progresso tecnologico avrebbe inevitabilmente reso i loro principi libertari in un fatto sociale. Influenzati in modo decisivo dalle teorie di Marshall McLuhan, questi tecnofili ritenevano che la convergenza dei media, dei computer (??) e delle telecomunicazioni avrebbe inevitabilmente creato una agora elettronica – un luogo virtuale in cui tutti sarebbero stati in grado di esprimere le loro opinioni, senza il timore della censura [10]. Nonostante fosse un professore inglese di mezza età, McLuhan predicava il messaggio radicale che il potere di un grande affare e di un grande governo sarebbe stato abbattuto prossimamente dagli effetti che intrinsecamente danno potere alle nuove tecnologie sugli individui.

    ‘I media elettronici … aboliscono le dimensioni spaziali …Tramite l’elettricità, noi ovunque ricominciamo le relazioni personali come sul modello del più piccolo villaggio. E’ una relazione in profondità, senza delega di funzioni o poteri … Il dialogo sostituisce la conferenza’ [11].

    Incoraggiati dalle predizioni di McLuhan, i radicali dell West Coast vennero conivolti nello sviluppo di nuove tecnologie dell’informazione per la stampa alternativa, le stazioni radio della comunità, i clubs di computer per uso domestico e i video della collettività. Questi attivisti della comunità dei media erano convinti che essi si trovavano in prima linea per costruire un nuova America. La creazione dell’agora elettronica era il primo passo verso la realizzazione della democrazia diretta in tutte le istituzioni sociali [12]. La lotta potrebbe essere dura, ma ‘l’ecotopia’ sarebbe quasi a portata di mano.

    L’ASCESA DELLA CLASSE VIRTUALE

    Chi avrebbe previsto che, in meno di trenta anni dopo la battaglia per People’s Park, squares e hippies avrebbero creato insieme la Californian Ideology? Chi avrebbe pensato che tale contraddittoria mescolanza di determinismo tecnologico e di libertario individualismo sarebbe diventata l’ortodossia ibrida dell’era dell’informazione? E chi avrebbe sospettato che poiché la tecnologia e la libertà erano sempre più venerati sarebbe diventato sempre meno possibile dire qualsiasi cosa di sensato sulla società in cui venivano applicate?

    La Californian Ideology deriva la sua popolarità proprio dall’ambiguità dei suoi precetti. Negli ultimi decenni, il lavoro pioneristico della comunità degli attivisti dei media è stato ampiamente recuperato dalle industrie hi-tech e dai media. Sebbene le società in tali settori possano automatizzare e sub-appaltare molte delle loro mansioni di lavoro, esse rimangono dipendenti da persone chiave che sono in grado di fare ricerca e creare prodotti originali, dai software e dai chip dei computer ai libri ed ai programmi TV. Insieme ad alcuni imprenditori questi di abili lavoratori formano la cosiddetta ‘classe virtuale’: ‘… la tecno-intellighenzia degli scienziati cognitivisti, ingenieri, esperti di computer, creatori di video-games e tutti gli altri specialisti delle comunicazioni …’ [13] Incapaci di assoggettarli alla disciplina della catena di montaggio o di sostituirli con le macchine, i managers hanno organizzato tali lavoratori intellettuali attraverso contratti a tempo determinato. Come ‘l’aristocrazia laburista’ del secolo scorso, il personale centrale dei media, le industrie dei computers e delle telecomunicazioni fanno l’esperienza dei riconoscimenti e delle insicurezze del mercato. D’altra parte, questi artigiani dell’hi-tech non solo tendono ad essere ben remunerati, ma godono anche di una considerevole autonomia sul loro ritmo di lavoro e sul luogo di impiego. Come risultato, la separazione culturale tra gli hippie e ‘l’uomo dell’organizzazione’ è diventata ora piuttosto approssimativa. Tuttavia, d’altra parte, tali lavoratori sono legati dalle clausole dei loro contratti e non hanno garanzie di un lavoro continuato. Non avendo il tempo libero degli hippies, il lavoro in sé è diventato la strada principale per l’autorealizzazione per molta della ‘classe virtuale’ [14].

    La Californian Ideology offre un modo di comprendere la realtà vissuta da questi artigiani dell’hi-tech. D’altra parte, questi lavoratori sono una parte privilegiata della forza lavoro. D’altro canto essi sono gli eredi delle idee radicali degli attivisti della comunità dei media. La Californian Ideology, quindi, contemporaneamente riflette le discipline delle economie di mercato e le libertà dell’artigianato hippie. L’ibrido bizzarro è solo reso possibile tramite un quasi universale credo nel determinismo tecnologico. Sin dagli anni ’60, i liberali nel senso sociale della parola, hanno sperato che la nuova tecnologia dell’informazione avrebbe realizzato i loro ideali. Rispondendo alla sfida della Nuova Sinistra, la Nuova Destra ha resuscitato una più antica forma di liberalismo: il liberalismo economico [15]. Al posto della libertà collettiva perseguita dagli hippie radicali, essi hanno difeso la libertà degli individui all’interno del mercato. Tuttavia, persino questi conservatori non potevano resistere al fascino delle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Negli anni ’60 le predizioni di McLuhan furono reinterpretate come un annuncio pubblicitario per nuove forme di media, computer e telecomunicazioni, essendo state sviluppate nell’ambito privato. Dagli anni ’70 in poi, Toffler, de Sola Pool e altri gurus tentarono di dimostrare che l’avvento dell’hypermedia avrebbe paradossalmente implicato un ritorno al liberalismo economico del passato [16]. Questa retro-utopia faceva eco alle predizioni di Asimov, Heilein e altri romanzieri di fantascienza i cui mondi futuri erano sempre popolati da commercianti spaziali, super-disinvolti venditori, geniali scienziati, capitani pirati e altri austeri individualisti [17]. La strada del progresso tecnologico non conduce sempre alla ‘ecotopia’ – essa potrebbe invece portare indietro all’America dei Padri Fondatori.

    AGORA O MERCATO?

    L’ambiguità della Californian Ideology è più evidente nelle sue visioni contraddittorie del futuro digitale. Lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia è una componente chiave del prossimo campo d’azione del capitalismo. Come fa notare Zuboff, l’introduzione delle tecnologie dei media, dei computer e delle telecomunicazioni nella fabbrica e in ufficio è l’apice di un lungo processo di separazione della forza lavoro dal coinvolgimento diretto nella produzione [18]. Se solo per ragioni competitive, tutte le maggiori economie industriali saranno alla fine costrette a fare in modo che le loro popolazioni ottengano gli aumenti di produttività del lavoro digitale. Ciò che è sconosciuto è l’impatto sociale e culturale del consentire alle persone di produrre e scambiare delle quantità quasi illimitate di informazione su scala globale. Soprattutto, l’avvento dell’hypermedia realizzerà le utopie o della Nuova Sinistra o della Nuova Destra? Come una fede ibrida, la Californian Ideology risolve questo enigma credendo in entrambe le visioni allo stesso tempo – e non criticando l’una o l’altra.

    D’altra parte, la purezza anti-corporativa della nuova Sinistra è stata protetta dai sostenitori della ‘comunità virtuale’. Secondo il loro guru, Howard Rheingold, i valori della contro-cultura dei baby boomers stanno forgiando lo sviluppo di nuove tecnologie informatiche. Come conseguenza, gli attivisti della comunità saranno in grado di utilizzare l’hypermedia per sostituire il capitalismo corporativo ed il governo forte con una ‘economia del regalo’ hi-tech. Già i bullettin board systems, le conferenze in Rete in tempo reale ed i servizi delle chat si basano sullo scambio volontario di informazioni e conoscenze tra i loro partecipanti. Secondo il punto di vista di Rheingold, i membri della ‘classe virtuale’ sono tuttora in prima linea nella lotta per la liberazione sociale. Nonostante il frenetico coinvolgimento commerciale e politico nella costruzione della ‘superstrada dell’informazione’, l’agora elettronica inevitabilmente trionferà sui suoi nemici corporativi e burocratici.

    D’altra parte, altri ideologi della West Coast hanno abbracciato l’ideologia del laissez-faire dei loro nemici conservatori del passato. Per esempio, Wired – la rivista mensile bibbia della ‘classe virtuale’ – ha acriticamente riprodotto le opinioni di Newt Gingrich, il leader repubblicano di estrema destra della Casa dei Rappresentanti, e dei Tofflers, che sono i suoi stretti consiglieri [20]. Ignorando le loro politiche per i tagli per il welfare, la rivista è ipnotizzata dal loro entusiasmo per le possibilità libertarie offerte dalle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Tuttavia, sebbene essi adottino il determinismo tecnologico di McLuhan, Gingrich e i Tofflers non stanno sostenendo l’agora tecnologica. Al contrario, essi affermano che la convergenza dei media, dei computer e delle telecomunicazioni produrrà un mercato elettronico:

    ‘Nel cyberspazio …, mercato dopo mercato verrà trasformato dal progresso tecnologico da un ‘monopolio naturale’ ad uno in cui la competizione è la regola’ [21].

    In questa versione della Californian Ideology, a ciascun membro della ‘classe virtuale’ viene promessa l’opportunità di diventare un imprenditore hi-tech di successo. Le tecnologie dell’informazione, così la controversia prosegue, rafforza il singolo, accresce la libertà individuale e riduce radicalmente il potere dello stato-nazione. Le strutture sociali, politiche e legali esistenti deperiranno per essere sostituite dalle interazioni senza restrizioni tra gli individui autonomi ed i loro software. Questi ‘McLuhanitiani’ ridisegnati sostengono che il grande governo dovrebbe stare lontano dalle spalle degli imprenditori pieni di risorse, che sono le uniche persone abbastanza disinvolte e coraggiose per assumere dei rischi. Al posto di regole contro-produttive, gli ingegneri lungimiranti stanno inventando gli strumenti necessari per creare un ‘libero mercato’ nel cyberspazio, come la crittografia, il denaro digitale, e le procedure di verifica. Invece, i tentativi di interferire con le proprietà emergenti di queste forze tecnologiche ed economiche, particolarmente da parte del governo, si ripercuotono semplicemente su coloro che sono abbastanza stolti da sfidare le leggi primarie di natura. Secondo l’editore esecutivo di Wired, la ‘mano invisibile’ del mercato e le forze cieche dell’evoluzione darwiniana sono effettivamente le stesse cose [22]. Come nei romanzi fantascientifici di Heinlein e di Asimov, la strada verso il futuro sembra condurre indietro verso il passato. Il ventunesimo secolo dell’era dell’informazione sarà la realizzazione degli ideali liberali del diciottesimo secolo di Thomas Jefferson:

    ‘… la …creazione di una nuova civilizzazione, fondata sulle verità eterne dell’Idea di Americana’ [23].

    IL MITO DEL ‘LIBERO MERCATO’

    In seguito alla vittoria del partito di Gingrich nelle elezioni legislative del 1994, l’ala destra della versione della Californian Ideology è ora dominante. Tuttavia, i principi sacri del liberalismo economico sono contraddetti dalla storia attuale dell’hypermedia. Per esempio, le tecnologie iconiche del computer e della Rete potrebbero essere state inventate solo con l’aiuto dei sussidi massicci dello stato ed il coinvolgimento entusiasta degli appassionati. La aziende private hanno giocato un ruolo importante, ma solo come una parte di una economia mista.

    Per esempio, il primo computer – the Different Engine – è stato progettato e costruito da società private, ma il suo sviluppo è stato possibile solo tramite una sovvenzione, da parte del Governo Britannico, di 17.47 sterline, che era una piccola fortuna nel 1834 [24]. Da Colossus a EDVAC, dai simulatori di volo alla realtà virtuale, lo sviluppo del computer è dipeso in momenti chiave dalla ricerca pubblica fatta circolare o da corposi contratti con le agenzie pubbliche. La società IBM ha costruito il primo computer digitale programmabile solo dopo che è stato richiesto dal Dipartimento della Difesa degli Stati Uniti durante la guerra di Corea. Fin da quando, lo sviluppo delle generazioni successive di computer è stato direttamente o indirettamente sovvenzionato dal budget della difesa americana [25]. Così come l’aiuto dello stato, l’evoluzione del computer è anche dipeso dal coinvolgimento della cultura d.i.y. Per esempio, i personal computer sono stati inventati da tecnici dilettanti che volevano costruirsi le loro macchine a buon mercato. L’esistenza di una ‘economia del regalo’ tra gli appassionati era una precondizione necessaria per il successo successivo dei prodotti creati da Apple e da Microsoft. Persino oggi, i programmi in shareware giocano ancora un ruolo vitale nell’avanzamento della progettazione dei software.

    La storia di Internet contraddice anche i principi delle ideologie del ‘libero mercato’. Per i primi venti anni della sua esistenza, lo sviluppo della Rete è dipeso quasi completamente dall’assai insultato governo federale americano. O attraverso l’esercito degli Stati Uniti, oppure tramite le università, grandi quantità di dollari dei contribuenti andarono nella costruzione delle infrastrutture della Rete e l’abbassamento dei costi di utilizzo dei suoi servizi. Allo stesso tempo, molti dei programmi chiave della Rete e delle applicazioni sono stati inventati sia dagli appassionati sia dai professionisti che hanno lavorato nel loro tempo libero. Per esempio, il programma MUD, che consente di fare conferenze in tempo reale in Rete, stato inventato da un gruppo di studenti che volevano fare dei giochi di fantasia su una rete di computer [26].

    Una delle cose più strane della spinta verso destra della Californian Ideology è che la West Coast stessa è una creazione dell’economia mista. I dollari del governo sono stati utilizzati per costruire i sistemi di irrigazione, le autostrade, le scuole, le università ed altri progetti di infrastrutture che rendono possibile la buona vita in California. All’apice di questi sussidi pubblici, il complesso industriale hi-tech della West Coast ha banchettato con il maiale più grasso nella storia di decenni. Il governo degli Stati Uniti ha versato miliardi di dollari di tasse nell’acquisto di aerei, missili e in bombe elettroniche e nucleari da società californiane. Per quelli non accecati dal dogma del ‘libero mercato’, era ovvio che gli Americani avessero sempre avuto un piano statale: soltanto lo chiamavano budget per la difesa [27]. Allo stesso tempo, gli elementi chiave dello stile di vita della West Coast venivano dalla sua lunga tradizione di bohème culturale. Sebbene fossero stati commercializzati più tardi, i media della comunità, lo spiritualismo ‘new age’, il surfing, i cibi salutisti, le droghe ricreative, la musica pop e molte altre forme di eterodossia culturale sono emerse tutte dagli scenari decisamente non commerciali basati intorno ai campus universitari, alle comunità di artisti ed ai comuni rurali. Senza la sua cultura d.i.y, i miti della California non avrebbero avuto la risonanza globale che hanno oggi [28].

    Tutto questo finanziamento pubblico e coinvolgimento della comunità ha avuto un effetto immensamente benefico – sebbene non riconosciuto e senza costi – sullo sviluppo della Silicon Valley e sulle altre industrie hi-tech. Gli imprenditori capitalisti hanno spesso un senso inflazionato delle loro proprie risorse nello sviluppo di nuove idee e danno poco riconoscimento ai contributi ottenuti o dallo stato, o dalla propria forza lavoro o dalla più ampia comunità. Tutto il progresso tecnologico è cumulativo – esso dipende dai risultati da un processo storico collettivo e deve essere considerato, almeno in parte, come una conquista collettiva. Perciò, come in qualsiasi altro paese industrializzato, gli imprenditori americani hanno inevitabilmente fatto affidamento sull’intervento dello stato e sulle iniziative d.i.y. per nutrire e sviluppare le loro industrie. Quando le società giapponesi hanno minacciato di prendere il controllo sul mercato del microchip americano, i capitalisti libertari del computer della California non hanno avuto scrupoli ideologici ad unirsi in un cartello sponsorizzato dello stato per respingere gli invasori dall’Est. Finché i programmi della Rete che consentono la partecipazione della comunità nel cyberspazio potevano essere inclusi, Bill Gates riteneva che la Microsoft non aveva altra scelta se non ritardare il lancio di ‘Windows ‘95’ [29]. Come in altri settori dell’economia moderna, il problema che sta di fronte all’industria emergente dell’hypermedia non è se sarà organizzata o no come una economia mista, ma quale sorta di economia mista sarà.

    LIBERTA’ E’ SCHIAVITU’

    Se i suoi precetti sacri sono rifiutati dalla storia profana, perché i miti del ‘libero mercato’ hanno influenzato così i proponenti della Californian Ideology? Vivendo in una cultura del contratto, gli artigiani hi-tech conducono un’esistenza schizofrenica. Da una parte, non sono in grado di sfidare il primato del mercato sulle loro vite, dall’altra, risentono dei tentativi di quelli al potere, che intaccano la loro autonomia individuale. Mescolando la Nuova Sinistra con la Nuova Destra, la Californian Ideology fornisce una risoluzione mistica degli atteggiamenti contraddittori tenuti dai membri della ‘classe virtuale’. L’anti-statalismo fornisce in modo deciso i mezzi per riconciliare le idee radicali e reazionarie sul progresso tecnologico. Mentre la Nuova Sinistra se la prende con il governo per il finanziamento del complesso industriale militare, la Nuova Destra attacca lo stato per l’interferenza nella diffusione spontanea della nuove tecnologie, tramite la competizione di mercato. Nonostante il ruolo centrale giocato dall’intervento pubblico nello sviluppo dell’hypermedia, gli ideologi Californiani predicano un vangelo anti-statalista di libertarianismo hi-tech: un’accozzaglia bizzarra di anarchismo hippie e di liberalismo economico rimpolpata da una grande quantità di determinismo tecnologico. Piuttosto che comprendere il capitalismo realmente esistente, i gurus sia della Nuova Sinistra, sia della Nuova Destra preferiscono di gran lunga sostenere versioni contrapposte della ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ digitale. Per esempio, Howard Rheingold della Nuova Sinistra è convinto che l’agora elettronica consentirà agli individui di esercitare quella sorta di libertà dei media sostenuta dai Padri Fondatori. Similmente, la Nuova Destra sostiene che la rimozione di tutti i freni regolatori dell’iniziativa privata creerà la libertà dei media, degna della ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ [30].

    Il trionfo di questo retro-futurismo è un risultato del fallimento del rinnovamento negli Usa durante la fine degli anni ’60 e gli inizi degli anni ’70. In seguito al confronto al People Park, la lotta tra l’estabilishment americano e la contro-cultura è entrata in una spirale di confronto violento. Mentre i Vietnamiti – a costo di un’enorme sofferenza umana – sono stati in grado di espellere gli invasori americani dal loro paese, gli hippies ed i loro alleati nel movimento dei diritti civili dei neri sono stati alla fine schiacciati da una combinazione di repressione di stato e di co-opzione culturale.

    La Californian Ideology incapsula perfettamente le conseguenze di questa sconfitta per i membri della ‘classe virtuale’. Sebbene essi godano delle libertà culturali conquistate dagli hippies, molti di loro non sono più coinvolti attivamente nella lotta per costruire ‘l’ecotopia’. Invece di ribellarsi apertamente al sistema, questi artigiani hi-tech ora accettano che la libertà individuale possa essere raggiunta solo lavorando nei limiti del progresso tecnologico e del ‘libero mercato’. In molti romanzi cyberpunk, questo libertarianismo asociale è personificato dal personaggio centrale dell’hacker, che è un individuo solo che lotta per la sopravvivenza in un mondo virtuale di informazione [31].

    La spinta verso la destra da parte degli ideologi californiani è favorita dalla loro accettazione fiduciosa dell’ideale liberale dell’individuo autosufficiente. Nel folklore americano, la nazione è stata costruita da un deserto da individui con gli stivali – cacciatori, cowboys, predicatori e colore che hanno stabilito le frontiere. La rivoluzione americana in sé è stata combattuta per proteggere le libertà e la proprietà degli individui contro le leggi oppressive e le tasse ingiuste imposte da una monarchia straniera. Per entrambe, la Nuova Sinistra e la Nuova Destra, i primi anni della repubblica americana forniscono un modello potente per le loro versioni contrapposte della libertà individuale. Tuttavia c’è una profonda contraddizione al centro di questo sogno primordiale americano: in questo periodo, gli individui prosperavano solo tramite le sofferenze degli altri. In nessun luogo è più chiaro se non nella vita di Thomas Jefferson – la figura più importante della Californian Ideology. Thomas Jefferson è stato l’uomo che ha scritto l’appello che ispira la democrazia e la libertà nella Dichiarazione Americana di Indipendenza e – allo stesso tempo – possedeva circa duecento esseri umani come schiavi. Come politico, difese il diritto dei contadini e degli artigiani americani di determinare i loro destini, senza essere soggetti alle restrizioni dell’Europa feudale. Come altri liberali del periodo, pensava che le libertà politiche potessero essere protette dai governi autoritari solo tramite il possesso diffuso della proprietà privata individuale. I diritti dei cittadini sono derivati da questo fondamentale diritto di natura. Al fine di incoraggiare l’autosufficienza, ha proposto che a ciascun americano dovessero essere dati almeno cinquanta acri di terra per garantire la loro indipendenza economica. Tuttavia, mentre idealizzava i piccoli coltivatori e gli uomini d’affari della frontiera, Jefferson era, in realtà, un possessore di piantagioni in Virginia che viveva del lavoro dei suoi schiavi. Sebbene le ‘istituzioni peculiari’ del sud preoccupavano la sua coscienza, egli credeva ancora che i diritti naturali dell’uomo includevano il diritto a possedere gli esseri umani come proprietà privata. Nella ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’, la libertà per i popoli bianchi si basava sulla schiavitù del popolo nero [32].

    AVANTI VERSO IL PASSATO

    Nonostante la finale emancipazione degli schiavi e le vittorie del movimento dei diritti civili, la segregazione razziale si trova ancora al centro della politica americana – specialmente sulla West Coast. Nell’elezione del 1994 del governatore della California, Pete Wilson, il candidato repubblicano, ha vinto tramite una feroce campagna anti-immigranti. A livello nazionale, il trionfo del partito repubblicano di Gingrich nelle elezioni legislative era basato sulla mobilitazione degli ‘arrabbiati maschi bianchi’ contro la minaccia supposta dei ladruncoli del benessere nero, immigrati dal Messico ed altre minoranze arroganti. Questi politici hanno raccolto i benefici elettorali della polarizzazione crescente tra coloro che abitano fuori città, principalmente bianchi e ricchi – molti dei quali votano – ed i cittadini del centro città, prevalentemente non bianchi e più poveri – molti dei quali non votano [33].

    Sebbene essi conservino alcuni ideali hippie, molti ideologi californiani hanno trovato impossibile prendere una posizione chiara contro le politiche che creano divisione dei Repubblicani. Questo perché le industrie hi-tech e dei media sono un elemento chiave della coalizione elettorale della Nuova Destra. In parte, entrambi i capitalisti ed i lavoratori ben pagati temono che l’aperto riconoscimento dei fondi pubblici delle loro società giustificherebbe l’innalzamento delle tasse da pagare terribilmente necessarie per la salute, la salvaguardia ambientale, l’alloggio, il trasporto pubblico e l’educazione. In modo più rilevante, molti membri della ‘classe virtuale’ vogliono essere sedotti dalla retorica libertaria e dall’entusiasmo tecnologico della Nuova Destra. Lavorando per le società hi-tech e dei nuovi media, ad esse piacerebbe credere che il mercato elettronico possa risolvere in qualche modo i problemi sociali ed economici pressanti dell’America, senza alcun sacrificio da parte loro. Preso nelle contraddizioni della Californian Ideology, Gingrich è – come un collaboratore di Wired ha detto – sia loro ‘amico, sia nemico’ [34].

    Negli Usa, una maggiore redistribuzione della ricchezza è urgentemente necessaria nel benessere economico a lungo termine della maggioranza della popolazione. Tuttavia, questo è contro gli interessi a breve termine del popolo bianco ricco, che include molti membri della ‘classe virtuale’. Piuttosto che dividere con i loro vicini poveri neri o ispanici, gli yuppies, invece, si ritirano nei loro sobborghi ricchi, protetti da guardie armate e sicuri con i loro servizi di benessere privato [35]. Lo svantaggiato partecipa solo, nell’era dell’informazione, fornendo del lavoro a buon mercato, non sindacalizzato, per le insalubri fabbriche di chip della Silicon Valley [36]. Persino la costruzione del cyberspazio potrebbe diventare parte integrante della frammentazione della società americana in classi antagoniste, determinate dalla razza. Già ‘segnati in rosso’ dalle compagnie telefoniche affamate di profitto, gli abitanti poveri delle aree del centro città sono ora minacciati con l’esclusione dai nuovi servizi on-line per la mancanza di denaro [37]. In contrasto, i membri della ‘classe virtuale’ ed altri professionisti possono divertirsi ad essere dei cyberpunk nella hyper-realtà, senza dover incontrare alcuno dei loro vicini impoveriti. Insieme alle sempre ampie divisioni sociali, un’altra discriminazione sta per essere creata tra i ‘ricchi di informazione’ ed i ‘poveri di informazione’. In questa ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ hi-tech, la relazione tra i padroni e gli schiavi continua in una nuova forma.

    PADRONI CYBORG E SCHIAVI ROBOT

    Il timore del ‘sottoproletariato’ ribelle ha ora corrotto il principio della Clifornian Ideology: il suo credo nel potenziale emancipatorio delle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Mentre i proponenti dell’agora elettronica e del mercato elettronico promettono di liberare gli individui dalle gerarchie dello stato e dai monopoli privati, la polarizzazione sociale della società americana sta portando avanti una immagine più oppressiva del futuro digitale. Le tecnologie della libertà si stanno trasformando in macchine di dominio.

    Presso la sua proprietà a Monticello, Jefferson ha inventato molti gadget ingegnosi per la sua casa, come un ‘montavivande’ per portare il cibo dalla cucina alla sala da pranzo. Mediando i suoi contatti con i suoi schiavi con la tecnologia, questo individualista rivoluzionario si risparmiava di fronteggiare la realtà della sua dipendenza dal lavoro forzato dei suoi simili esseri umani [38]. Nel tardo ventesimo secolo, la tecnologia sta per essere ancora una volta usata per rinforzare la differenza tra i padroni e gli schiavi.

    Secondo alcuni visionari, la ricerca della perfezione della mente, del corpo e dello spirito inevitabilmente condurrà al sorgere di un post-umano: una manifestazione bio-tecnologica dei privilegi sociali della ‘classe virtuale’. Mentre gli hippies vedevano lo sviluppo di se stessi come una parte della liberazione sociale, gli artigiani hi-tech della California contemporanea è più probabile che cerchino l’autosoddisfacimento tramite la terapia, lo spiritualismo, l’esercizio o altre occupazioni narcisistiche. Il desiderio di fuga nel sobborgo protetto dell’hyper-reale è solo un aspetto di questa profonda ossessione di sé [39]. Incoraggiato dai supposti avanzamenti nella ’Intelligenza Artificiale’ e nella scienza medica, il culto dell’Extropia fantastica di abbandonare il ‘wetware’ dello stato umano nel suo complesso per diventare macchine viventi [40]. Proprio come Virek e Tessier-Ashpools nei romanzi di Gibson Sprawl, essi credono che il privilegio sociale, alla fine, fornirà loro l’immortalità [41]. Invece di predire l’emancipazione dell’umanità, questa forma di determinismo tecnologico può solo prevedere un approfondimento della segregazione sociale.

    Nonostante queste fantasie, la gente bianca in California rimane dipendente dai loro simili dalla pelle più scura per lavorare nelle loro fabbriche, fare il raccolto, badare ai loro bambini e curare i loro giardini. In seguito alle rivolte L.A., essi temono sempre più che questo ‘sottoproletariaro’ un giorno chiederà la propria liberazione. Se gli schiavi umani sono, in definitiva, poco affidabili, quindi, quelli meccanici devono essere inventati. La ricerca del sacro calice della Intelligenza Artificiale rivela il desiderio del Golem – uno schiavo forte e fedele la cui pelle è il colore della terra, il cui interno è fatto di sabbia. Come nel romanzo di Asimov, Robot, i techno-utopisti immaginano che è possibile ottenere il lavoro simile degli schiavi dalle macchine inanimate [42]. Tuttavia, sebbene la tecnologia può immagazzinare o amplificare il lavoro, non potrà mai eliminare la necessità per gli esseri umani di inventare, costruire e mantenere tali macchine al primo posto. Il lavoro degli schiavi non può essere mantenuto senza che qualcuno venga ridotto in schiavitù.

    Nel mondo, la Californian Ideology è stata abbracciata come una forma ottimistica ed emancipatoria di determinismo tecnologico. Tuttavia, questa fantasia utopistica della West Coast dipende dalla sua cecità – e dipendenza – dalla sua polarizzazione sociale e razziale della società da cui è nata. Nonostante la sua radicale retorica, la Californian Ideology è, in definitiva, pessimistica su un cambiamento sociale fondamentale. Al contrario degli hippies, i suoi sostenitori non stanno lottando per costruire la ‘ecotopia’ o persino per aiutare a far rivivere il ‘New Deal’. Invece, il liberalismo sociale della Nuova Sinistra ed il liberalismo economico della Nuova Destra sono conversi in un sogno ambiguo di ‘Democrazia Jeffersoniana’ hi-tech. Interpretato generosamente, questo retro-futurismo potrebbe essere una visione di una frontiera cybernetica dove gli artigiani hi-tech scoprono il loro autosoddisfacimento individuale o nell’agora elettronica, o nel mercato elettronico. Tuttavia, come lo zeitgeist della ‘classe virtuale’, la Californian Ideology è allo stesso tempo una fede esclusiva. Se solo alcune persone hanno accesso alle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione, la ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ può diventare una versione hi-tech dell’economia della piantagione del Vecchio Sud. Riflettendo la sua profonda ambiguità, il determinismo tecnologico della Californian Ideology non è semplicemente ottimistico ed anticipatorio. E’ contemporaneamente una visione profondamente pessimistica e repressiva del futuro.

    CI SONO DELLE ALTERNATIVE

    Nonostante le sue profonde contraddizioni, le persone nel mondo credono ancora che la Californian Ideology esprima la sola via verso il futuro. Con la crescente globalizzazione dell’economia del mondo, molti membri della ‘classe virtuale’ in Europa ed in Asia sentono maggiore affinità con i loro colleghi californiani che con gli altri lavoratori del loro paese. Tuttavia, in realtà, il dibattito non è stato più possibile o più necessario. La Californian Ideology è stata sviluppata da un gruppo di persone residenti in uno stato specifico, in una particolare mescolanza di scelte socio-economiche e tecnologiche. La sua miscela eclettica e contraddittoria di economia conservativa e radicalismo hippie riflette la storia della West Coast – e non il futuro inevitabile del resto del mondo. Per esempio, le assunzioni anti-stataliste degli ideologi californiani sono piuttosto limitate. A Singapore, il governo non sta solo organizzando la costruzione di una rete a fibre ottiche, ma sta anche tentando di controllare l’idoneità ideologica dell’informazione distribuita su di essa. Data la assai veloce crescita delle ‘tigri’ dell’Asia, il futuro digitale non arriverà necessariamente per primo in California [43].

    Nonostante le raccomandazioni neo-liberali del Bangemann Report, la maggior parte delle autorità europee sono determinate ad essere coinvolte da vicino nello sviluppo delle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Il Minitel – la prima rete di successo nel mondo – è stata la creazione voluta dalla Francia. Rispondendo ad una relazione ufficiale sull’impatto potenziale dell’hypermedia, il governo ha deciso di investire delle risorse nello sviluppo delle tecnologie ‘taglienti’. Nel 1981, la France Telecom ha lanciato il sistema Minitel, che forniva una mescolanza di informazioni basate sul testo e i mezzi di comunicazione. Come un monopolio, questa compagnia del telefono è stata in grado di costruire una massa critica di utilizzatori per il suo sistema pioneristico on-line, dando i terminali gratuiti a chiunque volesse rinunciare alle guide cartacee del telefono. Una volta che il mercato è stato creato, i providers commerciali e della comunità erano poi in grado di trovare clienti o partecipanti sufficienti da avere successo nel sistema. Da allora in poi, milioni di francesi di tutti gli strati sociali hanno felicemente prenotato i biglietti, chiacchierato tra loro e si sono organizzati politicamente on-line, senza rendersi conto che stavano infrangendo i precetti libertari della Californian Ideology [44].

    Lungi dal demonizzare lo stato, la stragrande maggioranza della popolazione francese crede che un maggiore intervento pubblico sia necessario per una società efficiente e sana [45]. Nelle recenti elezioni presidenziali, quasi tutti i candidati dovevano sostenere – almeno retoricamente – un maggiore intervento dello stato per porre fine all’esclusione sociale dei disoccupati e dei senza tetto. Al contrario dei suoi equivalenti americani, la rivoluzione francese andò oltre il liberalismo economico verso la democrazia popolare. In seguito alla vittoria dei Giacobini sui loro avversari liberali nel 1972, la repubblica democratica in Francia divenne l’incarnazione della ‘volontà generale’. Come tale, si credeva che lo stato difendesse gli interessi di tutti i cittadini, piuttosto che proteggere i diritti dei possessori della proprietà individuale. Il discorso dei politici francesi permette un’azione collettiva da parte dello stato per mitigare – o persino rimuovere – i problemi incontrati dalla società. Mentre gli ideologi californiani tentano di ignorare i dollari dei contribuenti che sovvenzionano lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia, il governo francese può intervenire apertamente in questo settore dell’economia [46].

    Sebbene la sua tecnologia sia ora datata, la storia del Minitel confuta chiaramente i pregiudizi anti-statalisti degli ideologi californiani – e del comitato di Banbemann. Il futuro digitale sarà un ibrido di intervento dello stato, imprenditorialità capitalista e cultura d.i.y. In modo decisivo, se lo stato può incoraggiare lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia, un’azione consapevole potrebbe anche essere presa per prevenire il sorgere della segregazione sociale tra il ‘ricco di informazione’ ed il ‘povero di informazione’. Non lasciando ogni cosa alle bizzarrie delle forze di mercato, l’Unione Europea ed i suoi stati membri potrebbero garantire che ogni cittadino abbia la possibilità di essere connesso ad una rete a banda larga a fibre ottiche al più basso prezzo possibile.

    In primo luogo, questo sarebbe uno schema di lavoro assai necessario per la creazione di lavori semi-specializzati in un periodo di disoccupazione di massa. Come le misure di impiego Keynesiane, niente sconcerta pagare delle persone per scavare buche nella strada e riempirle ancora [47]. Ancora più importante, la costruzione di una rete a fibre ottiche nelle case e al lavoro potrebbe dare a chiunque l’accesso a nuovi servizi on-line e creare una comunità ampia e vitale di conoscenza condivisa. I guadagni a lungo termine per l’economia e la società dalla costruzione dello ‘infobahn’ sarebbe incommensurabile. Consentirebbe all’industria di lavorare in modo più efficiente e di commercializzare nuovi prodotti. Assicurerebbe che l’educazione ed i servizi dell’informazione siano disponibili a tutti. Senza dubbio lo ‘infobahn’ creerà un mercato di massa per le compagnie private per vendere le materie prime dell’informazione esistente – films, programmi tv, musica e libri – attraverso la Rete. Allo stesso tempo, una volta che la gente può distribuire, così come ricevere l’hypermedia, emergerà rapidamente un prosperare di comunità dei media e di gruppi di particolare interesse. Perché accada tutto ciò, sarà necessario l’intervento collettivo per assicurare che tutti i cittadini siano inclusi nel futuro digitale.

    LA RINASCITA DEL MODERNO

    Anche se non è in circostanze di loro propria scelta, è necessario ora che gli Europei sostengano il loro proprio punto di vista sul futuro. Ci sono varie vie verso la società dell’informazione – ed alcune strade sono più desiderabili di altre. Al fine di effettuare una scelta informata, gli artigiani digitali d’Europa hanno bisogno di sviluppare una analisi più coerente dell’impatto dell’hypermedia, che può essere trovata tra le ambiguità della Californian Ideology. I membri della ‘classe virtuale’ europea devono creare la loro popria identità distintiva.

    Questa comprensione alternativa del futuro parte da un rifiuto di qualsiasi forma di segregazione – sia all’interno, sia all’esterno del cyberspazio. Ogni programma per lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia deve assicurare che la totalità della popolazione abbia accesso ai nuovi servizi on-line. Al posto dell’anarchia della Nuova Sinistra o della Nuova Destra, una strategia europea per lo sviluppo delle tecnologie della nuova informazione deve necessariamente riconoscere l’inevitabilità di una qualche forma di economia mista – la miscela creativa e antagonistica di iniziative di stato, corporative e d.i.y. L’indeterminatezza del futuro digitale è il risultato dell’ubiquità di questa economia mista nel mondo moderno. Nessuno sa esattamente quale saranno le forze relative di ciascun componente, ma l’azione collettiva può assicurare che nessun gruppo sociale sarà deliberatamente escluso dal cyberspazio.

    Una strategia europea per l’era dell’informazione deve anche celebrare i poteri creativi degli artisti digitali. Poiché il loro lavoro non può essere aspecializzato o meccanizzato, i membri della ‘classe virtuale’ esercitano un grande controllo sul loro lavoro. Piuttosto che soccombere al fatalismo della Californian Ideology, dovremmo abbracciare la possibilità creative dell’hypermedia. All’interno delle limitazioni dell’economia mista, gli artigiani digitali sono in grado di inventare qualcosa di completamente nuovo – qualcosa che non è stato previsto in alcun romanzo di fantascienza. Queste forme innovative di conoscenza e di comunicazioni proverà le conquiste degli altri, inclusi alcuni aspetti della Californian Ideology. E’ impossibile ora per alcuni movimenti seri per l’emancipazione sociale non includere domande sul femminismo, la cultura della droga, la liberazione omosessuale, l’identità etnica ed altre questioni aperte dai radicali della West Coast. In modo simile, qualsiasi tentativo di sviluppare l’hypermedia in Europa richiederà dello zelo imprenditoriale ed un atteggiamento del poter fare sostenuto dalla nuova destra Californiana. Tuttavia, allo stesso tempo, lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia significa innovazione, creatività ed invenzione. Non esistono precedenti per tutti gli aspetti del futuro digitale.

    Come pionieri del nuovo, gli artigiani digitali hanno bisogno di ricollegarsi alla teoria ed alla pratica dell’arte produttiva. Essi non sono impiegati di altri – o addirittura sarebbero degli imprenditori cybernetici. Essi sono anche degli ingegneri-artisti – disegnatori del prossimo stadio della modernità. Avvicinandosi all’esperienza di Saint, dei Simonisti e dei Costruttivisti, gli artigiani digitali sono in grado di creare una nuova macchina estetica per l’era dell’informazione [48]. Per esempio, i musicisti hanno utilizzato i computers per creare semplicemente delle forme digitali di musica, come il jungle e la techno [49]. Gli artisti interattivi hanno esplorato la potenzialità delle tecnologie del CD-rom, come mostrato dal lavoro dell’ANTI-rom. L’Hypermedia Research Centre ha costruito uno spazio sociale virtuale sperimentale chiamato J’s Joint [50]. In ciascun esempio, gli ingegneri-artisti stanno tentando di spingere oltre le limitazioni di entrambe le tecnologie e la loro creatività. Soprattutto, queste nuove forme di espressione e di comunicazione sono collegate con la cultura più vasta. Coloro che sviluppano l’hypermedia devono riaffermare la possibilità di un controllo razionale e consapevole sulla forma del futuro digitale. Al contrario dell’elitarismo della Californian Ideology, gli ingegneri-artisti europei devono costruire un cyberspazio che è inclusivo ed universale. Ora è il momento per la rinascita del Moderno.

    ‘Le circostanze presenti favoriscono il lusso nazionale. Il lusso diventa utile e morale quando è goduto dall’intera nazione. L’onore ed il vantaggio di impiegare direttamente, negli accordi politici, il progresso delle scienze esatte e delle belle arti .. è stato riservato per il nostro secolo’ [51].

    NOTE

    [1] Naum Gabo e Anton Pevsner, ‘The Realistic Manifesto, 1920’, in John E. Bowlt (ed.), Russian Art of the Avant-Garde, London 1976, p. 214.

    [2] Per oltre 25 anni gli esperti hanno predetto l’arrivo imminente dell’era dell’informazione, vedi Alain Touraine,La Société post-industrielle; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages; Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society; e Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom.

    [3] Vedi Martin Bangemann, Europe and the Global Information Society, ; e il programma e gli abstracts della Warwick University’s Virtual Futures ’95 Conference.

    [4] Vedi Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.

    [5] Vedi Mike Davis, City of Quartz; Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’; e le registrazioni di Ice-T, Snoop Dog, Dr Dre, Ice Cube, NWA e molti altri rappers della West Coast.

    [6] Vedi George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, p. 124.

    [7] Jerry Rubin, ‘An Emergency Letter to my Brothers and Sisters in the Movement’.

    [8] Per il ruolo chiave giocato dalla cultura popolare nell’identità della Nuova Sinistra americana, vedi George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left; e Charles Reich, The Greening of America. Per una descrizione delle vite dei lavoratori dal colletto binco nell’America degli anni ’50, vedi William Whyte, The Organization Man.

    [9] In un romanzo best seller della metà degli anni ’70, la metà più a nord della West Coast si è separata dal resto degli Stati Uniti per formare una utopia hippie, vedi Ernest Callenbach, Ecotopia. Questa idealizzazione della vita di comunità californiana può anche essere trovata in John Brunner, The Shockwave Rider,; ed anche in lavori successivi, come Kim Stanley Robinson, Pacific Edge.

    [10] Per un’analisi dei tentativi di creare una democrazia diretta tramite le tecnonologie dei media, vedi Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom.

    [11] Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, pp. 255-6. Vedi anche Marshall McLuhan e Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage; and Gerald Emanuel Stern (ed.), McLuhan: Hot & Cool.

    [12] Vedi John Downing, Radical Media.

    [13] Arthur Kroker e Michael A. Weinstein, Data Trash, p. 15. Questa analisi segue quella di quei futurologi che pensano che ‘knowledge workers’ fossero l’embrione di una nuova classe dirigente, vedi Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; e gli economisti che credevano che i ‘symbolic analysts’ sarebbero diventati la parte dominante della forza lavoro sotto un capitalismo globalizzato, vedi Robert Reich, The Work of Nations. In contrasto, negli anni ’60, alcuni teorici della Nuova Sinistra credevano che i lavoratori tecnico-scientifici stavano conducendo una lotta per la liberazione sociale, tramite l’occupazione delle fabbriche e la richiesta di auto-gestione, vedi Serge Mallet, The New Working Class.

    [14] Vedi Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, per una descrizione del contratto di lavoro nella Silicon Valley; e per una trattazione romanzesca del medesimo tema, Douglas Coupland, Microserfs. Per un esame più teorico dell’organizzazione del lavoro post-Fordista, vedi Alain Lipietz, L’audace ou l’enlisement e Mirages and Miracles; Benjamin Coriat, L’atelier et le robot; e Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved.

    [15] C’è un aconsiderevole confusione politica e semantica sul significato di ‘liberalismo’ da entrambe le parti dell’Atlantico. Per esempio, gli Americani usano liberalismo per descrivere qualsiasi politica che avviene da essere sostenuta in apparenza dalla sinistra del partito Democratico. Tuttavi, come Lipset ha puntualizzato, questo ristretto senso della parola cela l’accettazione quasi universale, negli Stati Uniti, del liberalismo nel suo significato classico. Come dice: ‘Questi valori [liberali] erano evidenti nel ventesimo secolo fatto che … gli Stati Uniti non solo mancavano di un partito socialista vitale, ma non hanno neanche mai sviluppato uno stile conservativo britanni o europeo o un partito dei Tory’, vedi see Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism, pp. 31-2. La convergenza della Nuova sinistra e della Nuova Destra intorno alla Californian Ideology, pertanto, è un esempio specifico del più ampio consenso intorno al liberalismo anti-statalista, come un discorso politico negli Stati Uniti.

    [16] Per il successo di McLuhan sul circuito del viaggio ufficiale corporativo, vedi Tom Wolfe, ‘What If He Is Right?’. Per l’utilizzo di questa idea dai pensatori conservatori, vedi Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages; Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; e Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom.

    [17] Gli eroi sono comuni nei romanzi classici di fatascienza, vedi D. D. Harriman in Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon; o i personaggi principali in Isaac Asimov, The Foundation Trilogy; I, Robot; e The Rest of the Robots. Hagbard Celine – una versione più psichedelica di questo archetipo maschile – è il personaggio centrale in Robert Shea e Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminati Trilogy. Nella tabella temporale della ‘storia del fututro’ di fronte al romanzo di Robert Heinlein, predice che, dopo un periodo di crisi sociale, causata dal rapido avanzamento tecnologico, la stabilità sarebbe stata ristabilita negli anni ’80 e ’90 tramite ‘ .. un’apertura di nuovefrontiere ed un ritorno all’economia del diciannovesimo secolo!’. Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon, pp. 8-9.

    [18] Vedi Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine. Certamente, questa analisi è derivata da Karl Marx, Grundrisse; e ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’.

    [19] Vedi Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community; e la sua home page.

    [20] Vedi l’esuberante intervista con i Tofflers in Peter Schwartz, ‘Shock Wave (Anti) Warrior’; e, per la caratteristica ambiguità della rivista sullo Speaker del programma politico reazionario della House, vedi l’intervista chiamata, a proposito, con Newt Gingrich in Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’.

    [21] Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, p. 5.

    [22] Vedi Kevin Kelly, Out of Control. Per una critica del libro, vedi Richard Barbrook, Pinocchio Theory.

    [23] Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream: , p. 13. Toffler e gli amici proclamano orgogliosamente anche che: ‘L’America … rimane la terra della libertà individuale, e questa libertà, chiaramente, si esende al cyberspazio’, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, p. 6. Vedi anche Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.

    [24] Vedi Simon Schaffer, Babbage’s Intelligence: Calculating Engine and the Factory System.

    [25] Vedi Jonathan Palfreman e Doron Swade, The Dream Machine, pp. 32-36, per un resoconto di come una mancanza dell’intervento dello stato abbia significato che la Germania Nazista abbia perso dell’opportunità di costruire il primo computer del mondo. Nel 1941 l’Alto Comando Tedesco ha rifiutato di finanziare ulteriormente Konrad Zuze, che ha aperto la strada all’utilizzo del codice binario, all’immagazzinamento dei programmi e ai gates logici elettronici.

    [26] Vedi Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community.

    [27] Come il Segretario del Lavoro del Presidente Clinton ha affermato: ‘Ricordatevi che , durante l’era del dopoguerra, il Pentagono è stato tranquillamente responsabile di aiutare le corporazioni americane di progredire con le tecnologie come i motori degli aerei, le cellule, itransistors, i circuiti integrati, i nuovi materiali, i lasers e le fibre ottiche … Il Pentagono ed i 600 laboratori nazionali che lavorano con esso e con il Dipartimento dell’Energia sono la cosa che l’America ha di pù vicino al noto Ministero del Commercio Internazionale del Commercio e dell’Industria giapponese’, Robert Reich, The Work of Nations, p. 159.

    [28] Per un resoconto di come queste innovazioni culturali sono emerse dalla recente scena, vedi Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test. Curiosamente, uno degli autisti del famoso bus era, che è ora uno dei principali collaboratori di Wired.

    [29] Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, pp. 21-2, sostiene che l’industria del computer americana è già stata incoraggiata dal Pentagono a formare dei cartelli contro la competizione straniera. Gates ammette che ha realizzato solo di recente che il ‘massiccio cambiamento strutturale’ è stato causato dalla Rete, vedi Bill Gates, ‘The Bill Gates Column’.

    [30] Vedi le home pages di Howard Rheingold, e Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’. Nonostante gli istinti liberisti di entrambi questi scrittori, la loro infatuazione per l’era dei Padri Fondatori è condivisa dalla Milizia neo-fascista e dei movimenti patriottici, vedi Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America.

    [31] Vedi gli eroi hacker in William Gibson, Neuromancer; Count Zero; e Mona Lisa Overdrive; o in Bruce Sterling (ed.), Mirrorshades. Un prototipo di questa sorta di anti-eroe è Deckard, il cacciatore esistenziale dei replicanti in Bladerunner di Ridley Scott.

    [32] Secondo Miller, Thomas Jefferson credeva che le persone nere non potessero essere membri del contratto sociale di Locke che riunisce insieme i cittadini della repubblica americana. ‘Il diritto dell’uomo … mentre teoricamente e idealmente il diritto di nascita di ogni essere umano si applicava in pratica negli Stati Uniti solo agli uomini bianchi: gli schiavi neri erano esclusi dalla considerazione perché, sebbene certamente esseri umani, essi erano anche proprietà e dove i diritti dell’uomo entravano in conflitto con i diritti di proprietà, la proprietà aveva la precedenza’, vedi John Miller, The Wolf by the Ears, p. 13. L’opposizione di Jefferson alla schiavitù era retorica al massimo. In una lettera del 22 Aprile 1820, disonestamente suggeriva che il modo migliore per incoraggiare l’abolizione della schiavitù era legalizzare le proprietà privata degli esseri umani in tutti gli Stati dell’Unione e dei territori di frontiera! Egli affermava che ‘ … la loro diffusione in territori più ampi li avrebbe resi individualmente più felici e aprebbe facilitato in proporzione la realizzazione della loro emancipazione, dividendo il peso su un grande numero di collaboratori [cioè i possessori di schivi]’, vedi Merill Peterson (ed.), The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 568. Per una descrizione della vita nella sua piantagione, vedi anche Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello.

    [33] Per la svolta a Destra della California, vedi Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’.

    [34] Vedi Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’. Esther Dyson ha collaborato con i Tofflers nello scrivere Peace and Progress Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, che è un manifesto retro-futurista progettato per raccogliere voti per Gingrich, da parte dei membri della ‘classe virtuale’.

    [35] Per il sorgere dei sobborghi fortificati, vedi Mike Davis, City of Quartz; e Urban Control. Questi ‘sobborghi con i cancelli’ forniscono l’ispirazione per lo sfondo alienato di molti cyberpunk dei romanzi di fantascienza, come Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash.

    [36] Vedi Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain.

    [37] Vedi Reginald Stuart, ‘High-Tech Redlining’.

    [38] Vedi Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello.

    [39] Vedi Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain.

    [40] Per una esposizione del loro programma retro-futurista vedi l’Extropian FAQ.

    [41] Vedi William Gibson, Neuromancer, Grafton, London 1984, e Count Zero, Grafton, London 1986.

    [42] Vedi Isaac Asimov, I, Robot; e The Rest of the Robots.

    [43] Vedi William Gibson e Sandy Sandfort, ‘Disneyland with the Death Penalty’. Dal momento che questi articoli sono un attacco a Singapore, è ironico che la vera Disneyland sia in California – il cui codice penale repressivo include la pena di morte!

    [44] Per la relazione che ha condotto alla creazione del Minitel, vedi Simon Nora e Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society. Un resoconto dei primi anni del Minitel può essere trovato in Michel Marchand, The Mintel Saga.

    [45] Secondo un sondaggio condotto durante le elezioni presidenziali del 1985, il 67% della popolazione francese era a favore dell’affermazione che ‘lo stato deve intervenire di più nella vita economica del nostro paese’, vedi ‘Une majorité de Français souhaitent un vrai “chef” pour un vrai “Etat”.

    [46] Per l’influenza del Giacobinismo sulle concezioni francesi dei diritti democratici, vedi Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom. Alcuni economisti francesi credono che proprio la storia differente dell’Europa ha creato un modello specifico – e superiore socialmente – del capitalismo, vedi Michel Albert, Capitalism v. Capitalism; e Philippe Delmas, Le Maître des Horloges.

    [47] Come Keynes stesso dice: ‘ “Per scavare buche nel terreno”, sborsati i risparmi, crescerà non solo l’impiego, ma anche il dividendo nazionale reale per i beni di prima necessità ed i servizi’, vedi J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, p. 220.

    [48] Vedi Keith Taylor, Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825; and John E. Bowlt, Russian Art of the Avant-Garde.
    [49] Come Goldie, un compositore di musica, sostiene: “Dobbiamo portarlo avanti e prendere il tamburo ed il basso e spingerlo spingerlo spingerlo. Ricordo quando si diceva che non poteva essere più spinto. E’ stato spinto dieci volte da allora”, vedi Tony Marcus, ‘The War is Over’.

    [50] Per informazioni sull’ANTI-rom e J’s Joint, vedi i loro contributi all’Hypermedia Research Centre’s Web site.

    [51] Henri Saint-Simon, ‘Sketch of the New Political System’ in Keith Taylor, Henri Saint-Simon 1760- 1825, p. 203.

    —————————————————————

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    Simon Schaffer, ‘Babbage’s Intelligence: Calculating Engines and the Factory System’.

    Peter Schwartz, ‘Shock Wave (Anti) Warrior’, Wired, 1.5, November 1993, pages 61-65, 120-122.

    Ridley Scott (director), Bladerunner, Warner Brothers, USA 1982.

    Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminati Trilogy, Dell, New York 1975.

    Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, Belknap Press, Harvard 1983.

    Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash, Roc, New York 1992.

    Bruce Sterling (editor), Mirrorshades, Paladin, London 1988.

    Gerald Emanuel Stern (editor), McLuhan: Hot & Cool, Penguin, London 1968.

    Reginald Stuart, ‘High-Tech Redlining: are Afro-Americans being frozen out of the new communications network’, Utne Reader, 68, March-April 1995, page 73.

    Keith Taylor (editor), Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825: Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation, Croom Helm, London 1975.

    Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Pan, London 1980.

    Alain Touraine, La Société post-industrielle, Editions Denoël, Paris 1969.

    Virtual Futures ’95, Conference Website.

    Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’, New Left Review, 209, January-February 1995, pages 42-74.

    Tom Wolfe, ‘What If He Is Right?’, The Pump House Gang, Bantam Books, London 1968, pages 107-133.

    Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, Bantam Books, New York 1968.

    William Whyte, The Organization Man, Simon & Schuster, New York 1956.

    Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello, William Heinemann, London 1925.

    Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: the future of work and power, Heinemann, New York 1988.

    ——————————————————————

  • NJUJORÅ KA PROROÄŒANSTVA: ZAMIÅ LJENA BUDUĆNOST VEÅ TAÄŒKE INTELIGENCIJE

    Budućnost je ono što je i bila

    “BioloÅ¡ka inteligencija je nepromenljiva, zato Å¡to je u pitanju stara, zrela paradigma, dok nova paradigma nebioloÅ¡kog raÄ?unarstva i inteligencije eksponencijalno raste. Prelaz će se odigrati 2020-ih a nakon toga, bar sa stanoviÅ¡ta hardvera, dominiraće nebioloÅ¡ko raÄ?unarstvo…“
    Kurcvejl (Kurzweil), 2004, str. 3.

    Na poÄ?etku 21. veka, san o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji ukorenjen je duboko u savremenu maÅ¡tu. Od detinjstva pa nadalje, ljudima u razvijenom svetu se govori da će raÄ?unari jednog dana moći da rasuÄ‘uju – Ä?ak i da imaju osećanja – baÅ¡ kao ljudi. U priÄ?ama nauÄ?ne fantastike, maÅ¡ine koje misle su odavno omiljeni likovi. Publika je odrastala sa likovima robota drugara, kao Å¡to je Dejta iz serije Zvezdane staze: Nova generacija. ili nemilosrdnih robota-Ä?udoviÅ¡ta poput kiborga iz Terminatora. (Startrek.com 2005; Kameron/Cameron 1984). Ove nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne maÅ¡tarije dodatno podstiÄ?u pouzdana predviÄ‘anja istaknutih informatiÄ?ara. Neprekidna poboljÅ¡anja hardvera i softvera naposletku će dovesti do stvaranja veÅ¡taÄ?kih inteligencija, moćnijih od “bioloÅ¡ke inteligencije” ljudskog mozga.

    Komercijalni proizvoÄ‘aÄ?i već neko vreme sa nestrpljenjem iÅ¡Ä?ekuju dan kada će prodavati svesne maÅ¡ine koje obavljaju kućne poslove i pomažu starijima (Honda 2004). Neki informatiÄ?ari Ä?ak veruju da je stvaranje “nebioloÅ¡kih inteligencija” jedna duhovna potraga. U Kaliforniji, Rej Kurcvejl, Vernor Vindž (Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge) i njihove kolege s nestrpljenjem oÄ?ekuju Singularnost: Prvi dolazak silicijumskog mesije (Vindž 1993; Bel/Bell 2004). Bilo da su nadahnuti novcem ili misticizmom, svi ovi zagovornici veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije dele uverenje da se sadaÅ¡njost mora shvatiti kao ’embrion’, kao budućnost u zametku – a upravo iz budućnosti će se rasvetljivati potencijal sadaÅ¡njosti. Svaki napredak u raÄ?unarskoj tehnologiji objavljuje se kao novi korak ka stvaranju potpuno svesne maÅ¡ine. ProroÄ?anstvo o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sve bliže je ispunjenju sa pojavljivanjem svakog novog komada softvera ili hardvera. Nije važno ono Å¡to raÄ?unari mogu sada, već ono Å¡to će moći uskoro. SadaÅ¡njica je beta verzija nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nog sna: zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost.

    Uprkos svom istaknutom mestu u kulturi, vera u svesne maÅ¡ine podložna je teorijskom egzorcizmu. Daleko od toga da bude prazan oznaÄ?itelj, ovo proroÄ?anstvo duboko je ukorenjeno u vremenu i prostoru. OÄ?ekivano, savremeni propagatori veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije retko priznaju koliko je sâm koncept star. Žele da napreduju, ne da se osvrću. Ipak, proÅ¡lo je viÅ¡e od Ä?etrdeset godina otkad je san o razumnim maÅ¡inama prvi put zaokupio maÅ¡tu javnosti. ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije ima dugu povest. Analiziranje te prvobitne verzije proroÄ?anstva preduslov je za razumevanje njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. S tim u vidu, vratimo se u drugu deceniju Hladnog rata kada je najveća svetska raÄ?unarska kompanija priredila predstavu o Ä?udesima razumnih maÅ¡ina u finansijskoj prestonici najmoćnije i najbogatije zemlje na planeti…

    Milenijum napretka

    Na dan 22. aprila 1964. godine, Svetski sajam (World’s Fair) u Njujorku otvoren je za javnost. U naredne dve godine, ta moderna zemlja Ä?uda ugostila je preko 51 milion posetilaca. Na izložbi su bili zastupljeni svi delovi ameriÄ?ke elite: savezna vlada, državne uprave, velike korporacije, finansijske ustanove, industrijski lobiji i verske grupe. Svetski sajam je dokazao da SAD prednjaÄ?i u svemu: u robi Å¡iroke potroÅ¡nje, demokratiji, Å¡ou-biznisu, modernistiÄ?koj arhitekturi, lepim umetnostima, verskoj toleranciji, kućnom životu i, iznad svega, tehnologiji. Kao Å¡to je sugerisao jedan od reklamnih slogana izložbe, “milenijum progresa” doživeo je vrhunac u ameriÄ?kom stoleću (Stenton/Stanton 2004, 2004a; Ljus/Luce 1941).

    Ta rodoljubiva poruka slavljena je veliÄ?anstvenim predstavljanjem novih tehnologija na Svetskom sajmu. Pisci i filmadžije odavno su maÅ¡tali o putovanju na druge svetove. Sada je u Nasinom (National Aeronautics and Space Administration – Nacionalna agencija za aeronautiÄ?ka i svemirska ustraživanja, popularno NASA) Svemirskom parku, javnost mogla da se divi ogromnim raketama koje su odnele ameriÄ?ke astronaute u orbitu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf /Time-Life Books 1964, str. 208; Lorens/Laurence 1964, str. 2-14). Uprkos svom poÄ?etnom neuspehu kada su Rusi lansirali prvi satelit 1957, SAD sad tek Å¡to nisu pretekle svog takmaca u “svemirskoj trci” (Å efter/Schefter 1999, str. 145-231). A ono Å¡to je najbolje od svega, posetiocima Svetskog sajma govorilo se kako će i sami imati priliku da za svog životnog veka postanu astronauti. U paviljonu Futurama Dženeral motorsa (General Motors), Amerikanci iz 1980-ih bili su prikazani kako provode godiÅ¡nji odmor na Mesecu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 222). Druge korporacije bile su podjednako sigurne da će dostignuća sadaÅ¡njice ubrzo biti prevaziÄ‘ena trijumfima sutraÅ¡njice. U svom paviljonu Progreslend (Progressland), Dženeral motors predvideo je da će elektriÄ?na energija proizvedena u reaktorima za nuklearnu fuziju biti “isuviÅ¡e jeftina da bi se naplaćivala” (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 90-92; Lorens 1964, str 40-43). U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti Svetskog sajma, Amerikanci neće samo postati svemirski turisti – oni će takoÄ‘e biti blagosloveni besplatnom elektriÄ?nom energijom…

    Za mnoge korporacije, najdelotvorniji metod da dokažu svoju tehnoloÅ¡ku savremenost bio je taj da izlože raÄ?unar. Klerolova (Clairol) maÅ¡ina birala je “najlaskavije boje za kosu” za posetiteljke, a mejnfrejm (eng. mainframe, veliki, Ä?esto i ogromni centralni kompjuterski sistemi, kakvi su poÄ?eli da se razvijaju 40-ih i 50-ih godina, prim. prev.) Parker pena je uparivao ameriÄ?ku decu sa “prijateljima za dopisivanje” iz stranih zemalja (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 86, 90). Koliko god možda delovali impresivno svojoj publici, ti eksponati nisu bili niÅ¡ta drugo do reklamni trikovi. Za razliku od njih, IBM (skraćeno od International Business Machines, jedna od prvih i najvećih informatiÄ?kih kompanija, osnovana pod imenom Tabulating Machine Company 1896, danas sa oko 400 000 zaposlenih u 170 zemalja, prim. prev.) je bio u mogućnosti da svoj paviljon posveti iskljuÄ?ivo Ä?udima informatike kao zasebne tehnologije. U 1961, jedan jedini proizvod – IBM 1401 – Ä?inio je Ä?etvrtinu svih raÄ?unara koji su radili u SAD-u (Pju 1995, str. 265-267). Po poimanju mnogih Amerikanaca, IBM je bio sinonim za ‘kompjuter’. BaÅ¡ pred otvaranje Svetskog sajma, korporacija je izbacila seriju proizvoda koji će joj obezbediti dominaciju industrijom i u iduće dve decenije: System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, str. 54-146). UgrabivÅ¡i priliku za isticanje koju je sajam nudio, Å¡efovi IBM-a naruÄ?ili su paviljon koji će zaseniti sve ostale. Ero Sarinen (Eero Saarinen) – renomirani finski arhitekta – nadgledao je konstrukciju veliÄ?anstvene zgrade: bele dvorane u obliku jajeta sa reljefnim korporativnim logotipom, koja je lebdela visoko u vazduhu uz pomoć 45 metalnih stabala boje rÄ‘e. Ispod te upeÄ?atljive atrakcije nalazile su se interaktivne izložbe koje su veliÄ?ale IBM-ov doprinos raÄ?unarskoj industriji (Stern, Melins i FiÅ¡man/Stern, Mellins, Fishman, 1997, str. 1046-1047).

    Za samu dvoranu, ÄŒarsl i Rej Ims (Charles i Ray Eames) – par koji je bio oliÄ?enje ameriÄ?kog modernistiÄ?kog dizajna – napravili su glavnu zanimljivost u IBM-ovom paviljonu: “InformatiÄ?ku maÅ¡inu” (The Information Machine). PoÅ¡to bi zauzeli svoja mesta u “Ljudskom zidu” (People Wall) sa 500 sediÅ¡ta, posetioci bi bili podignuti u jajoliku graÄ‘evinu. Kada bi se naÅ¡li unutra, narator bi najavio “veliÄ?anstvenu” multimedijalnu predstavu o tome kako su maÅ¡ine izložene u IBM-ovom paviljonu preteÄ?a svesnih maÅ¡ina budućnosti. RaÄ?unari su u procesu sticanja svesti. (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 70-74; Lorens 1964, str. 57-58). U bliskoj budućnosti, svaki Amerikanac biće vlasnik odanog mehaniÄ?kog sluge baÅ¡ kao Å¡to je Robot Robi (Robby the Robot) iz Zabranjene planete (Forbidden Planet), popularnog nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nog filma iz 1956. godine (Vilkoks/Wilcox, 1999). Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku, IBM je ponosno objavio da će taj san o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji napokon biti ostvaren. Sa izbacivanjem serije System/360, mejnfrejmovi su postali dovoljno moćni da izgrade prototipe jednog potpuno svesnog raÄ?unara.

    Ta Ä?udesna meÅ¡avina avangardne arhitekture i multimedijalnog performansa u IBM-ovom paviljonu doživela je veliki uspeh i u medijima i u javnosti. Zajedno sa svemirskim raketama i nuklearnim reaktorima, raÄ?unar je potvrdio svoju poziciju kao jedna od tri ikoniÄ?ne tehnologije moderne Amerike. IdeoloÅ¡ka poruka tih maÅ¡ina bila je nedvosmislena: sadaÅ¡njost je budućnost u zametku. U IBM-ovom paviljonu, raÄ?unari su postojali istovremeno u dva vremenska okvira. Sa jedne strane, tadaÅ¡nji modeli su prikazani kao prototipovi svesnih maÅ¡ina iz budućnosti; sa druge strane, vizija raÄ?unarske svesti pokazala je istinski potencijal mejnfrejmova izloženih u IBM-ovom paviljonu. Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1964, izbacivanje serije System/360 se slavilo kao najava zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije.
    “Nije daleko dan kada će sposobnostî [ljudskog] mozga za reÅ¡avanje problema i rukovanje informacijama biti prekopirane; iznenadio bih se ako se to ne bi ostvarilo u narednoj deceniji.”
    Sajmon/Simon, str. 39.

    Otkrivanje razumne mašine

    FuturistiÄ?ke fantazije iz IBM-ove multimedijalne predstave bile su nadahnute nepristrasnom logikom akademskog sveta. Alan Tjuring (Turing) – utemeljivaÄ? informatike – oznaÄ?io je razvoj veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije kao dugoroÄ?ni cilj te nove discipline. Sredinom 1930-ih, ovaj matematiÄ?ar sa Kembridža objavio je uticajan Ä?lanak koji je opisivao apstrakni model za programabilni raÄ?unar: “univerzalnu maÅ¡inu” (Tjuring 2004). Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, njegov tim inženjera napravio je prvi elektriÄ?ni kalkulator kako bi se ubrzalo deÅ¡ifrovanje nemaÄ?kih vojnih signala. Kada se sukob okonÄ?ao, Tjuring se preselio na Univerzitet u ManÄ?esteru kako bi se pridružio timu istraživaÄ?a koji su pravili programabilnu maÅ¡inu. Kao Å¡to je bilo izloženo u njegovom Ä?lanku iz 1936, koristiće se softver kako bi se hardveru omogućilo da obavlja niz razliÄ?itih zadataka. Na dan 21. juna 1948, pre no Å¡to je Tjuring Ä?ak i doÅ¡ao na svoje novo radno mesto, njegove kolege ukljuÄ?ile su prvi svetski elektronski raÄ?unar sa unapred ugraÄ‘enim programom: Baby. Taj teoretski koncept, do tada opisan u jednom struÄ?nom Ä?asopisu, se materijalizovao u obliku ogromne metalne kutija ispunjene ventilima, prekidaÄ?ima, žicama i brojÄ?anicima (Tjuring 2004a; Ejgar/Agar, 2001, str. 3-5, 113-124; Hodžis/Hoges, 1992, str. 314-402).

    Za Tjuringa, Baby je bio daleko viÅ¡e od poboljÅ¡ane verzije kancelarijskog tabulatora. Kada hardverom upravlja softver, raÄ?unanje postaje svest. U nizu uticajnih Ä?lanaka, Tjuring je izneo tezu da je njegova matematiÄ?ka maÅ¡ina preteÄ?a jednog sasvim novog oblika života: mehaniÄ?kog matematiÄ?ara. To predviÄ‘anje potkrepio je odredivÅ¡i ljudsku inteligenciju kao neÅ¡to Å¡to bi mogli raditi i raÄ?unari. Budući da je raÄ?unanje prefinjeni vid razmiÅ¡ljanja, raÄ?unarske maÅ¡ine su zasigurno sposobne da misle. Ako deca stiÄ?u znanje obrazovanjem, edukativni softver mogao bi da stvori obrazovane raÄ?unare. PoÅ¡to ljuski mozak radi kao maÅ¡ina, oÄ?igledno je da bi se maÅ¡ina mogla ponaÅ¡ati kao elektronski mozak (Tjuring 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Å afer/Schaffer, 2000). Sudeći po Tjuringu, iako prvobitni raÄ?unari joÅ¡ nisu bili dovoljno moćni da bi dostigli svoj pravi potencijal, pre ili kasnije, kroz neprestano poboljÅ¡avanje hardvera i softvera, ta ograniÄ?enja bi bila prevaziÄ‘ena. U drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka, raÄ?unarska tehnologija brzo se razvijala ka svojoj unapred utvrÄ‘enoj sudbini: veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji.

    “Memorijski kapacitet ljudskog mozga verovatno je reda deset hiljada miliona binarnih brojeva. Ali najveći deo toga po svoj prilici se koristi za pamćenje vizuelnih utisaka, i na druge relativno rasipniÄ?ke naÄ?ine. Ostvarivanju istinskog napretka [ka veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji] možemo se osnovano nadati sa nekoliko miliona brojeva [raÄ?unarske memorije].”
    Tjuring 2004a, str. 393

    U svom najpoznatijem Ä?lanku, Tjuring je opisao test za prepoznavanje pobednika u toj ‘trci za budućnost’. Kada posmatraÄ? ne bude mogao da razluÄ?i da li razgovara ljudskim bićem ili raÄ?unarom u onlajn konverzaciji, onda viÅ¡e neće postojati bitna razlika izmeÄ‘u te dve vrste svesti. Ako se imitacija ne može razlikovati od originala, maÅ¡ina se onda mora smatrati razumnom – kompjuter je položio ispit (Tjuring 2004c, str. 441-448; Å afer 2000). Od tada pa nadalje, raÄ?unari su postali mnogo viÅ¡e od pukih praktiÄ?nih alatki i robe kojom se trguje. Kao Å¡to je Tjuringov Ä?lanak objasnio, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije otkrivala je potencijal ove nove tehnologije da se konstantno menja. Uprkos svojim nedostacima, aktuelni modeli raÄ?unara predstavljaju preteÄ?u svesnih maÅ¡ina koje će za njima doći…

    Pred kraj 1940-ih, katihizis veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije već je bio ustoliÄ?en. U okviru informatike, ono Å¡to je bilo i ono Å¡to će biti je postalo jedno te isto. Uprkos tom dostignuću, Tjuring je bio prorok Ä?iji je uticaj slabio u njegovoj roÄ‘enoj zemlji. RaÄ?unar je možda izmiÅ¡ljen u Britaniji, ali njena zadužena vlada nije imala sredstava da bi dominirala razvojem te nove tehnologije (Ejgar 2003, str. 266-278). S druge strane Atlantika, prilike su se umnogome razlikovale. Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, ameriÄ?ka vlada takoÄ‘e je obezbedila izdaÅ¡na sredstva za istraživanje elektronskog raÄ?unarstva. Shodno tome, kada je pobeda izvojevana, presudilo je to Å¡to se nauÄ?nici koji su radili na tim projektima nisu susreli sa ozbiljnim poteÅ¡koćama u daljem obezbeÄ‘ivanju sredstava. Dok je Britanija oskudevala u novcu, SAD su lako sebi mogle priuÅ¡titi da finansiraju najsavremenija istraživanja u oblasti novih tehnologija. Kada je Hladni rat poÄ?eo, ameriÄ?kim politiÄ?arima nije bilo teÅ¡ko da svojim biraÄ?ima opravdaju te dotacije (Lesli/Leslie, 1993, str. 1-13; Luontin/Lewontin, 1997).

    U SAD, informatiÄ?ari su imali joÅ¡ jednu veliku prednost u odnosu na svoje britanske suparnike: meta-teoriju kibernetike. Tokom poznih 1940-ih i ranih 1950-ih, grupa istaknutih ameriÄ?kih intelektualaca sastajala se na Mejsi konferencijama (Macy conferences) kako bi istraživala naÄ?ine da se sruÅ¡e granice izmeÄ‘u razliÄ?itih nauÄ?nih disciplina: (Hajms/Heims, 1991). Od samog poÄ?etka, kao guru tog poduhvata izdvojio se Norbert Viner (Norbert Wiener). Dok je radio na MIT-ju (skraćeno od Massachusetts Institute of Technology, privatni istraživaÄ?ki univerzitet i institut lociran u gradu Kejmbridžu, država MasaÄ?usets, SAD, prim. prev.), on je izmislio kibernetiku kao novi teorijski okvir za analiziranje ponaÅ¡anja i ljudi i maÅ¡ina. Input (unos, ulaz) informacija o okruženju vodi do autputa (output, izlaz, rezultat) delovanja Ä?iji je cilj da to okruženje promeni. Nazvan “povratna sprega” (feedback loop), taj ciklus nadražaja i rezultirajućih odgovora je Å¡irenje entropije u svemiru okrenuo u obrnutom pravcu – red je moguće stvoriti iz haosa (Viner 1948, str. 21, 32-33). U 1948, Viner je izneo svoju novu univerzalnu teoriju u knjizi ispunjenoj stranicama matematiÄ?kih dokaza: “Kibernetika – ili komanda i kontrola u životinji i maÅ¡ini” (Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine).

    Na svoje veliko iznenaÄ‘enje, ovaj nauÄ?nik je napisao bestseler. Prvi put, jedan zajedniÄ?ki skup apstraktnih naÄ?ela povezivao je i prirodne i druÅ¡tvene nauke. Vinerov tekst pružio je moćne metafore za opisivanje haj-tek (hi-tech, visoko-tehnoloÅ¡kog, prim. prev.) sveta Amerike u periodu Hladnog rata. ÄŒak i ako nisu razumeli njegove matematiÄ?ke jednaÄ?ine, Ä?itaoci su lako mogli da prepoznaju kibernetiÄ?ke sisteme u okviru druÅ¡tvenih institucija i mreža komunikacije koje su dominirale njihovim svakodnevnim životom. Povratna sprega, informacije i sistemi ubrzo su postali deo narodnog govora (Konvej/Conway i Sigelman/Siegelman 2005, str. 171-194; Hajms 1991, str. 271-272). Uprkos javnom odobravanju, Viner je ostao autsajder u krugovima ameriÄ?ke inteligencije. Podsmevajući se ideoloÅ¡kom pravoverju Amerike u Hladnom ratu, ovaj guru bio je pacifista i socijalista.

    PoÄ?etkom 1940-ih, Viner – kao i skoro svaki ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nik – verovao je da će Ä?oveÄ?anstvo imati koristi od razvijanja oružja kojima bi se pobedila nacistiÄ?ka NemaÄ?ka. Kada je poÄ?eo Hladni rat, njegove kolege koje je finansirala vojska tvrdile su kako njihov istraživaÄ?ki rad takoÄ‘e doprinosi borbi protiv jednog agresivnog totalitarnog neprijatelja (Luontin 1997). Osporavajući taj patriotski konsenzus, Viner je izneo tezu da bi ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nici trebalo da zauzmu sasvim drugaÄ?iji stav u sukobu sa Rusijom. Upozorio je da bi trka u nuklearnom naoružanju mogla dovesti do uniÅ¡tenja Ä?oveÄ?anstva. SuoÄ?eni sa ovom opasnom novom situacijom, odgovorni nauÄ?nici bi trebalo da odbiju da sprovode vojna istraživanja (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 237-243, 255-271). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, Vinerovo politiÄ?ko otpadniÅ¡tvo nadahnulo je njegovo socijalistiÄ?ko tumaÄ?enje kibernetike. U epohi korporativnih monopola i atomskog oružja, teorija koja objaÅ¡njava ponaÅ¡anje i ljudi i maÅ¡ina mora se upotrebiti kako bi ljudi uspostavili kontrolu nad svojim maÅ¡inama. NapuÅ¡tajući svoje prvobitno oduÅ¡evljenje Tjuringovim proroÄ?anstvom, Viner je sada naglaÅ¡avao opasnosti koje predstavljaju svesni raÄ?unari (Viner 1966, str. 52-60, 1967, str. 239-254). Pre svega, pokuÅ¡aj stvaranja veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije predstavljao je skretanje sa neodložnog zadatka uspostavljanja socijalne pravde i globalnog mira.

    “Svet budućnosti biće jedna sve zahtevnija borba protiv ograniÄ?enja naÅ¡e sopstvene inteligencije, a ne udobna ležaljka na koju se možemo ispružiti da bi nas služili naÅ¡i robovi – roboti.”
    Viner 1966, str. 69.

    Suprotstavljajući se militarizaciji nauÄ?nog istraživanja, osnivaÄ? kibernetike je svoje pokrovitelje iz redova ameriÄ?ke elite doveo u priliÄ?no nezgodnu situaciju. Na sreću po vladare Amerike, na Mejsi konferencijama bio je joÅ¡ jedan briljantan matematiÄ?ar, koji je istovremeno bio i fanatiÄ?an borac u Hladnom ratu: Džon fon Nojman (John von Neumann). Budući traumatizovan nacionalizacijom svoje porodiÄ?ne banke za vreme MaÄ‘arske revolucije iz 1919, njegovi antikomunistiÄ?ki stavovi su bili toliko ekstremni da je sredinom 1940-ih bio zagovornik preventivnog rata kako bi se Rusija spreÄ?ila da napravi nuklearno oružje (Hajms 1980, str. 235-236, 244-251). Dok je igrao glavnu ulogu i u razvoju atomske bombe, Fon Nojman je već primenjivao svoje matematiÄ?ke i organizacione veÅ¡tine u tada novoj oblasti informatike. Kada se 1946. održala prva Mejsi konferencija, njegov tim istraživaÄ?a radio je na izgradnji prototipa mejnfrejm kompjutera za ameriÄ?ku mornaricu (ÄŒeruci/Ceruzzi, 2003, str. 21-4). U Fon Nojmanu, ameriÄ?ka imperija je pronaÅ¡la gurua bez i jednog traga krivoverja.

    Na prvim Mejsi konferencijama, politiÄ?ke razlike meÄ‘u prisutnima nisu bile oÄ?igledne. Ujedinjeni u antifaÅ¡istiÄ?koj borbi, Viner i Fon Nojman mogli su da zastupaju isti koncept kibernetike (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 143-149; Hajns 1980, str. 201-207). MeÄ‘utim, kako su im se politiÄ?ki stavovi razilazili, ove dve zvezde Mejsi konferencija poÄ?ele su da zastupaju suparniÄ?ka tumaÄ?enja te meta-teorije. U svojoj leviÄ?arskoj verziji, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija optužena je kao apoteoza tehnoloÅ¡ke dominacije. Kada je formulisao svoj desniÄ?arski remiks, Fon Nojman je odveo kibernetiku u dijametralno suprotnom pravcu. Pre svega, njegovo tumaÄ?enje podvlaÄ?ilo je Ä?injenicu da je njegova univerzalna teorija nadahnuta proroÄ?anstvom o razumnim maÅ¡inama. Sredinom 1930-ih, Tjuring je kratko radio sa Fon Nojmanom na univerzitetu Prinston. ÄŒitavu deceniju pre no Å¡to je i sam poÄ?eo da se bavi informatikom, maÄ‘arski nauÄ?nik znao je sve o zamisli da se napravi univerzalna maÅ¡ina. Kada su dva Ä?ikaÅ¡ka psihologa poÄ?etkom 1940-ih primenila Tjuringovu teoriju kako bi objasnili procese ljudskog miÅ¡ljenja, Fon Nojman je bio oÄ?aran implikacijama njihovih pretpostavki.

    PoÅ¡to je mehaniÄ?ki raÄ?unar napravljen po modelu ljudskog mozga, Voren Mekalok (Warren McCulloch) i Volter Pits (Walter Pitts) izneli su tezu da je svest isto Å¡to i raÄ?unanje. Poput elektriÄ?nih veza IBM-ovog tabulatora, neuroni su prekidaÄ?i koji prenose informacije u binarnom obliku (Mekalok i Pits 1943). OÄ?aran ovom inverzijom Tjuringove linije argumenta, Fon Nojman je postao uveren da je teorijski moguće napraviti razumnu maÅ¡inu. Ako se neuroni ponaÅ¡aju kao prekidaÄ?i u ljudskom mozgu, ventili bi se mogli upotrebiti kako bi se po istom principu napravio elektronski mozak (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 43-46, 1976, str. 308-311). Dok se bavio raÄ?unarskim istraživanjima za ameriÄ?ku vojsku, Fon Nojman je koristio ljudski mozak kao model za svoju eponimsku kompjutersku arhitekturu. SliÄ?no kao i Tjuring, ovaj prorok je tvrdio da će – kada se broj ventila u raÄ?unaru bude približio broju neurona u mozgu – maÅ¡ina moći da misli (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 36-41, 1976, str. 296-300, 2000, str. 39-52). U roku od decenije, Fon Nojman i njegove kolege opremaće ameriÄ?ku vojsku kibernetiÄ?kim vojnicima sposobnim da se bore u nuklearnom ratu i izvojuju svaku pobedu…

    “Dr Mekalok: Å ta mislite o pravljenju raÄ?unarskih maÅ¡ina tako da ako budu oÅ¡tećene u vazduÅ¡nim napadima… mogu da zamene delove… i nastave sa radom?
    Dr Fon Nojman: To su zaista pre kvantitativna no kvalitativna pitanja.”
    Fon Nojman 1976, str. 324

    Do ranih 1950-ih, ameriÄ?ki akademski svet i korporativni istraživaÄ?ki timovi preoteli su od svojih britanskih takmaca vodeći položaj u informatici. Od tada pa nadalje, sve najnaprednije maÅ¡ine pravile su se u Americi (ÄŒeruci 2003, str. 13-46). Ipak, stvorivÅ¡i kibernetiku bez Vinera, Fon Nojman se postarao da ove ameriÄ?ke laboratorije poÄ‘u Tjuringovim putem ka zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti: kroz izgradnju veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Metafora povratne sprege sada je dokazala da raÄ?unari funkcioniÅ¡u kao ljudi. Inputi informacija vode do autputa delovanja. Ako mozak radi kao maÅ¡ina, onda mora biti moguće razviti maÅ¡inu koja oponaÅ¡a funkcije mozga. Kompjuteri već raÄ?unaju brže od ljudi koji su ih izmislili. Ovladavanje složenostima matematiÄ?ke logike mora biti prvi korak ka opremanju ovih maÅ¡ina novim odlikama ljudske svesti. Jezik je skup pravila koji se može kodifikovati u obliku softvera. UÄ?enje iz novih iskustava može se programirati u hardver (Minski/Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nici su naporno radili na izgradnji misleće maÅ¡ine. Jednom kada bude imao dovoljnu moć obrade podataka, raÄ?unar će postati svestan (Edvards/Edwards, 1996, str. 239-273). Kada je IBM izbacio svoj mejnfrejm System/360 na Svetskom sajmu 1964, delovalo je kao da je Tjuringov san blizu svom ostvarenju.

    Informatika za vreme Hladnog rata

    ÄŒetvrt veka ranije, jedna od zvezda Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939. bio je Elektro (Electro): robot koji je – sudeći po njegovim publicistima – “… umeo da priÄ?a, hoda, broji na prste, pućka cigaretu, i razlikuje crvenu i zelenu boju pomoću fotoelektriÄ?ne ćelije” (Ims i Ims 1973, str. 105). Uprkos svoj svojoj pretvornosti, na ovoj izložbi je prvi put ponovljena zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Pre Svetskog sajma 1939, roboti u knjigama i filmovima gotovo uvek su prikazivani kao frankenÅ¡tajnovska Ä?udoviÅ¡ta koja imaju nameru da uniÅ¡te svoje ljudske stvoritelje (Å elijeva/Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Nadahnut svojim odlascima na izložbu, Isak Asimov (Isaac Asimov) je odluÄ?io da promeni tu negativnu sliku. BaÅ¡ kao i Elektro, roboti iz njegovih nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nih priÄ?a su bezbedni i prijateljski nastrojeni proizvodi jedne velike korporacije (Asimov 1968, 1968a). Kada je 1964. godine otvoren Svetski sajam u Njujorku, ova pozitivna slika veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije već je bila jedna od najpopularnijih zamiÅ¡ljenih budućnosti u Americi. I u nauÄ?noj fantastici i u nauÄ?noj stvarnosti, robot sluga bio je simbol boljih vremena koja će uslediti…

    Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1939, Elektro se nadmetao sa aktuelnom tehnoloÅ¡kom ikonom tog trenutka: automobilom. Zanimljivosti koje se nisu smele propustiti bile su Demokrasiti (Democracity) – maketa izložena u zgradi Perisfera Njujork Stejta (New York State Perisphere) – i Futurama – diorama (Ä?esto “trodimenzionalna” predstava, model ili maketa odreÄ‘enog objekta ili pejzaža, prim. prev.) u paviljonu Dženeral motorsa (General Motors). Obe izložbe promovisale su viziju bogate i haj-tek Amerike 1960-ih. U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti, najveći deo stanovniÅ¡tva živi u porodiÄ?nim domovima u predgraÄ‘u i na posao odlazi vlastitim automobilom (publikacije sa izložbe/Exposition Publications 1939, str. 42-45, 207-209). Za najveći broj posetilaca Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939, ovo proroÄ?anstvo potroÅ¡aÄ?kog blagostanja zasigurno je delovalo kao utopijski san. AmeriÄ?ka ekonomija i dalje se oporavljala od najgore recesije u istoriji zemlje, Evropa je bila na rubu novog razornog graÄ‘anskog rata a istoÄ?na Azija već u vrtlogu smrtonosnih sukoba. No, kada se otvorio Svetski sajam 1964, najÄ?uvenije predviÄ‘anje sa izložbe 1939. već je bilo ostvareno. Koliko god da su posetioci bili podozrivi 1939, dvadeset godina kasnije, diorame Demokrasiti i Futurama delovale su izuzetno dalekovido. Do ranih 1960-ih, Amerika je postala potroÅ¡aÄ?ko druÅ¡tvo koje živi u predgraÄ‘u i poseduje kola. ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost postala je savremena stvarnost.

    “Automobil… upravlja celokupnim [druÅ¡tvenim] ponaÅ¡anjem, od ekonomije do govora. Protok saobraćaja je jedna od glavnih funkcija druÅ¡tva… Prostor [u gradskim oblastima] osmiÅ¡ljava se u skladu sa automobilistiÄ?kim potrebama, a saobraćajni problemi imaju veću važnost od smeÅ¡taja… Ä?injenica je da je za mnoÅ¡tvo ljudi auto možda i najvažniji deo njihovih ‘životnih prilika’.”
    Lefebr/Lefebvre, 1984, str. 100

    Budući da su se predviÄ‘anja sa izložbe iz 1939. u velikoj meri ostvarila, posetiocima Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964. moglo se oprostiti Å¡to su poverovali da će se njegove tri glavne zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti takoÄ‘e ostvariti. Ko je mogao sumnjati u to da će – najkasnije do 1990. godine – većina Amerikanaca uživati u blagodetima svemirskog turizma i besplatne elektriÄ?ne energije? A ono Å¡to je najbolje od svega, živeće u svetu gde će im svesne maÅ¡ine biti verne sluge. MeÄ‘utim, vera ameriÄ?ke javnosti u te zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti zasnivala se na pogreÅ¡nom osećaju kontinuiteta. Uprkos tome Å¡to je održan na istom mestu i Å¡to je na njemu uÄ?estvovalo mnogo istih izlagaÄ?a, Svetski sajam iz 1964. bio je usredsreÄ‘en na neÅ¡to sasvim drugo od njegovog prethodnika iz 1939. Dvadeset pet godina ranije, glavni eksponat na izložbi bio je automobil: potroÅ¡aÄ?ki proizvod masovne proizvodnje. Za razliku od njega, zvezde izložbe na Svetskom sajmu 1964. bile su tehnologije subvencionisane od strane države, a za potrebe voÄ‘enja Hladnog rata. Kompjuteri su izraÄ?unavali putanje kojima će se ameriÄ?ke rakete naoružane nuklearnim bombama kretati kako bi uniÅ¡tavale ruske gradove i njihove nesrećne stanovnike (Ajzeks/Isaacs i Dauling/Dowling 1998, str. 230-243). Ako je reprezentativni objekat na njegovom prethodniku iz 1939. bio motorizovani prevoz za mase, zvezde Svetskog sajma 1964. su bile maÅ¡ine atomskog armagedona.

    Dok je osmiÅ¡ljavala svoj paviljon, korporacija IBM je morala da se pozabavi sa ovim problemom u odnosima sa javnošću. Nalik nuklearnim reaktorima i svemirskim raketama, i raÄ?unari su razvijani kao oružja za Hladni rat. ENIAC – prvi prototipski mejnfrejm napravljen u Americi – bio je maÅ¡ina za izraÄ?unavanje tabela kako bi se poboljÅ¡ala preciznost artiljerijskih topova (ÄŒeruci 2003, str. 15). Od ranih 1950-ih pa nadalje, IBM-ov raÄ?unarski odsek bio je usredsreÄ‘en na dobijanje narudžbi od Ministarstva odbrane (Pju/Pugh, 1995, str. 167-172). Koristeći mejnfrejmove nabavljene od ove korporacije, ameriÄ?ka vojska se spremala za nuklearni rat, pripremala invazije na “neprijateljske2 zemlje, upravljala bombardovanjem neprijateljskih meta, isplaćivala plate svojim trupama, vodila složene ratne igre i rukovodila lancem snabdevanja (Berkli/Berkeley 1962, str. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Zahvaljujući ameriÄ?kim poreskim obveznicima, IBM je postao tehnoloÅ¡ki lider raÄ?unarske industrije.

    Kada se 1964. otvorio Svetski sajam u Njujorku, IBM je i dalje bio tesno povezan sa mnogo razliÄ?itih vojnih projekata. Ipak, paviljon te korporacije je bio posvećen promovisanju nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne maÅ¡tarije o razumnim maÅ¡inama. Kao i u sluÄ?aju predviÄ‘anja o besplatnoj energiji i svemirskom turizmu, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije onemogućavala je posetiocima Svetskog sajma da otkriju pravi motiv za izgradnju IBM-ovih mejnfrejmova: ubijanje miliona ruskih civila. Iako je imperijalna hegemonija supersila zavisila od atomskog oružja, njegovo posedovanje postajalo je sve problematiÄ?nije usled pretnje od sveopÅ¡teg uniÅ¡tenja. Dve godine ranije, SAD i Rusija umalo nisu greÅ¡kom uÅ¡le u katastrofalan rat oko Kube (Dalek/Dallek, 2003, str. 535-574). Uprkos tome Å¡to je propast za dlaku izbegnuta, supersile nisu bile sposobne da prekinu trku u naoružanju. U bizarnoj logici Hladnog rata, predupreÄ‘ivanje totalnog sukoba izmeÄ‘u dva bloka zavisilo je od neprestanog povećanja broja nuklearnih glava koje obe strane poseduju. Vladajućim elitama SAD i Rusije bilo je teÅ¡ko da priznaju sebi – a kamoli svojim graÄ‘anima – duboku iracionalnost te nove vrste vojnog nadmetanja. U retkom trenutku lucidnosti, ameriÄ?ki analitiÄ?ari izmislili su ironiÄ?nu skraćenicu za tu visokoriziÄ?nu strategiju “uzajamnog sigurnog uniÅ¡tenja”: MAD (skraćeno od Mutually Assured Destruction:, na engleskom “mad” znaÄ?i, otprilike, “ludilo”, uglavnom u nasilnom ili agresivnom obliku, prim. prev.) (Ajzeks i Dauling/Dowling, 1998. str. 230-243; Kan/Kahn 1960, str. 119-189).

    OÄ?ekivano, propagandisti sa obe strane opravdavali su ogromno traćenje sredstava na trku u naoružanju promovisanjem mirnodopske primene vodećih tehnologija primenjenih u Hladnom ratu. Do otvaranja Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964, oružje genocida uspeÅ¡no je prepakovano u proizvode korisne za ljude. Nuklearna sila uskoro će svima obezbeÄ‘ivati besplatnu elektriÄ?nu energiju. Svemirske rakete ubrzo će voziti turiste na godiÅ¡nje odmore na Mesecu. Nestali su gotovo svi tragovi vojnog porekla tih tehnologija. SliÄ?no, u IBM-ovom paviljonu, mejnfrejm System/360 promovisan je kao preteÄ?a veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Od posetilaca se oÄ?ekivalo da se dive tehnoloÅ¡kim dostignućima korporacije i da ne preispituju njenu sumnjivu ulogu u proizvodnji naoružanja. Užasi tekućeg Hladnog rata bili su skriveni Ä?udesima zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti. IBM-ov ideoloÅ¡ki trik umnogome je olakÅ¡ala jedna od osobenih crta industrijske modernosti: kidanje eksplicitnih veza izmeÄ‘u proizvoda i njihovih proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a. Hiljadama godina, ratnici i sveÅ¡tenici otvoreno su od seljaÅ¡tva izvlaÄ?ili njihove proizvodne viÅ¡kove radi sopstvene koristi. MeÄ‘utim, kada su Evropljani poÄ?eli da privatizuju vlasniÅ¡tvo nad zemljiÅ¡tem i mehanizuju ruÄ?nu proizvodnju, rodio se jedan novi – i napredniji – ekonomski sistem: liberalni kapitalizam. Preduzetnici su dokazali da se, konkurentnošću cena, ljudskim radom posredno može daleko delotvornije upravljati nego neposrednim metodama feudalizma. Pustolovi su otkrili da je prodavanje robe na svetskom tržiÅ¡tu daleko unosnije od nametanja otimaÄ?ke najamnine zemljoradnicima na jednoj ograniÄ?enoj teritoriji. Prvi put u ljudskoj istoriji ostvarivao se proizvodni potencijal kolektivnog rada (Smit/Smith 1976, str. 1-287; 401-445; Marks/Marx 1976, str. 762-940).

    U toj novoj ekonomiji od ljudi se zahtevalo da meÄ‘usobno komuniciraju putem stvari: robe, novca i kapitala. Podela rada u Ä?itavoj ekonomiji regulisala se cenama i platama koje je odreÄ‘ivala konkurencija na tržiÅ¡tu. MeÄ‘utim, kraj aristokratije i sveÅ¡tenstva nije okonÄ?ao klasnu vladavinu. Kada se rad kupuje i prodaje u kapitalistiÄ?koj ekonomiji, jednakost na tržiÅ¡tu vodi do nejednakosti na radnom mestu (Marks 1976, str. 270-280; Rubin 1972, str. 77-253). PoÅ¡to se roba razmenjivala za drugu robu iste vrednosti, ovaj novi oblik klasne vladavine bio je umnogome drugaÄ?iji od onoga koji mu je prethodio. Neposredno vladanje zamenjeno je posrednim izrabljivanjem. I, pre svega, sudbinu pojedinaca sada je odreÄ‘ivalo bezliÄ?no kretanje tržiÅ¡ta. Svetom viÅ¡e nisu vladali ljudi, već stvari.

    “To znaÄ?i da se tajanstvenost robnog oblika sastoji prosto u tome Å¡to on ljudima druÅ¡tvene karaktere njihovog sopstvenog rada odražava kao karaktere koji objektivno pripadaju samim proizvodima rada, kao druÅ¡tvena svojstva koja te stvari imaju od prirode, a otuda im (se) i druÅ¡tveni odnos proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a prema celokupnom radu odražava kao druÅ¡tveni odnos koji izvan i nezavisno od proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a postoji meÄ‘u predmetima.”
    Marks 1976, str. 164-165

    Razvoj kapitalizma stvorio je mnogo složeniju podelu rada unutar ekonomije. Uporedo sa povećanjem broja radnih mesta u fabrikama i kancelarijama, nauÄ?no istraživanje se takoÄ‘e izdvojilo kao zaseban poziv (Bar/Bahr 1980; Smit 1976, str. 7-16). UspeÅ¡na preduzeća rasla su ne samo tako Å¡to su zapoÅ¡ljavala joÅ¡ radnika, već i ulažući u novu maÅ¡ineriju. U fetiÅ¡izovanom svetu kapitalizma, rast produktivnosti prouzrokovan sve prefinjenijom saradnjom rada i fabrici i nauÄ?nog istraživanja je bio izražen kroz razvoj najsavremenijih tehnologija. Sa ljudskom kreativnošću skrivenom iza robe, proces modernizacije dobio je kao svoj subjekat jedan izuzetno vidljiv objekat: “… automatski sistem maÅ¡inerije… pokretaÄ?ku snagu koja pokreće samu sebe.” (Marks 1973, str. 692)

    Sredinom dvadesetog veka, fetiÅ¡izacija tehnologije dostigla je svoju apoteozu u proroÄ?anstvu o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji. Za ljude koji su živeli u druÅ¡tvu u kojem je nova maÅ¡inerija naoko bila pokretaÄ?ka snaga druÅ¡tvene evolucije, Tjuringova i Fon Nojmanova tvrdnja da maÅ¡ine evoluiraju u živa bića nije delovala neobiÄ?no. Kada raÄ?unari vrÅ¡e svoje operacije, rad uložen u razvoj njihovog hardvera i pisanje njihovih programa nije neposredno vidljiv. OÄ?arani tehnoloÅ¡kim fetiÅ¡izmom, obožavatelji Tjuringa i Fon Nojmana ubedili su sebe da će elektronski mozak ubrzo moći da misli kao i ljudski mozak. U 1964-toj, raÄ?unarska moć mejnfrejma System/360 je bila toliko velika da se Ä?inilo kao da je ta IBM-ova maÅ¡ina na pragu svesnosti. Tvorevina je trebalo da postane stvoritelj.

    KibernetiÄ?ka nadmoć

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti privremeno su uspele da od ameriÄ?ke javnosti prikriju osnovni cilj svoje tri ikoniÄ?ne tehnologije. Ali, Ä?ak ni najbriljantnije opsenarsko umeće nije moglo veÄ?no da krije njihove lažne upotrebne vrednosti. Kako su decenije proticale, nijedno od predviÄ‘anja o kljuÄ?nim tehnologijama iz Hladnog rata datih na Svetskom sajmu se nije ostvarilo. ElektriÄ?na energija se i dalje naplaćivala, turisti nisu posećivali Mesec, a raÄ?unari joÅ¡ uvek nisu postali razumni. Za razliku od dalekovide vizije automobila za mase na Svetskom sajmu iz 1939, proroÄ?anstva o Ä?uvenim tehnologijama sa izložbe iz 1964. delovala su gotovo besmisleno dvadeset pet godina kasnije. Hiper-realnost se sudarila sa realnošću – i izgubila bitku.

    Uprkos neuspehu svog proroÄ?anstva, IBM nije pretrpeo nikakvu Å¡tetu. Za razliku od nuklearne energije i putovanja u svemir, informatika je bila hladnoratovska tehnologija koja je uspeÅ¡no pobegla iz konteksta Hladnog rata. Od samog poÄ?etka, maÅ¡ine koje su se pravile za ameriÄ?ku vojsku prodavale su se i profesionalnoj klijenteli (Pju 1995, str. 152-155). Kada je IBM izgradio svoj paviljon za Svetski sajam 1964, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije morala je da Ä?uva u tajnosti viÅ¡e od sumnjive primene informatike u vojne svrhe. FetiÅ¡izam robe takoÄ‘e je odigrao svoju klasiÄ?nu ulogu skrivanja ljudkog rada u procesu proizvodnje. RaÄ?unari su opisivani kao “razumni” kako bi se zanemario naporan rad uložen u njihovo projektovanje, graÄ‘enje, programiranje i rukovanje. Iznad svega, proroÄ?anstvo o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sakrilo je ulogu tehnoloÅ¡kih inovacija u okviru ameriÄ?kih radnih mesta. Pronalazak raÄ?unara odigrao se u pravi Ä?as za krupan biznis. Tokom prve polovine dvadesetog veka, velike korporacije postale su dominantne institucije ameriÄ?ke ekonomije. Divovska fabrika automobila Henrija Forda (Henry Ford) postala je eponimni simbol nove druÅ¡tvene paradigme: fordizma (Ford i Krouter/Crowther 1922; Aljeta/Aglietta 1979). Kada im je to uvećavalo zaradu, korporacije su zamenjivale posredno regulisanje proizvodnje putem tržiÅ¡ta neposrednim nadzorom preko birokrata. Kako su plate kancelarijskih službenika postojano rasle, preduzećima je bilo potrebno sve viÅ¡e opreme kako bi se podigla produktivnost na radnom mestu. Mnogo pre pronalaska raÄ?unara, fordistiÄ?ke korporacije vodile su informatiÄ?ku ekonomiju uz pomoć tabulatora, pisaćih maÅ¡ina i drugih vrsta kancelarijske opreme (Benidžer/Beniger, 1986, str. 291-425). MeÄ‘utim, do poÄ?etka 1950-ih, mehanizacija u administraciji se zaustavila. Povećanje produktivnosti u kancelariji dobrano je zaostajalo za povećanjem produktivnosti u fabrici. Kada su se na tržiÅ¡tu pojavili prvi raÄ?unari, upravnici korporacija brzo su uvideli da nova tehnologija nudi reÅ¡enje za taj urgentan problem (Sobel 1981, str. 95-184). Posao velikog broja operatera tabulatora sada je mogla obavljati mnogo manja grupa inženjera uz pomoć mejnfrejm kompjutera (Berkli 1962, str. 5). JoÅ¡ i bolje, nove informatiÄ?ke tehnologije omogućavale su kapitalistima da prodube kontrolu nad svojim organizacijama. Mnogo viÅ¡e informacija o mnogo viÅ¡e tema sada je moglo da se sakuplja i obraÄ‘uje na sve složenije naÄ?ine. Upravnici su bili gospodari svega Å¡to su mogli da drže na oku.

    Maltene od svog prvog pojavljivanja na radnom mestu, mejnfrejm je – sa dobrim razlogom – karikiran kao mehaniÄ?ko savrÅ¡enstvo birokratske tiranije. U nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nim priÄ?ama Isaka Asimova, gospodin i gospoÄ‘a ProseÄ?ni bili su ponosni vlasnici sluge-robota. Ali, kada su prvi raÄ?unari stigli u ameriÄ?ke fabrike i kancelarije, tom novom tehnologijom upravljali su Å¡efovi, a ne radnici. U 1952, Kurt Vonegat (Kurt Vonnegut) je objavio nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ni roman koji je satirizovao autoritarne ambicije korporativne informatike. U njegovoj antiutopijskoj budućnosti, vladajuća elita poverila je upravljanje druÅ¡tvom sveznajućoj veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji.

    “EPIKAK XIV… odluÄ?ivao je koliko od svega Amerika i njene muÅ¡terije mogu dobiti i koliko će ih to stajati. I… odluÄ?ivaće koliko će inženjera i upravnika i… državnih službenika, i kakvih veÅ¡tina, biti potrebno da se roba isporuÄ?i; i koji će koeficijent inteligencije i nivo sposobnosti deliti korisne muÅ¡karce [i žene] od onih beskorisnih, i koliko se zaposlenih… može izdržavati na odreÄ‘enom nivou plate…”
    Vonegat, 1969, str. 106

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, IBM-ov paviljon obećavao je da će razumne maÅ¡ine biti sluge Ä?itavog Ä?oveÄ?anstva. A ipak, u isto vreme, njihove službe za prodaju su objaÅ¡njavale Å¡efovima velikih korporacija kako raÄ?unari uvode birokratsku vlast u savremeno druÅ¡tvo. Herbert Sajmon (Herbert Simon) – jedan od vodećih ameriÄ?kih teoretiÄ?ara upravljanja i nekadaÅ¡nji Fon Nojmanov kolega – predvideo je da će sve veća moć mejnfrejmova omogućiti preduzećima da automatizuju sve viÅ¡e i viÅ¡e administrativnih zadataka. Upravo kao u fabrici, i u kancelariji maÅ¡ine preuzimaju posao od ljudske radne snage. Sa pojavom veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije, mejnfrejmovi će bezmalo sasvim zameniti birokratsku i tehniÄ?ku radnu snagu u okviru proizvodnje. Krajnji cilj je stvaranje potpuno automatizovanog radnog mesta. Preduzećima tada viÅ¡e neće biti potrebni ni fiziÄ?ki ni kancelarijski radnici koji bi pravili proizvode ili pružali usluge. ÄŒak će i sami upravnici većinom postati ‘viÅ¡ak’. Umesto njih, ameriÄ?kim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljaće razumne maÅ¡ine (Sajmon 1965, str. 26-52). U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije, korporacija i raÄ?unar biće jedno isto. Ovo predviÄ‘anje temeljilo se na Fon Nojmanovom konzervativnom tumaÄ?enju kibernetike. U svojim tekstovima o teoriji upravljanja, Sajmon je izneo tezu da rad u jednom preduzeću nalikuje operacijama raÄ?unara. Kao i u psihologiji Mekaloka i Pitsa (McCulloch i Pitts), ovo poistovećivanje bilo je dvosmerno. Upravljanje radnicima izjednaÄ?avano je sa programiranjem raÄ?unara. Pisanje softvera bilo je nalik sastavljanju poslovnog plana. I zaposlenima i maÅ¡inerijom upravljalo se nareÄ‘enjima izdatim odozgo. RadniÄ?ka antiutopija ‘Veliki Brat’ superkompjutera je mutirala u kapitalistiÄ?ku utopiju kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma. IroniÄ?no, verodostojnost Sajmonove ideologije upravljanja zavisila je od toga hoće li njegovi Ä?itaoci zaboraviti žestoke kritike koje je na raÄ?un korporativne informatike izneo sam utemeljivaÄ? teorije sistema. Pozivajući se na Marksa, Viner je upozoravao da je osnovna uloga nove tehnologije pod kapitalizmom intenziviranje izrabljivanja radnika. Umesto da stvori viÅ¡e slobodnog vremena i poboljÅ¡a životne standarde, kompjuterizacija ekonomije će pod fordizmom povećati nezaposlenost i smanjiti plate (Viner 1967, str. 206-221). Da bi se izbegla Vonegatova antiutopija, ameriÄ?ki sindikalisti i politiÄ?ki aktivisti moraju se mobilisati protiv korporativnog Golema (Viner 1966, str. 54-55). U skladu sa Vinerom, kibernetika je dokazala kako veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija predstavlja pretnju za ljudske slobode.

    „Ne zaboravimo da je automatska maÅ¡ina… precizan ekvivalent robovske radne snage. Svaka radna snaga koja se nadmeće sa robovskom mora prihvatiti ekonomske uslove robovske radne snage.“
    Viner 1967, str. 220

    Za poslovne rukovodioce, Vonegatova i Vinerova noćna mora bila je njihov raÄ?unarski san na javi. MeÄ‘utim, ova korporativna vizija kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma znaÄ?ila je zaboravljanje istorije samog fordizma. Ova ekonomska paradigma zasnivala se na uspeÅ¡noj koordinaciji masovne proizvodnje sa masovnom potroÅ¡njom. IroniÄ?no, budući da su bile u većoj meri povezane sa druÅ¡tvenom realnošću, izložbe Demokrasiti i Futurama iz 1939. pružile su daleko taÄ?nije predviÄ‘anje razvojnog puta informatike nego Å¡to je to uÄ?inio IBM-ov paviljon iz 1964. BaÅ¡ kao i automobili dvadeset pet godina ranije, ova nova tehnologija polako se preobražavala iz retke, ruÄ?no pravljene maÅ¡ine u sveprisutnu robu masovno proizvedenu u fabrici. Isto kao i u Fordovim fabrikama, IBM-ovi mejnfrejmovi sastavljali su se na pokretnim trakama (Pju, Džonson/Johnson i Palmer 1991, str. 87-105, 204-210). Ti prvi koraci ka masovnoj proizvodnji raÄ?unara predvideli su ono Å¡to će biti najvažniji pomak u ovom sektoru dvadeset pet godina kasnije: masovnu potroÅ¡nju raÄ?unara. Po svojem spoljaÅ¡njem obliku, mejnfrejm System/360 iz 1964. je bio nezgrapan i skup prototip mnogo sitnijeg i jeftinijeg IBM-ovog PC-ja iz 1989.

    ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije bila je naÄ?in da se izbegne razmiÅ¡ljanje o verovatnim druÅ¡tvenim posledicama Å¡iroko rasprostranjenog posedovanja raÄ?unara. Ranih 1960-ih, superkompjuter tipa ‘Veliki Brat’ je pripadao moćnoj vladi i krupnom biznisu. Pre svega, povratna sprega je bila znanje onih nad kojima se vlada, monopolizovano od strane vladara. MeÄ‘utim, kao Å¡to je istakao Viner, fordistiÄ?ka proizvodnja će skupe mejnfrejmove neminovno pretvoriti u jeftinu robu (Viner 1967, str. 210-211). Zauzvrat, sve rasprostranjenije posedovanje raÄ?unara verovatno će poremetiti postojeći druÅ¡tveni poredak. Jer je povratna sprega informacija u okviru ljudskih institucija najdelotvornija kada je dvosmerna (Viner 1967, str. 67-73). Ponovnim povezivanjem zamisli i izvrÅ¡enja, kibernetiÄ?ki fordizam je podrivao druÅ¡tvene hijerarhije koje su bile osnova samog fordizma.

    “… prosta koegzistencija dve jedinice infomacije relativno je male vrednosti, psim ako se te dve jedinice ne mogu uspeÅ¡no kombinovati u nekom umu… koji je sposoban da jednu oplodi pomoću druge. Ovo je upravo suprotno od organizacije u kojoj svaki Ä?lan prelazi unapred odreÄ‘eni put…”
    Viner 1967, str. 172

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, ta mogućnost definitivno nije bila deo IBM-ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti. Pre nego da za cilj ima proizvodnju sve većeg broja sve efikasnijih maÅ¡ina po nižim cenama, korporacija je bila usredsreÄ‘ena na stabilno povećavanje sposobnosti svojih raÄ?unara kako bi saÄ?uvala svoj skoro potpuni monopol nad vojnim i korporativnim tržiÅ¡tem. Umesto da se maÅ¡ine veliÄ?ine sobe smanjuju i vremenom postaju stoni raÄ?unari, laptopovi i, naposletku, mobilni telefoni, IBM je bio uveren da će raÄ?unari zauvek ostati krupni i nezgrapni mejnfrejmovi. Korporacija je iz sve snage verovala da će – ukoliko taj put tehnoloÅ¡kog razvoja bude ekstrapoliran – rezultat sasvim sigurno biti veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija. I, najvažnije, ovaj konzervativni oporavak kibernetike je podrazumevao da će svesne maÅ¡ine neizbežno evoluirati u oblike života naprednije od obiÄ?nih ljudi. FordistiÄ?ko razdvajanje izmeÄ‘u ideje i izvrÅ¡enja bi dostiglo svoju tehnoloÅ¡ku apoteozu.

    OÄ?ekivano, IBM je bio reÅ¡en da se usprotivi tom uznemirujućem tumaÄ?enju sopstvene futuristiÄ?ke propagande. Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, paviljon korporacije je isticao utopijske mogućnosti informatike. Ipak, i upkros svojim najvećim naporima, IBM nije mogao da u potpunosti izbegne dvosmislenost sadržanu u zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Ta fetiÅ¡izovana ideologija mogla je biti privlaÄ?na svim slojevima ameriÄ?kog druÅ¡tva samo u sluÄ?aju da će raÄ?unari ispunjavati najdublje želje obe strane na radnom mestu. Stoga je IBM, na izložbama u svom paviljonu, promovisao jednu jedinu viziju zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti, viziju koja je objedinjavala dva nepomirljiva tumaÄ?enja veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Sa jedne strane, radnicima se govorilo da će sve njihove potrebe zadovoljavati razumne maÅ¡ine-roboti: sluge koje se nikada ne umaraju, ne žale i ne dovode nareÄ‘enja u pitanje. Sa druge strane, kapitalistima se obećavalo da će njihovim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljati razumne maÅ¡ine-roboti: proizvoÄ‘aÄ?i koji nikada ne zabuÅ¡avaju, ne izražavaju miÅ¡ljenje i ne Å¡trajkuju. Robot Robi viÅ¡e se nije mogao razlikovati od EPIKAK-a XIV. Iako tek na nivou ideologije, IBM je pomirio klasne podele u Americi 1960-ih. U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti, radnici viÅ¡e neće morati da rade, a poslodavcima viÅ¡e neće biti potrebni nameÅ¡tenici. NauÄ?nofantastiÄ?na maÅ¡tarija o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji uspeÅ¡no je omela ljude u pokuÅ¡aju da preispitaju posledice uvoÄ‘enja informatike na radnom mestu. Posle posete IBM-ovom paviljonu na Svetskom sajmu 1964, bilo je suviÅ¡e lako poverovati da će svi biti na dobitku jednom kada maÅ¡ine dobiju svest…

    Izmišljanje novih budućnosti

    ÄŒetrdeset godina kasnije, joÅ¡ Ä?ekamo na zamiÅ¡ljenu budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. U meÄ‘uvremenu, neprestano su nam obećavali njen neposredni dolazak. Ipak, uprkos stalnim pomacima u razvoju hardvera i softvera, maÅ¡ine i dalje nisu sposobne da “misle”. Likovi u video-igrama i dalje predstavljaju neÅ¡to najbliže veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sa Ä?ime se većina ljudi susrela. MeÄ‘utim, kao Å¡to pokazuje rastuća popularnost igranja na Internetu, gde ljudi i dalje igraju jedni protiv drugih, virtuelni protivnik je slaba zamena za ljudskog igraÄ?a. Kada se osvrnemo na istoriju ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti, oÄ?igledno je da se ni optimistiÄ?ka ni pesimistiÄ?ka verzija veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije nisu ostvarile. Robot Robi nije naÅ¡ verni sluga, a EPIKAK XIV ne upravlja naÅ¡im životima. Umesto da se razviju u razumne maÅ¡ine, raÄ?unari su postali potroÅ¡aÄ?ka roba. Mejnfrejmovi veliÄ?ine sobe nastavljaju da se smanjuju u sve sitnije i sitnije maÅ¡ine. U savremenom svetu raÄ?unari su svugde – a njihovi korisnici itekako znaju da su oni i dalje glupi.

    Ovi ponovljeni neuspesi bi, oÄ?ekivano, trebalo da su nepovratno naruÅ¡ili ugled zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Ipak, njeni zagovornici nemaju griže savesti. ÄŒetiri decenije posle Svetskog sajma 1964, IBM i dalje tvrdi da su njihove maÅ¡ine na pragu toga da postanu svesne (Bel/Bell 2004, str. 2). Upornost ove nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne fantazije pokazuje trajnu važnost Fon Nojmanovog konzervativnog pripajanja kibernetike raÄ?unarskoj industriji. Kao i ranih 1960-ih, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija i dalje pruža sjajan alibi za razvoj novih vojnih tehnologija. Stvaranje Singularnosti deluje daleko prijateljskije od saraÄ‘ivanja sa ameriÄ?kim imperijalizmom. A Å¡to je joÅ¡ važnije, ova zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost nastavlja da prikriva posledice uvoÄ‘enja informatike na radno mesto. I upravnicima i radnicima i dalje se obećavaju tehnoloÅ¡ka reÅ¡enja za druÅ¡tveno-ekonomske probleme. San o svesnim maÅ¡inama je mnogo bolji medijski materijal od realnosti kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma. Na poÄ?etku 21. veka, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija ostaje dominantna ideoloÅ¡ka manifestacija (velikog) obećanja informatike.

    Verodostojnost ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti zavisi od zaboravljanja njene sramotne istorije. Osvrt na to kako su ranije verzije proroÄ?anstva iznova i iznova diskreditovane podstiÄ?e duboki skepticizam po pitanju njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. NaÅ¡a liÄ?na frustriranost raÄ?unarskom tehnologijom bi trebalo da pokaže koliko je mala verovatnoća da se ona pretvori u Silicijumskog mesiju. ÄŒetrdeset godina posle Svetskog sajma u Njujorku, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija je postala zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost iz davne proÅ¡losti. Ono Å¡to nam umesto toga sada treba jeste daleko prefinjenija analiza potencijala informatike. Viner – ne Fon Nojman – mora biti naÅ¡ kibernetiÄ?ki guru. ProuÄ?avanje istorije bi trebalo da nas pouÄ?i kako da iznova izmislimo budućnost. Mesijanski misticizam se mora zameniti pragmatiÄ?nim materijalizmom. Pre svega, ta nova slika budućnosti bi trebalo da slavi raÄ?unare kao oruÄ‘a za uvećavanje ljudske inteligencije i kreativnosti. VeliÄ?anje hijerarhija kontrole mora se zameniti zagovaranjem dvosmernog deljenja informacija. Budimo nadahnuti i strastveni u zamiÅ¡ljanju naÅ¡ih sopstvenih vizija boljih vremena koja će uslediti (Barbruk/Barbrook i Å ulc/Shultz 1997; Barbruk 2000).

    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    Argumenti u ovom Ä?lanku dalje se razvijaju u knjizi RiÄ?arda Barbruka ZamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti: od razumnih maÅ¡ina do globalnog sela, Pluto, London 2007. ViÅ¡e tekstova i ažurirane informacije na adresi: www.imaginaryfutures.net
    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

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  • Imaginary Futures – Introduction to the Polish edition

    I was sitting in a lecture theatre at University College London listening to the speakers at the final session of the Solidarity/solidarities conference on the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Jan Dzierzgowski had worked hard on this translation and I owed it to him to write a smart introduction for its Polish readers. Where better to find inspiration than at this retrospective look at the demise of the Cold War? Imaginary Futures is a book about the political and cultural impact of the technological prophecies which emerged from this geopolitical confrontation. Computers and the Net are much more than useful tools. For over half a century, they have also embodied utopian dreams in the service of imperial ambition. During the Cold War, the American and Russian empires competed not only to control space, but also to own time. The nation that was pioneering the future in the present could claim leadership over the peoples of the world. The Berlin Wall might have fallen and the Russian troops have returned home, but this technological determinist ideology has proved to be remarkably persistent. The cheerleaders of neo-liberal globalisation have spent the past two decades pointing out American predominance over the computer industry and the Net – and then ordering the rest of the humanity to adopt their socio-economic panaceas of US-style privatisation, deregulation and financial speculation. By painstakingly explaining the history of the imaginary futures of artificial intelligence and the information society, my aim is to equip the readers of this book with the knowledge to refute this passé argument. The next time that someone tells you that the post-industrial utopia is just around the corner, you can reply that this prediction is nothing more than recycled McLuhanism. The Cold War is over – and so are its made-in-America imaginary futures.

    If I needed confirmation of this book’s relevance, I could find it in the air of melancholy at the Solidarity/solidarities conference. This event was being held to mark the 20th anniversary of the wonderful historical moment when the Stalinist monopoly over political power was breached for the first time: the 4th June 1989 multi-party elections to the Polish parliament. Within a few months, the old order was being swept away across Eastern Europe – and decades of mendacity and oppression had come to an end. Yet, as I sat in the lecture theatre, the closing session of this conference seemed to be as much a memorial service for frustrated aspirations as a celebration of revolutionary victories. One Polish member of the audience ruefully admitted that he and his compatriots now enjoyed that greatest of European privileges: being able to complain in public about how dreadful everything was. The excitement of 1989’s ‘springtime of the nations’ seemed like a distant memory when the region was being battered by the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. Adding to the misery, its governments were still in thrall to the ideological choices that had been made during the transition to national independence and political pluralism. Neo-liberal economic policies didn’t just mark the break with the impoverished Russian empire, but also a commitment to American post-industrial modernity. The new elites of ‘new Europe’ had made the mistake of swapping one Cold War superpower’s imaginary future for that of the other. While I was listening to the downbeat discussion at the Solidarity/solidarities conference, I cast my mind back to when I first realised that our continent was on the brink of a momentous upheaval. The implosion of the Russian empire might have been a big surprise to expert opinion in the West, but it wasn’t to me. A Polish leftie had predicted what would happen in 1984 – and the opinions of someone who is on the side of the workers are always more credible than those who only think what is allowed to be thought. Trust your own, that’s what I say.

    “It’s all over, you know. No one believes in the system. Not the workers, not the peasants, not even the bureaucrats.” Elcia was a Solidarnösc activist who had fled to London after the 1981 military coup. We’d first met when she and her friends were making a programme for their fellow refugees on Our Radio: 103.8FM. They would knock on the door of the house in Kilburn where the studio of this pirate station was based and proudly announce that the “mad Poles” had arrived to do their show. Yet, beneath this bravado, there was the sadness that they faced long years of exile from their homeland. Scattered across London were the exiles from the 1953 Berlin Uprising, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring. This new wave of Polish émigrés knew that they might have to wait 10 or 20 years before another attempt was made to overthrow the Stalinist regimes which oppressed the nations of Eastern Europe. They would be condemned to live in limbo – separated from their family and friends back home with their children growing up in England having little more than an exotic name to connect them with their Polish heritage. No wonder my friend was so jubilant. It was only three years after the military coup that had crushed Solidarnösc – and she’d been able to make a quick visit to see her parents without any difficulties. The secret police must have known about her subversive activities in London, but no one seemed to care in Warsaw. She was enjoying a sweet irony: “Remember what Lenin said? The revolution will succeed when the masses can’t go on in the same old way and neither can the ruling class. Well, that’s what it’s like in Poland now. It’s all over, finished, done with. Once Poland goes, the whole rotten structure will collapse across the East. We’ve won, we’ve won!!”

    Elcia had read the historical conjuncture correctly. She could now move back to Poland with her son in anticipation of what was to come. Five years later, it really was all over. For those who weren’t around at the time, it is difficult to explain the liberation that we felt when the Cold War finally ended. I’d spent all of my adult life with the nagging fear that a stoned American pilot or a dodgy piece of Russian technology might accidentally launch a nuclear weapon which would start a conflagration that wiped out a large percentage of the European population. What made matters worse was how the institutionalised hypocrisy of the two superpowers had colonised the minds of people trapped on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was a looking-glass world where the American bastion of democracy overthrew elected governments and the Russian champion of socialism sent in the tanks against the proletariat. Of course, it was easy to see the ideological corruption of this imperial duplicity in others. Our Polish friends from Solidarnösc were horrified when English leftists carried banners of Lenin and Trotsky on their demonstrations. We were disgusted when the workers of Gdansk gave a hero’s welcome to Margaret Thatcher so soon after she had brutally smashed the National Union of Miners’ strike at home. But, trying to get each other to understand that these acts of stupidity were symbolic gestures of defiance was almost impossible. Convinced that your enemy’s enemy must be your friend, too many dissidents on both sides had forgotten that they were united in a common struggle for freedom and dignity.

    In 1989, when the Polish elections began a chain reaction which swept away the Stalinist regimes across Eastern Europe, there was the brief moment of euphoria when it seemed that the doublethink of the Cold War might be exorcised. Jacek KuroÅ„ joked in an interview that he was on the verge of accomplishing his mission in life: restoring the rationality of politics in Europe by making the Left on the left and the Right on the right. The crowds in the streets of Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Berlin and Bucharest chanted the slogan: “We don’t want any more social experiments.” They weren’t like their parents who’d been fooled by fascists who spoke like communists. This was Georg Hegel’s ‘end of history’ when utopian dreams are transformed into pragmatic solutions. On that magic evening of 9th November when the Berlin Wall came down, we celebrated in style in London with expensive champagne and strong weed. Power hungry US Presidents and Russian General Secretaries would no longer be aiming nuclear missiles at the major cities of Europe. The common people had shown that – with enough courage and determination – it was possible to overcome the violence and lies of a modern state. This time, the good guys were the winners.

    Two decades on, the participants at the Solidarity/solidarities conference faced the hard task of explaining what one contributor called the ‘double disappointment’ of the hopes of the 1989 revolutions. Radicals in the West had expected that the collapse of Stalinism would lead to the emergence of a reinvigorated socialism in the East – and instead witnessed the nations of ‘new Europe’ embracing neo-liberalism in its most brutal forms. Oppositionists in the East had anticipated that the adoption of a free market economy would lead to consumer plenty for all like in the West – and instead saw the divisions between rich and poor within their societies growing ever wider. Of course, it is now all too easy to blame the shabby deals that allowed the Party bosses to plunder the state’s assets in return for relinquishing their grip over political power without bloodshed. What is more difficult to understand – twenty years on – is why there was mass support for the ‘shock therapy’ of privatisation, deregulation and cuts in welfare. Having rejected the failed social experiment of Russian-style Communism, sane and sensible people had voted in overwhelming numbers for a new social experiment: US-style neo-liberalism. It wasn’t as if there weren’t any other options. Just across the Baltic, there were the prosperous and egalitarian societies of Scandinavian Social Democracy, but, unfortunately, they lacked the ideological magic of the free market model. Above all, the American empire had seized the ownership of the imaginary future of the information society. As the transition gathered pace in the early-1990s, the arrival of the Net confirmed the correctness of this US-led path of modernisation for the nations of the East. In the same way that their parents had admired the industrial combines of Stalinist Russia, these ‘new Europeans’ were convinced that the dotcom entreprises of neo-liberal California represented the future in the present. No wonder that ‘double disappointment’ was the leitmotif of final panel at the Solidarity/solidarities conference…

    In 2009, the Polish community in London is thriving. Unlike Elcia and her friends, a new wave of exiles has come here voluntarily to earn money, learn English and experience life in a foreign country. They take it for granted that they can move and back forth across Europe with no problems. The only thing that they’re escaping from back home is the conservative morality of the Church. You can move in with your partner without getting married as long as you do it abroad. Tellingly, most of the Polish students who I teach at Westminster University choose the ‘liberal’ option for Political Views on their Facebook profile – and they mean it in both the social and economic senses of the term. These are the children of the defeat-in-victory of the 1989 revolution. Solidarnösc smashed the Stalinist bureaucracy – and then the neo-liberal regime destroyed the organised working class in Poland. As this generation came to adulthood, the dream of dissidents like Elcia of founding the Self-Managed Socialist Republic of Poland must have seemed like a relic from a long forgotten theological debate. Let’s remember that – for them – Francis Fukyama had reinterpreted the ‘end of history’ to outlaw any alternative to US-style capitalism. There was only the American path to modernity.

    The aim of this book is to help its readers to refute this ideological claim to imperial hegemony. On 15th September 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers marked the end of the neo-liberal ascendancy. George W. Bush – one of the most reactionary presidents in US history – was soon implementing the 5th demand of The Communist Manifesto: public ownership of the financial system. In such strange times, it is necessary to rediscover the complex history of the imaginary future of the information society. Here’s an interesting fact which is overlooked in the official accounts of the West. One of the first prophets of post-industrialism was Oscar Lange in the 1950s – and he was Polish. This visionary believed that the advent of the Net would provide the technological foundation for participatory democracy in both politics and the economy: cybernetic communism. With intellectual property withering away in cyberspace, his prediction does seem more prescient than it did a decade ago at the height of the dotcom bubble. If nothing else, Lange is telling us that the future is not necessarily neo-liberal California – and that the Polish Left can find its own path to a better future. The reformers of his generation opened the way for their successors to begin the process of dismantling of totalitarian rule. What they could have never envisaged was that one evil empire’s imaginary future would be replaced with that of its rival. As the last public act of his eventful life, Jacek Kuroń wrote an open letter in support of the people protesting against the 28th–30th April 2004 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Warsaw. Castigating the neo-liberal orthodoxy with the same contempt that he once directed against Stalinism, he called upon the dissidents of the 21st century to ‘create a new conception of social cooperation, realise the ideals of freedom, equality and social justice.’ What more needs to be said? I hope that the Polish translation of my book can make a small contribution towards fulfilling this goal. You can use the tools of the Net to invent new futures for humanity. Enjoy the book – and be inspired!

    Richard Barbrook,
    London,
    England,
    12th June 2009

  • ANARCHISM

    The 1872 Hague Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association
    The split in the First International:
    British, German & Dutch Sections v. Swiss, Spanish & Italian Sections
    Socialism v. Anarchism
    Karl Marx v. Mikhail Bakunin
    mass party v. revolutionary conspiracy
    democratic republic v. local communes
    working class v. peasants, students & bandits
    organised labour v. spontaneous uprisings

    Bakuninists’ forerunners of anarchism:
    William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1789)
    Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? (1840)
    Max Stirner, Ego and His Own (1845)

    1889 Second International: parliamentary socialism, trade unions and cooperatives
    German Social Democratic Party, British Labour Party and French Socialist Party
    Friedrich Engels, The Bakuninists at Work
    Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists

    Libertarianism: invisible dictatorship, propaganda of the deed and collectives
    Mikhail Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy
    Sergei Nechaev, The Catechism of a Revolutionary
    Errico Malatesta, Anarchy

    Individualist anarchism v. collectivist anarchism

    Anarchist terrorism:
    Tsar Alexander II (1881), US President McKinley (1901)
    Sidney Street siege (1911), Bonnot gang (1911-12)

    Anarcho-syndicalism:
    General Strike, labour exchanges and workers’ cooperatives
    CGT in France, CNT in Spain and IWW in USA
    1905 Russian Revolution
    Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence
    Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid

    Socialist Maximalism: anti-parliamentary and syndicalist
    Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions

    Outbreak of 1st World War 1914: patriotism v. internationalism
    Benito Mussolini, National Syndicalism, Italian Fascism and the corporate state

    October 1917 Russian Revolution
    Marx + Bakunin = Bolshevism
    vanguard party, revolutionary dictatorship and worker-peasant alliance
    1918 dissolution of Constituent Assembly
    1921 suppression of the Kronstadt Soviet
    V.I. Lenin, State & Revolution
    Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat

    1919 Third International
    Totalitarian Communism v. Council Communism
    V.I. Lenin, Left-Wing Communism: an infantile disorder
    Anton Pannekoek, World Revolution and Communist Tactics

    1936 Spanish Revolution
    Barcelona workers’ uprising v. fascist military coup
    CNT, FAI and the Durruti Column
    workers’ militias and peasants’ cooperatives
    Popular Front against fascism
    1937 Barcelona May Days:
    Catalan Nationalists, Stalinists and Socialists v. Anarchists and POUM
    George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia
    Abel Paz, Durruti

    New Left revival of anarchism:
    1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Budapest Workers’ Council
    1957 CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and the Aldermaston marches
    1964 Free Speech Movement in UC Berkeley
    1965 American invasion of Vietnam
    Hippie counter-culture: folk music, rock ‘n’ roll, festivals, happenings, pot, LSD and rural communes
    Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism
    Charles Reich, The Greening of America
    Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation

    May ’68 French Revolution
    Sorbonne occupation, general strike and worker-student alliance
    Situationist International, Kommune 1 and Italian Autonomism
    urban squats, rural communes, feminism, gay liberation and anti-racism
    Weather Underground, Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof Gang
    Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle
    Dany & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: the left-wing alternative
    Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved

    Punk subculture: independent labels, pirate radio and fanzines
    Sex Pistols, Anarchy in the UK (1976)
    Class War (1983-9), Stop the City (1983-4, Bash the Rich marches (1984-5) and Poll Tax riot (1990)
    Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming
    Class War, A Decade of Disorder

    Post-modern anarchism: new social movements, anti-prisons and anti-psychiatry
    Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish
    Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Thousand Plateaus

    Green anarchism:
    Earth First!, monkey wrenching and primitivism
    Theodore Kaczynski, The Unabomber Manifesto
    John Zerzan, Why Primitivism?

    Alter-globalisation movement:
    1999 Seattle protests, World Social Forum and the Black Block
    IndyMedia, DIY Culture and social networks
    Toni Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire
    George McKay, DiY Culture
    nettime.org
    metamute.org

  • CREATIVE CITY THESES

    1) We Must Invent New Futures

    The information society has arrived – and the McLuhanist prophecy of the network utopia has been disappointed. The critical analysis of the creative city provides an opportunity to devise new futures to guide our actions in the present.

    2) The New Class of the New

    Like their forebears who moved from artisan workshops into the Fordist factory, the present generation is learning how to make new things in new ways with new technologies. This study will examine how far the flattened hierarchies and cooperative ethos of cognitive capitalism are remaking the shape of the city’s economy.

    3) Mapping the Creative Workforce

    The emergence of a new class of the new lives is not just an economic phenomenon, but also social, political and cultural. This study will measure the vital statistics of the creative class: age, gender, ethnicity, education and ideology. In parallel, psychogeographical research will both delineate the neighbourhoods where its members congregate and trace their links with the global diaspora of intellectual labour.

    4) Funky Businesses in Trendy Locations

    Just like the artisan trades of medieval times, the creative sector is clustered in specific areas of the world city. Forming a distinct subculture, its members wear the same clothes, drink in the same bars, listen to the same music and share a common obsession with cutting-edge technology. This study will examine the role of these marks of distinction in forming the new class of the new.

    5) The Cultural Vanguard of Property Speculation

    The creative sector is making a major contribution to the regeneration of neglected inner-city areas. Unfortunately, in many cases, the original inhabitants of these neighbourhoods have been bypassed by this economic turn around. They lack the technical skills, cultural outlook and social connections required for employment within this post-industrial sector. Worst of all, an influx of creative companies and their employees causes a rapid inflation in property prices and commercial rents in the area. This study will track this gentrification of inner city neighbourhoods and how its negative consequences can be countered.

    6) Self-Managed Exploitation

    The neo-liberal cult of authoritarian managerial power has become an anachronism within the creative industries. Instead, as the business manuals of the dotcom boom explained, the spread of contract working and job insecurity can be rebranded as extending individual freedom and career opportunities. Among the most talented employers and employees, the measure of success isn’t just making lots of money, but also creating something cool. This research will investigate how respect and autonomy for knowledge workers are the preconditions of innovation and excellence in this sector.

    7) The Carnival Economy

    For most of the citizens of the world city, creativity is what happens when they’re playing outside the workplace. Within popular music, the new thing appears on the dance floor and in the streets before it’s repackaged as a commodity. This study will investigate how those who earn their living outside the creative industries are not just participating in cultural production, but also, in many cases, driving forward innovation in this sector.

    8 ) Sharing Knowledge as Collective Production

    The information society isn’t just a new phase of capitalism, but also an evolutionary stage beyond capitalism. Alongside orders and commodities, gifts are now one of the principle methods of organising collective labour. The technical icon of the knowledge economy – the Net – is primarily a tool for sharing knowledge not selling information. This study will examine how the principles of open architecture and open source can be extended from the virtual realm into the real world.

    9) Libertarian Social Democracy

    Social welfare and economic security provide the best foundations for constant change and perpetual innovation. Contrary to the neo-liberal prognosis, public housing, free healthcare, subsidised culture and state education are still the preconditions of a modern civilisation. This study will ponder how this reformist programme can be updated and extended for the new conditions of the 21st century. Political democracy requires cultural democracy. If everyone is a voter, then everyone is also a creator. When mapping out the route to the future of libertarian social democracy, our vision of the new class must become inclusive.

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  • KAUTSKY IN CAMBRIDGE

    “How was the conference?”, Simon Schaffer asked. “Very interesting”, I replied. “The Autonomists have finally come out of the closet as reformists!”At the opening session of the Immaterial Labour conference in Cambridge, Andrea Fumagalli had told us that Toni Negri and the other gurus of the movement now advocated a commendably pragmatic political programme: a guaranteed income for all citizens; employment rights for precarious workers; the democratisation of the European Union; and more environmental protection. “As left-wing members of the Labour Party”, I pointed out, “we can no longer criticise the Autonomists. Their policies are also our policies!”

    I continued, “It’s particularly good to see that – after 25 years – the Autonomists have at long last aligned their practice with their theory.” Back in the early-1980s, Simon and I had both diligently studied the Red Notes booklets which had first made available the key texts by Negri, Tronti and their comrades to an English-speaking audience. What was then so striking about the writings of the Autonomists was their engagement with Marx’s critique of political economy. In contrast with their Althusserian and Trotskyist peers, these Italian leftists did have something intelligent to say about the neo-liberal restructuring of capitalism. However, at this point, the Autonomists’ admiration for Marx’s theory didn’t extend to his practice. Far from being social democrats, they took pride in their revolutionary intransigence. Autonomism was the extreme left of the Ultra-Left.

    “What was the comrades’ reaction to Andrea Fumagalli’s speech?” Simon asked. “As you might have guessed”, I replied, “it didn’t go down very well with most of his audience. For the old school, it was a betrayal of the holy precepts of Autonomism. For the younger generation, it was a bit like going to see Johnny Rotten and discovering that he had always been a Bee Gees fan!” “What did they expect?”, Simon exclaimed. “It was obvious that Autonomism was reformist right from the beginning. Haven’t they ever read Negri’s article on Keynes from the mid-1970s? If you – correctly – point out that ‘effective demand’ is a euphemism for working class struggle, then you’re arguing in favour of social democracy!” “Maybe”, I mused, “their horrified reaction proves that the revolutionary image of Autonomism was always more important than its theoretical achievements? It can’t be an accident that its acolytes prefer reading the Grundrisse to Capital. If they carefully studied the chapter on the Factory Acts in Volume 1, they would realise that Marx himself was a social democrat!”

    “So was your visit to Cambridge worthwhile?”, Simon enquired. “Back in the early-1980s, we might have disagreed with their politics, but we always enjoyed going to their conferences.” “Of course”, I responded. “It’s not just that our politics which have converged. Do you remember the cyber-communism article which I wrote in the late-1990s for the McLuhan conference in New York? At the time, it was meant as a satirical piece: America invented the only working model of communism in human history – it’s called the Net! Well, you’ll be pleased to hear that there were two excellent papers at the conference which put forward the same argument.” “Very good”, Simon said. “But do you think that anyone outside the academic Left is listening to what was said?” “I do hope so since the conference was – rather appropriately – being held in Keynes Hall at Kings. Looking at the current state of the Labour Party, it certainly needs some fresh ideas. Maybe – as in the 1930s – Cambridge can again provide them?” My comrade smiled somewhat sceptically, “I look forward to that day!” “You never know”, I joked, “in a couple of decades time, we could be going to a similar conference in the Negri Hall at Kings.” “After Blairism”, Simon announced, “Autonomist reformism!” “We should drink to this future!”, I concluded – and so we left for the pub to continue the conversation over a few pints…

  • UP FOR GRABS: Richard Barbrook’s Imaginary Futures, From Thinking Machines to the Global Village

    The imaginary future is invariably a claim to the present by its dominant political and economic class. In the case of Cold War America, there was an urgency to its creation, because although it was outdoing the USSR in all conventional economic and productive indices, the distorted Marxist veneer maintained in Moscow had a stronger rhetorical vision of the future which, in the end, it claimed, would win out: history was on its side. The creation of such an American version ‘imaginary future’, spurred on also by short lived moments when the Soviets were ahead, or appeared to be ahead in certain modernist technologies – the first satellite in space, and then the possibility of a communist cybernetics — is what Richard Barbrook describes in this book. It is an account which exhaustively pulls out the ideological and fetishistic dynamics from under the flim-flam of its promoters, but also describes how the development of the internet and its world wide web has ironically emerged as a tool with liberatory possibilities.

    His starting point is the 1964 World’s Fair in New York that took place during an intense period of the Cold War, its planning no doubt underway during the time of the Cuban missile crisis. With its futurist IBM Pavilion the Fair acted as Trojan-Horse type propaganda. “Instruments of genocide,� Barbrook writes “were successfully disguised as benefactors of humanity.� Nuclear weapons, militarized computing, and militarized space use were presented as the utopian future being made real in the present.

    To make the particular nature of this futurism clear, he contrasts the Fair with London’s Great Exhibition of 1851, which instead disguised Britain’s modern hi-tech world in the medieval fantasies of the Gothic Revival; and with the American exhibition of 1939 whose promise of a suburban America built around the motor car was realized, and had a New Deal rhetoric of a cohesive and peaceful society. On the other hand, the 1964 promises of unmetered energy (nuclear fusion), tourism to the moon, and intelligent computers, have been unfulfilled and, since Chernobyl and an Apollo crash at take-off, have been discredited. Only the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence is still on the table, pursued with a fanaticism borne of some deep and perverse psychic need, and enabled by the non-stop levels of its research budget, forthcoming during the period described here, because of an equally deep ideological need to disguise the grotesque military ‘game-playing’ it allowed for.

    Barbrook himself was at the 1964 Fair as a boy with his mother, sister, and an academic father who he comes to realize was part of what he calls the cold-war left, one which willingly made accommodation with the technological fantasies on display there, and the ‘military definition of reality’ as described by C. Wright Mills. This, given that he hates this view of the world and what it lead to, gives the book its drive and its edge. It ends with a rousing cry for the equality of an intelligent citizenry, allied to use of the world wide web as a liberatory tool, but it is also an angry lament, that a generation of self-styled progressives should have destroyed social democracy both as a possible, perhaps likely, governmental mode, and as an ideal.

    What destroys it is the Vietnam War, though he is scrupulous enough to avoid his anger becoming yet another version of this being ‘an American Tragedy’. He is forthright in saying that this was a Vietnamese tragedy, and is horrified that here were nominal progressives who became obsessed with how many Vietnamese peasants could be killed. This callousness began with an ideological notion of what was modernity – a Cold War version – but also from a faith in technology itself. This faith — in line with the top-down history of social democracy — involved a denial of human agency. Describing the IBM Pavilion at the 1964 Fair, he argues that it wasn’t just military use being disguised, but that the imaginary future of electronic brains concealed the human labour involved. Computers were described as ‘thinking’ so that the hard work, the surplus-value producing labour of designing, building and operating of them, could be discounted.

    EX-MARXISTS MADE GOOD

    In the course of World War II, various intellectuals, including Marxists, and ex-Marxists, found a place in positions of responsibility and power in a militarized government. This wartime government was the genesis of what C. Wright Mills came to call the Power Elite, and as it morphed into Cold War governments, the ‘military definition of reality’ became a crucial cohesive force for it. In this transition the newcomer intellectuals who remained in this elite included ex-Marxists, and especially ex-Trotskyists whose hostility to the USSR as it existed, made the switch to a wholly militarized American view of the world not so difficult. (1)

    Barbrook sees them as playing an important role in the creation of this ‘counter futurism.’ We have seen something depressingly similar among the ‘Blairites’ of New Labour, and the presence of ex-Marxists among today’s American neo-cons has also been noted. He quotes from Ignazio Silone that “the final struggle (for global hegemony)…will be between the Communists and the ex-Communists.� But with both the neo-cons of today, and the real villains of this book, their influence is rather over played for polemical effect. In this book those real villains are intellectuals, social democrat Keynesians if pushed, but with a penchant for American military superiority, and a role in the Power Elite, who had read some Marx, understood the idea of historical materialism, and wanted to create a class-free version of it.

    Early in the book he introduces the ex-Trotskyist leader James Burnham, who had made such a switch, to describe a revolution in which a managerial class was the deservedly new elite, one most developed in the USA. To give this notion force, Burnham wanted to give it the Shock and Awe touch, inevitability. It is true that managerialism was new in its ideological and practical importance for the Power Elite, and that computer development would only strengthen this development. Equally, the imagined future was dependent on managerial capacity, but of itself, managerialism provided none of the required appeal.

    HEROES AND VILLAINS

    Instead, Barbrook presents the advent of cybernetics, and soon after the ‘global village’ notions of converging communication technologies pioneered in new style by Marshall McLuhan. Both were, and are, capable of varying interpretation and so become, though he is hesitant to say it, sites of ‘struggle’. He traces the history of cybernetics back to ‘the Macy Conferences’, and from this there emerge hero and villain. The hero, and this is the big rescue job of the book, is Norbert Wiener. True, Wiener’s theory of a continual feedback between information and action which could be used to describe the behaviour of living organisms and technological systems would seem to make misuse possible, even likely, but he also challenged the ‘patriotic consensus’ of the Cold War which allowed scientists to rationalize their military-funded research; and asserted the need for humans to control their machines.

    Later he became an inspiration to a short-lived reformist faction of the USSR elite and their utopian idea of computerized and interactive planning, a “new cybernetic model of communism: the ‘unified information network’.” It did not survive the return to centralized control under Brezhnev, but in turn, spurred the American cybernetic world to make something more inspiring than one dominated by military use and Artificial Intelligence fanaticism. This is how Barbrook characterizes the turn cybernetics had taken when it became dominated by John von Neumann, mathematician and Cold War enthusiast, who had been involved in developing the atomic bomb and then in building a prototype mainframe computer for the US Navy. The inherent danger of metaphor and analogy in scientific work, allowed him to argue that ‘feedback’ meant that computers operated like humans. He is the first of Barbrook’s villains whose propagandizing of AI, allowed the development of war games with a clean conscience for those doing the work.

    But this, no more than Burnham’s managerial elite, created much of an attractive version of the future. Enter Marshall McLuhan, an obscure literature professor in Canada with a suitably modern mish-mash of snappy perceptions based on the ideas of Harold Innis. that ‘the movement of information’ played the primary role in shaping human societies. In Understanding Media and the more snappier titled The Gutenberg Galaxy, he postulated a convergence of a communication technologies, and neutral gloablisation. For him “print consciousness – the indifference of rationalism – would be superseded by electronic media consciousness – the empathy of intuition,â€? as Barbrook puts it. One might object to the domineering arrogance of some of its proponents, but the superseding of rationalism, can only make one nervous. The intellectuals of the Power Elite on the other hand, were all to happy keep their monopoly on rationalism, while taking up McLuhan’s ideas. What appealed to them in his work was not just the heralding of the information age, but in particular the converging and ‘unification’ of computing, media and telecommunications, and how this provided a vision of the future in which the USA already had an unassailable lead. The technical determinism implied in his argument – a changed technological mode of communication making for a new mode of consciousness – also meant that, in the right hands, the ideas could be rendered ideologically safe.

    MCLUHANISM WITHOUT MCLUHAN

    The intellectuals, the ones Barbrook calls ‘the cold war left’, were of the type who tell you what you were really saying the moment you’ve finished saying it. In this instance there was not even acknowledgement of what McLuhan had said.. He had to be interpreted and unacknowledged because he himself was too off-the-wall to provide a Cold War imaginary future, or to be useful to academic careerists. Without acknowledgement, interpretation becomes appropriation, and what was constructed was McLuhanism without McLuhan. This when McLuhan himself had shown his ‘flakiness’ when, at a 1969 meeting of the Bilderberg Group he asked, “What are we fighting Communism for? We are the most Communist people in world history.�

    The appropriation of the ideas and breakthroughs of inventers, innovators, and mavericks by those with institutional and financial power is hardly new. In the case of McLuhan, his appropriators were real operators, Daniel Bell and the geopolitical cold warrior Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of Bell’s multi-disciplinary Commission which had come out of the American Cybernetics Conference of 1964 and was financed by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Bell had already provided an early version of the ‘Third Way’ with his The End of Ideology, (“The end of ideology is not – and should not – be the end of utopia as wellâ€?) having already proved himself a reliable hatchet man for the Power Elite with a critique of Wright Mills’ book, that depended on nod-and-wink put-downs and the distortions that arise from simply ignoring the phenomena it highlighted.(2) As well as professional academics, the Commission also involved think-tankers like Herman Kahn who, in the 1950s, had claimed a nuclear war against the USSR was winnable on the basis of simulated war games. It was he and a colleague from the Hudson Institute who came up with a list of 100 imminent inventions for the Commission. Much was predicated on the power of ‘thinking machines’. Meanwhile Brzezinski in a 1968 article and a 1970 book, reproduced McLuhanism as academic sociology with technology as the driving form of human history, no class conflict involved. And this time it was new technology which was effecting a new economy, and a view of the world to go with it, the information society replacing the industrial with the USA in the lead.

    Barbrook argues that Bell found this insufficient, that it didn’t offer their own vision of “the emancipated society�, their vision of utopia, and that this was his self-appointed job. His point of view was essentially similar however: “As in earlier stages of growth, people were spectators of an evolutionary movement outside of their control,� Barbrook writes. Certain ironies also arise. For one thing, there is a distinct whiff of ‘the end of history’ in Bell’s conclusions, and the end of history itself sounds all too like the thousand year Reich, an absurd claim, inviting hubris. Already there has been a new version of the end of history, American also, but from a rather different viewpoint. Then there is the date of Bell’s final ‘canonical text’ (a phrase Barbrook is overly fond of) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. It finally appeared in 1973, but by then the political-ideological base it had been built on, had gone. Not that the technological developments towards the information society as network (net) came to a stop, far from it, but that his ‘third way version’ had been discredited by the Vietnam War, a triple whammy.

    HUBRIS

    First of all information technology was used not just in a callous manner in this war, it also created delusions of victory. It is also the Vietnamese – and this irony Barbrook does emphasize – who used television to greater effect, making it integral to the Tet Offensive which had such an impact on American opinion. Then a youth counter-culture which had already smelled something rotten, a technological determinism which was intrinsically anti-democratic in this notion of a post-industrial society, saw that the War brought it out into the open. This counter-culture included students who, for Bell, were to be integral to, leaders of the information society, with bases in the universities. They were integral to his society. Instead many students became militant opponents of the War and all that went with it.

    Longer term, the costs of the war was a catalyst for a radical shift in general capitalist policy. The Keynesianism which had been taken for granted by the cold war left was in any case becoming unacceptable to capital and its representative power elite, blamed for its failure to deliver social discipline. The costs of the war and those of the Great Society, and then the oil price shock in the same year that Bell finally published, made this shift in capitalist strategy both necessary and possible. It was a switch aimed at making people work harder for the same, or less money. Computerized technology, developed as it was within the capitalist relations of production that Bell airbrushed out of the picture, was an important means of making this happen. Instead of the greater free time for creativity inherent in the cold war left’s imaginary future, people have come to work harder and for longer hours.

    Barbrook describes the political ironies, but remains ambivalent about them because of the longevity he ascribes to the conception of the information society as both imaginary future and fetish, that was developed by this group with Bell as its synthesiser and promoter. But before he gets there, and what this means and has meant for the present, the real villain of this cold war left, W.W. Rostow steps out of his role as a key intellectual contributor to cold war leftist ideology, to become the most enthusiastic of the Washington desk bombers of Vietnam; and the one who could not give up on its supposed efficacy. The saddest off-stage individuals in the book are his parents who had optimistically christened him Walt Whitman. For Rostow, the global village required the destruction of real villages that did not, and had no chance of following his stages of growth,

    ARMCHAIR WARRIORS

    The ideological contribution was his stages of economic growth theory which had the merit of providing a historical materialist alternative to Marxism as against the dominant bourgeois theories of the market and equilibrium. He understood, as Barbrook puts it, that “market competition was a historical creation rather than an immutable law of nature.� But that was as far as it went, ‘progressive’ only in relation to the pre-New Deal economics of laisser-faire, and in its promise of everyone a consumer of the goods technology had made available. It is a theory which eradicates class and class conflict as a motor of economic growth; and leaves out the crucial importance of the military budget for both research and armaments to the US economic growth of the time, something at least recognized by ex-President Eisenhower in his ‘military-industrial complex’ warning speech of 1961. Most of all the theory itself is also ahistorical, believing that the American model was the only ‘modern’ one in town, and that it was universally available, its prescriptive stages ultimately unrecognizing of all the advantages and violence of the USA’s economic history. For development to take place for Rostow, a change in attitudes to technology was required, along with a “willingness to work�.

    However, its claim as a model for modernity and the future for the “Third World� in a period when a proxy Cold War was being fought in this world, fell down when even “communist economics� seemed more modern and realistic, given the USA’s support for the most regressive forms of the elites of that world. That this was the case was intolerable not just to Rostow and the Cold War left, but to American ultra-nationalists wholly imbued with a ‘military definition of reality’ like Samuel Huntington who, at this time, was railing – with racist overtones – about a surfeit of democracy within the USA, itself, and who hated the very idea of the Great Society. (3) With some consistency, his solution to the ‘Maoist threat’ was to destroy the Vietnamese peasantry as a class, the non-modern peasant class. This coalition of forces, the cold war left and authoritarian nationalists, has recently returned to cause more misery to other people, and exhibited the same characteristics:

    -the same arrogant ignorance. In the earlier case they could not even be bothered to know Vietnam’s history of fierce independence towards China, when China was presumed to be the instigator of ‘dominos’ falling.
    -the same gruesome wishful thinking
    -the same absolute belief in the abstract violence of its military technology.

    Noting the importance of games theory, and then war gaming, Barbrook says “When processed through a computer, the irrational could be made to appear rational … and according to ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency, an agency with financial backing from the military) computer simulations, the success of their B52 air offensive was guaranteed. When their losses in people and property reached the critical breaking point, the Communists would be forced to admit defeat and abandon the struggle against South Vietnam.�

    For Rostow, the war criminal, the people whose losses were to reach breaking point were abstractions, and whose deaths were required to prove a point. At the same time, he never questioned the reliability of the data provided by the US military (with its own interests), and placed his trust in “the mediated interpretation of the war provided by information technologies.� That the people killed in wars are abstract figures for those who perpetuate them was not new, but the fetishizing of information technology took it to new levels, while all the time, this same technology was being proclaimed for making a liberatory society possible.

    INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR USES

    Imaginary Futures is a history lesson. Its purpose to show how the Net both as shorthand for, and realization of the Information Society, was theorized by the cold war left he describes. He argues that this theorizing made in the circumstances of the Cold War, has somehow survived the limits of its time and, one way or another, established the parameters within which it is imagined. The blind faith in American superiority in information age warfare, re-packed as Shock and Awe, has played a great part in the devastation heaped on the people of Iraq. The notion that any model other than the American information society is of the dinosaur variety (a handy and clichéd symbol implying what is heavy, slow-moving, and awaiting distinction) has had great resonance, as well as minimizing the political impact of a decline in US manufacturing and its balance of trade.

    This is true, but as a history of the intellectuals in this process, questions remain. An alternative view of these cold war leftists might be that those who ally themselves with the power elite, are its ‘useful idiots’, useful only at certain times. In this case, that it was not just the Vietnam War, but a shift in the elite’s requirements that meant that any ‘progressive’ elements that existed in their imaginary future could be ditched, and just the rhetoric maintained. This is not a single case. Monetarism for example, economic theory from the 1920s, was dusted down to be used in the capitalist offensive of the 1970s. Lip service to Milton Friedman was still to be paid until his recent death, but voodoo economics and militarized Keynesianism have been the order of the day ever since.

    Barbrook cannot bring himself to give this alternative view. It is a history of intellectuals, but he has a problem with them. With a nasty piece of work like von Neumann, the ‘fanatical Cold War warrior’, there is a psycho-political history attached; he was “traumatized by the nationalization of his family’s bank during the Hungarian revolution of 1919�. What we don’t get is any real history of more ‘progressive figures’ in the story. Or rather, a question posed by Armin Medosch, is whether the psycho-political histories of the technologists who helped make some of the building blocks of the Net as a reality, played a part in the nature of the technical developments they worked on. Barbrook makes the practical suggestion that as with reading Marx himself, rather than the Bolshevik version, we should read Norbert Wiener and McLuhan in their own words. Wiener the pacifist socialist he implies is the person who theorized cybernetics as a non-hierarchical form of interaction. But what of J.C.R. Licklider and his ARPA group. Of these he says that some of the cybernetic radicals who had been ‘persuaded’ to serve the US military were able to “hardwire the academic gift economy into its social mores and technical architecture.� This begs the question as to whether certain technical achievements were the product of some ‘socialist’ consciousness. Paul Baran for example, and Licklider himself, was such consciousness at work in the development of packet-switching?

    Technological and scientific leaps have been made, or managed by, people committed to such advances being public property. There is the well-known case of Tim Beners-Lee and the world wide web. Sir John Sulston has been very clear about the moral basis of the long battle to keep the Human Genome Project as public property against Craig Venter’s push for profitable patenting. In this instance, motivation did not change the nature of the human genome, but given that it is in this field we are likely to see a new wave of technological determinism, that it is public knowledge is likely to be crucial.

    Neither Berners-Lee nor Sulston were financed by the military however, so that motivations are visible. In the case of packet-switching, Barbrook is not helpful with his ‘persuaded’ and ‘hardwired’, a word that seems to substitute itself for explanation. Is the net as gift economy an accidental, ironic outcome of ARPA, or is he suggesting that Licklider and Baran consciously mad a ‘deal with the devil’ knowing the ultimate public good that could come from packet-switching. (4)

    If this question, now perhaps being resolved in the world of the computer itself by the ‘hactivists’ of Open Source Culture, is not answered in the book, it is much clearer in the case of the maverick McLuhan. He has been as Barbrook shows, open to interpretation from all sides (5), but it is the “we are the most communist people in history,� that he says to the Bilderberg Conference, which should stand out to us.. It is this possibility, this possible view of the present, which has stood out in Barbrook’s own writing from the famous The Californian Ideology onwards.(6) This is, in a sense, the miracle; an internet which regardless of the motives of those making its constituent parts has real elements of the gift economy and the public ownership of knowledge so important to Sulston, This is what Barbrook aims to celebrate. It is accompanied by his consistent attack on technological determinism, and an insistence on people-made decisions as to how technology can and should be developed. It follows up his previous attacks on capitalist versions of the Net. By giving us the history of intellectuals thriving on an ahistorical view of the world, and what this view leads to, he has given depth to the critique that began with The Californian Ideology, and provided the tools to see through new versions of the same, however attractively packaged.

    The imaginary future is an area of contestation. Harlan K. Ullman, co-author of Shock and Awe, a man with his own military consultancy business sits on the Advisory Board of the Roosevelt Group, a characteristically Power Elite organization, a mega-consultancy for CEOs and their senior corporate executives who are “charged with leading, indeed inventing the future.� Given how much technological research is financially controlled by military and corporate interests, a grim future is what they have in mind. Imaginary Futures gives us some tools to recognize and contest the flim-flam with which it will be presented as it was in the New York World’s Fair of 1964.

    NOTES

    (1) This was not a wholly new phenomena however. In Mimesis, Eric Auerbach describes a frequent trajectory in Europe between the World Wars, of ultra-leftists to the extreme right.

    (2) The American Journal of Sociology, November 1958. Reprinted in C.Wright Mills and the Power Elite, Beacon Press 1969. Essays collected by G.William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard.

    (3) In his essay in The Crisis of Democracy, Huntington aghast at an excess of democracy makes a plea for cultivating “discouragement and apathy.� He goes on to say “Democracy is only one way of constituting authority, and is not necessarily a universally applicable one. In many situations the claims of expertise, seniority, experience and special talents may override the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority.� And with the brazen cheek for which he is well known goes on to say – this when the budget for waging war on Vietnam was almost limitless – that “a government which lacks authority and which is committed to substantial domestic programmes will have little ability, short of a cataclysmic crisis, to impose on its people the sacrifices which may be necessary to deal with foreign policy problems and defense.�

    (4) Don de Lillo has a fine passage in the Epilogue section of Underground on consciousness and technological outcome financed by the military. The protagonist is watching a weapons demonstration in free enterprise Russia. “Viktor asks me if I’ve ever witnessed a nuclear explosion. No. It is interesting, he says how weapons reflect the soul of the maker. The Soviets always wanted bigger yield, bigger stockpiles. They had to convince themselves they were a superpower. Throw-weight. What is throw-weight? We don’t know exactly but we agree it sounds like hurled bulk, the hurled will of the collective. Soviet long-range missiles had greater throw-weight…
    And the USA, I say…
    It was the US, Viktor says, that designed the neutron bomb. Many buzzing neutrons, very little blast. The perfect capitalist tool. Kill people, spare property.�

    (5) It could be argued that what McLuhan really provides is a vocabulary-led weltanschaung for what was emerging somewhat in the manner of William Gibson’s Neuromancer trilogy, fiction that is also open to various interpretations.

    (6) Co-written with Andy Cameron.

  • INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY LECTURES

    1POL547
    INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
    SEMESTER 1 2007-2008

    Dr. Richard Barbrook
    Room 408 Wells Street
    Extension 2313
    R.Barbrook (a) wmin.ac.uk

    Option: International Political Economy

    Code: 1POL547

    Staff: Richard Barbrook and Nik Howard

    Time and Location: Thursdays 2.00pm – 5.00pm
    Fyvie Lecture Theatre

    Assessment Scheme: Essay (2,500 – 3,000 words): 30%
    Unseen Examination: 70%

    Assessment Criteria: Full Details in your handbook.

    Synopsis: Criteria for grading assessed work will include the following:

    Structure and Quality of Argument
    Use of Evidence
    Contents
    Writing, Presentation and Communication Skills

    Assignment Deadline: Tuesday 8th January 2008

    Office Hours: Please email or phone to make an appointment

    Room 408 Wells Street

    Website: http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/author/ipe/

    There is a link in the blogroll on the bottom right-hand side of the Imaginary Futures website.

    Key text: Meghnad Desai, Marx’s Revenge: the resurgence of capitalism and the death of statist socialism, Verso, London 2002.

    The quickest and easiest way to obtain a copy of this book is from abebooks.

    Essay Questions

    LECTURE PROGRAMME

    1. 27th September
    Introduction: What is International Political Economy and why does it determine your life? (RB)

    2. 4th October
    The Lessons of History: the East Asian miracle and Japan’s bubble economy of the late 1980s. (NH)

    3. 11th October
    The 18th and 19th Century Theories of the Global Political Economy: Liberalism versus Nationalism versus Marxism. (RB)

    4. 18th October
    The 20th Century Theories of the Global Political Economy:
    Leninism versus Keynesianism versus Neo-Liberalism. (RB)

    5. 25th October
    Theory into Practice: North Korea and South Korea. (NH)

    6. 1st November
    Building the World Market: the rise and fall of the British empire 1649– 1914. (RB)

    7. 8th November
    Private Study Week

    8. 15th November
    Managing the Global Economy: the ascendancy and decline of the American empire 1914-2007. (RB)

    9. 22nd November
    Money as Command: chaos and order in the international financial system. (RB)

    10. 29th November
    The Carbon Economy: the affluent society and the limits to growth. (RB)

    11. 6th December
    The Global Village: the Net as dotcom capitalism and cybernetic communism. (RB)

    12. 13th December
    Think Locally, Act Globally: beyond the neo-liberal paradigm. (RB)

    READING LIST

    Michel Aglietta, M. (1979) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the US experience, Verso, London.

    Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism vs. Capitalism, Four Wall Eight Windows, New York.

    Ambrose, S. (1971) Rise to Globalism: American foreign policy 1938-1970, Penguin, London.

    Aoki Masahiko, Kim Hyung-ki and Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro (eds.) (1998) The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Oxford University Press. New York.

    Atkinson, B and Johns S (2001) Studying Economics, Palgrave.

    Bacevich, A. (2002) American Empire: the realities and consequences of U.S. diplomacy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.

    Barbrook, R. (1990) ‘Mistranslations: Lipietz in London and Paris’, http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/2007/02/01/mistranslations-lipietz-in-london-and-paris-by-richard-barbrook/

    Barbrook, R. (2006) The Class of the New, Open Mute, http://www.theclassofthenew.net

    Barbrook, R. (2007), Imaginary Futures: from artificial intelligence to the global village, Pluto, London, http://www.imaginaryfutures.net

    Bell, D. (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: a venture in social forecasting, Basic Books, New York.

    Walden, B. and Rosenfeld, S. (1992) Dragons in Distress: Asia’s Miracle Economies in Crisis, Penguin Books. London.

    Berry, C. (1997) Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

    Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defence of Globalisation, Oxford University Press.

    Brenner, R. (2002) The Boom and the Bubble: the US in the world economy, Verso, London.

    Buchan, J. (2006) Adam Smith and The Pursuit of Perfect Liberty, Profile.

    Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G. (1993) British Imperialism: innovation and expansion 1688-1914, Longman, London.

    Cassidy, J. (2002) dot.con: the greatest story ever sold, Penguin, London.

    Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society: the information age – economy, society and culture volume 1, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Chiu, Stephen W.K. and So, Alvin Y. (1995) East Asia and the World Economy, Sage Publications. California, London and New Delhi.

    Crump, J. (2003) Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism, Routledge/Curzon. Richmond, England.

    Cumings, B. (2004) North Korea: Another Country, New Press.

    Meadows, D and the Club of Rome (1972) The Limits to Growth, Earth Island, London.

    Desai, M. (2002) Marx’s Revenge: the resurgence of capitalism and the death of statist socialism, Verso, London.

    Diamond, J (1997) Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, New York: Norton.

    Earle E M (ed) Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, The Economic Foundations of Military Power, Makers of Modern Strategy.

    Eckert, C. J. et al. (1990) Korea Old and New: A History, Ilchokak Publishers. Seoul.

    Economides, S and Wilson, P (2001) The Economic Factor in International Relations.

    Fallows, J. (1994) Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System, Vintage.

    Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class: and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life, Basic, New York.

    Frieden, J and Lake, D (eds) (2001) International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, New York: St Martins Press.

    Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London.

    Galbraith, J.K. (1961) The Great Crash 1929, Penguin, London.

    Galbraith, J.K. (1970) The Affluent Society, Penguin, London.

    Gilpin, R (2001) Global Political Economy, Princeton University Press.

    Gittings, J. (2006) The Changing Face of China: from Mao to market, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Godard, R and Cronin, P (ed) (2003) International Political Economy, Palgrave.

    Gruber, H. (1991) Red Vienna: experiment in working-class culture 1919-1934, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Gundar Frank, A. (1969) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: historical studies of Chile and Brazil, Monthly Review, New York.

    Halliday, J. and McCormack, G. (1973) Japanese Imperialism Today: ‘Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia’, Penguin Books.

    Harris, N. (1987) The End of the Third World: newly industrialising countries and the decline of an ideology, Penguin, London.

    Hayek, F. A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom, Routledge, London.

    Held, D and McGrew, A. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Helleiner, E. (1994) States and the Re-Emergence of Global Finance, Cornell.

    Hersh, J. (1993) The USA and the Rise of East Asia since 1945: Dilemmas of the Postwar International Political Economy, Macmillan, London.

    Hettine, B. (ed) (2001) International Political Economy, London: Zed Books.

    Hilferding, R. (1981) Finance Capital: a study of the latest phase of capitalist development, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

    Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (2000) Globalisation in Question, Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Hobsbawm, E. (1968) Industry and Empire: an economic history of Britain since 1750, Penguin, London.

    Hobson, J.A. (1902) Imperialism: a study, George Allen & Unwin, London.

    Huntington, S. (2002) The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Free Press, London.

    Hyam, R. (2002) Britain’s Imperial Century 1815-1914: a study of empire and expansion, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

    Irwin, D. A. (1996) Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton University Press.

    Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford University Press.

    Jones, G. S. (2005) An End to Poverty: A Historical Debate, Profile Books.

    Kalecki, M. (1972) The Last Phase in the Transformation of Capitalism, Monthly Review, New York.

    Kant, I. (1983 ) ‘To Perpetual Peace: a philosophical sketch’, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Hackett, Indianapolis, pages 107-143.

    Kelly, K. (1998) New Rules for the New Economy: 10 ways that the network economy is changing everything, Fourth Estate, London.

    Kennedy, P. (1989) The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana, London.

    Keynes, J.M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, MacMillan, London.

    Kihl, Young Whan, ed (1994) Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado.

    Krugman, P. (November 1994). “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle: A Cautionary Fable�. Foreign Affairs.

    Landes, D. (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, New York: W W Norton.

    Lenin, V.I. (1965) Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism, Progress, Moscow.

    Lipietz, A. (1987) Mirages and Miracles: the crises of global Fordism, Verso, London.

    Luxemburg, R. (1963) The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge, London.

    Madison, A (2001) The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD 2001.

    Mandel, E. (1980) Long Waves of Capitalist Development, CUP, Cambridge.

    Mao, Z. (1967) ‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society’, Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, pages 13-21.

    Marx, K. (1976) Capital Volume 1: a critique of political economy, Penguin, London.

    Marx, K. (1978) Capital Volume 2: a critique of political economy, Penguin/New Left Review, London.

    Marx, K. (1981) Capital Volume 3: a critique of political economy, Penguin/New Left Review, London.
    McLean, B. and Elkind, P. (2004) The Smartest Guys in the Room: the amazing rise and scandalous fall of Enron, Portfolio, New York.

    McLuhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media: the extensions of man, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

    Meiskens Wood, E. (2003) Empire of Capital, Verso, London.

    von Mises, L. (1947) Planned Chaos, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-On-Hudson.
    Negri, T. (1988) ‘Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State’, Revolution Retrieved: selected writings on Marx, Keynes, capitalist crisis & new social subjects 1967-83, Red Notes, London, pages 9-42.

    Negri T. and Hardt, M. (2000) Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.

    Ocalan, A. (2007) Prison Writings: the roots of civilisation, Pluto, London.

    Odell, J. S. (2000) Negotiating the World Economy, Cornell University Press.

    Okina Y., Shirakawa M., and Shiratsuka S., ‘The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons’, Monetary and Economic Studies (February 2001).

    Pilbeam, K. (2006) Finance and Financial Markets, Palgrave.

    Phillips, N. (2006) Globalising International Political Economy, Palgrave.

    Pressman, S. (1999) Fifty Major Economists, Routledge, London.

    Reich, R. (1991) The Work of Nations: a blueprint for the future, Simon &
    Schuster, London.

    Ricardo, D. (1911) The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Everyman, London.

    Richardson, B. (1997) Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

    Ridderstråle, J. and Nordström, K. (2000) Funky Business: talent makes capital dance, ft.com, London.

    Roberts, P. (2004) The End of Oil, Bloomsbury.

    Rostow, W.W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-communist manifesto, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Rubin, I.I. (1979) A History of Economic Thought, Ink Links, London.

    Sachs, J. (2005) The End of Poverty, Penguin.

    Scholte, J. (2000) Globalisation, Critical Introduction, London: Macmillan.

    Schumpeter, J. (1976) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper, New York.

    Smith, A. (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Volume 1 & Volume 2, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Stiglitz, Joseph and Yusuf S. eds. (2001) Rethinking the East Asian Miracle, World Bank and Oxford University Press, Washington DC and New York.

    Stiglitz, Joseph (2003) Globalization and Its Discontents, Penguin Books, London.

    Stubbs, S. and Underhill, G. (1999) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Palgrave.

    Szporluk, R. (1988) Communism & Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, OUP, Oxford.

    Todd, T. (2004) After the Empire: the breakdown of the American order, Constable, London.

    Toynbee, A. (1946) A Study of History, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    van Wolferen, K. (1990) The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, Random Books.

    Wallerstein, I. (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Warren, B. (1980) Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, Verso, London.

    White, D. (1996) The American Century: the Rise & Decline of the United States as a World Power, Yale University Press, New Haven 1996.

    Wood, C. (2005). The Bubble Economy: Japan’s Extraordinary Speculative Boom of the ‘80s and the Dramatic Bust of the ‘90s, Barnes and Noble.

    World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford University Press.

    World Bank (2004) World Development Indicators, Washington DC: World Bank.

    Yarborough, B. and Yarborough, Y. (1997) The World Economy: Trade and Finance, Dryden Press.

    PERIODICALS

    The Economist
    Capital & Class
    Journal of Political Economy
    International Studies Perspectives
    The World Economy
    Third World Quarterly
    Race and Class
    New Left Review
    Journal of World Trade
    OPEC Review
    Asian Pacific Review
    World Development
    The Journal of Asian Studies
    The Journal of Japanese Studies
    Japan Forum

    WEBSITES

    http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
    http://www.iccwbo.org/
    http://www.europa.eu.int
    http://worldbank.org/
    http://eldis.org/
    http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/
    http://www.newunionism.net/
    http://www.un.org/climatechange/
    http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk
    https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

    Assignment

    Answer ONE question, typed in 12 point or above and approximately 2,500 words in length.

    Submit to the Assessment Letterbox in the SSHL Undergraduate Office, Wells Street by 6.00pm, Tuesday 8th January 2008.

    Severe penalties will apply to late entries.

  • Cronopis Associats Interview

    Andrés Lomeña of Cronopis Associats interviewed Richard Barbrook on 13th September 2007.

    Question 1

    AL: Franco Bifo Berardi criticises your The Holy Fools. In his opinion, you simplify the rhizomatic thought of Deleuze and Guattari, making equal it to technonomadism and The Californian Ideology. Berardi argues that the state cannot solve the self-organisational structure of the Net. My question is: what ethical and aesthetic paradigm should we take for Internet given that the May ’68 Revolution was defeated?

    RB: Bifo is attacking me for the very crime which inspired my article! In late-1990s London, Hari Kunzru and others at Wired UK were arguing that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari were proponents of the Californian ideology. Knowing these gurus’ political history and theoretical writings, I was curious as to why it was so easy to confuse their particular brand of hippie leftism with its apparent opposite: dotcom neo-liberalism. A decade earlier, an anarchist comrade who was running a pirate radio station in Paris had jokingly told me that Deleuze and Guattari – and their milieu – should be called the “Pol Pot tendencyâ€?. Michel Foucault only a few years earlier had been praising the Islamist seizure of power in Iran as a revolution against modernity. When D&G fantasised about nomads destroying the city in A Thousand Plateaus, they – scarily – did mean what they were saying! In The Holy Fools, I tried to explain this intellectual paradox: these prophets of hardcore anti-modernism had provided the theoretical tools for their own post-modernist recuperation. As Bifo’s loud protests demonstrate, there is obviously an embarrassing similarity between New Left anti-statism and New Right anti-statism. Much more seriously, D&G were also proponents of a post-structuralist approach which is completely compatible with the tenets of McLuhanism. Information – not humanity – is the subject of history. Artists and intellectuals are the new class of the new. So maybe it wasn’t so surprising that D&G’s vision of the Net was so easily misinterpreted as a celebration of the dominant imaginary future of the American empire: the information society…

    Question 2

    AL: You are really witty when you quote and analyse Eric S. Raymond’s essays. You are the first one. It demonstrates that you study the phenomena of Internet from inside, without keeping your distance; we need to contaminate ourselves to talk about Net (the metaphor would be: “we cannot talk about dirtiness if we do not get dirty�). In my opinion, there is a maladjustment between the generations. Are there more hopes with our generation, totally immersed in new medias?

    RB: I’m from the punk rock generation – my formative moment was seeing the Sex Pistols and discovering Situationism as a 20-year old student in 1976. When the Net took off in England two decades later, I thought that technology had finally caught up with what me and my mates had been doing for all of our adult lives. In 2007, instead of climbing tower blocks to install pirate transmitters like we did in the 1980s, my students run their radio stations from their bedrooms – and, most wonderfully, have many more listeners than we ever did. Respect! Of course, it is easy for people from my generation to say that the youth aren’t as politically engaged as we were, but the historical moment is very different. If nothing else, today’s 20-somethings have the advantage over us that Leninism is ancient history. In my Imaginary Futures book, I argue that they also possess the privilege of living within the information society. It is difficult to believe that the Net will liberate humanity when almost everyone you know has a broadband connection – and corporate capitalism is more in control of the global economy than it has ever been.

    Question 3

    AL: The New Left sought anarcho-communism, based on gift economy. However, the New Economy of the cyberspace is an advanced way of social democracy: anarcho-communism is sponsored by corporate capital. This seems paradoxical. Is it possible to have a collapse of the system? All of this is quite disconcerting.

    RB: The contemporary symbiosis of cybernetic communism and dotcom capitalism is only a paradox if – like Deleuze – you are anti-Hegelian! However, if you study history, this contradictory phenomenon is unexceptional. The feudal monarchy played a key role in the rise of capitalism and – against its own intentions – destroyed its own patriarchal power. Stalinist states industrialised their economies and – in the process – undermined the social foundations of totalitarian rule. We should not be surprised that corporate capitalism is similarly unaware of its own historical mission. Kevin Kelly in New Rules for the New Economy says that dotcom entrepreneurs should adopt the maxim of “follow the free�: commercialising the innovations of the hi-tech gift economy. But, as the music industry has found out to its cost, the opposite is also taking place: the decommodification of proprietary information. Don’t be disconcerted, enjoy the paradox!

    Question 4

    AL: I would like to read a critical evaluation of Google. What do you think? Do they symbolise a huge change in the recent history of the Net?

    RB: So would I. What is interesting is that Google makes its money out of searches not content. When most of the information on the Net is made by amateurs who work for nothing and pay for their own hosting, then the profit-making point is owning the large numbers of servers needed to catalogue and sort this data. Google is getting rich off what neo-classical economists call a “natural monopoly�: a privatised public utility. I wonder if Bifo disapproves of the French state’s plans to launch a European competitor to this American hegemon?!

    Question 5

    AL: Creative commons modified the map of Internet. Many people think that this licence is a restrictive choice (with a libertarian make up). They would prefer the deregulated situation before Creative Commons. I do not have opinion here. What about you?

    RB: Tellingly, Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the web – didn’t release html under a copyleft licence because its provisions were too restrictive. Despite its name, Creative Commons is also a form of private property. If you want to operate within the contemporary economy, this licence does offer some protection against your work being ripped off or being used inappropriately. If you were a cynic, copyleft could also be seen as the last stand of intellectual property lawyers against the decommodification of information on the Net. Imprisoning teenagers for sharing music or movie files with each other is absurd in the 2000s. According to its promoters, Creative Commons is the only way that commercial organisations can sue each other for making money out of what private individuals are doing on a daily basis…

    Question 6

    AL: What do you think about the Technorealism Manifesto? I sort of agree with it. It is very symptomatic of lot of manifestos that I’ve read on the Internet.

    RB: Sweet. We should encourage all signs of resistance in America against the neo-liberal hegemony which dominates that long suffering country.

    Question 7

    AL: Is it possible to have a new Luddite movement in our society (I still remember a Thomas Pynchon’s article where he was really ironic about the Luddites)?

    RB: I’m all in favour of celebrating Luddism as long as we’re talking about the Luddites in early-19th century England. These heroic rebels were founders of the Labour movement in this country. Unfortunately, many on the Left believe the smears of the liberal bourgeoisie against them. Contrary to the dictionary definition, the Luddites were NOT against all new technologies – only those which deskilled and displaced artisanal workers. Spinning Jennies deserved to be smashed – and Jacquard Looms were rightly cherished. If we want to learn from the Luddites, we should welcome technologies which make our work more interesting and our lives more pleasurable…

    Question 8

    AL: We must to extend the political history of Internet into all areas of life. However, the thing is that if we begin transforming cyberspace and then we want to change our society… it seems to me that we are adopting a naive reformism. The Internet is a good battlefield, but it’s not the only field where we can fight, right?

    RB: The Net is a tool not a talisman. When Debord published The Society of the Spectacle in 1967, only the privileged few could make radio and television programmes. Four decades later, anyone with the time and money in the North can broadcast their efforts to a global audience over the Net. Contrary to Debord’s expectations, the smashing of the spectacle didn’t require a proletarian revolution. Does this make us backsliding reformists? Or does it mean that we realise that we live within a historical process which capital and labour – consciously or unconsciously – compete to mould society in their own interest? If we’re lefties, our ambition is to ensure our side is more conscious about what we’re doing than our opponents.

    Question 9

    AL: How do you value the role of John Perry Barlow in the history of the Internet? Everyone can laugh at his neo-liberal utopianism, but he founded the EFF, among other things. Maybe we should consider his Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace like poetry, not like a political programme.

    RB: John Perry Barlow was also Dick Cheney’s campaign manager when he stood for the US Senate in 1978! Conclusion: you can smoke good weed and still be on the wrong side of the barricades.

    Question 10

    AL: Is there anything else that you want to add?

    RB: Check out the website of my new book: http://www.imaginaryfutures.net

  • NEW YORK PROPHECIES: THE IMAGINARY FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

    The Future Is What It Used To Be

    ‘Biological intelligence is fixed, because it is an old, mature paradigm, but the new paradigm of non-biological computation and intelligence is growing exponentially. The crossover will be in the 2020s and after that, at least from a hardware perspective, non-biological computation will dominate…’
    Kurzweil 2004, p. 3.

    At the beginning of the 21st century, the dream of artificial intelligence is deeply embedded within the modern imagination. From childhood onwards, people in the developed world are told that computers will one day be able to reason – and even feel emotions – just like humans. In science fiction stories, thinking machines have long been favourite characters. Audiences have grown up with images of robot buddies like Data in Star Trek TNG and of pitiless monsters like the cyborg in The Terminator (Startrek.com 2005; Cameron 1984). These science fiction fantasies are encouraged by confident predictions from prominent computer scientists. Continual improvements in hardware and software will eventually led to the creation of artificial intelligences more powerful than the ‘biological intelligence’ of the human mind.

    Commercial developers are already looking forward to selling sentient machines which can do the housework and help the elderly (Honda 2004). Some computer scientists even believe that the creation of ‘non-biological intelligences’ is a spiritual quest. In California, Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge and their colleagues are eagerly waiting for the Singularity: the First Coming of the Silicon Messiah (Vinge 1993; Bell 2004). Whether inspired by money or mysticism, all these advocates of artificial intelligence share the conviction that the present must be understood as the future in embryo – and the future illuminates the potential of the present. Every advance in computing technology is heralded as another step towards the creation of a fully conscious machine. The prophecy of artificial intelligence comes closer to fulfilment with the launch of each new piece of software or hardware. It is not what computers can do now that is important but what they are about to do. The present is the beta version of a science fiction dream: the imaginary future.

    Despite its cultural prominence, the meme of sentient machines is vulnerable to theoretical exorcism. Far from being a free-floating signifier, this prophecy is deeply rooted in time and space. Not surprisingly, contemporary boosters of artificial intelligence rarely acknowledge the antiquity of the concept itself. They want to move forwards not look backwards. Yet, it’s over forty years since the dream of thinking machines first gripped the public’s imagination. The imaginary future of artificial intelligence has a long history. Analysing this original version of this prophecy is the precondition for understanding its contemporary iterations. With this motivation in mind, let’s go back to the second decade of the Cold War when the world’s biggest computer company put on a show about the wonders of thinking machines in the financial capital of the most powerful and wealthiest nation on the planet…

    A Millennium Of Progress

    On the 22nd April 1964, the New York World’s Fair was opened to the general public. During the next two years, this modern wonderland welcomed over 51 million visitors. Every section of the American elite was represented at the exposition: the federal government, US state governments, large corporations, financial institutions, industry lobbies and religious groups. The World’s Fair proved that the USA was the leader in everything: consumer goods, democratic politics, show business, modernist architecture, fine art, religious tolerance, domestic living and, above all else, new technology. As one of the exposition’s advertising slogans implied, a ‘millennium of progress’ had culminated in the American century (Stanton, 2004, 2004a; Luce 1941).

    This patriotic message was celebrated in the awe-inspiring displays of new technologies at the World’s Fair. Writers and film-makers had long fantasised about travelling to other worlds. Now, in NASA’s Space Park, the public could admire the huge rockets which had taken American astronauts into orbit (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, p. 208; Laurence 1964, pp. 2-14). Despite its early setback when the Russians launched the first satellite in 1957, the USA was now on the verge of overtaking its rival in the ‘space race’ (Schefter 1999, pp. 145-231). Best of all, visitors to the World’s Fair were told that they too would have the opportunity to become astronauts in their own lifetimes. In the General Motors’ Futurama pavilion, Americans of the 1980s were shown taking their holidays on the moon. (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, p. 222). Other corporations were equally confident that the achievements of the present would soon be surpassed by the triumphs of tomorrow. At its Progressland pavilion, General Electric predicted that electricity generated by nuclear fusion reactors would be ‘too cheap to meter’ (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp. 90-92; Laurence 1964, pp. 40-43). In the imaginary future of the World’s Fair, Americans would not only become space tourists but also be blessed with free energy.

    For many corporations, the most effective method of proving their technological modernity was showcasing a computer. Clairol’s machine selected ‘the most flattering hair shades’ for female visitors and Parker Pen’s mainframe matched American kids with ‘pen pals’ in foreign countries (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp 86, 90). However impressive they might have appeared to their audience, these exhibits were nothing more than advertising gimmicks. In contrast, IBM was able to dedicate its pavilion exclusively to the wonders of computing as a distinct technology. For over a decade, this corporation had been America’s leading mainframe manufacturer. In 1961, one single product – the IBM 1401 – had accounted for a quarter of all the computers operating in the USA (Pugh 1995, pp. 265-267). In the minds of many Americans, IBM was computing. Just before the opening of the World’s Fair, the corporation had launched a series of products which would maintain its dominance over the industry for another two decades: the System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, pp. 54-146). Seizing the opportunity for self-promotion offered by the exposition, the bosses of IBM commissioned a pavilion designed to eclipse all others. Eero Saarinen – the renowned Finnish architect – supervised the construction of the building: a white, corporate-logo-embossed, egg-shaped theatre which was suspended high in the air by 45 rust-coloured metal trees. Underneath this striking feature were interactive exhibits celebrating IBM’s contribution to the computer industry (Stern, Mellins and Fishman 1997, pp. 1046-1047).

    For the theatre itself, Charles and Ray Eames – the couple who epitomised American modernist design – created the main attraction at the IBM pavilion: ‘The Information Machine’. After taking their places in the 500-seat ‘People Wall’, visitors were elevated upwards into the egg-shaped structure. Once inside, a narrator introduced a ‘mind-blowing’ multi-media show about how the machines exhibited in the IBM pavilion were forerunners of the sentient machines of the future. Computers were in the process of acquiring consciousness. (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp. 70-74; Laurence 1964, pp. 57-58). In the near future, every American would own a devoted mechanical servant just like Robby the Robot in the popular 1956 sci-fi film Forbidden Planet (Wilcox 1999). At the New York World’s Fair, IBM proudly announced that this dream of artificial intelligence was finally about to be realised. With the launch of the System/360 series, mainframes were now powerful enough to construct the prototypes of a fully conscious computer.

    The IBM pavilion’s stunning combination of avant-garde architecture and multi-media performance was a huge hit with both the press and the public. Alongside space rockets and nuclear reactors, the computer had confirmed its place as one of the three iconic technologies of modern America. The ideological message of these machines was clear-cut: the present was the future in embryo. Within at the IBM pavilion, computers existed in two time frames at once. On the one hand, the current models on display were prototypes of the sentient machines of the future. On the other hand, the vision of computer consciousness showed the true potential of the mainframes exhibited in the IBM pavilion. At the 1964 New York World’s Fair, the launch of the System/360 series was celebrated as the harbinger of the imaginary future of artificial intelligence.

    ‘Duplicating the problem-solving and information-handling capabilities of the [human] brain is not far off; it would be surprising if it were not accomplished within the next decade.’
    Simon, p. 39.

    Inventing the Thinking Machine

    The futurist fantasies of IBM’s multi-media show were inspired by the dispassionate logic of the academy. Alan Turing – the founding father of computer science – had defined the development of artificial intelligence as the long-term goal of this new discipline. In the mid-1930s, this Cambridge mathematician had published the seminal article which described the abstract model for a programmable computer: the ‘universal machine’ (Turing 2004). During the Second World War, his team of engineers had created a pioneering electronic calculator to speed up the decryption of German military signals. When the conflict was over, Turing moved to Manchester University to join a team of researchers who were building a programmable machine. As proposed in his 1936 article, software would be used to enable the hardware to perform a variety of different tasks. On 21st June 1948, before he’d even taken up his new post, Turing’s colleagues switched on the world’s first electronic stored-program computer: Baby. The theoretical concept described in an academic journal had taken material form as an enormous metal box filled with valves, switches, wires and dials. (Turing 2004a; Agar 2001 pp. 3-5, 113-124; Hodges 1992, pp. 314-402).

    For Turing, Baby was much more than just an improved version of the office tabulator. When software could control hardware, counting became consciousness. In a series of seminal articles, Turing argued that his mathematical machine was the precursor of an entirely new life form: the mechanical mathematician. He backed up this prediction by defining human intelligence as what computers could do. Since calculating was a sophisticated type of thinking, calculating machines must be able to think. If children acquired knowledge through education, educational software could create knowledgeable computers. Because the human brain worked like a machine, it was obvious that a machine could behave like an electronic brain (Turing 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Schaffer 2000). According to Turing, although the early computers weren’t yet powerful enough to fulfil their true potential, continual improvements in hardware and software would – sooner or later – overcome these limitations. In the second half of the twentieth-century, computing technology was rapidly evolving towards its preordained destiny: artificial intelligence.

    ‘The memory capacity of the human brain is probably of the order of ten thousand million binary digits. But most of this is probably used in remembering visual impressions, and other comparatively wasteful ways. One might reasonably hope to be able to make some real progress [towards artificial intelligence] with a few million digits [of computer memory].’
    Turing 2004a, p. 393

    In his most famous article, Turing described a test for identifying the winner of this race to the future. Once an observer couldn’t tell whether they were talking with a human or a computer in an on-line conversation, then there was no longer any substantial difference between the two types of consciousness. If the imitation was indistinguishable from the original, the machine must be thinking. The computer had passed the test (Turing 2004c, pp. 441-448; Schaffer 2000). From this point onwards, computers were much more than just practical tools and tradable commodities. As Turing’s articles explained, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence revealed the transformative potential of this new technology. Despite their shortcomings, the current models of computers were forerunners of the sentient machines to come.

    By the late-1940s, the catechism of artificial intelligence had been fixed. Within computing, what was and what will be were one and the same thing. Despite this achievement, Turing was a prophet whose influence was waning within his own country. The computer might have been invented in Britain, but its indebted government lacked the resources to dominate the development of this new technology (Agar 2003, pp. 266-278). Across the Atlantic, the situation was very different. During the Second World War, the American government had also provided generous funding for research into electronic calculation. Crucially, when the victory was won, scientists working on these projects didn’t encounter severe problems in maintaining their funding. While money was scarce in Britain, the USA could easily afford to pay for cutting-edge research into new technologies. Once the Cold War was underway, American politicians had no problem in justifying these subsidies to their constituents (Leslie 1993, pp. 1-13; Lewontin 1997).

    In the USA, computer scientists possessed another major advantage over their British rivals: the meta-theory of cybernetics. During the late-1940s and early-1950s, a group of prominent American intellectuals came together at the Macy conferences to explore ways of breaking down the barriers between the various academic disciplines: (Heims 1991). From the outset, Norbert Wiener was recognised as the guru of this endeavour. While working at MIT, he had devised cybernetics as a new theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of both humans and machines. The input of information about the surrounding environment led to the output of actions designed to transform the environment. Dubbed ‘feedback’, this cycle of stimulus and response reversed the spread of entropy within the universe. Order could be created out of chaos (Wiener 1948, pp. 74-136). According to Wiener, this master theory described all forms of purposeful behaviour. Whether in humans or machines, there was continual feedback between information and action. The same mathematical equations could be used to describe the behaviour of living organisms and technological systems (Wiener 1948, pp. 168-191). Echoing Turing, this theory implied that it was difficult to tell the difference between humans and their machines (Wiener 1948, pp. 21, 32-33). In 1948, Wiener outlined his new master theory in a book filled with pages of mathematical proofs: Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine.

    Much to his surprise, this academic had written a bestseller. For the first time, a common set of abstract concepts covered both the natural sciences and the social sciences. Wiener‘s text had provided potent metaphors for describing the new hi-tech world of Cold War America. Even if they didn’t understand his mathematical equations, readers could easily recognise cybernetic systems within the social institutions and communication networks which dominated their everyday lives. Feedback, information and systems soon became incorporated into popular speech (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 171-194; Heims 1991, pp. 271-272). Despite this public acclamation, Wiener remained an outsider within the US intelligentsia. Flouting the ideological orthodoxies of Cold War America, this guru was a pacifist and a socialist.

    In the early-1940s, Wiener – like almost every US scientist – had believed that developing weapons to defeat Nazi Germany benefited humanity. When the Cold War started, his military-funded colleagues claimed that their research work was also contributing to the struggle against an aggressive totalitarian enemy (Lewontin 1997). Challenging this patriotic consensus, Wiener argued that American scientists should adopt a very different stance in the confrontation with Russia. He warned that the nuclear arms race could lead to the destruction of humanity. Faced with this dangerous new situation, responsible scientists should refuse to carry out military research (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 237-243, 255-271). During the 1950s and early-1960s, Wiener’s political dissidence inspired his socialist interpretation of cybernetics. In the epoch of corporate monopolies and atomic weaponry, the theory that explained the behaviour of both humans and machines must be used to place humans in control of their machines. Abandoning his earlier enthusiasm for Turing’s prophecy, Wiener now emphasised out the dangers posed by sentient computers (Wiener 1966, pp. 52-60, 1967, pp. 239-254). Above all, this attempt to build artificial intelligences was a diversion from the urgent task of creating social justice and global peace.

    ‘The world of the future will be an ever more demanding struggle against the limitations of our own intelligence, not a comfortable hammock in which we can lie down to be waited upon by our robot slaves.’
    Wiener 1966, p. 69.

    By opposing the militarisation of scientific research, the founder of cybernetics had embarrassed his sponsors among the US elite. Fortunately for the rulers of America, there was another brilliant mathematician at the Macy conferences who was also a fanatical Cold War warrior: John von Neumann. Traumatised by the nationalisation of his family’s bank during the 1919 Hungarian revolution, his anti-communist politics were so extreme that he had argued in the mid-1940s in favour of launching a pre-emptive war to stop Russia acquiring nuclear weapons (Heims 1980, pp. 235-236, 244-251). While playing a leading role in developing the atomic bomb, von Neumann had already applied his mathematical and organisational talents to the new field of computing. When the first Macy conference was held in 1946, his team of researchers were working on building a prototype mainframe for the US navy (Ceruzzi 2003, pp. 21-4). In von Neumann, the American empire had found a guru without any trace of heresy.

    At the early Macy conferences, the political differences among its attendees weren’t apparent. United by the anti-fascist struggle, Wiener and von Neumann could champion the same concept of cybernetics (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 143-149; Heims 1980, pp. 201-207). But, as their politics diverged, these two stars of Macy conferences began advocating rival interpretations of this meta-theory. In its left-wing version, artificial intelligence was denounced as the apotheosis of technological domination. When he formulated his right-wing remix, von Neumann took cybernetics in exactly the opposite direction. Above all, his interpretation emphasised that this master theory had been inspired by the prophecy of thinking machines. Back in the mid-1930s, Turing had briefly worked with von Neumann at Princeton. A decade before his own involvement in computing, this Hungarian scientist had known all about the idea of the universal machine. When two Chicago psychologists in the early-1940s applied Turing’s theory to explain the processes of human thought, von Neumann became fascinated by the implications of their speculations.

    Since the mechanical calculator was modelled on the human brain, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts argued that consciousness was synonymous with calculation. Like the electrical contacts of an IBM tabulator, neurons were switches which transmitted information in binary form (McCulloch and Pitts 1943). Entranced by this inversion of Turing’s line of argument, von Neumann became convinced that it was theoretically possible to build a thinking machine. If neurons acted as switches within the human brain, valves could be used to create an electronic brain (von Neumann 1966, pp. 43-46, 1976, pp. 308-311). When he was working on computer research for the US military, von Neumann used the human brain as the model for his eponymous computer architecture. Echoing Turing, this prophet claimed that – as the number of valves in a computer approached those of the neurons in the brain – the machine would be able to think (von Neumann 1966, pp. 36-41, 1976, pp. 296-300, 2000, pp. 39-52). Within a decade, von Neumann and his colleagues would be equipping the US military with cybernetic soldiers capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war.

    ‘Dr. McCulloch: How about designing computing machines so that if they were damaged in air raids … they could replace parts … and continue to work?
    Dr. von Neumann: These are really quantitative rather than qualitative questions.’
    von Neumann 1976, p. 324

    By the early-1950s, the USA’s academic and corporate research teams had seized the leadership of computing from their British rivals. From then onwards, all of the most advanced machines were made-in-America (Ceruzzi 2003, pp. 13-46). Yet, by creating cybernetics without Wiener, von Neumann had ensured that these US laboratories would also follow Turing’s path to the imaginary future: building artificial intelligence. The metaphor of feedback now proved that computers operated like humans. Inputs of information led to outputs of action. If the mind operated like a machine, then it must be possible to develop a machine which duplicated the functions of the mind. Computers could already calculate faster than their human inventors. Mastering the complexities of mathematical logic must be the first step towards endowing these machines with the other attributes of human consciousness. Language was a set of rules which could be codified as software. Learning from new experiences could be programmed into hardware (Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Throughout the 1950s and early-1960s, American scientists worked hard to build the thinking machine. Once it had enough processing power, the computer would achieve consciousness. (Edwards 1996, pp. 239-273). When IBM launched its System/360 mainframe at the 1964 World’s Fair, Turing’s dream appeared to be close to realisation.

    Cold War Computing

    A quarter of a century earlier, one of the stars of the 1939 New York World’s Fair had been Electro: a robot which – according to its publicists – ‘… could walk, talk, count on its fingers, puff a cigarette, and distinguish between red and green with the aid of a photoelectric cell’ (Eames and Eames 1973, p. 105). For all its fakery, this exhibit was the first iteration of the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. Before the 1939 World’s Fair, robots in books and movies had almost always been portrayed as Frankenstein monsters intent on destroying their human creators (Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Inspired by his visits to the exposition, Isaac Asimov decided to change this negative image. Just like Electro, the robots in his sci-fi stories were safe and friendly products of a large corporation (Asimov, 1968, 1968a). By the time that the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, this positive image of artificial intelligence had become one of the USA’s most popular imaginary futures. In both science fiction and science fact, the robot servant was the symbol of better times to come.

    At the 1939 New York World’s Fair, Electro was competing against the technological icon of the moment: the motor car. The must-see attractions were Democracity – a model featured in the New York State’s Perisphere building – and Futurama – a diorama inside the General Motors’ pavilion. Both exhibits promoted a vision of an affluent and hi-tech America of the 1960s. In this imaginary future, the majority of population lived in family homes in the suburbs and commuted to work in their own motor cars (Exposition Publications 1939, pp. 42-45, 207-209). For most visitors to the 1939 New York World’s Fair, this prophecy of consumer prosperity must have seemed like a utopian dream. The American economy was still recovering from the worst recession in the nation’s history, Europe was on the brink of another devastating civil war and East Asia was already engulfed by murderous conflicts. Yet, by the time that the 1964 World’s Fair opened, the most famous prediction of the 1939 exposition had been realised. However sceptical visitors might have been back in 1939, the Democracity and Futurama dioramas seemed remarkably prescient twenty-five years later. By the early-1960s, America was a suburban-dwelling, car-owning consumer society. The imaginary future had become contemporary reality.

    ‘The motor car … directs [social] behaviour from economics to speech. Traffic circulation is one of the main functions of a society … Space [in urban areas] is conceived in terms of motoring needs and traffic problems take precedence over accommodation … it is a fact that for many people the car is perhaps the most substantial part of their ‘living conditions’.’
    Lefebvre 1984, p. 100.

    Since the predictions of the 1939 exposition had largely come true, visitors to the 1964 New York World’s Fair could have been forgiven for believing that its three main imaginary futures would also be realised. Who could doubt that – by 1990 at the latest – the majority of Americans would be enjoying the delights of space tourism and unmetered electricity? Best of all, they would be living in a world where sentient machines were their devoted servants. However, the American public’s confidence in these imaginary futures would have been founded upon a mistaken sense of continuity. Despite being held on the same site and having many of the same exhibitors, the 1964 World’s Fair had a very different focus from its 1939 antecedent. Twenty-five years earlier, the centrepiece of the exposition had been the motor car: a mass produced consumer product. In contrast, the stars of the show at the 1964 World’s Fair were state-funded technologies for fighting the Cold War. Computers calculated the trajectories which would guide American missiles armed with nuclear bombs to destroy Russian cities and their unfortunate inhabitants (Isaacs and Dowling 1998, pp. 230-243). While its 1939 predecessor had showcased motorised transportation for the masses, the stars of the 1964 World’s Fair were the machines of atomic armageddon.

    When the IBM pavilion was being designed, the corporation had to deal with this public relations problem. Like nuclear reactors and space rockets, computers had also been developed as Cold War weaponry. ENIAC – the first prototype mainframe built in America – was a machine for calculating tables to improve the accuracy of artillery guns (Ceruzzi 2003, p. 15). From the early-1950s onwards, IBM’s computer division was focused on winning orders from the Department of Defence (Pugh 1995, pp. 167-172). Using mainframes supplied by the corporation, the US military prepared for nuclear war, organised invasions of ‘unfriendly’ countries, directed the bombing of enemy targets, paid the wages of its troops, ran complex war games and managed its supply chain (Berkeley 1962, pp. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Thanks to the American taxpayers, IBM had become the technological leader of the computer industry.

    When the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, IBM was still closely involved in a wide variety of military projects. Yet, its pavilion was dedicated to promoting the sci-fi fantasy of thinking machines. Like the predictions of unmetered energy and space tourism, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence distracted visitors at the World’s Fair from discovering the original motivation for developing IBM’s mainframes: killing millions of Russian civilians. Although the superpowers’ imperial hegemony depended upon atomic weapons, the threat of global annihilation made their possession increasingly problematic. Two years earlier, the USA and Russia had almost blundered into a catastrophic war over Cuba (Dallek 2003, pp. 535-574). Despite disaster being only narrowly averted, the superpowers were incapable of stopping the arms race. In the bizarre logic of the Cold War, the prevention of an all-out confrontation between the two blocs depended upon the continual growth in the number of nuclear weapons held by both sides. The ruling elites of the USA and Russia had difficulties in admitting to themselves – let alone to their citizens – the deep irrationality of this new form of military competition. In a rare moment of lucidity, American analysts invented an ironic acronym for this high-risk strategy of ‘mutually assured destruction’: MAD (Isaacs and Dowling 1998, pp. 230-243; Kahn 1960, pp. 119-189).

    Not surprisingly, the propagandists of both sides justified the enormous waste of resources on the arms race by promoting the peaceful applications of the leading Cold War technologies. By the time that the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, the weaponry of genocide had been successfully repackaged into people-friendly products. Nuclear power would soon be providing unmetered energy for everyone. Space rockets would shortly be taking tourists for holidays on the moon. Almost all traces of the military origins of these technologies had disappeared. Similarly, in the IBM pavilion, the System/360 mainframe was promoted as the harbinger of artificial intelligence. Visitors were expected to admire the technological achievements of the corporation not to question its dubious role in the arms race. The horrors of the Cold War present had been hidden by the marvels of the imaginary future.

    IBM’s ideological legerdemain was made much easier by one of the distinguishing features of industrial modernity: the breaking of the explicit links between products and their producers. For millennia, warriors and priests had overtly extracted the surpluses of the peasantry for their own benefit. But, when Europeans started to privatise land ownership and mechanise handicraft production, a new – and more advanced – economic system was born: liberal capitalism. Entrepreneurs proved that price competition could indirectly coordinate human labour much more efficiently than the direct methods of feudalism. Adventurers discovered that selling commodities in the world market was much more profitable than rack-renting peasants in one locality. For the first time in human history, the productive potential of collective labour was being realised (Smith 1976, pp. 1-287, 401-445; Marx 1976, pp. 762-940).

    In this new economy, people were required to interact with each other through things: commodities, money and capital. The distribution and division of labour across the economy was regulated by the prices and wages set by market competition. However, the demise of the aristocracy and the priesthood hadn’t ended class rule. When labour was bought and sold in the capitalist economy, equality within the marketplace resulted in inequality inside the workplace (Marx 1976, pp. 270-280; Rubin 1972, pp. 77-253). Because commodities were exchanged with others of equivalent value, this new form of class rule was very different from its predecessor. Indirect exploitation had replaced direct domination. Above all, the impersonal movements of the markets now determined the destiny of individuals. Things not people now ruled the world.

    ‘The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists … simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of [women and] men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relations of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers.’
    Marx 1976, pp. 164-165

    The growth of capitalism created a much more complex division of labour within the economy. In parallel with the proliferation of factory and office jobs, scientific research also emerged as a distinct profession (Bahr 1980; Smith 1976, pp. 7-16). Successful firms grew by not only employing more workers but also investing in new machinery. In the fetishised world of capitalism, the growth in productivity caused by the increasingly sophisticated cooperation of factory labour and scientific research was expressed as the development of cutting-edge technologies. With human creativity hidden behind the commodity, the process of modernity had acquired a highly visible object as its subject: the ‘… automatic system of machinery … a moving power that moves itself.’ (Marx 1973, p. 692).

    During the mid-twentieth century, the fetishisation of technology reached its apotheosis in the prophecy of artificial intelligence. Living in a society where new machinery appeared to be the driving force of social evolution, Turing and von Neumann’s claim that machines were evolving into living beings didn’t seem outlandish. When computers were operating, the labour involved in developing their hardware and writing their programs wasn’t immediately visible. Mesmerised by technological fetishism, the admirers of Turing and von Neumann had convinced themselves that an electronic brain would soon be able to think just like a human brain. In 1964, the calculating power of the System/360 mainframe was so great that this IBM machine seemed be on the threshold of consciousness. The creation was about to become the creator.

    Cybernetic Supremacy

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, imaginary futures temporarily succeeded in concealing the primary purpose of its three iconic technologies from the American public. But even the flashiest showmanship couldn’t hide dodgy use values forever. As the decades passed, none of the predictions made at the World’s Fair about the key Cold War technologies were realised. Energy remained metered, tourists didn’t visit the moon and computers never became intelligent. Unlike the prescient vision of motoring for the masses at the 1939 World’s Fair, the prophecies about the star technologies of the 1964 exposition seemed almost absurd twenty-five years later. Hyper-reality had collided with reality – and lost.

    Despite the failure of its prophecy, IBM suffered no damage. In stark contrast with nuclear power and space travel, computing was the Cold War technology which successfully escaped from the Cold War. Right from the beginning, machines made for the US military were also sold to commercial clients (Pugh 1995, pp. 152-155). By the time that IBM built its pavilion for the 1964 World’s Fair, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence had to hide more than the unsavoury military applications of computing. Commodity fetishism also performed its classic function of concealing the role of human labour within production. Computers were described as ‘thinking’ so the hard work involved in designing, building, programming and operating them could be discounted. Above all, the prophecy of artificial intelligence obscured the role of technological innovation within American workplaces.

    The invention of computers came at an opportune moment for big business. During the first half of the twentieth century, large corporations had become the dominant institutions of the American economy. Henry Ford’s giant car factory became the eponymous symbol of the new social paradigm: Fordism (Ford and Crowther 1922; Aglietta 1979). When it boosted their profits, corporations replaced the indirect regulation of production by markets with direct supervision by bureaucrats. As the wage-bill for white-collar employees steadily rose, businesses needed increasing amounts of equipment to raise productivity within the office. Long before the invention of the computer, Fordist corporations were running an information economy with tabulators, typewriters and other types of office equipment (Beniger 1986, pp. 291-425). However, by the beginning of the 1950s, the mechanisation of clerical labour had stalled. Increases in productivity in the office were lagging well behind those in the factory. When the first computers appeared on the market, corporate managers quickly realised that the new technology offered a solution to this pressing problem (Sobel 1981, pp. 95-184). The work of large numbers of tabulator operators could now be done by a much smaller group of engineers using a mainframe (Berkeley 1962, p. 5). Even better, the new technology of computing enabled capitalists to deepen their control over their organisations. Much more information about many more topics could now be collected and processed in increasingly complex ways. The managers were masters of all that they surveyed.

    Almost from its first appearance in the workplace, the mainframe was caricatured – with good reason – as the mechanical perfection of bureaucratic tyranny. In Asimov’s sci-fi stories, Mr and Mrs Average were the owners of robot servants. Yet, when the first computers arrived in America’s factories and offices, this new technology was controlled by the bosses not the workers. In 1952, Kurt Vonnegut published a sci-fi novel which satirised the authoritarian ambitions of corporate computing. In his dystopian future, the ruling elite had delegated the management of society to an omniscient artificial intelligence.

    ‘EPICAC XIV … decided how many [of] everything America and her customers could have and how much they would cost. And it … would decide how many engineers and managers and … civil servants, and of what skills, would be needed to deliver the goods; and what I.Q. and aptitude levels would separate the useful men [and women] from the useless ones, and how many … could be supported at what pay level…’
    Vonnegut 1969, p. 106.

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, the IBM pavilion promised that thinking machines would be the servants of all of humanity. Yet, at the same time, its sales personnel were telling the bosses of large corporations that computers were hard-wiring bureaucratic authority into modern society. Herbert Simon – one of America’s leading management theorists and a former colleague of von Neumann – foresaw that the increasing power of mainframes would enable companies to automate more and more clerical tasks. Just like in the factory, machines were taking over from human labour in the office. When artificial intelligence arrived, mainframes would almost completely replace bureaucratic and technical labour within manufacturing. The ultimate goal was the creation of the fully automated workplace. Companies would then no longer need either blue-collar or white-collar workers to make products or provide services. Even most managers would become surplus to requirements. Instead, thinking machines would be running the factories and offices of America (Simon 1965, pp. 26-52). In the imaginary future of artificial intelligence, the corporation and the computer would be one and the same thing.

    This prediction was founded upon von Neumann’s conservative interpretation of cybernetics. In his management theory texts, Simon argued that the workings of a firm resembled the operations of a computer. As in McCulloch and Pitts’ psychology, this identification was made in two directions. Managing workers was equated with programming a computer. Writing software was like drawing up a business plan. Both employees and machinery were controlled by orders issued from above. The workers’ dystopia of Big Brother mainframe had now mutated into the capitalist utopia of cybernetic Fordism. Ironically, the credibility of Simon’s managerial ideology depended upon his readers forgetting the fierce criticisms of corporate computing made by the founding father of systems theory. Echoing Marx, Wiener had warned that the primary role of new technology under capitalism was to intensify the exploitation of the workers. Instead of creating more leisure time and improving living standards, the computerisation of the economy under Fordism would increase unemployment and cut wages (Wiener 1967, pp. 206-221). If Vonnegut’s dystopia was to be avoided, American trade unionists and political activists must mobilise against the corporate Golem (Wiener 1966, pp. 54-55). According to Wiener, cybernetics proved that artificial intelligence threatened the freedoms of humanity.

    ‘Let us remember that the automatic machine … is the precise equivalent of slave labour. Any labour which competes with slave labour must accept the economic conditions of slave labour.’
    Wiener 1967, p. 220.

    For business executives, Vonnegut and Wiener’s nightmare was their computer daydream. However, this corporate vision of cybernetic Fordism meant forgetting the history of Fordism itself. This economic paradigm had been founded upon the successful co-ordination of mass production with mass consumption. Ironically, since these exhibits were more closely connected to social reality, Democracity and Futurama in 1939 provided a much more accurate prediction of the development path of computing than the IBM pavilion did in 1964. Just like motor cars twenty-five years earlier, this new technology was also slowly being transformed from a rare, hand-made machine into a ubiquitous, factory-produced commodity. As in the Ford factories, IBM’s System/360 mainframes were manufactured on assembly-lines (Pugh, Johnson and Palmer 1991, pp. 87-105, 204-210). These opening moves towards the mass production of computers anticipated what would be most important advance in this sector twenty-five years later: the mass consumption of computers. In its formal design, the 1964 System/360 mainframe was a bulky and expensive prototype of the much smaller and cheaper IBM PCs of 1989.

    The imaginary future of artificial intelligence was a way of avoiding thinking about the likely social consequences of the widespread ownership of computers. In the early-1960s, Big Brother mainframe belonged to big government and big business. Above all, feedback was knowledge of the ruled monopolised by the rulers. However, as Wiener had pointed out, Fordist production would inevitably transform expensive mainframes into cheap commodities (Wiener 1967, pp. 210-211). In turn, increasing ownership of computers was likely to disrupt the existing social order. For the feedback of information within human institutions was most effective when it was two-way (Wiener 1967, pp. 67-73). By reconnecting conception and execution, cybernetic Fordism threatened the social hierarchies which underpinned Fordism itself.

    ‘… the simple coexistence of two items of information is of relatively small value, unless these two items can be effectively combined in some mind … which is able to fertilises one by means of the other. This is the very opposite of the organisation which every member travels a preassigned
    path ɉ۪
    Wiener 1967, p. 172.

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, this possibility was definitely not part of IBM’s imaginary future. Rather than aiming to produce ever greater numbers of more efficient machines at cheaper prices, the corporation was focused on steadily increasing the capabilities of its computers to preserve its near-monopoly over the military and corporate market. Instead of room-sized machines shrinking down into desktops, laptops and, eventually, mobile phones, IBM was convinced that computers would always be large and bulky mainframes. The corporation fervently believed that – if this path of technological progress was extrapolated – artificial intelligence must surely result. Crucially, this conservative recuperation of cybernetics implied that sentient machines would inevitably evolve into lifeforms which were more advanced than mere humans. The Fordist separation between conception and execution would have achieved its technological apotheosis.

    Not surprisingly, IBM was determined to counter this unsettling interpretation of its own futurist propaganda. At the 1964 World’s Fair, the corporation’s pavilion emphasised the utopian possibilities of computing. Yet, despite its best efforts, IBM couldn’t entirely avoid the ambiguity inherent within the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. This fetishised ideology could only appeal to all sections of American society if computers fulfilled the deepest desires of both sides within the workplace. Therefore, in the exhibits at its pavilion, IBM promoted a single vision of the imaginary future which combined two incompatible interpretations of artificial intelligence. On the one hand, workers were told that all their needs would be satisfied by sentient robots: servants who never tired, complained or questioned orders. On the other hand, capitalists were promised that their factories and offices would be run by thinking machines: producers who never slacked off, expressed opinions or went on strike. Robby the Robot had become indistinguishable from EPICAC XIV. If only at the level of ideology, IBM had reconciled the class divisions of 1960s America. In the imaginary future, workers would no longer need to work and employers would no longer need employees. The sci-fi fantasy of artificial intelligence had successfully distracted people from questioning the impact of computing within the workplace. After visiting IBM’s pavilion at the 1964 World’s Far, it was all too easy to believe that everyone would win when the machines acquired consciousness.

    Inventing New Futures

    Forty years later, we’re still waiting for the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. In the intervening period, we’ve been repeatedly promised its imminent arrival. Yet, despite continual advances in hardware and software, machines are still incapable of ‘thinking’. The nearest thing to artificial intelligence which most people have encountered are characters in video games. But, as the growing popularity of on-line gaming demonstrates, a virtual opponent is a poor substitute for a human player. Looking back at the history of this imaginary future, it is obvious that neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic versions of artificial intelligence have been realised. Robby the Robot isn’t our devoted servant and EPICAC XIV doesn’t control our lives. Instead of evolving into thinking machines, computers have become consumer goods. Room-sized mainframes have kept on shrinking into smaller and smaller machines. Computers are everywhere in the modern world – and their users are all too aware that they’re dumb.

    Repeated failure should have discredited the imaginary future of artificial intelligence for good. Yet, its proponents remain unrepentant. Four decades on from the 1964 World’s Fair, IBM is still claiming that its machines are on the verge of acquiring consciousness (Bell 2004, p. 2). The persistence of this sci-fi fantasy demonstrates the continuing importance of von Neumann’s conservative appropriation of cybernetics within the computer industry. As in the early-1960s, artificial intelligence still provides a great cover story for the development of new military technologies. Bringing on the Singularity seems much more friendly than collaborating with American imperialism. Even more importantly, this imaginary future continues to disguise the impact of computing within the workplace. Both managers and workers are still being promised technological fixes for socio-economic problems. The dream of sentient machines makes better media copy than the reality of cybernetic Fordism. At the beginning of the 21st century, artificial intelligence remains the dominant ideological manifestation of the promise of computing.

    The credibility of this imaginary future depends upon forgetting its embarrassing history. Looking back at how earlier versions of the prophecy were repeatedly discredited encourages deep scepticism about its contemporary iterations. Our own personal frustrations with computer technology should demonstrate the improbability of its transformation into the Silicon Messiah. Forty years after the New York World’s Fair, artificial intelligence has become an imaginary future from the distant past. What is needed instead is a much more sophisticated analysis of the potential of computing. Wiener – not von Neumann – must be our cybernetic guru. The study of history should inform the reinvention of the future. Messianic mysticism must be replaced by pragmatic materialism. Above all, this new image of the future should celebrate computers as tools for augmenting human intelligence and creativity. Praise for top-down hierarchies of control must be superseded by the advocacy of two-way sharing of information. Let’s be inspired and passionate about imagining our own visions of the better times to come (Barbrook and Schultz 1997; Barbrook 2000).

    ==================================================

    The arguments in this article are developed further in Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures: from thinking machines to the global village, Pluto, London 2007. Check out the book’s website: <www.imaginaryfutures.net>.

    =================================================

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  • Virtual Dreams, Real Politics

    ‘What are we fighting Communism for? We are the most Communist people in world history.’

    – Marshall McLuhan, 1969.

    In 1961, at its 22nd Congress, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formally adopted the goal of spreading the benefits of computerisation across the whole economy. Over the next two decades, the information technologies being developed within the Russia’s research laboratories were going to create a socialist paradise. Ever since the 1917 Revolution, totalitarian Communists with a big C had drawn ideological sustenance from their self-proclaimed role as the vanguard of proletarian communism with a small c. Under Stalin, the horrors of forced industrialisation were sold to the Russian population as premonitions of the promised land of socialism. Ironically, it was the successful completion of this task which posed a potentially fatal existential dilemma for the totalitarian system. Having successfully identified communism with the factory, the Communist Party was now making itself obsolete. According to its reformist faction, the vanguard had to move on to tackling the tasks of the next stage of its world-historical mission: building the ‘Unified Information Network’. Computers should be placed in every factory, office, shop and educational institution. In this Russian vision of the Net, two-way feedback between producers and consumers would calculate the correct distribution of labour and resources which most efficiently satisfied all of the different needs of society. Even better, this technological revolution also promised to democratise an undemocratic society. In his leader’s speech at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev assured his audience that – after decades of purges, wars, corruption and austerity – the promised land was within sight. By the 1980s at the latest, the inhabitants of the Russian empire would be enjoying all the wonders of cybernetic communism.

    Across the Atlantic, the CIA had watched the rise to power of the post-industrial reformers in the East with growing concern. Embracing their opponents’ analysis, its analysts warned the US government that the technological race to develop the Net was becoming the key contest which would decide which superpower would lead humanity into the future. Back in 1957, America had suffered a major setback in the propaganda struggle when its Cold War enemy succeeded in launching the first satellite into space. Determined to prevent any repetition of this humiliation, the US government had quickly set up ARPA: the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Next time, America was going to win the hi-tech race. Responding to the CIA’s briefings, the Kennedy administration sent ARPA into battle against the cybernetic Communist enemy. Bringing together the top scientists in the field, the agency coordinated and funded an ambitious programme of research into computer-mediated-communications. In 1969, overtaking the Russian opposition, its team created the appropriately-named first-ever iteration of the Net: ARPANET.

    From the outset, the US government was convinced that this contest was much more than a test of scientific virility. The two superpowers were competing not only to develop new technologies, but also, more importantly, to decide which side had the most advanced social system. In 1964, a multi-disciplinary team of intellectuals led by Daniel Bell was given a large grant to invent the Anti-Communist vision of the non-communist future: The Commission on the Year 2000. Luckily, these experts were able to find exactly what they were looking for in Marshall McLuhan’s bestselling book Understanding Media. Just like Marx, this prophet had also foreseen that the next stage of modernity would sweep away the most disagreeable manifestations of capitalism: national rivalries, industrial exploitation and social alienation. As in proletarian communism with a small c, peace, prosperity and harmony would reign in the global village. What made McLuhan so much more attractive than Marx was that the knowledge elite – not the proletariat – was the maker of history.

    In 1966, three years before its first hosts were connected, the Bell commission persuaded itself that the arrival of the Net utopia was imminent. Just as McLuhan had foreseen, the limitations of industrialism were about to be overcome by the wondrous technologies of the information society. Best of all, 1960s America was already entering into this post-capitalist future. J.C.R. Licklider – the founder of ARPA’s project to build the Net – had long been arguing that the primary purpose of computer-mediated-communications was facilitating the idiosyncratic working methods of the scientific community. Instead of trading information with each other like the overwhelming majority of cultural producers, academics collaborate by sharing knowledge. Promotion and prestige depends upon contributing articles to journals, presenting papers at conferences and distributing findings for peer review. Although deeply enmeshed with the state and corporate hierarchies of the USA, this communistic method of advancing knowledge had proved its worth in both the natural and social sciences. Thanks to the American taxpayer, Licklider now had the money to sponsor the emergence of a virtual social space emancipated from both the market and the factory. Inside this hi-tech gift economy, proprietary hardware and software were technical obstacles to the most efficient ways of working. The people who built the Net were the ones who ran it. In a bizarre twist, at the height of the Cold War, the US military was funding the invention of cybernetic communism.

    Even more ironically, it was the Russian elite which lacked the self-confidence to sponsor even ARPA-style small-scale experiments in networked socialism. The reformers had offered a rejuvenation of the world-historic mission of the vanguard party. However, for their conservative opponents, the advantages of owning the imaginary future were by far outweighed by the threat which the Net posed to their power and authority. When the Czechoslovak reformers’ theoretical manifesto Civilisation at the Crossroads celebrated the Unified Information Network as the demiurge of participatory democracy, the subversive image of this cybernetic technology was confirmed for these conservative bureaucrats. In 1968, the Russian government sent in its tanks to put an end to the Prague Spring. The perpetuation of totalitarian Communism depended upon the prevention of cybernetic communism.

    Back in the 1930s, Stalinist state planning had been at the cutting-edge of economic modernity. But, by holding on to its ideological monopoly, the Communist Party had deprived itself of the information which it needed to deliver the goods. In 1980, the Polish workers rebelled when they were once again called upon to pay for the mistakes of the economic planners. The disintegration of totalitarianism in one country started a chain-reaction of events which within a decade brought down the entire Russian empire. Communism with a big C was the future which had failed. In his 1992 neo-conservative bestseller The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama proudly announced that the whole world had become American. With all alternatives now discredited, there was only one path to modernity.

    Back in the mid-1960s, McLuhanism had been invented as a credo of the mildly reformist Democratic Party. Over the next four decades, its meaning had moved steadily rightwards. In 1983, Ithiel de Sola Pool – a Bell commission member – codified this neo-liberal appropriation of McLuhanism in his masterpiece: Technologies of Freedom. From software to soap operas, all forms of information would soon be traded as commodities over the Net. For the first time, everybody could be a media entrepreneur. By the end of the 1980s, this conservative remix had become the dominant form of American McLuhanism. George Gilder – a Republican Party activist – proclaimed the computer companies of northern California as the harbingers of a free market paradise. Not only Stalinist central planning, but also Social Democratic welfare provision were relics from the Fordist past. Looking at Silicon Valley, the neo-liberal prophets were convinced that the factory and the campus were synergising into a superior entity: the hi-tech entrepreneurial firm.

    By the time that the 1990s dotcom boom took off, McLuhanist technological determinism had become an unapologetic celebration of ‘out of control’ capitalism. In his New Rules for the New Economy, Kevin Kelly explained how technologies which were prototyped within the hi-tech gift economy could be successfully spun off into commercial products. Like the Stalinist elite, the music majors had found out to their cost that it was futile trying to resist the onrush of the McLuhanist future. In contrast, dotcom companies had shown how to transform user generated content and on-line communities into profitable enterprises. The phenomenal growth of MySpace, Bebo and YouTube demonstrates that successful businesses can be built upon Kelly’s dictum of following the free. Clever managers know how to make cybernetic communism serve establishment goals.

    Like their Stalinist predecessors, these 1990s proponents of McLuhanism saw themselves as the vanguard of the hi-tech utopia. As the early-adopters and beta-testers of the dotcom future, this privileged group was prefiguring today what the general public would be doing tomorrow. When everyone had access to the Net, participatory democracy and cooperative creativity would be the order of the day. But, until this happy moment arrived, humanity required the guidance of the cybernetic elite to reach the promised land. Ironically, in the 2000s, the boosters of the information society – like the Stalinists before them – are unexpectedly faced with the problem of living within their own future. Confounding the McLuhanist credo, the advent of the Net hasn’t marked the birth of a new humanistic and equalitarian civilisation. For more than four decades, the knowledge elite have asserted its control over space through ownership of time. Now, in the early-twenty-first century, the imaginary future of the information society is materialising in the present. What the McLuhanists have to explain is why utopia has been delayed.

    When the users of the Net are both consumers and producers of media, the vanguard has lost its ideological monopoly. Yet, at the same time, the arrival of the information society hasn’t precipitated a wider social transformation. Cybernetic communism is quite compatible with dotcom capitalism. Contrary to the tenets of McLuhanism, the convergence of media, telecommunications and computing has not – and never will – liberate humanity. The Net is a useful tool not a mechanical saviour. In the 2000s, ordinary people have taken control of sophisticated information technologies to improve their everyday lives and their social conditions. Freed from the preordained futures of McLuhanism, this emancipatory achievement can provide inspiration for new anticipations of the shape of things to come. Cooperative creativity and participatory democracy need to be extended from the virtual world into all areas of life. Rather than disciplining the present, our futurist visions should be open-ended and flexible. We are the inventors of our own technologies. We can intervene in history to realise our own interests. Our utopias provide the direction for the path of human progress. Let’s be hopeful and courageous when we imagine the better futures of libertarian social democracy.

     

    Response

    Carl Gudeian’s nettime rant

  • CYBERSALON MANIFESTO

    Manage Your Own Medium

    1.0 Genesis.

    In March 1960 J.C.R Licklider envisioned a network of computers connected together where human and machine would work together in intimate association. He prophesised that this era would be intellectually the most creative and exiting in the history of mankind. We are living in this time. Our group is a collective of people emerging from the human/computer interface who are engaged in digital practices and theories. As artists, practitioners and academics we have joined together to create the Cybersalon: live gatherings in the image of the new digital medium of the Net.

    2.0 The medium is no longer the message, we formulate the medium to convey our own message.

    Creating in pixels underpins the use of the computer both as a tool and as a communicating device. These two characteristics have completed their integration in the Net. Within new media, the creative process is made and distributed in bits and pixels. The exchanging, sharing and manipulating information is an integral part of our work. Our networked computers are the devices of creativity and of communication. Our message is intended for a pixel-generated screen mediating the relationship of humans and computers.

    3.0 Enjoy the schism.

    Our visual culture has been formulated by an analogue world whose traditions have been uneasily carried on into the digital format. We are still confined by the look, design, fashions and aesthetics of the old media. Our practices and theories must now be changed for the time of the Net. The schism between old and new media is caused by the passivity of the first and the interactivity of the second. The medium that carries our message conveys an active and intimate association with its users. New media exist only in digital format: identical copies can be shared between makers and receivers. We must now deliver in the same format that we create in.

    4.0 The original is obsolete.

    The digital format assumes countless identical copies of the same work. The do-and-undo command encourages non-linear approaches within the creative process. A digital work can be shared between its makers who can add and delete parts. Visuals, sounds and machine code can be placed and accessed across the Net. Whether we’re multi-media constructors, web developers, programmers, theoreticians, digital artists, we all have to ask ourselves these key questions: Whose idea was it anyway? Who inspired whom? Is the remix better than the original version? How can we contribute our creativity to the collective digital work?

    5.0 We must meet up soon.

    New media brings together people from a wide range of different practices. For instance, when building a website, the computer programmer and the graphic designer will each contribute their own particular skills to the common product. Within the creative process, each person possesses their own heterogeneous experience of the human/computer interface. Out of these divided and layered practices, a collective aesthetic is emerging in the form of code and pixels.

    6.0 Cybersalon is a real-time environment.

    Cybersalon is a real and virtual space where people involved in digital creativity can congregate and meet with each other. If we want to discover innovative practices and theories, it is essential for us to share and communicate our on-line experiences. Some short-sighted interests are trying to inhibit the participatory nature of the Net. In contrast, we want to celebrate and promote the emancipatory and creative possibilities of the new information technologies. We will organise discussions around the social and cultural issues brought out by the Net. We will exhibit cutting-edge digital work. We present the latest practices and theories emerging from the educational, commercial, community and artistic forms of new media.

    7.0 Beyond hi-tech neo-liberalism.

    We are escaping from the most liberal times in the history of communications. After decades of globalisation, privatisation and deregulation, information became something which could only be bought and sold. Education, entertainment and political debates were read-only files. Now all these old certainties are being swept away. The Net is overcoming the enforced passivity and cultural boundaries imposed by the old media. Whether as individuals or as groups, we now have the ability to create our own media with the new information technologies. We can enjoy the benefits of sharing knowledge, giving information, communicating our ideas and making friends within a place where time and space are undetermined. In this new situation, we are forced to reconsider our practices and theories of cultural creativity. We must revisit the revolutionary legacy of the past. We must invent new ways of acting and thinking.

    8.0 Montage the medium.

    Living inside the human/computer interface is an integral part of everyday life. As digital practitioners, we use our computer as a production tool and as a communications device. As mobile phone users, we each carry with our own personal transmitter. Although we don’t own the landlines or airwaves, we are still able to give away our content to whoever wants to download it. We can collect and filter information from the Net to customise our own information. Neither political censors nor copyright enforcers have the power to control our freedom of expression. Across the globe, individuals and groups can now enjoy the most libertarian interpretation of media freedom. We are no longer limited to owning only receivers of information. Each of us can now possess their own transmitter. Everyone can be an artist, a designer, a broadcaster and a theorist. Our pixel-aided world is the integration of all known culture – and the emergence of entirely new practices and theories.

    Sophia Drakopoulou
    Richard Barbrook
    3rd October 2000

  • MOBILE MANIFESTO

    1.0 Is WAP crap?

    Early adopters can only access the pleasures of new technologies by accepting the pains of beta-testing the future.

    2.0 When will the hardware come up to speed?

    Net users assume that large screens, colourful icons, pop-down menus and all the other features of the PC interface should be available on mobiles which are small enough to fit into their pockets.

    3.0 Has my SIM card become my identity?

    Even if we forget what we did yesterday, our mobiles have recorded all aspects of our daily lives: who we spoke with, what we bought and where we were.

    4.0 What shall I broadcast tonight?

    With the advent of 3G mobiles, everyone will carry a television transmitter in their pocket for video-conferencing with work colleagues, providing live-feeds to the Net and swapping MPEG movies with their friends.

    5.0 Is your partner monitoring your visits to your lover?

    While we appreciate being able to find out where we are using the GPS facilities on our mobile, we don’t want other people knowing where we are without us telling them first.

    6.0 How did I ever leave home without one?

    Wherever we go, we are carrying our own intimate world of friends, colleagues and contacts inside the screens of our mobiles.

    7.0 Who said that text was dead?

    The popularity of SMS disproves McLuhan’s prediction that reading and writing would disappear once we could easily communicate with each other using audio-visual media.

    8.0 Will we ever develop manners for mobiles?

    The happiness of hearing from an absent friend means ignoring your best mate who is sitting right next to you.

    9.0 Is my mobile acting as a double-agent?

    By becoming my easy-to-use gateway for on-line banking, e-commerce and socialising, my mobile is surreptitiously revealing information about my finances, shopping habits and lifestyle choices to outside forces, such as law enforcement agencies and market researchers.

    10.0 Are we frying our brains instead of polluting our lungs?

    For today’s young people, the first sign of maturity is ignoring the danger of radiation from mobiles rather than disregarding the risk of getting cancer from cigarettes.

    Andrew Purdy; Armin Medosch; Mark Fitzpatrick; Niki Gomez; Richard Barbrook; Robin Hamman; and Sophia Drakopoulou.
    7th November 2000
    www.cybersalon.org

  • F.A.Q. WEARABLE COMPUTING

    1. Why are there never enough pockets to carry my mobile, my PDA, my MP3 player and my Gameboy?

    We should weave talking, organising, listening and playing into the fabric of our clothing.

    2. Can’t we have something better than “one-size-fits-all� technology?

    Wearable computers will know our desires – and therefore also know how to flatter our figures.

    3. Will my avatar tell me if my bum looks too big in it?

    Since most of us refuse to believe that body scanners give a true representation of our figures, we’ll be shocked when fashion reveals as much as it conceals.

    4. Are my clothes spying on me?

    If we want GPS to tell us where we are, we must accept that someone else might be interested in finding out too.

    5. Why do the fashions of the future always look like those in old science fiction movies?

    The cut of a well-designed suit can easily disguise the most ‘cutting-edge’ of technologies.

    6. Will we only play with ourselves?

    Even when we’re alone, wearable devices are connecting us with our friends, relations and workmates.

    7. Will my clothing give me an all-over body toning?

    As Marshall McLuhan once said, the medium *is* the massage!

    8. Do you want to wear my cyber-suit?

    If we could feel each other’s sensations, we might be better able to understand each other’s emotions.

    9. Can we customise our virtual selves?

    If we’re unhappy with our physical bodies, we can always invent a sexier image for our adventures in cyberspace.

    10. What’s the effect of all these electrical impulses?

    The risk of radiation is the price of connectivity.

    Niki Gomez
    Richard Barbrook

    5th February 2001

  • CYBERSEX CATECHISM

    “I fuck therefore I am” (Shu Lea Cheang – 2000)

    1.0 Do you want to play with your self?

    Shift your identity, be on top, attach an extra port.

    2.0 Is the pussy the matrix?

    We are jacking into the Big Daddy mainframe so we can jerk off.

    3.0 Is one-hand typing the best form of safe sex?

    I was unable to open up when I had a virus concealed in an attachment.

    4.0 Why does the Net love pioneering porn?

    Every other medium has its own intimate massage: telephone – chatlines; motor car – backseat fumbling; hormone research – contraception; VCR – sex films.

    5.0 Does virtual sex cause real jealousy?

    The swapping of text is the low bandwidth version of exchanging bodily fluids.

    6.0 “Feeling horny?” Why can’t I say this as easily in a bar as on-line?

    When hiding behind my anonymous IP address, I can lose all my inhibitions about exploring my deepest desires.

    7.0 Have you read the joy of text?

    Cybersex is the theory without the practice.

    8.0 Do we have a fetish for technology?

    Sometimes I prefer my toys to my lover.

    9.0 Is technology good for sex?

    My body has been upgraded with an extra hard drive, more RAM, lots of shareware and the hottest plug-ins.

    10.0 Wouldn’t you like to download an orgasm?

    Let’s make XXXML into an open source protocol.

    10th December 2000

  • RESPONSE TO THE CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY by FEnix

    Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron have provided a provocative and necessary contribution to the emerging debate over the future of ‘Cyberspace’ (or Hypermedia).

    It is unfortunate that the authors’ strident anti-Americanism somewhat detracts from the validity of their final conclusion – that the ‘State’ has a role in fostering the development of the new medium, with a view to ensuring its democratization and accessibility.

    “Ideology n. 1. (arch.) science of ideas; visionary speculation. 2. manner of thinking characteristic of a class or individual, ideas as the basis of some economic or political theory or system.” [Oxford English Dictionary].

    By their use of the term ‘The Californian Ideology’ Barbrook and Cameron seek to foster the illusion that, buried on a hard drive somewhere in California is a set of guiding principles which underly the development of the Web. The cognoscenti are presumably given the URL of this ‘ideology’, which is then ingested, acted upon, actions assessed, ideology modified and so on.

    A somewhat cursory search through Infoseek and Alta Vista turned up one reference – that of the authors’ own site at HRC. The existence, then, of an ‘ideology’ would seem to exist only within the authors’ self-constructed, neo-Marxist universe.

    While the conclusion of the paper is valid, the analysis would seem to betray a woeful ignorance of recent American – and particularly Californian – political, social and cultural history.

    While there is no doubt that the new medium has spawned a flood of optimism amongst the digerati, the authors’ attempts to equate this to a new type of ‘slavery’ is risible. “Their Utopian vision of California depends upon a wilfull blindness towards the other – much less positive – features of life on the West Coast: racism, poverty and environmental degradation”, they state with a confidence bordering on arrogance.

    It is this writer’s opinion and experience that, in fact, the opposite is the case. That artists and writers are still passionate about these issues; that the fight against social injustice and environmental exploitation is being joined in the new medium. Political, environmental and social activists are using the new medium to disseminate knowledge and information, forming previously impossible alliances and exchanging skills, knowledge and expertise to strengthen their cases against institutions and corporations which have no appreciation of the medium – yet.

    Perhaps the authors’ major analytical flaw is in using the labels ‘New Left’ and ‘New Right’ as if they still had meaning, not only in the new medium, but in the context of American politics.

    Politics in the US, on a national level, is in process of re-alignment. Ten years ago, a simple equation could be drawn: ‘Left’ = Democrat/Liberal, ‘Right’ = Republican. That is no longer the case – for example, Senator Exon – a Democrat – favors censorship of the Net, while Speaker Gingrich, a Republican, opposes same. Members of both parties in both houses have changed sides. The Democrats, in abandoning an interventionist agenda, have finally broken with the New Deal tradition in pursuit of short-term political gain. It is a step they will rue.

    The political process at the national level has divorced itself from the mass of people and alienated them. Voter participation is low – ‘representatives’ often represent noone but themselves and/or their special interests. There are, of course, exceptions, but this is a view which is current at a perceptual level. Such perceptions inform action – or inaction.

    In California, this process is particularly apparent. Pete Wilson was elected Governor on a rabid anti-immigrant platform. He successfully used the mainstream media to instill fear into the bosoms of those most likely to vote. And, because he had the bigger warchest, he carried off the prize. Of course, the spin-off the authors fail to mention is that his opponent, Dianne Feinstein, was subsequently elected a Senator, and has been instrumental in furthering the handgun control agenda – a piece of ‘liberal’ – and many would say ‘interventionist’ – legislation if ever there was one.

    The disillusion of voters is due to one simple fact – the passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978. This piece of legislation – voter-driven – effectively froze revenues from property taxes at 1978 levels. When a piece of residential property changes hands, the annual tax is assessed at the new market value – but only when it changes ownership. (Corporations, being enduring legal fictions, are effectively exempt.) The result has been the polarisation of communities along age lines, with established residents paying low taxes and younger newcomers paying higher rates.

    For several years, the state was able to coast on the accumulated surplus of the late sixties and early seventies. By the mid/late 1980’s, the surplus was exhausted, and the state started to rein in its activities, cutting grants to cities and counties. There is widespread acknowledgment, both in and out of the ‘virtual community’, of the damaging effects of Proposition 13, particularly in the education field. Californians bemoan the fall from grace of the University of California system, which, with the help of immense state subsidies, was affordable, accessible and enjoyed a reputation for excellence. Alas, no more….

    The new medium upends the existing paradigms for commerce, for social interaction, for communication – for everything. Participants in the ‘virtual world’ are, in the very absence of a coherent ideology, being forced to enter the supermarket of ideas, just to see what’s around, to make sense of their experience. This is part of the process of the redefinition of the political and social landscape. As ideas and theories are picked up, examined and rejected, so new ones appropriate to the chaged circumstances, will emerge. Many of these will be syntheses of existing notions. But it would be foolish to seek to characterize them as either of the ‘Left’ or of the ‘Right’.

    The authors make much of the apparent hijacking of credit for Web development by private entrepreneurs. They cite the subsidization of Babbage’s Difference Engine by the British Government in the 1830’s. Later in their paper, they make much of the French Government’s backing of Minitel. Minitel may well have been a success at the time. But where is it now? And what about other, less successful interventionist strategies, like the nationalization of the French car industry? Along the way, they throw in references to IBM, flight simulators and just abut every gew-gaw of modern life with a technological bent.

    The implication seems to be that everyone who has developed a piece of hard- or software for use on the Web should, somehow or other, render praise to the Feds for making it all possible. That is like arguing that the developers of anti-lock braking systems should give tribute to the Feds because the Government builds roads!

    The authors would do well to stop searching every nook and cranny of the Net for evidence of an “anti-statist ideology”. There isn’t one.

    “The business of America is business”. This truism may be riddled with inconsistencies, with false perceptions, with an over-adulation (and over compensation) for corporate entrepreneurs. But it is a guiding principle. It has given rise to beauty and ugliness in about equal measure. But that’s the way America works. We may disagree with it, but the credo’s very flexibility leaves it open to change, both from within and without. For example, Pacific Gas & Electricity has, on numerous occasions, hired the author of ‘Ecotopia’, Ernest Callenbach, as a consultant on how best to minimize the utility’s environmental impact.

    California, in particular, is a state of abundant paradoxes. Consider the Yosemite valley and South Central LA. In their own ways, access to one – and the inaccessibility of the other – are both a result of the policies and practices of private enterprise, tempered by legislative and administrative action at state and federal levels.

    One of California’s paradoxes is it’s love/hate relationship with the State of California and its agencies. For example, how can CalTrans, responsible for the construction of Highway 280 (one of the most elegant and environmentally sensitive freeways in the state), also be responsible for the urban blight created by the 5 years of inactivity in repairing the Cypress Freeway after the Loma Prieta Earthquake? How is it that the home of the automobile – Los Angeles – also has a brand spanking-new public transit system?

    Californians are aware of these paradoxes, and about the ambiguities of life in the state. But how can we talk of “Californians” with any sense of homogeneity? San Francisco and Los Angeles are in a state of constant cultural warfare, and both disdain the inhabitants of the Central Valley…..

    The fact that the paper millionaires of Silicon Valley choose to live in Mountain View is, in a sense, irrelevant. Would their work have more integrity if they lived in East Palo Alto or San Francisco’s Mission barrio? Apparently, the authors of “The Californian Ideology” believe so.

    Currently, the Net is an elitist club. Access currently runs at about $3,000 for a system. Six months ago, it was $5,000. Six months from now, it will probably be $1,500, with the possibility of the $500 Internet ‘box’ a possibility in the not too distant future. Net access will become, in California at least, as ubiquitous as the automobile. (It would, as an aside, be interesting to learn the equivalent subscription rate for would-be users in the United Kingdom. In my experience, a dollar price translates to a £ sterling price 1:1.5, making Net access in Britain a truly elitist experience.)

    How to democratize access is one of the challenges facing all of us, no matter where we are located geographically. The Web has no boundaries, knows no time. It is a miraculous medium, which will for ever change our thinking, our feeling, our range of life experience.

    The authors of ‘The Californian Ideology’ are correct in their plea for further development to be a result of cooperation between the ‘State’ (the ‘nation-state’? – an increasingly irrelevant concept…), private industry, individuals and other, more amorphous collectives of interested participants.

    It is unfortunate that a somewhat simplistic, ideologically-burdened analysis detracts from that message.

    John Blower – January 18, 1996

  • THE COUNTER-CULTURE WRITES BACK by Jeffrey Kaplan

    Bay Area counter-culture veteran responds to the Californian Ideology

    I was one of the demonstrators at People’s Park in Berkeley in 1969. And I now make my living as a computer consultant in the San Francisco Bay area. I share your dismay at the rise of the cyber-libertarian market ethic. At the same time, I find your attempt to link the rise of that market ethic to the counter-culture of the 1960’s to be way off the I see very little evidence to support your claim that many of the computer consultants are former hippies. For the most part, the independent computer consultants – and employees in computing in general for that matter – that I have encountered over the last fifteen years in this business have not been former hippies nor have they displayed any affinity for the counter-culture. It is true that some people from the counter-culture have turned to computers as a way to make a living. But most, like myself, have done so more as a concession to current economic reality than to any belief in technical determinism or the sancitity of the market place.

    Your attempt to link the development of the PC to the counter-culture is equally flawed. Yes, there undoubtedly were some freaks in the Haight-Ashbury and Berkeley who believed that computers would liberate us from the grip of corporate greed. No doubt some of them made important contributions to the development of computers. But the home-brew computer clubs were almost entirely centered well to the south of San Francisco, in the Peninsula which includes Palo Alto and what is now Silicon Valley. The area was home to a number of important high-tech defense contractors as well as Stanford University, a very elite and very expensive private university. As a result, there were a lot of engineers in the Valley even then, and a lot of money. That probably had more to do with its prominence in the history of computing than any association with hippies. Every one I knew in those days considered that area a cultural wasteland and would venture there only in transit to another outpost of the counter-culture such as Santa Cruz. Those folks from the Peninsula who identified with the counter-culture usually left for San Francisco, the Grateful Dead being a prime example.

    It is true that the counter-culture was somewhat ambiguous in its attitude towards technology, embracing LSD and amplified music while claiming to be developing a more “natural” way of living. But technological utopianism was hardly a defining characteristic of the counter-culture. Technological utopianism has been a major theme in European civilization at least since Francis Bacon. And Karl Marx assured us that once the workers seized the means of production, the industrial revolution would enable them to create a paradise where humanity would be freed from physical labor. Despite its lapses in this regard, the counter-culture was generally less tied to high technology than the general society that surrounded it. The first things the occupiers of People’s Park did with the land was plant a community garden and put up a childrens’ playground. This emphasis on community interdependence and the rejection of a society based on the production and consumption of commodities were the true hallmarks of the counter-culture of the 1960’s and 1970’s. I don’t know where your libertarian followers of McLuhan were in those days, maybe they were smoking their weed in Cupertino, or New York, or London. But they weren’t much of a factor in Berkeley or the Haight.

    In fact they still aren’t. The voting record for San Francisco and Berkeley shows a political direction almost diametrically opposed to the conservatism that has overtaken much of the rest of California. While the rest of the state has voted in favor of ballot propositions attacking the rights of immigrants and enhanced employment oportunities for minority groups, San Francisco and Berkeley have opposed them by margins as high as 2 to 1. Those cities recently voted in favor of universal, government-sponsored health care – anathema to the libertarians. Democratic political candidates carried Berkeley and San Francisco throughout the 1980’s even when the rest of the state and the country was voting for Ronald Reagan or George Bush by a wide margin.

    It would be difficult for your readers to know, but People’s Park is still in existence. Shortly after the 1969 riots the University of California agreed to lease the land to the City of Berkeley for one dollar a year so that the city could maintain it as a park. Over the years, the park has become a hangout for a rather rough crowd. Two or three years ago the city and the univeristy agreed to end the lease so that the university could build housing on the site. There was another riot. A much smaller one to be sure. But then again no one had even put up any fences yet. And a very significant portion of the taxpayers and homeowners of Berkeley – the aging hippies who you claim have given up on their ideals – demanded that the park be preserved. Most of these people were professionals in their forties who wouldn’t feel safe walking around Peoples Park. But the symbolic importance of that little piece of land was still sufficient to bring angry groups of them down to city hall. The potentially explosive situation scared the hell out of the local authorities and they quickly agreed to guarentee the park’s continued existence.

    I am not claiming the counter-culture is nearly as strong and vibrant as it was twenty-five years ago. For the most part people have simply drifted away – into libertarianism in some cases, but mostly into a more mainstream American existence. Nonetheless, what remains is more than a tattered remnant, although it is certainly les visible. Age is partly responsible. People tend to be less outrageous in their behavior. Nonetheless, significant numbers of people are still working on community supported agriculture, child-care, community health and hospice care. The Bay Area is still an important center of opposition to American military intervention overseas, and more recently, the global economy.

    Meanwhile, the closing paragraphs of your own manifesto on “The Californian Ideology”, display the same technological naivete and elitism that befuddled your McLuhanite hippies of twenty-five years ago. You proclaim the “Promethean possibilities of hypermedia” which will allow a liberated “virtual class” of “digital artisans” to “create a new machine aesthetic for the information age.” How is all of this going to lead to social emancipation for those who are not in the privileged group of “artist-engineers -designers of the next stage of modernity?” Are folks who are not digital artisans going to have any say in what the next “stage of modernity” is going to look like? What is the likelihood that a group of digital artisans could ever retain control over a large-scale, capital-intensive technology such as hypermedia?

    And what makes you think that your revolutionary efforts won’t be co-opted if they are successful? I suggest you think about some basic things such as where your food comes from or how you care for your children. Think about what resources you really have which are independent of international corporate interests. Unless your creative efforts address those kinds of issues, you won’t change a damn thing.

  • THE ENGLISH IDEOLOGY AND WIRED MAGAZINE by Mark Stahlman

    Last year, a critical essay entitled The Californian Ideology by Richard Barbrook and Andrew Cameron (University of Westminster) appeared on the Internet and quickly became a focal point for growing criticism of the glossy and widely influential Wired magazine. However, the author’s difficulty in sorting out the origins of the ideas behind Wired and it’s version of the “Digital Revolution” was painfully obvious in their essay.

    I’d like to argue that the group which has consistently promoted the worldview expressed by Wired and, in effect, publishes and writes the magazine today isn’t American at all — it’s the English. If anything, Wired represents yet another attempt to invade American culture and to undermine American political and economic initiative — another of the attempts which have characterized American relations with the English for many centuries.

    Wired magazine is not an American institution, nor is it even distinctly Californian (although its association with San Francisco is certainly undeniable). And, it’s ideology is also not nearly as novel as Barbrook/Cameron and some other European commentators seem to suggest — although, arguably, it is appearing in a new and, therefore, potentially confusing form. Each of the magazine’s elements, including free-market economics, hedonic lifestyle, techno-utopianism and, crucially, complete disdain for the uniqueness of human consciousness are all specifically and historically English.

    For that matter, the magazine’s sponsors are all English (or self-confessed Anglophiles). Its themes are largely English in origin and its strategy of world-domination through techno-utopian revolution is English (specifically H.G.Wells) to the core. Indeed, Wired is a house-organ for the modern political expression of British radical liberalism and it’s philosophical partner British radical empiricism. Politically, philosophically, financially and psychologically, Wired is a concrete expression of the English ideology.

    The Wired project began when the director of MIT’s Media Lab, Nicholas Negroponte (an Anglophile who’s ideal digital-slave is an AI-spawned robotic English butler), plucked Louis Rossetto and Jane Metcalfe from obscurity in San Francisco’s European sister-city, the other Anglo-Dutch “experimental” metropolis, Amsterdam. Before Wired, Rosetto’s greatest previous literary achievement had been a book describing the high-budget nudie shenanigans at the filming of Caligula. This movie, in turn, was the boldest effort by Penthouse magazine’s Bob Guccione, whose introduction to porn-production was under English tutelage in Tangier and who sent his sons to British military finishing schools.

    Negroponte’s apparent goal was to meld Rosetto/Metcalfe with the now flagging San Francisco-based Whole Earth project of his longtime associate, Stewart Brand (who had previously contributed the book/marketing-brochure Media Lab). First to join the Wired editorial team was Brand protege and Whole Earth editor, Kevin Kelly, in what was billed as an ambitious relaunch of the original effort designed to amp-up the graphics, capture consumer product advertisers and spearhead the, now digital, techno-Utopian world revolution. Sex, Drugs and Rock & Roll were now “tired”; Wired was now “wired.”

    Wired, which positioned itself as the journal of this post-psychedelic world revolution, was launched with seed money from Negroponte (buying him the back page and ultimately a best-seller) and from game designer Charlie Jackson. But the glossy mockup failed to attract the crucial second round of investment and Wired appeared to be still-born until Negroponte introduced them to the San Francisco-based private bank, Sterling Payot, which fronted the money for the magazine’s launch. Continued existence, however, was still in doubt until the notoriously Anglophile (a polite word for English in American clothing) publisher Si Newhouse’s Advance Publications stepped in for the last push. (No, despite its name, the Newhouse published magazine, The New Yorker is actually not an American publication — it’s English.)

    In this tumultuous process involving financial reorganizations, whatever notions of editorial independence which might have been initially entertained at Wired were quickly contained. The editorial content of the magazine from its inception has been heavily influenced by the larger utopian agendas of Brand and his Whole Earth-to-Wired editorial colleague Kevin Kelly. In particular, the multi-national scenarios-planning company co-founded by Brand and previously London-based Royal-Dutch Shell futurist Peter Schwartz, the Global Business Network (GBN), has been decisive in shaping Wired’s “content.” From promoting GBN’s consultants endlessly with cover-stories and interviews to actually producing a “special issue” on the future totally with GBN resources, Wired handed over its editorial reigns to GBN and it’s New Dark Age scenarios (more on this below) from day one.

    To be sure, proclaiming the gloomy truth of the GBN scenario-planned and social-engineered future is not exactly Wired’s public mission. Wired is all about the “optimism meme” and is committed to catalyzing the creation of a “better world” — at least for the 5% of the population who are expected to comprise the new Information Age rulers. This new “class” even has a name — the “Brain Lords” (and what else would the English call the Information Age aristocracy, anyway?) — according to Michael Vlahos, a policy analyst at Newt Gingrich’s think-tank, the Progress and Freedom Foundation. Editorial support for Gingrich’s brand of “revolution” as well as consistent backing of his technocratic policy advisers, most notably Alvin Toffler, has been a Wired commitment from its earliest issues.

    The project which preceded Wired, the Whole Earth Catalog (and its various off-shoots, such as the computer conferencing system known as the Well and the newer Electric Minds), had been the product of Stewart Brand et. al’s 1960’s efforts to engineer a utopian counter-culture which, it was hoped, would broadly transform society at large. So, aren’t I confusing my history here? Isn’t Brand all American? No, I don’t think so. Scratch a Stewart Brand and what will you find? None other than the English anthropologist Gregory Bateson, of course. And, it is from Bateson’s lifelong commitment to re-program a humanity which he deeply despised and, in particular, his explicit drive to destroy the religious basis of Western civilization by replacing God with Nature, that the Whole Earth project was born. It was literally the beginning of a new religion with Nature at its center and mankind portrayed as the dangerous ape threatening to destroy it all.

    Bateson’s British (and American) intelligence sponsored takeover of the nascent field of cybernetics in the 1950’s from its creator, Norbert Wiener, led directly into Bateson’s LSD-driven experiments on schizophrenia and creativity in Palo Alto, which in turn, were the origins of Ken Kesey’s Merry Pranksters and their house band, the Grateful Dead. Indeed, Stewart Brand’s own career as a publicist for what was first conceived of as drug and then computer-based techo-utopian revolution owes much to Bateson’s cybernetics guidance. Brand was among the first to recognize that personal computers and computer networks might have even greater potential to re-program the humans who “used” them than the psychedelics which fueled his earlier efforts. Indeed, based on Brand’s success at promoting LSD at his Trips Festivals, he was hired by Doug Englebart to stage the first mass demonstration of the mouse and windows system which Englebart had invented at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI).

    Bateson is the son of the English geneticist, William Bateson, whose attacks precipitated the suicide of his principle Continental rival, Otto Kammerer, is chronicled in Arthur Koestler’s Case of the Mid-Wife Toad. And, if the Englishman Bateson doesn’t satisfy your hunger for a proper genealogy for psychedelic San Francisco, one might consider Captain Al Hubbard (no relation to L. Ron), the Johnny Appleseed of LSD. He was born in Kentucky but by the 1950’s had renounced his U.S. citizenship and sailed right up to Vancouver, British Columbia, to become a commodore in their very English yacht club. That’s where he set up the world war-room to target the destruction of Western culture (through San Francisco) and from this base that he joined forces with Humphrey Osmond (English military psychiatrist, lead English MK-ULTRA researcher and the originator of the term “psychedelic”) and Aldous Huxley (English black-sheep godson of the original techno-utopian, H.G. Wells) to spread LSD among the intelligentsia to achieve the world revolution. To be sure, San Francisco’s cultural scene has long been shaped by its close association with English/Anglophile intellectuals and social engineers.

    But, it’s not sufficient to demonstrate the intellectual genealogy of Wired to fully describe their tight affiliation with the English ideology. There is a crucial component of the technological and biologically deterministic utopian worldview at the core of Wired’s “content” which must be carefully situated as well. Wired’s techno-utopianism is merely the modern expression of H.G. Wells’ attempts in the first half of this century to construct a technocratic global empire ruled by a new elite — much like the audience that Wired seeks to rally behind its now digital but still self-consciously revolutionary banner.

    In its various forms, following Thomas More’s coining of the term Utopia with the publishing of his book with that title in 1516, utopian writing and, indeed, utopian social experiments tended to be pastoral and, if anything, anti-technology. It was H.G. Wells who changed all that with his 1905 publication of his novel, A Modern Utopia (one of the few of his 20th century works which is still in print). And, it was Wells who initiated the entire inquiry into a technology-defined future (and, indeed, launched the field now known as futurism) in his seminal 1902 essay, Anticipations.

    While Wells is popularly known as the first true science fiction writer, he lived for 50 years after he completed his cycle of four major sci-fi novels in 1897. During this half century, he was very busy designing the future of the British Empire — the Third Rome as he put it (or as Toffler would later put it, the Third Wave) — as a vision of a world knit together by communications and transportation technologies and controlled by a new class of technocrats. What Wells’ described in volume after volume throughout the rest of his life (both in fictional and essay format) is indistinguishable from the digital revolution Wired hopes to lead. It’s a post-industrial world that has abandoned the nation-state in favor of Wells’ World State, that has scrapped the premises of it’s industrial past, embraced the scarcity of an anti-growth economics and based itself on the emergence of a newly indoctrinated post-civilization humanity.

    Wells had devoted himself to organizing a world revolution based on technology, synthetic religion and mass mind-control — the same revolution discussed monthly in the pages of Wired. In Wells’ A Modern Utopia, the rulers are called the “New Samurai” and they are a caste of scientist/priests who social-engineer the global society Wells called the “World State.” John Perry Barlow’s Wired-published, Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace would have made Wells very happy, I have no doubt. Yes, that’s Wells’ “World State” lurking in the margins of Barlow’s manifesto despite his waffling on the specifics of future forms of “governance” — except to say that the future of politics will be conveniently (from the social engineer’s standpoint) “post-reason.”

    But, aren’t I heading straight into the jaws of an overwhelming and categorical contradiction? Wells was certainly no free-marketeer. He was a professed socialist and Wired appears on its face to be thoroughly free-market capitalist. How could I claim any affinity between the British radical liberals and Wells (and with both and Wired)? Aren’t I just gluing together two sets of intellectual forebears — who both just happen to be English? How do I avoid the “bizarre fusion” description favored by Barbrook/Cameron? In the end, doesn’t my English ideology argument collapse as just another curious historical accident combine with an overworked imagination?

    I don’t think so. Despite the naked attempt to rescue Well’s socialist legacy in a recent biography by the past-head of the British Labour Party, Michael Foot, Wells was indeed a very strange socialist. Likewise, when the substance of its arguments are carefully considered, Wired strikes the pose of a very odd sort of capitalist. I’m convinced that they both choose to adopt protective coloring to enhance their stature in their respective times and places but that, just beneath the surface, they are both simply utopian/corporativists — the same ideological impulse which gave rise to Fascism — and not what they may appear to be to the more casual and, too often, more credulous observer.

    Both Wired and Wells are, in fact, utopians and elitists with overarching ambitions of leading a world revolution. This revolution is intended to produce radical economic and political transformation which would put their ilk in charge of running a new worldwide empire. From a strategic standpoint — fundamental goals and premises — Wells, Wired (and their common antecedent the anti-human radical Liberals) were/are all fighting for the same new imperial outcome. While there are certainly many tactical twists and turns in this plot over the centuries, this entire grabbag is precisely what I’ve been referring to as the English ideology — the ideology behind a global empire which combines an anything-goes small-scale private life (libertarianism) with rigidly defined large-scale constraints (technocracy). If you would like another description of the same utopian ying-yang, refer to Jaron Lanier’s November 1995 editorial in the Spin magazine issue on the future and his characterization of the Stewards (technocrats) and the Extropians (libertarians) as the post-political poles of discourse.

    Wells’ dalliance with the Fabian Society (he tried to take it over by promoting free-love to the wives of its board members) may be one of the sources of confusion leading to Wells’ apparent “socialist” credentials. But, as even a cursory reading of Wells’ quickly demonstrates, their was absolutely no room for working class revolt (or certainly working class leadership) in Wells’ worldview. He was thoroughly convinced that the downtrodden could never lead or even comprehend the revolution he saw coming. Wells’ life was dedicated to organizing a completely new class of technical and social scientific experts — technocrats — who would assume control of a world driven to collapse and ruin by workers and capitalists alike. Wells wanted to completely re-program humanity — through the creation of a synthetic religion — and, like all utopians, had no affection for the commoner of his time at all. Wells considered socialism, in its various Social Democratic to Marxist manifestations, to be a string of completely anachronistic failures and a throwback to the era of human folly and self-destruction which Wells sought to leap past — much like Toffler dismissing nation-states and representative democracy as “Second Wave.”

    In fact, Wells was very clear what sort of corporativist world he wanted when identified the earliest of the multinational corporations as the fledgling model of his ideal economic organization. In his 1920’s novel, The World of William Chissolm, and the companion essay, Imperialism and The Open Conspiracy, Wells cites early multi-nationals as the only kind of globe-spanning (and, therefore, anti-nation-state) economic structures which could embody his revolutionary principles. He chides both government and business leaders who think that any remnant of the still British-nation-centered Empire could survive and calls on the heads of multinationals to join in forming the vanguard of his revolutionary “Open Conspiracy.”

    He also published extensively about the inevitable scrapping of democracy and any form of popular rule in his World State. His “New Samurai” were volunteers who pledged their lives to the pure experience of ruling as a new caste of priest/scholars. No elections, no parliament, no hereditary titles and no buying your way in, Wells was clear that his new ruling class would be a religious elite with global reach. He even predicted that a new field of inquiry, which he termed Social Psychology, would arise and become the “soul of the race” by developing social control techniques which would systematically re-train the masses which he openly despised. And, following WW II, the core of British and American psychological warfare leadership created just such field to pursue worldwide social engineering. H.G. Wells was a very strange “socialist”, indeed.

    Oh, he did call for the abolition of all socially significant private property. But, then so has Wired with their repeated claims that in the Information Age intellectual property will disappear in cyberspace — a posture that has not gone unnoticed in the more orthodox neo-liberal circles as demonstrated by Peter Huber’s scathing critique of Wired in his piece for Slate, Tangled Wires. Such a call for abolishing property was also featured by the native U.S. fascist movement, Technocracy — which was launched out of the Columbia University Engineering Department with 1932 nationwide radio broadcast. In fact, while Wells rejected the offered allegiance to his “Open Conspiracy” by native British fascist, Oswald Moseley, he did it by pointing out that “what we need is some more liberal fascists.” Being educated as he was, Wells surely understood (and I believe embraced) the philosophical heritage of radical “liberalism.”

    As a matter of fact, independent economic sovereignty (the essence of politically effective private property) is what Wells (and all his empire building successors have) objected to. It is the independence of large scale economic forces — particularly those associated with strong nation-states — that both Wells and the radical Liberals both objected to so forcefully. It is only such forces, operating with determination and resolve, that function as a bulwark against empires like Wells’ World State. Despite their surface appearance of conflict, Wired-style free-marketeering and Wells’ “Open Conspiracy” both lead to the same political-economic outcome — oligarchist/corporativist control of a global economy. This is why the intellectual progenitor of modern libertarianism, Hayek, spent his career at the nominally Fabian socialist London School of Economics alongside Keynes, they were simply two birds of the same feather. Another ying-yang twinned pairing pointing to a common endgame.

    While it admittedly flies in the face of conventional categorization, right-wing and left-wing utopian/oligarchists are still fundamentally and most significantly utopian/oligarchists — even if their protective plumage might temporarily succeed in confusing some birdwatchers. They differ merely on the tactics, while presenting a home for confused fellow-travellers of all persuasions, while they thump for the same 1000 year empire and imagine themselves sitting behind the steering wheel. This should be no more confusing than watching Alvin Toffler, and his wife Heidi, move from active Communist Party membership and factory floor colonization to becoming chief advisors to Newt Gingrich. Tactics may change; the strategy remains unaltered.

    What sort of future do the futurists see for us? Despite the sugar-coated promises of wealth and power being held out to those who make the cut and get inducted into the supreme religious cult which gets to play imperial Wizard of Oz, the reality of a Wells/Wired future won’t be nearly so cinematic for most earthlings. As every honest futurist has admitted, the future will be painful and pointless for most who survive. The Information Age will be a Dark Age. It will bring pre-mature death to half or more of the earth’s population and it will represent the deliberate scrapping and then forgetting of humanity’s greatest achievements.

    Perhaps, the harsh truth of the Information Age was best described in Michael Vlahos’ January 1995 speech, “ByteCity -or- Life After the Big Change.” Vlahos is a Senior Fellow at Newt Gingrich’s thinktank, the Progress and Freedom Foundation (PFF), and a past geo-political analyst who has led PFF’s exploration of implementing the Toffler/Wells plans. Vlahos presents a terrifying future scenario roughly 20 years in the future in which society has stratified into elites and gangs. In fact, life is so threatening in ByteCity that we spent most of our time in our rooms staring at wall sized vidscreens — if we’re lucky enough to have a room, that is.

    Vlahos’ world is run by stateless modern robber-barons, which he terms the “Brain Lords” and which he characterizes as “rampaging not through the landscape but making billions in the ether.” These new aristocrats will come from the merger of telecommunications and entertainment multinational giants and much like in Wells’ formulation, the “Brain Lords” do not inherit their class status and they will burn out from looting at an early age. After 40 they will retire to run the world. They will comprise 5% of the population, he says. They are Wells’ “New Samurai.”

    Below them he stratifies in the “Upper Servers” and the “Agents” who comprise another 20% who will spend their lives destroying the value of professional education and association in a vicious “information” driven chase for individual recognition. Below that, roughly 50% of the population lives as service workers slaving 12-15 hours a day in front their living-room vidscreens “servicing” their global clients in a world that respects no time zones.

    And the bottom 25%, who, if they are not pacified will provide ample motivation for people to stay indoors to avoid being attacked by roving gangs, are what Vlahos calls “The Lost.” Roughly twice as large a population share as those who were discarded by the Industrial Revolution in Britain according to Vlahos, “The Lost” are those that will never become a functioning part of “ByteCity.” Sustained by modern “Victorians” who know the threat posed by the poor, “The Lost” are merely the most wretched of the wretches. Life all the way up the line from “lost” to “lord” will entail such radical disruption of personal safety and well-being that, in effect, Vlahos has turned dystopian cyberpunk literature into a policy statement. Naturally, expecting to rise to the top, Vlahos appears to feverishly await the “Big Change.”

    No less chilling is the scenarios planning exercise that Wired’s wizards-behind-the-curtain perform on their multi-national clients. From General Motors to AT&T, the Global Business Network (GBN) charges hefty sums to show the yellow-brick-road towards “ByteCity” to strategic planners and top corporate brass. In one recent and rare public discussion of the results, GM’s top planning team defined the three “alternative futures” which emerged after years of GBN counciling. The first is just like our world and, so by definition, is not very interesting. The second is an eco-fascist regime in which car designs are completely “Green” and the companies can only follow orders. The third is the fun one, however. This is the world in which armed gangs roam the streets and surface travel is a series of car chases. This scenario has already been anticipated with a Cadillac that includes armored protection and a “panic” button installed in the middle of the dashboard. The car has a satellite tracking system built in and it can call the local authorities (presumably your multi-national’s private swat-team) and get help when you get trapped by the natives.

    Vlahos/PFF/Gingrich and Wired/GBN/Brand and Wells/Toffler/”Open Conspiracy”. What ideology is being expressed by all these 20th century New Dark Age “revolutionaries”? Is this ideology “Californian”? Or, does it have another historical context and another tribal association? I merely suggest that accuracy, intellectual faithfulness and international solidarity require us to pin the tail on the real (Benthamite) donkey. This is the English ideology and, as usual, it’s hell-bent on ruling the world — over our dead bodies.

    [Copyright New Media Associates, 1996]

  • AN INSIDER’S VIEW ON THE CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY by Celia Pearce

    I first read a draft of ‘The Californian Ideology’ given to me by Andy Cameron during his visit to Los Angeles last summer for the SIGGRAPH ’95 Convention. At that time, Andy was showing Anti-Rom at SIGGRAPH on my invitation as part of an exhibition of alternative new media called the lounge@siggraph which I organized for the conference. Andy was staying near my house at a beachside motel in Santa Monica and wore sandals for the entire period of his stay. We ate cheap Mexican food for lunch every day across the street from the Convention Center. We had lively discussions on a variety of topics. With the exception of a few technical problems during the show, he seemed to have a lovely visit with us here in California. If I am not very much mistaken, he left Southern California with a bit of a tan.

    What, Precisely, Is California?

    “American and England are two nations divided by a common language.” Oscar Wilde was succinct in his observation, if not a bit simplistic. There is much more that divides America from England than mere linguistics. And if we are on the subject of California, the division is even more drastic since California is as far away from England as any place in the U.S., including Alaska, but with the possible exception of Hawaii.

    It is typical of Americans to be myopically ignorant of their own history – not to mention everyone else’s – which is how the Republican Party is able to repeatedly succeed at the polls. But a glimpse into our history, and particularly the history of California, is useful in understanding the basis for the Californian Ideology.

    California is and has always been characterized by pioneers and gold diggers. From the gold rush, to the movie industry, to the computer revolution, the Californian Ideology has always been one of spirited individualism and entrepreneurialism. A less utopian way to look at it is that California is a breeding ground for greed and self-interest. Both interpretations are correct. By way of example, take a look at this list of just a few of the things California has brought the world:

    Levis Movies Charles Manson The Grateful Dead Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon Silicon Graphics Microsoft and Apple Industrial Light & Magic Los Angeles and San Francisco Scientology Disneyland

    A Member of the Virtual Class

    Bearing all that in mind, I’d like to analyze some of Cameron and Barbrook’s points from the perspective of someone who must live – and survive – the Californian Ideology on a daily basis. By way of qualifying that statement, let me confess at once and without shame that I am a member of the ‘virtual class’ described in the article. The description of this individual – the independent contractor, free to come and go as they wish, well-paid, but at the same time, suffering from acute workaholism – fits me to a tee. All except the well-paid part. And that is a myth. It is true that many of us are well paid by the hour. However, it is also true that many of us spend between fifty and seventy-five percent of our time trying to secure that hour of work. Furthermore, prospective clients often expect us to do work on spec or for very low rates, often with no assurance that work will not be used without our participation. Those of us to are pushing the envelope the hardest, and particularly, those who are trying to make product with social and cultural merits, must fight every step of the way. The people who are at the forefront of the digital revolution, the true vanguards, are blazing their trail at tremendous personal risk.

    The condition of the ‘virtual class’ cannot be blamed on the individuals within it, but must be looked at in a larger context. In America, artists receive very little support from the government or, for that matter, the society-at-large. Since the 1930’s and the New Deal, when WPA funding was created to support a variety of arts and cultural projects, America has systematically eroded away its art and cultural support, much as a desperate animal gnaws its own foot off to release itself from a trap. In our anti-intellectual culture, artists are considered subversive and unnecessary. In America, anything that does not generate revenue is viewed as gratuitous.

    And herein lies the key to understanding the Californian Ideology. The most important thing in America is making money. Period. If we begin our discussion starting from that axiom, we can start to make a little more sense of what the Californian Ideology is all about.

    “Bigger is Better”

    In many arenas, America prides itself on matters of size. “Bigger is better” is the general belief. But one of the primary reasons for the average American’s sense of political impotency is that America is quite simply too big to manage. The European Community will ultimately be a better model for managing governments than the United States of America. If you look at any large country with a large physical area and a large population, you will recognize that it is almost impossible to run a large country with any measure of freedom to its members. If you are autocratic and highly centralized, as was the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China, you can have some measure of control. However, once you start letting people have any say in what’s going on, things start to degenerate, as we are now seeing with former Soviet republics.

    To compensate for this flaw in large-scale decentralized management, we have developed, in the form of corporations and companies, our own form of a tribal culture. Big companies like Disney, IBM, McDonald’s or Coca-Cola, are small nations unto themselves with their own culture, ethics, even their own language. These tribes cluster themselves into “industries” – software, entertainment, automobile, and so on. It is within these corporate tribes that most Americans find the unity and security one might expect to be provided by government in a place where the “common good” is seen as a priority.

    Capitalist Cyberhippies

    Why is Silicon valley overrun with capitalist hippies? It is easy to label these individuals are revolutionaries who ‘sold out’ to the capitalist ethic. But when you live within that ethic, you can also look at it another way. We learned in the 1960’s, after our President, his brother, and our two most influential civil rights leaders were murdered, that politics was a dangerous path to take in building a revolution. The Nixon regime further drove home the point that politics was no place for a respectable individual to devote their time and energy. Furthermore, it doesn’t take a genius to see that in reality, there is no politics in America, only economics. So to say that Americans are apolitical is absolutely correct. And that is because our country is about economics, not politics. In Europe, there are countries. In America, there are corporations. It is the corporations who take care of the people, not the government. Those things which are typically government supported in social democracies, like medical insurance, education, and even the arts, are provided by corporations. We have created a modern-day feudal society. And the only way to secure any real power in America is to either make -or control- large sums of money.

    In the 1960’s, the generation that seemed destined to revolutionize America was utterly derailed by the events described above from a political path to change. They did, in fact, change America, but not in the ways we thought they would. Those who would have excelled in politics turned instead to industry. In another time and place, it might have been Bill Gates in the White House rather than Bill Clinton. But their generation learned the hard way that politics is as treacherous in America as it is pointless. The mere comparison of the two Bills should attest to that.

    Siliwood & the Military Entertainment Complex

    From Silicon Valley, you can follow the California fault to the other nexus of activity in California – Hollywood. Hollywood is the home of the entertainment industry, Silicon Valley of the computer industry. And in the past three years, these two powerful forces have “gotten in bed together” (as we say in showbiz) and given birth to a new phenomenon aptly known as ‘Siliwood’.

    But beneath the self-congratulatory glitter of this marriage, both regions are tied together by a much stronger bond, a bond much less glamorous, but no less profitable. That bond is the military. As ‘The Californian Ideology’ very astutely points out, virtually every aspect of the computer industry has its roots in government-funded military technology, and California has always been a leader in military contracts. This all but explodes (pun intended) the myth of the autonomous pioneer. For every Apple in California, there is a Lockheed. Considering Silicon Valley is the domain of the cyberhippie-turned-capitalist culture, there is a deep irony in the fact that people who were once anti-war demonstrators have built an entire industry on the shoulders of the military. The brushing over of this fact is yet another example of historical myopia.

    But one can scarcely explore the ironies of this without acknowledging Siliwood’s companion movement, the ‘Military Entertainment Complex’. In the wake of military downsizing, many military contractors, scratching their heads and wondering “Who, but the military, can afford us?” turned to their liberal neighbors in Hollywood. The result is a whole series of hybrid technologies, some of which I have had the pleasure of participating in the development of. I rather enjoy the concept of forging weapons into ploughshares, especially since both of the military-cum-entertainment projects I have worked on consisted of non-violent content. In spite of my staunchly pacifist position, I have a tremendous amount of respect for the fact that none of this would be possible without the military. In a way, the military could be looked at as the front end of the technological adoption curve.

    Adoption Curve

    ‘The Californian Ideology’ spends a good deal of time on the topic of technological determinism and elitism. In America, we call this the ‘adoption curve’. Here’s how it works: Technology is developed at tremendous capital expense. It is released on the market at exorbitant prices, prices that the ‘average’ person cannot begin to afford. It is targeted to a certain demographic – affluent, young, educated, eager to impress themselves and each other. These are the people who ‘lead’ the market. They run out and buy ‘the latest’ thing, drop it in the trunk of their BMW’s, and take it home to their house in Marin County while listening to the CD player in their trunk, perhaps having a phonecall in the car on the way. If and when enough of these ‘early adopters’ invest in the technology, one of two things will happen. More often than not, the technology falls on its face for whatever reason and becomes obsolete, rendering the expensive device virtually useless. However, if the right combination of factors are present, and a certain saturation level is reached, then presto! The price begins to plunge, and the subsequent tiers of adoption trailers follow, and eventually, the technology becomes available and affordable on a mass level. This process can sometimes take years, and there is fairly consistent demographic sequence to this pattern. This is the general means by which technology achieves mass market penetration in the U.S. and these are the actual terms that are used to describe this.

    On the one hand, this can be viewed as an elitist system. And in many respects it is. But the fact is that if the technology is really worthwhile, eventually, the cost will keep being pushed down until it becomes affordable on a mass level. And the people at the head of the adoption curve are the ones who pay the price. Because they buy the device at a premium, subsidizing further development so that a year or two later, others can buy it at a fraction of the cost. No-one feels sorry for them because that’s their job.

    Underlying it all is the axiom with which we started. Profits profits and more profits. In France, you give free MINITELs to everyone. In America, you sell them for a lot of money to early adopters.

    Social Capitalism & Autodidactic Communalism

    If you prefer to exist outside the corporate culture, you must take on the role of a renegade and become a member of ‘the virtual class’. If you play your cards right, you can evolve into a consultant, which is basically just a renegade who knows how to market themselves.

    Contrary to the myth, renegades to not operate in a vacuum, nor would the vast majority of us claim to. Instead, we form our own loosely structured, somewhat anarchistic communities. Because we share the common resource of the ‘digisphere’, we can, in fact, function in this way, without the ‘big brother’ protection of a feudal master. There are two systems of community which this has given rise to, which I call Autodidactic Communalism and Social Capitalism.

    Most people in new media are autodidacts. As in all fields, education is always about twenty years behind industry, so anyone with any time in the new media business is, by definition, self-taught. The computer is, of course, the ultimate heuristic tool (and as I am speaking to a British audience, I can rest assured that you all know what this word means.) As such, it is the boon of the autodidact. But autodidacticism is also a myth and nowhere is this more true than in the computer field. In fact, we autodidacts work together. We learn by doing, and we learn by showing each other how to do things. HTML is a great example of autodidactic communalism. Everyone learns how to do it from their friends. Shareware is another great example. I can get all kinds of software on-line, and I can even download manuals. As people learn to do things, they make their learning available to each other, and this is very much a part of the hacker ethic. While the corporate world takes a proprietary posture, hoarding ‘intellectual property’ and charging a premium for its use, and the military world is entirely shrouded in secrecy, autodidactic communalists freely share – and steal – ideas and information, fully aware that such an open architecture is to the benefit of all.

    Social Capitalism is a system by which a series of individuals or small companies develop horizontal, collaborative relationships providing each other with various services to support each others’ work. Sometimes, this work is done on contract, other times, it is taken in barter. But unlike the traditional hierarchical structure, in which one person is always ‘boss’ and the other always ‘worker’, relationships under social capitalism are reciprocal. I may be your client one day and you may be mine the next. Or, we may join forces and create a larger ‘alliance’ in order to take on a project than neither alone could do. This model is much less competitive than the corporate model in which large organizations vie for absolute power. In this model, cooperation and a sense of community is seen to benefit all. In the interactive multimedia field, there are many small companies and individuals who operate in just this way, and in fact, they have become the backbone of the industry. If you got to any of the major content producers in the U.S. multimedia industry, you will find that a significant number of them contract out the majority of their work to small production companies. Those who have tried to produce in-house have given up, finding they get better, faster and cheaper results if they contract out to a multimedia ’boutique’. Unhindered by the burden of high overhead or executive bottlenecks, these smaller organizations are frequently more efficient, more creative, and just plain better at what they do. (It may surprise some to know that it is becoming quite fashionable for American companies to call on the talent of small British companies for their multimedia needs.)

    These two movements combine together to create a community of individualists. For those of us who are trying to break new ground, we have no choice but to live on the edge, but we cannot live on the edge alone. We must of necessity join together. Those of us who do share a sense of social conscience and do everything in our power to broaden the landscape and create a more inclusive forms of technology. But we must always fight an uphill battle to do so.

    Many young entrepreneurs are creating cybercafes and other venues that allow free and open access of technology to a much wider audience. And although the Internet does promote individual expression, as suggested by ‘The Californian Ideology’, it also promotes freedom of access to information and a sense of community that transcends geographical boundaries.

    This disintegration of these international boundaries is precisely what makes this type of discourse possible. As an inhabitant of the Californian Ideology, I can choose to write an article for Mute, rather than Wired, because to a large extent, I am more closely aligned to its ideology.

    In spite of the apparent absolutism of ‘The Californian Ideology’, I happen to know that Andy Cameron spends his Friday nights watching American television programs. In fact, Andy knows more about American TV than I do. (I rarely watch it!) As much as the British may disdain our unsophisticated ways, just as the proponents of the Californian Ideology cannot deny their ties to the military, neither can its critics deny their ties to California.

    Look at the world. On the one hand, we are in the midst of a number of major planetwide transformations. Multinational corporations are changing the face of the global economy. The earth’s environment is on the brink of major disaster. While half of Europe coalesces, the other half disintegrates. And in and around this complex landscape is the digital ‘Global Village’ (to unabashedly quote the oft-maligned Marshall McLuhan), simultaneously contracting and exploding, a parallel universe of which we all the architects – whether we read Wired, Mondo 2000 or Mute. In light of all this, it seems absurd to speak at all of ideologies which are geographically based. Rather, it would make more sense to define a new ideology which takes into account our individual political, social and economic realities, while creating a forum for change that goes beyond those limitations towards a global community consciousness that we can all aspire toward.

  • RESPONSE TO THE CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY by John Barker

    I’m in broad agreement with the argument of ‘The Californian Ideology’ and its attack on that ideology in which “the ahistorical dogmas of neo-liberalism are beefed up with added techno-determinism.”

    The argument does have a weakness in the alternatives it presents:

    – an idealistic view of the French Minitel system of which there is evidence that its use is mainly by young professional men;

    – the pan-European ideology of modern Gaullism, Europe versus America, a Europe which is not subject to the same analysis of inequality and exploitation applied to the USA.

    This insufficiency is excusable given that the Californian ideology, ironically constructed by people with a psychic need to see themselves as rebels, is now ‘the conventional wisdom’. Alternative models are liable to be viewed optimistically by those opposing the dominant ideology. This is especially so when the European Commission’s own Bangemann Report undermined any European strategy when it embraced the Californian ideology with enthusiasm.

    What’s less excusable is that this ‘Gaullist’ point of view in ‘The Californian Ideology’ is to ignore initiatives in the USA like the Public Information Exchange (PIE) based in Maryland. It is described as “an electronic clearing house that brings together a wide variety of public information consumers and producers. It has organized coalitions of health care organizations, consumer groups, environmentalists and civil rights groups to put information on-line in America’s 15,000 public libraries.” It has also attempted to provide real information about candidates, their histories and programmes before elections. This in stark contrast to the frightening prospect of instant referenda without the time or means being provided to give the information on which judgements could be made. Against this Mao’s view: “No opinions without research.”

    This insufficiency can only be remedied by an informed and scrupulous tracking of what possibilities are offered by the variety of tools made available by the new computer-driven technologies. That and a cold-eyed analysis of what social democracy is capable of doing in this area, whether it is capable of doing anything serious at nation-state level. What I mean by social democracy here is the ability of the state or supra-state structures to regulate what exists, and instigate what does not, with the aim of enhancing the power of those without historically-made resources. Here again a more scrupulous look at the difference between the Gore/Clinton programme of cultivating small-scale public initiatives and making public libraries on line, and that for example of the British Labour party, whose prospective deal with BT makes sense from the point of view of national economic development but depends rather a lot on exhortation and enclouragement when it comes to on-lining all schools and libraries. Geoff Mulgan of Demos (a New Labour thinktank), for example thinks the Gore approach better than the Labour-BT promise.

    The techno-utopianianism of the Californian ideology would see these questions as irrelevant political and moral anachronisms. For me, they are difficult and unpalatable. I see myself as being part of a socialist libertarian tradition which has little trust in the nation-state or social democracy. Little trust, because enhancing the power of those without historically-made resources involves some degree of restricting the power of those who have them in abundance, and at minimum their perception of that exclusive power. This is something social-democracy has usually not had the stomach for.

    This libertarian socialist tradition I am proud to identify myself with sees the twin evils of elitism and exploitation as what must be fought to make the world civilized and sustainable. Let alone the global reality of these evils, even the words do not exist in the interminable supply of printed text from the Californian ideologists. Who, at the same time, define themselves as libertarians for whom the state is a necessarily stupid – because centralized-oppressor which they no longer need. This at a time when after years of being trashed, there are signs of a rehabilitation of the New Deal and even Johnson’s Great Society. There is hard evidence beyond sentimental recollection, that the state-instigated initiatives of the New Deal (regardless of the motivations of its instigators) released the creativity of masses of poor Americans.

    One of the main reasons given by the text for the ’emergence’ (as Kevin Kelly might put it) of 1960s libertarian hippies in the Californian ideology is the physical defeat of the Californian left by then Governor Ronald Reagan. Fear -and the US state and capital has always been especially violent towards ‘leftist activity’ – is likely to involve a fair degree of displacement activity, the direction of energy to safer goals. Income, ageing, and ambition may also have been involved as well as a genuine intellectual-utopian excitement. California is also an exceptionally privileged area of the globe for a good part of its population. More than that, it is not surprising that this ideology of a computer-driven revolution of infinite potential should come from an area of the globe which is so successful in producing many of the key bits and pieces of this revolution. The re-discovery of American self-confidence vis-a-vis Japan has emanated specifically from this sector of production. That this happened in the presidency of a nominally social democratic President with a seriously IT enthusiast Vice President is either coincidence, or is further evidence of the wilful non-acknowledgement of state support for this sector which the text demonstrates. For the Californian ideology it shows – without regard for anything as banally economic as a long-term over-valuation of the Yen – the triumph of genuine individualism against a corporate version of capitalism.

    The embracing of free-market ideology (as articulated by then President Ronald Reagan) by a techno-counter-culture with a psychic need to see itself in rebellion, requires a massive array of flim-flam. In particular it has used Fuzzy Implication and Dodgy Analogy. Global has been a key word in both techniques. It implies an internationalist and ecological view of the world. In fact it has replaced ‘imperialism’ in a way which hides the global hierarchy of exploitation that ‘imperialism’ (however degraded its use became) did not. It derives not just from McLuhan but more tangibly from the icon of 1960s technological optimism, the space programme and those shots of the earth as a globe in space. This image is key in the development of the most fuzzy forms of ecology which also originated in the USA and centred around the phrase ‘Spaceship Earth’. Spaceship earth – we’re all in this together – again had the role of hiding the global hierarchy of exploitation, which in the most tangible ways, prevents the development of any real ecology. I emphasise this because this kind of ecology was important in the 1960’s counter-culture (Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalogue for example) and in Kevin Kelly’s present individualized ecological concerns which have been a rich source of dodgy analogies.

    From the global we are lurched into equally fuzzy Good Things as proclaimed by this ideology, the Holistic – the Non-Linear. The fuzziness of these involves the implication that they are automatically non-reductionist which is a Very Good Thing. The preferred course taken by the Californian ideology in the use of these words has been chaos theory. The degraded notion of the holistic can also be seen in the work of ‘management gurus’. We have Richard Pascale of Stanford University urging a ‘holistic approach to management. And we have Tom Peters, frequently described as an evangelist or missionary of management, entitling his latest best-seller, Thriving on Chaos.

    Chaos theory, with its dependence on number-crunching, is a child of the computer revolution. It proclaims that there is pattern, that the world is mathematical, just that these patterns are far more complex than linear Newtonian physics would allow. Its holistic/ecological claim is seen in the metaphor/partial reality of an event in one part of the world having an effect on the climate elsewhere. It also creates beautiful patterns called Fractals. On the basis of this it rather fetishizes Weird Connections via its use of statistics on a scale unknown before computing power. It makes big claims for itself in stark contrast to the modesty expressed in Eugene Wigner’s great essay, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.

    In some respects it mimics the breakthroughs of the modernist science of quantum physics – just as post-modernism takes the Uncertainty Principle of quantum physics and makes of it a lazy analogy for a bogus relativism – in its use of the non-local effect which is central to that physics. N.B. The non-local effect is proposed by J.S. Bell and later proved by Alain Aspect in an experiment in which two unrelated atoms influenced each other without being able to signal each other. A wonderful piece of science, but one which is open to plenty of dodgy analogizing. That we should be vigilant about dodgy analogizing, should be clear from the late 19th century notion of Social Darwinism. The revolutionary theory of evolution, the liberation from monotheism (and the accompanying soul-body dualism) it offered, was analogized into a banal and rather nasty prop to elitism and comepetitive capitalism. Still today, it lurks behind both: to justify the unjustifiable in the one; and to prop up the nostalgic version of itself which the multi-natioanl corporations and their planning staffs maintain as a working ideolgy in textbooks.

    Chaos theory like quantum physics is not-Newtonian. What is lazy, and will therefore hide various dirty corners of bad faith, is the assumption that what is anti-Newtonian is A Good Thing in itself. In Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control there is a continual complacency about anything which is non-linear, not-Newtonian; the interchangeable networks/swarm systems/complex adaptive systems he sees across the board. Yet he does not acknowledge the real anti-Newtonian breakthrough of the pre-computer mathematicians of Quantum Physics. Perhaps it is too uncomfortable, whereas Chaos theory, we might say, puts the Certainty back into the Uncertainty Principle.

    Equally the attack on Newtonianism from Ilya Prigorgine (Order Out of Chaos) is far tougher. What it does is to attack the notion of timeless equilibria in the Newtonian and posit against it the “irreversible arrow of time” from his own speciality: thermodynamics. Spurious notions like “the End of History” and the equilibria-based mathematical models of neo-classical/liberal economics are both dependent on non-acknowledgement of the irreversible arrow. Chaos theory is static and timeless in its claims to be able to draw the unexpected, with iteration doing the rest, as if all time and all dynamics was a process of iteration. We can see this in the interest of Chaos theory in commodity prices and their historical cycles. There is a safety to it. Just as Kevin Kelly, futurologist, lives in a perpetual present in which, discussing money, there are no questions about the cashability of future pensions for example.

    If we compare the technological utopianism of the 1950s which focussed on atomic energy, featured non-photogenic squares, working for the state in white coats and smoking pipes to that of the more exotic Californian ideologues of now what we see is a change of language from the control of nature to that of its management. This reflects those ecolgical and holistic concerns of the present hiding how it is global patterns of exploitation which determine Spaceship Earth’s condition. It also shows a touching faith in our powers of observation and data-gathering (increased so greatly by satellite and computer) to solve ecological problems by themselves. This is the supposed fallacy if intellectuals: if you’re aware of a problem, it’s OK, it’s then manageable. In addition, Who is doing the watching? Who is doing the interpreting?

    It is precisely these political questions the Californian ideology avoids, just as those pipe-smoking squares dodged them. They have more than that in common, they share a techno-determinism which tends to be uncritically optimistic. I would like to seperate this from that smug and crass element of Gaullism which likes to pose a wise European scepticism against an exclusively American brash optimism: techno-determinism is not exclusively American. Instead it has an uncanny resemblance to the individualist optimism that comes from the theorizing of the free-market by von Hayek for example. This too raises difficult questions about the nature and possibilities of social democracy. Socialism has usually been characterized as an Enlightenment project with a fundamental belief in human reason and the perfectability of humans; while a reactionary view of the world was based on the notion of original sin. Modern social democracy seems to see the world as a pretty shitty, and that therefore controls and regulations are needed to protect the weak. My doubts about it remain that it hasn’t done much of a job of it.

    This techno-determinism has something else in common. I’ve said that non-reductionism was an important strand of that weave of flim-flam the Californian ideologists have created. In its uncritical embrace of the new however this strand is revealed as flimsy.

    This flimsiness is revealed in the embracing of Marvin Minsky’s notions of Artificial Intelligence. Aside from the argument that there are limits to the number-crunching which would be involved, the most effective critique of AI comes from the mathematician Roger Penrose, someone with great confidence in mathematics but who says mathematical understanding is non-computational as is understanding in general. As an example of what he is arguing he quotes Godel saying that no system of computational rules can characterize the properties of natural numbers and then points out that children can grasp the notion of them.

    It is hard to say whether the especially heavy dose of fuzzy and dodgy analogizing by Kevin Kelly on this question is because he can see the reductionism there or not. Whatever way, the chapter of Out of Control entitled ‘Machines with Attitude’, focussing on the work of Marvin Minsky and Rodney Brooks, is a tour de force of flim-flam. We are jumped from quote to quote: – from the philosopher Daniel Dennett, “The idea that the brain has a centre is just wrong. Not only that, it is radically wrong.” – to an approving reference to “the bureaucratization of the brain” – to the collapse of the USSR being soley ascribable to the instability of any centrally controlled complexity to “There is no ‘I’, for a person, for a beehive, for a corporation…” (this a knowing nod in the direction of post-modernist orthodoxy) – to the really specious analogy filched without acknowledgement from quantum physics (whose practitioners have warned against such analogy) it is very likely that intelligence is a probabilistic or statistical phenomena.

    With the reader suitably softened up from this scatter gun of analogies, up pops Marvin Minsky to tell us “You can build a mind from many little parts, each mindless by itself.” Followed by Kelly telling us “Singly, each is a moron; but together, organized in tangled hierarchy of control, they can create thinking.” Kelly then has a few problems with this “hierarchy of control” but soldiers through that, warning the anarchists they would be wrong to be disappointed by this necessity and by the use of tangle which he has previously used in a string of metaphors, “the web of life, the tangle of the economy…” He bypasses the reductionism inherent in Minsky with the concept of complexity: “Complexity must be grown up from simple systems that already work.” ‘The Californian Ideology’ points out that the new multi-media technologies make up something greater than its parts, but this does not mean that this is true of the world in general or of natural sciences.

    In his superb attack on the genome Project in The Politics of DNA, Richard Lewontein analyses why so much biochemistry research is focussed on the bits and pieces. It is easier to do, to get results than examining the working of the central nervous system for example that can only be understood as a whole. The bits and pieces do not necessarily add up.

    With Roger Brooks’s alternative of many small robots, Kevin Kelly says, “So difficult was the task of co-ordinating a central world view that Brooks discovered it was far easier to use the real world as its own model…With no centrally imposed model, no one has the job of reconciling disputed notions; they simply aren’t reconciled. Instead, various signals generate various behaviours. The behaviours are sorted out (suppressed, delayed, activated) in the web hierarchy of subsumed control.” Then in a brazen piece of reader flattery he says “Astute observers have noticed that Brooks’s prescription is an exact description of a market economy.” It is not just flattery but that most dangerous of analogies and time-worn ideological props, that the capitalist free market is a Natural state of affairs.

    The virtues of the market economy have already been implied by the fetishizing of “decentralization” as a Good Thing in itself. In the world of lazy and dodgy analogizing, the righteous celebration of diversity, difference and multiplicity; the creative potential of the non-linear and some of the insights of quantum physics; and the structuralist critique which kicked away so many of the props of White-man-centricity, has been hijacked by that relativism which says that nothing is better than anything else, one which has always been a handy tool for those doing very well with the way things are. The notion of de-centralization can be proclaimed by post-modernism as an at-last reflection of the multiplicity of human life. In reality it has been used to kick way the vestiges of class struggle in the social democratic mode, i.e. regulation of the conditions of exploitation and an element of redistributive taxation. For the relatively powerless there is no one to negotiate with anymore, governing institutions are consciously made ad hoc. It reminds me of a self-critical pamphlet from the socialist libertarian movement and entitled, The Tyranny of Structurelessness.

    This de-centralization has its objective base not in post-facto, dusted down monetarist economics, but in real globalization, especially that of money. It is the global movement of capital made ever easier by the developments of communications technology which consistently undermines any aspirations to a Global ecology. The free movement of capital is seen as one of the essential constituents of that de-regulated free trade ideology which rules the world from various centralized locii of financial power. Ricardo may have been rubbished as all classical economics has been by the free marketeers, but his theory of comparative advantage has been constantly re-used by its ideologues. In fact the theory of comparative advantage assumes that factors of production, including capital, are immobile. The present interpretation is that capital can be mobile, labour not. There are no regulations on the movement of capital: there are an ever-increasing raft of them when it comes to labour. Turn the rafts over, drown the fuckers as the Italian state has it. With decentralization the forces of lazy analogy have also been hard at work. In the latter years of the Cold War planning was made synonymous with centralization and the state. In the West planning continued and continues apace, the planning by large capitalist concerns called corporations. They have anthroplogical, technical, sociological, economic philosphical talent working on it constantly. They have always planned. The difference now is that:

    – the role of state as planner has been reduced to the production of infrastructure when and if required by these corporations; – the corporations also have the gurus of the Californian ideology on the team. On the team partially on their own terms, as consultants. Thus Stewart Brand and Peter Schwartz’s ‘Global Business Network’ for example.

    In the polemic one of the sharpest arguments is how much of the technology which celebrates its free birth and development in fact originated with state spending. In both the USSR and the USA this took place largely through defence budgets. I think this argument could be widened without becoming fuzzy. Free markets have always depended on the state to bail it out when major fuck ups take place. The de-regulation of the S&L banking set-up in the USA lead to massive scandals and losses. The state, using a large chunk of that taxation that is anathema to free-trade ideology, rescued it In The Public Interest. Something similar seems to be happening now in the UK with the de-regulation of pensions.

    How anyway does the free market component of the Californian ideology look in relation to its own history and present. They may hold Bill Gates up as a baddie but the fact is that he is a monopolist, and a successful one, in the heart of their world. Mr Murdoch’s very recent move into Telecoms with MCI is also indicative. The regulation of US ‘national interest’ between the rights of big capital and its monopolizing and the cutting edge that real competition should provide is at present all being determined in the US legal system. There are no regulatuions but it is here that the arbitration of the respective rights of dynamic corporatist capitals and a dynamic technology is taking place on a case by case basis. The recruitment policy of Microsoft, the baddie, has also been copied by Californian ideologists who profess to see him as an anemy. Microsoft scoured India for the best and cheapest programmers and instituted a hierarchical system with an elite of mega-programmers to point these saps on their way. In the true traditions of the Californian ideolgy they could dress as they liked and worked which hours they liked as long as they did the hours and kept to their subservient role of serving the meta-programmers.

    The Californian ideologists have been more interested in the programmers of the ex-USSR and their ideas. There is a programming cottage industry in the low-wage Ukraine. There are also ideas. If the difference between the USSR and the USA in the Cold war period could be characterized (as it is so often is) as between the empiricists and the theoreticians, the empiricists are now reaping the benefit of the theoretical brilliance of Russian computer experts financed by the very defence budgets which helped finish off the “state-socialist” USSR. Many of these brightest and best of the ex-USSR state are employed by Californian hi-tech industries for that theoretical brilliance which enabled them to stay up with the USA in the space race even though the US government had banned them from access to super-conducters.

    In a thoroughly snide interview of Kevin Kelly by Peter Yorke in The Guardian (one which makes me instinctively sympathize with Kevin Kelly) there is one revealing section with deals with the basic question of empowerment and the net, one which many people have raised.

    PY: “Won’t a lot of people be left outside these new media?” KK: “There will be a large number left outside and it’s unfortunate, we should bring them in. No one argues about that. Let the rich buy technology now, to make it cheaper for the poor. The issues are not the haves and the have-nots but the haves and the have-lates.” He goes on to say that what is important is shrinking the time-lapse.

    All the evidence is that a whole range of hard and software which began as being very expensive has got cheaper and cheaper. It may also be true that in many cases it is the rich who have been conned into buying all sorts of dubious up-dates. On the other hand what Kelly is saying sounds suspiciously like ‘trickle-down’ theory, that socio-moral get-out clause of hard-line free market economics, which asserts that if the bounds are removed from the rich getting much richer (bounds like health and safety requirements at work as well as minimum wages) wealth will be generated which the poor will (again there is a time-lapse) eventually benefit from. All the evidence here is that this is not the case.

    I don’t want this to stand as a dodgy analogy but there is a similar question to be asked which is, why should those doing very, very well out of how things are want this situation to change. Some people who are very clever do have an edge right now and a lot of them are in California. What is implied by the Californian ideologists’ techno-determinism is that this technology is different, that this technology cannot help but be progressive and democratic.

    In the absence of public or autonomous initiatives wotking to make it so, this is wilfully optimistic. It ignores the fact that though there may be legendary small outfits in Silicon Valley the industry is still dominated by large capital. Time-Warner, Viacom-Blockbuster, Rupert Murdoch, telephone companies, they’re all in there. More specifically, IBM has not gone bust. Predictions of Microsoft being ‘in trouble’ in relation to Netscape sounds like whistling in the wind from the Jeffersonian ideologues.

    In the Financial Times of 2nd Febuary 1996 it was announced that Visa International and MasterCard International have agreed to collaborate in creating a system to ensure the security of credit card transactions on the net. The system will be called Secure Electronic Transactions. The software code will be made freely available. “This is the first step in making cyberspace an attractive venture for banks and merchants,” said Mr Edmund Jensen, president and chief executive of Visa International. The report also says that until now Visa had been working with Microsoft on the project, and Mastercard with Netscape. They are now all working together.

    In the early issues of Wired magazine, encryption was seen as the cutting edge of rebellious libertarian work in the new technologies, creating the means for genuine privacy from the state I do not want to try and describe Kevin Kelly’s chapter on E-money, he gets into terrible difficulties with the potential use by organized crime, but to say that a means of safe payment on the net is precisely what is required for full commercial exploitation of it. It is here that a ‘trickle-down’ notion of the Net runs into difficulties and the price of information likely to be prohibitive without social democratic and autonomous initiatives.

    My suspicion of social democracy remains for the reasons I have given and also because it is been elitist in the sense of managing and representing its clientele in a way which allows them little input. What it might be able to offer is some protection and resources to make autonomous initiatives flower and make the new technology truly a tool for liberation.

  • RESPONSE TO THE CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY by the author of Neuromagma

    1: Proliferating Futures

    What about the Becoming of the Net? We cannot describe the Net as one single process of Becoming, but as proliferation of different coexisting processes. Therefore we can’t make a statement about the future of the Net. Many different futures will coalesce within it.

    Different intentions can enter the Net, different processes of semiotization can coevolute. The Net is not a territory, but a multiplanary Sphere. Infinite plateaux are rotating inside this Sphere. What is forbidden on one level can be done on another.

    The Net cannot be conceptualized within the Hegelian concept of Totality. In Hegel, the Truth is the Whole. The Hegelian Whole is Aufhebung – the annihilation of every difference. In the Net, every connection between points of enunciation creates its own level of truth. Truth is only found in singularity.

    In the Net, the world cannot be considered as the objective reference point of a process of enunciation. The world is the projection of enunciation itself.

    Networking is the method of a new social paradigm – one that goes beyond the social oppositions and conceptual contradictions inherited from the modern world. Because capitalism is still in power, acting as the general semiotic code, the old social oppositions and conceptual contradictions are not vanishing yet. This is the reason why we are still concerned with the old problem of the State versus the Market. Notwithstanding the emergence of the Net, the State and the Market still exist.

    2: High Tech Deregulation

    The discourse about the Net (cyberculture) is still dominated by ideologies which are the legacy of the past twentieth century. Cyberculture is still dominated by the conceptual and political alternatives coming from the industrial society. A sort of high tech neo-liberalism is emerging from the American scene. In the theoretical core of this philosophical movement, I see a misunderstanding: the identification of technology with economics within the paradigm shift. Thinkers like Alvin Toffler, Kevin Kelly and Esther Dyson support the neo-liberal agenda of Newt Gingrich because, they argue, the free market is the best method for expanding free communications – and free communications are the key to the future world.

    Sounds good, but what does the ‘free market’ mean? In the social framework of capitalism, free market means power to the strongest economic groups – and the absorption or elimination of society’s intellectual energies.

    Kevin Kelly, in ‘Out of Control’, says that, thanks to the digital technologies and computer networks, mankind is evolving into a superorganism, a new biological system. The biologisation of culture and society which is described by Kelly is nothing but the disappearance of any alternative from the social field, the absorption of intelligence itself within the framework of capitalist semiotization. The possibility of choice is denied, eradicated.

    This is the main effect of the integration of technological development, scientific work and economic power. Michel Foucault describes the formation of modern society in terms of the imposition of discipline on the individual body and on social behaviour. What we are now witnessing is the making of what Gilles Deleuze defines as a society of control: the code of behaviour is being imprinted directly onto the mind through models of cognition, of psychic interaction. Discipline is no longer imposed on the body through the formal action of the law – it is printed in the collective brain through the dissemination of techno-linguistic interfaces inducing a cognitive mutation.

    3: Old Alternatives are Misleading

    In their article ‘The Californian Ideology’, Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron criticize the mystification of this high tech neo-liberalism. But what do they oppose it with? They talk of a European way – the way of the welfare state, public intervention within the economy, public control over technological innovation. Can we believe in this solution? I don’t.

    Barbrook and Cameron say that MINITEL in France has shown the possibility of a European way to build the Net. But this is pointless. This example shows exactly that public intervention cannot achieve this goal. MINITEL is a rigid and centralized system, unable to face the challenges of virtualization. And in Italy, the experience of Olivetti shows that it is impossible to develop innovation on the basis of state investment and controls. From this point of view, the American model of development is working better. It opens the way to creative innovations. It captures these innovations through techno-social interfaces.

    Barbrook and Cameron say that Europe must oppose the process of globalization which is led by the U.S. But this idea is naive and dangerous. Stopping globalization, preserving identities: these are the ideas which are generating nationalism and fundamentalism. These are what are called retrofascism by Kroker and Weinstein in their book ‘Data Trash’.

    The war between neo-liberalism and the old fashioned welfare state is not over – as shown by the strikes of the French railwaymen. The struggles of Fordist workers will probably go on for a long time, but they are doomed to defeat. The strategic defeat of industrial labour has already happened – FIAT 1980, Peugeot, the Miners Union, Detroit were the stages of this defeat during the ’80s. The marginalisation of industrial labour began in that period.

    The new composition of social labour is marked by the emergence of the cognitariat – what Kroker and Weinstein call the ‘virtual class’. The social labour of the collective intelligence, or general intellect as Marx calls it in ‘The Grundrisse’, remains dominated by capitalist social relations in spite of its formal independence. Marx distinguishes two different kinds of domination of capital over human activity: formal domination and real domination.

    Formal domination is the legal imposition of discipline, the legal subordination of human time to the capitalist exploitation. Real domination is the technological and material dependence of social activity on the capitalist form of social relations. We are probably entering today a new phase of capitalist domination, beyond formal and real: mental domination, realized through the pervasiveness of the semiotic code of capital within the collective brain, within language, within the mind, and within the cognitional activity. The capitalist paradigm is imprinted on the collective intelligence, inside the techno-social interfaces, in the semiotic framework of social communications.

    The alternative between policies of deregulation and policies of state intervention is a false alternative. There is no way of regulating capital. Capital is a proliferating process of semiotization, informing techno-social interfaces and producing neural pathways and frames of social interaction. Since capital is pervading all social relationships, it is the regulator, not the regulated. The problem is not the legal regulation of capitalism, the problem is capitalism itself.

    The industrial world is fading, the industrial composition of labour is dissolving, and a new composition of social activity is emerging. But the capitalist code is still pervading it. And in its current virtual (dis)incarnation, capitalism seems to be a system without any alternative. The alternative cannot be found in the past.

  • RESPONSE TO THE CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY by Louis Rossetto

    A seeming understanding of the Digital Revolution’s crucial left-right fusion of free minds and free markets, followed by a totally out-to-lunch excursion into discussions of the role of the government, racism, and the ecology in California, ending with a startling admission of the need to marry “some of the entrepeneurial zeal and can-do attitude” of California to a uniquely European (but not even vaguely defined) mixed economy solution – all of it betraying an atavistic attachment to statism, and an utterly dismal failure to comprehend the possibilities of a future radically different than the one we currently inhabit, one that is actually democratic, meritocratic, decentralized, libertarian.

    Far from building the Digital Revolution, the US Defense Department sucked up 6 to 7 percent of US GNP for 40 years and utilized up to 40 percent of all engineering talent, chanelling these resources not into technological growth, but into tanks, bombs, and military adverturism. In point of fact, it was the cutback in American defense spending following the Vietnam War and the subsequent firing of thousands of California engineers which resulted in the creation of Silicon Valley and the personal computer revolution.

    A descent into the kind of completely stupid comments on race in America that only smug Europeans can even attempt. (Any country which prohibits its own passport holders from residing within its borders, or any people who are currently allowing genocidal war to be waged in their own back yard after the stupefying genocide of WWII, shouldn’t be lecturing Americans about anything having to do with race, much less events which occurred 200 years ago.) The charge of technological apartheid is just plain stupid: “Already ‘red-lined’ by profit-hungry telcos [isn’t every company, by definition, “profit hungry?”, although that description in this context is also stupid since telcos are regulated monopolies with government enforced rates of return], the inhabitants of poor inner city areas are prevented from accessing the new on-line services through lack of money.” Oh really? Redlined? Universal telephone access is mandated in the US. And anyone with a telephone has access to online service. Lack of money? Online is cheaper than cable television, and you can get a new computer for less than $1000, a used one less than $500.

    The utterly laughable Marxist/Fabian kneejerk that there is such a thing as the info-haves and have-nots – this is equivalent to a 1948 Mute whining that there were TV-haves and have-nots because television penetration had yet to become universal, the logical conclusion being that, of course, the state had to step in and create television entitlements. This whole line of thinking displays a profound ignorance of how technology actually diffuses through society. Namely, there has to be a leading edge, people who take a risk on new, unproven products – usually upper tenish types, who pay through the nose for the privilege of being beta testers, getting inferior technology at inflated prices with the very real possibility that they have invested in technological dead ends like eight track or betamax or Atari. Yet they are the ones who pay back development costs and pave the way for the mass market, which, let me assure you, is every technology company’s wet dream (the biggest market today for the fastest personal computers is not business, but the home). Not haves and have-nots – have-laters.

    This anal retentive attachment to failed 19th century social and economic analysis and bromides is what allows you to claim that the laughable French MINITEL system is a success, when in fact it is a huge impediment to France developing a real networked economy since the dirigisme which mandated an instantly obsolete closed technology for deployment into every home in France – and then conspired to stifle any alternative – has insured that France remain resolutely outside the mainstream of the Internet.

    A profound ignorance of economics. The engine of development of the Digital Revolution was not state planning, whether you call that an industrial policy or a defense policy. It was free capital markets and venture funds which channeled savings to thousands upon thousands of companies, enabling them to start, and the successful to thrive. Contrast this with the sorry history of European technology development, where huge plutocratic organizations like Siemens and Philips conspired with bungling bureaucracies to hoover up taxes collected by local and Euro-wide state institutions and shovel them into mammoth technology projects which have proven to be, almost without exception, disasters. The true measure of the failure of European (in other words, statist) direction of technology can be measured by the fact that in ten years, during the biggest technology boom the planet has ever witnessed, Europe has gone from a net exporter of technology, to a net importer.

    Let’s get real here: High European taxes which have restricted spending on technology and hence retarded its development; state telco monopolies which have kept prices high and service bad, again impeding networking in business and the home; state-directed technology investment, which has resulted in the monopolization of risk capital, uniformly bad technology policy, and the squandering of resources and opportunities; social welfare policies which reward parasitical living rather than risk-taking; a truly attavistic, sick attachment to the compulsion and non-meritocratic elitism of statism as a way of life; and a kneejerk disdain for truly radical social and political thought which falls outside Euro PC dogma (read failed Marxist/Fabian) – have all retarded and will continue to retard Europeans; if the US and Asian countries had conspired to insure Europe continued to cede export markets, they could not have come up with a better stategy that the one you advocate: continued statist meddling).

    Meanwhile, it’s Europeans who are discussing ‘California Ideology’, not Californians who are discussing ‘European Ideology’. And not because some clatch of bureaucrats in Strasbourg or Luxembourg have issued yet another directive. Because Europeans are recognizing that 19th century nostrums are not solutions to 21st century problems – on the contrary, they are the problem – and it’s time to encourage competition, risk taking, democracy and meritocracy, and dare I say it, dreaming about a different, better future.

    Ask me again, and I’ll really tell you what I think.

    Yours for the Revolution,

    Louis Rossetto
    Editor-in-Chief, Wired

  • THE HI-TECH GIFT ECONOMY by Richard Barbrook

    Abstract

    During the Sixties, the New Left created a new form of radical politics: anarcho-communism. Above all, the Situationists and similar groups believed that the tribal gift economy proved that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. From May 1968 to the late Nineties, this utopian vision of anarcho-communism has inspired community media and DIY culture activists. Within the universities, the gift economy already was the primary method of socialising labour. From its earliest days, the technical structure and social mores of the Net has ignored intellectual property. Although the system has expanded far beyond the university, the self-interest of Net users perpetuates this hi-tech gift economy. As an everyday activity, users circulate free information as e-mail, on listservs, in newsgroups, within on-line conferences and through Web sites. As shown by the Apache and Linux programs, the hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. Contrary to the purist vision of the New Left, anarcho-communism on the Net can only exist in a compromised form. Money-commodity and gift relations are not just in conflict with each other, but also co-exist in symbiosis. The ‘New Economy’ of cyberspace is an advanced form of social democracy.

    The Legacy of the New Left

    “… when … [Ben Slivka] suggested that Microsoft consider giving away its browser, à la Netscape, Gates exploded and called him a ‘communist’ … [1]

    The Net is haunted by the disappointed hopes of the Sixties. Because this new technology symbolises another period of rapid change, many contemporary commentators look back to the stalled revolution of thirty years ago to explain what is happening now. Most famously, the editors of Wired continually pay homage to the New Left values of individual freedom and cultural dissent in their coverage of the Net. However, in their Californian ideology, these ideals of their youth are now going to be realised through technological determinism and free markets. The politics of ecstasy have been replaced by the economics of greed [2].

    Ironically, the New Left emerged in response to the ‘sell-out’ of an earlier generation. By the end of the Fifties, the heroes of the anti-fascist struggle had become the guardians of Cold War orthodoxies. Even within the arts, avant-garde experimentation had been transformed into fashionable styles of consumer society. The adoption of innovative styles and new techniques was no longer subversive. Frustrated with the recuperation of their parents’ generation, young people started looking for new methods of cultural and social activism. Above all, the Situationists proclaimed that the epoch of the political vanguard and the artistic avant-garde had passed. Instead of following the intellectual elite, everyone should instead determine their own destinies.

    “The situation is…made to be lived by its constructors. The role played by a passive…’public’ must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors but rather… ‘livers’ must steadily increase.’ [3]

    These New Left activists wanted to create opportunities for everyone to express their own hopes, dreams and desires. The Hegelian ‘grand narrative’ would culminate in the supersession of all mediations separating people from each other. Yet, despite their Hegelian modernism, the Situationists believed that the utopian future had been prefigured in the tribal past. For example, tribes in Polynesia organised themselves around the potlatch: the circulation of gifts. Within these societies, this gift economy bound people together into tribes and encouraged cooperation between different tribes. In contrast with the atomisation and alienation of bourgeois society, potlatches required intimate contacts and emotional authenticity [4]. According to the Situationists, the tribal gift economy demonstrated that individuals could successfully live together without needing either the state or the market. After the New Left revolution, people would recreate this idyllic condition: anarcho-communism [5].

    However, the Situationists could not escape from the elitist tradition of the avant-garde. Despite their invocation of Hegel and Marx, the Situationists remained haunted by Nietzsche and Lenin. As in earlier generations, the rhetoric of mass participation simultaneously justified the leadership of the intellectual elite. Anarcho-communism was therefore transformed into the ‘mark of distinction’ for the New Left vanguard. As a consequence, the giving of gifts was seen as the absolute antithesis of market competition. There could be no compromise between tribal authenticity and bourgeois alienation. After the social revolution, the potlatch would completely supplant the commodity [6].

    In the two decades following the May 1968 revolution, this purist vision of anarcho-communism inspired community media activists. For instance, the radical ‘free radio’ stations created by New Left militants in France and Italy refused all funding from state and commercial sources. Instead, these projects tried to survive through donations of time and money from their supporters. Emancipatory media supposedly could only be produced within the gift economy [7]. During the late-Seventies, pro-situ attitudes were further popularised by the punk movement. Although rapidly commercialised, this sub-culture did encourage its members to form their own bands, make their own fashions and publish their own fanzines. This participatory ethic still shapes innovatory music and radical politics today. From raves to environmental protests, the spirit of May ’68 lives on within the DIY culture of the Nineties. The gift is supposedly about to replace the commodity [8].

    The Net as Really Existing Anarcho-Communism

    Despite originally being invented for the U. S. military, the Net was constructed around the gift economy. The Pentagon initially did try to restrict the unofficial uses of its computer network. However, it soon became obvious that the Net could only be successfully developed by letting its users build the system for themselves. Within the scientific community, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists don’t have to turn their intellectual work directly into marketable commodities. Instead, research results are publicised by ‘giving a paper’ at specialist conferences and by ‘contributing an article’ to professional journals. The collaboration of many different academics is made possible through the free distribution of information [9].

    Within small tribal societies, the circulation of gifts established close personal bonds between people. In contrast, the academic gift economy is used by intellectuals who are spread across the world. Despite the anonymity of the modern version of the gift economy, academics acquire intellectual respect from each other through citations in articles and other forms of public acknowledgement. Scientists therefore can only obtain personal recognition for their individual efforts by openly collaborating with each other through the academic gift economy. Although research is being increasingly commercialised, the giving away of findings remains the most efficient method of solving common problems within a particular scientific discipline [10].

    From its earliest days, the free exchange of information has therefore been firmly embedded within the technologies and social mores of cyberspace [11]. When New Left militants proclaimed that ‘information wants to be free’ back in the Sixties, they were preaching to computer scientists who were already living within the academic gift economy. Above all, the founders of the Net never bothered to protect intellectual property within computer-mediated communications. On the contrary, they were developing these new technologies to advance their careers inside the academic gift economy. Far from wanting to enforce copyright, the pioneers of the Net tried to eliminate all barriers to the distribution of scientific research. Technically, every act within cyberspace involves copying material from one computer to another. Once the first copy of a piece of information is placed on the Net, the cost of making each extra copy is almost zero. The architecture of the system presupposes that multiple copies of documents can easily be cached around the network. As Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the Web – points out:

    “Concepts of intellectual property, central to our culture, are not expressed in a way which maps onto the abstract information space. In an information space, we can consider the authorship of materials, and their perception; but … there is a need for the underlying infrastructure to be able to make copies simply for reasons of [technical] efficiency and reliability. The concept of ‘copyright’ as expressed in terms of copies made makes little sense.” [12]

    Within the commercial creative industries, advances in digital reproduction are feared for making the ‘piracy’ of copyright material ever easier. For the owners of intellectual property, the Net can only make the situation worse. In contrast, the academic gift economy welcomes technologies which improve the availability of data. Users should always be able to obtain and manipulate information with the minimum of impediments. The design of the Net therefore assumes that intellectual property is technically and socially obsolete [13].

    In France, the nationalised telephone monopoly has accustomed people to paying for the on-line services provided by Minitel. In contrast, the Net remains predominantly a gift economy even though the system has expanded far beyond the university. From scientists through hobbyists to the general public, the charmed circle of users was slowly built up through the adhesion of many localised networks to an agreed set of protocols. Crucially, the common standards of the Net include social conventions as well as technical rules. The giving and receiving of information without payment is almost never questioned. Although the circulation of gifts doesn’t necessarily create emotional obligations between individuals, people are still willing to donate their information to everyone else on the Net. Even selfish reasons encourage people to become anarcho-communists within cyberspace. By adding their own presence, every user contributes to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return, each individual has potential access to all the information made available by others within the Net. Everyone takes far more out of the Net than they can ever give away as an individual.

    “… the Net is far from altruistic, or it wouldn’t work… Because it takes as much effort to distribute one copy of an original creation as a million … you never lose from letting your product free…as long as you are compensated in return … What a miracle, then, that you receive not one thing in value in exchange – indeed there is no explicit act of exchange at all – but millions of unique goods made by others!” [14]

    Despite the commercialisation of cyberspace, the self-interest of Net users ensures that the hi-tech gift economy continues to flourish. For instance, musicians are using the Net for the digital distribution of their recordings to each other. By giving away their own work to this network community, individuals get free access to a far larger amount of music in return. Not surprisingly, the music business is worried about the increased opportunities for the ‘piracy’ of copyrighted recordings over the Net. Sampling, DJ-ing and mixing are already blurring property rights within dance music. However, the greatest threat to the commercial music corporations comes from the flexibility and spontaneity of the hi-tech gift economy. After it is completed, a new track can quickly be made freely available to a global audience. If someone likes the tune, they can download it for personal listening, use it as a sample or make their own remix. Out of the free circulation of information, musicians can form friendships, work together and inspire each other.

    “It’s all about doing it for yourself. Better than punk.” [15]

    Within the developed world, most politicians and corporate leaders believe that the future of capitalism lies in the commodification of information. Over the last few decades, intellectual property rights have been steadily tightened through new national laws and international agreements. Even human genetic material can now be patented [16]. Yet, at the ‘cutting edge’ of the emerging information society, money-commodity relations play a secondary role to those created by a really existing form of anarcho-communism. For most of its users, the Net is somewhere to work, play, love, learn and discuss with other people. Unrestricted by physical distance, they collaborate with each other without the direct mediation of money or politics. Unconcerned about copyright, they give and receive information without thought of payment. In the absence of states or markets to mediate social bonds, network communities are instead formed through the mutual obligations created by gifts of time and ideas.

    “This informal, unwritten social contract is supported by a blend of strong-tie and weak-tie relationships among people who have a mixture of motives and ephemeral affiliations. It requires one to give something, and enables one to receive something. … I find that the help I receive far outweighs the energy I expend helping others; a marriage of altruism and self-interest.” [17]

    On the Net, enforcing copyright payments represents the imposition of scarcity on a technical system designed to maximise the dissemination of information. The protection of intellectual property stops all users having access to every source of knowledge. Commercial secrecy prevents people from helping each other to solve common problems. The inflexibility of information commodities inhibits the efficient manipulation of digital data. In contrast, the technical and social structure of the Net has been developed to encourage open cooperation among its participants. As an everyday activity, users are building the system together. Engaged in ‘interactive creativity’, they send e-mail, take part in listservs, contribute to newsgroups, participate within on-line conferences and produce Web sites [18]. Lacking copyright protection, information can be freely adapted to suit the users’ needs. Within the hi-tech gift economy, people successfully work together through “… an open social process involving evaluation, comparison and collaboration.” [19]

    The hi-tech gift economy is even at the forefront of software development. For instance, Bill Gates admits that Microsoft’s biggest competitor in the provision of Web servers comes from the Apache program [20]. Instead of being marketed by a commercial company, this program is shareware [21]. Like similar projects, this virtual machine is being continually developed by its techie users. Because its source code is not protected by copyright, the program can be modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programmingskills. When someone does make a contribution to a shareware project, the gift of their labour is rewarded by recognition within the community of user-developers.

    The inflexibility of commodified software programs is compounded by their greater unreliability. Even Microsoft can’t mobilise the amount of labour given to some successful shareware programs by their devotees. Without enough techies looking at a program, all its bugs can never be found [22]. The greater social and technical efficiency of anarcho-communism is therefore inhibiting the commercial take-over of the Net. Shareware programs are now beginning to threaten the core product of the Microsoft empire: the Windows operating system. Starting from the original software program by Linus Torvalds, a community of user-developers are together building their own non-proprietary operating system: Linux. For the first time, Windows has a serious competitor. Anarcho-communism is now the only alternative to the dominance of monopoly capitalism.

    “Linux is subversive. Who could have thought even five years ago that a world-class operating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?” [23]

    The ‘New Economy’ is a Mixed Economy

    Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, almost nobody still believes in the inevitable victory of communism. On the contrary, large numbers of people accept that the Hegelian ‘end of history’ has culminated in American neo-liberal capitalism [24]. Yet, at exactly this moment in time, a really existing form of anarcho-communism is being constructed within the Net, especially by people living in the U. S. When they go on-line, almost everyone spends most of their time participating within the gift economy rather than engaging in market competition. Because users receive much more information than they can ever give away, there is no popular clamour for imposing the equal exchange of the marketplace on the Net. Once again, the ‘end of history’ for capitalism appears to be communism.

    For the hi-tech gift economy was not an immanent possibility in every age. On the contrary, the market and the state could only be surpassed in this specific sector at this particular historical moment. Crucially, people need sophisticated media, computing and telecommunications technologies to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. A manually-operated press produced copies which were relatively expensive, limited in numbers and impossible to alter without recopying. After generations of technological improvements, the same quantity of text on the Net costs almost nothing to circulate, can be copied as needed and can be remixed at will. In addition, individuals need both time and money to participate within the hi-tech gift economy. While a large number of the world’s population still lives in poverty, people within the industrialised countries have steadily reduced their hours of employment and increased their wealth over a long period of social struggles and economic reorganisations. By working for money during some of the week, people can now enjoy the delights of giving gifts at other times. Only at this particular historical moment have the technical and social conditions of the metropolitan countries developed sufficiently for the emergence of digital anarcho-communism [25].

    “Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [26]

    The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture: the gift was the absolute antithesis of the commodity. Yet, anarcho-communism only exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, money-commodity and gift relations are not just in conflict with each other, but also co-exist in symbiosis. On the one hand, each method of working does threaten to supplant the other. The hi-tech gift economy heralds the end of private property in ‘cutting edge’ areas of the economy. The digital capitalists want to privatise the shareware programs and enclose the social spaces built through voluntary effort. The potlatch and the commodity remain irreconcilable.

    Yet, on the other hand, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial Net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. For instance, Netscape has tried to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence from its foundation. Under threat from the Microsoft monopoly, the company has to ally itself with the hacker community to avoid being overwhelmed. It started by distributing its Web browser as a gift. Today the source code of this program is freely available and the development of products for Linux has become a top priority. The commercial survival of Netscape depends upon successfully collaborating with hackers from the hi-tech gift economy. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital [27].

    “”Hi there Mr CEO [Chief Executive Officer] – tell me, do you have any strategic problem right now that is bigger than whether Microsoft is going to either crush you or own your soul in a few years? No? You don’t? OK, well, listen carefully then. You cannot survive against Bill Gates [by] playing Bill Gates’ game. To thrive, or even survive, you’re going to have to change the rules …”” [28]

    The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. The state isn’t just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. At the same time, the public sector provides essential support for the hi-tech gift economy. In the past, the founders of the Net never bothered to incorporate intellectual property within the system because their wages were funded from taxation. In the future, governments will have to impose universal service provisions upon commercial telecommunications companies if all sections of society are to have the opportunity to circulate free information. Furthermore, when access is available, many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. Within the digital mixed economy, anarcho-communism is also symbiotic with the state.

    This miscegenation occurs almost everywhere within cyberspace. For instance, an on-line conference site can be constructed as a labour of love, but still be partially funded by advertising and public money. Crucially, this hybridisation of working methods is not confined within particular projects. When they’re on-line, people constantly pass from one form of social activity to another. For instance, in one session, a Net user could first purchase some clothes from an e-commerce catalogue, then look for information about education services from the local council’s site and then contribute some thoughts to an on-going discussion on a listserver for fiction-writers. Without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy. Far from realising theory in its full purity, working methods on the Net are inevitably compromised. The ‘New Economy’ is an advanced form of social democracy [29].

    At the end of the twentieth century, anarcho-communism is no longer confined to avant-garde intellectuals. What was once revolutionary has now become banal. As Net access grows, more and more ordinary people are circulating free information across the Net. Crucially, their potlatches are not attempts to regain a lost emotional authenticity. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May ’68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. Sometimes they buy commodities on-line and access state-funded services. However, they usually prefer to circulate gifts amongst each other. Net users will always obtain much more than will ever be contributed in return. By giving away something which is well-made, they will gain recognition from those who download their work. For most people, the gift economy is simply the best method of collaborating together in cyberspace. Within the mixed economy of the Net, anarcho-communism has become an everyday reality.

    “We must rediscover the pleasure of giving: giving because you have so much. What beautiful and priceless potlatches the affluent society will see – whether it likes it or not! – when the exuberance of the younger generation discovers the pure gift.” [30]

    Footnotes

    1. James Wallace, Overdrive, p. 266.

    2. For a critique of the neo-liberal politics of Wired, see Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    3. Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’, p. 25.”

    4. The Situationists discovered the tribal gift economy in Marcel Mauss, The Gift.

    5. For the historical antecedents of New Left anarcho-communism, see Richard Gombin, Les Origins du Gauchisme, pp. 99-151. For its later influence on the new social movements, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, pp. 204-212.

    6. For instance, in their famous analysis of the 1965 Los Angeles Watts riots, the Situationists praised looting as the revolutionary supersession of money-commodity relations: “… instead of being eternally pursued in the rat race of alienated labour and increasing but unmet social needs, real desires begin to be expressed in festival, in playful self-assertion, in the potlatch of destruction.” Situationist International, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’, p. 155.

    7. See John Downing, Radical Media.

    8. DIY stands for ‘do-it-yourself’. This slogan is used to emphasise the need for people to tackle social problems through collective direct action rather than to wait for someone else to solve them. See Elaine Brass, Sophie Poklewski Koziell and Denise Searle, Gathering Force.

    9. See Warren O. Hagstrom, ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’, p. 29.

    10. This is why the increasing role of private funding can hamper as well as help academic research. See David Noble, ‘Digital Diploma Mills’.

    11. See Mark Geise, ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet’, pp. 126-132.

    12. Tim Berners-Lee, ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’, p. 11.

    13. See Neil Kleinman, ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology’.

    14. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’, p 10.”

    15. Steve Elliot of Slug Oven quoted in Karlin Lillington, ‘No! It’s Not OK, Computer’, page 3. Also see Andrew Leonard, ‘Mutiny on the Net’.

    16. For instance, one of the major components of the 1993 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was increased protection for patents and copyrights, especially with agriculture and medicine, see John Frow, ‘Information as Gift and Commodity’.

    17. Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pp. 57-58.

    18. Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’, p. 5.

    19. Bernard Lang, ‘Free Software For All’, p. 3.

    20. Keith W. Porterfield, ‘Information Wants to be Valuable’, p. 2.

    21. Shareware is also often known as freeware or open source software. All these names emphasise that the program is a gift to anyone on the Net, especially those who have the skills to improve its code. See the use of these terms in Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’; Free Software Foundation, ‘What is Free Software?’; and Eric S. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’.

    22. See Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’.

    23. Eric S. Raymond, ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’, p. 1.

    24. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man.

    25. “Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods.” Eric S. Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, p. 9.

    26. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, p. 700.

    27. See Netscape Communications Corporation, ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’.

    28. Eric Raymond describing his pitch on behalf of shareware to commercial software companies in Andrew Leonard, ‘Let My Software Go!’, p. 8. Bill Gates doesn’t just believe that free software is ‘communism’, but even allowing other companies to have access to Microsoft products before their release date! See James Wallace, Overdrive, p. 57.

    29. Wired uses ‘The New Economy’ as a synonym for its neo-liberal fantasies about the Net. See Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy.

    30. Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, p. 70.

    References

    Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, (1996) ‘The Californian Ideology’, Science as Culture, volume 6 part 1, number 26, pages 44-72,

    Tim Berners-Lee, (1996) ‘The World Wide Web: Past, Present and Future’.

    Tim Berners-Lee, (1997) ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’.

    Elaine Brass and Sophie Poklewski Koziell with Denise Searle (editor), (1997) Gathering Force: DIY culture – radical action for those tired of waiting, Big Issue, London.

    Guy Debord, (1981) ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’ in Ken Knabb (editor), Situationist International Anthology, Bureau of Public Secrets,
    Berkeley CA.

    John Downing, (1984) Radical Media: the political experience of alternative communication, South End Press, Boston Massachusetts.

    Free Software Foundation, (1996) ‘What is Free Software?’ .

    John Frow, (1996) ‘Information as Gift and Commodity’, New Left Review, number 219, September/October, pages 89-108.

    Francis Fukuyama, (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London.

    Mark Geise, (1996) ‘From ARPAnet to the Internet: a cultural clash and its implications in framing the debate on the information superhighway’ in Lance Strate, Ron Jacobson and Stephanie B. Gibson (editors), Communications and Cyberspace: social interaction in an electronic environment, Hampton Press, Cresskill New Jersey, pages 123-141.

    Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, (1998) ‘Cooking Pot Markets: an economic model for the trade in free goods and services on the Internet’, First Monday, volume 3, number 3, March, .

    Richard Gombin, (1971) Les Origins du Gauchisme, Editions du Seuil, Paris.

    Warren O. Hagstrom, (1982) ‘Gift Giving as an Organisational Principle in Science’ in Barry Barnes and David Edge (editors), Science in Context: readings in the sociology of science, The Open University, Milton Keynes, pages 21-34.

    George Katsiaficas, (1987) The Imagination of the New Left: a global analysis of 1968, South End Press, Boston.

    Kevin Kelly, (1997) ‘New Rules for the New Economy: twelve dependable principles for thriving in a turbulent world’, Wired, volume 5, number 9, September, pages 140-144, 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196-197.

    Neil Kleinman, (1996) ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Copyright, Property and Technology’ in Lance Strate, Ron Jacobson and Stephanie B. Gibson (editors), Communications and Cyberspace: social interaction in an electronic environment, Hampton Press, Creskill New Jersey, pages 59-82.

    Bernard Lang, (1998) ‘Free Software For All: freeware and the issue of intellectual property’, Le Monde Diplomatique, January.

    Andrew Leonard, (1998) ‘Mutiny on the Net’, Salon.

    Andrew Leonard, (1998) ‘Let My Software Go!’, Salon.

    Karlin Lillington, (1998) “No! It’s Not OK, Computer,” The Guardian, On-Line Section, 6th April, pages 2-3.

    Karl Marx, (1973) Grundrisse, Penguin, London.

    Marcel Mauss, (1990) The Gift: the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies, Routledge, London.

    Netscape Communications Corporation, (1998) ‘Netscape Announces Plans to Make Next-Generation Communicator Source Code Available Free on the Net’, Netscape Press Release, 22 January.

    David Noble, (1998) ‘Digital Diploma Mills: the automation of higher education’, First Monday, volume 3, number 1, January.

    Keith W. Porterfield, (1997) ‘Information Wants to be Valuable: a report from the first O’Reilly Perl conference’.

    Eric S. Raymond, (1998), ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’, First Monday, volume 3, number 3, March.

    Eric S. Raymond, (1998), ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, First Monday, volume 3, number 10, October.

    Howard Rheingold, (1994) The Virtual Community: finding connection in a computerised world, Secker & Warburg, London.

    Douglas Rushkoff, ‘Free Lessons in Innovation’, The Guardian, On-Line Section, 9th April.

    Situationist International, (1981) ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’ in Ken Knabb (editor), Situationist International Anthology, Bureau of Public Secrets,
    Berkeley CA.

    Raoul Vaneigem, (1972) The Revolution of Everyday Life, Practical Paradise, London.

    James Wallace, (1997) Overdrive: Bill Gates and the Race to Control Cyberspace, John Wiley, New York.

  • THE::CYBER.COM/MUNIST::MANIFESTO by Richard Barbrook

    A spectre is haunting the Net: the spectre of communism. Whatever their professed political beliefs, every user dreams of the digital transcendence of capitalism. Yet, at the same time, even the most dedicated leftist can no longer truly believe in communism. The horrors of totalitarianism have discredited its promises of social emancipation. Seizing this opportunity, the prophets of American neo-liberalism are now laying claim to the future. The adoption of information technologies will lead to the privatisation and deregulation of all economic activities. The freedoms of the information society will be created by an elite of entrepreneurs, technocrats and ideologues. Needing to popularise their prophecies, right-wing gurus emphasise that every hi-tech professional can compete to join the emerging digital aristocracy. Above all, they predict that everyone will eventually enjoy the technological marvels currently only available to the lucky few. In the late-1990s, the prophets of American neo-liberalism measure our progress towards utopia through increases in the ownership of digital artefacts: home computers, Net connections, mobile phones and laptops. Ironically, this right-wing futurism echoes the preconceptions of Stalinist communism. In the former Soviet Union, the enlightened minority was also leading the ignorant masses towards eventual emancipation. Any suffering caused by the introduction of new technologies was justified by the promise of future liberation. During the 1930s, Josef Stalin similarly measured progress towards utopia through the rising output of modern products: steel, cars, tractors and machine-tools. Although the Soviet Union has long disappeared, the ideologues of American neo-liberalism are still inspired by the Stalinist version of communism.

    vanguard party digerati
    The Five-Year Plan The New Paradigm
    boy-meets-tractor nerd-meets-Net
    Third International Third Wave
    Moscow Silicon Valley
    Pravda Wired
    party line unique thought
    Soviet democracy electronic town halls
    Lysenkoism memetics
    society-as-factory society-as-hive
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    Stakhanovite norm-busting overworked contract labour
    purges downsizing
    Russian nationalism Californian chauvinism

    According to most politicians, executives and pundits, the Net is founded upon the buying and selling of information. As in other cultural industries, intellectual labour within cyberspace must be enclosed into commodities and protected by copyright. However, computer-mediated communications was never designed for trading information. On the contrary, the scientists who invented the Net were working within the academic gift economy. As a consequence, they embedded the free distribution of information within the technical structures and social mores of the Net. Over time, the charmed circle of users has slowly grown from scientists through hobbyists to the general public. Crucially, each new member doesn’t just observe the technical rules of the system, but also adheres to certain social conventions. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. By giving away their own personal efforts, Net users always receive the results of much greater amounts of labour in return from others. Instead of needing a market, people can now work together by circulating gifts between each other. Although many on-line activities are trivial, some collaborations are creating very sophisticated products, such as the Linux operating system and interactive music pieces. Despite their power and wealth, the multi-media multinationals are unable to impose the commodification of intellectual labour within cyberspace. At the dawn of the new millennium, Net users are developing a much more efficient and enjoyable way of working together: cyber-communism.

    commodity gift
    enclosure disclosure
    copyright piracy
    fixed fluid
    product process
    proprietary open source
    digital encryption free download
    original recording latest remix
    scarcity abundance
    alienation friendship
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    market competition network communities
    e-commerce cyber-communism

    In earlier times, the abolition of capitalism was envisaged in apocalyptic terms: revolutionary uprisings, mass mobilisations and modernising dictatorships. In contrast, Net users are engaged in the slow process of superseding capitalism. In this dialectical movement, hi-tech neo-liberals perfect the existing relations of production by developing e-commerce: work-as-commodity. Reacting against this enclosure of cyberspace, left-wing activists celebrate the piracy of copyright material within the on-line potlatch: waste-as-gift. For those nostalgic for ideological certainty, there can be no compromise between these contradictory visions of the Net. Yet, the synthesis of these dialectical opposites is happening for pragmatic reasons. The low ‘cost of entry’ into e-commerce is due to the absence of proprietary barriers within the Net. The rapid expansion of the hi-tech gift economy is facilitated by hardware and software sold by large companies. Above all, Net users always adopt the working methods which are most beneficial to their own interests. Sometimes, they will engage in e-commerce. On most occasions, they will prefer to collaborate within the hi-tech gift economy. Many social activities are already organised by voluntary labour and with donated resources. Now, with the advent of the Net, this gift economy is challenging market competition at the cutting-edge of modernity. Living within a prosperous society, many people are no longer solely motivated by financial rewards. If they have sufficient time and money, they will also work to gain the respect of their peers for their efforts. Within the Net, people are developing the most advanced form of collective labour: work-as-gift. During the last two hundred years, the intimate bonds of kinship and friendship have simultaneously inhibited and underpinned the impersonal relationships needed for market competition. The modern has always co-existed with the traditional. Now, within cyberspace, the exchange of commodities is being both intensified and prevented by the circulation of gifts. The modern must synthesise with the hyper-modern. Far from needing leadership by a heroic elite, ordinary people can now successfully construct their own digital future. In the age of the Net, cyber-communism is a mundane everyday experience.

    The Positive: The Negation: The Negation of the Negation:
    work-as-commodity waste-as-gift work-as-gift

    e-commerce potlatch network communities

    reactionary modernism revolutionary anti-modernism revolutionary modernism

     

  • MEDIA AND THE SPECTACULAR SOCIETY by Gillian McIver

    in the beginning…

    The expansion of industrial capitalism led to the realisation of the consumer society, which creates a society split between leisure and labour, a leisure society in which we work to obtain the instruments of leisure, the machines of pleasure, and this split organises our thoughts in every way. Eventually everything has to be subordinated to the illusion of leisure as information becomes “infotainment” and work becomes almost a luxury, a privilege. In our desperation to free ourselves we rush with open arms to the soothsayers of technical futures, to the Utopias made possible by technology. We, and they, forget that it is purely a human and social decision as to how any technology is used. If, for example, we live in a deregulated monopoly capitalist society, then they way we use technology will serve the interests of that society, unless an effort is made to create the freedom, intellectually and psychologically, to that will allow us to use the technology the way we dream we are able to: to make a better world.

    Ideology

    The Limits of Democracy

    “…society becomes a mechanism and an organism which ceases to be comprehensible to the very people who participate in it, and who maintain it through their labour.” Henri Lefebvre, on the process of alienation. [1]

    “The Western model has made tabula rasa of the old forms of oppression and instated a democracy of the supermarket, a self-service autonomy, a hedonism whose pleasures must be paid for. … The system has realised in the nick of time that a dead human being is more of a paying proposition than a dead human being – or one riddled by pollutants.” Raoul Vaneigem [2]

    The trouble with a state that purports to base its existence on the People’s Will, is that it then has to go some way in ensuring that the People’s Will is met, or at least pay lipservice to the idea. This is the position in which the Western industrial nations found themselves after the Second World War. Vestiges of old notions of tradition, privilege and precedent could no longer be appealed to. People knew their “rights” and one of these was the right to vote. In response, the expansion of the “consumer society” which had been developing steadily since the turn of the 19th century due to assembly-line mass-production techniques [3], was stepped up, partly as a response to the Cold War challenge of Stalinism and Communist theory. The consumer society served to create an ideology of consumer capitalism based on the notion of the citizen as consumer and spectator, rather than participant, of events. This was even true in the Soviet Bloc, as post-Stalinist leaders were able to hold out promises of consumer goods to ensure the smooth running of the state apparatus. [4] Of course, none of the capitalist oligarchs and communist apparatchiks wanted to have anything to do with the “People’s Will.” In the Soviet sphere, the carrot-and-stick approach was dependent upon a rather big stick, the gulag. In the West, as the above quote from Raoul Vaneigem points out, a cunning system of free elections, consumer choice and growth of an entertainment culture served to keep the energies of the population in check, while actual freedoms were tightly governed by State control. 1968 saw the crisis point of this system in both East and West. In Czechoslovakia, reformers within the Czech Communist Party were instituting a series of mild reforms, while, far more importantly, allowing an explosion of free speech all over the country. It was this latter development that alarmed the Russians, and influenced their decision to send in troops. The crushing of the Prague Spring showed how terrified the system was of freedom of thought, and discredited, for once and for all, the Soviet system. [5] In the West in that same year, French students and workers revolted against de Gaulle’s government and the whole post-war French state system. In the United States, opposition to and criticism of US involvement in Indochina was dramatically increasing, encompassing, as in France, a wholesale rejection of the American state and what it now stood for. In the West, although a police response was used to counter these expressions of protest, allegiance to the system was ensured by still greater abundance of pleasures to consume. [6] But it is more than simply “bread and circuses” that maintains the Western system of consumer capitalism. Rather, it is the mentality of consumption and spectatorship which dominates our thought and decides our priorities.

    Hegemony: Power and Practice

    As early as the 1920’s, jailed Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci was articulating the idea of what he called “egemonia” (in Italian “the presence of power,” usually translated as “hegemony”). Hegemony is not simply the “superstructure” as more conservative Marxist critics would maintain, but the most everyday factors of life as these are lived within the frames that we think of – if we think of them at all – as having freely chosen. This “everyday consciousness” is produced and shared by all members of the polity, but is dominated by the dominant class. There is political society, which is the realm of the State, and civil society, the realm of the people – and Gramsci sees these in a conceptual opposition, although they are one and the same. Gramsci is careful to avoid reductionism, however. For example, a state-run broadcasting system is clearly at one level part of political society. But this does not mean that everything which takes place within the system, or everything that is broadcast, will be subservient to the State or reflect ruling-class interests. [7] Civil society is the site of consent and hegemony; political or state society is the site of coercion and control, yet of course they make up the single entity we live in and consider “society.” Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony, or the permeation of popular thought by the ruling class, is a useful tool for cultural historians and in cultural studies, as it can be used to analyse culture as a set of material forms and practices, and the institutions in which cultural forms are produced and by which they are rendered significant. For practical purposes, Gramsci had no innovative solution to the problem of the domination of hegemony by the ruling class. He hoped that it might be counteracted by a systematic but gradual re-education of the People by an organised Communist intelligentsia based on the experience of the workplace. [8]

    The New Left

    Following the Second World War, and the defeat of fascism by the combined strengths of “democracy” and “communism,” the forces that shaped the popular consciousness were influenced by technological development, deliberate expansion of the consumer society and the even further decline of traditional society and traditional social bonds. In the Soviet bloc, no secret was made of the fact that the State was the source and regulator of this. In the West, however, the democratic idea meant that choice and participation were still expected to be the deciding factor in what kind of society people lived in. There were critics who distrusted the democratic idea, seeing it as essentially self-serving the oligarchies and the “military industrial complex.” To old-style Leninists it was all perfectly clear: the repository of all good lay in Moscow, the precedent of the Bolshevik revolution was a serviceable global precedent, and it was up to them, the slogan-wielding vanguard of the working class (even if they were not personally working class) to lead the class struggle. Other socialists preferred a Gramscian approach to revolution, of permeation through education, where they vied with liberals who followed the ideas of Matthew Arnold to attempt to create a culturally aware, individually-responsible morally “good” intellectual and political culture. Other leftist intellectuals attempted to look more deeply into why the society of capitalist consumer production appeared to be working, not to mention thriving. To Althusser, the institutions which direct our information, culture and education are “ideological state apparatuses” and we are controlled by them, and that is a large part of how we function as a society. But schools, universities, newspapers, broadcast media, churches, political parties, “think tanks” and so on are more than State apparatuses, though they may be that too – they are agencies of power which organise our thinking. Michel Foucault maintained that modern society is marked by the unending struggle, or Will, towards power – conflicting discourses piled upon discourses. Foucault suggested notions of sabotage, resistance and counter-discourse to wrest power from the dominant. But he rejected the economic bais: the needs of the system of industrial capitalism, and thus forgot, or ignored, that the discourses of power and the truths they claim, do emerge from social, economic and technological realities. The struggle for power is not (deterministic) necessarily for its own sake but because these particular realities present crucial threats or opportunities to the contestants. But Foucault was right to see contestation for the power-domination, rather than the simpler assumption that one sector of society (e.g. the Rich, Men etc.) was bigger and stronger and therefore would dominate. Cultural and intellectual domination also perturbed the Frankfurt school. These philosophers and cultural critics on the Left disagreed with Leninism and its methods, but at the same time, warned against the industry of cultural production, identifying “mass” culture as manipulated and degenerate and serving only the status quo. To them, cultural production under capitalism worked the way religion had in Marx’s day, as “opiate of the masses” to lull them into passivity and consumerism of shoddy, hollow junk goods. [9]

    Henri Lefebvre and “Everyday Life”

    In France, Henri Lefebvre was less concerned with the shoddiness of the goods and more concerned with the fact of alienation, one of the linchpins of Marxist thought but one which had gone virtually unremarked in orthodox Marxism. Lefebvre saw that alienation operated at all levels and in both capitalism and Soviet societies, where it was declared to no longer exist. To Lefebvre, everything in contemporary industrial consumer culture worked to turn the worker’s attention from the realities of everyday life and exploit the alienation that capitalism relied on to operate. That is, alienation was more than simply the by-product of industrial capitalism but a cornerstone of it. The division of life into the realm of labour and the realm of leisure served to divide the human “from himself, from nature, from his consciousness, dragged down and dehumanised by his own social products.” (p. 180) the realm of labour is one that Marxist had hitherto spent a lot of time discussing, and the workplace was considered the starting point of revolution. But Lefebvre argued for the consideration of leisure as at least as important. We think of “leisure” as something we have earned after putting in time at the factory or office. But leisure exists in a dialectic with work; it is not free, it is not hours but is as dictated by the rhythms and needs of capitalism as much as is the timeclock and the paystub. Furthermore, leisure as it exists substitutes for an “immediate sensory life” and is instead more often than not passive activity, which itself alienates or anaethsetises man from his “everyday life.” Lefebvre exempts the all too rare occurrence “cultivated or cultural leisure” by which he means productive leisure such as hobby photography or painting, and is critical instead of the leisure we obtain through “leisure machines” (p. 33) which we buy with our wage packets purely to serve the purpose of occupying our time, our “leisure” time, as passively as possible while we are excused from labour. We have even created “leisure activities” which mimic work, like camping and sailing, as a response to the charge of passivity, though these too are essentially escapist and fantasial. But most leisure is extremely passive: Lefebvre notes the phenomenon of the “sportsman” who “participates in the action and plays sport via an intermediary” i.e. as a spectator.(p. 41) But the main form of leisure in the post-war era was of course the “couch potato” forms of radio and, even more so, television, of which more later. To Lefebvre, everyday life and the commodities, roles and discourses which inhabit (and inhibit) it, are the true realm of political debate. It is the very realm over which we ought to have the most control, yet we experience “everyday life” as dull and mundane, a source of worry and insecurity that is largely constructed by the promises of fulfilment to which we rush, in dazzled blindness, in the world of commodity pleasures.

    Media for a Spectacular Society

    Situationism: Create and Arm Your Desires

    Lefebvre’s critique of alienated man was taken up by the Situationists of the 1950s and 60’s. The Situationists were concerned with recapturing the arena of everyday life and most importantly recapturing the spirit of desire unfettered by the artificial desires created by commodity culture. [10] They called the commodity culture, which forced the worker into passive consumption of leisure, and deprived him of any real opportunity to participate in the construction of his own reality, the “society of the spectacle” and called for the creations of “situations” outside the spectacle to challenge its domination. Guy Debord was one of the main theorists of the “society of the spectacle” in his 1967 work of the same name, which followed many essays and pamphlets developing these ideas. He begins by asserting that “In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation.” [11] The spectacle, he goes on to say, “presents itself simultaneously as all of society, as part of society, and as the instrument of unification. As a part of society it is specifically the sector which concentrates all gazing and consciousness” but “the unification it achieves is nothing but an official language of generalised separation.” [12] To challenge the spectacle, Debord and the Situationists believed, nothing less than popular action to reclaim creative control of everyday life as well as political control of the means of production, would be needed. To the Situationists, the real horror in the society of the spectacle was its boringness. The dialectic of alienated Labour in the workplace and alienated leisure, made a dreary, mundane substitute for reality, lacking passion, desire and joie de vivre. As Ivan Chtcheglov wrote, “it has become essential to bring about a complete spiritual transformation by bringing to light forgotten desires and by creating entirely new ones. And by carrying out an intensive propaganda in favour of these desires. [13] And Vaneigem promised that “we have a world of pleasures to win, and nothing to lose but boredom.” [14]

    From the New Left to DIY culture and Beyond

    Vaneigem said, of romantic individualist liberalism and revolutionary communism, that “too many corpses strew the paths of individualism and collectivism. Two apparently contrary rationalities cloak an identical gangsterism, and identical oppression of the individual man.” (p. 23) The course of political movements in the latter part of the twentieth century has shown the truth of Vaneigem’s assertion. Following the events of 1968 it started to become clear that the intellectual critiques of modern culture that took into account how mentalities and perspectives are created and perpetuated, were legitimate analyses on which to base radical action. Radicalism in the contemporary period shares several things in common: criticism and suspicion of democratic political systems as they exist today; suspicion of the media and “big business” interests and perhaps most significantly, the idea that “everyday life” can be reclaimed by looking at the smaller issues which then build into a comprehensive challenge to the status quo. Contemporary “alternative culture” is deeply suspicious of the work/leisure dialectic. For the dialectic no longer works in reality: in this “post-industrial” society of structural unemployment, underemployment and deskilling, “work” is no longer the assured centrepoint of most people’s lives. However, our “leisure” activities predominate in our consciousness, and most of them appear to be based around the media. Contemporary alternative culture is largely concerned with creating viable alternatives to the mainstream culture of media and commodity exchange, and framing their protest in terms of these alternatives.

    Media for a Spectacular Society

    Lefebvre had noted the importance of the passive media as early as 1947:

    Television – the sudden violent intrusion of the whole world into family and “private” life, “presentified” in a way which directly captures the immediate moment, which offers truth and participation, or at least appears to do so. (p. 41)

    Arguably, all forms of media are entertainment, even if not overtly “entertaining.” But crucially, they also offer information, and we base most of our knowledge about the world and ourselves on the information supplied to us by the media. What is “the media” and how does it work? There are essentially three types of media available in Western society: public service media, which is usually broadcast media (but also includes newsletters etc.) which are produced by State-owned, tax-funded bodies which may or may not be responsible to the governing Party; Private enterprise media, which today are deregulated conglomerate media, often encompassing the whole range of media, from broadcast to print to music to digital media in one multinational corporation; and alternative or Do-It-Yourself (DIY) media, in which individuals or small independent groups take responsibility for creating and disseminating their work with no recourse to either of the other two media, examples include fanzines and small magazines, underground film and music, video journals, pirate radio, the Internet.

    In this paper I am going to concentrate on the efforts of alternative media to challenge the society of the spectacle by creating and representing themselves as an alternative culture based on desires, and disseminating their ideas through the use of carnival and pleasure, while at the same time overtly challenging the dominance of ideas about culture, economics and society portrayed in the mass media. In part 4 I will look briefly at the history of popular radicalism and the media; in parts 5 and 6 I will look at television and the uses of video; part 7 will describe the relationship of activism and the media; part 8 will present a case study of Small World Media, an alternative media company struggling to survive by creating Undercurrents “alternative television”; and part 9 will consider alternative futures promised by the fusion of television and computer. Concluding , in part 10, will be a discussion as to whether alternative culture and alternative media is fated to recuperation.

    Popular Radicalism and the Media

    “Knowledge is Freedom”

    “The free flow of information and communication is essential to a democratic society, and thus democracy requires that powerful instruments of information and communication be accessible to all.” Douglas Kellner [15]

    The democratic idea is predicated upon two essentials: knowledge and choice. Knowledge so that the citizen/voter knows what the issues are, and choice so that s/he can make an informed decision between possible options. Yet is these very essentials that are most tightly controlled and subjected to dissimulation. There are various reasons for this: the interests of governments, businesses, interest groups which vie to dominate popular thinking; and basic laziness and willingness to accept whatever is put before one. This, however, is often the result of realising that the choices offered are illusionary, but not considering whether one can do anything about it. “The media” are routinely blamed for disseminating half-truths, speculations and opinions disguised as “news” or “information.” So much so that contemporary alternative publications speak of “media-proofing:” techniques, if not charms, to disempower the hold that media (usually broadcast media, in this context) has on everyday life. [16] Yet until recently “the media” was held to be the cornerstone of democracy, and still is, as Kellner’s quote asserts.

    Print Culture and Popular Radicalism

    The printing press was invented in Europe in the late 15th century, though a type of press was in use in China long before that. Nevertheless the press easily lent itself to producing printed work in the far simpler European alphabet in Latin and then, swiftly, the vernacular tongues. Immediately upon its invention it was constantly modified, altered and perfected in details, and its products turned to a growing diversity of uses. With the availability of printed matter came a desire to understand it, and although there are no proper indicators of literacy rates for the Renaissance-Early-Modern period, we do know that the literacy rates grew in all European regions, until, on the eve of the French revolution in Paris, literacy rates stood at between 86 and 93 percent for all classes. [17] In addition, for every reader of a printed item, there were those who could be read to, not to mention the milieu of coffee-houses and cafes. [18] Literary culture allowed for the dissemination of “fact” which purports to be unambiguous and to imply reality. The first publications which may be said to be devoted to this were the early newspapers, such as More Newes from Europe (1623) which was one of the first to provide a consistent account of events which also provided a recapping of earlier news. This foreign news, which dealt mainly with the events of the Thirty Years War, was soon followed by several papers which reported the news from Parliament, and during the Civil War rival newspapers purported to tell the “truth” from the King’s or Parliament’s point of view. These early papers were text-based but featured elaborate woodcut illustrations, mainly of a symbolic rather than an illustrative nature, thus keeping contact with the older methods of communication. In 1665 the first regular paper appeared in England, the Gazette and the first American paper appeared in Boston in 1690, but was soon suppressed. [19] Advertisements appeared in the 18th century and became very prevalent by the end of the century. In the 18th century the press was refined to the point that a small, easy-to use hand-operated press could be purchased relatively inexpensively. These were bought or leased to operate as small family-run businesses. This ease of access made the press available to a much greater number of people and especially to political radicals who wished to disseminate their ideas and gain support for their aims. Despite heavy Government suppression and censorship, these publications continued. [20] The printers and writers played their part in the great agitation for social and political reform of the late eighteenth century, in France (where newspapermen like Danton were key Revolutionary players) and elsewhere. As Richard Barbrook notes, “according to the revolutionaries, individual citizens directly shaped the policies of the state by engaging in reasoned debate over political issues in print,” thus creating a common political culture based on freedom of expression and private ownership of the means of production and distribution. [21] Despite Government suppression of the unlicensed press, there remained a high demand for cheaply-printed texts until the second half of the nineteenth century. A whole popular political culture was shaped by this access: “the mass of broadsides, addresses, letters, pamphlets, newspapers and occasional books were the very fabric of political activity.” [22] The life of 1840’s Chartist radical Thomas Frost is indicative: with some knowledge of compositing and a small capital of £25, Frost was able to earn his living by founding and editing a local newspaper in his native Croydon, launching a short-lived satirical magazine called Penny Punch, editing the Owenite Communist Chronicle and then his own Communist Journal, acting as correspondent for Lloyd’s London Newspaper and the South Eastern Gazette, and contributing to Chambers’s Papers for the People. Throughout the period he was continually on the bread line … but he was able to launch a series of publications with virtually no capital and, what is of equal significance, see them all fail without being permanently ruined. [23]

    Karl Marx was in the thick of the newspaper milieu when, as a young man, he wrote for the liberal ‘Rheinische Zeitung.’ Throughout his life and work, he never developed the awe of the power of the press to manipulate thought that is the hallmark of most post-Marx political orders. Rather, he insisted upon the right to a free press, and, in his early work, envisioned a DIY culture where writers and artists would simply be ordinary people expressing themselves, not “professionals.” [24] However, rival Utopian socialist Wilhelm Weitling noted that “a ‘free’ press is impossible if people are not free and editors [are] hirelings of a wage system.” [25]

    The steam press made possible faster and immeasurably better quality papers to be produced far more cheaply. The price of a good-quality illustrated paper fell dramatically, due to economies of scale which allowed far greater variety of reading material. The drawback was that the press itself was very expensive to own and operate. So only wealthy concerns could afford them. The rotary press, developed in 1870, allowed real mass-production of printed material for the first time, but again, the hardware was very expensive. Within a few years the large presses were churning out all manner of printed material, from comics to newspapers, under the aegis of a large capitalist concern. What we can recognise as our modern-day “newspaper” came into being, but these could only be created “by the collective labour of large numbers of wage workers on mechanised presses.” [26] Writers, artists and, later, photographers, were put on salary and their work strictly supervised as to content, and spirit, by the owner or his representatives. Press barons like Northcliffe and Beaverbrook became very powerful. The era of the individual or small group producing their own information or creative work and putting it out into the world was all but over.

    After the press was professionalised, the idea of a DIY press was taken up by artists, but artists with a political agenda, from the Futurists to the Dadaists, the Lettrists and the Situationists, and spilled into the late 60’s-early 70’s hippie “counterculture” movement. The “punk” era of the 1970s saw the creation of the “fanzine,” deliberately crude, photocopied magazines which blended cod-anarchist politics and an appreciation of punk style and music. These “fanzines” still exist, as does an informal international network of distribution. [27] Revolutionary political groups equally saw the press as an organ of change, from Lenin’s “What is to be Done?” to last month’s Class War tabloid, the classic mouthpiece of the vanguard has been the newspaper, as anyone who has walked the Socialist Worker gauntlet of paper-sellers will recognise.

    The alternative press gained dramatically with the advent of the desktop computer and printer: a whole magazine could be produced and typeset in an afternoon, if necessary. It could incorporate text and pictures, even pictures taken directly from video. Distribution was still a problem, as only small independently-run bookshops – themselves a vanishing breed – could usually be persuaded to sell them. Then the Internet was set up. That same magazine could be put onto the Web, saving paper and distribution hassles. As the software advances, the pages themselves become more graphic and less dependent on text, even incorporating small video clips. Even better, anyone with access to a computer can write in and share news, opinion and ideas. The potential for political and social debate away from governments, moral arbiters (these used to be the churches but now it seems anyone with enough gall can set themself as a moral spokesperson) and capitalist forces is tremendous.

    Broadcast Media and the “Couch Potato”

    The millions of human beings who were shot, tortured, gaoled, starved, treated like animals and made the object of a conspiracy of ridicule, can sleep in peace in their communal graves, for at least the struggle in which they died has enabled their descendants, isolated in the air-conditioned apartments, to believe, on the strength of their daily dose of television, that they are happy and free. [28]

    Vaneigem’s bitter statement reflects a dissatisfaction with the way the broadcast media has apparently turned its back on its role in providing the tools of democracy; information upon which to base knowledge, and choice. He sees the history of the struggle for freedom as betrayed by a broadcast media which tells us we are happy and free, entertains us, tells us what and what not to worry about (e.g. “the economy” – whatever that is, in real terms – not “poverty”). Prior to broadcast media, which is essentially designed for private consumption in the home, film – the newsreel, the comedy and the melodrama projected as a neat package – was the agent of shared cultural experience. It still fulfils a role in cultural consciousness but it is nowhere near as powerful as television for explaining the world to us, and for sheer routine entertainment. As with print media, film and radio in their earliest stages appeared to be a participatory format. Although difficult to master, the technology of early film and radio was not impossible for an enthusiast to learn. But, as Barbrook notes about radio, “using mass production techniques, radio-set manufacturers soon started producing simple receivers as consumer commodities … by using Taylorist labour discipline and assembly-lines, manufacturers were able to lower the price of radio receivers until almost everyone could afford a set.” Radio programming became mass programming, created by people hired to produce certain things in a particular way. Similarly, film-making soon passed from the realm of independent artists to the businessmen of Hollywood, who created the studio system and enormously expensive, widely-distributed spectacles. By the 1960s, television and radio, had totally replaced film as the information media, as the newsreels which used to precede every feature quietly disappeared from the screens. The public experience of theatrically-released film was made over solely to fictional entertainment, and news and information reception was to be a private experience. The Fordist production of media, its reliance on economies of scale, creates a vast division between producers and consumers. As Vaneigem acerbically notes, “it is useless to expect even the caricature of creativity from the conveyor-belt,” as the products become ever more formulaic, predictable and remote from human experience.

    Television

    Watching the Box

    “Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order.” Walter Benjamin [31]

    Who can forget the late winter of 1991? Sitting glued to the television as CNN delivered the horrendous news from the far-flung desert wastes of Iraq: war. [32] As the scene unfolded, we watched in enchanted, stricken horror, never knowing whether it would all result in nuclear annihilation. As the days passed, we gradually became aware that the news reports and interviews with steely-eyed military personnel were more and more broken by commercial advertisements. This was war, brought to you by Coca Cola, McDonalds and The Gap. At any moment it seemed that Sly Stallone would turn up and “waste” Saddam Hussein, and everything would be all right. The very unreality of the war on television, a “spectacle” unlike any hitherto seen, made it seem like an entertainment. Jean Baudrillard even went so far as to claim that the war never really happened, that it was a media construct. [33] This would certainly have been possible. Instead, as we now know, the coverage of the Gulf War was as biased as it could possibly have been, hiding the realities of heavy civilian casualties and the murder of retreating Iraqi troops.

    As noted earlier, television viewing is essentially a private activity, but one in which the “sudden and violent intrusion of the whole world into family and ‘private’ life” means that the world comes to us; we do not have to go ‘out there’ for our information about the world around us; we don’t have to go into the marketplace or out on the road. [34] As we passively contemplate the world through the rectangular box, we are sharing our private experience with others all over the globe. The technology of television is global and, increasingly, the content of what we see is global too. The homogenisation of culture is a fact. American cultural producers dominate television broadcasting internationally, just as they dominate film production. Economies of scale mean that vast media conglomerates, including networks and their subsidiaries, can reproduce and recycle almost infinitely a relatively small amount of cultural product. George Gerbner, a media researcher and outspoken critic of global media consolidation explains:

    “Most of what we see and what our children see on television is not produced for us [Americans]; it is produced for the global market. The reason other countries import it is because our syndicators present them with an irresistible deal. They say: “We can sell you an hour’s worth of this television show or motion picture for less money than it would cost you to produce one minute of your own programming.” That’s destroying their own industries, their own creative people, the integrity of their own culture … [for the sake of] dumping action-packed cheaply produced violent material on them.” [35]

    Gerbner goes on to explain why this tendency has negative consequences for the American people: their own culture and society is not represented accurately, nor are their interests in terms of everyday life addressed. Since programs essentially serve as an atmosphere for sales, they have to be compatible with the advertising message. That means they present a world where the best customers dominate. In this world, men outnumber women three to one…One third of our population – namely people with lower incomes and less education – is represented by 1.2 per cent of the characters.

    The sort of programming Gerbner is talking about is concerned with selling not only a particular product (say, sports shoes), but a way of life in which we see these products as essential to living. This is not only happening in television, but in the full range of the “media corporations’” services. “By eroding cultural differences between nations, [media multinationals] dreamt of an international electronic marketplace where all forms of information would be traded under their control.” [36]

    Infotainment

    Here Gerbner has been talking about programming that is overtly “entertaining” – sitcoms, films, game shows. But increasingly, “news” and documentary television has been reshaped to reflect the obsession with entertainment. Finding the “entertainment” angle on the news is easier than one might think: in the afore-mentioned example of the Gulf War, once it became clear that the world was not going to be blown up by the nuclear arsenal, people felt free to cheer on “their team” and to collect Gulf War trading cards. [37] In terms of day-to-day news programming, the Undercurrents video “Snodland News” features a typical ITN “human interest” story that takes up a full two minutes of news time, and over the saccharine tale lists nine important news stories which didn’t make it into ITN’s broadcast that day, including:

    Seven London police charged with assault and attempt to pervert the course of justice. Muslims clash with Government forces in Nigeria following the arrest of their spiritual leader. The first senior French politician is forced to stand trial for sending Jews to death camps. MoD blocks a Newbury District Council survey of radiation leaks from two atomic power stations. Australian maritime unions impose a ban on shipping movements to protest at the arrest of two Indonesian labour leaders.

    Any of these would have made an interesting and informative two minutes, but ITN chose instead the story of a toddler who ran away from nursery school and was found safe at home?! [38] Television documentary film-making is likewise under pressure to create a “human interest” angle. Commissioning editors invariably want a documentary with distinct “characters” and for the piece to unfold in a dramatic way, that is, to resemble dramatic entertainment.

    Both George Gerbner and Richard Barbrook believe that “the imposition of a marketing formula on journalists and creative people” [30] forms a particularly tight noose of censorship, as “the majority of the population were only offered a choice between almost identical one-way flows of communications.” [30] Both blame the deregulation and privatisation of the electronic media, which sacrifices creativity, public input and fresh approaches to representation, to the financial bottom line.

    Public Service Broadcasting

    Outside the United States, most countries have at least some form of public broadcasting. This is a publicly-funded (through taxes and/or license fees) television network which may or may not have advertising. In Britain, the BBC was founded in the 1920s, and the Canadian CBC was modelled upon it. Both the BBC and the CBC were supposed to completely independent of any kind of direct control by Government or other interests. [41] In recent years public service broadcasting has come under attack from neo-liberal “market force” advocates who claim that private enterprise has the money to buy in the creativity to make better programmes and thus provide greater choice. Notable exceptional programmes from private broadcasters do not unfortunately prove this true. The license fee debate is represented in the popular press as a “cash grab” by the snob John Birt to rip off the television consumer, who would rather watch private, cable or satellite television anyway. It is no accident that the papers which make this claim (the Sun among others) are owned by corporate media magnates that are ideologically hostile to public broadcast television, such as Rupert Murdoch. Governments are following on this trend, with swingeing cuts as a result. The BBC has just laid off thousands of workers as it closed many departments in favour of “contracting out.” In Canada, the CBC, which is financed by a direct government grant (no license fee) and advertising, was severely cut in the recent Liberal budget. Approaching election year, the CBC fought back. In a carefully-staged “town hall” style public meeting, the campaigning Prime Minister Jean Chretien was to meet with members of the public to answer questions and listen to their views. Alas for Chretien, the CBC staffers had carefully chosen the most verbose, aggressive and angry voters for the meeting, and the Prime Minister, a career populaist whose image has been crafted to represent that of an “ordinary guy,” was made to look foolish, arrogant and vague as he was bombarded with questions about unemployment and the future of the resource industries under NAFTA, issues he had wanted to side-step. [42]

    The Uses of Video

    Video and Utopian Technology

    Video has enabled events to be captured immediately upon happening; thus it is much faster than film and, since it employs push-button technology, is easier to learn (though not necessarily easier to do well). “Video Vultures, TV News in America” shows how a freelance camera unit combs the streets of New York City recording events, and selling them to television stations as “news.” The significance of the Rodney King case cannot be underestimated for what it says about the possibilities of camcorder culture and ways of challenging mainstream representation and interpretation. In Britain, various counterculture and political groups – which have far more adherents than the mainstream media would like to acknowledge – have started producing their own camcorder-generated news-video compilations which are sold, lent and exhibited in squats, clubs and pubs around the country. In the USA, video-based cable-access television allows groups to make their own television programmes for limited broadcast. The ability to distribute information and generate debate appears to be within the grasp of possibility, given that a V-8 or VHS camcorder can cost as little as £500 (or $500), implying that anyone can record and present documentary programmes and “news.”

    The technological determinism of Marshall McLuhan still hold appeal for both pundits and developers of new electronic media technology. McLuhan’s assertion that the development of print media determined the emergence of liberal society ignores most other historical developments in the period. [43] But Utopianism is still with us; having predicted glorious futures for radio, television and video, Utopians now see our future salvation in the Internet. Jon Dovey, in “the Revelation of Unguessed Worlds” cites the experience of video as a heralded Utopian technology to caution overly optimistic thinking about digital technology. [44] While acknowledging the potential impact for camcorder activism, he notes the current fashion for camcorder-based television: incredibly cheap, populist “home movie” TV which use mainly camcorder-generated material. The end result is not so much “reality TV” as simply cheap and nasty television. “The trick,” said Vaneigem, “is that the spectators of the cultural and ideological vacuum are here enlisted as its organisers. The spectacle’s inanity is made up for by forcing its spectators … to participate in it.” [45] Meanwhile, camcorder activists like the Undercurrents and Conscious Cinema crews, don’t get a look in.

    Fear of the Electronic Eye

    In one local daily paper on one day chosen at random I discovered the following TV-fear stories:

    “Tougher TV curbs to protect children” London Evening Standard, 10 December 1996, page 2 – a call for censorship of television to protect children from sex and violence.

    “1 in 4 Children Under 5 Have Bedroom TVs” London Evening Standard, 10 December 1996 page 4 – this is written in such a way as to assume that this is a bad thing.

    The second story suggests several things, the main one being that we have evidently achieved a society where parents need an electronic device as a child-minder. The first story appears at first glance to be yet another annoying and wearisome call for censorship. Will these uptight people never give up? Surely they could exercise some form of voluntary control over their children’s viewing habits? But then I realised, these people calling for regulation of violent and sexual content in television are actually crying out for some kind of input, some kind of participation and role in deciding what is fed to them by the great leisure machine. Gerbner makes a similar point when he notes that “the so-called culture warriors” like evangelist Pat Robertson and Pat Buchanan are cashing in on people’s legitimate grievance. [46]

    The newspaper press regularly features stories about television, but very rarely positive stories about television. The idea that television corrupts children is a familiar theme. If it is true that “by the late 1980’s many people within the advanced industrial countries were spending more time watching television than working,” then we are obviously doomed. [47] Why this fear? It cannot be simply rivalry – rather, is it the intrinsic fear of the “electric eye” in the house, the alien within, whom we cannot live without but whom we secretly fear?

    To answer these fears, Canadian university professor Timothy Collings has invented the “V-chip” which has been taken up enthusiastically by the Clinton administration as a sop to conservative critics, and will be marketed in the US this year. This device allows the television to filter out sex and violence that is broadcast, presumably allowing the parents to disengage it so that they can freely watch the ruttings and maimings that are so unsuitable for their young. Unfortunately, the chip does not filter out poor plot, bad characterisation, wooden acting, idiotic advertisements, shallow reportage, fatuous hosts, racial and sexual stereotyping, sheer dullness and condescension … the list goes on.

    What we really fear is not so much sex and violence, but the fact that we are enslaved to a television culture, we rely on it to palliate us, entertain us, inform us, narcotise us and recreate us in the fashion of the day. Yet we feel powerless before its seductive glamour. We don’t realise that, in its essence, television is as simple as picking up a video camera and sticking a transmitter on top of a tall tree or tower-block.

    Activism and the Media

    DIY Culture

    “The struggle against mass culture can consist only in pointing out its connection with the persistence of social injustice.” Max Horkheimer [48]

    “To be radical is to grasp something at its roots. But for man the root is man himself.” Karl Marx

    According to Jon Dovey, the use of a technology is only as good as who is using it: the 1970’s Utopian project of community video failed “because the political movements in which it was embedded failed.” [49] In the mid-1990’s there are new radical movements, which use video and computer technology, to doubly challenge the social and political status quo, and to offer a participatory alternative to the mainstream media itself. They reject what they see as an “official” culture sanctioned by the partnership of government, corporations and the media elite as being appropriate for public consumption. Further, they reject politics, believing that popular participation in the official political prcess is possible but pointless. [50] They use the tactics of direct action, and many were first influenced by the environmental movement. [51]

    Direct action does work in the West to the extent that, since we don’t live under the sort of oppressive regimes that exist elsewhere, propped up by Western-armed dictators and Western-owned multinationals, the activist is unlikely to be found headless and mutilated in a ditch. In the end, the main threat Western states can offer the activist is prison. According to activist Lotte Kronhild of Project Ploughshares, fear of prison keeps us inactive; by openly doing action which will send us to prison we break the power of the state. [52] In the eighteenth century, when the death penalty was laid down for crimes of property, particularly poaching, juries were reluctant to convict. Challenging the dominance of the State is not risk-free but it is not a life-or-death situation. However, the price of challenging the corporations can be high, for example, the gargantuan two-year libel suit McDonald’s has brought against pro-vegetarian activists. [53] The main weapon Western regimes have toward activists is the weapon of silence, isolation. This doesn’t always work., as activists have learned the skills of networking (e.g. persuading a popular music group to openly support them) and guerrilla publicity (e.g. AIDS awareness group ACT-UP).

    Since the 1960s, the underground press, community television and radio, in small self-managed groups, usually co-operatives, have waxed and waned in the alternative scene. They have never entirely gone away. The underground press continues, especially in the USA, to thrive and produce interesting material. The promise of cable-access local television comes and goes; in parts of the US, several years ago, cable access was certainly serving the alternative movement, but the neo-Nazi alternative. Lately, however, the price of video equipment has dropped so dramatically that for the first time, real community and/or activist television is possible in the same way that pirate radio is possible. And alternative groups are making videos, setting up websites. Examples of current alternative campaigns are too numerous to describe fully, but instead of a single movement (e.g.socialist struggle) there are many, which together make up a sort of counterculture. The fact that there is no great plan or scheme is both a strength and a weakness. The Situationist ideas of direct democracy and reclamation of everyday life from consumer culture, are a large part of alternative practice. Do-It-Yourself culture is the expression of a generation which grew up into an adulthood of shrinking job opportunities, lowered expectations and a deep distrust of the political system, in which parties offer variations on the single theme of conservatism and the reign of “free market” economics at the expense of the environment, people and the future. “You don’t sit around wait for something to be handed to you on a plate,” says one woman involved in creating free festivals. However, rejecting the yuppie idea of “go and get it,” the DIY culture attempts to provide as much as possible for free, funded by donations, or through co-operative means. They “create situations” rather than sloganeer and demonstrate (e.g. Reclaim the Streets festive urban street parties; the anti-roads campaign inhabiting Claremont Road and throwing vast free parties every week; Earth First proclaiming the “Cascadia Free State” in the Oregon forest, and so on). With the same sort of enthusiasm, the activist’s disgust at the media’s portrayal of them has led them to try and make an alternative media. How successful this will be remains to be seen.

    The New Radicalism

    In the past, governments relied on class divisions and the power of the state to crush popular radicalism, while at the same time it was buying allegiance with material goodies. Now, children of the middle classes reject as unattainable the certainties that their parents built their lives upon: career, marriage, nice home etc. since the reality they see is divorce, unemployment, underemployment, debt, environmental damage, corporate greed, homelessness and so on.

    Alternative culture tries to counter the globalism of the media by forging grassroots global links with other groups around the world.

    Alternative culture is carnivalesque. The whole ethos of DIY is to cast off passivity and embrace life, action, decision, in everyday life. According to Mikhail Bakhtin, the great theorist of carnival, carnival is oppositional. It is not simply a “break” from labour or everyday life, not a leisure or entertainment. It has no utilitarian motive. It is not to be observed, but to be lived. The point of the DIY culture as it exists in free festivals, squat centres and activist campaigns, is to live in a carnivalesque manner. Use of costume, mask and theatrical devices, which are “connected with the joy of change an reincarnation, with gay relativity and with the merry negation of uniformity and similarity,” are common. [54] Gone is the sacrificial radicalism derided by Vaneigem:

    Violence has changed its meaning. Not that the rebel has grown weary of fighting exploitation, boredom, poverty and death: the rebel has simply resolved no longer to fight them with the weapons of exploitation, boredom, poverty and death. For the first victim of any such struggle is anyone who engages in it full of contempt for their own life… If the ancient cry of “Death to the Exploiters” no longer echoes through the streets, it is because it has given way to another cry, one harking back to childhood and issuing from a passion which, though more serene is no less tenacious. That cry is “Life First!”. [55]

    Replacing the revolutionary tactics of the past, Vaneigem sees the activists of the present as “groups whose collective decision-making admits of no intrusion by political representation, shuns all organisers or leaders and combats all hierarchy.”

    One recurring theme in radical culture and the emphasis of many of the actions which are carried out, is a call for love and respect for the natural world. While there are echoes of a “golden age” mythology at work here, a hearkening after a lost state of innocence, it cannot be ignored that modern global capitalist practices are causing rapid depredation of both the natural environment and the cultivated/inhabited environment. Whether it is forced monoculture dependent on harsh pesticides, chemical-based animal-rearing practices, opencast mining, clearcut logging or pro-roads/pro-automobile policies, all of these practices are factored inot the global economy now. Short term profit there may be, but activists realise that the long term consequences are ones which we have to live with, in terms of health and quality of life, and these have the potential to be very dangerous. Instead of nostalgia, the activists of today seek to recoup that which we have lost and are losing by an insistence on direct democracy and radical action.

    Anarchism is the one romantic idea that has not yet been tainted by corrupt practice, and so many people involved in creating alternative culture are self-confessed anarchists. Like the hippies of the late 60’s, some glory in the fact that mainstream consumer culture recoils at their style and behaviour: a song accompanying an Earth First video of an action to protest Clinton allowing logging of old-growth forests had these lyrics:

    “Hurrah for the riffraff. Come join our circle of jolly fools Squatters and crusties who make their own rules. Rebels and beggars, carousers and thieves. Our only motto: Anarchy!”

    and has other references to Luddites and Diggers, and ends with “go ahead and stare, we’re everywhere!” [56]

    Rejection of the mainstream is more than just about wearing dreadlocks and mohawk hairstyles, or adopting veganism. One anti-logging protester says from his camp in the Oregon wilderness “the collective spirit that’s evolved up here is nothing like anything that exists down below. It’s truly the Cascadia Free State, nothing to do with the Babylonian US principles of individuality and everyone for themselves and greed.” [57] As stated earlier, the rebels of the 1990’s differ from those of the 1960’s and early 70’s in that they have much less to lose by rebelling. They know that most of the old hippies became yuppies, as Vaneigem notes, “became career bureaucrats and covered themselves with glory as cogs in the apparat of State and marketplace.” [58]

    Alternative culture is not afraid to use the mainstream. Undercurrents (of which more later) sells camcorder footage to television to help finance its activist video projects. The band Zion Train, interviewed at a free rave, acknowledges that the label they have signed to, Time-Warner, are “arms manufacturing completely cold-hearted capitalist pigs.” Zion Train defend their decision to sign however, by saying that Time Warner can now “spread the message much further than we ever could, and that way we are able to provide an alternative to Quentin Tarantino, Ice T, the Fugees, glorifying sex, death and money, coz that’s not what we’re about! We’ve had chart entries and as a result we’ve had people come up to us who’ve never heard of Newbury or RTS [Reclaim the Streets] or anything like that and say “I’ve joined the animal rights movement,” or “I was down at Newbury…” We do what we can.” [59] In the summer of 1996, the activists opposing the Newbury bypass joined forces with mainstream group Friends of the Earth (prominently sponsored by Tory-supporter Andrew Lloyd-Webber) and a number of artists to create a huge one-day art festival on the land immediately adjacent to the bypass site, and spilling over into the site. The event was well-attended, as genteel Guardian readers mixed with dreadlocked stewards for a day of performance and visual art with an anti-automobile theme.

    The representation of activists in the mainstream media has long been one of “shiftless, lazy hippies.” This dates back to the 1960s when many in the counterculture adopted a distinctive aesthetic style which made them very easy to identify. Creating a common bond using subcultural style has its assets and its drawbacks. It can help to create a sense of an identifiable community, but it can also serve as a “uniform” which excludes as much as it includes. What is interesting in the contemporary scene is that increasingly people who might once have been identified as “straight” or mainstream are starting sympathise with alternative culture. [60]

    In the video “Celtic Enemy” the dispute is between local people in rural Wales and Celtic Energy over open-cast mining in their area, documented on video and distributed by Undercurrents [52]. The locals, mainly elderly and middle aged, describe how they tried “all conventional routes as far as campaigning is concerned” but “for three years we tried all the legal channels and got nowhere.” As news of their protest filtered outside of the community, numbers of activists arrived in the village. At first they shocked the locals by their appearance (“some of them had dreadlocks…”) but soon the locals realised that “somebody cared” about what was happening, and together they embarked on a fierce protest. The vile images of environmental ruin wreaked in the end by the mine contrasts with the beauty of the countryside in its original state, but the locals state that they feel that the struggle has given them the courage to continue the fight. The video shows clearly the brutality of the police, directed by big-business interests and the government, and the equally-brutal destruction of the landscape; the vaunted “reconstruction” of the countryside after the mining companies have gorged their fill, is shown to be a surreal joke: the the new landscape is hideous and artificial and nothing like what was there before.

    By making a video like Celtic Enemy, the activist video-makers and Undercurrents want to provide information about the struggle of the Welsh villagers against the Establishment of big business and the government, but also, and more subversively, they want to show the gradual alliance of the villagers with the counterculture activists.

    Today the ennui of the assembly-line has been replaced by the ennui of the dole queue and the McJob. [61] Unless things change drastically, there is no real reason not to put energies into creating a viable radical critique and an alternative way of life.

    Undercurrents

    Undercurrents And The Camcorder Action Network

    “Subjectivity is the only truth” Soren Kierkegaard

    “How can anybody be truly objective? Everybody has a point of view, and that’s what makes you take up the camcorder in the first place The idea is to be honest and show people what they’re otherwise not going to get to see.” Paul O’Connor, Undercurrents [62]

    By the early 1990s, the grassroots direct action movement was finding its own strength as people tackled situations issue by issue, refusing to get caught up in mainstream political posturing.

    The road protest movement formed spontaneously as a response to the Government’s policy of creating access and bypass roads to facilitate motorway traffic. In the process, land which had been zoned for agriculture, for environment protection, or – as in the case of the M11, residential – was expropriated. Rather than simply demonstrating, the protestors occupied the sites, creating “alternative communities.” The protestors at Claremont Road, in East London, created a kind of “alternative village” and held regular free parties and art exhibitions, attracting international media attention. The Government’s response was to send in heavy security forces to enforce the building of the road.

    With the rapid drop in prices of video-recording equipment in the 1990s – when a basic camcorder can be had for under £400 and a Hi-8 for under £1000, new possibilities arose for documenting the struggles.

    At the M11 protest site, Thomas Harding, a Cambridge graduate, who had been involved in the protest movement surrounding the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, met Jamie Hartzell, another neophyte documentary film-maker, who was also a trainee editor at the BBC, and Zoe Broughton a media studies student. Paul O’Connor, originally Irish, an activist and photographer, also became involved in the group. As well as being actively involved in the protest action, all were attempting to document the event, seeing it as a crucial change in British political involvement on the grassroots level. They all found that their environmental films and photographs were rejected by the media as being “too political.” While they took this as a compliment, as the work was intended to be political, they were getting no distribution and the movement was getting no recognition.

    They made a 40-minute documentary on the M11 road protests, which came out long before the movement had any publicity whatsoever, failed to be broadcast on any British station, though it later won first prize at Germany’s 1994 Okomedia Film Festival

    Hartzell then left the BBC and he, Broughton, O’Connor and Harding set up Small World Media, as a co-operatively-owned non-profit media company to rectify the trouble that they and other independent documentary makers were having getting their work distributed and/or broadcast. They started Undercurrents, a video magazine of “camcorder journalism” to report on the issues and events ignored by the rest of the broadcast media, and to encourage grassroots direct-action.

    The first issue of Undercurrents came out in April 1994, and featured the M11 film, together with a film on the subject of the media’s self-censorship of direct action, a critique of local councils’ attitudes to environmental issues, and a round-up of the UK’s direct action campaigns. This effort was the result of around 50 pieces of footage shot by the Small World group, and collected from other activists. Edited together and “whacked out” as O’Connor calls it, onto five hundred VHS tapes, the first Undercurrents video went out on sale at alternative bookshops, festivals and mail order.

    Sales were slow, which did not discourage the group, which by now was actively seeking material from activists up and down the country. In December 1994, the second issue came out, with a focus on the impending Criminal Justice and Public Order Act: videos on squatting, common land issues, Solsbury Hill, Claremont Road road-protests and the rave crackdown were featured, along with a report on the McLibel campaign and television censorship of anti-Indonesian logging adverts.

    At this point, the Guardian did an interview (December 5th, 1994) followed in February by the Independent. These articles prompted an “avalanche” of media response: TV, magazines – all wanted to interview the group. This presented the members of the group and the activists with whom they were working with a dilemma: to gain coverage for the campaigns they supported and to sell videos and fund the continuation of the project they would have to get as much “free” publicity as possible. But they were also aware that they ran the risk of becoming “flavour of the month.” While they did agree to be featured on “The Little Picture Show” and “The Late Show,” they insisted that no reporters were to come to their offices and film them in the spartan Oxfam-furnished editing suite as talking heads behind desks. Instead, the journalists were to accompany them “into the field” to the campaign sites and show them working on site with activists, filming security-protester conflicts etc. This gave publicity to the campaigners as well as to Undercurrents.

    At this point, Undercurrents was hoping to capitalise on the publicity to try and convince national and local television to purchase individual items. The creation of the Camcorder Action Network and creation of an archive of activist video has gone some way to realise this goal but as yet no television station has seen fit to broadcast any Undercurrents film. O’Connor says, “ideally, really we’d like to see a spot maybe twice a week on Channel Four where the videos could be broadcast and there would be some opportunity for feedback.” In fact, Channel Four has a mandate to show “alternative views” and has publicly said they want more innovative documentary work. [63]

    Simon Hattenstone, writing in The Guardian, summed up the relationship of Undercurrents and groups like it to the broadcast media:

    “Actually, Undercurrents would sit easily and proudly in the medium for the masses, but TV has never been quite as democratic as it likes us to believe, not even in the days when the BBC cuddled up to Ken Loach, or when Channel Four darned the socks of any documentary film-maker who could spell “anti-establishment.” [64]

    Undercurrents and TV : Ethics and Aesthetics

    Undercurrents’ most recent video issues have “blown the whistle” on the mystique of television reportage. As O’Connor says, “we’ve never met anyone yet who can’t do it. By the time it’s finished it’s a good film.” In fact, he goes on to say, the worst films are made by those who fancy themselves as film-makers: the auteur impulse is too strong to make effective reportage! The incredible power of television to get the message across is not so difficult to access. Over the past two and a half years, the Undercurrents team has trained over one hundred people in camcorder video technology. Some of these have started their own activist video co-ops, like Brighton’s Conscious Cinema and the anarchists of the 56a Infoshop in London. Others continue to contribute to Undercurrents and projects in their own communities.

    O’Connor and Harding both agree that that what they are trying to do with Undercurrents is not television-making but “camcorder activism.” The problem, if it is a problem, is that in order to appeal to people brought up on television, it must be entertaining enough so they will watch it. The Undercurrents videos are entertaining, but as O’Connor says “most of the people who involve themselves with Undercurrents come from a DIY cultural backgrounds, and there’s always been a strong sense of humour there. Natural humour, not scripted humour – real people not sound bites!” The rhetoric and aesthetic of carnival are present in the anarchic, irreverent humour of the activist videos, implicitly recognising the truth of Vaneigem’s statement that “the project of participation is grounded in the passion for play.” [65] The question is, would this type of humour appeal to people outside of the DIY cultural background? Obviously it is difficult to tread the fine line between the spactacular nature of our telelvision-viewing habits and expectations, and the use of television as a medium for alternative news. The work of Undercurrents is designed to inform and provoke, not simply to entertain. But they realise, rightly, that didacticism and humourlessness have no popular appeal. The aesthetics of television are difficult, and maybe impossible, to avoid. The trick is to combine the ethics of activism with the aesthetics of television. This in itself means aping as well as satirising the medium that they are criticizing. There are no easy answers.

    But it may be a problem that the rhetoric and aesthetic of television is too seductive to camcorder activists. O’Connor admits that, compared to the first few issues, Undercurrents 5, when the group had the Avid and had mastered the equipment well enough, was “so slick it’s – sick!” It may be difficult to go on producing material that challenges, mocks and exposes television, yet operates within its boundaries. It must entertain, but not so much that people confuse it with television, and treat it with the same passive consumerism that they treat “The X Files.” The other potential “danger” is the lure of a professional broadcast career as a result of this activist work. This is already happening with Undercurrents: Zoe Broughton is already working on BBC commissions. There are potential benefits of this, of course; the danger lies in the possibility of recuperation (see part 10).

    Keeping the Thing Alive

    As the experience of the New Left radical movement shows, the co-operatively run self-management model of media production declined and fell away during the 1980’s period of reaction, as the former activists decided to go and make some money, and the tenuous financial support that had been available dried up. In the United States, formerly hard-core radical Bibles of the 60’s and 70’s like Mother Jones, Rolling Stone, Ms. and Village Voice became slick, glossy, expensive – or disappeared. College radio, in some campuses a hotbed of free speech and focus for environmental and social justice groups, was forced throughout the 1980’s to chase after corporate sponsorship as student funding was cut. Undercurrents are already feeling this type of squeeze: one original member has already left. A recent grant has allowed them to recruit new administrative personnel, but in order for Undercurrents to survive, the new blood will have to be as firmly committed as they are highly competent. Will they survive? O’Connor does not think it is so important that the actual entity of Undercurrents survives, so long as camcorder activism continues. “We don’t want to become an institution here,” he says. “Ultimately the dream is more powerful than the product.”

    “Broadcast Quality”

    According to both the BBC and Channel Four, the problem with “activist productions” is that they are not ‘broadcast quality.’ This is a charge that might initially have been levelled at Undercurrents; in the beginning none of the members knew how to do more than the most rudimentary editing, for example. However, this is no longer true. Personal financing, gifts, an EU grant and the sales of footage have allowed Undercurrents to set up a professional Beta/Avid editing suite, a format transfer system and Hi-8 camcorders. In addition, they train activists onsite and in the edit suite to shoot and edit their own videos, with an emphasis on quality. Finally, as the Undercurrents group has learned more about the techniques of editing, they have made the last few issues quite slick and televisual. Cheap and cheerful the videos Undercurrents, Conscious Cinema and the anarchists of the 56a Infoshop produce may be, their quality is high enough to make them accessible, and their aesthetic and rhetoric retains the carnivalesque flair that characterises contemporary radical DIY culture.

    This move has been mirrored by the BBC and CNN, among others, who send many of their foreign correspondents into the field equipped with nothing more than Hi-8 camcorders. And news programmes do buy camcorder-generated material.But still they are reluctant to broadcast activist films. Ironically, this intransigence comes at a time when television, in Britain as in the USA, is buying up cheap camcorder material for dubious “real life” programmes, also known ingenuously as “reality TV.” [66] Jon Dovey, in “The Revelation of Unguessed Worlds” argues that it is “the application of the camcorder within the regime of “reality TV” that characterises the dominant face of its culture,” thus ever-marginalizing radical interventions using the technology. [67]

    Cheap and cheerful the videos Undercurrents, Conscious Cinema and the anarchists of the 56a Infoshop produce may be, their quality is high enough to make them accessible, and their aesthetic and rhetoric retains the carnivalesque flair that characterises contemporary radical DIY culture.

    Interestingly, despite the BBC’s refusal to recognise activist independent documentary producers and broadcast their work, the new Director of Television, Michael Jackson (a former producer of the Late Show, among others), recently reflected upon his role and the future of the BBC: “…it shouldn’t cut itself off from different ways of thinking about the world and different ways of making programmes, or people wandering off and doing things we wouldn’t have thought of ourselves.” He goes on to predict a new, more accessible broadcast culture in the face of the “threat” of Murdoch and digital TV: “…you can see how television is going to become – despite everything you read every day about Rupert Murdoch or whatever – much more available. The days of gated sanctuaries are over.” [68]

    Over the past thirty years it has become increasingly apparent that it is important in any struggle to attempt to harness the power of television. However, this has invariably been very difficult to do, given that television access is limited and expensive. The Undercurrents videos are not “television” in the true sense of the word, they are not for broadcast but are sold as VHS cassettes for playing in a video cassette recorder. But they seek to imitate television, news and documentary television. By showing the “news they don’t want you to see” [italics mine] the Undercurrents videos are in some ways subversive of television, but since they are not broadcast, they have no access to the power that television has to invade the private space, no power to create “the sudden violent intrusion of the whole world into family and “private” life,” (to quote Lefevbre again). And it is precisely this power which makes television so unique, so fraught with danger yet so full of possibility.

    Alternative Futures?

    An “Information Culture?”

    “Categorically, we need freedom, but a freedom based in our deepest spiritual needs, in our most severe and human desires of the flesh.” Henri Lefebvre [69]

    “It is no mean feat to imprison liberty in the name of liberty” Raoul Vaneigem [70]

    We are constantly being told that we live in a post-industrial age of information. An “information culture.” What kind of information? Useful information? Useless information? Does it lead to knowledge, which is the application of information? The plethora of useless “information” that constantly bombards us turns us away from knowledge, which we can only come by through critical judgement. We will soon grow tired of this novelty of “facts.” The old idea that “knowledge is power” has been drowned in a deluge of “information” which must be “processed.” Meaningless terms, but manipulative.

    Some of this information is obviously surveillance: what you watch, what you buy, read, suffer from, believe – all quantified and stored so that you can become the specially-selected target of a marketing campaign. But for the rest, we’re promised all the information we could ever dream of, all the knowledge and understanding – we’ll know everything about everywhere; if we believe them, the promises of the information culture are such as to make us godlike: omniscience, omnipresence and, with “Choice”- being the key word, omnipotence.

    It is true that new technology and the expansion of existing technology is making more stuff available to us than ever before. Cable and satellite channels, home video, home shopping, CD-ROM and so on have changed the way many of us use our “leisure” time and, following the existing post-war trend, have driven us further and further into the womblike privacy of the home.

    None of these things are more than passive activities. Some promise to “save us time.” Time for what? For more passive entertainment? The illusion of choice is just that, an illusion. What is the point of sixty or a hundred television channels if most of them are showing the same programmes? What is the point of more and wider-reaching news if it means the information is condensed into shallow sound bites, with little analysis and a predictable point of view?

    Television is still a powerful medium. The viewer still has the power to choose to switch on or off, and between stations. S/he can videotape programmes and thus cut out annoying advertisements. Basic television programming using video is easy and cheap to produce.

    But the freedom offered in our neoliberal spectacular society is the freedom of deregulated monopoly disguised as private enterprise, and this applies especially to media freedom. So, in the United States, the four main sources of popular information, the four main television networks, are owned by four enormous companies: Disney, Murdoch, Westinghouse and General Electric. [71] Public broadcasting is dependent on grants from companies like Mobil and Shell, which explains why they are eager to buy British costume dramas rather than John Pilger’s documentary work. In Britain, we are promised an orgy of choice by Murdoch, while our government turns a blind eye to monopoly regulations, happily sees BBC services cut to the bone, and considers turning Channel Four into a completely private network. [72]

    Given the domination of neo-liberalism, with its rhetoric of freedom, defence of liberty and choice, are the current structures flexible enough to allow the realisation of “alternative television?” In Britain, Channel Four’s idea of “alternative” appears to be “The Girlie Show,” and despite the shake-up of the television services there is no scheme to create local public-access television. A general State crackdown on all forms of alternative culture as part of an overall increasing of coercive power means that opportunities for pirate television are very remote. [73] In the United States, the radical far-right is far better funded than the radical left, and appears to dominate such alternative broadcast media production as does exist. For this reason, many are nervous to call for expanded opportunities in popular media production.

    In this climate, we get the sort of information you would be likely to expect from such sources: bland, soporific paeans to the capitalist ethic. Celebrity “news” features prominently in all forms of the media: Debord called the celebrity “the spectacular representation of a living human being” who is famous for not being what s/he is. [74] He is “the enemy of the individual in himself as well as in others.” [75] They are “the admirable people in which the system personifies itself,” however briefly the may shine. And, in the system of planned obsolescence, their shelf-lives are not usually very long.

    Digital Future

    The new promise is “interactivity.” This term, as it is used by media pundits and salespeople, is a toy which will be given to us to play with so we think that we are making choices and rising from our passive couch potato sloth. While the structures could be put in place for local-access DIY television, but this is either disregarded or considered dated. Instead the Internet is proposed as an interactive media with popular accessibility. Up until now, the Internet has indeed been both interactive and accessible. It is not difficult to master, to search for material and to post bulletins and set up basic websites. and a single set-up can be used by any number of people. Until recently it has not been a medium enjoyed in the private home: access was generally confined to academic and other institutions, and “cybercafes.” Taking advantage of this, many radical groups have managed to get Internet access and set up websites. Examples include the Zapatista rebels in Mexico, Reclaim the Streets in Britain, and Earth First, as well as larger organisations like Amnesty International. Less “organised” forums for debate exist, so you can debate policy with anarchists and Situationists all over the world, or get the latest news on the McLibel campaign. Activist groups have discovered that the user-friendly nature of new technology of computer networks can help break through isolation and silence of mainstream media. The Internet promises the greatest tool of communication of alternative/ DIY culture for the immediate future – combining images and text, video and sound – combine the cheapness and immediacy of the newsletter/zine and the entertainment and graphics of photography, animation and video. And above all, it is not regulated – as yet. Undercurrents, for instance, hope that within the next year or two the technology will allow activist videos to be shown over the Internet, thus bypassing the broadcasting system, and allowing immediate e-mail feedback. [76]

    Fear and Loathing

    If we assume that attempts to regulate the Internet will fail, this is promising indeed. As with television, the Internet is accused of having a hand in the perceived corruption of society, with websites offering pornography and prostitution and the threat of paedophiles using the Internet. [77] Such sites do exist, as they would in a society that has pornography, prostitution and, regrettably, paedophiles. However, unlike television, the majority of households are not as yet linked up to the Internet. So why the outrage? Because there is fear of a medium which is accessible, popular, and unregulated. Fear of a media technology which allows people to express their ideas and tell their own stories and discuss globally ideas and practices for change. The fear comes from the spectacular coalition of governments, media corporations, military interests multinationals, companies with dubious business practices, and “moral” arbiters – who enlist in their ranks of civilian supporters people who are afraid of life, bitter that their own lives are so subjected, enslaved and curtailed by the spectacle that they will cry out to urge social control in the name of “society,” and repression in the name of liberty. To paraphrase Raoul Vaneigem, perhaps the suppression of memory of what they have lost is what chains them most firmly to the pillory of submission. [78]

    If attempts to control the Internet by regulation fail, there are alternate ways to undermine it. Phillips is currently marketing “Web TV.” This allows you to “consume” the Internet at home, cheaply, using your television and a remote control. You can “surf” the Net to your heart’s desire, but you can’t put up a website, or e-mail anyone. The marketing blurb talks about accessibility and affordability, but if this venture is successful, it means that the Internet may go the way of radio: people at home with their receivers, waiting to be fed the next titbit of infotainment.

    The hope though, is that video and computer technology can work toward creating a media that challenges the passivity of spectacular society. As one activist put it, “We want to create a “community of activism”- activism as a part of everyday life, a way of life, not of protest so much as of claiming what is rightfully ours. Not a “revolutionary” programme but a forum for people to tell each other their own stories, to join struggles and share pleasures.”

    Media for a Spectacular Society?

    Conclusion

    Does the media create and feed our reality to us? Whether you are a post-modernist like Baudrillard who sees the collapse of reality and mimesis into hyper-reality, or a Marxist-Leninist who sees the media as an ideological state apparatus serving its master, or even just an old-fashioned cynic, we are all left with the uneasy suspicion that there is both more and less than what meets the eye in media representation of information. Can alternative culture subvert the status quo or does it preach to the converted? In the end, is Middle America and Middle England even interested in what the alternative culture has to say? On the face of it, no. But dig a little deeper and look past the media representations of Middle America and Middle England: journalist Studs Terkel’s interviews with ordinary people about how they survive in the system; the surprising numbers of people the BBC described – shocked – as “middle class” who turned out to fight the police over live animal shipments, the Newbury bypass and the Criminal Justice Bill; the dozens of local community centres who shelter groups like Groundswell (anti-Jobseeker’s Allowance); the outpouring of popular support for, and astonishing jury acquittal of, the Project Ploughshares women – and so on.

    Does the power of the spectacle allow the fringe elements to produce their “alternative” commodities in order to contain them? Here we come to the problem of recuperation, as the Situationists called it: the commodification of criticism and dissent, in which all attempts to reach consciousness of the possibilities of structural change are thwarted at their inception. [79] Recuperation is not just co-option or integration of criticism, instead, in recuperation, the criticism is actually turned to the benefit of the structures and institutions it means to negate. Criticism of the spectacle is taken out of the hands of those who make it, repackaged and sold back in spectacular forms. The classic late 60’s pinup of Che Guevara is one example, the popularity of rap music (especially among white suburban kids) is another. Guevara was a freedom fighter willing to risk his life for his beliefs (unlike those who stuck his mug on the wall); rap was the expression of angry written-off black ghetto dwellers, which the spectacular representation of them make it easy to forget.

    The Situationists saw that recuperation is one of the most – if not the most – powerful tools of capitalist relations. Capitalism requires the constant circulation of goods, and so will commodify anything. All experience, all dissatisfaction, will be brought into this alienation. Dissent is packaged and returned to those who experience it in the form of badges and T-shirts,” while at the intellectual level, it is confined to the “critical theory” and subordinated to the sterility of academia. [80] Detournement, the Situationist anti-venom to recuperation, is a first-strike measure of subversion, to turn the objects of the spectacle against themselves. [81] The “culture jamming” work of Kalle Lasn of the Media Foundation is in this vein. Lasn counts on the fact that media selling advertising are not going to look to closely or ask too many question about what they are dealing with. When his 30-second anti-automobile TV spot aired on the CBC during a popular motoring programme, he “could just feel a few hundred thousand people in Canada having their media consumer trance popped right out.” [82]

    The alternative movement’s attempts to side-step the consumer condition by living as much as possible in an economy based on voluntary co-operative work (contrary to media reports, not all are not on DSS benefits), barter, free squats, free parties, exchange and recycling of goods, and other non-profit practices, is another example. In a consumption-driven culture, the act of valuing something that has no monetary value, like an old pair of boots or a vegan meal in a squat cafe, is subversive, as it interferes with the operation of spectacular consumption. If everybody simply gave away old boots to someone who needs a pair, or ate in a non-profit vegan squat cafe, who would buy the latest fashionable new boots or the delectable creations of Marco Pierre White?

    But the post-modernists ask: isn’t the alternative just part of the spectacle? To Baudrillard, hyper-reality is such that it can comfortably and endlessly encompass both the vegan squat cafe and Marco Pierre White, and it is not a matter of an opposition between authenticity and illusion, or a dialectic of recuperation and detournement. If this is true, however, why do the institutions of power waste time and resources destroying traveller and squat communities? Why have television stations refused to sell Kalle Lasn advertising space?

    In the end, to challenge the passivity that wrings its hands at, yet accepts, environmental pollution, exploitation, the alliance of government and big business in Third World oppression, structural unemployment and a carceral approach to social problems, we must create intellectual and psychological freedom. To do this, we must be able to discuss ideas, tactics and know what is being done, globally. We need media which will facilitate this. It is very difficult to evade recuperation into the arms of the spectacle. Do we, like, Baudrillard, melt into the passivity of post-modernism, or like Vaneigem, renew the call for action and a deliberate reassessment of how to really live?

    footnotes

    [1] Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life (Verso 1991) p. 180.

    [2] Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life (2nd ed. Rebel Press, 1994) p.10.

    [3] “Fordism.”

    [4] Titoism was the most successful of these systems; notable exceptions include Hoxha’s Albania and Ceaucescu’s Romania.

    [5] Playing devil’s advocate, one might argue that, at least the Soviets had the decency to invade Prague openly, unlike the American treatment of Cuba and the rest of Central America.

    [6] And, of course, the tried and true device of the “Common Enemy” – in America these were the oil barons of the Middle East, who threatened to sanctity of the Big American Car; in Europe the immigrants, who threatened “the culture.”

    [7] Antonio Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, Selected Writings 1916 – 1935, ed. David Forgacs. (New York: Schocken, 1988) pp.222 – 225. Gramsci avoids the reductionism of liberalism, which wants to see civil society as one of individual freedom, entirely separate from the State, and the reductionism of the hard-line Left and philosophy of Althusser, which holds that everything in capitalist society belongs to the State and serves its interests, a view Gramsci would have recognised as also being that of fascists like Giovanni Gentile.

    [8] “In the modern world, technical education, closely bound to industrial labour … must form the basis of the new type of intellectual.” p. 321.

    [9] Theodore Adorno, Minima Moralia; reflections from damaged life. Trans. EFN Jephcott. (London: New Left Books, 1974.); Also “Adorno” in Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: from structuralism to postmodernity. John Lechte (London: Routledge, 1994) pp. 177 – 181.

    [10] For the purposes of this paper I am using the term Situationist loosely and including all those who were involved with the group, or agreed at least in part with their approach.

    [11] Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red 1983) 1.

    [12] ibid. 3

    [13] Chtcheglov, “Formulary for a new urbanism” (October 1953) in Situationist International Anthology ed. and trans. Ken Knabb. Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981. p.3. 14 This is the closing line of his major work, The Revolution of Everyday Life, also published in 1967.

    [15] Kellner, Media Culture (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 338.

    [16] See the January-February issue of the Utne Reader, a compilation magazine from the alternative press (also a website at www.utne.com) gleaned from around the English-speaking world: a section headed “How to Media-Proof Your Life.”

    [17] Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1989) p. 180, pointing out that this rate is higher than that of the late 20th century USA.

    [18] In Paris in the Revolutionary era, W. Scott Haine has found that the role of the cafe was significant in radical politics from 1789 through to at least the Second Empire. Cafe society, he finds, was about ideas, and was the most radical sphere of Parisian life, above the “low” milieu of the tavern, which revolved around drink, and the “high” milieu of the salon, which revolved around manners and presentation. W. Scott Haine. “Cafe Politics in Paris, 1789 – 1851” Consortium 1988 305 – 20. This tradition seems to go on right through to the 1950s and 60s – Greil Marcus describes how the Lettrist International used to meet at Moineau’s Cafe on the Left Bank in the early 50’s (Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces, 376-382). 5 Alison Hutt, The Changing Newspaper. p.17.

    [19] Iain MacCalman, Radical Underworld.

    [20] Barbrook, “The Republic of Letters”, in Hypermedia Research Centre website, www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk.

    [21] David Vincent, Bread, Knowledge and Freedom (London: Methuen, 1981) p.28.

    [22] ibid. 153 – 154.

    [23] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The German Ideology in Collected Works, V, New York 1976.

    [24] Weitling in Carl Wittke, The Utopian Communist: A Biography of Wilhelm Weitling (Baton Rouge, 1950) p. 57.

    [25] Barbrook, op. cit, and “The Industrialisation of the Media,” HRC website.

    [26] Vaneigem, op cit. p.68.

    [27] Barbrook, “The Industrialisation of the Media,” HRC website.

    [28] The very few exceptions we see prove the rule: most feature documentaries only ever appear theatrically at film festivals and we are most likely to see them on television anyway.

    [31] “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Illuminations (London: Jonathan Cape, 170) p. 244.

    [32] I write of my experience witnessing the war while in Canada, where it was universally unpopular. During the same period I visited the United States, where cynicism and disgust had not set in, and people were waving flags all over the place calling for the death of Saddam Hussein. In Canada, we relied on US television in the initial phase of the war, as Canadian television did not have the resources CNN and the US networks do. As the war progressed, however, some Canadian programmes were broadcast which were critical of the war and which challenged American versions of events. Douglas Kellner, Media Culture, pp. 198 – 228, describes the process of creating the Gulf War reportage for American television

    [33] Norris, Christopher. Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1992. Baudrillard is one of the main philosophical spokesmen for the “post-modern,” as he believes that the commodity system has taken on a life of its own, and the distinctions between reality and illusion, between society and spectacle, have imploded, leaving us only “hyperreality” to contend with. Baudrillard obviously owes a lot to Situationism for his analysis, but he wants to go further and deny the lurking existence of “authentic” everyday life, which Vaneigem and the others urged as essential to recapture. Baudrillard argued that the Situationist analysis, as a modernist analysis dependent upon notions of history, reality and interpretation, was obsolete in the face of simulation and hyperreality. Later, Debord, troubled by the problem of recuperation, and generally disillusioned, moved to a Baudrillardian position, but Raoul Vaneigem continues to maintain a modernist stance (Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, (London: Verso, 1990; Vaneigem’s 1991 introduction to the first paperback edition of The Revolution of Everyday Life) Steven Best, “The Commodification of Reality and the Reality of Commodification: Baudrillard, Debord and Postmodern Theory” in Baudrillard, A Critical Reader, ed. Douglas Kellner, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

    [34] Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, p. 41.

    [35] Interview with George Gerbner in the Utne Reader, January-February 1997, p.80.

    [36] Richard Barbrook, “The Revival of the Media Utopias” HRC website.

    [37] These came, like hockey cards, with a stick of bubblegum. Saddam Hussein cards were especially prized.

    [38] “Snodland News” Undercurrents 6.

    [39] Gerbner, op. cit.

    [40] Barbrook, “Infotainment” HRC website.

    [41] This is not always the case. Labour activists’ views were routinely excluded form the airwaves, and press watchdogs have uncovered various forms of pro-Establishment bias on various programmes.

    [42] In the event, a lack of any credible opposition candidate means that Chretien and his party are going to win the election, and the CBC’s audience will have to make do with fewer original programmes, more US buy-ins, more advertising.

    [43] See, for example, Ferdinand Braudel’s study of early modern Europe, Civilisation and Capitalism. Jon Dovey says of McLuhan “his work stands in a similar relation as Baudrillard’s in our own period, powerfully resonant without being in the least use to anyone actually producing in the field. ( see below p.115)

    [44] in Fractal Dreams: New Media in Social Context (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1996)

    [45] Vaneigem, p.85.

    [46] Gerbner, p. 81.

    [47] Barbrook, “The Re-regulation of the Media” HRC website.

    [48] Quoted in Adorno, Prisms (Merlin Press, 1968) p.109.

    [49] Dovey, p. 130.

    [50] As with much of the material in this chapter, this assertion is based on interviews. Informal surveys conducted at the University of Westminster and at a squat centre in Hackney revealed that well over 90 per cent of the people questioned felt there was no point in voting, that all the parties/candidates were the same, and that nothing could change through the political system.

    [51] Although Joanna Wilson of Ploughshares claims that it was John Pilger’s television documentary Death of a Nation, about East Timor, that influenced her decision to be an activist.

    [52] Lotte Kronhild, quoted in “If I Had a Hammer” distributed on Undercurrents 6 (1996).

    [53] See www.mcspotlight.org for all the details.

    [54] Bakhtin, Rabelais (University of Indiana Press, 1984) p.39.

    [55] Vaneigem, p. 8. From his 1991 preface.

    [56] “Salvage Rider” Undercurrents 6.

    [57] ibid.

    [58] Vaneigem, p. 9.

    [59] Interview by Cosmo, Undercurrents 6.

    [60] The public response to the road protesters “Swampy” and “Animal” and the the others who tunnelled deep beneath the protest site could be read as a sea-change in attitudes to alternative culture activists. Even no less an Establishment figure as A.N. Wilson praised them from his Evening Standard pulpit.

    [61] “McJob” – phrase coined by Doug Coupland in his brilliantly incisive novel Generation X, to describe a low-paid low-satisfaction service industry job usually held by a college graduate who was brought up with much higher expectations.

    [62] Information about Undercurrents is based on interviews with Paul O’Connor.

    [63] Broadcasting magazine, week of November 1.

    [64] Guardian, Monday, December 5, 1994

    [65] Vaneigem, p. 236.

    [66] Crimewatch, You’ve Been Framed, Video Diaries, Emergency 999, Takeover TV, Caught on Camera – just a few examples of current camcorder-generated programming; In America the long-running series Hardcopy, A Current Affair and Inside Edition, which specialise in gossip and seediness, all use primarily camcorder footage.

    [67] Jon Dovey, “The Revelation of Unguessed Worlds” Fractal Dreams: New Media in Social Context. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1996, p. 125.

    [68] Guardian Friday November 29, 1996.

    [69] a youthful cry, from “La revolution d’abord et toujours” in La Revolution surrealiste, no.5, 15 Oct. 1925. quoted in Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces, p. 190.

    [70] p. 169.

    [71] For the record, the latter two have military and arms-manufacturing interests.

    [72] It must be recognised that there are potential benefits as well as dangers in mass media controlled by a few large cultural producers. Perhaps globalisation of culture can help to eradicate ethnic and nationalist hatred; it is true that the concentration of money in large organisations allows more research and development. And the propaganda put out by Murdoch and Disney is not the kind of propaganda put out by fascist regimes. But still, we have to weigh these benefits against the question of whether we want to have a voice in what kind of ideas and information we have access to, and if this kind of media allows us to do so.

    [73] The combination of 1994 Criminal Justice Act and Michael Howard’s increase in prison facilities combine to create a climate of coercion, though the inefficiency of the system makes it less oppressive than it seems.

    [74] Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 60.

    [75] ibid, 61, also below.

    [76] Already Reclaim the Streets includes some video in its web-site.

    [77] E.g. “Adverts Selling Women Flood Onto The Internet” Guardian 13 November 1995.

    [78] Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, p. 97.

    [79] Sadie Plant, The Most Radical Gesture (London: Routledge, 1992) and “The Situationist International: A Case of Spectacular Neglect” in Radical Philosophy, summer 1990, p.3.

    [80] Plant, “The Situationist International”, p 5.

    [81] Vaneigem, “Basic Banalities” no.19, in The Situationist International Anthology, ed. Ken Knabb, p. 125.

    [82] “Madison Avenue’s Worst Nightmare,” Utne Reader, p. 74. (An attempted interview with Lasn and the Media Foundation in Vancouver in December 1996 had to be cancelled due to heavy snow).

    bibliography

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    James Houston “But What Will They Use To Wrap Fish? Journalist Oct/Nov 95 p.21
    Videos

    Bailey, Fenton and Randy Bulsato, Videos, Vigliantes and Voyeurism. Channel Four, 1995.
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    Video Vultures, TV News in America no date [VT 1843]
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    The Utne Reader (Minneapolis) January-February 1997
    Earth First Action Update
    The Prisoner (London)
    Schnews (Brighton)
    Festival Eye SQUALL (London)
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    Barbrook,Richard and Andy Cameron, “The Californian Ideology” and other essays by Richard Barbrook of The University of Westminster Hypermedia Research Centre Website at www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk
    Reclaim the Streets at www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk/campaigns/rts
    Newbury Campaign at www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk/campaigns/earthfirst/html
    McLibel Campaign at www.mcspotlight.org SQUALL at www.phreak.co.uk/squall and others
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    Debord, Guy. Comments on the Society of the Spectacle London: Verso, 1990
    Denzin, Norman K. Cinematic Society: Voyeur’s Gaze. London: Sage, 1995.
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    Gramsci, Antonio. Selected Writings, edited by David Forgacs. New York: Schocken, 1988.
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  • VIDEOGAME MODIFICATION by Matt Eley

    MA Hypermedia Dissertation (Short) – Matt Eley 2005

    Download a Microsoft Word version of this dissertation, including all illustrations and footnotes

    Q – What does the growing consumer culture of videogame modification reveal about changes in the culture industry, and does this offer the possibility for a radical new artistic form?

    Abstract

    This paper offers a discussion of the modification of videogames in relation to the writings of the Situationist International and the Frankfurt School. Videogames are one of the few areas of contemporary popular culture that actively encourage a real involvement from consumers, a product that exists entirely as digital information, that requires active participation, and that can be directly reconfigured by consumer and producer alike. Such an interaction between consumers and producers offers a useful situation that both may exploit.

    The issues discussed here are arranged around the broad distinction between artistic and fan made modifications and the blurring of boundaries between consumer and producer. Through the communities and gift economy of the Internet, modification has simultaneously become a major threat to the homogeneous structure of this particular culture industry and one of its best allies. This contradiction will be discussed through the theory of Adorno and Debord. Firstly Adorno and the Frankfurt School’s work on the ‘Culture Industry’ is used to understand the relationship between videogame hacking and its recent commodification into a consumer practice using commercially supplied modification software. Secondly, Debord and the writings of the Situationist International will be used to explore how modification can be understood in light of the notion of the Spectacle, its artistic détournement and the recuperation of such cultural negation.

    Introduction
    “The nineteenth-century dispute as to the artistic value of painting versus photography today seems devious and confused… Earlier much futile thought had been devoted to the question of whether photography is an art. The primary question – whether the very invention of photography had not transformed the entire nature of art – was not raised. Soon the film theoreticians asked the same ill-considered question with regard to the film. But the difficulties which photography caused traditional aesthetics were mere child’s play as compared to those raised by the film�?, (Benjamin 1999 p220).

    In a similar light, at the end of the 20th Century much had been made of the question of whether videogames might ever be understood as an art form. But just as Benjamin’s observations addressed what was overlooked in early debates around photography and film – the question of what this new mix of art and technology really meant for our experience of social and cultural life – so to does current discussion on videogames often overlooks Benjamin’s point; it must be recognised that games are a unique form of cultural commodity in which consumer-led customisation and modification is not only possible, but actively encouraged. Not only are issues of aesthetics complicated by this new cultural form, but so too are methods of production and consumption. In recent years, advances in digital technology have been utilised by both consumers and producers within the culture industry, this has redirected the production process away from the closed commodity relations of earlier mass culture and towards a supposedly more open dialogue between audience and author.

    As a mainly digital commodity, videogames provide the key example of this reconfiguration of the producer-consumer relationship; this can be found most clearly in the recent expansion of the online videogame modification scene. Artistic and fan made modification and total conversions are all part of the popular practice of rewriting the code of a commercial videogame in order to change the way it looks or plays (see figures 1, 2 and 3). Changes range from minor visual and audio adjustments to the creation of completely new games. For the time being this commercialised practice is mainly restricted to FPS (First Person Shooter) PC games , and while modding was once achieved by forcibly hacking a game to access its code, it is more common today to use the commercial software development tools supplied.

    The defining example for this process is Counter Strike, a modification of Valve Software’s classic game Half Life. A project originally initiated by 21 year old computer science student Minh Le, as a freely downloadable multiplayer modification for Half Life; it went on to be one of the most popular online games ever (Kline, Dyer-Witheford, de Puter 2003) . In fact “it became so popular that Valve began helping Le and his now-considerable band of collaborators to write code and later arranged for Sierra to publish the ‘mod’�? (2003: p252-3). In addition to being a freely available home-made upgrade, Counter Strike is now packaged and sold over multiple formats as a stand-alone game; this does appear a very real case of consumers having the means with which to produce media and distribute it on a mass scale.

    Figures 1, 2 and 3: From left to right, Half Life 2, it’s most successful mod (Counter-Strike Source) and a recent student-led total conversion (Eclipse) all running on Valve Software’s Source engine.

    In its earliest beta versions during the summer of 1999 the mod was technically similar to most fan led independent projects and far less sophisticated than many popular modifications at the time, but as Valve showed an interest in Counter-Strike’s potential for innovative gameplay, and so contributed funding and technical support, the project overtook all others . Valve’s positive attitude toward user led modification of its own intellectual property illustrates newly emerging economic practices within the videogame culture industry. For Dyer-Witheford “video and computer games are made in complex, transnational webs of paid and unpaid labor�? (2002), there are three collectivities within this web: the conventional programmers or knowledge workers who write the games, the new proletariat created by the exploitative outsourcing of hardware production to developing world countries, and a new kind of audience, the player who engages in consumer led production or ‘prosumerism’ (as coined by Toffler 1981 p261) with which this discussion is primarily concerned:

    “Of particular importance is the encouragement of the player « modding » (modification) of games through shareware, open source and player editing capacities… This process is now widespread throughout the computer game side of the business, where it serves not only to renew interest in games, but also as a sort of voluntary training and recruitment arenas for future workers in the industry�?, (Dyer-Witheford 2002).

    It seems then that both the consumer and the producer are benefiting from this situation in ways that fulfil their own particular aims. For example, despite Counter-Strike’s success and eventual commodification as a boxed retail edition, its developers continue to view themselves as the ‘CS-Team’, as consumer-producers and not a software company. Such an attitude underpins what Kline, Dyer-Witheford and de Puter (2003) have highlighted; that videogames today may offer a far more complex evolution of the consumer relationship with the culture industry than Adorno (2001) had observed in his analysis of the hierarchical worlds of popular music and film in the early 20th Century. The importance of such changes shall now be discussed.

    Videogames in the consumer society
    Marx lived in and wrote about an industrial capitalism of exploitative bourgeoisie owners and wage slave factory working proletariat, building upon Hegel’s philosophy and combining it with Smith’s economic analysis of processes of industrialisation, particularly the increasing division of labour (1976 p109-117). In his early writings Marx formed an image of humans as essentially productive beings; it was not simply the labour process that was alienating them in 19th Century industrial capitalism, but the sub-division of that labour process into a multitude of unfulfilling tasks. While ‘species being’ or human potential (Marx 1994 p74) , could be the outcome of a “society [that] regulates the general production and thus makes it possible… to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic�?, (Marx and Engels 1974 p54). As Guarneri (1991 p3-8) states, Marx and Engels classic image of communism borrows greatly from the American utopianism of Fourier, a society of free labour, an ideal without class antagonism but high in material wealth, art and culture.

    Under capitalism, productive labour had become severed from this utopian image of humanity and returned to a state, where – like animals – people felt that they worked only to keep themselves alive and through the abstraction of exchanging money for time and labour power, had lost the satisfaction of any particular cultural of labour (see Marx 1994 p71-5 and Giddens 1971 p14-15). Since then there have been dramatic changes in capitalisms structure, into ‘post-Fordist’ or ‘post-Industrial information age’ (Bell 1999) of consumer capitalism. Today workers exchange their labour power (be it physical or mental) for money, not just to satisfy their basic needs for subsistence but in order to buy commodities most of which function as signs rather than material objects (Baudrillard 1998). However despite the changes of the 20th Century, the division of labour remains high and therefore still alienating in the way Marx described:

    “Hence the rule of the capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead labour over the living, of the product over the producer […] Thus at the level of the social – for that is what the process of production is – we find the same situation that we find in religion at the ideological level, namely the inversion of subject into object and vice versa […] This antagonistic stage cannot be avoided… [and]… what we are confronted by here is the alienation of man from his own labour�?, (Marx 1976 p990).

    Yet with the rise of the digital technology and the Internet, more and more commodities are marketed with the claim to offer a capacity for creative productive labour in ones free time. This situation – easily identifiable in the case of Counter-Strike and many other videogame modifications as well as current claims for interactive media’s general authorless (see Barthes 1977, Manovich 2001 p61) – would seem on first observation to provide a realisation of non-alienated labour through cultural production. The non-alienated productive process and free online distribution of cultural artefacts in videogame modification stands in direct contrast to the traditional capitalist system. For which ‘alien labour’ is the outcome, an almost mechanical productive process that is geared towards producing commodities and further capital, neither of which the worker owns because during the productive process they no longer own their own labour power, for they have sold it in advance to their employer under contractual agreement (Marx 1976 p1016).

    In contrast much has been made of the potential offered by post-Fordist intellectual property and the extent to which the online gift economy counters the strictly constructed divisions and contractual obligations, sharing what Marx described: “an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single labour force… The total product of our imagined association is a social product�?, (Marx 1976 p171). Information can appear in this way to be both the commodity and the means of production, distributed within an online videogame modification community. Yet the original source code and software development tools remain the means of production and are thus owned by the capitalist class even when distributed amongst those consumers who modify it, because as consumers of intellectual property they are automatically denied the usual rights of individual ownership. So while software like Flash is a tool, a means of production, purchased from its producer under a licence agreement that allows you to produce your own intellectual property. A game like Half Life remains a commodity, a consumer item, despite being packaged with production tools. Such games are not sold as a means of production because their licence agreement states that anything you produce cannot be sold without further permission. Openly modifiable games allow you to engage in productive activity, but only under the mutual understanding, control and guidance that unless permission is granted, modifications cannot be sold as commodities. Unless one purchases the actual game engine, the authorship of videogame modification does not extend fully into the realms of intellectual property rights in the way that authorship of a game does (see Lessig 1999 p133).

    This means that most mods must remain free, a situation that is inherently positive for niche markets that once had to be specifically targeted and sold distinctly customized versions of otherwise standardised commodities (Ross and Nightingale 2003 p64). Today a niche or subculture can create its own commercial quality content using self-modified mass cultural products in a way that is not encouraged in other less directly changeable popular culture. Some might argue that this digital culture is completely intertwined with the relativism, plurality, pastiche and quotation of postmodern popular culture; “destabilizing the distinction between production, performance and reception�? (Gilbert and Pearson 1999 p126) within new cultural practices. Yet the ‘freedom of information’ that has become the hallmark of digital culture’s emphasis on free production and distribution, is at root an element of the hacker ethic (Levy 1984 p40), the deeply ingrained ideology within the very structure of contemporary digital communications since the mid 1960s. This digital culture, most clearly seen in the form of the Internet, has been built in the image of the world of scientists and academics (Barbrook 1998), a mixed economy of gifts and commodities. From this perspective, digital technology finally presents a workable solution to the achievement of Marxist hopes for non-alienated labour through acts of independent cultural production within capitalism.

    However this situation sets up a contradiction, as “behind the label of the independent ‘self-employed’ worker, what we actually find is an intellectual proletarian, but who is recognised as such only by the employers who exploit him or her… [Simultaneously] in a sense, life becomes inseparable from work�?, (Lazzarato 2005 p3). Perhaps this is the reality of the videogame modification pastime of the bored Silicon Valley white-collar information worker , “lacking the free time of the hippies, work itself has become the main route to self-fulfillment for much of [this] ‘virtual class’�? (Barbrook and Cameron 1996). This ‘knowledge class’ (Bell 1999 p213) is just as alienated today as the workers Marx had written of because they do not directly own the means of production, or the outcome of their labour power, by definition they remain the proletariat:

    “As long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood…�? (Marx and Engels 1974 p54).

    Yet with however little free time they have, the ‘knowledge class’ in today’s digital consumer capitalism can purchase a commodity like Half Life, and then produce new cultural artefacts (extra levels or entirely new games) with others online, in their spare time, using the software provided them and a free exchange of ideas. There is no fixed division of labour, no exchange of labour power for money, this is non-alienated productive activity, roles are swapped between artist, level designer, programmer; and the work is distributed freely. In fact companies like id Software have gone one step further and released the actual source code of their games freely over the Net, for people to seemingly do with as they please, “in a way that the American founders would have instinctively understood, ‘free software’ or ‘open source software’… is itself a check on arbitrary power. A structural guarantee of constitutionalized liberty… like freedom of speech or the press, but its stand is more fundamental.�? (Lessig 1999 p7). But is that what this situation really presents? Is it not true that rather than living in a non-alienated society of productive labour, we must continue to work to purchase commodities that let us explore (in our own free time) the possibilities that common ownership might theoretically offer. Such a problem may be approached via Adorno’s critique of the culture industry.

    Adorno and the videogame culture industry
    “The prominence of player-devised game modifications [for] collective multiplayer games makes interactive play porous to infusions of creativity from below. Much of this only elaborates and intensifies preset genres and conventions. But it can create surprises�?, (Dyer-Witheford 2002).

    In light of the somewhat romanticised issue of videogame modification, Dyer-Witheford’s observations may actually signal a new level to Adorno’s idea of pseudo-individualization. “By pseudo-individualization we mean endowing cultural mass production with the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardisation itself�?, (Adorno 1990 p308). When consumers are treated as producers, often they are really presented with only a narrow set of choices that are directed by, and aim to, support the confines of the existing hegemonic structure of the culture industry. One example of this process is the Sony Net Yaroze, “a seven-hundred-and-fifty-dollar version of the Playstation that allows gamers to write their own code�? (Kline et al 2003 p204). Marketed as consumer liberation, a return to the golden age of the 1980s ‘bedroom coders’ , the ten thousand Yaroze sold can also be read as a consumerist exploitation of hopeful college graduates, an overly expensive consumer commodity, or as an extra unpaid arm in Sony’s worldwide R&D workforce. This is a new (more elaborate yet efficient) take on the older processes of the culture industry; where “the attitude of the audiences toward the natural language [of the commodity] is reinforced by standardised production, which institutionalises desiderata which originally might have come from the public“, (Adorno 1990 p307). Although the idea of DIY is attacked by Adorno as ‘pseudo-activity’ (2001 p194, 201) when it is packaged and sold as yet another commodity, there is the claim that:

    “Today’s generation of gamers feels deprived, deceived and disillusioned by an industry fast conglomerating into fortified hives where little creed exists beyond the maintenance of power and profitability… As publishers tear the features from their faces to avoid scaring the money back into people’s pockets, so their audience increasingly chooses to draw a less bridled infusion of energy and spirit from the past. Homebrew software may be freely available, but it more importantly represents freedom – something of which there’s ever-decreasing evidence among commercial developers.�? (Edge: Sept 2005)

    This scene is commonly noted to be driven by a passionate underground of independent producers, seemingly a-political despite tendencies towards illegal action such as bootlegging, unapproved emulation, cracking and hacking, simply done for the pleasure of it. While Adorno might observe this as another level of individualising false consumer consciousness, the common aspect that drives all independent cultural production is this idea of “being creative [which] remains… a sort of dream world or utopia�? (McRobbie 1999 p134). To be part of the culture industry, either as an artist (by overtly challenging conventions) or as an independent producer is what drives audience interaction, as McRobbie notes, in independent music:

    “Here we have, with the growth of cultural capitalism, something similar to the scenario Marx himself looked forward to: cooking, looking after the children and doing the ironing in the morning, writing lyrics and composing tracks on the home computer in the afternoon, and playing them for money in the evening!�?, (1999 p135).

    This is equally true of modification, where “emphasis on the skill rather than on stardom does not mean that the utopian dynamics of these new apprenticeships for the night-time economies of dance and club culture are denied“, (ibid p135). Both areas of independent production share the major draw of what Bourdeiu terms ‘cultural capital’ (1993), and as even Adorno (2001) noted, we can observe a dual consumer mindset gravitating towards self produced culture, because “what the culture industry presents people with in their free time… is indeed consumed and accepted, but with a kind of reservation�? (p196). Such reservations may grow stronger while commodified production replaces interaction as the consumer fantasy (Manovich 2001 p61, and Darley 2000 p194, Barthes 1977) of the digital culture industry – with the aim of making the consumer feel like an active producer – because “we do not require all music to move to ‘enhanced’ formats which require opening-out, to arrive raw or unmixed requiring that we reheat it prior to consumption�?, (Gilbert and Pearson 1999 p132). Clearly if you buy a modifiable commodity you are still consuming while you create, in the extreme it could be argued that such willing interaction with the media spectacle may just further absorb consumers into a Baudrillardian hyperreality (1983). This trend for consumer modification plays on the myths of authenticity that surround DIY cultural production in art, music and literature (Adorno 1990, 2001), which originated through dissatisfaction with the homogeneous produce of the culture industry, and it may still offer some small innovations through remixing these cultural commodities with an open attitude typical of the Hacker ethic (Levy 1984), but since id Software’s Doom its structure has become a new form of consumption.

    Doom (the culture industry’s commodification of hacker ideology)
    Doom is an important historical break in videogame modification; id Software’s release of a set of editing tools and the full source code of their classic game blurred the division between videogame producers and consumers . In the years since, and with the increasing sophistication of the web, the division has become radically distorted, as “id turned every player into a potential programmer�? (Kline et al 2003 p204), and these ‘potential programmers’ formed online social networks for the production and distribution of new content.

    Id Software built a commercial model upon (and in the process assimilated) the existing underground culture of bedroom programmers, hackers and crackers that appeared alongside pre-web 8bit commercial microcomputers like the Sinclair, C64 and Amiga. A few key players like Jeff Minter may have managed to turn a subcultural interest successfully commercial but most remained underground in a way that mirrors McRobbie’s (1999) observations of the music and fashion industry. By the early 1990s with the introduction of the web and online gaming, this DIY attitude found a platform of communication that allowed its numbers to increase exponentially. The new structure, design and distribution methods of Doom provided the catalyst for “a virtual kustom kar kulture – a community based on shared, self-made chunks of the Doom universe called .wad files. Players became part of Doom’s world not just because they played the game, but also because they constructed bits of it�?, (Herz 1997 p90). Doom presented the moment at which industry recuperated videogame modification practices like hacking and cracking and sold them back to a mass audience as a commercial commodity.

    The Origins of Videogame Modification
    While the prosumerism originally encouraged by id Software provides the contemporary model for modification, modding’s roots are to be found within the same institutional situation as the Internet, the Cold War computer labs of ARPA funded academic institutions during the 1960s (Levy 1984). The Internet was however to remain for decades an elite network of military and academic users, before the online expansion that arrived with the web in the early 1990s (see Castells 2001, Giese 2003). In a complete contrast, videogaming rapidly moved from its earliest foundations in military applications, to more experimental forms in the university labs of the 1960s and finally to civilian popular culture in the arcade with Computer Space in 1970 and in a domestic setting with the Magnavox Odyssey in 1971 .

    Despite such early commercial adoption, modification has always been at the centre of digital gaming culture, which “with its origin in the unauthorized play of military-industrial programmers, is a child of hacking�? (Dyer-Witheford 2002). The unofficial exploration of early computer architecture – making the hardware at the time do things beyond the military bureaucracy which it was designed to process – was common within institutions like MIT (Levy 1984) and quickly led to Spacewar (1962), officially labelled the first computer game, in a re-imagining of history that ignores any earlier and more serious military links, thus following the fantasy of the innovative individual typical of the Californian Ideology (Barbrook and Cameron 1996); after all the graphical user interface was the product of military research that occurred much earlier than the Xerox PARC desktop (see Levy 1984). There were in fact multiple experiments into making early computers perform game-like functions beyond their intended use. Examples range from Douglas’s 1952 EDSAC noughts and crosses and Higinbotham’s 1958 oscilloscope tennis game (see Edge: July 2005 p73), to Levy’s (1984 p26) description of a similar tennis game created at MIT in 1959 that shows an imaginative (mis)use of the coloured lights on the front of old IBM 704 mainframes.

    With its early commercialisation, videogaming code – a spectacle sealed within arcade cabinets and plastic ROM cartridges – soon became entrenched in the clear and familiar circuits of the one-to-many consumer-producer relationship that typifies the mass culture industry. However with the Odyssey (the first TV game console), and the earliest arcade cabinets, the effect on the television set was to shift broadcastings existing cultural hegemony into new cultural circuits. Such manipulation of material technology occurred at the tail-end of the Fordist industrial society and the digital content that ran on these new systems came to prominence with the following movement into a post-industrial information society (Kline et al 2003). With the shift in platform architecture, to actual ‘computer games’ on the more customisable microcomputers in the mid 1980s boom driven by companies like Amiga, Sinclair, and Apple (Kline et al 2003 p94-5), the minority coding subculture of amateur experimental software producers – descendants of the MIT ARPA elite hackers – became “a huge underground culture [which] grew up, mostly in Europe, to craft and appreciate these demos, even holding parties to celebrate the art�?, (Burnham 2001 p290). Demos, hacks, modifications of existing software, these consumers were also active producers. As Willis’ ethnographic study noted at the time, the computer was beginning to offer a site for advanced symbolic creativity that rivalled other areas of cultural media for its productive uses (1990 p40-2).

    In the last 15 years that promise has been met by the same hacker ideology that underpins open source or free software projects like Linux and Firefox, and also the growing online open source Flash development community that has recently given rise to freely distributed, yet both technically and politically sophisticated, zero-budget games. At the same time it seems that any political features of the hacker ideology that underpinned the basis of videogame modification have been recuperated into the circuits of the videogame culture industry. However in the light of recent political artistic activity in game modification, it may be possible to observe something comparable to a postmodern remixing of the Situationist strategy of détournement in re-politicising this manipulation of the videogame spectacle .

    Debord and videogame modification, détournement and recuperation
    “Détournement is the antithesis of quotation, of a theoretical authority invariably tainted if only because it has become quotable, because it is now a fragment torn away from its context�?, (Debord 1994 Thesis 208).

    Ross and Nightingale argue (2003 p144) that consideration needs to be made of the context that any independent cultural product is made within. If the consumer is ever more so treated as an active producer then changes in the contemporary structure of capitalism and peoples reactions to such changes must influenced decisions to adopt more active and creative roles. It can in no way be said that modifiable software was the sole idea and beneficiary of the software producers as an Adorno-esque observation might assume. For instance in console gaming (which is centered on software purchases) the role of free homemade software, be it emulation, mod or a freeware game, is very different to that on the PC (where the consumer emphasis is on continual hardware upgrades). In light of Sony’s uncomfortable stance on the popularity of homemade games and emulation for its portable console, it is clear that the consumer-producer benefits far more than Sony does; “For the manufacturer, every PSP sold is money lost, with profit reliant upon the [commercial retail] games that homebrew does nothing to whisk from the shelves�?, (Edge: Sept 2005) . Thus the situation of modification may be a continuation of hacker ideology and a site for the struggle of cultural détournement against the constant commodification of independent media.

    As Debord wrote, with the maturation of industrial capitalism in the mid to late 20th century the proletariat were suddenly treated “with a great show of solitude and politeness�? (1994 Thesis 43) as the bourgeoisie sought to attend to all aspects of their lives, their leisure and humanity, not just their labour power. Détournement – or the manipulation of the spectacle by negation of cultural commodities – can be seen as a practice of resistance to this commodification of all social life. Yet the process itself has lost much of its radical nature through its own recuperation and re-introduction into the cultural sphere, it is now just another factor used to treat late capitalism’s proletariat consumers as self-consciously knowing cultural producers.

    Although not détournement in the political sense, new forms of cultural innovation have often been produced by free manipulation of the uses of existing technology already well integrated into hegemonic mass culture. In the 1960s this process of remixing became clear in relation to television art, and simultaneously the impacts upon TV and the related elements of popular culture that the introduction of Ralph Baer’s Magnavox Odyssey had. In the art world one such example of a similar process is the work of Nam June Paik, who’s flattening and subversion of the TV is comparable to Baer’s more commercial exploration of that same format. “By the 1960s, when [Paik’s] Zen for TV was produced, the broadcast model of television programming and the aesthetics that accompanied it were firmly entrenched as hegemonic uses of TV technology�? (Wilson 2004 p88-89). The resulting interaction between TV and art as discussed by Daniels (2005) also highlights a very similar set of conditions in videogaming. As he notes, the early TV art of Paik was completely reliant on the content produced by commercial broadcasting stations. Manipulating the image on the TV screen with magnets would be redundant without the actual broadcast content provided by the culture industry. Similarly artistic game modification relies on the pre-existence of commercial game engines. But while Daniels (2005) notes that video art (making original programs from scratch) has become the primary tele-visual art because of its distancing from the commercial broadcasts of TV; in contrast modification (rather than original programming) has become the primary artistic form of videogames. Perhaps because of their closeness to the original commercial commodity, modifications are provided a highly visible (mainstream) platform for exhibition that can also dramatically cut the costs of production. Yet this practice ignores the artistic problem of homogenisation which sees any radical culture recuperated in the drive for new content within the culture industry, a problem which video artists are very aware.

    The aesthetic experiments of Paik’s TV art share a perspective to the artistic modifications of Jodi. In their works: Sod (a 1999 mod for Wolfenstein 3D) and Untitled Game (a 2002 mod for Quake), Jodi have (as Cannon 2003, Paul 2003 and Stallabrass 2003 all reiterate) deconstructed the game engines created by id Software to raise a number of important issues about software . Their minimalist and reductive interpretations of these classic games aims to make apparent the abstract nature of simulated perception and artificial physics inherent in game design. These mods highlight the entropic chaos of code, and the controls imposed upon it by player and designer alike. Despite all this rhetoric, the work of Jodi remains inherently influenced by the commercial technologies and designs produced by id. While for outsiders to the gaming community their work might seem radical and confrontational, a modern day cultural détournement of the commercial videogame spectacle, this practice has been a central cultural issue in gaming since the early 1980s, only recently becoming industry-led common practice (Kent 2001). After all, Jodi’s mods focus mainly on manipulation of the visual aspects of the original game, it must be questioned whether this counts as détournement if the militarised point and shoot first person adventure gameplay remains. As Baumgartel (2005) explains, the creators of Doom initially had concerns about opening up their games, and encouraging modification by hackers, (this was the first time such behaviour had been actively encouraged). But having seen the producerly reaction from both fans and artists and more importantly the way most mods remain faithful to the confines of the original gameplay format, it was clear that this new open source and shareware model of the digital economy offered a non-threatening expansion to this relatively new area of the culture industry. Game developers have, it seems, found a way of producing vast amounts of new content that prolong the use of their products, while also giving consumers all the content they could desire and the ability to play at being active producers, and all for very little extra cost .

    While any radical possibility for détournement in videogame modification may well have been recuperated by the industry early on, it has also been argued that perhaps détournement is too strong a concept for contemporary activity such as artistic modification, like “culture jamming [which] is, at root, just a metaphor for stopping the flow of spectacle long enough to adjust your set.�? (Lasn 1999 p107), not quite reaching “the violence of détournement itself [which] mobilizes an action capable of disturbing or overthrowing any existing order�?, (Debord 1994 Thesis 209). Although quite a negative claim, it may well be far from suitable to label modifications like 9/11 Survivor, Waco Resurrection and Escape from Woomera (see figures 4, 5 and 6) as a violent revolution to gameplay, when their effects seem to offer a more gradual subversion of gaming themes .

    Figures 4, 5 and 6: From left to right, scenes from Waco Resurrection, 9/11 Survivor and Escape from Woomera.

    While early user-modification of source code, may have prompted developers to react to the technical innovations and social awareness of this small movement, today the videogaming culture industry has (by actively inviting modification and source code alteration via specially designed tools) managed to homogenise and subdue much of this negation and violence, repackaging and selling the process as another consumer item. This problem is of central importance to Net.Art, yet as Stallabrass notes in his discussion of ®™ark’ spoof websites and subversive consumer activism, perhaps such actions are “too straightforwardly oppositional to suit the Situationists’ requirements… but the cultural context of such interventions is very different now that détournement is a staple advertising technique�? (2003 notes p91). Similarly for artistic videogame mods, if the culture industry supports modification, and assimilates so much of it back into its circuits, can any mod, however politically aware, or culturally subversive, really be labelled detournement? A similar story is found within punk’s continuation of Situationist strategy:

    “An attack on the established values and institutions of music, culture, and society, punk provided a vehicle for the growing disaffection of the post-sixties generation. It attacked royalty, the culture industry, and the political authorities, shocking the bourgeoisie and antagonising the establishment�?, (Plant 1991 p144).

    Yet despite its initial power, much that was punk was soon engulfed by the rest of the culture industry. “Indeed, punk was accommodated so swiftly that the possibility was raised that it was in some sense already recuperated before it had begun�?, (ibid p144). This is certainly a case in point for the current wave of artistic videogame modifications, the political statements of these artists is often lost within the entrenched gameplay and thematic grammar of ‘militarised masculinity’ (see Kline et al 2003 p251-56, Herz 1997 p197-213) that has long homogenised videogames. As Stalker (2005) notes, despite the artists best ethnographical intentions, Escape from Woomera still plays very much like the point and shoot engine its built from (Half Life) and shares a close resemblance to the recent commercial game The Great Escape, it seems that artistic modifications are destined to remain part of the spectacle, as perhaps even “Political acts of violence can also sink to the level of pseudo-activity, resulting in mere theatre�?, (Adorno 2001 p201). They are the practical material outcome of the belief that individual acts of immediacy have the power to change society one step at a time. But “very little is needed to turn the resistance against repression repressively against those who – little as they might wish to glorify their state of being – do not desert the standpoint that they have come to occupy�?, (Adorno 2001 p199).

    In punk this reversal took place in the quick adoption of the movements style and attitude by mass culture, a pamphlet circulated in the late 1970s called The End of Music suggested this recuperation of anything which at first seemed subversive of the spectacle is common to all elements of art and culture; “just as Dada anti-art hangs in galleries and surrealist dreams sell cars, the Situationists joined every other failed critique and abandoned their weapons on the battlefield where their slogans were captured for T-shirts�? (Plant 1991 p146). The message is clear, for the modern day consumer of commodified lifestyles, “Organised freedom is compulsory�? (Adorno 2001 p190). Even the promise of revolution, the power to challenge and reconfigure the systems of society, including the culture industry itself, is presented as yet another commodity, as Barbrook and Cameron put it, “over the last few decades, the pioneering work of the community media activists has been largely recuperated by the hi-tech and media industries�?, (1996).

    In gaming this problematic situation of restriction from above being placed on the celebrated creativity from below (because of antagonistic or subversive works) is most clearly seen in Valve Software’s recent alterations to the Half-Life online gaming community using its new Steam distribution system . The once optional choice of becoming a part of any number of online PC gaming communities has been replaced with the forced membership to Valves own system called Steam. The game cannot be played without the extra Steam client software and an online account set up on its system, therefore all online activity based around Valves games is now mediated through the Steam network. The heightened control that Valve now has over consumer modification of its software is negating some freedoms of the hacker ethic, and this echo’s Manovich’s (2001) warnings that controlled alternatives do not always offer real choice. This system is good news for the developer, who can not only control piracy and increase profits by direct distribution methods that avoid retail, but can also continue to direct fan led modification projects with an even greater degree of control at the levels of production and distribution than were possible with the highly successful cases of Counter-Strike and Gunman Chronicles (Kline et al 2003 p251-53, see figures 7, 8 and 9).

    Figures 7, 8 and 9: From left to right, the original Half Life and the two commercially successful mods, Counter Strike and Gunman Chronicles. Note the homology of visual style and gameplay.

    While such mods actually went on to become full commercial commodities available for sale in high street shops, the pursuit of more artistic or political modifications are increasingly pushed into the margins. One case is Velvet Strike (see Paul 2003 p203, also see figures 10 and 11), a mod that allows players to spray ironic anti-war graffiti – for example ‘hostages of military fantasy’ – onto the walls of Counter-Strike’s online locations. Before the client authentication practices of the Steam network, this mod could easily be used to ‘hijack’ online games and enlighten general players usual unthinking acceptance of the militarised nature of gaming, but today many of this mods unsuspecting yet intended audience can no-longer be reached. However negative this seems, such marginalisation is also a positive occurrence; the deliberate distancing of hackivism styled artistic modification from the homogenising tendencies of the industry may allow game artists more freedom to explore the applications of this interactive technology, allowing for further exploration and a shelter from hegemonic mass culture, even if this means it has minimal direct effect on the aesthetics, interactions, or narratives of the mainstream gaming industry.

    Figures 10 and 11: Scenes from Velvet Strike, note that despite looking and playing exactly the same as Counter Strike, it features custom made posters and graffiti that aims to question the military theme.

    And so perhaps the Spectacle has changed – since the threats of the Situationist led mass culture détournement through punk – adopting a more shrewd postmodern form, which many identify in Baudrillard’s (1983) notions of hyperreality and simularcra. What remains is the possibility that online communities involved in major modification projects that touch on sensitive political or cultural issues, or deconstruct the standardisation of the gaming culture industry, may well producing a détournement-esque subversion of the spectacle, albeit in a way that is markedly different to Situationism of 30 years ago.

    Conclusions, videogames and the ideal commodity
    “Games are extensions, not of our private but of our social selves… they are media of communication�?, (McLuhan 1964 p266).

    It would seem that the modifiable videogame has through its growing popularity among consumers led to the construction of a complex online relationship of social labour. Videogames have long been a media of many contradictions, they may be (in McLuhan’s sense) hot because of their audio-visual intensity or cool due to the requirement of a ‘player’. With the addition of modification tools it would seem that they are increasingly authorless (Barthes 1977), and therefore a commodity form typical of the move to a post-Fordist society. Yet while modification and customisation seems to present great freedom in the creation of an authorial consumer, such an emphasis on a ‘logic of selection’ and collage has, as Manovich notes become a central flaw of postmodern digital culture; “Although computer software does not directly prevent its users from creating from scratch, its design on every level makes it ‘natural’ to follow a different logic – that of selection�? (1999 p129). All potential for creative production disappears amidst a new false consciousness (Marx 1994 p75, Giddens 1974 p13), a consumer society that claims complete freedom, but only from within a hegemonic cultural cage where, “even the individual object which man confronts directly, either as producer or consumer, is distorted in its objectivity by its commodity character�?, (Lukacs 1988 p257). The problem concerns all independent production of popular cultural artefacts, from videogame modification, to independent pop music or film.

    This illusion of freedom is for many writers, the greatest trick of postmodern popular culture, for as Baudrillard (1983) would argue; the individual is now trapped, paralysed within a never ending hyperreality of symbolic exchange. Within such a system, the videogame commodity offers the perfect example of a circuit of exchange between both producer and consumer, and among consumers themselves. As Martyn Lee has noted, it is the ideal post-Fordist commodity:

    “Fordist commodities were governed by a ‘metalogic’ of massification, durability, solidity, structure, standardisation, fixity, longevity and utility. Post-Fordism’s ‘metalogic,’ in contrast, is one of intensification and innovation; its typical commodities are instantaneous, experiential, fluid, flexible, heterogeneous, customised, portable and permeated by a fashion with form and style�?, (Lee, quoted in Kline et al 2003 p74).

    The way videogames are produced and consumed, reflect absolutely the ideals and the arrangement of the post-industrial capitalist system we inhabit today. In this system there may be no such thing as videogame ownership for the consumer; they are merely paying a fee to play a copy of the game, just as with CD’s and DVD’s (Lessig 1999 p127-35), remaining completely against the hacker ethic that information should be freely accessible (Levy 1984 p40), yet as authorship becomes blurred through modification gaming is being led back to its hacker origins. Here modding encounters the debate over claims of authorship for a work containing other artworks, a central issue of appropriation art (Irvin 2005 p123). If you cannot fully own the game you have purchased, can you own the modification of it that you have produced? This has been an ongoing issue for videogames since the early 1980s, as Ms Pac-Man – one of the most popular arcade games ever produced – did in fact start as an unapproved ‘enhancement board’ (created by two MIT students), to be applied to the original Pac-Man arcade cabinet. This was not a unique stand alone game; the students intentions were to sell the enhancement as their own work (which technically it was) however Atari threatened this with major legal action, but eventually settled for a development deal (Kent 2001 p167-173). While the music industry has battled with the effects of digitalisation, resisting sampling and re-distribution, even this early example illustrates how commercial gaming employs these processes to strengthen its cultural hegemony (ibid p170).

    Yet perhaps because of the ephemeral form of software, if not controlled, unofficial enhancement could have had major repercussions for a commercial consumer industry. The outcomes of such action can be seen to be perfected in Valve Software’s online intervention in the user made mods for Half Life and its sequel. With this move, the diversity of modding now sits condensed under the banner of the ‘commercial prosumer’ (Kline et al 2003 p14), where:

    “In production it demonstrates the foundation of a new industry built on the mobilization of an elite immaterial workforce, whose activities are supported by a penumbra of vital but un- or low paid activities conducted either by volunteer prosumers… At the level of production, they reveal the dependence of new media on forms of « dot.communist » activity, such as open source and freeware, and the implosion of the commodity form under the pressure of the escalating piracy inherent to networks. More generally, the digital socialization of youth through gaming discloses a subversive face in a proliferation of cyberactivist and hacktivist practices that both explode within game culture and overspill into more manifestly political spheres.�? (Dyer-Witheford 2002).

    This is certainly true of the feminist Art-games that Holmes (2003) considers to be creating a new space for critique of contemporary society and culture. Just as industrial capitalism was defined by the class struggle at the site of the means of production, between capitalist owner and proletariat wage labourer, so to is post-industrial society defined by a similar struggle. This struggle is typical of a society of consumption, seen most clearly in the antagonism between the hegemony of the culture industry and the desires of its consumers. While alienated labour has largely remained, it is not revolution but productive consumption that has now become regarded as the road to a non-alienated common existence. And yet consumption alone does not produce anything:

    “Only the real negation of culture can inherit culture’s meaning. Such negation can no longer remain cultural. It is what remains, in some manner, at the level of culture – but it has a quite different sense�?, (Debord 1994 Thesis 210).

    However this radical negation may be found through customisation. For Benjamin (1990) access to art through mass reproductions held the ability to enlighten individuals in such a way that quickly and “to an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.�? (p218). Today we might argue that the once individually customised commodity has now become the commodity designed for customisation, not only that, in addition as new customisations appear they are increasingly created with one eye on being commoditised. The era of mass reproduction of art, of the mass of copies that lack the aura of their original, has now been replaced by the era of the customisable artistic commodity, each an individually authored original in its own way. Art available for the people has now become art by the people, or so the culture industry promises.

    Following this, Barbrook’s observations on the way Net users interact within its mixed economy is even more appropriate in relation to those involved with the culture of videogame modification, where online-communism really is sponsored by corporate-capital and “without even consciously having to think about it, this person would have successively been a consumer in a market, a citizen of a state and an anarcho-communist within a gift economy�?, (1998 p5). The most striking feature within the duality of this situation is the corrosion of the boundry between alienated and non-alienated labour; for as Lazzarato notes, “Immaterial labour… makes immediately apparent something that material production had ‘hidden’, namely, that labour not only produces commodities, but first and foremost it produces the capital relation�?, (2005 p3). Yet modification crosses many times between the dual forms of immaterial labour, from social relation to capital relation and back again. Videogame commodities are produced and sold, then modified and distributed as gifts, and finally these gifts may be incorporated (with or without an exchange of capital) into future commodities; the contradictions here complicate existing classifications of alienated labour . So while videogames are but one aspect of today’s consumer society, modification represents a general trend of increasing complexity which:

    “As Capitalism’s ever-intensifying implosion of alienation at all levels makes it increasingly hard for workers to recognise and name their own impoverishment… the revolutionary organisation must learn that it can no longer combat alienation by means of alienated forms of struggle�?, (Debord 1994: Thesis 122).

    There are undeniable benefits and problems in the flattening of the lines of production and distribution into a many-to-many system where consumers can access tools for customisation; and for very little financial outlay distribute their re-workings to their peers digitally. If this sounds incredibly utopian then we must not forget that the freedom to innovate and explore within the homogenized borders of the culture industry is slight and narrowing rapidly with the ever increasing intervention of software producers channelling modification projects down the well walked paths of militarised gameplay so prevalent today. Even the most successful and sophisticated mods are often little more than a scenario change (be it Star Wars or the plights of asylum seekers) for a commercial shoot-em-up or tactical military war game. There is opportunity for development within videogame culture through modification, and the potential is greater than it has been for most past forms of tactical and community media because of digital gaming’s structural compatibility with the distribution and community strengths of the Internet. As a mainly de-politicised, consumer friendly, détournement-style practice, videogame modification is unlikely to generate any radical change, yet as Benjamin might have noted, its processes do illustrate the possibilities that customisable digital media offers for all art and popular culture.

    Download a Microsoft Word version of this dissertation, including all illustrations and footnotes

  • CYBER-COMMUNISM by Richard Barbrook

    HOW THE AMERICANS ARE SUPERSEDING CAPITALISM IN CYBERSPACE

    ‘…is the impact of the …information revolution on capitalism not the ultimate exemplification of… Marx’s thesis that: “at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production…”? …does the prospect of the… “global village” not signal the end of market relations… at least in the sphere of digitalised information?’ (Zizek 1998: 33-4)

    Ghosts in the Machine

    A spectre is haunting the Net: the spectre of communism. Reflecting the extravagance of the new media, this spectre takes two distinct forms: the theoretical appropriation of Stalinist communism and the everyday practice of cyber-communism. Whatever their professed political beliefs, all users of the Net enthusiastically participate in this left-wing revival. Whether in theory or practice, each of them desires the digital transcendence of capitalism. Yet, at the same time, even the most dedicated leftist can no longer truly believe in communism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, this ideology is completely discredited. The promises of social emancipation turned into the horrors of totalitarianism. The dreams of industrial modernity culminated in economic stagnation. Far from representing the future, communism seems like a relic from the past.

    Above all, the Soviet Union was incapable of leading the information revolution. The political and economic structures of Stalinist communism were far too inflexible and secretive for the emergence of the new technological paradigm. How could the totalitarian party allow everyone to produce media without its supervision? How could the central planning agency permit producers to form collaborative networks without its authorisation? A much more open and spontaneous society was needed to develop the Net. Excited by the libertarian potential of further digital convergence, the proponents of almost every radical ideology have recently updated their positions. Yet, among the cyber-feminists, communication guerrillas, techno-nomads and digital anarchists, there is no new version of the once dominant current of Stalinist communism. Even its former acolytes admit that the Soviet Union exemplified the worst failures of Fordism: authoritarianism, conformity and environmental degradation. (Hall and Jacques: 1989)

    The ideologues of American neo-liberalism have seized this opportunity to lay claim to the future. For almost thirty years, they have been predicting that new technologies were about to create a utopian civilisation: the information society. For instance, the Tofflers have long been convinced that the convergence of computing, telecommunications and the media would free individuals from the clutches of both big business and big government. (Toffler 1980) Similarly, Ithiel de Sola Pool prophesied that interactive television would allow everyone to make their own media and participate in political decision-making. (de Sola Pool 1983) Despite their radical rhetoric, these conservative pundits were primarily interested in proving that information technologies would force the privatisation and deregulation of all economic activity. Their post-Fordist future was the return to the liberal past. When the Net became popular, this free market fundamentalism was quickly adapted to fit the new situation. Most famously, Wired argues that the ‘New Paradigm’ of unregulated competition between cyber-entrepreneurs is extending individual freedom and encouraging technological innovation in the USA. (Barbrook and Cameron 1996) As the Net spreads across the world, the material and spiritual values of American neo-liberalism will eventually be imposed on the whole of humanity. As Louis Rossetto – the founding editor of Wired – explains:

    ‘This new world [of the Net] is characterised by a new global economy that is inherently anti-hierarchical and decentralist, and that disrespects national boundaries or the control of politicians and bureaucrats… and by a global, networked consciousness… that is turning… bankrupt electoral politics… into a dead end.’ (Hudson 1996: 30)

     

    The Cult of the Digerati

    The narcissism of the Californian ideology reflects the self-confidence of a triumphant nation. With the Cold War won, the USA no longer has any serious military or ideological competitors. Even its economic rivals in the EU and East Asia have been surpassed. According to most commentators, the renaissance of American hegemony is founded upon its lead in new information technologies. No country can match the ‘smart weapons’ of the US military. Few companies can compete against the ‘smart machines’ used by American corporations. Above all, the USA dominates the cutting-edge of technological innovation: the Net. Realising the American dream, a lucky few are making huge fortunes from floating their hi-tech companies on Wall Street. (Greenwald 1998) Mesmerised by the commercial potential of e-commerce, many others are speculating their savings on new media share issues.

    ‘Internet stocks… may be the hottest things since the Dutch tulip-bulb craze in the 1600s’. (Kadlec 1999: 1)

    Despite all the wealth being generated by technological innovation, the division between rich and poor continues to widen in the USA. (Elliott 1999) In contrast with the European and East Asian forms of capitalism, American neo-liberalism can successfully combine economic progress with social immobility. Ever since the 1789 French revolution, conservatives have searched for this union of opposites: reactionary modernism. (Herf 1984) Although necessary for the survival of capitalism, the social implications of economic growth have always frightened the Right. Over the long-run, continual industrialisation slowly erodes class privileges. As their incomes rise, ordinary people can increasingly determine the political concerns and cultural attitudes of society. As a result, successive generations of conservatives have faced the dilemma of reconciling economic expansion with social stasis. Despite deep ideological differences, they have always proposed the same solution: the formation of a hi-tech aristocracy. (Nietzsche 1961; Ortega y Gasset 1932)

    The earliest versions of this reactionary fantasy emphasised the hierarchical division of labour under Fordism. Although many skills were destroyed by the industrial system, new specialisms were simultaneously created. Within Fordism, engineers, bureaucrats, teachers and other professionals formed an intermediate layer between management and the shopfloor. (Elger 1979) Unlike most employees, this section of the working class received high incomes and escaped subordination to the assembly-line. Fearful of losing their limited privileges, some professionals became enthusiastic supporters of reactionary modernism. Instead of fighting for social equality, they dreamt of founding a new aristocracy: the technocracy.

    ‘Reason, science, and technology are not inert processes by which men [and women] discover, communicate, and apply facts disinterestedly and without passion, but means by which, through systems, some men [and women] organise and control the lives of other men [and women] according to their conceptions as to what is preferable.’ (Israel 1972: 2-3)

    During the boom years of Fordism, the new ruling class was supposedly being formed by the managers and other professionals from large corporations and government departments. (Burnham 1945) However, when the economy went into crisis in the early-1970s, right-wing intellectuals were forced to look for supporters amongst other sections of the intermediate layer. Inspired by Marshall McLuhan, they soon discovered the growing number of people developing new information technologies. (McLuhan 1964) For almost three decades, conservative gurus have been predicting that the new ruling class would be composed of venture capitalists, innovative scientists, hacker geniuses, media stars and neo-liberal ideologues: the digerati. (Bell 1973; Toffler 1980; Kelly 1994) Seeking to popularise their prophecies, they always claim that every hi-tech professional has the opportunity to become a member of this new aristocracy. Within the convergent industries, skilled workers are essential for the development of original products, such as software programs and website designs. In common with many of their peers, most digital artisans suffer from the insecurity of contract employment. However, they also are better paid and have greater autonomy over their work. As in the past, this ambiguous social position can encourage gullibility towards reactionary modernism. Chasing the American dream, many hi-tech workers hope to make millions from founding their own company. Instead of identifying with their fellow employees, they aspire to join the digerati: the new technocracy of the Net. (Kroker and Weinstein 1994)

    Unlike in earlier forms of conservatism, this desire for domination over others is no longer openly expressed in the Californian ideology. Instead, its gurus claim that the rule of the digerati will benefit everyone. For they are the inventors of sophisticated machines and the improvers of production methods. They are pioneering the hi-tech services which will eventually be enjoyed by the whole population. Over time, the digerati will transform the restrictions of Fordism into the freedoms of the information society. The compromises of representative democracy will be replaced by personal participation within the ‘electronic town hall’. The limits on personal creativity in the existing media will be overcome by interactive forms of aesthetic expression. Even the physical confines of the body will be transcended within cyberspace. In the Californian ideology, the autocracy of the few in the short-term is necessary for the liberation of the many in the long-term. (Toffler 1980; Kelly 1994; Hudson 1996; Dyson 1997)

    ‘Not haves and have-nots – [but have-nows and] have-laters.’ (Rossetto 1996)

     

    The Liberating Minority

    What is now expected from the digerati in the age of the Net was once predicted about other heroic elites in the times of steel and electricity. Ever since the late-nineteenth century, science fiction novelists have fantasised about a small group of scientists and philosophers inventing the technological fix for the problems of society. (Bellamy 1982; Wells 1913) Among political activists, this faith in the leading role of the enlightened minority has an even older pedigree. At the peak of the French revolution in the 1790s, the Jacobins decided that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. Although their regime was fighting for political and cultural freedom, substantial sections of the population violently resisted the modernisation of French society. According to the Jacobins, the minds of these traditionalists had been corrupted by the aristocracy and the clergy. The revolutionary dictatorship was needed not only to crush armed rebellions, but also to popularise the principles of republican democracy. For only once everyone had been educated could all citizens participate in political decision-making. The tyranny of the minority in the short-term would lead to democracy for the majority in the long-term. (Brinton 1961; Barbrook 1995: 19-37)

    Although the Jacobins only held power for a few years, their example has inspired revolutionary movements for generations. In many countries, radical groups have faced the identical problem of transforming traditional communities into industrial societies. Whatever their ideological differences, every revolutionary minority had the same mission: leading the masses towards modernity. By the mid-nineteenth century, the European Left had realised that this goal of political and cultural emancipation could only be achieved through economic progress. Henri de Saint-Simon had explained that the power of the aristocracy and clergy was founded upon agriculture. If the economy could be modernised, wealth and power would inevitably transfer to members of the new industrial professions: entrepreneurs, workers, politicians, artists and scientists. Like the Jacobins, Saint-Simon argued that this new elite shouldn’t just look after its own interests. For these modernisers also had the historical task of liberating their less-fortunate fellow citizens from poverty and ignorance. By creating economic abundance, the enlightened minority would enable everyone to enjoy happy and productive lives.

    ‘Politics should now be nothing more than the science of providing people with as many material goods and as much moral satisfaction as possible.’ (Saint-Simon and Halévy 1975: 280)

    Inspired by Saint-Simon, early socialists believed that economic growth would inevitably lead to political and cultural emancipation. Under capitalism, there had to be continual improvements in the methods and machinery used to make goods and services: the forces of production. Over time, these advances were slowly undermining the private ownership of business: the relations of production. According to this version of Saint-Simon, the increasing interdependence of the modern economy would eventually force the adoption of more collective forms of social organisation. Whatever their current difficulties, the parliamentary parties of the European Left were confident of eventual victory. Sooner or later, the development of the forces of production would democratise the relations of production. (Marx 1970: 20-21; Engels 1975: 74-101)

    By the mid-twentieth century, this Marxist remix of Saint-Simon had also been appropriated by apologists of totalitarianism. Even before seizing power, V.I. Lenin had argued that revolutionary intellectuals should form a prototype of the Jacobin dictatorship: the vanguard party. (Lenin 1975) Under the old order, the minds of most people were filled with incorrect ideologies from right-wing newspapers, churches and other cultural institutions. The enlightened minority had the historical duty of leading these ignorant masses towards the utopian future. After the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin and his followers were able to create a modernising dictatorship. Like its predecessor in 1790s France, this new regime was committed to fighting against reactionary forces and to educating the whole population. (Lenin 1975a) In addition, the revolutionary dictatorship had acquired an even more important task: the industrialisation of the Russian economy. Appropriating the analysis of Saint-Simon and his Marxist interpreters, Lenin claimed that economic modernisation would eventually lead to political and cultural liberation. By imposing authoritarian rule in the short-term, the Russian revolutionaries hoped to construct participatory democracy in the long-run. (Lenin 1932; Bukharin 1971)

    This determination to modernise the economy soon led to the removal of all political and cultural freedoms. The promise of eventual emancipation justified the murder and imprisonment of millions. The creativity of artists was reduced to making propaganda for the totalitarian party. The modernising dictatorship had even lost interest in improving the living conditions of the masses. (Ciliga 1979: 261-291) Instead, the Soviet leadership became obsessed with the introduction of new technologies: the mechanical proof of increasing productive forces. By the early-1930s, Josef Stalin – the successor of Lenin – was measuring progress towards the utopian future by rises in the output of industrial goods: steel, cars, tractors and machine-tools. (Stalin 1954: 512-520) Economic development had become an end in itself.

    ‘The results of the Five-Year Plan [of industrialisation] have shown that the capitalist system… has become obsolete and must give way to another, higher, Soviet, socialist system…’ (Stalin 1954: 541-542)

    Back in the nineteenth century, there had been no clear definition of communism. While Mikhail Bakunin had found its antecedents within peasant communities, Karl Marx believed that the new system was prefigured by industrial co-operatives. (Bakunin 1973: 182-194; Marx 1959: 435-441) But, after the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, there could no longer be any doubt about the correct interpretation of communism. Across the world, almost every revolutionary movement embraced some variant of the Stalinist creed. The radical intellectuals must form a vanguard party to overthrow the existing order. Once in power, this revolutionary minority had to set up the modernising dictatorship. As well as providing security and education, the totalitarian state would organise the rapid development of the economy. (Djilas 1966) Almost all radicals believed that this Stalinist version of communism had been proved both in the factory and on the battlefield. Once the Cold War started, any other interpretations were marginalised. For nearly fifty years, the imperial rivalry between the two superpowers was expressed as a fierce ideological conflict: Russian communism versus American capitalism.

    Stalin in Silicon Valley

    During the Cold War, each side claimed that its particular socio-economic structures represented the future of all humanity. Despite championing rival systems, the apologists of both superpowers still shared a common – and unacknowledged – theoretical source: Saint-Simon. Ever since the 1917 revolution, the Russian state had been using his futurist prophecies to justify its actions. Learning from its Cold War opponent, the US government began making similar claims about its policies. Although promoting liberal capitalism, American propagandists enthusiastically mimicked the theoretical rhetoric of Stalinist communism. The power of the minority of capitalists was in the long-term interests of the majority of the population. Any flaws in American society would be soon solved by further economic growth. Above all, the utopian potential of the USA was proved by continual introduction of new technologies: the symbol of increasing productive forces. (Rostow 1971) Alongside their military-political contest over ‘spheres of influence’, the two superpowers also competed over who represented the future.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t end the theoretical influence of Stalinist communism over right-wing American intellectuals. On the contrary, the global mission of the USA had been confirmed by victory over its totalitarian rival. According to one apologist, American neo-liberalism is now the realisation of the Hegelian ‘end of history’. Although wars and conflicts will continue, there is no longer any alternative form of socio-economic system. (Fukuyama 1992) For the proponents of the Californian ideology, this narcissistic assumption is proved by American dominance over the cutting-edge of economic modernity: the Net. If other countries also want to enter the information age, they will have to imitate the peculiar social system of the USA. Like its Cold War predecessors, this contemporary celebration of American neo-liberalism appropriates many theoretical assumptions from Stalinist communism. Once again, the enlightened minority is leading the ignorant masses towards a utopian civilisation. Any suffering caused by the introduction of information technologies is justified by the promise of future liberation. (Hudson 1996: 33) Echoing the Russian tyrant, the digerati even measure progress towards utopia by increasing ownership of modern artefacts: home computers, beepers, mobile phones and laptops. (Katz 1997: 71-72) Although the Soviet Union has long disappeared, the proponents of the Californian ideology are still appropriating the theoretical legacy of Stalinist communism:

    vanguard party digerati
    The Five-Year Plan The New Paradigm
    boy-meets-tractor nerd-meets-Net
    Third International Third Wave
    Moscow Silicon Valley
    Pravda Wired
    party line unique thought
    Soviet democracy electronic town halls
    Lysenkoism memetics
    society-as-factory society-as-hive
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    Stakhanovite norm-busting overworked contract labour
    purges downsizing
    Russian nationalism Californian chauvinism

     

    The Revenge of Saint-Simon

    Across the industrialised world, this conservative appropriation of Stalinism now dominates discussions about the Net. Every guru celebrates the emergence of the new technocracy: the digerati. Every pundit claims that these pioneers of the Net are building a new utopia: the information society. Yet, like their Soviet predecessors, contemporary right-wing intellectuals can only produce corrupted versions of Saint-Simon’s prophecy. While this socialist philosopher wanted economic progress to liberate everyone, these proponents of reactionary modernism exclude the majority of the population from their hi-tech future. For the privileges of the digerati depend upon the subordination of the unenlightened masses. In the Californian ideology, permanent technological revolution is always identified with unchanging social hierarchy. However, without the promise of eventual redemption, economic modernisation becomes an end in itself. Once again, conservative philosophers are promising an imaginary future to dissuade people from improving their lived present.

    Although always imminent, the arrival of the information society must be perpetually postponed. As in the former Soviet Union, the prophecy of Saint-Simon is never supposed to be actually realised within the USA. On the contrary, the development of the forces of production is designed to reinforce the existing relations of production. For both public and private institutions only introduce new information technologies to advance their own interests. Back in the 1960s, the US military funded the invention of the Net to fight nuclear wars. Ever since the 1970s, financial markets have used computer networks to impose their hegemony over the entire world. During the last few years, both capitalist companies and government departments have adopted the Net to improve communications with their employees, contractors and clients. At the moment, every speculator on Wall Street is looking for the cyber-entrepreneur who is building the next Microsoft. Despite all the utopian predictions of the digerati, there appears to be nothing inherently emancipatory in the convergence of computing, telecommunications and the media. Like earlier forms of capitalism, the information society remains dominated by the hierarchies of the market and the state. (Schiller 1995; Winston 1998: 321-336)

    At the beginning of the new millennium, American neo-liberalism seems to have successfully achieved the contradictory aims of reactionary modernism: economic progress and social immobility. Because the long-term goal of liberating everyone will never be reached, the short-term rule of the digerati can last forever. Yet, as in the former Soviet Union, this dialectic of development and stasis is inherently unstable. By modernising agricultural societies, the ruling parties of Stalinist communism slowly destroyed the foundations of their own power. Over time, the relations of production formed by totalitarianism became incompatible with the continual expansion of the forces of production. At this historical moment, Saint-Simon finally had his revenge on his false disciples.

    ‘The [Stalinist] communist revolution… has brought about a measure of industrial civilisation to vast areas of Europe and Asia. In this way, material bases have actually been created for a future freer society. Thus, while bringing about the most complete despotism, the [Stalinist] communist revolution has also created the basis for the abolition of despotism.’ (Djilas 1966: 41-42)

    Like its erstwhile opponent, American neo-liberalism is now also being undermined by the development of the forces of production. As predicted by Saint-Simon, the full potential of recent technological and social advances cannot be realised within the traditional hierarchies of capitalism. According to the proponents of the Californian ideology, the Net is founded upon the buying and selling of information goods and services. Only through market competition can individual desires be satisfied. Yet, when they go on-line, Net users are primarily engaged in giving and receiving information as gifts. Quite spontaneously, people are adopting more democratic methods of working together within cyberspace.

    Fulfilling the prophecy of Saint-Simon, these new relations of production have emerged at the cutting-edge of economic progress: the Net. Not surprisingly, they are being pioneered by a privileged minority of the world’s population: people with access to computer-mediated communications technologies. As a result, these new ways of working are most widespread within the leading capitalist nation: the USA. The technological and social preconditions for the realisation of Saint-Simon’s prophecy are now present. While conservative ideologues remain entranced by the theoretical legacy of Stalinist communism, their fellow Americans are discovering the practical benefits of a new version of this concept: cyber-communism.

    ‘Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods.’ (Raymond 1998: 9)

    The gift economy of the Net emerges from the technological and social advances catalysed by capitalist modernisation. Over the last three hundred years, the reproduction, distribution and manipulation of information has become slowly easier through a long process of mechanisation. A manually-operated press produced copies which were relatively expensive, limited in numbers and impossible to alter without recopying. After generations of technological improvements, the same quantity of text on the Net is easily circulated, copied and remixed. However, individuals need money and time to access this advanced communications system. While most of the world’s population still live in poverty, the inhabitants of the industrialised countries have reduced their hours of employment and increased their wealth over two centuries of economic growth. Ever since the advent of Fordism, mass production has depended upon workers having enough resources and leisure for mass consumption. (Negri 1988) Having disposable income and spare time, many workers within the metropolitan countries are now able to work on their own projects. (Gorz 1989) Only at this particular historical moment have the technical and social conditions developed sufficiently for the emergence of cyber-communism.

    ‘Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.’ (Marx 1973: 700)

     

    The Academic Gift Economy

    The invention of the Net was the greatest irony of the Cold War. At the height of the struggle against Stalinist communism, the US military unwittingly bankrolled the creation of cyber-communism. Faced with the threat of nuclear attack on command and control structures, research money was given to scientists for experiments in computer-mediated communications. Although initially developed for the military, its inventors soon started using the Net for their own purposes. Crucially, scientists simply assumed that all information should be distributed for free over their new communications system. Unlike most other sectors of production, the gift economy has long been the primary method of socialising labour within universities. Funded by the state or by donations, scientists don’t have to turn their intellectual work directly into marketable commodities. Instead, research results are publicised by ‘giving a paper’ at specialist conferences and by ‘contributing an article’ to academic journals. By being quoted, scientists acquire personal recognition which enhances their career prospects within the university system. Despite increasing commercialisation, the giving away of findings remains the most efficient method of solving common problems within a particular scientific discipline.

    ‘The rationality of professional services is not the same as the rationality of the market… In the professions, and especially in science, the abdication of moral control would disrupt the system. The producer of professional services must be… responsible for his products, and it is fitting that he not be alienated from them.’ (Hagstrom 1982: 29)

    Because of these pioneers, the gift economy became firmly embedded within the social mores of the Net. Over time, the charmed circle of its users has slowly grown from scientists through hobbyists to the general public. Each new member doesn’t just have to observe the technical rules of the system, but also adheres to certain social conventions. Without even thinking about it, people continually circulate information between each other for free. Although the Net has expanded far beyond the university, its users still prefer to co-operate together without the direct mediation of money.

    There are even selfish reasons for adopting cyber-communism. By adding their own presence, every user is contributing something to the collective knowledge accessible to those already on-line. In return for this gift, each individual obtains potential access to all the information provided on the Net by others. Within a market economy, buyers and sellers tend to exchange commodities of equivalent worth. Yet, within the hi-tech gift economy, everyone receives far more from their fellow users than any individual could ever give away. (Ghosh 1998: 10) Not surprisingly, there is no popular clamour for imposing the equal exchange of the marketplace on the Net. Even the most dogmatic neo-liberals are happily participating within cyber-communism.

    From the beginning, these gift relations of production were hardwired into the technological structure of the Net. Although funded by the military, scientists developed computer-mediated communications to facilitate the distribution and manipulation of their own research data. Working at universities, they never conceived of this information as a commodity. On the contrary, these academics were advancing their careers by giving away the results of their labour. Creating a communications system for their own use, they incorporated these working methods inside the technologies of the Net. (Geise 1996: 126-132) Above all, their invention depends upon the continual and unhindered reproduction of information. When on-line, every connection involves copying material from one computer to another. Once the first copy of a piece of information is placed on the Net, the cost of making each extra copy becomes almost zero. The architecture of the system presupposes that multiple copies of documents can easily be cached around the network. Although most of its users are now from outside the academy, the technical design of the Net still assumes that all information is a gift.

    ‘In an information space, we can consider the authorship of materials, and their perception; but… there is a need for the underlying infrastructure to be able to make copies simply for reasons of efficiency and reliability. The concept of “copyright” as expressed in terms of copies made makes little sense.’ (Berners-Lee 1996: 11)

     

    The Eclipse of Copyright

    Despite its huge popularity, the gift economy of the Net appears to be an aberration. Mesmerised by the Californian ideology, almost all politicians, executives and pundits are convinced that computer-mediated communications can only be developed through market competition between private enterprises. Like other products, information must be bought and sold as a commodity. This faith in market forces comes from historical experience. During the past three centuries, the mediation of commodity exchange has dramatically increased the productivity of labour. Responding to changes in prices, workers and resources are distributed towards the most efficient sectors of the economy. Competing against rival firms, entrepreneurs must continually improve the methods and means of production. When disciplined by the market, the self-interest of individuals can be directed towards increasing the wealth of the whole nation. (Smith 1970; Ricardo 1973)

    The founding fathers of liberal economics discovered the central paradox of capitalism: individual property is the precondition of collective labour. In pre-modern societies, the aristocracy and clergy’s control over their lands was circumscribed by feudal rights and duties. The work of the peasantry was organised through the particular set of customs found in each domain. In contrast, the pioneers of capitalism transformed land into a tradable commodity: the enclosures. Once feudal bonds were removed, work of different types and in various locations could be regulated by a single mechanism: the marketplace. (Marx 1976: 873-930) Over the last few centuries, this modern form of collective labour has become ubiquitous. For the disciplines of market competition not only raised productivity within traditional trades, but also encouraged the development of new industries. Within the metropolitan countries, ordinary people are now using goods and services which were unavailable even to kings and popes in earlier times. However, each of these technological wonders has been shaped by the peculiar production relations of capitalism. As well as satisfying a human desire, every new product must also be sold as a commodity. Within a market economy, the enclosure of collective labour is perpetual. (Midnight Notes Collective 1990)

    Under capitalism, most goods and services are produced as commodities. If they’re tangible objects or temporary actions, this social transformation is usually unproblematic. However, the commodification of intellectual labour has always been more difficult. While teaching and entertaining are like other services, publications are very different from other goods. Most of work to create an information product is expended in making the first copy. Even with the earliest printing presses, the cost of producing each subsequent copy is always much cheaper. In an open market, publishers would be encouraged to plagiarise existing works rather than paying for new material. The first capitalist nations quickly discovered a pragmatic solution to this economic problem: copyright. Although everyone could buy cultural artefacts, the right to reproduce them was limited by law. Like every other form of work, intellectual labour could now be enclosed into a commodity. (May 1998: 68-73)

    ‘Milton produced Paradise Lost as a silkworm produces silk, as the activation of his own nature. He later sold his product for £5 and thus became a merchant.’ (Marx 1976: 1044)

    At the end of the twentieth century, copyright continues to provide the legal framework for information production. Many forms of intellectual labour are sold as commodities: books, music, films, games and software. The publishers of copyright-protected artefacts have become major industries: the multi-media multinationals. The international legal agreements protecting intellectual property are continually tightened: Berne, the WTO, TRIPS. Not surprisingly, most politicians, executives and pundits assume that the Net will inevitably be commercialised. Like radio broadcasting and cable television in earlier times, the moment of the gift economy can only be temporary. As in other cultural industries, intellectual labour within cyberspace has to be enclosed into information commodities. (May 1998a; Frow 1996, Porter 1995)

    Anticipating this obsession, some pioneers did try to incorporate copyright protection within computer-mediated communications. For instance, Ted Nelson’s Xanadu project contained a sophisticated tracking and payment system for enforcing intellectual property. Using this software, individuals could work together by trading information commodities with each other. Yet, despite its technical brilliance, the Xanadu scheme failed for entirely social reasons. (Wolf 1995) Instead of encouraging participation, copyright protection proved to be a major obstacle to on-line collaboration. For most people benefit more from circulating information without payment than trading cultural commodities. By giving away their own personal efforts, Net users always receive the results of much greater amounts of labour in return from others. The scarcity of copyright cannot compete against the abundance of gifts. Far from intensifying commodification, the Net is the practical vindication of the old hacker slogan: “information wants to be free”. (Lang 1998; Ghosh 1998)

    At the cutting-edge of modernity, the exchange of commodities now plays a secondary role to the circulation of gifts. The enclosure of intellectual labour is challenged by a more efficient method of working: disclosure. Within universities, scientists have long solved problems within their specialisms by pooling their findings. As the Net grows, more and more people are discovering the benefits of the gift economy. For they are not only have the opportunity to contribute their own information, but also gain access to the knowledge of many others. Everyday, the users of the Net are sending emails, taking part in listservers, making websites, contributing to newsgroups and participating within on-line conferences. No longer enclosed in the commodity, intellectual labour is continually disclosed as a gift. The passive consumption of fixed information products is transforming into a fluid process of ‘interactive creativity’. (Berners-Lee 1998: 5)

    ‘The logic of digital technology leads us in a new direction. Objects, as well as ideas, are no longer fixed, no longer tangible. In cyberspace, there is no weight, no dimensions; structure is dynamic and changing; size is both infinite and immaterial. In this space, stories are written that change with each new reader; new material can be added, and old material can be deleted. Nothing is permanent.’ (Kleinman 1996: 76)

    The types of ‘interactive creativity’ between Net users are very varied. While some on-line encounters are only temporary, others evolve into long-lasting collaborations. Although many users only talk to close friends and family, some are building relationships which solely exist on the Net. If most on-line conversations are frivolous, other groups are meeting to talk about serious issues. Out of all these different types of ‘interactive creativity’, Net users have developed their own distinctive form of social organisation: the network community. (Rheingold 1994; Hamman 1999) By circulating gifts between each other, individuals are able to work together on common projects. For, as well as having fun, the members of network communities are engaged in a continuous process of collective labour. Everyone can send out gifts of texts, visuals, animations, music, games and other software to their on-line colleagues. In return, they will receive lots of virtual presents from their fellow community members. By contributing their own work, each individual potentially possesses the creative efforts of the whole network community. (Ghosh 1998; Kollock 1999)

    The pleasure of giving and receiving gifts can radically change the personal experience of collective labour. Within the marketplace, individuals primarily collaborate through the impersonal exchange of commodities. The buyers and sellers should remain unconcerned about each other’s fate. In contrast, the circulation of gifts encourages friendships between its participants. The construction of a successful network community is always a labour of love. Working within cyber-communism can be not only more productive, but also more enjoyable than digital capitalism. According to Howard Rheingold, these social benefits of the hi-tech gift economy are not confined to the Net. Despite all their wealth, many Americans are suffering from the isolation and alienation imposed by market competition. Luckily, some can now find friendship and intimacy within network communities. Since there is no necessity for the enclosure of collective labour within cyberspace, Americans can compensate for the damage caused by their nation’s ‘…loss of a sense of a social commons.’ (Rheingold 1994: 12)

    The results of ‘interactive creativity’ within network communities are often trivial and mundane. Yet, at the same time, some on-line collaborations are creating very sophisticated products. Among the most celebrated are the network communities working on free software. From the beginning, scientists developed the core programs of the Net as gifts. The exponential expansion of the system was only made possible by the absence of proprietary barriers. For instance, although the Xanadu project contained most of the technical capabilities of the Web, this prototype of computer-mediated communications lacked the ‘killer app’ of Tim Berners-Lee’s invention: the absence of copyright. Neither the program nor its products were designed to be commodities. (Berners-Lee 1996)

    In recent years, the rapid growth of the Net has catalysed a exuberant revival of the hacker ethic. Increasingly frustrated with commercial products, techies have come together to write their own software. When enclosed by copyright, a program’s capabilities are frozen until the next version is made available. Even its bugs cannot be fixed. In contrast, when disclosed as a gift, this virtual machine can be continually modified, amended and improved by anyone with the appropriate programming skills. The product has become a process. Above all, each member of the network community developing a program potentially has access to the skills of all their colleagues. If one person can’t solve a software problem, others within the group will help find the solution. (Leonard 1998a) By participating within such ‘interactive creativity’, formerly isolated techies are now making friends across the world. Like other network communities, collective labour within free software development can be not only more efficient, but also more enjoyable than working on commercial projects. As technological convergence intensifies, this gift economy of the Net is now encroaching further into the market economy of computing. (Porterfield 1998) Starting from a prototype by Linus Torvalds, a network community of developers is building their own non-proprietary operating system: Linux. (Linux Online 1999) For the first time, Microsoft has a serious competitor for Windows. Enclosed by a capitalist monopoly, many American techies are working hard to perfect its pragmatic alternative: software cyber-communism.

    ‘…you assume that bugs are generally shallow phenomena – or, at least, that they turn pretty shallow when exposed to a thousand eager co-developers pounding on every single new release.’ (Raymond 1998a: 7)

    The convergence of many different technologies around digital formats is also reinforcing the gift economies found in other areas of cultural production. According to the multi-media multinationals, the Net will soon have to adopt the methods of the marketplace. Protected by encryption and passwords, digital information will be traded as a commodity. However, these aspiring enclosers of the Net are already confronted by the partial decommodisation of their own cultural industries. For instance, the home-taping of music has existed for many decades. The continual advances in digital reproduction and the rapid spread of the Net are making this piracy of copyright material ever easier. (Chesterman and Lipman 1988: 36-45; Leonard 1998) Crucially, the most innovative forms of popular music now emerge from the creative appropriation of other people’s intellectual property: house, hip-hop, drum & bass. Instead of remaining frozen in a single recording, tunes and breaks can be repeatedly sampled, mixed and remixed. If someone has a good idea, many other musicians will try to refine the concept. Like the Net, contemporary DJ culture is also ‘interactive creativity’. (Garratt 1998; James 1997)

    For years, the most popular word entered into search engines was quite predictable: ‘sex’. Yet, in 1999, the top request became the music format of the Net: ‘MP3’. (Wice 1999) For the commercial music industry, the minor problem of home-taping is amplifying into a major crisis. Since copying and distributing is now so easy, many people are giving away digital recordings not only to their friends, but also to complete strangers. As music is integrated within the Net, the scarcity of commodities is spontaneously transforming into the abundance of gifts. (Leonard 1998) As well as facilitating the piracy of existing recordings, technological convergence also deepens musical ‘interactive creativity’. Like many other people, musicians are working together, making friends and inspiring each other within network communities. By publishing their own material, they can offer their music as gifts to Net users across the world. From these on-line collaborations, they are inventing new forms of rhythmic expression: midi-jamming, interactive music, cyber-trance.

    As other media technologies converge into the Net, all forms of cultural production are slowly integrating into the hi-tech gift economy. Even television and film-making will soon be transformed by the possibilities of ‘interactive creativity’. Despite their power and wealth, the multi-media multinationals can only inhibit this economic transformation. Quite spontaneously, the users of the Net are adopting more efficient and enjoyable ways of working together. At the dawn of the new millennium, many Americans are now experiencing the practical benefits of cyber-communism:

    commodity gift
    enclosure disclosure
    copyright piracy
    fixed fluid
    product process
    proprietary open source
    digital encryption free download
    original recording latest remix
    scarcity abundance
    alienation friendship
    New Soviet Man post-humans
    market competition network communities
    e-commerce cyber-communism

     

    The Market on the Commons

    Compared with the rest of humanity, the inhabitants of the USA are already very privileged. Although still denied adequate welfare provision, most Americans not only consume more goods and services, but also enjoy greater democratic liberties than the majority of the world’s population. Over the past two hundred years, the continual expansion and intensification of commodity exchange has massively raised the productivity of collective labour in the USA. Regulated by the federal government and local states, rival entrepreneurs have competed to build an increasingly complex and interdependent economic system. According to almost all American politicians, executives and pundits, the next stage of the marketisation of society is being pioneered at the cutting-edge of technology: the Net. As in the past, the enclosure of new types of collective labour will inevitably raise living standards and extend personal freedoms within the USA. There is no alternative to the organising principle of the existing relations of production: work-as-commodity.

    Ironically, the revenge of Saint-Simon is now being visited upon his American false disciples. As in the former Soviet Union, constant increases in the forces of production are threatening the dominant relations of production. Far from being the apotheosis of commodity exchange, the social and technical structures of computer-mediated communications embody an alternative form of collective labour: the gift economy. If individuals were forced to collaborate primarily through e-commerce, their opportunities to participate within ‘interactive creativity’ would be very limited. The full potential of the productive forces of the Net can only be realised by adopting the most advanced relations of production: cyber-communism.

    At such historical moments, the proponents of reactionary modernism are thrown into an existential crisis. Despite their deep ideological differences, almost all right-wing intellectuals have the same goal: economic development without social progress. Sometimes for decades, ruling elites can successfully combine these contradictory aims of reactionary modernism. However, the continual growth of the forces of production will eventually undermine the existing relations of production. Sooner or later, the supporters of reactionary modernism are forced to make a hard choice: economic growth or social stasis. For instance, the followers of Stalinist communism were confronted by this dilemma at the end of the 1980s. Wanting to catch up with their Western neighbours, most Eastern European politicians, executives and intellectuals accepted the demise of the totalitarian state which provided their livelihoods. In contrast, the Serbian ruling elite decided to choose another option: destroying the forces of production. Fearful of losing their wealth and power, they launched wars and ‘ethnic cleansings’ to block any further social and economic progress. Instead of moving towards the utopian future, their totalitarian state headed in another direction: ‘the flight from modernity’. (Perovic 1999)

    Within the USA, there are also powerful groups championing reactionary anti-modernism: religious fundamentalists, white supremacists and the gun lobby. As in Serbia, some influential people are willing to sacrifice economic growth to maintain the existing social order. However, most of those with power and wealth would like to avoid to making this choice. Instead, they want to update reactionary modernism for the age of the Net. Within right-wing American politics, hi-tech neo-liberalism has long been the optimistic alternative to traditional conservatism. Far from fearing the future, its prophets confidently predict that economic progress will eventually liberate humanity. Unable to use the ‘L-word’ for peculiar historical reasons, American neo-liberals even describe themselves as ‘libertarians’: a moniker taken from revolutionary left-wing anarchists.

    This optimistic form of conservatism is easily adapted for right-wing analyses of the Net. For instance, the proponents of the Californian ideology still believe that constant technological change can be reconciled with the preservation of social hierarchy. (Barbrook and Cameron 1996) Like their conservative forebears, these gurus often claim that their contradictory aims will be realised by mystical means: the Gaia mind, post-humans and memetics. More importantly, they also advocate a practical method for perpetuating reactionary modernism: the hybridisation of the commodity and the gift.

    Like pioneers in the Wild West, cyber-entrepreneurs are seizing all opportunities to enclose the newly-opened electronic frontier. At the cutting-edge of convergence, the profits of commercial companies now depend upon the rapid expansion of the hi-tech gift economy. (Kelly 1997) The hardware and software for accessing the Net can be sold as commodities by large companies: IBM, Sun, Microsoft. The circulation of free information among users can be enclosed within commercial sites: AOL, Yahoo!, GeoCities. Instead of resisting all changes, the digerati must embrace some social advances to reap the material benefits of technological progress. The lucky few have discovered a new way of achieving the American dream: the enclosure of cyber-communist labour into digital capitalist property. (Leonard 1999) Most famously, this bizarre union of opposites underpins the frenzied speculation in Net stocks. Each moment of ‘interactive creativity’ is a potential source of profits. If the correct hybrid of gift and commodity could be found, collective labour would immediately transmute into individual wealth. Excited by the riches of some cyber-entrepreneurs, many Americans are now speculating on the same assumption about the Net: ‘…communism is… a generalisation and consummation of… private property.’ (Marx 1961: 99)

    For nearly thirty years, the prophets of hi-tech neo-liberalism have identified economic growth with social stasis. In many sectors, they have advocated old-fashioned methods for raising profits: extending hours, reducing wages, speeding-up production, cutting welfare and increasing pollution. Yet, within the Net, these gurus champion the synthesis of both technological innovation and social progress. For the commodification of cyberspace is impossible without some accommodation with the gift economy. Even the increasing importance of e-commerce is facilitated by the non-commercial structure of the Net. The ‘cost of entry’ into the digital marketplace is so low due to the absence of proprietary barriers. Small companies now have access to computer-mediated-communications once only available to government agencies, financial institutions and multinational corporations. Cutting-out the middlemen, many providers of goods and services can increase their profits by dealing directly with suppliers and customers over the Net. Excited by these developments, the proponents of the Californian ideology believe that the freest of all free markets is now being held on the commons of cyberspace. (Kelly 1994; Hudson 1996; Dyson 1997)

     

    The Purity of the Gift

    Opposed to this invasion by commercial interests, some left-wing activists are reviving a purist vision of the gift. The enclosure of the Net will be prevented by refusing any compromise with the commodity. (Critical Art Ensemble 1996) This revolutionary position takes its inspiration from 1960s hippie radicalism. Over thirty years ago, many young people rebelled against the socio-economic systems of both the USA and the Soviet Union. The material benefits of modernity no longer compensated for the political authoritarianism and cultural conformity imposed by industrialism. Disillusioned with the hi-tech future, these hippies sought inspiration from the tribal past. While many were simply lifestyle tourists, others were looking for a revolutionary alternative to modernity. Crucially, some left-wing intellectuals believed that this utopia could be found in the gift economy of Polynesian tribes: the potlatch. (Mauss 1990)

    For radical hippies, this gift economy was the complete antithesis of capitalism. Instead of accumulating surpluses, individuals in these primitive societies gained prestige by giving away their wealth at public celebrations. If market competition required alienating work to produce ever more goods and services, the potlatch involved the pleasurable destruction of excess resources. While the modern commodity imposed hierarchy and utilitarianism, the primitive gift encouraged equality and hedonism. Rejecting work-as-commodity, left-wing hippies proclaimed a new organising principle for their utopian society: waste-as-gift. (Situationist International 1981; Baudrillard 1975; Negri 1979)

    Many years later, this revolutionary anti-modernism still influences left-wing analyses of computer-mediated communications. Although emerging at the cutting-edge of technology, the gift economy of the Net can easily be confused with the potlatch of primitive societies. These tribal attitudes are also be found within dance music, free parties, protest movements and other forms of ‘DIY culture’. (Brass, Koziell and Searle 1997; McKay 1998) Imitating their hippie elders, left-wing Net activists emphasise the autonomy of these gift relationships from the corruption of commodity exchange. Rejecting any hybridisation, they champion the destruction of private property through the piracy of copyright material: waste-as-gift. Instead of being bought and sold, information will become freely available to everyone participating within the on-line potlatch.

    Unfortunately, this revival of revolutionary anti-modernism also has reactionary implications. As in earlier times, left-wing intellectuals are tempted to see themselves as a vanguard leading the unenlightened masses. Drawn from the intermediate layer, they champion the ‘refusal of work’ to symbolise their superiority over the rest of the working class. Although deprived of the Soviet Union, some members of the revolutionary minority will still apologise for foreign dictatorships which resist American hegemony. Despite the advent of new information technologies, old political habits are difficult to discard. The revolutionary rhetoric of hippie communism is haunted by the reactionary practice of Stalinist communism. (Barbrook 1998)

     

    The American Road to Communism

    Within the USA, this left-wing vision of the pure gift remains marginalised. Ever since independence, a fervent belief in private enterprise has defined American ‘exceptionalism’. During the Cold War, no patriot could support the revolutionary ideology of the national enemy. Even today, many people still virulently oppose the public provision of welfare services considered indispensable in other developed countries. (Lipset 1996) Yet, these same right-wing Americans are happily participating in the construction of cyber-communism. Quite spontaneously, they adopt the working methods which are most beneficial to their own interests. Sometimes, they want to engage in e-commerce. At other times, they prefer to collaborate within the hi-tech gift economy. Like everyone else, conservative Americans choose cyber-communism for pragmatic reasons.

    Despite their addiction to free market nostrums, Americans have long preferred practical solutions over ideological correctness. Sceptical about the theoretical obsessions of Europeans, they have always been proud of their ‘Yankee pragmatism’. (de Tocqueville 1975: 3-20) Updating this tradition for the Net, most Americans simply ignore the widening discrepancy between their political beliefs and their everyday activities. Although forced to talk like neo-liberals, they often choose to act like communists within cyberspace. For the literal application of the Californian ideology would immediately remove many of the benefits of the Net. Not surprisingly, few Americans will openly admit to their pleasure in sinning against the national myth. While the reformist demand for a public health system remains obviously left-wing, the subversive implications of circulating information as gifts are literally unthinkable. Without any self-doubt, Eric Raymond can be simultaneously a passionate advocate of the decommodisation of software and ‘…a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons…’ (Leonard: 1998a: 2).

    Among Americans, cyber-communism is the love that dares not speak its name. No one talks about what everyone is doing. Above all, the historical significance of their collective behaviour on the Net can never be discussed. Within everyday life, people have always given gifts to each other. Many social activities are already organised by voluntary labour and with donated resources. The DIY culture is the celebration of doing-things-for-yourself in all aspects of life from politics to music. (Hyde 1999; Brass, Koziell and Searle 1997) Now, with the advent of the Net, this gift economy is challenging market competition at the cutting-edge of modernity. For only these new relations of production can fully realise the social and technical potential of its advanced productive forces. When digital gifts are freely circulated, people are able to participate within ‘interactive creativity’. As information is incessantly reproduced, the quantity of collective labour embodied in each copy is soon reduced to almost nothing. Under these social and technical conditions, circulating information as gifts can be not only more enjoyable, but also more efficient than commodity exchange. Although appreciating the benefits of e-commerce, Americans are enthusiastically participating within an alternative form of collective labour: cyber-communism.

    In earlier times, the abolition of capitalism was envisaged in apocalyptic terms: revolutionary uprisings, mass mobilisations and modernising dictatorships. In contrast, cyber-communism is now an unremarkable everyday experience within the USA. The users of the Net are spontaneously adopting more enjoyable and efficient ways of working together. Instead of destroying the market economy, Americans are engaged in the slow process of superseding capitalism. (Hegel 1873: 141-142; Marx 1961: 98-114) In this dialectical movement, hi-tech neo-liberals perfect the existing relations of production by developing e-commerce: work-as-commodity. Reacting against this enclosure of cyberspace, left-wing activists destroy information property within the on-line potlatch: waste-as-gift. For those nostalgic for ideological certainty, there can be no compromise between these contradictory visions of the Net.

    Yet, the synthesis of these dialectical opposites must happen for pragmatic reasons. Often Net users benefit more from working together through circulating gifts than from taking part in e-commerce. Living within a prosperous society, many Americans are no longer solely motivated by monetary rewards. With sufficient time and money, they will also work to gain the respect of their peers for their efforts. Increasing numbers of people are now satisfying this desire for recognition within network communities. Individuals receive praise and friendship from their fellow-members by making excellent contributions to collective projects. Within the Net, the rise in the productive forces encourages a more advanced form of collective labour: work-as-gift. (Kohn 1998; Leonard: 1998a)

    ‘…Work is born from the Desire for Recognition… and it preserves itself and evolves in relation to this same Desire.’ (Kojève 1969: 230)

    The dialectical process of superseding capitalism is marked by the evolving syntheses of gift and commodity within the Net. During this transition, neither the disclosure nor the enclosure of collective labour can be assumed. If the correct hybrid isn’t found, individuals working on a collective project can quickly disappear to more agreeable locations within cyberspace. Sometimes, they will look for monetary rewards. On many occasions, they will prefer the freedom of autonomous labour. Depending upon circumstances, both these desires need to be partially realised in a successful hybrid of gift and commodity. During the last two hundred years, the intimate bonds of kinship and friendship have simultaneously inhibited and underpinned the impersonal relationships needed for rapid economic growth. The modern has always co-existed with the traditional. Now, in the age of the Net, the exchange of commodities is being both intensified and prevented by the circulation of gifts. The modern must synthesise with the hyper-modern.

    The gurus of the Californian ideology emphasise the survival of social hierarchy within these hybrid productive relations of the Net. Already, successful cyber-entrepreneurs begin their careers by giving away their most desirable products. If their brand is widely adopted, they hope to make money by providing supporting services and products to its users. A lucky few digerati can become very wealthy by selling shares to Wall Street speculators. (Cusumano and Yoffie 1998; Leonard 1999) Yet, even in this conservative synthesis of gift and commodity, copyright has ceased to be the precondition of information production. Every consumer is now won with promotional items. Unable to resist the technical possibilities of digital convergence, some neo-liberal ideologues accept the eventual disappearance of copyright. (Barlow 1994) Since plagiarism will soon become ubiquitous, cyber-entrepreneurs must adopt other ways of commodifying the Net: real-time services, advertising, merchandising. The hi-tech aristocracy can only protect their privileges by continually making gifts to the masses.

    This hybridisation of productive relations is prevalent across the hi-tech industries. For instance, many people gain employment only after serving an apprenticeship within network communities. If their work is respected among their peers, they can join the emerging intermediate layer employed by e-commerce companies: the digital artisans. Although operating outside the academy, the gift of information still facilitates the sale of labour. According to the prophecies of Saint-Simon, innovative workers in advanced industries should be pioneering the economic and cultural conditions for social emancipation. The intermediate layer is the vanguard of modernity. Faithful to this role, digital artisans are making many technological and aesthetic advances. Despite having to sell their creativity for money, their ways of working are often egalitarian and collaborative. Once again, the intermediate layer is inventing the future.

    Yet, even this synthesis is already being superseded at the cutting-edge of modernity. The heroic minority is no longer alone. After two centuries of economic growth, ordinary people are also able to adopt advanced productive relations. Within the Net, working together by circulating gifts is now a daily experience for millions of people. As well as in their jobs, individuals also collaborate on collective projects in their free time. Freed from the immediate disciplines of the marketplace, work can increasingly become a gift. The enlightened few are no longer needed to lead the masses towards the future. For the majority of Net users are already participating within the productive relations of cyber-communism. Everyday, they are sending emails, taking part in listservers, making websites, contributing to newsgroups and participating within on-line conferences. Having no need to sell information as commodities, they spontaneously work together by circulating gifts. All across the world, politicians, executives and pundits are inspired by the rapid expansion of e-commerce in the USA. Mesmerised by neo-liberal ideology, they fail to notice that most information is already circulating as gifts within the Net. Engaged in superseding capitalism, Americans are successfully constructing the utopian future in the present: cyber-communism.

    ‘No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. …The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – …an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of humanity accordingly closes with this social formation.’ (Marx 1970: 21-22)

    The Positive: The Negation: The Negation of the Negation:
    work-as-commodity waste-as-gift work-as-gift
    e-commerce potlatch network communities
    reactionary modernism revolutionary anti-modernism revolutionary modernism

     

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    This article is dedicated to the USAF pilots who risked their lives in the 1999 Kosovar national independence struggle.

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    Response

    Ted Byfield, ‘THE GIF ECONOMY: How Several Layers of Lossy Images Are Synthesized into a Moving Image that Will Animate the Masses and Inspire Them to Do What They’re Doing Anyway, Namely, Clicking Their Way to Liberation; Or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Californian Ideology’, nettime, 6th October 1999.

  • THE CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY by Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron

    “Not to lie about the future is impossible and
    one can lie about it at will” – Naum Gabo
    [1]

    As the Dam Bursts…

    At the end of the twentieth century, the long predicted convergence of the media, computing and telecommunications into hypermedia is finally happening.[2] Once again, capitalism’s relentless drive to diversify and intensify the creative powers of human labour is on the verge of qualitatively transforming the way in which we work, play and live together. By integrating different technologies around common protocols, something is being created which is more than the sum of its parts. When the ability to produce and receive unlimited amounts of information in any form is combined with the reach of the global telephone networks, existing forms of work and leisure can be fundamentally transformed. New industries will be born and current stock market favourites will swept away. At such moments of profound social change, anyone who can offer a simple explanation of what is happening will be listened to with great interest. At this crucial juncture, a loose alliance of writers, hackers, capitalists and artists from the West Coast of the USA have succeeded in defining a heterogeneous orthodoxy for the coming information age: the Californian Ideology.

    This new faith has emerged from a bizarre fusion of the cultural bohemianism of San Francisco with the hi-tech industries of Silicon Valley. Promoted in magazines, books, TV programmes, websites, newsgroups and Net conferences, the Californian Ideology promiscuously combines the free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies. This amalgamation of opposites has been achieved through a profound faith in the emancipatory potential of the new information technologies. In the digital utopia, everybody will be both hip and rich. Not surprisingly, this optimistic vision of the future has been enthusiastically embraced by computer nerds, slacker students, innovative capitalists, social activists, trendy academics, futurist bureaucrats and opportunistic politicians across the USA. As usual, Europeans have not been slow in copying the latest fad from America. While a recent EU Commission report recommends following the Californian free market model for building the information superhighway, cutting-edge artists and academics eagerly imitate the post human philosophers of the West Coast’s Extropian cult.[3] With no obvious rivals, the triumph of the Californian Ideology appears to be complete.

    The widespread appeal of these West Coast ideologues isn’t simply the result of their infectious optimism. Above all, they are passionate advocates of what appears to be an impeccably libertarian form of politics – they want information technologies to be used to create a new ‘Jeffersonian democracy’ where all individuals will be able to express themselves freely within cyberspace.[4] However, by championing this seemingly admirable ideal, these techno-boosters are at the same time reproducing some of the most atavistic features of American society, especially those derived from the bitter legacy of slavery. Their utopian vision of California depends upon a wilful blindness towards the other – much less positive – features of life on the West Coast: racism, poverty and environmental degradation.[5] Ironically, in the not too distant past, the intellectuals and artists of the Bay Area were passionately concerned about these issues.

    Ronald Reagan v. the Hippies

    On 15th May 1969, Governor Ronald Reagan ordered armed police to carry out a dawn raid against hippie protesters who had occupied People’s Park near the Berkeley campus of the University of California. During the subsequent battle, one man was shot dead and 128 other people needed hospital treatment.[6] On that day, the straight world and the counter-culture appeared to be implacably opposed. On one side of the barricades, Governor Reagan and his followers advocated unfettered private enterprise and supported the invasion of Vietnam. On the other side, the hippies championed a social revolution at home and opposed imperial expansion abroad. In the year of the raid on People’s Park, it seemed that the historical choice between these two opposing visions of America’s future could only be settled through violent conflict. As Jerry Rubin, one of the Yippie leaders, said at the time: ‘Our search for adventure and heroism takes us outside America, to a life of self-creation and rebellion. In response, America is ready to destroy us…’[7]

    During in the 1960s, radicals from the Bay Area pioneered the political outlook and cultural style of New Left movements across the world. Breaking with the narrow politics of the post-war era, they launched campaigns against militarism, racism, sexual discrimination, homophobia, mindless consumerism and pollution. In place of the traditional left’s rigid hierarchies, they created collective and democratic structures which supposedly prefigured the libertarian society of the future. Above all, the Californian New Left combined political struggle with cultural rebellion. Unlike their parents, the hippies refused to conform to the rigid social conventions imposed on ‘organisation man’ by the military, the universities, the corporations and even left-wing political parties. Instead they openly declared their rejection of the straight world through their casual dress, sexual promiscuity, loud music and recreational drugs.[8]

    The radical hippies were liberals in the social sense of the word. They championed universalist, rational and progressive ideals, such as democracy, tolerance, self-fulfillment and social justice. Emboldened by over twenty years of economic growth, they believed that history was on their side. In sci-fi novels, they dreamt of ‘ecotopia’: a future California where cars had disappeared, industrial production was ecologically viable, sexual relationships were egalitarian and daily life was lived in community groups.[9] For some hippies, this vision could only be realised by rejecting scientific progress as a false God and returning to nature. Others, in contrast, believed that technological progress would inevitably turn their libertarian principles into social fact. Crucially, influenced by the theories of Marshall McLuhan, these technophiliacs thought that the convergence of media, computing and telecommunications would inevitably create the electronic agora – a virtual place where everyone would be able to express their opinions without fear of censorship.[10] Despite being a middle aged English professor, McLuhan preached the radical message that the power of big business and big government would be imminently overthrown by the intrinsically empowering effects of new technology on individuals.

    ‘Electronic media…abolish the spatial dimension… By electricity, we everywhere resume person-to-person relations as if on the smallest village scale. It is a relation in depth, and without delegation of functions or powers… Dialogue supersedes the lecture.’[11]

    Encouraged by McLuhan’s predictions, West Coast radicals became involved in developing new information technologies for the alternative press, community radio stations, home-brew computer clubs and video collectives. These community media activists believed that they were in the forefront of the fight to build a new America. The creation of the electronic agora was the first step towards the implementation of direct democracy within all social institutions.[12] The struggle might be hard, but ‘ecotopia’ was almost at hand.

    The Rise of the Virtual Class

    Who would have predicted that, in less than 30 years after the battle for People’s Park, squares and hippies would together create the Californian Ideology? Who would have thought that such a contradictory mix of technological determinism and libertarian individualism would becoming the hybrid orthodoxy of the information age? And who would have suspected that as technology and freedom were worshipped more and more, it would become less and less possible to say anything sensible about the society in which they were applied?

    The Californian Ideology derives its popularity from the very ambiguity of its precepts. Over the last few decades, the pioneering work of the community media activists has been largely recuperated by the hi-tech and media industries. Although companies in these sectors can mechanise and sub-contract much of their labour needs, they remain dependent on key people who can research and create original products, from software programs and computer chips to books and TV programmes. Along with some hi-tech entrepreneurs, these digital artisans form the so-called ‘virtual class’: ‘…the techno-intelligentsia of cognitive scientists, engineers, computer scientists, video-game developers, and all the other communications specialists…’[13] Unable to subject them to the discipline of the assembly-line or replace them by machines, managers have organised such skilled workers through fixed-term contracts. Like the labour aristocracy of the last century, core personnel in the media, computing and telecoms industries experience the rewards and insecurities of the marketplace. On the one hand, these digital artisans not only tend to be well-paid, but also have considerable autonomy over their pace of work and place of employment. As a result, the cultural divide between the hippie and the organisation man has now become rather fuzzy. Yet, on the other hand, these skilled workers are tied by the terms of their contracts and have no guarantee of continued employment. Lacking the free time of the hippies, work itself has become the main route to self-fulfilment for much of the virtual class.[14]

    The Californian Ideology offers a way of understanding the lived reality of these digital artisans. On the one hand, these core workers are a privileged part of the labour force. On the other hand, they are the heirs of the radical ideas of the community media activists. The Californian Ideology, therefore, simultaneously reflects the disciplines of market economics and the freedoms of hippie artisanship. This bizarre hybrid is only made possible through a nearly universal belief in technological determinism. Ever since the 1960s, liberals – in the social sense of the word – have hoped that the new information technologies would realise their ideals. Responding to the challenge of the New Left, the New Right has resurrected an older form of liberalism: economic liberalism.[15] In place of the collective freedom sought by the hippie radicals, they have championed the liberty of individuals within the marketplace. Yet even these conservatives couldn’t resist the romance of the new information technologies. Back in the 1960s, McLuhan’s predictions were reinterpreted as an advertisement for new forms of media, computing and telecommunications being developed by the private sector. From the 1970s onwards, Alvin Toffler, Ithiel de Sola Pool and other gurus attempted to prove that the advent of hypermedia would paradoxically involve a return to the economic liberalism of the past.[16] This retro-utopia echoed the predictions of Isaac Asimov, Robert Heinlein and other macho sci-fi novelists whose future worlds were always filled with space traders, superslick salesmen, genius scientists, pirate captains and other rugged individualists.[17] The path of technological progress didn’t always lead to ecotopia – it could instead lead back to the America of the Founding Fathers.

    Electronic Agora or Electronic Marketplace?

    The ambiguity of the Californian Ideology is most pronounced in its contradictory visions of the digital future. The development of hypermedia is a key component of the next stage of capitalism. As Soshana Zuboff points out, the introduction of media, computing and telecommunications technologies into the factory and the office is the culmination of a long process of separation of the workforce from direct involvement in production.[18] If only for competitive reasons, all major industrial economies will eventually be forced to wire up their populations to obtain the productivity gains of digital working. What is unknown is the social and cultural impact of allowing people to produce and exchange almost unlimited quantities of information on a global scale. Above all, will the advent of hypermedia will realise the utopias of either the New Left or the New Right? As a hybrid faith, the Californian Ideology happily answers this conundrum by believing in both visions at the same time – and by not criticising either of them.

    On the one hand, the anti-corporate purity of the New Left has been preserved by the advocates of the ‘virtual community’. According to their guru, Howard Rheingold, the values of the counter culture baby boomers are shaping the development of new information technologies. As a consequence, community activists will be able to use hypermedia to replace corporate capitalism and big government with a hi-tech gift economy. Already bulletin board systems, Net real-time conferences and chat facilities rely on the voluntary exchange of information and knowledge between their participants. In Rheingold’s view, the members of the virtual class are still in the forefront of the struggle for social liberation. Despite the frenzied commercial and political involvement in building the information superhighway, the electronic agora will inevitably triumph over its corporate and bureaucratic enemies.[19]

    On the other hand, other West Coast ideologues have embraced the laissez-faire ideology of their erstwhile conservative enemy. For example, Wired – the monthly bible of the virtual class – has uncritically reproduced the views of Newt Gingrich, the extreme-right Republican leader of the House of Representatives, and the Tofflers, who are his close advisors.[20] Ignoring their policies for welfare cutbacks, the magazine is instead mesmerised by their enthusiasm for the libertarian possibilities offered by new information technologies. However, although they borrow McLuhan’s technological determinism, Gingrich and the Tofflers aren’t advocates of the electronic agora. On the contrary, they claim that the convergence of the media, computing and telecommunications will produce an electronic marketplace: ‘In cyberspace… market after market is being transformed by technological progress from a “natural monopoly” to one in which competition is the rule.’[21]

    In this version of the Californian Ideology, each member of the virtual class is promised the opportunity to become a successful hi-tech entrepreneur. Information technologies, so the argument goes, empower the individual, enhance personal freedom, and radically reduce the power of the nation state. Existing social, political and legal power structures will wither away to be replaced by unfettered interactions between autonomous individuals and their software. These restyled McLuhanites vigorously argue that big government should stay off the backs of resourceful entrepreneurs who are the only people cool and courageous enough to take risks. In place of counter productive regulations, visionary engineers are inventing the tools needed to create a free market within cyberspace, such as encryption, digital money and verification procedures. Indeed, attempts to interfere with the emergent properties of these technological and economic forces, particularly by the government, merely rebound on those who are foolish enough to defy the primary laws of nature. According to the executive editor of Wired, the invisible hand of the marketplace and the blind forces of Darwinian evolution are actually one and the same thing.[22] As in Heinlein’s and Asimov’s sci-fi novels, the path forwards to the future seems to lead back to the past. The twenty-first century information age will be the realisation of the eighteenth century liberal ideals of Thomas Jefferson: ‘…the…creation of a new civilisation, founded in the eternal truths of the American Idea.'[23]

    The Myth of the ‘Free Market’

    Following the victory of Gingrich’s party in the 1994 legislative elections, this right-wing version of the Californian Ideology is now in the ascendant. Yet, the sacred tenets of economic liberalism are contradicted by the actual history of hypermedia. For instance, the iconic technologies of the computer and the Net could only have been invented with the aid of massive state subsidies and the enthusiastic involvement of amateurs. Private enterprise has played an important role, but only as one part of a mixed economy.

    For example, the first computer – the Difference Engine – was designed and built by private companies, but its development was only made possible through a British Government grant of £17,470, which was a small fortune in 1834.[24] From Colossus to EDVAC, from flight simulators to virtual reality, the development of computing has depended at key moments on public research handouts or fat contracts with public agencies. The IBM corporation only built the first programmable digital computer after it was requested to do so by the US Defense Department during the Korean War. Ever since, the development of successive generations of computers has been directly or indirectly subsidised by the American military budget.[25] As well as state aid, the evolution of computing has also depended upon the involvement of DIY culture. For instance, the personal computer was invented by amateur techies who wanted to construct their own cheap machines. The existence of a gift economy amongst hobbyists was a necessary precondition for the subsequent success of products made by Apple and Microsoft. Even now, open source programs still play a vital role in advancing software design.

    The history of the Internet also contradicts the tenets of the free market ideologues. For the first twenty years of its existence, the Net’s development was almost completely dependent on the much reviled American federal government. Whether via the US military or through the universities, large amounts of tax payers’ dollars went into building the Net infrastructure and subsidising the cost of using its services. At the same time, many of the key Net programs and applications were invented either by hobbyists or by professionals working in their spare-time. For instance, the MUD program which allows real-time Net conferencing was invented by a group of students who wanted to play fantasy games over a computer network.[26]

    One of the weirdest things about the rightwards drift of the Californian Ideology is that the West Coast itself is a creation of the mixed economy. Government dollars were used to build the irrigation systems, highways, schools, universities and other infrastructural projects which makes the good life possible in California. On top of these public subsidies, the West Coast hi tech industrial complex has been feasting off the fattest pork barrel in history for decades. The US government has poured billions of tax dollars into buying planes, missiles, electronics and nuclear bombs from Californian companies. For those not blinded by laissez-faire dogmas, it was obvious that the Americans have always had state planning: only they call it the defence budget.[27] At the same time, key elements of the West Coast’s lifestyle come from its long tradition of cultural bohemianism. Although they were later commercialised, community media, new age spiritualism, surfing, lesbian & gay liberation, health food, recreational drugs, pop music and many other forms of cultural heterodoxy all emerged from the decidedly non-commercial scenes based around university campuses, artists’ communities and rural communes. Without its DIY culture, California’s myths wouldn’t have the global resonance which they have today.[28]

    All of this public funding and community involvement has had an enormously beneficial albeit unacknowledged and uncosted effect on the development of Silicon Valley and other hi tech industries. Capitalist entrepreneurs often have an inflated sense of their own resourcefulness in developing new ideas and give little recognition to the contributions made by either the state, their own labour force or the wider community. All technological progress is cumulative it depends on the results of a collective historical process and must be counted, at least in part, as a collective achievement. Hence, as in every other industrialised country, American entrepreneurs have inevitably relied on state intervention and DIY initiatives to nurture and develop their industries. When Japanese companies threatened to take over the American microchip market, the libertarian computer capitalists of California had no ideological qualms about joining a state sponsored cartel organised to fight off the invaders from the East. Until the Net programs allowing community participation within cyberspace could be included, Bill Gates believed that Microsoft had no choice but to delay the launch of Windows ’95.[29] As in other sectors of the modern economy, the question facing the emerging hypermedia industry isn’t whether or not it will be organised as a mixed economy, but what sort of mixed economy it will be.

    Freedom is Slavery

    If its holy precepts are refuted by profane history, why have the myths of the free market so influenced the proponents of the Californian Ideology? Living within a contract culture, the digital artisans lead a schizophrenic existence. On the one hand, they cannot challenge the primacy of the marketplace over their lives. On the other hand, they resent attempts by those in authority to encroach on their individual autonomy. By mixing New Left and New Right, the Californian Ideology provides a mystical resolution of the contradictory attitudes held by members of the virtual class. Crucially, anti-statism provides the means to reconcile radical and reactionary ideas about technological progress. While the New Left resents the government for funding the military-industrial complex, the New Right attacks the state for interfering with the spontaneous dissemination of new technologies by market competition. Despite the central role played by public intervention in developing hypermedia, the Californian ideologues preach an anti-statist gospel of cybernetic libertarianism: a bizarre mish-mash of hippie anarchism and economic liberalism beefed up with lots of technological determinism. Rather than comprehend really existing capitalism, gurus from both New Left and New Right much prefer to advocate rival versions of a digital Jeffersonian democracy. For instance, Howard Rheingold on the New Left believes that the electronic agora will allow individuals to exercise the sort of media freedom advocated by the Founding Fathers. Similarly, the New Right claim that the removal of all regulatory curbs on the private enterprise will create a marketplace of ideas worthy of a Jeffersonian democracy.[30]

    The triumph of this retro-futurism is a result of the failure of renewal in the USA during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Following the confrontation at People’s Park, the struggle between the American establishment and the counter culture entered into a spiral of violent confrontation. While the Vietnamese at the cost of enormous human suffering were able to expel the American invaders from their country, the hippies and their allies in the black civil rights movement were eventually crushed by a combination of state repression and cultural co-option.

    The Californian Ideology perfectly encapsulates the consequences of this defeat for members of the virtual class. Although they enjoy cultural freedoms won by the hippies, most of them are no longer actively involved in the struggle to build ecotopia. Instead of openly rebelling against the system, these digital artisans now accept that individual freedom can only be achieved by working within the constraints of technological progress and the free market. In many cyberpunk novels, this autistic libertarianism is personified by the central character of the hacker, who is a lone individual fighting for survival within the virtual world of information.[31]

    The drift towards the right by the Californian ideologues is the helped by their unquestioning acceptance of the liberal ideal of the self-sufficient individual. In American folklore, the nation was built out of a wilderness by free booting individuals the trappers, cowboys, preachers, and settlers of the frontier. The American revolution itself was fought to protect the freedoms and property of individuals against oppressive laws and unjust taxes imposed by a foreign monarch. For both the New Left and the New Right, the early years of the American republic provide a potent model for their rival versions of individual freedom. Yet there is a profound contradiction at the centre of this primordial American dream: individuals in this period only prospered through the suffering of others. Nowhere is this clearer than in the life of Thomas Jefferson – the chief icon of the Californian Ideology.

    Thomas Jefferson was the man who wrote the inspiring call for democracy and liberty in the USA’s Declaration of Independence and – at the same time – owned nearly 200 human beings as slaves. As a politician, he championed the right of American farmers and artisans to determine their own destinies without being subject to the restrictions of feudal Europe. Like other liberals of the period, he thought that political liberties could be protected from authoritarian governments only by the widespread ownership of individual private property. The rights of citizens were derived from this fundamental natural right. In order to encourage self-sufficiency, he proposed that every American should be given at least 50 acres of land to guarantee their economic independence. Yet, while idealising the small farmers and businessmen of the frontier, Jefferson was actually a Virginian plantation-owner living off the forced labour of his slaves. Although the South’s ‘peculiar institution’ troubled his conscience, he still believed that the natural rights of man included the right to own human beings as private property. In Jeffersonian democracy, freedom for white folks was based upon slavery for black people.[32]

    Forward Into the Past

    Despite the eventual emancipation of the slaves and the victories of the civil rights movement, racial segregation still lies at the centre of American politics especially on the West Coast. In the 1994 election for governor in California, Pete Wilson, the Republican candidate, won through a vicious anti immigrant campaign. Nationally, the triumph of Gingrich’s Republican party in the legislative elections was based on the mobilisation of ‘angry white males’ against the supposed threat from black welfare scroungers, immigrants from Mexico and other uppity minorities. These politicians have reaped the electoral benefits of the increasing polarisation between the mainly white, affluent suburbanites – most of whom vote – and the largely non-white, poorer inner city dwellers – most of whom don’t vote.[33] Although they retain some hippie ideals, many Californian ideologues have found it impossible to take a clear stand against the divisive policies of the Republicans. This is because the hi tech and media industries are a key element of the New Right electoral coalition. In part, both capitalists and well-paid workers fear that the open acknowledgement of public funding of their companies would justify tax rises to pay for desperately needed spending on health care, environmental protection, housing, public transport and education. More importantly, many members of the virtual class want to be seduced by the libertarian rhetoric and technological enthusiasm of the New Right. Working for hi-tech and media companies, they would like to believe that the electronic marketplace can somehow solve America’s pressing social and economic problems without any sacrifices on their part. Caught in the contradictions of the Californian Ideology, Gingrich is – as one Wired contributor put it – both their ‘friend and foe’.[34]

    In the USA, a major redistribution of wealth is urgently needed for the long term economic well being of the majority of the population. However, this is against the short term interests of rich white folks, including many members of the virtual class. Rather than share with their poor black or hispanic neighbours, the yuppies instead retreat into their affluent suburbs, protected by armed guards and secure with their private welfare services.[35] The deprived only participate in the information age by providing cheap non-unionised labour for the unhealthy factories of the Silicon Valley chip manufacturers.[36] Even the construction of cyberspace could become an integral part of the fragmentation of American society into antagonistic, racially-determined classes. Already ‘red-lined’ by profit hungry telephone companies, the inhabitants of poor inner city areas are now threatened with exclusion from the new on line services through lack of money.[37] In contrast, members of the virtual class and other professionals can play at being cyberpunks within hyper-reality without having to meet any of their impoverished neighbours. Alongside the ever widening social divisions, another apartheid is being created between the ‘information-rich’ and the ‘information-poor’. In this hi-tech Jeffersonian democracy, the relationship between masters and slaves endures in a new form.

    Cyborg Masters and Robot Slaves

    The fear of the rebellious ‘underclass’ has now corrupted the most fundamental tenet of the Californian Ideology: its belief in the emancipatory potentiality of the new information technologies. While the proponents of the electronic agora and the electronic marketplace promise to liberate individuals from the hierarchies of the state and private monopolies, the social polarisation of American society is bringing forth a more oppressive vision of the digital future. The technologies of freedom are turning into the machines of dominance.

    At his estate at Monticello, Jefferson invented many clever gadgets for his house, such as a dumb waiter to deliver food from the kitchen into the dining room. By mediating his contacts with his slaves through technology, this revolutionary individualist spared himself from facing the reality of his dependence upon the forced labour of his fellow human beings.[38] In the late-twentieth century, technology is once again being used to reinforce the difference between the masters and the slaves.

    According to some visionaries, the search for the perfection of mind, body and spirit will inevitably lead to the emergence of the post-human: a bio-technological manifestation of the social privileges of the virtual class. While the hippies saw self-development as part of social liberation, the hi-tech artisans of contemporary California are more likely to seek individual self-fulfillment through therapy, spiritualism, exercise or other narcissistic pursuits. Their desire to escape into the gated suburb of the hyper-real is only one aspect of this deep self-obsession.[39] Emboldened by supposed advances in Artificial Intelligence and medical science, the Extropian cult fantasises of abandoning the ‘wetware’ of the human state altogether to become living machines.[40] Just like Virek and the Tessier-Ashpools in William Gibson’s Sprawl novels, they believe that social privilege will eventually endow them with immortality.[41] Instead of predicting the emancipation of humanity, this form of technological determinism can only envisage a deepening of social segregation.

    Despite these fantasies, white people in California remain dependent on their darker skinned fellow humans to work in their factories, pick their crops, look after their children and tend their gardens. Following the recent riots in Los Angeles, they increasingly fear that this underclass will someday demand its liberation. If human slaves are ultimately unreliable, then mechanical ones will have to be invented. The search for the holy grail of Artificial Intelligence reveals this desire for the Golem a strong and loyal slave whose skin is the colour of the earth and whose innards are made of sand. As in Asimov’s Robot novels, the techno-utopians imagine that it is possible to obtain slave like labour from inanimate machines.[42] Yet, although technology can store or amplify labour, it can never remove the necessity for humans to invent, build and maintain these machines in the first place. Slave labour cannot be obtained without somebody being enslaved.

    Across the world, the Californian Ideology has been embraced as an optimistic and emancipatory form of technological determinism. Yet, this utopian fantasy of the West Coast depends upon its blindness towards – and dependence on – the social and racial polarisation of the society from which it was born. Despite its radical rhetoric, the Californian Ideology is ultimately pessimistic about fundamental social change. Unlike the hippies, its advocates are not struggling to build ecotopia or even to help revive the New Deal. Instead, the social liberalism of New Left and the economic liberalism of New Right have converged into an ambiguous dream of a hi-tech Jeffersonian democracy. Interpreted generously, this retro-futurism could be a vision of a cybernetic frontier where digital artisans discover their individual self-fulfillment in either the electronic agora or the electronic marketplace. However, as the zeitgeist of the virtual class, the Californian Ideology is at the same time an exclusive faith. If only some people have access to the new information technologies, Jeffersonian democracy can become a hi-tech version of the plantation economy of the Old South. Reflecting its deep ambiguity, the Californian Ideology’s technological determinism is not simply optimistic and emancipatory. It is simultaneously a deeply pessimistic and repressive vision of the future.

    There are Alternatives

    Despite its deep contradictions, people across the world still believe that the Californian Ideology expresses the only way forward to the future. With the increasing globalisation of the world economy, many members of the virtual class in Europe and Asia feel more affinity with their Californian peers than other workers within their own country. Yet, in reality, debate has never been more possible or more necessary. The Californian Ideology was developed by a group of people living within one specific country with a particular mix of socio-economic and technological choices. Its eclectic and contradictory blend of conservative economics and hippie radicalism reflects the history of the West Coast – and not the inevitable future of the rest of the world. For instance, the anti-statist assumptions of the Californian ideologues are rather parochial. In Singapore, the government is not only organising the construction of a fibre-optic network, but also trying to control the ideological suitability of the information distributed over it. Given the much faster growth rates of the Asian ‘tigers’, the digital future will not necessarily first arrive in California.[43]

    Despite the neo-liberal recommendations of the Bangemann Report, most European authorities are also determined to be closely involved within the development of new information technologies. Minitel – the first successful public interactive network in the world – was the deliberate creation of the French state. Responding to an official report on the potential impact of hypermedia, the government decided to pour resources into developing ‘cutting edge’ technologies. In 1981, France Telecom launched the Minitel system which provided a mix of text-based information and communications facilities. As a monopoly, this nationalised telephone company was able to build up a critical mass of users for its pioneering on-line system by giving away free terminals to anyone willing to forgo paper telephone directories. Once the market had been created, commercial and community providers were then able to find enough customers or participants to thrive within the system. Ever since, millions of French people from all social backgrounds have happily booked tickets, chatted each other up and politically organised on line without realising they were breaking the libertarian precepts of the Californian Ideology.[44]

    Far from demonising the state, the overwhelming majority of the French population believe that more public intervention is needed for an efficient and healthy society. In the recent presidential elections, almost every candidate had to advocate – at least rhetorically – greater state intervention to end social exclusion of the unemployed and homeless.[45] Unlike its American equivalent, the French revolution went beyond economic liberalism to popular democracy. Following the victory of the Jacobins over their liberal opponents in 1792, the democratic republic in France became the embodiment of the ‘general will’. As such, the state was believed to defend the interests of all citizens, rather than just to protect the rights of individual property owners. The discourse of French politics allows for collective action by the state to mitigate – or even remove – problems encountered by society. While the Californian ideologues try to ignore the taxpayers’ dollars subsidising the development of hypermedia, the French government can openly intervene in this sector of the economy.[46]

    Although its technology is now increasingly dated, the history of Minitel clearly refutes the anti-statist prejudices of the Californian ideologues – and of the Bangemann committee. The digital future will be a hybrid of state intervention, capitalist entrepreneurship and DIY culture. Crucially, if the state can foster the development of hypermedia, conscious action could also be taken to prevent the emergence of the social apartheid between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information poor’. By not leaving everything up to the vagaries of market forces, the EU and its member states could ensure that every citizen has the opportunity to be connected to a broadband fibre optic network at the lowest possible price.

    In the first instance, this would be a much needed job creation scheme for semi-skilled labour in a period of mass unemployment. As Keynesian employment measure, nothing beats paying people to dig holes in the road and fill them in again.[47] Even more importantly, the construction of a fibre optic network into homes and businesses could give everyone access to new on line services and create a large vibrant community of shared expertise. The long term gains to the economy and to society from the building of the the Net would be immeasurable. It would allow industry to work more efficiently and market new products. It would ensure that education and information services were available to all. No doubt this construction project will create a mass market for private companies to sell existing information commodities films, TV programmes, music and books across the Net. At the same time, once people can distribute as well as receive hypermedia, a flourishing of community media and special interest groups will quickly emerge. For all this to happen, collective intervention will be needed to ensure that all citizens are included within the digital future.

    The Rebirth of the Modern

    Even if it is not in circumstances of their own choosing, it is now necessary for Europeans to assert their own vision of the future. There are varying ways forward towards the information society – and some paths are more desirable than others. In order to make an informed choice, European digital artisans need to develop a more coherent analysis of the impact of hypermedia than can be found within the ambiguities of the Californian Ideology. The members of the European virtual class must create their own distinctive self-identity.

    This alternative understanding of the future starts from a rejection of any form of social apartheid – both inside and outside cyberspace. Any programme for developing hypermedia must ensure that the whole population can have access to the new on-line services. In place of New Left or New Right anarchism, a European strategy for developing the new information technologies must openly acknowledge the inevitability of some form of mixed economy – the creative and antagonistic mix of state, corporate and DIY initiatives. The indeterminacy of the digital future is a result of the ubiquity of this mixed economy within the modern world. No one knows exactly what the relative strengths of each component will be, but collective action can ensure that no social group is deliberately excluded from cyberspace.

    A European strategy for the information age must also celebrate the creative powers of the digital artisans. Because their labour cannot be deskilled or mechanised, members of the virtual class exercise great control over their own work. Rather than succumbing to the fatalism of the Californian Ideology, we should embrace the Promethean possibilities of hypermedia. Within the limitations of the mixed economy, digital artisans are able to invent something completely new – something which has not been predicted in any sci-fi novel. These innovative forms of knowledge and communications will sample the achievements of others, including some aspects of the Californian Ideology. It is now impossible for any serious movement for social emancipation not to incorporate feminism, drug culture, gay liberation, ethnic identity and other issues pioneered by West Coast radicals. Similarly, any attempt to develop hypermedia within Europe will need some of the entrepreneurial zeal and can-do attitude championed by the Californian New Right. Yet, at the same time, the development of hypermedia means innovation, creativity and invention. There are no precedents for all aspects of the digital future.

    As pioneers of the new, the digital artisans need to reconnect themselves with the theory and practice of productive art. They are not just employees of others – or even would-be cybernetic entrepreneurs. They are also artist-engineers – designers of the next stage of modernity. Drawing on the experience of the Saint-Simonists and Constructivists, the digital artisans can create a new machine aesthetic for the information age.[48] For instance, musicians have used computers to develop purely digital forms of music, such as drum ‘n’ bass and techno.[49] Interactive artists have explored the potentiality of CD-rom technologies, as shown by the work of Anti-Rom.[50] The Hypermedia Research Centre has constructed an experimental virtual social space called J’s Joint. In each instance, artist-engineers are trying to push beyond the limitations of both the technologies and their own creativity. Above all, these new forms of expression and communications are connected with the wider culture. The developers of hypermedia must reassert the possibility of rational and conscious control over the shape of the digital future. Unlike the elitism of the Californian Ideology, the European artist-engineers must construct a cyberspace which is inclusive and universal. Now is the time for the rebirth of the Modern.

    ‘Present circumstances favour making luxury national. Luxury will become useful and moral when it is enjoyed by the whole nation. the honour and advantage of employing directly, in political arrangements, the progress of exact sciences and the fine arts…have been reserved for our century.’[51]

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    Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron are members of the Hypermedia Research Centre of the University of Westminster, London: www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk. We would like to thank Andrej Skerlep, Dick Pountain, Helen Barbrook, Les Levidow, Jim McLellan, John Barker, John Wyver, Rhiannon Patterson and the members of the HRC for their help in writing this article.

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    Footnotes

    [1] Naum Gabo and Anton Pevsner, ‘The Realistic Manifesto, 1920’, page 214.
    [2] For over 25 years, experts have been predicting the imminent arrival of the information age, see Alain Touraine, La Société post-industrielle; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages; Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society; and Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom.
    [3] See Martin Bangemann, Europe and the Global Information Society; and the programme and abstracts on Virtual Futures ’95, Conference Website.
    [4] See Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.
    [5] See Mike Davis, City of Quartz; Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’; and the records of Ice-T, Snoop Dog, Dr Dre, Ice Cube, NWA and many other West Coast rappers.
    [6] See George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, page 124.
    [7] Jerry Rubin, ‘An Emergency Letter to my Brothers and Sisters in the Movement’, page 244. The Yippies were members of the Youth International Party – an influential group within the American New Left of the late-1960s and early-1970s.
    [8] For the key role played by popular culture in the self-identity of the American New Left, see George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left; and Charles Reich, The Greening of America. For a description of the lives of white-collar workers in 1950s America, see William Whyte, The Organization Man.
    [9] In a best-selling novel of the mid-1970s, the northern half of the West Coast has seceded from the rest of the USA to form a hippie utopia, see Ernest Callenbach, Ecotopia. This idealisation of Californian community life can also be found in John Brunner, The Shockwave Rider; and even in later works, such as Kim Stanley Robinson, Pacific Edge.
    [10] For an analysis of attempts to create direct democracy through media technologies, see Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom.
    [11] Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, pages 255-6. Also see Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage; and Gerald Emanuel Stern (ed.), McLuhan: Hot & Cool.
    [12] See John Downing, Radical Media.
    [13] Arthur Kroker and Michael A. Weinstein, Data Trash, page 15. This analysis follows that of those futurologists who thought that ‘knowledge workers’ were the embryo of a new ruling class, see Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; and economists who believe that ‘symbolic analysts’ will become the dominant section of the workforce under globalised capitalism, see Robert Reich, The Work of Nations. In contrast, back in the 1960s, some New Left theorists believed that these scientific- technical workers were leading the struggle for social liberation through factory occupations and demands for self-management, see Serge Mallet, The New Working Class, Spokesman Books, Nottingham 1975.
    [14] See Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, for a description of contract work in Silicon Valley; and, for a fictional treatment of the same subject, Douglas Coupland, Microserfs. For more theoretical examinations of post-Fordist labour organisation, see Alain Lipietz, L’audace ou l’enlisement; Mirages and Miracles; Benjamin Coriat, L’atelier et le robot; and Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved.
    [15] As Seymour Martin Lipset points out, anti-statism liberalism has – and still is – the underlying basis of American politics on both the Right and the Left: ‘These [liberal] values were evident in the twentieth century fact that…the United States not only lacked a viable socialist party, but also has never developed a British or European-style Conservative or Tory party.’, see Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism, pages 31-32.. The convergence of the New Left and New Right around the Californian Ideology, therefore, is a specific example of the wider consensus around anti-statist liberalism as a political discourse in the USA.
    [16] For McLuhan’s success on the corporate junket circuit, see Tom Wolfe, ‘What If He Is Right?’. For the use of his ideas by conservative thinkers, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages; Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society,; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; and Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom.
    [17] Heroic males are common throughout classic sci-fi novels, see D. D. Harriman in Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon; or the leading characters in Isaac Asimov, The Foundation Trilogy; I, Robot; and The Rest of the Robots. Hagbard Celine – a more psychedelic version of this male archetype – is the central character in Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminati Trilogy. In the timechart of ‘future history’ at the front of Robert Heinlein’s novel, it predicts that, after a period of social crisis caused by rapid technological advance, stability would restored in the 1980s and ’90s through ‘…an opening of new frontiers and a return to nineteenth-century economy’! Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon, pages 8-9.
    [18] See Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine. Of course, this analysis is derived from Karl Marx, Grundrisse; and ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’.
    [19] See Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, and his home pages.
    [20] See the gushing interview with the Tofflers in Peter Schwartz, ‘Shock Wave (Anti) Warrior’; and, for the magazine’s characteristic ambiguity over the Speaker of the House’s reactionary political programme, see the aptly named interview with Newt Gingrich in Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’.
    [21] Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, page 5.
    [22] See Kevin Kelly, Out of Control. For a critique of the book, see Richard Barbrook, Pinnochio Theory.
    [23] Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, page 13. Toffler and friends also proudly proclaim that: ‘America…remains the land of individual freedom, and this freedom clearly extends to cyberspace’ in Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, page 6. Also see Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.
    [24] See Simon Schaffer, Babbage’s Intelligence.
    [25] See Jonathan Palfreman and Doron Swade, The Dream Machine, pages 32 – 36, for an account of how a lack of state intervention meant that Nazi Germany lost the opportunity to build the world’s first electronic computer. In 1941 the German High Command refused further funding to Konrad Zuze, who had pioneered the use of binary code, stored programs and electronic logic gates.
    [26] See Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community.
    [27] As President Clinton’s Labor Secretary puts it: ‘Recall that through the postwar era the Pentagon has quietly been in charge of helping American corporations move ahead with technologies like jet engines, airframes, transistors, integrated circuits, new materials, lasers, and optic fibres…The Pentagon and the 600 national laboratories which work with it and with the Department of Energy are the closest thing America has to Japan’s well-known Ministry of International Trade and Industry.’, see Robert Reich, The Work of Nations, page 159.
    [28] For an account of how these cultural innovations emerged from the early acid scene, see Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test. Interestingly, one of the drivers of the famous bus was Stewart Brand, who is now a leading contributor to Wired.
    [29] Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, pages 21-2, points out that the American computer industry has already encouraged by the Pentagon to form cartels against foreign competition. Gates admits that he’d only recently realised the ‘massive structural change’ being caused by the Net, see Bill Gates, ‘The Bill Gates Column’.
    [30] See Howard Rheingold’s home pages, and Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’. Despite the libertarian instincts of both these writers, their infatuation with the era of the Founding Fathers is shared by the neo-fascist Militia and Patriot movements, see Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America.
    [31] See the hacker heroes in William Gibson, Neuromancer; Count Zero; and Mona Lisa Overdrive; or in Bruce Sterling (ed.), Mirrorshades. A prototype of this sort of anti-hero is Deckard, the existential hunter of replicants in Ridley Scott’s Bladerunner.
    [32] According to Miller, Thomas Jefferson believed that black people could not be members of the Lockean social contract which bound together citizens of the American republic: ‘The rights of man…while theoretically and ideally the birthright of every human being, applied in practice in the United States only to white men: the black slaves were excluded from consideration because, while admittedly human beings, they were also property, and where the rights of man conflicted with the rights of property, property took precedence’, see John Miller, The Wolf by the Ears, page 13. Jefferson’s opposition to slavery was at best rhetorical. In a letter of 22 April 1820, he disingenuously suggested that the best way to encourage the abolition of slavery would be to legalise the private ownership of human beings in all States of the Union and the frontier territories! He claimed that ‘…their diffusion over a greater surface would make them individually happier, and proportionally facilitate the accomplishment of their emancipation, by dividing the burden on a greater number of coadjutors [i.e. slave-owners]’, see Merill Peterson (ed.), The Portable Thomas Jefferson, page 568. For a description of life on his plantation, also see Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello.
    [33] For California’s turn to the Right, see Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’.
    [34] See Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’. Esther Dyson collaborated with the Tofflers in the writing of The Peace and Progress Foundation’s Cyberspace and the American Dream, which is a retro-futurist manifesto designed to win votes for Gingrich from members of the ‘virtual class’.
    [35] For the rise of the fortified suburbs, see Mike Davis, City of Quartz; and Urban Control: the Ecology of Fear. These ‘gated suburbs’ provide the inspiration for the alienated background of many cyberpunk sci-fi novels, such as Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash.
    [36] See Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain.
    [37] See Reginald Stuart, ‘High-Tech Redlining’.
    [38] See Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello.
    [39] See Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain.
    [40] For an exposition of their retro-futurist programme, see the Extropians, FAQ.
    [41] See William Gibson, Neuromancer; and Count Zero.
    [42] See Isaac Asimov, I, Robot; and The Rest of the Robots.
    [43] See William Gibson and Sandy Sandfort, ‘Disneyland with the Death Penalty’. Since these articles are an attack on Singapore, it is ironic that the real Disneyland is in California – whose repressive penal code includes the death penalty!
    [44] For the report which led to the creation of Minitel, see Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society. An account of the early years of Minitel can be found in Michel Marchand, The Mintel Saga.
    [45] According to a poll carried out during the 1995 presidential elections, 67% of the French population supported the proposition that “the state must intervene more in the economic life of our country”, see Le Monde, ‘Une majorité de Français souhaitent un vrai “chef” pour un vrai “Etat”‘.
    [46] For the influence of Jacobinism on French conceptions of democratic rights, see Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom: the contradictions of communications in the age of modernity. Some French economists believe that the very different history of Europe has created a specific – and socially superior – model of capitalism, see Michel Albert, Capitalism v. Capitalism; and Philippe Delmas, Le Maître des Horloges.
    [47] As Keynes himself says: ‘”To dig holes in the ground”, paid for out of savings, will increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of useful goods and services.’, see J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, page 220.
    [48] See Keith Taylor (ed.), Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825; and John E. Bowlt, Russian Art of the Avant-Garde.
    [49] As Goldie, a jungle music-maker, puts it: “We have to take it forwards and take the drums ‘n’ bass and push it and push it and push it. I remember when we were saying that it couldn’t be pushed anymore. It’s been pushed tenfold since then…”, see Tony Marcus, ‘The War is Over’, Mixmag, August 1995, page 46.
    [50] For information on ANTI-rom, see their website.
    [51] Henri Saint-Simon, ‘Sketch of the New Political System’ in Keith Taylor (ed.), Henri Saint-Simon 1760- 1825, page 203.

    —————————————————————

    References

    Michel Albert, Capitalism v. Capitalism, Four Wall Eight Windows, New York 1993.

    ANTI-Rom, Website.

    Isaac Asimov, The Foundation Trilogy, Gnome Press, New York 1953.

    Isaac Asimov, I, Robot, Panther, London 1968.

    Isaac Asimov, The Rest of the Robots, Panther, London 1968.

    Martin Bangemann, Europe and the Global Information Society, European Union, Brussels 1994.

    Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom: the contradictions of communications in the age of modernity, Pluto, London 1995.

    Richard Barbrook, ‘The Pinnochio Theory’.

    Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, Basic Books, New York 1973.

    Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: too close for comfort, Guilford Press, New York 2000.

    John E. Bowlt (editor), Russian Art of the Avant-Garde: Theory and Criticism, Thames & Hudson, London 1976.

    John Brunner, The Shockwave Rider, Methuen, London 1975.

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s role in the Technetronic Era, Viking Press, New York 1970.

    Ernest Callenbach, Ecotopia, Bantam, New York 1975.

    Benjamin Coriat, L’atelier et le robot, Christian Bourgois Éditeur, Paris 1990.

    Douglas Coupland, Microserfs, Flamingo, London 1995.

    Mike Davis, City of Quartz, Verso, London 1990.

    Mike Davis, Urban Control: the Ecology of Fear, Open Magazine, New Jersey 1992.

    Philippe Delmas, Le Maître des Horloges, Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris 1991.

    John Downing, Radical Media, South End Press, Boston 1984.

    Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’, Wired, 3.08, August 1995, pages 106-112, 160-162.

    The Extropians, FAQ.

    Naum Gabo and Anton Pevsner, ‘The Realistic Manifesto, 1920’, in John E. Bowlt (editor), Russian Art of the Avant-Garde: Theory and Criticism, Thames & Hudson, London 1976, pages 208-214.

    Bill Gates, ‘The Bill Gates Column’, The Guardian, On-Line Section, 20 July 1995, page 14.

    William Gibson, Neuromancer, Grafton, London 1984.

    William Gibson, Count Zero, Grafton, London 1986.

    William Gibson, Mona Lisa Overdrive, Grafton, London 1989.

    William Gibson and Sandy Sandfort, ‘Disneyland with the Death Penalty’, Wired, 1.4, September/October 1993, pages 51-55, 114-115.

    Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, Free Association Books, London 1989.

    Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon, Signet, New York 1950.

    Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’, Wired, 1.3, July/August 1993, pages 53-59, 94.

    George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: a Global Analysis of 1968, South End Press, Boston 1987.

    Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: the New Biology of Machines, Fourth Estate, London 1994.

    Tony Marcus, ‘The War is Over’, Mixmag, August 1995, page 46.

    John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London 1964.

    Arthur Kroker and Michael A. Weinstein, Data Trash: the theory of the virtual class, New World Perspectives, Montreal 1994.

    Alain Lipietz, L’audace ou l’enlisement, Éditions La Découverte, Paris 1984.

    Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, Verso, London 1987.

    Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a double-edged sword, W.W. Norton, New York 1996.

    Serge Mallet, The New Working Class, Spokesman Books, Nottingham 1975.

    Michel Marchand, The Mintel Saga: A French Success Story, Larousse, Paris 1988.

    Tony Marcus, ‘The War is Over’, Mixmag, August 1995, page 46.

    Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Penguin, London 1973.

    Karl Marx, ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’ in Albert Dragstedt (editor), Value Studies by Marx, New Park, London 1976, pages 71-193.

    Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1964.

    Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage, Penguin, London 1967.

    John Miller, The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery, Free Press, New York 1977.

    Le Monde, ‘Une majorité de Français souhaitent un vrai “chef” pour un vrai “Etat”‘, Le Monde, 11 avril 1995, page 6.

    Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved: Selected Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis & New Social Subjects 1967-83, Red Notes, London 1988.

    Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1980.

    Jon Palfreman and Doron Swade, The Dream Machine: exploring the computer age, BBC, London 1991.

    Merill Peterson (editor), The Portable Thomas Jefferson, The Viking Press, New York 1975.

    Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age.

    Charles Reich, The Greening of America, Random House, New York 1970.

    Robert Reich, The Work of Nations: a blueprint for the future, Simon & Schuster, London 1991.

    Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: finding connection in a computerised world, Secker & Warburg, London 1994,

    Howard Rheingold, Home Pages.

    Kim Stanley Robinson, Pacific Edge, Grafton, London 1990.

    Jerry Rubin, ‘An Emergency Letter to my Brothers and Sisters in the Movement’ in Peter Stansill and David Zane Mairowitz (editors), BAMN: Outlaw Manifestos and Ephemera 1965-70, Penguin, London 1971, pages 242-244.

    Henri de Saint-Simon, ‘Sketch of the New Political System’ in Keith Taylor (editor), Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825: Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation, Croom Helm, London 1975, pages 198-206.

    Simon Schaffer, ‘Babbage’s Intelligence: Calculating Engines and the Factory System’.

    Peter Schwartz, ‘Shock Wave (Anti) Warrior’, Wired, 1.5, November 1993, pages 61-65, 120-122.

    Ridley Scott (director), Bladerunner, Warner Brothers, USA 1982.

    Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminati Trilogy, Dell, New York 1975.

    Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, Belknap Press, Harvard 1983.

    Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash, Roc, New York 1992.

    Bruce Sterling (editor), Mirrorshades, Paladin, London 1988.

    Gerald Emanuel Stern (editor), McLuhan: Hot & Cool, Penguin, London 1968.

    Reginald Stuart, ‘High-Tech Redlining: are Afro-Americans being frozen out of the new communications network’, Utne Reader, 68, March-April 1995, page 73.

    Keith Taylor (editor), Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825: Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation, Croom Helm, London 1975.

    Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Pan, London 1980.

    Alain Touraine, La Société post-industrielle, Editions Denoël, Paris 1969.

    Virtual Futures ’95, Conference Website.

    Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’, New Left Review, 209, January-February 1995, pages 42-74.

    Tom Wolfe, ‘What If He Is Right?’, The Pump House Gang, Bantam Books, London 1968, pages 107-133.

    Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, Bantam Books, New York 1968.

    William Whyte, The Organization Man, Simon & Schuster, New York 1956.

    Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello, William Heinemann, London 1925.

    Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: the future of work and power, Heinemann, New York 1988.

    ——————————————————————

    Responses

    Louis Rossetto: editor-in-chief of Wired

    Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi: author of Neuromagma

    John Barker: Londoner, novelist and activist

    Celia Pearce: an insider’s view of The Californian Ideology

    Jeffrey Kaplan: the counter-culture writes back

    John Blower: a response from FeNix

    Mark Dery: The Californian Demonology

  • THE DIGITAL ARTISANS MANIFESTO by Richard Barbrook and Pit Schultz

    European Digital Artisans Network 1st May 1997

    Making The Future

    1. We are the digital artisans. We celebrate the Promethean power of our labour and imagination to shape the virtual world. By hacking, coding, designing and mixing, we build the wired future through our own efforts and inventiveness.

    2. We are not the passive victims of uncontrollable market forces and technological changes. Without our daily work, there would be no goods or services to trade. Without our animating presence, information technologies would just be inert metal, plastic and silicon. Nothing can happen inside cyberspace without our creative labour. We are the only subjects of history.

    3. The emergence of the Net signifies neither the final triumph of economic alienation nor the replacement of humanity by machines. On the contrary, the information revolution is the latest stage in the emancipatory project of modernity. History is nothing but the development of human freedom.

    4. We will shape the new information technologies in our own interests. Although they were originally developed to reinforce hierarchical power, the full potential of the Net and computing can only be realised through our autonomous and creative labour. We will transform the machines of domination into the technologies of liberation.

    5. We will contribute to the process of democratic emancipation. As digital artisans, we will come together to promote the development of our trade. As citizens, we will participate within republican politics. As Europeans, we will help to break down national and ethnic barriers both inside and outside of our continent.

    The Present Moment

    6. Freedom today is now often just the choice between commodities rather the ability to determine our own lives. Over the past two hundred years, the factory system has dramatically increased our material wealth at the cost of removing all meaningful participation in work. Even poorer members of European societies can now live better than the kings and aristocrats of earlier times. However the joys of consumerism are usually constrained by the boredom of most jobs.

    7. Since 1968, the desire for increased monetary rewards has increasingly been supplemented by demands for increased autonomy at work. In the European Union and elsewhere, neo-liberals have tried to recuperate these aspirations through their policies of marketisation and privatisation. If we are talented workers in the ‘cutting-edge’ industries like hypermedia and computing, we are promised the possibility of becoming hip and rich entrepreneurs by the Californian ideologues. They want to recruit us as members of the ‘virtual class’ which seeks to dominate the hypermedia and computing industries.

    8. Yet these neo-liberal panaceas provide no real solutions. Free market policies don’t just brutalise our societies and ignore environmental degradation. Above all, they cannot remove alienation within the workplace. Under neo- liberalism, individuals are only allowed to exercise their own autonomy in deal-making rather than through making things. We cannot express ourselves directly by constructing useful and beautiful virtual artifacts.

    9. For those of us who want to be truly creative in hypermedia and computing, the only practical solution is to become digital artisans. The rapid spread of personal computing and now the Net are the technological expressions of this desire for autonomous work. Escaping from the petty controls of the shopfloor and the office, we can rediscover the individual independence enjoyed by craftspeople during proto-industrialism. We rejoice in the privilege of becoming digital artisans.

    10. We create virtual artifacts for money and for fun. We work both in the money-commodity economy and in the gift economy of the Net. When we take a contract, we are happy to earn enough to pay for our necessities and luxuries through our labours as digital artisans. At the same time, we also enjoy exercising our abilities for our own amusement and for the wider community. Whether working for money or for fun, we always take pride in our craft skills. We take pleasure in pushing the cultural and technical limits as far forward as possible. We are the pioneers of the modern.

    11. The revival of artisanship is not a return to a low-tech and impoverished past. Skilled workers are best able to assert their autonomy precisely within the most technologically advanced industries. The new artisans are better educated and can earn much more money. In earlier stages of modernity, factory labourers symbolised of the promise of industrialism. Today, as digital artisans, we now express the emancipatory potential of the information age. We are the promise of history.

    12. We not only admire the individualism of our artisan forebears, but also we will learn from their sociability. We are not petit-bourgeois egoists. We live within the highly collective institutions of the market and the state. For many people, autonomy over their working lives has often also involved accepting the insecurity of short- term contracts and the withdrawal of welfare provisions. We can only mitigate these problems through our own collective action. As digital artisans, we need to come together to promote our common interests.

    13. We believe that digital artisans within this continent now need to form their own craft organisation. In early modernity, artisans enhanced their individual autonomy by organising themselves into trade associations. We proclaim that the collective expression of our trade will be: the European Digital Artisans Network (EDAN).

    The Aims of EDAN

    14. We urge everyone who is working within hypermedia, computing and associated professions on this continent to join EDAN. We call on digital artisans to form branches of the network in each of the member states of the European Union and its associated countries. By forming EDAN, we will also be creating a means of forging links between European digital artisans and those from elsewhere in the world. We will strive for cooperation in work and in play with our fellow artisans in all countries.

    15. We believe that the principal task of EDAN is to enhance the exercise of our craft skills. By collaborating together, we can protect ourselves against those who wish to impose their self- interests upon us. By having a strong collective identity, we will enjoy more individual autonomy over our own working lives.

    16. EDAN will celebrate our creative genius as digital artisans. The network will act as the collective memory about the achievements of digital artisans within Europe. It will publicise outstanding ‘masterpieces’ of craft skill made by its members among the trade and to the wider public.

    17. The network will be the social meeting-place for digital artisans from across Europe. EDAN will organise festivals, conferences and congresses where we can meet to organise, discuss and party. We believe that digital artisans should express their collective identity by regularly celebrating together in private and public.

    18. EDAN will collect detailed knowledge about the trade in the different regions of Europe. It will aim to provide information about best practice in contracts, copyright agreements and other business arrangements to its members. The network will also be a source of contacts in each locality for digital artisans looking for work in different areas of Europe.

    19. We believe that what cannot be organised by our own autonomous efforts can only be provided through democratic political institutions. The network will lobby for changes in local, national and European legislation which can enhance our working lives as digital artisans. As concerned citizens, we will also support the fullest development of public welfare services.

    20. EDAN will campaign for European governments to put more resources into the theoretical and practical education of digital artisans in schools and universities. The network will facilitate links between educational institutions teaching hypermedia and computing across the continent. EDAN also believes that publicly-funded research is necessary for the fullest development of our industry.

    21. EDAN will urge the European Union to launch a public works programme to build a broadband fibre- optic network linking all households and businesses. We believe in the principle of universal service: everyone should have Net access at the cheapest possible price. No society can call itself truly democratic until all citizens can directly exercise their right to media freedom over the Net.

    22. We will campaign for the creation of ‘electronic public libraries’ where on-line educational and cultural resources are made accessible to everyone for free. Public investment in digital methods of delivering life-long learning is needed to create an information society. The Net should become the encyclopedia of all knowledge: the primary resource for the new Enlightenment.

    23. We believe that the role of the hi-tech gift economy should be further enhanced. As the history of the Net has shown, d.i.y. culture is now an essential part of the process of social development. Without hacking, piracy, shareware and open architecture systems, the limitations of the money-commodity economy would have prevented the construction of the Net. EDAN also supports open access as means of people beginning to learn the skills of hypermedia and computing. The promotion of d.i.y. culture within the Net is now a precondition for the successful construction of cyberspace.

    24. We are the digital artisans. We are building the information society of the future. We have come together to advance our collective interests and those of our fellow citizens. We are organised as the European Network of Digital Artisans. Join us.

    Digital Artisans of Europe Unite!

  • THE REGULATION OF LIBERTY by Richard Barbrook

    The State In Cyberspace

    The rapid expansion of e-commerce depends upon effective legal regulation of the Net. As in the rest of the economy, courts and police are needed to enforce the ‘rules of the game’ within on-line marketplaces. Theft remains theft even when committed with the latest technology. Since the Net encourages its own forms of anti-social behaviour, governments also have to update their legislation to counter the new threats from so-called ‘cyber-terrorism’. [2] Trespass laws must now protect computer systems as well as physical buildings. Not surprisingly, media corporations expect that the courts and the police will carry on protecting their intellectual property. Anyone who distributes unauthorised copies of copyright material over the Net must be punished. Anyone who invents software potentially useful for on-line piracy should be criminalised. Like other companies, media corporations need a secure legal framework for conducting e-commerce with their customers. As in the old Wild West, business will only prosper once law and order is established on the new electronic frontier. [3]

    This new common sense has displaced the fashionable anti-statism of a few years ago. According to the Californian ideology, national governments are incapable of controlling the global system of computer-mediated communications. Instead, individuals and businesses will compete to provide goods and services within unregulated on-line marketplaces. The advance to the hi-tech future is simultaneously the return to the liberal past. [4] Above all, this nostalgic ‘New Paradigm’ supposedly not only delivers greater economic efficiency, but also extends individual freedom. For instance, state regulation of broadcasting will become obsolete once everyone can buy and sell programming over the Net. Just like after the American revolution, public institutions will only be needed to provide minimal ‘rules of the game’ for people to trade information with each other. [5] In their constitution, the Founding Fathers formally prohibited government censorship of the press: the First Amendment. This ‘negative’ concept of media freedom emphasised the absence of legal sanctions against publishing dissident opinions. Like their fellow entrepreneurs, writers and publishers should be able to produce what their customers want to buy. Free speech is free trade. [6]

    For decades, experts and entrepreneurs have predicted that the emerging information society would realise the most libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment. They have never doubted the eventual triumph of their hi-tech vision: one virtual marketplace for trading information commodities. Instead of buying physical objects, people would purchase on-line versions of books, newspapers, films, television, radio, music, software and games – and also sell their own creations. Above all, this pay-per-use form of computer-mediated communications would have copyright protection hardwired into its social and technical architecture. The First Amendment is trading intellectual property within cyberspace.

    ‘Anyone with a computer and some organised information located on it can offer the information for sale. The customers are as close to the data base as their telephone. Publishing of information is thus likely to become a more competitive industry…’ [7]

    Intellectual property has long been seen as a commodity just like all other commodities. Yet, at the same time, the sellers of information have always wanted to avoid fully alienating their products to their customers. Even on primitive presses, the costs of reproducing existing publications were very much lower than making the first copy of a new work. As well as justified by liberal philosophy, copyright laws were also a pragmatic solution to the problem of plagiarism. The state enforced the monopoly of particular individuals over reproducing specific items of information to reward their creativity. [8] Unlike political censorship, liberals believed that this economic censorship was essential for media freedom. For instance, the Founding Fathers included copyright protection alongside the First Amendment within the American constitution. If free speech was synonymous with free trade, the state had to defend intellectual property. [9]

    In early copyright legislation, the ownership of information was always conditional. Just as media commodities were never fully alienated, no one could claim absolute ownership over intellectual property. Instead, copyrights could be lawfully expropriated for a ‘fair use’ in the public interest, such as political debate, education, research or artistic expression. [10] However, during the last few decades, these restrictions on copyright ownership have been slowly disappearing. According to hi-tech neo-liberals, all information must be transmuted into pure commodities traded within unregulated global markets. In their Californian ideology, media freedom is the ‘negative’ freedom from state interference. Yet, in practice, the marketisation of information requires more legal regulation of the Net. For instance, national laws and international treaties have already been adopted to cover the on-line trading of media commodities. Even if nation states give up trying to censor the content of the Net, their courts and police will be needed more than ever to defend the ownership of copyrights. [11] As John Locke emphasised long ago: ‘The great and chief end of… Mens… putting themselves under Government… is the preservation of their Property.’ [12]

    The Digital Panopticon

    While the Net remained a predominantly text-based system used by academics and hobbyists, media corporations could happily ignore the emergence of this participatory form of computer-mediated communications. According to the experts, the majority of the population was only interested in new information technologies which would offer a wider choice of media commodities. However, this ostrich strategy became increasingly untenable as more and more people went on-line. Along with making their own entertainment, Net users also enjoy sharing information with each other. For instance, many owners of music CDs give MP3 copies to their on-line friends – and even to complete strangers. Much to their horror, media corporations have slowly realised that the Net threatens the core of their business: the sale of intellectual property.

    The owners of copyrights are now demanding that the state launches the ‘war on copying’. [13] The courts and police must prevent consenting adults from sharing information with each other without permission. In a series of high-profile cases, industry bodies are suing the providers of technical facilities for swapping copyright material. [14] At the same time, media corporations are experimenting with encryption and other software programs which prevents unauthorised copying. [15] However, this anti-piracy offensive is proving to be only partially effective. For instance, the music industry’s attempts to close down Napster simply encourages people to install more sophisticated software for swapping music. [16] Even worse, the failure to agree a common method of encryption means that MP3 has become the de facto standard for distributing music over the Net. Contrary to neo-liberal prophecies, the transmutation of information into commodities is becoming more difficult in the digital age.

    Since intellectual property can’t be protected within the existing Net, media corporations want to impose a top-down form of computer-mediated communications in its place: the digital Panopticon. [17] If everyone’s on-line activities could be continually monitored, nobody would dare to defy the copyright laws. When information was sold as a commodity, media corporations would be able to control its subsequent uses. Across the world, security agencies are already developing ‘Big Brother’ technologies for placing every user of the Net under constant surveillance. For instance, the Chinese regime deters dissent by spying on the on-line activities of its citizens. Even the elected governments of the USA and the EU like snooping on the e-mails of their real or imaginary enemies. [18] According to the Californian ideology, such oppressive behaviour would become an anachronism in the unregulated virtual marketplace. Yet, only a few years later, it is commercial companies which are pressing for the monitoring of private Net use to defend their intellectual property. Until there is some fear of detection, people will carry on spontaneously sharing copyright material with each other. Ironically, the ‘negative’ freedom of the First Amendment now justifies the totalitarian ambitions of the digital Panopticon. As the head of the Motion Picture Association of America warns: ‘If you can’t protect that which you own, then you don’t own anything.’ [19]

    Despite the futurist rhetoric of its proponents, the digital Panopticon perpetuates an earlier stage of industrial evolution: Fordism. Ever since the advent of modernity, each transient burst of technological and social innovation has been idealised as an a timeless utopia. During the last century, the Fordist factory didn’t just become the dominant economic paradigm, but also provided the model for politics, culture and everyday life. [20] The media corporations now want to impose this top-down structure on computer-mediated communications. Like workers on an assembly-line, users of the digital Panopticon will be under constant surveillance from above. Like viewers of television, they can only passively consume media produced by others. The new information society must be built in the image of the old industrial economy. Free speech should only exist as media commodities.

    The Hi-Tech Gift Economy

    Many Left intellectuals also believe that the Net will – sooner or later – be replaced by the digital Panopticon. How could the version of computer-mediated communications devised by poor academics and insignificant nerds triumph over the structure championed by wealthy and influential media corporations? [21] Ironically, these gurus disprove their own masochistic predictions when they themselves go on-line. Like everyone else, they don’t primarily use the Net to consume media, but to send e-mails, swap information, conduct on-line research and participate in network communities. While there can be nothing new about more television, interactive collaboration over the Net is novel. The digital Panopticon is a future which is already history.

    For the emerging information society is being built according to principles laid down by the scientists who invented the Net. Funded by the state and foundations, academics collaborate with each other by giving away their findings in journals and at conferences. Scientists had no need for on-line systems for trading information commodities. Instead, they built the code of the Net in the image of the academic gift economy. Designing for their own use, they invented a form of computer-mediated communications for sharing knowledge within a single virtual space: the ‘intellectual commons’. [22] Above all, the pioneers of the Net knew that the publication of findings across many different books and journals was hampering scientific research. From Vannevar Bush to Tim Berners-Lee, they developed technologies which could overcome this fragmentation of academic knowledge. The passive consumption of fixed pieces of information would become the participatory process of ‘interactive creativity’. [23]

    As the Net spread outside the university, its new users quickly discovered the benefits of sharing knowledge with each other. There has never been much demand for the equal exchange of commodities when people can access the labour of a whole community in return for their own individual efforts. [24] Many non-academics are also striving to overcome the fixed boundaries imposed by the commodification of information. For instance, musicians have long appropriated recordings for DJ-ing, sampling and remixing. [25] The popularity and capabilities of the Net is intensifying these ambiguities within the economics of music-making. The MP3 format doesn’t just make the piracy of copyright material much easier. As importantly, the social mores and technical structure of the Net encourages enthusiasts to make their own sounds. The passive consumption of unalterable recordings is evolving into interactive participation within musical composition. [26]

    What began inside scientific research is now transforming music-making and many other forms of cultural expression. Back in the early-1990s, only a few academics and hobbyists could access this open form of computer-mediated communications. A decade later, almost every academic discipline, political cause, cultural movement, popular hobby and private obsession has a presence on the Net. Whether for work or for pleasure, people are creating websites, bulletin boards, listservers and chat rooms. Although only a minority are now engaged in scientific research, all Net users can participate within the hi-tech gift economy. A few hope that network communities are prefiguring the co-operative and ecological societies of the future. Some are convinced that ‘interactive creativity’ is the cutting-edge of modern art. Most simply participate within on-line projects as a leisure activity. Far from being displaced by the digital Panopticon, the ‘intellectual commons’ of the Net continues to expand at an exponential rate. Free speech is a free gift.

    What’s Left of Copyright?

    The Net is now proclaimed as the new paradigm of society. Business, government and culture are supposed to restructure themselves in its image: flexible, participatory and self-organising. [27] Although often seen as pioneers of the hi-tech future, media corporations are terrified of this emerging paradigm. For the rapid growth of the Net is exposing the contingency of their intellectual property. As information separates from physical products, copyright loses its apparent basis in nature. Quite spontaneously, most people are opting to share knowledge rather than to trade media commodities over the Net. Technological progress is symbiotic with social evolution. Free speech can flourish without free trade.

    The media corporations are desperate to reverse history back to the previous paradigm: the Fordist factory. As in old sci-fi stories, they dream of giant mainframes spying upon everyone’s on-line activities. Like members of the secret police, the owners of copyright are nostalgic for the Cold War days of ‘Big Brother’. However, history has moved on. The centralised vision of computer-mediated communications is already technically obsolete. How much computing power would be needed to make a detailed analysis of every piece of data in the information flows passing across the Net? How could constant top-down surveillance be imposed on all peer-to-peer file-sharing within cyberspace? But, without constant monitoring from above, the effectiveness of encryption and other security devices is limited. As hackers have repeatedly proved, anything which is encoded will be eventually decoded. When no one is looking, media commodities will spontaneously transmute into free gifts on the Net.

    Since there is no technological fix for protecting copyright, the media corporations can only preserve their wealth in one way: state power. The police and the courts must deter people from pirating intellectual property or inventing software for making unauthorised copies. The social mores and software codes of the Net must be criminalised. Only fear of punishment can force everyone inside the digital Panopticon. For the media corporations, the ‘negative’ form of media freedom is now synonymous with state enforcement of economic censorship. The law must be obeyed. The Net must be replaced with the digital Panopticon. Free trade is more important than free speech.

    According to the Free Software Foundation, the growing contradiction between legality and reality within the Net can only be resolved by extending the scope of the First Amendment. The economic interests of the few should no longer take precedence over the political liberties of the many. The ‘negative’ concept of media freedom must now apply to private corporations as well as public institutions. Above all, the state should refrain from enforcing not only political censorship, but also economic censorship. [28] As privileges of copyright disappear, information should be regulated in a more libertarian way: ‘copyleft’. Although producers should still be able to prevent their own work from being claimed by others, everyone must be allowed to copy and alter information for their own purposes. Free speech is freedom from compulsory commodification. [29]

    Even this proposal isn’t radical enough for some Net pioneers. For instance, Tim Berners-Lee decided that the original programs of the web should be placed in the public domain. Instead of making proprietary software for sale in the marketplace, this inventor was developing tools for building the ‘intellectual commons’. His web programs were much more likely to be adopted as common standards if all residual traces of individual ownership were removed. Being a scientist funded by EU taxpayers, Tim Berners-Lee was happy to give away his research to anyone who could benefit from more accessible computer-mediated communications. Owned by nobody, the web could become the common property of all. [30]

    In the prophecies of the hi-tech neo-liberals, all information was going to be inevitably transformed into unalloyed commodities. Inside the digital Panopticon, everyone would be forced to prioritise a ‘single business model’: trading intellectual property. [31] Yet, when given a choice, almost everybody prefers the bottom-up Net over this top-down version of computer-mediated communications. Crucially, the absence of intellectual property within the Net has never been an obstacle to the successful commercialisation of computer-mediated communications. On the contrary, many dot-com entrepreneurs have discovered that more profits can be made outside the protection of the digital Panopticon. Businesses trade more efficiently with their suppliers and their customers when everyone uses open source software. Employees collaborate with each other much more easily within the non-proprietary architecture of the Net. [32] Despite their wealth and influence, media corporations are unlikely to persuade their fellow capitalists to adopt the digital Panopticon. While serious money can be made on the existing Net, why should businesses adopt a less flexible and more intrusive form of computer-mediated communications?

    Even for the trading of intellectual property, there is no pressing need for investing in expensive copyright protection systems. Information can still be commodified through other tried-and-tested methods: advertising, real-time delivery, merchandising, data-mining and support services. [33] While these techniques remain profitable, the weakening of intellectual property within the Net can be tolerated. Increasingly, information exists as both commodity and gift – and as hybrids of the two. No longer always fixed in physical objects, the social distinction between proprietary and free information becomes contingent. For instance, the Linux operating system can either be downloaded without payment from the Net or be purchased on a CD-rom from a dot-com company. [34] This hybrid existence is not confined to ‘cutting edge’ software. For instance, the same dance tune is sold on vinyl, given away on MP3 and sampled to create new sounds. The passive consumption of fixed pieces of information now co-exists with the participatory process of ‘interactive creativity’. Free speech is both free trade and free gifts.

    Making Media

    According to current copyright legislation, this new form of free speech is simply a new type of theft. Information must always remain a commodity within cyberspace. Yet, within the Net, free speech is evolving into the fluid process of ‘interactive creativity’. Information exists as commodities, gifts and hybrids of the two. Oblivious to this growing contradiction, politicians carry on tightening the legal protection of copyright at both national and international levels. [35] They are determined to help their local media corporations to compete successfully within the global marketplace. As a result, the letter of law criminalises the on-line activities of almost every Net user. For instance, giving away bootleg MP3s is stealing the intellectual property of media corporations. The ‘negative’ concept of media freedom prohibits political censorship only to justify economic censorship. Free trade is state power. [36]

    Yet, in their daily lives, everyone knows that there is almost no chance of being punished for swapping MP3s. The existing copyright laws are increasingly unenforceable within the Net. If only for pragmatic reasons, the concept of media freedom now needs be extended beyond freedom from political censorship. For instance, in nineteenth century Europe, Karl Marx argued that free speech shouldn’t be confined within free trade. The Left had to struggle not only against political censorship, but also economic censorship. Crucially, the removal of legal controls was an essential precondition, but not a sufficient foundation for free speech. Everyone also had to have access to the technologies for expressing themselves: the ‘positive’ concept of media freedom. [37] During the Fordist epoch, the Left almost forgot this libertarian definition of free speech. For technical and economic reasons, ordinary people appeared to be incapable of making their own media. Instead, the Left supported public service broadcasting so its leaders could gain access to the airwaves. Free speech was restricted to elected politicians. [38]

    With the advent of the Net, this limited vision of media freedom is becoming an anachronism. For the first time, ordinary people can be producers as well as consumers of information. Marx’s ‘positive’ concept of media freedom is now pragmatic politics. Instead of making media for them, the state can help people to make their own media. For instance, public service broadcasters can nurture network communities and telecoms regulators can encourage infrastructure investment. [39] Above all, the state must reverse the recent tightening of the copyright laws. For the ‘positive’ concept of media freedom precludes vigorous economic censorship. The widespread ‘fair use’ of copyright material should be recognised in law as well as in practice. The rigid enforcement of intellectual property must give way to official toleration of more flexible forms of information: bootlegs, copyleft, open source and public domain. ‘Fair use’ is free speech. [40]

    For most people, the weakening of copyright protection is someone else’s problem. They are unconcerned that trading of commodities in the old media must co-exist with the circulation of gifts in the new media. [41] Even neo-liberals are realising that the trading of physical commodities is much easier outside the digital Panopticon. While e-commerce will always depend upon legal regulation, ‘interactive creativity’ among Net users has little need for courts and police. When copying is ubiquitous, punishing people for stealing intellectual property will seem perverse. Instead of formal laws, most on-line activities can be regulated by the spontaneous rules of polite behaviour. [42]

    ‘The more perfect civilisation is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itself…’ [43]

    Sooner or later, the state will abandon its attempts to impose economic censorship on the Net. Even the media corporations will eventually have to accept the demise of information Fordism. Instead of copyright enforcement, government intervention can focus on extending and improving access to the Net for all people. The ‘negative’ freedom from state censorship must evolve into the ‘positive’ freedom to make media. In the age of the Net, free speech can become: ‘…the right to make noise… to create one’s own code and work… the right to make the free and revocable choice to interlink with another’s code – that is, the right to compose life.’ [44]

    Footnotes

    [1] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, page 98.

    [2] For instance, the British government is introducing legislation which includes any actions which ‘seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system’ within its definition of ‘terrorism’. See Will Knight, ‘Hackers Will Become Terrorists Under New Law’, page 1.

    [3] For an analysis of increasing legal regulation of the Net, see Lawrence Lessig, Code.

    [4] See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’.

    [5] See Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.

    [6] For an analysis of the origins of the First Amendment in English liberalism, see Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press. An English liberal mandarin later defined ‘negative’ freedom as: ‘…the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he [or she] is able to do or be, without interference by other persons…’ Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pages 121-2.

    [7] Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, page 211.

    [8] See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, pages 16-44.

    [9] See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 7-18; and Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, pages 220-281.

    [10] See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, pages 45-66.

    [11] Despite denouncing state regulation as obsolete, Newt Gingrich’s neo-liberal think-tank still saw that: ‘Defining property rights in cyberspace is perhaps the single most urgent and important task for government information policy.’ The Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, page 11.

    [12] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, page 395. For a socialist remix of this liberal analysis, see Eugeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism.

    [13] This analogy with the repressive ‘war on drugs’ is made in Richard Stallman, ‘Freedom – or Copyright?’, page 2.

    [14] See the Recording Industry Association of America, ‘RIAA Lawsuit Against Napster’; and the Motion Picture Association of America, ‘DVD-DeCSS Press Room’.

    [15] For instance, all the major record labels are members of a consortium to develop encryption methods for copyright-protected music, see the Secure Digital Music Initiative website.

    [16] For instance, see the Gnutella and Freenet websites.

    [17] See Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community, pages 289-296. The dystopian vision of the Net is inspired by the symbol of oppressive modernity in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish.

    [18] See Elmo Recio, ‘The Great Firewall of China’; and Duncan Campbell, ‘Inside Echelon’.

    [19] Jack Valenti talking about the potential threat from the DeCSS decryption program in ‘Film Studios Bring Claim Against DVD Hackers in Federal Court’.

    [20] See Simon Clarke, ‘What in the F—’s Name is Fordism’.

    [21] For instance, Robert McChesney says: ‘It’s almost an iron law of US communication[s] media… that… the corporate sector comes in, and… muscles all… other people out of the way and takes it over.’ Corporate Watch, ‘Towards a Democratic Media System’, page 3.

    [22] Lawrence Lessig, Code, page 141. Also see Michael Hauben and Rhonda Hauben, Netizens, page ix.

    [23] Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Realising the Full Potential of the Web’, page 5. Also see Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’; and ‘Cyber-communism’.

    [24] See Rishab Ghosh, ‘Cooking Pot Markets’; and Richard Barbrook, ‘The Hi-Tech Gift Economy’.

    [25] See Bill Brewster and Frank Broughton, Last Night a DJ Saved My Life; and Sheryl Garratt, Adventures in Wonderland.

    [26] See Jacques Attali, Noise, pages 133-148. Also see Romandson, ‘Interactive Music’.

    [27] From academic research to management theory, this new paradigm now fascinates the cutting-edge of intellectual life. For instance, see Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society; and Jonas Ridderstråle and Kjell Nordström, Funky Business.

    [28] See Richard Stallman, ‘Freedom – or Copyright?’. Some American judges have already defined computer programming as a form of free speech, see Patricia Jacobus, ‘Court: Programming languages covered by First Amendment’.

    [29] See Free Software Foundation, ‘What is Copyleft?’.

    [30] See Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, pages 78-80.

    [31] See Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, pages 70-71.

    [32] See John Hagel and Arthur Armstrong, net.gain.

    [33] See Esther Dyson, Release 2.0, pages 131-163.

    [34] See Robert Young, ‘How Red Hat Software Stumbled Across a New Economic Model and Helped Improve an Industry’.

    [35] See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights.

    [36] See Lawrence Lessig, Code, pages 30-60.

    [37] See Karl Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press’. In contrast with its ‘negative’ predecessor, ‘positive’ freedom is defined as: ‘I wish to be… a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon… by other men as if I was… a slave incapable of… conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them.’ Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, page 131. For this socialist concept of political rights, also see Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’.

    [38] See Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom, pages 55-73.

    [39] See Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology’, pages 63-68.

    [40] See Richard Barbrook, ‘Cyber-communism’, pages 26-35.

    [41] For a discussion of the ‘fragmentation of copyright’, see Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, pages 144-157.

    [42] Among early users of computer-mediated communications, such spontaneous self-regulation was dubbed ‘netiquette’, see Michael Hauben and Rhonda Hauben, Netizens, pages 63-4.

    [43] Tom Paine, Rights of Man, page 165.

    [44] Jacques Attali, Noise, pages 132.

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  • ON THE JOYS OF PIXEL POPPING by Rachel Collinson

    Ever done cross stitch? Followed a knitting pattern? Made a wee tapestry?

    Maybe the thought of such lame activity brings a smug smile to your face. It’s the sort of thing you just can’t admit to and stay fashionable.

    What on earth’s it got to do with new media culture, anyway? Such homely, farmhouse crafts just don’t cut it when you can take a digital camera snap or a scan of some random object, mangle it with the face of a soon-to-be ex-friend in Photoshop and print up your own t-shirt. Out with the homemade jam and in with the paper jam.

    But let’s take a different look at this – please bear with me while I take you on a digital detour for a moment. There have been some interesting developments in digital culture recently. We have seen an explosion in the use and production of bitmap fonts, which don’t expand and contract easily like normal fonts but are designed to be viewed on screen as small and crisp as possible. These allow designers to take the crazy amounts of text information given to them by demanding clients and cram it into the limited screen space available while still preserving precious white space. (This is essential to allow a design to breathe and therefore remain interesting and readable, if you’ve yet to hear a designer throw a wobbly about it. If you are a designer, you’ll probably be shaking your head in sad recognition at this point.)

    At first these fonts emerged for practical reasons but soon became a mark of slick style and ultra-modern design on the web (we shall put aside for a moment the fact that they are not accessible to those readers with impaired vision.) They are constructed not with curves, as the traditional font has always been, but simply by carving a letter out of a block of say, 10 by 10 pixels, much like the way text is displayed on the tiny monochrome lcd screens of mobile phones.

    Designing these – along with graphics and icons – far from being slavishly boring, is curiously relaxing and addictive. It’s like relieving stress systematically with a sheet of bubble wrap, but producing something pretty and intricate at the same time. Add in the kudos of announcing you’re doing interactive design, and you’ve got a winning formula for whiling away the hours – and, dare I say it, making money on the side.

    With sites like Warp Records (www.warp-net.com) and Flipflopflyin (www.flipflopflyin.com – the minipops section especially) now going down in the history of the web, pixel popping has become a major art form. Recognisable celebrities are rendered in 4 jagged colours and only one centimetre square. Like the appeal of small things in the real world- spider mites, micromachines, puppies, mobile phones- pixel art definitely has the greatest emotional power per square inch.

    And yet, for all the machismo of the webdesign industry, with its appalling gender imbalance, the technique itself differs very little from making a cross-stitch sampler – a talent which goes back hundreds of years and was purely the realm of uneducated adolescent girls. You’ve got to admit it, boys, it’s not so uncool. There’s a bit of passion for traditional craft in all of us.

    Whether icons would go down well at your local church sale of work, though, remains to be seen.

  • WHAT EVERY NEW MEDIA WORKER MUST KNOW: “CYBERSPACE” IS NOT A SPACE by Rachel Collinson

    (or, why I am against 3D navigation)

    Think back to the moment when you first heard all the fuss about the net. For your humble author the first memory is of seeing the film Jumping Jack Flash – and it’s not so much memorable for the image of Whoopi Goldberg brandishing a mansize toothbrush against an unknown intruder, (which has its merits) but for the fact that the plot effectively hinged on her character instant messaging a spy trapped in Russia.

    Perhaps you recall soundbites like “This is the beginning of end for the postal system/business air travel/commuting…” and other such ridiculous hype. It seemed almost reasonable, yet now we laugh cynically at such innocence.

    However, there was a seed of truth in those statements, which is probably why so many of us swallowed them at the time. The kernel of it was that the internet collapses space. Its magical combination of electricity, protocols and hardware, strung out across the globe, really do make Moscow seem as close to us as the PC in the next room.

    So, what did the great design minds do with this remarkable inversion of geography? They said “Let’s make a virtual gallery you can wander round” or “Let’s make a virtual nightclub.” Suddenly with such clumsy reproductions of the real world online, we had all its disadvantages (having to travel from one place to another in real time) with none of the advantages (the texture of a painting, the feel of a pint glass, and other luxuries which I shall let you imagine in your own time.)

    For some reason this desire to imitate travel still persists. Almost every fledgling webdesigner at some point suggests a navigation system based on rooms or spaces. (Go into the conference room and you can see the press releases. Go into the telephone booth and you get contact information.)

    Forget it! Physical dimensions are not what networked IT does well, and it’s certainly not an advantage (unless you are playing Tomb Raider, in which case you may be glad there’s a metre of virtual stone between you and some rabid wolf.) What if you wanted to compare differing sets of information, or change the order and grouping of images in our virtual gallery? On the web this becomes immediately possible, but it renders the metaphor superfluous at best; counter-intuitive at worst.

    Information and 3d space can rarely, if ever, be combined to good effect. Many extremely talented designers have tried to solve complex navigation and data representation problems, such as menus with many layers and interlinking options, by creating a kind of space which you can circumnavigate or zoom in and out of the text. But if you can find me a casual web user that understands what on earth is going on with these things, I promise to eat that very man-size toothbrush.

    Not so long ago, Apple announced that in their development of the next version of Mac OS, they were exploring a new desktop metaphor which was not based on two dimensions but three. Everybody danced around excitedly on reading the press release. But what happened? We ended up with beveled icons and little folders that look like they’re standing up on the desktop. Cute, but not exactly a quantum leap.

    I could be wrong about this. But one thing’s for sure, you’d have to spend a lot more money than Apple did to prove it.

  • ARS ELECTRONICA ’96 INTERVIEW with Richard Barbrook and Mark Dery

    The Liberalism Discussion

    MD: I would simply add as a kind of hypertext link to that statement, the term ‘liberal’ in America means something very different [from the European use of the term. WvW] and I think the boilerplate phrase ‘liberal economics’ is more usefully phrased for Americans as a ‘laissez-faire’ Ayn Randian deregulated economics. Not liberalism in the sense of social policies but ‘liberal’ meaning the least regulated, the least statist intervention.

    RB: Simon Martin Lipset says in his book American Exceptionalism: ‘all Americans are liberals’ it is just that they are either conservative liberals or social liberals. And that is part of the problem in the American debate; it is completely narrow. And he says quite rightly that there’s never been really a conservative party. You know pro-church, pro-aristocracy party since the revolution and similarly there’s never been a real socialist party, not even in the social democratic sense.

    The Commodification of Social Theories and the State

    MD: When Richard suggested they recapitulate Spencerian social theory it is interesting to know that the Spencerian theory was every bit as popular with the monopoly capitalists of his days as the neo-biological downsized demassified decentralized theories of Kevin Kelly are with corporate managerial theorists as Peter Drucker and Tom Peters, the last one being the author of the book Thriving on Chaos which is a bizarre carnival mirror, kind of fun house distortion of Deleuze in a very strange way. The disillusion of the body politics in sort of a flesh-eating viral fashion into a puddle of anomic atomized cellular units protoplasmicly going their own separate ways on the one hand echoes delirious excesses of Deleuzian theory at its most outermost bounds, and on the other hand the American militia movement at this moment, which also embraces very much the notion of micro-political resistance. Where have we ever heard that phrase before? Foucault sits upright in his grave and coughs a blood bubble!

    RB: That’s the interesting thing there is this link between the New Left and the New Right which is: anti-statism which actually anti-democracy. Both are against representative democracy. They see the political process as inherently corrupt because it involves compromise, the articulation of interests. The both have the common fantasy of direct democracy. Pure speech actions between people. This is interesting because – in classical republicanism – media freedom was seen as part of participation in the democratic process, it was not the substitute for it. But both the New Left and the New Right saw the media as a substitute for representative political institutions. Guattari talks about the community radio stations as ‘the immense permanent meeting of the airwaves’ where people engage in direct democracy, bypassing the Italian state. As we know it is a very deeply reactionary idea. Because politics involves being a citizen and that’s the reason why I’m a libertarian Social Democrat and not an ultra leftist! You have to accept that we are not we’re not just members of civil society. Both deny this dialectic between membership of civil society and political citizenship.

    The Future of the State

    MD: Since you are looking for differences between us one difference that should absolutely be highlighted but should be triple underscored italicised and said in fluorescent wired day-glo orange: I’m not a Social Democrat!!! nor am I an academic neo-Marxist!!! I’m deeply, deeply disenchanted with the notion of the nation state and profoundly saddened about the perilous state of constitutional participatory democracy in America at this point which is not to say that I don’t think that it is a remarkably robust line of political code and that I don’t think it is inherently one of the more liberating political systems, but where Richard and I part company is that – in America – the federalist paradigm, the government has been effectively brought to heel and hollowed out and turned essentially into a sickafennic lapdog by corporate power that is evermore global in scope that flows with the frightening liquidity over national borders from whence springs all of this utopian rhetoric in the Wired camp about the end of the nation state, the end of geography in a sort of dizzy vertiginous hyper-real way that almost sounds post-modern. And again the discorporation from the immediate physical body. But in their hands, in the hands of what a New Yorker essayist called the ‘Tofflerist/Gingrichist alliance’ all this rhetoric of returning power to the individual and ultimately to the local level is really a very transparent threadbare blind for on the one hand utterly unraveling of the social safety net and laying the full burden of responsibility for the sort of social concerns at the doorstep of the individual, and simultaneously as I said in my paper dismantling the rickety framework of the nation state that even now only just constraints corporate power to clear the way for transnational media monoliths whose power is utterly unconstrained and answerable to no one. So the pernicious, corrosive enzymes of corporate power have effectively hollowed out constitutional democracy in America. And we need look no further than the recent capitulation to all of Rupert Murdoch’s attempts to roll back anti-monopoly legislation where essentially all of the inside the beltway power-brokers basically melt and kissed his ring. This is the moment to my mind where the state is in serious peril.

    RB: This libertarian rhetoric is of a limited section of the economy and is an ideology in the classic sense of the word: it is a false description of reality. What’s interesting is that it is not a really successful economic strategy compared to the post-war period or the New Deal. State regulations and taxes are like physical exercises, nobody really wants to do them or have it imposed on them. A good example is universal access. One of the big campaigns of these free marketeers is to remove universal access from the provision of this new fibre-optic grid. It is literally going to be the virtual class that will be half-wired into the fiber-optic grid and the rest of the population will be left the decaying copper infrastructure. But if you create a mass market you need the masses to be on-line. So it needs the state to pro-actively built the turn-and-see value in order to electrify to…. If I were Time Warner I would want the state to organise the infrastructure and be able sell your commodities.

    MD: But how do you respond to my critique, my misgivings, profound weariness, my trepedation about rallying around the banner of the state. As a Social Democrat, you sound much more sanguine about participatory democracy’s ability to disentangle itself from the tentacles of corporate power and I would like you to address the way in which corporate power profoundly undermined the fundamental tenets of participatory democracy.

    RB: Political democracy is centered around state structures. If you are against the state in a very fundamental sense, you are against political democracy. It is about participating in political decision-making at a region a national and now at a continental level in Europe. That you have to state first and foremost. We are living within a mixed economy and each of these actors play a different role. But we have to be wary of saying that the state is disappearing, because in a sense it is accepting the propaganda but still the state plays an enormous role, in America as everywhere else. You have to be aware not to over exaggerate globalisation as we are still not at the stage we were in 1914. International trade is less important than it was then. After that we entered a period in which nations became radically autonomous, especially in the Depression era. Eastern Europe as the prime example. Everybody did this, everybody retreated behind the protectionist walls and yes they have been broken down in the last fifty years we reassembled a global trading system, but even now we are still not at the point we were at the beginning of this century.

    MD: My question hangs in the air unanswered; your response to my question about the extent in which corporate intervention and influence peddling and the enormously long dark shadow of transnational corporate power pass inside the beltway which effectively to my mind parries participatory democracy. There is a growing feeling in America which gives rise to the Militia Movement throwing a lever in a ballot booth is essentially a sob for the masses and that the real decisions made in the corridors of power have everything to do with pacts and corporate influence peddling and that that acts as a prophylactic, a firewall against the real wills and desires expressed by the people. Your response to that is that we first have to concede that we are committed to the state, and the state is a really profound influential entity; I would not deny that the state has a profound influence and still exercises an enormous impact on the everyday lives of citizenry e.g. in America. The point is that the state is evermore ventriloquised by transnational corporate power. Let me give you a material example; the recent telecommunication legislation in America. A statist, highly interventionist radically deregulatory act. It is the issue that draws all the heat and light from the Wired people because as libertarians they are very concerned with individual rights; it is the Hyde amendment, the so-called Communication Decency Act, which is a hairball! A fleetingly brief mirage, a distraction! The real profound issue in there are the evisceration of common carriage, the roll back of the regulation that would prevent monopolies and given media markets. So this is statist intervention but it is essentially the hamburgler hand puppet given out at McDonald playlands, you know, so, it is operated by corporate power. The pincers of the state close on our lives, but the people manipulating those indicators are in fact a sort of Deakyanesque captains of consciousness of global corporate power. It seems that you have to take that into account when you sort of robustly singing the anthem of statism.

    Voting

    RB: There is a very specific problem in American because fifty percent of the population don’t vote, it has to do with the very bizarre constitution that you have that, as you can read in The Federalist Papers, was designed to obstruct popular will. Alexander Hamilton makes it absolutely clear if you read what he says about it. So it is partly due to the American constitution, so you need constitutional reform, the end of the division between legislator and executive, proportionate representation, there is rather a number of measures, and even on a more profound level since Roosevelt there has not been a political project in America which is of a very consciously articulated social democratic value.

    MD: That is a distant geographically removed, I think academically aloof analysis of why Americans aren’t voting. If you descend to the ragtag and bobtail and ask them why they don’t vote they don’t say: We don’t vote because we think the democratic project has been brought to its knees by too much separation between legislative and executive branches. They say: I don’t vote because I feel it doesn’t make a difference! I feel that there is a profound disjuncture, a disconnect, a rupture, a bifurcation between this impotent, again, sop for the masses that I’m adopt a sort of a monkey on a unicycle performance kind of trained act that I play into the illusion of democratic participation when I doodively margin to the polling booth throw the lever and think that that has a profound impact when in fact that impact has largely been subverted by the real powers who have kind of woven their tendrils inside the beltway to the point where they have fenced out real democratic participation. It seems to me that the prophylactic alternatives, pragmatics progressive solutions, you propose don’t address the real gut-level visceral embodied quotidian reasons that Americans en masse are saying Don’t Vote! They don’t vote because it does not make a difference. To me it’s a no-brainer that it doesn’t make a difference because corporate power has unplugged participatory democracy by vast amounts of liquid capital with which they flooded the halls of representative legislation. If you’re going to make the case for the nation state you’ve got to look who at the end of the century in terminal culture is evermore ventriloquising the nation state. My position, my half-hearted animic endorsement of the nation state has entirely to do, following that analysis with the notion that is the last threadbare shopworn, flimsy prophylactic evermore rickety firewall between us and the raging fireball of totally unconstrainted corporate power that will run rough-shod over individual liberty.

  • UNDERCURRENT INTERVIEW: the contradictions of media freedom

    Eric Heroux You hold that the new media made possible by the Internet heralds a new day that might well overcome the “contradictions of media freedom.” One of these contradictions is that while the political rights of free public speech arrived, the means of disseminating free speech rested in the of very few who could afford a press. But today, new media potentially allow for everyone to speak to everyone at some point. And even the rudimentary beginnings of this process seem promising, or as you remind us, “…the success of the Internet system was based on the spontaneous collaboration of its participants on a global scale. ” Nevertheless, the Internet is rapidly becoming commercialized and privatized. And states are already regulating content over the Internet– China, Germany, USA, etc. The oft-repeated promise of democratization remains a mere potential. In a world where only one third of the people have ever owned a telephone, a modem seems rather improbable. Or…?

    Richard Barbrook I think that you are confusing the two elements of the contradiction of media freedom: participation and democratisation. This is why I think that it is important to analyse the history of media freedom. We’re then able to look at the deep roots of many contemporary debates.

    For example, many of our contemporary debates over the future of the Net were also carried out over radio broadcasting in ’20s and ’30s America. In the early days of the ‘wireless’, radio enthusiasts could experiment with the potentiality of the new media without much interference from the state or the large corporations. Given the ease of obtaining a broadcasting licence or buying airtime, almost anyone could appear on the radio if they really wanted to. But radio broadcasting could only act as a participatory media because it had a limited number of users. It was the democratisation of radio broadcasting which ended the brief experiment in participation. The new users were interested in radio as a source of entertainment and information rather than as a way of expressing themselves. For instance, mutual interference between unregulated stations caused interference for many listeners, especially in the big cities. The passing of the restrictive 1927 Radio Act was a politically popular piece of regulation because it allowed most radio users – who were owners of cheap listening devices – to obtain good quality signals of programmes with the star performers produced by the networks. Of course, this restrictive piece of legislation also opened the way for the dominance of the airwaves by large corporations and the censorship of political/cultural opinions, especially by left-wing radicals. But we should not forget that it was the democratisation of radio broadcasting which provided the social basis for the transformation of the new media from active involvement into passive consumption.

    The question now facing the Net is how far hypermedia will repeat this contradictory history. Will democratisation of its availability lead to the end of participation? When the market was small, the corporations weren’t much interested in providing Net services. When only few techies and academics were using on- line services, there was little demand for political regulation. As in the ’20s, there are some senses in which we should welcome the increasing involvement of the corporations and the state within cyberspace — it shows that the Net is becoming a popular phenomenon. Whether private or nationalised, large companies will be needed to make hypermedia widely available. If on-line services are to become ubiquitous, some form of basic content regulation will be needed. The point is whether this involvement is incompatible with the community involvement treasured by many of the pioneers of the Net. Despite appreciating the vigilance against corporate monopolies and state censorship, I think that the prophets of doom are treating the contradictions of media freedom as part of an ‘eternal present’ rather than a historical process. The emergence of hypermedia is the latest expression of the modern aspiration to transcend the contradiction between participation and democracy within media freedom. It is no accident that a fibre-optic grid has greater technological potentiality for two-way communications on a mass scale than the airwaves. It is the crystallisation of an emergent social practice which goes beyond the limitations of Fordism.

    E.H. You proposed that, “The emergence of hypermedia is the latest expresson of the modern aspiration to transcend the contradition between participation and democracy within media freedom.” Do our aspirations or social practices tend to precede and even lead to technologies that mirror them? Some would see it the other way around, e.g., Jacques Ellul and the critics of technocracy. For them, the problem is how technologies influence social practices.

    R.B. Technology is not the subject of history. As Sartre pointed out, technology is a crystallised praxis. It expresses the social relations and the social knowledge of a given historical era. For sure, machines have a material-technical basis which will limit its capabilities. This can be seen in the Net– downloading large images can be a frustrating experience because of the low bandwidth of the domestic telephone system. But the reasons why certain paths of innovation are followed and others ignored do not lie in some inherent logic within technology. McLuhan was wrong! On the contrary, states, companies and communities devote time and effort to researching and developing technologies which are useful for their own purposes. For instance, the Net was created by the state for military communications, was improved by amateurs as a form of horizontal communications and is now being further advanced by corporations who want to make money from “interactive tv”. Each section of the mixed economy hasn’t just created its own particular form of content, but also shaped the technological basis of hypermedia. As they used to say in the ’70s, science is social relations.

    E.H. Raymond Williams wrote a book about television back in the 1970s in which he insisted that it was up to how we deploy technics such as TV, up to the specific social practice or cultural form, to determine the effects of media technology on democracy. A medium can be either monopolized by the commodity form or democratized by smaller “alternative” uses….

    R.B. When I was a radio pirate, I would have agreed with this analysis. Each frequency granted to a commercial operator was one denied to a community radio station. However I think that this analysis is very difficult to apply to hypermedia. I don’t think that we’re faced with an either/or choice anymore. On the contrary, corporate involvement in building the Net could actually enhance community uses of the new information technologies. For instance, although broadband networks will be built mainly to sell home entertainment, they can also be used for distributing d.i.y. culture and information on a much wider scale. As long as two-way communications are possible over the network, hypermedia cannot be monopolised by the commodity form. Given that many software producers– such as music companies and book publishers– are dependent on commercialising artistic forms originating in popular culture, I don’t think that this would be even in their narrow commercial interests either!

    E.H. Back when radio was a radically new promise of mass communications, Bertolt Brecht used to insist that “Society cannot share a common communications system so long as it is split into warring factions.” To the degree that societies remain divided along the lines of race and class, will even the new media be something we really share?

    R.B. But what is “a common communications system”? Is it the entire population grouped around their television sets watching the same programme? – or the electronic marketplace with a myriad of interlocking companies – or the electronic agora composed of many diverse communities?

    It could be argued that this Brecht quote has potentially totalitarian implications. In radical Jacobin theories, social contradictions could be overcome through ideological uniformity imposed from above. Rather we should ask how far media freedom – including for hypermedia– can overcome the class differences within contemporary capitalism? In many ways, both the Right and the Left overestimate the power of the media to shape society. This is probably because the “opinion formers” spend so much of their lives trying to appear on the media! For instance, both black and white people in the USA share the same phone network– “a common communications system” — yet they don’t use it to ask each other out socially very much…

    E.H. This is quite right. Communication as genuine dialogue across divided sectors of society is a bit illusory and unattained so far. The Italian thinker, Gianni Vattimo, in “The Transparent Society” argues that contemporary media will never contribute to a transparent communication and unified understanding among different tribes– but almost the obverse. That is, the society of “generalized communication” has produced an increasing pluralization of groups and identities. Media do not lead to a rational unalienated intersubjectivity among people, as Habermas wishes. Instead we see the proliferation of new and disorienting possiblilities, new myths, hybrid tribes, multiple dialects and subcultures. Vattimo sees us as oscillating between belonging and disorientation. He finds this a promising development, something potentially positive.

    R.B. Again I would want to challenge the either/or basis of this question. Although the nation state retains its importance, there is a simultaneous process of globalisation and localisation shaping people’s lives. These parallel processes have positive and negative features. For instance, ethnicity can be both a source of self-identity and of racism. The national movement in Slovenia was emancipatory while in Serbia it created a new form of fascism. I think that we need to use dialectical forms of analysis rather than one-sided approaches. By this I do not mean the left Hegelian dialectics which simply sees the Negative opposed to the Positive, i.e. the sort of approach pioneered by Bakunin in “The Reaction in Germany” which has been at the centre of most radical left thought ever since. Rather I would like to see an analysis of the fuzzy and contradictory nature of our advanced modern society. The Net itself is an interesting example of how the supposedly separate areas of state, private and community activities are both in competition with each other and dependent upon each other at the same time.

    E.H. And much of the new communication freedom seems to have unleashed an unseemly crowd of miseducated gossips. Guy Debord was rather pessimistic on this point, as opposed to McLuhan’s glad prophecies of a global village. Debord wrote that “The Sage of Toronto . . . spent several decades marveling at the numerous freedoms created by a “global village” instantly and effortlessly accessible to all. Villages, unlike towns, have always been ruled by conformism, isolation, petty surveillance, boredom and repetitive malicious gossip about the same families. Which is a precise enough description of the global spectacle’s present vulgarity.” One wonders what Debord would say about most newsgroups!

    R.B. McLuhan’s concept of the “global village” can seem very apt in the present stage of the Net because it still only has an elite group of users. The social controls of a village are possible because everyone knows everyone else. Ironically, the Canadian guru was reexporting the Jeffersonian dream of creating technological pastoralism in the USA! In contrast with this fantasy about farmers, Debord dreams instead of the digital city — workers united through horizontal communications within an electronic agora. The question therefore has to be posed about whether it is possible to have mass democracy without representation in both politics and the media?

    E.H. For me the dimly formulated paradox is that cyberspace is inherently global: it tends to ignore geopolitical boundaries and regulations and power hierarchies (aside from, as I noted before, the outright censorship that is already happening), and yet cyberspace depends upon a very traditional material base– everything from the silicon hardware to the electric energy to the programmed connections can only be maintained by the technically complex organization of labor, knowledge, and resources found in developed countries. For the moment, that material base is equivalent to technocracy, in as much as it cuts across diverse economies and state practices. Cyberspace implies both the new freedom of global communication and the maintenance of technocratic bureaucracies. Cyberspace is a kind of communicational anarchy which depends upon a socio-technical hierarchy of expertise and resource production. We are entering an era in which hierarchy has led to a new kind of freedom, but that freedom is virtual. It is a virtual freedom since it can never choose to dismantle the technocratic base upon which it depends, for that would necessarily lead to the collapse of cyberspace itself. Still it is fascinating to see where this paradox might lead us. But I think that right now one of the tensions created is the contradiction you have pointed out. Do you have an educated guess about what we’ll see in the near future here?

    R.B. The development of cyberspace is only the latest and most dramatic manifestation of the evolutionary pressures inherent within modernity. The precondition of capitalism is the relentless drive to surpass all existing preconditions. At the core of this process is the breaking up of traditional local communities by increasing the socialisation of human existence on a global scale. The transition from Fordism to the information society is simply the present stage in this process.

    Yet, despite all our technological and social advances, the majority of humanity have only just joined this modernisation process. As Chomsky likes to point out, most people have yet to make a telephone call let alone get wired to the Net. As Lula (leader of the Brazilian Workers’ Party) said, the poor in the Third World haven’t yet reached Fordism let alone anything more futurist. We’re therefore faced by the paradox of being able to realise and not realise the ‘end of history’ at the same time.

    If we follow this argument of Hegel and Kojeve, the 1789 revolution declared the formal democratic principles of universal rights for all (male) citizens, including the right of media freedom. Ever since, people have been trying to realise these principles in practice through a variety of means (and include women within them). For instance, it has been claimed that media freedom would be realised in practice through public service broadcasting, the ‘free market’ and community self-organisation. In practice, all these different forms of media freedom have been elitist rather than democratic. Now, with the emergence of the Net, it is possible to see how every citizen could be both a producer as well as a consumer of media. Brecht’s dream of making every receiver into a transmitter is now technically possible.

    However, contrary to the optimism of the technological determinists, the advance of science doesn’t automatically benefit everyone. The impact of mechanical spinning machines and the cotton gin was to reinforce slavery in the Old South not to free the slaves. There have to be social and political debates over how and in whose interests any new technologies are deployed within society. But, as I hope that I’ve shown in earlier answers, the arguments over the development of the Net are not necessarily clear-cut. For instance, both the neo-liberal and neo-Luddite positions are wrong because they try to over-simplify complex situations. On the one hand, the neo-liberal belief that cyberspace has to be organised as a free market doesn’t correspond to how really existing capitalism operates. On the other, neo-Luddite opposition to any involvement by private corporations in the building of cyberspace ignores the need for large organisations to coordinate social labour.

    The social democratic response to these failed strategies should be to advocate methods by which we can realise the rational within hypermedia. Above all, the key issue is extending access to the new information technologies beyond the confines of the virtual class (aka symbolic analysts, knowledge elite, etc.). This is the problem at the centre of your question. Especially in the USA, the most privileged sections of the workforce have been tempted to shirk their responsibilities to their fellow citizens and to withdraw into their gated suburbs, including those built in cyberspace. As shown by their uncritical admiration for the liberal slave-owners of 1776, the New Right are happy to celebrate the social autism of the virtual class as an expression of individual freedom. Yet, the Left critique often takes the form of a blind hostility towards the new information technologies as if they’re a cause rather than an expression of the apartheid between the information rich and poor.

    As social democrats, we need instead to encourage a creative miscegenation between the contradictory components of the mixed economy to accelerate the process of modernisation. For instance, the active involvement of government is necessary in the building of the infobahn, from imposing universal access requirements to subsidising cultural production. Similarly, the large corporations will play a key role in organising the mass production of digital technologies and information services. Above all, we should do everything to foster community and individual participation in producing and distributing information. If a self-reinforcing virtuous circle can be started, the development of cyberspace can become a process of inclusion rather than exclusion. In the long run, the democratic form of cyber-modernisation will even prove to be more efficient in the narrowest economic sense as well as providing wider social, political and cultural benefits. The philosophical ‘end of history’ for media freedom can be realised, but only by overcoming the practical and social difficulties encountered in constructing cyberspace within the contradictory processes of actual history. The electronic agora is yet to be built– and it can only be achieved as a practical task undertaken through collective labour.

    E.H. You are currently involved in another form of alternative media. What is your latest project and who is your audience?

    R.B. I’m planning to do another book. This will present the arguments in a less academic style, have more about hypermedia and be graphically rich. This is the pop single rather than the serious album!

  • OK COMPUTER by Simon Schaffer

    ‘Imagine that human beings were used as reading machines. Assume that in order to become reading machines they need a particular training’ (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1934).

    Machines are predictable and humans are not. In celebrated papers of the late 1940s the English mathematician Alan Turing questioned this notion. Having been a wartime cryptographer at Bletchley Park, then a computer theorist at the National Physical Laboratory and Manchester, Turing claimed he had indeed occasionally been surprised by the output of some discrete state machines. But this revealed nothing about the source of surprise, rather it reflected one’s own mentality. The view that machines could never truly surprise was but a version of brainy folks’ snootiness towards mere deduction or computation.[1] Turing gave this prejudice a ready social explanation. A big machine like the new Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) at the National Physical Laboratory would need servants (whom Turing presumed would be women) to run the hardware, but their tasks would soon be absorbed by the machine itself. When sufficiently routine, even its masters’ tasks could also be taken over by ACE. But ‘they would surround the whole of their work with mystery and make excuses couched in well chosen gibberish’. Intellectuals and bosses liked to think that higher functions could never be automated, because they were informal, discretionary, and startling.[2]

    To counter this mystification, Turing distinguished between rules of conduct governing every eventuality, which were not to be had, and laws of behaviour, which might well exist though currently be unknown. Like Ludwig Wittgenstein, with whom he had some unfortunate exchanges about mathematical conventionalism in Cambridge seminar rooms just before the War, Turing reflected on rules and games. Once upon a time, the outcome of horse races was determined by Jockey Club stewards. Now it was thoroughly mechanized by photography. But Turing had a print of a photo finish whose outcome depended on whether six inches of saliva sprayed across the finishing line counted as part of a horse’s head. The rules didn’t say – so the decision had to be referred back to the stewards’ discretion. Criteria for automated judgments could still be vague, even though all might acknowledge the lawlike character of the behaviour involved. He showed the picture to his Manchester colleague, the physical chemist turned social theorist and fierce anti-communist Michael Polanyi. Polanyi gladly used photos of equine spittle in his own 1951 lectures on tacit knowledge and unspecifiable procedures. The distinction between conduct and lawlike behaviour also helped Turing explain how machines could learn. Though the laws of behaviour of a discrete state machine could and would never vary, its conduct might indeed develop in surprising directions. Hence followed a version of the maker’s knowledge argument that one knew with certainty only what one built. The machine/human distinction was just a matter of whether such laws were exhaustively known, not whether one was afterwards surprised by their ways of execution.[3]

    The wealth of commentary on Turing’s proposals has attended mainly to the imitation game he then devised. An interrogator communicating solely by teletype with a woman and a discrete state machine is challenged to identify the former. It has now been claimed there are machines which can defeat the interrogator. An American manufacturer of disco dance floors, Hugh Loebner, offers an annual prize to programmers of such machines and to convincingly human humans too.[4] It has also been argued that the Turing Test proved a dead end, a distraction for devotees of artificial intelligence now to be consigned to history. It has been suggested that the imitation game is too easy for the machine, since it displaces someone pretending to be a woman and ignores the full social repertoire through which attributions of intelligence are commonly made. It has been suggested that the imitation game is too stiff, since it tests whether discrete state machines possess specifically human intelligence, not simply any kind of intelligence.[5] I do not propose a further contribution to this debate. I agree with Donald Michie, the Oxford classicist who worked with Turing at wartime Bletchley on cryptography, chess and machine intelligence. Michie has pointed out that there are certainly intelligent but inarticulable human activities which would make the test obselete. Michie thought it understandable but fatal that Turing had defined intelligence in terms of academic communication not craft skills. I also agree with Robin Gandy, another of Turing’s closest collaborators and subsequently distinguished mathematical logician, who advises that the celebrated 1950 paper be read not as philosophy but propaganda and that machine programs alone cannot provide the right way to discuss intelligence.[6]

    But of all Turing’s exegetes, I find the most congenial in Hugh Kenner, eminent literary critic of modernism. Kenner did not assume human action and capacity stable, then wonder whether machines might ever mimic them. Instead, he proposed the investigation of changing human capacity and action, then wondered whether such changes made them more machine-like. ‘Imagine that human beings were used as reading machines’, Wittgenstein had suggested. What kind of training would be needed to execute this task ? Kenner saw that the imitation game was but one of a long series of projects in technical fakery – Swift’s speculations on whether Gulliver was man, machine or horse; Vaucanson’s automata; Babbage’s analytical engines; Keaton’s acting; Warhol’s soup tins. The point of this list was to remind us that notions of authentic human capacity and specifically mechanical capability develop in tandem. Kenner remarked that in the prediction that by the century’s end discrete state machines would pass a five minute test about 3 times in ten, ‘Turing himself was not perhaps allowing for the possibility that people will grow more machine-like’.[7] In fact Turing also seems to have just such a millenial prospect in view: ‘the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted’. The imitation game is then less interesting as philosophical propaganda than as historical sociology.[8]

    This would be an historical sociology of technology. It has been rightly urged that a history of brain models is really a history of the literary and material technologies which are familiar to, and then used as metaphors by, brain scientists. Their metaphorical menagerie exhibits mental clocks, logical pianos, barrel organisms, neural telegraphs and cerebral computer nets.[9] How do specific technologies get into this zoo ? Claims that certain systems can mimic, or even exhibit, intelligence are sustained by social hierarchies of head and hand. Minds are known because these social conventions are known. Colin Blakemore, an eminent contemporary neuroscientist, describes the brain as ‘a biological instrument more complex, more compact, more sophisticated than any machine made by man’. It might therefore seem to escape metaphoric analysis. But no: ‘within this enigmatic kilogram-and-a-half of jelly resides a power of computation that embarrasses the weightiest computer_.A computer with so many components and connections could administer the world. Perhaps it is not surprising that a few famous and infamous brains in history have tried to do the same’.[10] Such conventions include those which maintain or question the privileges of discretionary behaviour. Intellectual labour’s apparently discretionary character may be subsumed within more determinist regimes if it can be subjected to precise estimation. Then the performance of such labour by machines seems more plausible. There are obvious philosophical counterparts of the components of this argument: materialism, reductionism and determinism are ranged against idealism, emergence and free will. But the story which follows attempts to give these rather olympian philosophical themes a local significance in scientists’ interests in taming and analysing underdetermined behaviour by the measurement of intellectual outputs. Since the Enlightenment, neurology, anthropology and physiology have often relied on such measures: oxygen flow, pulse rate, galvanic activity, phrenological charts, cerebral thermometry or – most pervasively – cranial capacity have all been used as markers of underlying brain activity and thus intellectual, social and moral rank. No doubt the instruments used to make such measures then become the source of neurological metaphor.[11] But this kind of cerebral metrology embraces a wider history than that which links craniometry with more recent strategies of intelligence testing and psychometrics. It includes commonplace enterprises which preserve a space for mental life, and define and measure quantitative tokens of that life, so as to show how intellectuals function in economy and society. Cerebral metrology may involve physico-chemical monitoring of brains and bodies and competitive examinations to test intellectual achievement; but it also includes assessments of risk which displace cautionary theodicy by social insurance; political economies which show how price formation depends on matters of psychological judgment; or forms of industrial organisation which expropriate embodied skill as allegedly visible productive performance.

    The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to suggest how judgements that machines are intelligent have involved techniques for measuring brains’ outputs. These techniques show how discretionary behaviour is connected with status of those who rely on intelligence for their social legitimacy. These connections seem rather evident in Turing’s own milieu. Protagonists of thinking machines and artificial minds then scarcely doubted the entanglement of brains and culture. In the 1940s, for example, collective organisation and military mobilisation of intellectual labour seemed to make feedback systems acutely plausible representations of human capacity. Cybernetics temporarily convinced those who had lived among (and occasionally as) homoeostatic devices. The political scientist Herbert Simon, future guru of AI, moved via management science and military planning into ‘artificial intelligence research into high-order intellectual processes’. Soon he was predicting that within a decade ‘most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs’.[12] In 1950 the English biologist John Zachary Young gave a major series of radio lectures on new models of the brain using the then fashionable language of cybernetics and feedback theory. He mixed the well-established neurological research of Sherrington and Adrian with the up-to-date information theories of Lashley and Wiener. In quick succession he compared the brain with a guided missile system and with a mechanical computer based on networked valves. ‘In order to have some picture of how the brain works it is useful to think of it as an enormous ministry whose one aim and object is to preserve intact the country for which it is responsible’ – an image utterly familiar to a British audience accustomed to world war and welfare state. Young’s version of brain science closely tracked changes in communications technology. He recalled how Cartesian clockwork gave way to Victorian engineering. Had not Thomas Huxley claimed that mind is to brain as whistle is to steam engine ? The brain was obviously the machine which itself generated science; science was just the way good brains worked. Managerialism was the right way to run society and model the brain. ‘We do not know much yet about what goes on in our brains and therefore cannot expect educators to educate them properly, psychologists to help us correct their workings, or surgeons to know whether it is wise to cut pieces out of them’. [13]

    As he prepared to write up his broadcasts for publication at the end of 1950, Young needed advice on estimating the storage capacity of a brain-like machine. He recalled a meeting at Manchester a year before on ‘the mind and the computing machine’. There he debated the computer analogy with Polanyi and Turing. Young, Turing and their contemporaries such as the cyberneticist Ross Ashby (whose homeostatic ‘Design for a Brain’ first appeared in 1948) were much impressed by state-determined systems completely described by prior position and given imput. Ashby reckoned that such systems were exactly what experimenters achieved in ideal laboratory trials. Young urged that such systems were the best possible models of how neurological systems worked.[14] Polanyi, by contrast, worked hard to show how eliminativist neurology, cybernetics and the vices of Soviet Communism fitted together. He argued that contemporary neurologists reduced their subject matter to measurable variables and so got rid of discretion and will. Cybernetics turned humans into robots. Soviet ideology did the same — and had seduced fellow-travelling intellectuals such as Desmond Bernal because ‘rational action becomes a lifeless banality’. Polanyi found his allies among neurologists such as John Eccles and eminent opponents in Turing and Young.[15] Though very sceptical of its metaphysics, Turing knew all about cybernetics. From summer 1949 he joined a London discussion group on the topic with such enthusiasts as Ashby and Warren McCulloch. Soon Turing broadcast for the BBC on whether digital computers could think. Meanwhile, in October 1950 his Manchester paper appeared in the nation’s pre-eminent philosophy journal, Mind, under the title ‘Computing machinery and intelligence’.[16]

    The closing section of Turing’s paper was devoted to the problem of building a brain. Anything that could be turned into a routine could be aped by a computer and so plausibly performed by the kind of brain which Young set forth. Young deprecated intellectuals’ talk of ‘pseudo-things’ and ‘semi-things’ such as consciousness or mind. He claimed that cerebral evolution explained why humans might resist the possibility of treating brains as machines and so replacing one by the other. In February 1947, in a talk to the London Mathematical Society on the operation of ACE, Turing spent some time detailing the social organisation required to tend it and the gibberish with which bosses would try to resist their own automation. ‘This topic leads to the question as to how far it is in principle possible for a computing machine to simulate human activities’.[17] Turing insisted that learning machines, the basis of building brains, must possess operating rules which could ‘describe completely how the machine will react whatever its history might be, whatever changes it might undergo. The rules are thus quite time-invariant’. For the admirers of state-determined machines the principal puzzle would be the appearance of innovation: ‘intelligent behaviour presumably consists in a departure from the completely disciplined behaviour involved in computation, but a rather slight one, which does not give rise to random behaviour, or to pointless repetitive loops’. Now Turing turned back to the history of his own discipline, citing an 1843 account of Charles Babbage’s project to build a digital computer. In planning his Analytical Engine, Babbage had early developed the notion of conditional branching. As Turing’s biographer sagely remarks, mechanising conditionality ‘would be analogous to specifying not only the routine tasks of the workers but the testing, deciding, and controlling operations of the management‘. Bosses make choices, and intellectuals make reasoned but discretionary ones. The history of such choices might tell us something about the cultural history of thinking machines.[18]

    It has been convincingly suggested that the early nineteenth century separation of calculation from intelligence depended on the low status of the mechanics who performed computation and thus made its mechanization then seem viable.[19] Enlightenment ergonomics provided metrologies of work which were then applied to brains and helped make intelligent machines plausible. In the rapid industrialisation of the first decades of the 19th century, theorists of the factory system such as Charles Babbage represented the workforce as a collective machine under intelligent management. To extend their cultural legitimacy, Babbage and his allies showed that capricious or miraculous change could be the programmed outcome of intelligent mechanism. But when challenged by cultural conservatives, more friendly to priestcraft and the academy, they made sure to preserve a realm of intellect and will. This could help their own command over economic and social resources. By the end of the 19th century, scientific professionals such as Thomas Huxley and his colleagues among the scientific naturalists rapidly gained this command, imposed tests of intelligence and aptitude on the brainpower of the nation, and accounted for the brain as a complex mechanism. They also conceded that the mind might escape such mechanisation – using techniques of precision quantification, they were able to point to those tokens of mental activity which could indeed be subjected to measurement and thus mechanism. The balance of this admittedly Anglocentric paper, therefore, is devoted to the intellectual and social crises of industrialisation in the 1830s and of professionalisation in the 1870s, the cerebral metrologies developed at those moments, and the issues of prediction and underdetermination raised by the evaluation of brain power.

    ‘The engine knows’

    Â Â ‘The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Its province is to assist us in making available what we are already acquainted with. This it is calculated to effect primarily and chiefly, of course, through its executive faculties’ (Ada Lovelace: Sketch of the Analytical Engine, 1843).

    This cautionary text about the unoriginality of digital machines, which Turing cited in 1950, had originally been generated during Babbage’s dramatic publicity campaign for his troubled Analytical Engine. Babbage used contacts such as the Piedmontese military engineer and future premier Luigi Menabrea and then the aristocratic philomath Ada Lovelace. The ‘Sketch of the Analytical Engine’ appeared in journals in Geneva and then London in the winter of 1842-43.[20] It showed the new machine was an unprecedented technical system designed to carry in its memory one thousand numbers each of fifty digits. The store consisted of sets of parallel figure wheels, structured like those in the store of Babbage’s earlier Difference Engine, launched in the early 1820s and still incomplete despite massive government and private investment. Sequences of operation cards carried instructions to the engine, which were decoded in the store using the machine’s library of logarithmic and other functions, and then distributed to the operating sections of the mill. Such distribution could itself be modified by variables set by the existing state of operations in the machine. These crucial aspects of the Engine, its capacity for memory and for anticipation, were to be profound resources for Babbage’s metaphysics and his political economy. ‘Nothing but teaching the Engine to foresee and then to act upon that foresight could ever lead me to the object I desired’.[21] Discussions with his colleagues such as Menabrea questioned Babbage’s account of the knowledge which such complex processes of training and judgement might involve. When Menabrea completed his essay on the machine, he remarked that ‘the machine is not a thinking being, but simply an automaton which acts according to the laws imposed upon it’.[22]

    Enlightened savants such as Babbage and his allies well understood the figure of the automaton as a resource for estimating labour power and defining their own managerial role. They were enthusiasts for techniques first developed by the French engineer and academician Charles Coulomb, who after managing colonial military works had tried to evaluate the maximum effect extractible from labour, and the chemist and economist Antoine Lavoisier, who worked out laboratory methods treating all humans as so many machines absorbing vital air and nutriment. They could determine ‘how many pounds weight correspond to the efforts of a man who recites a speech, a musician who plays an instrument. Whatever is mechanical can similarly be evaluated in the work of the philosopher who reflects, the man of letters who writes, the musician who composes. These effects, considered as purely moral, have something physical and material which allows them, through this relationship, to be compared with those which a labourer performs’. Lavoisier’s chemical technology of self-experiment allowed him to evaluate ‘the efforts of the mind as well as those of the body’, because all humans were understood as automata labouring in closed exchange systems. By constructing, displaying and imagining such self-governing machine systems, the enlightened supposed they could make their own social order and a powerful place within it. So automata had a salient political function in ‘the technologies of rationalism'[23]. Menabrea and his allies worked hard to link this kind of algebraic analysis of human capacities with the urgent practical demands of military and civil engineering and thus to reform the labour force of new states. Babbage’s own use of such rationalist resources marked him out as an unusually sympathetic apostle of Enlightenment techniques in early Victorian Britain. In this context, the Analytical Engine was a neat way of accounting for labour discipline alongside intellectual control.

    Babbage and Lovelace, who translated and annotated Menabrea’s memoir in 1843, used highly anthropomorphic language to describe the faculty of anticipation, feeling and choice which they reckoned the engine would display. Lovelace had her own self-destructive interests in the bodily experiences of doing analysis. Alan Turing strangely echoed some of her own worries when, in a testy passage of his 1950 paper directed against theologians, he pointed out that ‘in attempting to construct such [intelligent] machines we should not be irreverently usurping [God’s] power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children’. Lovelace explicitly saw her own frail body as a ‘laboratory’ for testing currently fashionable materialist theories of mind, especially those of her ambitious young physiological mentor, William Carpenter. Carpenter, Babbage and Lovelace all discussed the effects of mathematical analysis on bodily constitution and of bodily condition on mathematical capacity. Then they applied these lessons to the calculating machines.[24] Babbage conceded that ‘in substituting mechanism for the performance of operations hitherto executed by intellectual labour…the analogy between these acts and the operations of mind almost forced upon me the figurative employment of the same terms. They were found at once convenient and expressive, and I prefer to continue their use’. Hence he was committed to phrases such as ‘the engine knows‘, to describe its predetermined move from one calculation to the next. Lovelace put the issue like this: ‘although it is not itself the being that reflects, it may yet be considered as the being which executes the conceptions of intelligence. The cards receive the impress of these conceptions, and transmit to the various trains of mechanism composing the engine the orders necessary for their action’. This execution of intelligence was directly linked to the capacities of reliable subordinate workmen: ‘it will by means of some simple notations be easy to consign the execution of them to a workman. Thus the whole intellectual labour will be limited to the preparation of the formulae, which must be adapted for calculation by the engine’. The subordination of machinofacture to intelligence was crucial. The Analytical Engine, like Turing’s ACE a century later, raised the issue of the class division of intelligence. Menabrea ended his memoir with a reflection on the ‘economy of intelligence’. ‘The engine may be considered as a real manufactory of numbers’. In her remarkable annotations to this text, Lovelace extended and qualified these remarks about the manufacture process. She urged that the issue of whether the ‘executive faculties of this engine…are really even able to follow analysis in its whole extent’ could only be answered by watching the engine work. She explicitly analogized between the working of the machine and the mind, notably in respect of the separation between operation cards, variable cards and number cards. ‘It were much to be desired’, she noted, ‘that when mathematical processes pass through the human brain instead of through the medium of inanimate mechanisms, it were equally a necessity of things that the reasonings connected with operations should hold the same just place as a clear and well-defined branch of the subject of analysis…which they must do in studying the engine’. The science of operations was proposed as a new discipline of utter generality both within the surveillance of cerebral labour and in the manufacture of exact values.[25]

    Management of labour’s caprices held the key to these connexions. In the decade of political reform and the factory system, Babbage tried to make industry uniquely visible to managers so as to guarantee the reliability of output. One could survey ‘not only the mechanical connection of the solid members of the bodies of men’ but also, ‘in the form of a connected map or plan, the organization of an extensive factory, or any great public institution, in which a vast number of individuals are employed, and their duties regulated (as they generally are or ought to be) by a consistent and well-digested system’. Under this gaze factories looked like perfect engines and calculating machines looked like perfect computers.[26] These engines for manufacturing numbers were developed alongside the discourse of political economy. The ‘philosophy of manufactures’ provided Babbage with an account of what he called the ‘domestic economy of the factory’. His publications on the economy of the factory and the automatism of labour power culminated in his great survey of 1828-32, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, a work based on intelligence gathered throughout the factories of Britain, soon translated into every major European language. As the calculating engine was a ‘manufactory of figures’, so Babbage sketched his definition of a ‘manufactory’, especially its disaggregation of production processes into their simplest components to allow economy and surveillance in terms of consumed power, wages, or time.[27]

    Babbage’s specifications placed unprecedented demands on the skills of the machine tool workshops. A report drafted in 1829 for the gentlemen of the Royal Society by Babbage’s closest allies conceded that ‘in all those parts of the machine where the nicest precision is required the wheelwork only brings them by a first approximation (though a very nice one) to their destined places, and they are then settled into accurate adjustment by peculiar contrivances which admit of no shake or latitude of any kind’.[28] The troublesome terms in these bland remarks by the gentlemen of science were the references to nice precision, accurate adjustment and shake or latitude. What might seem to a savant to be matters of irrational judgement were key aspects of the customary culture of the industrialising workshop. The rights of the workers to the whole value of their labour informed much of the radical protest of these key years. The Chartist workforce protested against the campaigns ‘to make us tools’. Proletarian visitors to the machine shows equally frequently complained that their own role in manufacture was invisible there. In contrast, Babbage’s colleague ‘the Pindar of Manufacture’ Andrew Ure characteristically lapsed into the imagery of Olympus and of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to describe the new automatic machinery as ‘the Iron Man sprung out of the hands of our modern Prometheus at the bidding of Minerva – a creation destined to restore order among the industrious classes’.[29]

    These issues made urgent the problem of the source and ownership of the intelligence and skills embodied in machines confessedly designed to perform mental work. In his Economy of Machinery Babbage made much of the means through which the automatic lathe and its product, the calculating engine, would guarantee ‘identity’ and ‘accuracy’.[30] Proponents of machinofacture reckoned that the factory system was evidently a consequence of intelligent reason and situated this intelligence in the complex relation between the fixed capital of the steam-driven engines and the mental capital of the millowners. The workforce itself was only judged a producer of value to the extent that it matched precisely the capacities of the machines. The qualities attributed to this intelligence were just those required from this form of superintendence, anticipation and meticulous scrutiny. This was the definition of intelligence which Babbage embodied in his machines and the sense of intelligence which he reckoned those machines displayed. He even claimed that these were the virtues of divinity. Natural theology was the indispensable medium through which early Victorian savants broadcast their messages. The dominant texts of this genre were the Bridgewater Treatises composed in the early 1830s by eminent divines and natural philosophers under the management of the Royal Society’s presidency.[31] The treatise produced by William Whewell, then mathematics tutor at Trinity College Cambridge, was among the most successful of these. Babbage’s machine philosophy was here assailed from a perspective in complete contrast to those of the radical artisans. Whewell rejected continuities at every level. He invented the word ‘palaetiology’ to describe the rational search for causes of current systems, just so as to point out that this search must always terminate with the inexplicable and spiritual. He denied any material origin for thought or language. He reckoned that discoveries were not made by the patient accumulation of facts but rather by the sudden dramatic superinduction of a fundamental idea which then governed the phenomena. He thought that his students could be drilled to formalise mathematical truths but not taught how to discover them. ‘We cannot unfold the mind of a spider or bee into the mind of a geometer’. The historical emergence of intelligence from mere matter was itself, for Whewell, not a lawlike surprise but rather a divine and thus miraculous act. Whewell maintained a consistent hostility to the implications of mechanised analysis: ‘we may thus deny to the mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times any authority with regard to their views of the administration of the Universe’. Worse was to follow. Whewell brutally denied that mechanised analytical calculation was proper to the formation of the clerisy. In classical geometry ‘we tread the ground ourselves at every step feeling ourselves firm’ but in machine analysis ‘we are carried along as in a railroad carriage, entering it at one station and coming out of it at another…..it is plain that the latter is not a mode of exercising our own locomotive powers…It may be the best way for men of business to travel but it cannot fitly be made a part of the gymnastics of education’.[32]

    These remarks were direct blows to Babbage’s programme. He called the reply to Whewell he produced in 1837 the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise and labelled it ‘a fragment’. It contained a series of sketches of his religious faith, his cosmology and his ambitions for the calculating engines. It amounted to a confession of his faith that the established clerisy was incompetent, dangerous and innumerate. Babbage had shown that memory and foresight were the two features of intelligence represented in his machines. He now showed, using resources from his calculating engines and from David Hume’s notorious critique of miracles and revelation, that these features of machine intelligence were all that was needed to understand and model the rule of God, whether based on the miraculous work of the Supreme Intelligence or on His promise of an afterlife. Foresight could be shown to be responsible for all apparently miaculous and specially providential events in nature. Throughout the 1830s Babbage regaled his guests with a portentous party trick. He could set the machine to print a series of integers from unity to one million. Any observer of the machine’s output would assume that this series would continue indefinitely. But the initial setting of the machine could be adjusted so that at a certain point the machine would then advance in steps of ten thousand. An indefinite number of different rules might be set this way. To the observer, each discontinuity would seem to be a surprise, if not a ‘miracle’, an event unpredictable from the apparent law-like course of the machine. Yet in fact the manager of the system would have given it foresight. Whewell’s Bridgewater Treatise appeared at the start of March 1833. Less than two months later Babbage had already worked out a salon experiment using the Difference Engine to print the series of even integers up to ten thousand and then increase each term in steps of three. The sudden discontinuity was predictable to the analyst and yet surprising to the audience. Babbage drew the analogy with divine foresight, whether in the production of new species or in miraculous intervention. In May 1833, therefore, Babbage was ready to show a mechanical miracle.[33]

    His onlookers were almost always impressed. As early as June 1833 Lady Byron and her daughter Ada Lovelace ‘both went to see the thinking machine (for such it seems)’ and were treated to Babbage’s miraculous show of apparently sudden breaks in its output. ‘There was a sublimity in the views thus opened of the ultimate results of intellectual power’, she reported. The dour Thomas Carlyle was predictably sceptical, and thundered his complaint about Babbage’s analogy between thought and steam power. ‘Innumerable are the illusions of Custom, but of all these, perhaps the cleverest is her knack of persuading us that the Miraculous, by simple repetition, ceases to be Miraculous….Am I to view the Stupendous with stupid indifference, because I have seen it twice, or two hundred, or two million times ? There is no reason in Nature or in Art why I should: unless, indeed, I am a mere Work-Machine, for whom the divine gift of Thought were no other than the terrestrial gift of Steam is to the Steam-Engine, a power whereby Cotton might be spun, and money and money’s worth realised’.[34] Two years later a curious visitor was treated to a lecture of three hours on the topic of programmed discontinuities: ‘the whole, of course, seems incomprehensible, without the exercise of volition and thought’. Here, then, was the spiritual equivalent of the systematic gaze. In answer to Whewell’s boast that only induction might reveal the divine plan of the world, and that machine analysis could never do so, Babbage countered that the world could be represented as an automatic array only visible as a system from the point of view of its manager. The world-system was a macroscopic version of a factory, the philosophy of machinery the true path to faith, and the calculating engines’ power of ‘volition and thought’ demonstrated to all.[35]

    Babbage’s house-party miracles were not the only way in which London reformers like Charles Darwin learnt about the capacity of machines to mimic sudden and unexpected actions. In the metropolitan anatomy schools where Marshall Hall taught and Thomas Huxley studied in the 1840s, the new doctrine of the reflex arc indicated that the central nervous system functioned like an automatic machine. Hall notoriously sought to distinguish the realm of the cerebrum, the proper governor of the sensory and voluntary nerves, from the more automatic, less capricious, excito-motory nerves. Some went further: the York medical teacher Thomas Laycock argued that since the cranial ganglia were continuous with the spinal cord, they must be regulated ‘by laws identical’. Compare this map of structural continuities of law-like determinism with that Babbage drew of the division between the automatism of mechanical labour and the unique privileges of the philosopher and manager. The language and technique of comparative anatomists and neurologists in the mid-century repeatedly questioned, though they tried to preserve, the proper sphere of mind and soul over and above an ever-expanding automatic system.[36] Thus the unitarian medic Carpenter, Lovelace’s erstwhile moral confidant and soon the capital’s premier physiology professor, wondered whether the cerebrum displayed the reflex functions common elsewhere in the body’s system of nerves and ganglia which he so patiently mapped. Somehow there had been an apparently discontinuous ‘increase of intelligence’ and ‘predominance of will over the involuntary impulses’. Eventually Carpenter wrote of cerebral reflexes no less automatic than those of the lower nervous system. Consciousness and will were then strictly limited, and the rule of the neurological machine extended to zones previously the prerogative of mind alone. Thus was forged the careful boundary around what later Victorian philosophers and intellectuals would call ‘the mysterious citadel of the will’.[37]

    Carpenter and Babbage argued that a single law could govern the universe’s unfolding, whether in cosmology or physiology. Both attacked Whewell’s donnish claim that divinity, spirit and mind supervened on, and dramatically disrupted, the law-like progression. And both understood the division of labour as apt evidence for the way in which machine-like automatism could generate apparent, but by no means miraculous or inexplicable, innovation.[38] In the 1870s, when the new professionals of the physiological and physical sciences set out to capture the commanding heights of government expertise, industrial science and college jobs, they carried with them this interest in the emergence of novelty from mechanically governed systematic order. Some psychologists and physiologists also reckoned that the security of intellectuals’ new status was dependent on preserving a realm of voluntary action and discretion resistant to reduction. The new tool in their hands was the capacity which men like Babbage had forged – the science of measurement. It had become plausible that natural objects like brains really behaved the way that geared engines did. At the end of his Economy of Machinery Babbage had described ‘a higher science’ which ‘is now preparing its fetters for the minutest atoms that nature has created: it is the science of calculation which becomes continually more necessary at each step of our progress’.[39] It is significant for this story of the cultural meaning of thinking machines that a prophecy of the universal role of tabulated calculation appears at the end of a text on social organisation of the factory system.

    A mechanical equivalent of consciousness

    ‘I believe that we shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat. If a pound weight falling through a distance of a foot gives rise to a definite amount of heat, which may properly be said to be its equivalent, the same pound weight falling through a foot on a man’s hand gives rise to a definite amount of feeling, which might with equal propriety be said to be its equivalent in consciousness’ (Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘On Descartes’ Discourse’, 1870)

    In any recognizable or recognized form, intellectuals first appeared in England around 1870. Gentlemen of letters and of science had not until then been members of a well-defined social class. Their standing had relied on the model of the learned professions – law, medicine and the church. Babbage complained in 1851 that ‘science in England is not a profession: its cultivators are scarcely even recognized as a class’.[40] It has been said that Victorian intellectuals ‘thought of themselves as exchanging specialized products in a market which was tolerably free, and the sum of whose intellectual commodities made up the sum of knowledge’.[41] But neither in political economy nor in materialist metaphysics was it easy to see exactly how to measure the productivity, and thus estimate the value, of this special class. Negative implications quickly clustered in English around the term ‘intellectual’. The airy realm of pure theory, brain rather than brawn, seemed too easily to distance this social formation from the common-sense world of market and home. Aesthetes were satirised as otherworldly; philosophers were viewed as useless on the exchange; experimenters were damned as inhuman vivisectors or as cloistered myopes. So when in the 1830s Whewell’s allies tried to defend their university against the tide of utilitarianism, the philosophic radical John Stuart Mill influentially answered by noting that ‘in intellect’ England was ‘distinguished only for…doing all those things which are best done where man most resembles a machine, with the precision of a machine’. The portentous Catholic theologian Cardinal Wiseman feared that ‘the next generation’ might be ‘brought up in the ideas of many of the present, that man is a machine, the soul is electricity, the affections magnetism, that life is a rail road, the world a share market, and death a terminus’.[42] Either brain power could be precisely estimated, thus bringing brains to market, or else it could be claimed that such valuation was really denigration, so keeping brains sacred.

    By the 1870s aggressive positivists and scientific naturalists, cultural critics and ambitious lay experts, all sought recognition as a distinct order. By analogy with the ‘labour aristocracy’ of highly skilled technicians and artisans, there was now an ‘intellectual aristocracy’ which had in the 1850s turned secretive discretionary government into well-oiled administrative machinery and by 1870 had imposed competitive public examinations on the military, the civil service and most cognate institutions.[43] The polite language of intellectual labour changed too. The Oxford English Dictionary (1888), compiled by James Murray and other intellectual aristocrats, carefully recorded the introduction of new terms for cerebral labour and its effects. In 1864 the Poet Laureate, Alfred Tennyson, started using the term ‘brain-labour’. In 1871 novelists invented ‘brainwork’ and psychical researchers started investigating ‘brain-waves’. In 1878 Huxley’s closest friend Joseph Hooker coined the term ‘brain-power’, and the author of a work on The Hygiene of Brain and Nerves began referring to ‘brain-workers’. In the United States, it was reported, one could now be ‘brainy’ (1874) and even suffer from ‘brain-fag’, a term soon picked up by William James. And from 1877 the Brain even had an eponymous learned journal all its own. The physiological psychology of Hall and Carpenter was now an entire professional world. It is thus tempting to link these lexicographic innovations with the ‘new phrenology’ which Brain‘s founders, the metropolitan hospital physicians John Hughlings Jackson and David Ferrier, then developed. These new phrenologists displaced the mapping of mental faculties by the exact energetics of sensory-motor phenomena. There could be no physiology of mind as such: ideas, memories, delirium, verbal slips, were markers for the expanding realm of sensory-motor phenomena. This was when Jackson, for example, introduced the punning term ‘barrel organism’ for the mechanisms of aphasia. ‘Neural physiology is concerned only…with the physics of the nervous system’. This version of cerebral metrology, with its naturalistic and evolutionist implications for the social order and careful explication of its apparent inequalities, provided what has acutely been called ‘a cosmic genealogy for middle-class civilisation’.[44]

    So in March 1870 Thomas Huxley came up to Cambridge to tell an audience of young Christians that the true path from Cartesian dualism led to ‘legitimate materialism’ – ‘man is nothing but a machine…capable of adjusting itself within certain limits’. Huxley called this ‘the introduction of Calvinism [understand: predestination] into science’. Exactly three years later Huxley again lectured on animals (and humans) as automata; so the university’s newly hired professor of experimental physics James Clerk Maxwell told a more senior Cambridge audience that such Cartesian metaphysics was just bad physics. Huxley’s fatal mix of Cartesianism and Calvinism was an error based on overconfidence in ‘absolutely perfect data and the omniscience of contingency’. Maxwell explained the cerebral metrology of bad metaphysics: ‘What is the occupation of a metaphysician ? He is nothing but a physicist disarmed of all his weapons – a disembodied spirit trying to measure distances in terms of his own cubit, to form a chronology in which intervals of time are measured by the number of thoughts which they include, and to evolve a standard pound out of his own self-consciousness’. The telling point in this intriguing contrast between the naturalist’s materialism and the physicist’s indeterminism is that both discussed how brain work could be turned into measurement. Huxley judged that a materialist science of consciousness was in prospect because he held that a mechanical equivalent of consciousness could be established. ‘It is because the body is a machine that education is possible’. Maxwell reckoned that no such science was to be had because there was no plausible physical measure of changes in consciousness, whether it be ‘the little word which sets the world a fighting, the little scruple which prevents a man from doing his will, the little gemmule which makes us philosophers or idiots’.[45]

    To deny the possibility of a ‘cerebral metrology’ was just to deny the submission of intellectuals to the mundane economy. As Otto Sibum reminds us, the enormous significance of James Joule’s construction of a ‘mechanical equivalent of heat’ for Victorian technical culture and economic life offered the notion of ‘mechanical equivalence’ as an apt way of measuring value[46]. Brain work could be made part of this economy if some token could be found allowing that work to be measured. Huxley, who thought of himself as ‘something of a mechanical engineer in partibus infidelium’, reckoned there was such a token – hence his appeal to the ‘mechanical equivalent of consciousness’. The pious and scholarly Maxwell held otherwise – hence his argument that the brain was an example of an underdetermined, arbitrary system. In February 1879 Maxwell discussed these matters with Francis Galton, genealogist of the new intellectual aristocracy, author of Hereditary genius, a self-confessedly ‘conscious machine’ then ‘busy with experiments on the workings of my own mind’. Maxwell had already attacked Galton’s hereditarian determinism in his 1873 Cambridge lecture and again in an article on atoms for the Encyclopedia Britannica a couple of years later. Now Maxwell wanted him to consider moments when the course taken by a material system ‘is not determined by the forces of the system’. Such a system ‘invokes some determining principle which is extra physical (but not extra natural) to determine which of the two paths it is to follow…it may at any instant at its own sweet will, without exerting any force or spending any energy, go off along that one of the particular paths which happens to coincide with the actual condition of the system at that instant’. For Maxwell, there were indeed natural systems of such complexity that they lay beyond the grip of the metrology derived from the conservation of energy. In such systems ‘expenditure’ could not be used as a token of real transformation. Cerebration was exactly such a system. The Maxwellian position reserved a certainly natural realm for brain-work outwith the control of the physical economy.[47]

    Institutionalisation of the experimental natural sciences within the universities, and the role of scientific experts in the state, were influentially urged by Huxley and his powerful allies. Political interest focussed on the expansion in public education and mass journalism, on German models of industrial expertise and military might, debates about church authority, about evolution and vivisection. All these themes of the early 1870s helped summon into existence a publicly recognizable intellectual profession.[48] It was just such a group of intellectuals whom Huxley entertained at the Metaphysical Society in London only a few months after his Cambridge lecture with the painstaking and imaginative anatomy of a frog in the deliberately futile search for the amphibian’s soul. It was at such an audience of commercially-minded intellectuals, too, that the ‘worldly philosopher’ and Manchester professor William Stanley Jevons aimed his remarkable manifesto, The Principles of Science (1874). Jevons urged that brute economic facts were mere reflections of mental phenomena. This was exactly why post-Smithian economics could become an exact science and why physical measurement could be applied to the brain’s output: ‘The time may come when the tender mechanism of the brain will be traced out, and every thought reduced to the expenditure of a determinate weight of nitrogen and phosphorus. No apparent limit exists to the success of the scientific method in weighing and measuring, and reducing beneath the sway of law, the phenomena both of matter and mind’.[49]

    Jevons and his allies among the new marginalist economists showed how the economy could be understood as a mental machine; and they also made sure to reserve an impenetrable zone of pure intellect. So in 1869 Jevons automated logic by turning Boolean algebra and Babbage’s calculating engine into a ‘logical piano’, a device built for him by a local clockmaker designed to automate reasoning.[50] What he judged Babbage’s ‘exquisite book’ on machinery and manufacture also gave Jevons the resources to replace the labour theory of value by a more thoroughly psychophysical account. Consumption would take place if calculations of increases in pleasure overbalanced those of further painful exertion. In 1870 Jevons published in the house journal of the new scientific professionals, Nature, on a series of experiments on muscular exertion which helped convinced him that labour became more painful the longer it was performed. Jevons learnt his experimental techniques directly from Babbage’s protocols and indirectly from the ergonomic models of Coulomb and Lavoisier.[51] From Carpenter’s physiological psychology Jevons then deduced two universal laws of the economy which tied economic activity firmly to psychological and measurable principles. Consumption relied on the marginal effect of external impressions on the neurospinal system; production on the differential action of muscles guided by the sensorimotor system towards external objects. The link between automatism and physiological psychology showed how the social order could be incorporated directly into the human frame. Like Carpenter and other admirers of the social cosmology of physiological psychology, Jevons made sure to reserve the realm of mind apart. ‘Every mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feeling seems possible’; but ‘we may estimate the equality or inequality of feelings by decisions of the human mind’. What could be estimated with great precision were the public tokens of these feelings in mechanical exertion, price formation and consumption decisions. These in turn depended on the mechanical behaviour of the reflex system. Marginalist economics treated homo economicus as a thinking machine. As a machine, its economic activity was individualised, quantified and then referred to physiological mechanics. In 1872 the economic journalist Walter Bagehot composed Physics and Politics, a history of economic organisation based entirely on the development of the reflex system as set out by Huxley himself. Huxley then issued Bagehot’s text in his influential series of works propagandising for scientific naturalism. Babbage’s productive machines here became human machines driven by neurological forces. But because these were machines which could think, a sequestered realm could be left for the exercise of mind, and especially for those of the intellectual analysts who alone could set out the laws which governed all of social and economic life[52].

    Competitive public examination of brainpower and expert value, newly introduced in the 1870s, was a triumph for the scientific professionals. Some worried that such quantitative estimates would miss the true qualities of intellect and spirit; others nicely compared examinations with ‘engines’ to drive social progress.[53] Their introduction might seem subversive of morally strenuous instruction among intellectual elites. Maxwell understood the resistance to testing the tyro intellectuals of a newfangled experimental physics laboratory. ‘In the present day’, he conceded in October 1871, ‘men of science are supposed to be in league with the material spirit of the age, and to form a kind of advanced Radical party among men of learning’. Would lab work for brainy students end up ‘tainting their mathematical conceptions with material imagery…Will they not break down altogether ?’ The mechanisms of breakdown and and brain work were the obsession of Victorian Cambridge’s intellectual elite. In his study of their manufacture, Andrew Warwick tellingly cites such commentators as Ralph Waldo Emerson on these remarkable ‘cast-iron men’ and recalls the catastrophic breakdowns during mathematics training of both Maxwell and Galton, the latter of whom had felt as if he had ‘tried to make a steam-engine perform more work than it was constructed for’.[54] Cerebral metrology was highly controversial. The head of the new Edinburgh University physics laboratory, Peter Guthrie Tait, judged examination of students’ ability in measurement experiments as a good way of testing their intellect. The Cambridge mathematician Isaac Todhunter, Whewell’s executor, countered that experimenters should be “born and not manufactured”. Both sides charged the other with levelling standards and breeding uniformity. Tait wanted “social entropy” in the laboratory, not the “eternal, hideous, intolerable sameness” of mathematical life. Energetics evidently provided the right language for cerebral metrology.[55]

    Maxwell’s energetics studied mechanical systems which behaved erratically or capriciously. His first triumph had been an essay on the stability of Saturn’s rings. In his campaigns to establish properly exact standards for electrical resistance during the 1860s, he’d had his attention drawn to the puzzles of making mechanical governors which could control the rate of spin of a current-carrying coil. The equations of motion of such homeostatic systems showed surprising irregularities and often escaped complete analysis. In early 1873, a few weeks before his paper attacking Descartes, Huxley and determinism, Maxwell introduced problems about apparently continuous, orderly, mathematical systems which nevertheless displayed sudden discontinuities as questions for Cambridge students.[56] In the 1870s he decided to use this expertise to teach his public the right lessons about the cognitive capacities of machines and the properly secure realm of mind. In dialogue with his Scottish colleagues such as Tait, Maxwell began satirising the capacities of any Laplacean intelligence which claimed complete knowledge of the entire future of a mechanical system. Maxwell reduced this intelligence to ‘a finite being’, a ‘pointsman on a railway line’, or, in William Thomson’s felicitous phrase, ‘a demon’.[57] There was a resonance with the physiological agencies of Jevons’ economics, which, unknown to the wilful economic agent, guided decisions about labour and consumption in the busy marketplace of clashing values. The link between indeterminacy, measurement and intellectual life was set forth in 1868 by Norman Lockyer, Nature‘s founder, and Balfour Stewart, Jevons’ opposite number as Manchester physics professor. They wrote of ‘a machine of infinite delicacy of construction’ such as an electric mine exploded by a long-range telegraphic signal. This was a singular point in the smooth physics of mechanical energy. Then the scientists invited their readers to compare this intriguingly mechanical yet startling system with a living body, and, in particular, with the ‘obscure transmutations of energy’ in ‘the mysterious brain chamber’ of a human being acquiring a new truth. In 1871 William Carpenter picked up the theme in a widely read article on ‘the physiology of will’: he acknowledged the existence of a mechanism of thought, then insisted that ‘there is a power beyond and above all such mechanisms — a will which_can utilize the automatic agencies to work out its own purpose’. Here was a a rude mechanical (rather than a deity) incapable of performing work but able to shift valves without friction or inertia, whose actions surpassed those of contemporary mechanical philosophy and defined a boundary which that science could not transcend.[58] Maxwell and his allies agreed to limit their science’s scope in order to scotch the dominion of blind fate and articulate the constitution, and social role of, scientific intellectuals. ‘Every existence above a certain rank has its singular points: the higher the rank, the more of them. At these points, influences whose physical magnitude is too small to be taken into account of by a finite being, may produce results of the greatest importance. All great results produced by human endeavour depend on these singular states when they occur’, and it was the solemn duty of public scientists to disseminate wider understanding of ‘singularities and instabilities’ so that the ill effects of materialism and the reduction of humans to mere machines could be corrected and quashed. At the end of his life Maxwell wondered whether the soul was ‘like the engine driver, who does not draw the train himself, but, by means of certain valves, directs the course of the steam so as to drive the engine forward or backward or to stop it .'[59]

    The demonic implications of Maxwell’s account of instability and discontinuity had a long and complex aftermath – in psychical research and theosophy, cybernetics and information science. Michael Polanyi made full use of the demon in his lectures on tacit knowledge in the 1950s. The ’emergence of man and the thoughts of man’ must not be understood as passive motions of matter and mind, but rather ‘the gradual rise of autonomous centres of decision’. The Maxwellian demon was Polanyi’s perfect example of such a centre free from the tyranny of material mechanism. This helped Polanyi contest Turing’s apparent attribution of intelligence to digital machines. Autonomous centres, such as human minds, themselves determined what might count as a machine. ‘Since the control exercised over the machine by the user’s mind is – like all interpretations of a system of strict rules – necessarily unspecifiable, the machine can be said to function intelligently only by aid of unspecifiable personal coefficients supplied by the user’s mind’. But in his 1948 talk on intelligent machinery, Turing also emphasised the social basis of this kind of technology. He suggested that ‘intellectual activity consists mainly of various kinds of search’, among which he singled out ‘what I should like to call the ‘cultural search’. The isolated man does not develop any intellectual power. It is necessary for him to be immersed in an environment of other men. From this point of view the search for new techniques must be regarded as carried out by the human community as a whole, rather than individuals’.[60]

    This paper has offered some historical remarks about the new techniques of mechanical intelligence and the communal cultures sustaining them. Babbage’s automated conditionality was a decisive moment in the history of these techniques, because he used startling outputs to show how even the most dramatically surprising events in his culture could be quantified and programmed. When intellectuals appeared in England as a specific class formation, debates about the scope of cerebral metrology, automation and determinism became correspondingly intense. In such images as Huxley’s mechanical equivalent of consciousness, and Maxwell’s cunning proletarian pointsman, Victorians worked out ways of redefining the role of the intellectual in the social economy. By finding proxies for mental life in variables which could be measured the system of thinking machines gained plausibility within a carefully defined but nevertheless rather extensive realm. Processes which are deemed machine-like can therefore be mechanised. It is true that ‘the cliché example’ of such a process has been the Taylorist ideal of production-line work. Resistance to thinking machines is sometimes bound up with resistance to (or satires of) Taylorisation. It is for this reason that Kenner neatly connects the imitation game with the on-screen antics of Keaton and Chaplin. One correspondingly cliché example of unmechanisable work is the artisan ideal of craft workshop culture. In cultures where administrative discretion and capricious coteries are seen as the principal threat to social virtue, mechanisation and predictability seem like ideals. In those where automation and expropriation of skill are seen as insidious, the tacit and irremediably embodied will be praised.[61] This is why judgments that some machines can think or that brains are well represented by such machines are of necessity implicated in rival accounts of the socioeconomic order. The hardware of cerebral metrology does more than provide the material for the neurological imagination. It also helps provide the brain with its cultural and economic place.

    ‘OK Computer’ is published in Michael Hagner (ed.), Ecce Cortex: Beitraege zur Geschichte des modernen Gehirns, Wallstein Verlag, 1999, pp. 254-85.


    Footnotes

    I thank Robin Boast, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Hagner, Emily James, Anna-Katherina Mayer, Andrew Mendelsohn, Helmut Mueller-Sievers and Alison Winter for help with the themes of this paper.

    [1] Alan Turing: Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind 59, 1950, S.433-60, S. 450-1.

    [2] Andrew Hodges: Alan Turing: the Enigma. London. 1992, S. 357.

    [3] Turing 1950, S. 452, 458; Michael Polanyi: Personal Knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy. London. 1958, S. 20.

    [4] Charles Platt: What’s it mean to be human anyway ?. Wired 1, April 1995, S. 80-85.

    [5] Blay Whitby: The Turing test: AI’s biggest blind alley ?. In P.J.R.Millican and A.Clark (Hg.), Machines and Thought: the Legacy of Alan Turing. Oxford. 1996, S. 53-62; Hubert Dreyfus: What Computers Still Can’t Do Cambridge, MA. 1992, S. 78; Robert French: Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test. Mind 99, 1990, S. 53-65; H.M.Collins, Artificial Experts. Cambridge, MA. 1990, S. 186-97.

    [6] Donald Michie: Turing’s Test and Conscious Thought. Artificial Intelligence 60, 1993, S. 1-22; Robin Gandy: Human versus Mechanical Intelligence. in Millican and Clark 1996, S. 125-36.

    [7] Ludwig Wittgenstein: Blue and Brown Books. Oxford 1975, S. 120; Hugh Kenner: The Counterfeiters. Bloomington. 1968, S. 123. Siehe Dreyfus 1992, S. 280.

    [8] Collins 1990, S. 222-24.

    [9] Jamie Kassler: Man a musical instrument: models of the brain and mental functioning before the computer. History of science 22, 1984, S.59-92; Gerd Gigerenzer: Discovery in cognitive psychology; new tools inspire new theories. Science in context 5, 1992, S. 329-50; and especially Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel Goldstein: Mind as computer: the birth of a metaphor, 1994.

    [10]Â Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin: Head and hand: rhetorical resources in British pedagogical writing 1770-1850. Oxford Review of Education 2, 1976, S. 231-54; Colin Blakemore: The baffled brain. In: Richard Gregory and Ernst Gombrich (Hg.): Illusion in nature and art. London 1973, S. 9-48, S.9-11.

    [11] Steven Shapin: The politics of observation. Cereberal anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh phrenology disputes. Sociological Review Monographs 27, 1979, S. 139-78; Stephen Jay Gould: The Mismeasure of Man. New York 1981; Anson Rabinbach: The Human Motor. Berkeley 1990; Anne Harrington: Medicine, mind and the double brain. Princeton 1989, S.113.

    [12] Hugh Kenner: The Mechanic Muse. New York 1987, S. 109; Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Ludwig Pfeiffer, (Hg.), Materialities of Communication. Stanford 1994, S. 292, 329-32; Peter Galison: The ontology of the enemy: Norbert Wiener and the cybernetic vision. Critical Inquiry 21, 1994, S. 228-66; Vernon Pratt: Thinking Machines: the evolution of artificial intelligence. Oxford 1987, S. 212-14; Dreyfus 1992, S. 82.

    [13] J.Z.Young: Doubt and certainty in science: a biologist’s reflections on the brain. New York. 1960, S. 49, 55.

    [14] W.Ross Ashby: Design for a Brain: the origin of adaptive behaviour. London. 1960, S. 25-6, 270.

    [15]Â Polanyi 1958, S.158-9, 237, 262-3.

    [16] Hodges 1992, S. 415, 436; Young 1960, S. 137; Turing 1950.

    [17] Young 1960, S. 50-1, 156; Hodges 1992, S. 357.

    [18]Turing 1950, 459, 451; Hodges 1992, S. 298; Bernard Dotzler u. Friedrich Kittler (Hg.): Alan Turing: Intelligence Service. Berlin. 1987, S.227. Siehe Harry Braverman: Labour and Monopoly Capital. New York. 1974, S. 213-33; Alfred Sohn-Rethel: Intellectual and Manual labour. London. 1978, S. 170-4.

    [19] Lorraine Daston: Enlightenment calculations. Critical Inquiry 21, 1994, S.182-202, S.186.

    [20] Ada Lovelace: Sketch of the Analytical Engine by L.F.Menabrea. Taylor’s Scientific Memoirs 3, 1843, S. 666-731, S.722. Siehe Charles Babbage: Passages from the Life of a Philosopher. London. 1864, S. 112-41; Anthony Hyman: Charles Babbage: Pioneer of the Computer. Oxford. 1982, S. 164-73; for Ada Lovelace’s role see Dorothy Stein: Ada: a Life and a Legacy. Cambridge, MA. 1985, S. 108-20 (who plays down her originality) and Betty Alexandra Toole: Ada, the Enchantress of Numbers. Mill Valley, CA. 1992, S. 194-260 (who emphasises it).

    [21] Babbage 1864, S.114.

    [22] Babbage 1864, S. 129-35; Lovelace 1843, S. 675.

    [23] Charles Coulomb: Théorie des machines simples. Paris. 1821, S. 260. Siehe C. Stewart Gillmor: Coulomb and the Evolution of Physics and Engineering in Eighteenth-century France. Princeton. 1971, S. 23-4 u. François Vatin: Le Travail: Economie et Physique 1780-1830. Paris. 1993, S. 42-3. Antoine Lavoisier and Armand Seguin: Première mémoire sur la respiration des animaux. 1790. In Oeuvres. 6 Bdd. J.B.Dumas and E. Grimaux (Hg.). Paris. 1864-96. Bd. 2, S. 688-703, S.697. Siehe Bernadette Bensaude Vincent: Lavoisier: Mémoires d’une Révolution. Paris. 1993, S. 220; M. Norton Wise: Mediations: Enlightenment Balancing Acts or the Technologies of Rationalism. In Paul Horwich (Hg.), World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science. Cambridge, MA. 1993, S. 207-56, S. 220.

    [24] Turing 1950, S. 443; Alison Winter: A calculus of suffering: Ada Lovelace and the bodily constraints on women’s knowledge in early Victorian England. In Steven Shapin and Christopher Lawrence (Hg.), Science incarnate. Chicago. 1998, S. 202-39.

    [25] H.W.Buxton: Memoir of the Life and Labours of the late Charles Babbage. R.A.Hyman (Hg.) Cambridge, MA.. 1988, S. 216 Anm.8; Lovelace/Menabrea 1843, S. 675, 689, 692, 723. For the ambitions for a new science see Toole 1992, S. 209-16.

    [26] Babbage: On a Method of Expressing by Signs the Action of Machinery. Philosophical Transactions 116, 1826, S. 250-65 and draft in Cambridge University Library MSS ADD 8705.21 ; Dionysius Lardner: Babbage’s Calculating Engines. Edinburgh Review 59, 1834, S. 263-327, S. 318-319. Iwan Morus: Manufacturing Nature: Science, Technology and Victorian Consumer Culture. British Journal for the History of Science 29, 1996, S. 403-34 discusses the relation between commodification and the show of machines in the early Victorian period.

    [27] Maxine Berg: The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815-1848. Cambridge 1980, S. 182-89; Babbage: On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures. London 1835, S. 120, 175. Siehe Richard M. Romano: The Economic Ideas of Charles Babbage. History of Political Economy 14, 1982, S. 385-405, p. 391.

    [28] Buxton 1988, S. 86.

    [29] E.P.Thompson: The Making of the English Working Class. Harmondsworth 1968, S. 889, 915; John Rule: The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England. London 1986, S. 357-63; Andrew Ure: The Philosophy of Manufactures. London 1835, S. 367.

    [30] Babbage 1835, S. 67.

    [31] W.F.Cannon: The problem of miracles in the 1830s. Victorian studies 4, 1960, S. 5-32.

    [32] William Whewell: Astronomy and General Physics Considered with reference to Natural Theology. London 1834, S. 334; Ders.: Indications of the Creator. London 1846, S. 44; Ders.: Of a Liberal Education in General. London 1845, S. 40-41. Siehe Richard Yeo: William Whewell, Natural Theology and the Philosophy of Science in mid-nineteenth-century Britain. Annals of Science 36, 1979, S. 493-516, u. George Stocking: Victorian anthropology. New York 1987, S. 69-70.

    [33] Babbage: Ninth Bridgewater Treatise. London 1838, S. 32-43; Babbage’s first experiment with the Difference Engine, 18 May 1833, Cambridge University Library MSS ADD 8705.38 p.38. Siehe William J. Ashworth: Memory, efficiency and symbolic analysis: Charles Babbage, John Herschel and the industrial mind. Isis 87, 1996, S. 629-653.

    [34]Lady Byron an King, 21.6. 1833. In Doris Langley Moore: Ada Countess of Lovelace. London 1977, S.44; S.E. de Morgan: Memoir of Augustus de Morgan. London 1882, S. 89; Thomas Carlyle: Sartor Resartus. London 1931, S. 232.

    [35] George Ticknor: Life, Letters and Journals. London 1876.

    [36] Brian Dolan: Representing novelty: Babbage, Lyell and experiments in early Victorian geology. History of Science 36, 1998, S. 299-327; Stephen Jacyna: Scientific Naturalism in Victorian Britain. PhD thesis. University of Edinburgh 1980, S. 161-73; Harrington 1987, S. 32-33; Adrian Desmond: Huxley. Harmondsworth 1998, S. 15-1

  • CULTURAL BABBAGE BOOK REVIEW by Richard Barbrook

    Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention edited by Francis Spufford and Jenny Uglow, Faber and Faber, London, pp 290.

    This book is a collection of essays inspired by Charles Babbage’s Difference Engine – a never-completed Victorian mechanical calculator which is often claimed as the ancestor of the modern PC. In London’s Science Museum, a working version of this machine has pride of place in its computer exhibition. A few years ago, William Gibson and Bruce Sterling used Babbage’s prototype computer as the theme of their sci-fi novel about an alternative Victorian England. Fascinated by this resurrected icon, the essays in Cultural Babbage use the Difference Engine as the starting-point for a discussion of the relationship between arts and science, especially in Britain. Its essays range from the intrguing, such as Alex Pang’s examination of the Cold War origins of the geodesic dome, to the eccentric, such as Lavinia Greenlaw’s musings on being the poet daughter of a doctor. The most interesting contributions to the book deal with the wonderful conceit at the centre of Gibson and Sterling’s novel: the Difference Engine could have only been successfully built in Victorian England as an integral part of a social revolution.

    In their essays, Tom Paulin and Neil Belton demonstrate how political conservatism has encouraged a deep-rooted hostility to science in this country. Despite being the first industrial nation, science in England has always been regarded with suspicion by those in power. Whether in Edmund Burke’s rantings against the French Revolution, Aldous Huxley’s literary snobbery or the present government’s neo-liberal dogmas, the Promethean powers of invention are feared as levelling and democratic forces which could sweep away inherited privileges and traditional deference. Scientific procedures are far too rational and, worst of all, continental in their precision.

    Echoing the analysis of Will Hutton and other ‘New Labour’ gurus, Paulin and Belton believe that the relative and absolute decline of British manufacturing industry has been caused by the semi- feudal political system defended by English conservatism. As a consequence, the key essays in this book champion a ‘republican science’ which combines technical innovation with political change. For instance, Jon Katz demonstrates the continued relevance of Tom Paine’s republican politics in the age of the Net. Now the Difference Engine has evolved into the PC with a modem, we can finally realise Paine’s vision of media freedom where everyone can publish their opinions and participate in politics without the interference of government or monopolists. As in Gibson and Sterling’s novel, science and democracy can advance together.

    However, this use of Babbage’s Difference Engine as the symbol of ‘republican science’ is not without its difficulties. In his essay, Simon Schaffer shows how Babbage promoted the idea that the Difference Engine possessed some form of ‘artifical intelligence’. Babbage was attracted to this deception because it concealed the human labour involved in the machine’s construction. He could never bring himself to acknowledge his dependence on the skills of the trained engineers who built the intricate parts needed for the Difference Engine. Yet, the main reason why Babbage failed to build his famous calculator was his inability to collaborate with Joseph Clement, the master machinist. Far from being a model for ‘republican science’, the story of the Difference Engine could instead be seen as a prime example of how archaic class prejudices have accelerated the industrial decline of England. Whether real or imagined, we need to free ourselves from all varieties of ‘Victorian values’ if we are to realise the democratic potential of scientific modernism.

    An edited version of this article appeared in New Scientist, 16th March 1996.

  • BABBAGE’S INTELLIGENCE by Simon Schaffer

    “Mr Babbage’s invention puts an engine in place of the computer”

    In summer 1823 the new and controversial Astronomical Society of London decided to award its gold medal to one of its own founder members, the equally controversial Cambridge-trained mathematician Charles Babbage. The award formed part of an energetic campaign to launch the construction of a Difference Engine to calculate navigational and astronomical tables. In his address to the Society in early 1824, the Society’s president, the financier, mathematician and orientalist Henry Colebrooke, summed up the significance of Babbage’s planned device. He referred to contemporary developments of industrial machinery only to contrast them with the Difference Engine. “In other cases, mechanical devices have substituted machines for simpler tools or for bodily labour….But the invention to which I am adverting comes in place of mental exertion: it substitutes mechanical performance for an intellectual process”. In other words, “Mr Babbage’s invention puts an engine in place of the computer”. [1] This may seem a paradoxical comment on the man who is now lauded as the computer’s inventor. But as with terms such as “typewriter”, the word “computer” referred here to a human being, in this case the hireling employed to perform the exhausting reckoning which every astronomical operation required. Babbage himself applied for the post of computer at the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, in summer 1814, until Herschel dissuaded him from the thankless task. The labour of verifying “the calculations of the computers” required in compiling astronomical tables for the new Society soon prompted a characteristic expostulation: “I wish to God these calculations had been executed by steam !” Hence developed the plans for the Difference Engine. [2]

    Through his gesture at the urgent issues of technological redundancy and the subordination of the labour process, Colebrooke’s remark provides the theme of this story of the apt connection which Babbage helped forge between the development of machinofacture and the design of intelligent machines. A key to this link is the term “intelligence”. The word refers both to signals received from without and to the capacity to register and interpret these signals. In early nineteenth century Britain, the site for Michel Foucault’s explorations of the origins of the human sciences, Ian Hacking’s account of the emergence of statistics, and Adrian Desmond’s stories of the origins of materialist evolutionism, the word “intelligence” simultaneously embodied the growing system of social surveillance and the emerging mechanisation of natural philosophies of mind. [3] In what follows, I explore the co-production of ideologically freighted accounts of intelligence and of politically charged systems of machinery.

    The politics of intelligence has been signally absent from much recent analysis of computation. Discussions of the limits of expert systems and the delimitation of the scope of artificial intelligence have too often hinged on a deracinated account of the very term “intelligence” and on an abstracted exposition of the capacity of machines to display this virtue. However, two salient themes of this contemporary literature will help my analysis of the constitution of Babbage’s intelligence:

    First, consider a notorious paper (1980) by the philosopher John Searle directed against the strong claim that appropriately programmed computers may have cognitive states. [4] Searle proposed a simulacrum of such a computer, a “Chinese room” occupied by a human being completely devoid of intelligence about Chinese but supplied with a set of symbols and rules which would allow her to respond to inquiries from outside the room. Searle envisages that such a system might pass the Turing test, that is, become indistinguishable from native Chinese speakers. But neither necessary nor sufficient conditions could be given for attributing intelligence to such a system. In response to the suggestion that while the human being might not possess intelligence, yet the entire system might be said to do so, Searle counters that the enterprise of artificial intelligence “must be able to distinguish the principles on which the mind works from those on which non-mental systems work”, and to judge that a system is intelligent just because of its inputs and outputs would compel us to attribute intelligence to a wide range of non-mental systems. I am not concerned with the force of this response. I am concerned with one implication of the story of the Chinese room. It dramatises the spatial mode of such debates. The site of intelligence, whether within the human, within the machine, or within the human-machine system, is an intrinsic puzzle for debates about the mechanics of intelligence. In this paper, I seek to show that the spatial distribution of intelligence in the early nineteenth century factory system was a vital political problem.

    Second, consider a recent book (1990) by the sociologist Harry Collins, Artificial Experts: social knowledge and intelligent machines. In the model of knowledge and skill transfer upon which much recent sociology of scientific knowledge depends, skills are principally acquired through enculturation, the acquisition of tacit capacities whose transmission is invisible and capricious and cannot, therefore, fully be spelt out in formal algorithms. This model tells against a classical account of experimentation in which trials may be replicated through the public and formal understanding of a set of demonstrative rules. So the model supports studies of laboratory life in which experimenters need to share a culture in order to go on in similar ways. Collins explores the implications for this model of attempts to build expert systems. Were it possible to design expert systems, in which programs could be developed exactly to simulate skilful human performances, the enculturational model might seem threatened. In Collins’ analysis, much is made of the collaborative work required from human beings to make their machines look expert and intelligent. “One of the reasons we tend to think a calculator can do arithmetic is the natural way we help it out and rectify its deficiencies without noticing. All the abilities we bring to the calculation – everything that surrounds what the calculator does itself are so widespread and familiar that they have disappeared for us”. [5] This is the other theme which my story highlights. The intelligence attributed to machines hinges on the cultural invisibility of the human skills which surround them. Collins’ argument sits very well with comparable sociological and historical studies on the invisibility of laboratory technicians or on the invisibility of support staff in art worlds. [6] In Babbage’s world, the artisanal skills which surrounded machinery were systematically rendered invisible. Then and only then might the machine seem intelligent. The attribution of automatism to the factory system accompanied the judgment that its mechanical components possessed intelligence.

    In a desperate attempt to be unsystematic, the paper that follows is divided into five sections. The first summarises the career of the calculating engines between the 1820s and the 1840s. Babbage worked hard to make these machines intelligent. His definition of intelligence, the combination of memory and foresight, was explicitly applied both to the engines and to his exactly contemporary work in political economy. The engines were therefore small-scale manufactories. In the second section, it is shown that these accounts of intelligent machines were developed polemically in debates about the character of workers’ skill. Babbage had immediate experience of these conflicts in his own relationship with the engineers and support staff who built the calculating engines. By the 1840s, Babbage’s machine philosophy was a resource for, and derived its intelligence from, the new automatic system which emerged in the machine-tool industry and the factory system. In the third and fourth sections, the factory system is described through the experiences of the factory tourists of the 1830s and 1840s, of whom Babbage was one. These tourists were the first to represent the factory system and helped make it. The account of the factory as a transparent and rational system was designed to demolish traditional and customary networks of skill and artisan culture. Finally, Babbage’s attribution of machine intelligence to his God shows how skills were disembodied in the philosophy of machines. The characteristic Victorian obsessions of natural theology and of waste disposal were important sites for the development of this philosophy and where it did its political work.

    Systems are socially constructed and so, as we are increasingly reminded, are the productive and unproductive bodies which inhabit them. This is why Babbage’s most penetrating contemporary reader, Karl Marx, famously reckoned that it would be easier to write “a critical history of technology,….a history of the productive organs of man in society” than Darwin’s “history of natural technology”. Babbage’s moment was decisive for the construction of sociotechnical systems, for the productive bodies of the workforce, and for the perception that their world was ordered systematically. These processes of construction and perception should not be separated. There is a whole history to be written of the counter-claim that they can be teased apart, that the point of view from which the systematic character of the social world can be detected is independent of that world. Early Victorian society provided major resources for this claim and it must be studied in detail to show how this position was developed. The philosophers of manufacture, like Babbage, carefully constructed a place from which they could make out the lineaments of the factory system. Critics of this philosophy, like Marx, pointed out the political implications of this construction. The issue of the science embodied in the machinery of the automatic system and the fate of the worker’s body was debated in speeches to London Chartists in 1856, where Marx announced that “all our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force”, and in his notebooks of 1857-8, where he observed that “it is the machine which possess skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it”. Under the “system of machinery”, as he defined it in early 1858, “the automatic one is merely its most complete, most adequate form, and alone transforms machinery into a system”. What follows is not a “critical history of technology” but it is an attempt to show where the systematic vision came from and some of the effects it had. [7]

    Calculating Engines and Intelligence

    “The engine, from its capability of performing by itself all those purely material operations, spares intellectual labour, which may be more profitably employed. Thus the engine may be considered as a real manufactory of figures”

    L.F.Menabrea, 1842, translated by Ada Lovelace, 1843. [8]

    Babbage’s designs for intelligent machines dominated his career from the moment he reached Regency London as an independently wealthy and ambitious analyst. His Difference Engine was based on the principle that the nth differences of successive values of n-power polynomials were constants and thus tables of these values could be computed by the addition and subtraction of a set of predetermined constants. The device was launched in London in summer 1822, received the promise of Treasury backing in spring 1823, and Babbage began active collaboration on the project with the master engineer Joseph Clement the following summer. To pursue the enterprise Clement’s workshop at Newington Butts took on as many as eight men, including one specialist draughtsman. Furious fights between Clement and Babbage on the ownership of tools, designs and hardware began in spring 1829. Despite interventions by the Prime Minister Wellington, the mediation of other engineers such as Henry Maudslay, and the nationalisation of the engine in early 1830, the project collapsed forever amidst recriminations in summer 1834. [9] But in the mid-1830s Babbage began negotiating a new contract with Clement’s former draughtsman, C.G.Jarvis, with whom he developed plans for what they baptised the Analytical Engine. “The railroad mania withdrew from other pursuits the most intellectual and skilful draftsmen”, Babbage recalled. In 1842-3 he arranged for a major publicity campaign, initially through Italian contacts such as the Piedmontese military engineer and future premier L.F.Menabrea and then through his close ally the aristocratic philomath Ada Lovelace. [10] This new machine was an unprecedented technical system. It was designed to carry in its memory one thousand numbers each of fifty digits. The store consisted of sets of parallel figure wheels, structured like those in the store of the Difference Engine; the input-output device was based on sets of number cards and variable cards, the latter of which would control which gear-axis would be used; and the control was transmitted though what Babbage baptized operation cards. Sequences of cards carried instructions to the engine, which were decoded in the store using the machine’s library of logarithmic and other functions, and then distributed to the operating sections of the mill. Such distribution could itself be modified by variables set by the existing state of operations in the machine. These crucial aspects of the Engine, its capacity for memory and for anticipation, were to be profound resources for Babbage’s metaphysics and his political economy. “Nothing but teaching the Engine to foresee and then to act upon that foresight could ever lead me to the object I desired”. [11]

    These resources were publicised throughout the 1840s, notably during Babbage’s important visit to the meeting of Italian scienzati at Turin in 1840, where he gave a public address on the new engine in the milieu of civil reform and nationalist sentiment. Babbage was invited to the meeting by Giovanni Plana, a Laplacian graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and Piedmontese government astronomer. Plana evoked the Engine with a brilliant political analogy: “hitherto the legislative department of our analysis has been all powerful – the executive all feeble. Your engine seems to give us the same control over the executive which we have hitherto only possessed over the legislative department”. The debates at Turin with Plana and the leading physicist Mossotti centred on the “intelligence” of this machine. They agreed that such intelligence would be measured by the capacity for anticipation. When Mossotti said he could not imagine how the engine could “perform the act of judgment”, Babbage described his recursion method for extracting roots from an equation of any degree: “his real difficulty consisted in teaching the engine to know when to change from one set of cards to another…..at intervals not known to the person who gave the orders”. The discussions with the Italian rationalists questioned the account of knowledge which such complex processes of training and judgement might involve. When Menabrea completed his essay on the machine, he remarked that “the machine is not a thinking being, but simply an automaton which acts according to the laws imposed upon it”. [12]

    In the context of British and Piedmontese debates about industrialisation and social change, this was a powerful if questionable image. Menabrea and Plana worked hard to link their algebraic analyses of moving forces with urgent practical demands of military and civil engineering and thus to reform the labour force of the new state. Babbage and Lovelace, who translated and annotated Menabrea’s memoir in 1843, used highly anthropomorphic language to describe the faculty of anticipation, feeling and choice which they reckoned the engine would display. In 1838 Babbage conceded that “in substituting mechanism for the performance of operations hitherto executed by intellectual labour….the analogy between these acts and the operations of mind almost forced upon me the figurative employment of the same terms. They were found at once convenient and expressive, and I prefer to continue their use”. Hence he was committed to phrases such as “the engine knows”, to describe its predetermined move from one calculation to the next. The machine might be an automaton, but it carried intelligence. Lovelace put the issue like this: “although it is not itself the being that reflects, it may yet be considered as the being which executes the conceptions of intelligence. The cards receive the impress of these conceptions, and transmit to the various trains of mechanism composing the engine the orders necessary for their action”. This execution of intelligence was directly linked to the capacities of reliable, subordinate, workmen: “it will by means of some simple notations be easy to consign the execution of them to a workman. Thus the whole intellectual labour will be limited to the preparation of the formulae, which must be adapted for calculation by the engine”. The subordination of machinofacture to intelligence was crucial. The Analytical Engine raised the issue of the class division of intelligence. Menabrea ended his memoir with a reflection on the “economy of intelligence”. “The engine may be considered as a real manufactory of numbers”. In her remarkable annotations to this text, Lovelace extended and qualified these remarks about the manufacture process. She urged that the issue of whether the “executive faculties of this engine…are really even able to follow analysis in its whole extent” could only be answered by watching the engine work. She explicitly analogized between the working of the machine and the mind, notably in respect of the separation between operation cards, variable cards and number cards. “It were much to be desired”, she noted, “that when mathematical processes pass through the human brain instead of through the medium of inanimate mechanisms, it were equally a necessity of things that the reasonings connected with operations should hold the same just place as a clear and well-defined branch of the subject of analysis…which they must do in studying the engine”. The science of operations was proposed as a new discipline of utter generality both within the surveillance of mental labour and in the manufacture of exact values. The Analytical Engine was simply the “material and mechanical representative of analysis”, and through its working “not only the mental and material but the theoretical and the practical in the mathematical world are brought into more intimate and effective connexion with each other”. [13]

    Mental labour became a measurable form of work and embodied in machine intelligence. The exactly contemporary discourse of political economy, especially the philosophy of manufactures, provided Babbage both with an account of what he called the “domestic economy of the factory”, as he baptized it, and also with an analysis of the skilled mental labour embodied in machinery. Since the analytical engines were always compared with the Jacquard card looms of the weaving trade, this analogy was close and just. “The Analytical Engine weaves algebraical patterns just as the Jacquard loom weaves flowers and leaves”, wrote Lovelace. Readers were instructed to visit the popular London shows of practical science at the Adelaide Gallery and the Polytechnic Institution to learn about this loom for themselves, while Babbage presented the Piedmontese court with a woven silk portrait of Jacquard purchased in the Lyons silk factories – it formed part of his evangelical promotion of machinofacture in Victor Emmanuel’s capital. [14] Furthermore, since Babbage’s collaborators on the calculating engines were themselves veterans of the machine tool industry inaugurated by Maudslay and Clement, this experience was of direct relevance to the construction of the engines. The precision, discipline and domestic order of the factory was this an intimate concern of Babbage’s project.

    Babbage’s publications on the political and domestic economy of the factory were exactly contemporary with the project to build the calculating engines. In the late 1820s Babbage took the Lucasian chair of mathematics in Cambridge and, in a series of lectures he planned to deliver in the university, he composed a thorough survey of British manufactures, first released as a contribution on the mechanical arts in the popular Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (1829), then published in 1832 as On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures. This remarkable exercise in the political economy of machinery reached a fourth edition by 1835 and was, by then, already in print in German, French, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and Russian. In Britain it was published by the agent of the reformist Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, Charles Knight. When the leading Ricardian economist John McCulloch, a principal advocate of the benevolent effects of mechanization, complained about the absence of political economic data from the first edition, Babbage added new sections against the abstractions of the Ricardians and made more use of the numbers available to him through his allies in the statistical movement. Babbage put the third edition in the library of the London Mechanics’ Institution, a forum for the educational improvement of metropolitan artisans, and he used the text during his unsuccessful election campaign on a radical platform in the London constituency of Finsbury in late 1832: “if you are a manufacturer…and would see industry as free as the air you breathe – Go and vote for Mr Babbage. If you are a mechanic, depending on your daily bread on a constant and steady demand for the products of your skill…. – Go and vote for Mr Babbage”, thundered the Mechanics’ Magazine. [15]

    Babbage himself made no attempt to deny the link between the engine project and the engine survey. The book’s very first sentence reads: “the present volume may be considered as one of the consequences that have resulted from the calculating engine, the construction of which I have been so long superintending. Having been induced, during the last ten years, to visit a considerable number of workshops and factories….I was insensibly led to apply to them those principles of generalization to which my other pursuits had naturally given rise”. [16] In his chapter on “the division of mental labour” Babbage cashed out this promissory note with a discussion of French schemes for the application of labour management to mathematical tabulation. The principles of hierarchy and the minimization of mental skill which Babbage found in G.F.Prony’s celebrated programme for the computation of new decimal tables in the 1790s were there made explicit as foundations of a general science of machine intelligence. This programme had been Babbage’s inspiration from his first pamphlets of 1822. Despite the fact that these tables were never published, they remained emblematic for British proponents of mechanized calculation. When Babbage visited Paris in 1819 he met the tables’ printer Didot and was given a copy of the section of the sine tables which had been set. Babbage left this invaluable compilation to his son in his will. One lesson he drew from the work of Prony and Legendre was that the subordinate computers “had no knowledge of arithmetic beyond the two first rules which they were thus called upon to exercise, and that these persons were usually found more correct in their calculations than those who possessed a more extensive knowledge”. [17]

    This intriguing relation between subordination and accuracy was immediately applied to the calculating engines. Babbage always contrasted mechanisms which “perform the whole operation without any mental attention” and those which “require a moderate portion of mental attention”. His popular expositions of this distinction invoked the analogue with human intelligence revealed in the French project to dramatise the equivalence with machine intelligence and then to point out a contrast. Thus the fundamental operation of addition might be mechanized by “following exactly the usual process of the human mind”. But since “the calculations made by machinery should be done in a much shorter time than those performed by the human mind, Babbage argued that it was necessary to mechanize the “faculty of memory” rather than that of addition. “Memory” in the carriage of digits was, for example, represented as the addition of an extra projecting tooth to each number wheel in the difference engine, a tooth which could in its turn by engaged after the first stage of summation was completed. Finally, memory was to be replaced by anticipation. This was the key change between the Difference and the Analytical Engine. “It occurred to me that it might be possible to teach mechanism to accomplish another mental process – namely, foresight”. [18]

    The transition from the Difference to the Analytical during the later 1830s raised three salient problems in the mechanization of memory and foresight. First, an issue discussed with the great science writer Mary Somerville and the Irish mathematician James McCullagh, the capacity of the engines to carry unlimited numbers of functions and variables and to represent unlimited series of digits, briefly, “an unlimited number of laws”. Babbage’s solution to this hard task was to draw on the Jacquard principle and to translate the “infinity of space, which was required by the conditions of the problem, into the infinity of time”. This “infinity of time” would be occupied by printing cards for the mill and in the printer itself, however long it be used, “the force to be exerted always remains the same”. The resources Babbage drew from political economy were directly deployed in the planning of the Analytical Engine through the application of time economy and supervision of work rate. [19] The second issue which Babbage raised was discussed with McCullagh and the German scientists Friedrich Bessel and Karl Jacobi, Prussian delegates to the 1842 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at Manchester. This involved the engine’s “knowledge” of tabular numbers used during calculations. Babbage designed his engines to recognize correct values of logarithms and other variables and to ring a bell and stop when needed. The mechanism for the machine to check tabular inputs meant that “the Engine will always reject a wrong card by continually ringing a loud bell and stopping itself until supplied with the precise intellectual food it demands”. Once again, this anthropomorphic language exemplified Babbage’s move to make specialised mental labour redundant. Ultimately, he claimed, such tabular inputs would be made unnecessary. [20] Finally, Babbage even playfully contemplated means by which the Analytical Engine could be stopped during operation and its figure wheels disturbed; the Engine would then automatically restore the wheels to their proper values. “The property itself is useless”, he wrote, but it dramatised the self-regulation he sought to embody in his Engines. This self-regulatory automatism was a key aspect of the general division of labour which he sought to design into these analytical mechanisms, and thus the systematic character he wished to grant them. [21]

    In each division of the Analytical project, the interaction between engine design and the principles of machinofacture was understood through Babbage’s model of intelligence, a term designed to capture both “information” and “skill”. Machine intelligence was therefore at once managerial skill, the skill embodied in machines and the data amassed by the analyst of machinofacture. At the same time, machine intelligence was mapped by the progressive redundancy of operatives’ manual skills. Babbage’s text on the economy of machinery was itself supposed to be an experiment in these principles of intelligence. It included series of questionnaires which managers were to complete when gathering exact information on mechanization. “The habit of forming an estimate of the magnitude of any object or the frequency of any occurrence, immediately previous to our applying to it measure or number, tends materially to fix the attention and improve the judgment”. [22] Babbage’s work in political economy depended on the application of precision measures and calculation to surveys of the factories and within them. He then erected a basic analogy between the development of the calculating engines and that of the economy at large. In 1851, for example, he announced his development of the engines with the statement that “man is a tool making animal”. The science of progress was emblematic of these arguments about mechanization and improvement. Progress was defined as “the substitution of machinery, not merely for the skill of the human hand, but for the relief of the human intellect”. The same principle guided the move from individual tools to complete factories. [23] As the Analytical Engine was a “manufactory of figures”, Babbage had to outline his definition of a “manufactory”. “A considerable difference exists between the terms making and manufacturing”, he explained. The difference lay in the economical regulation of the domestic system of the factory. This led to Babbage’s implementation of the division of labour, and, as he emphasised, the fundamental principle of that division which allowed the sensitive analytical regulation of the process of manufacture. The “Babbage principle”, as it came to be known, applied equally to the regulation of the factory and of the calculating engines:

    “That the master manufacturer by dividing the work to be executed into different processes, each requiring different degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that precise quantity of both which is necessary for each process; whereas if the whole work were executed by one workman, that person must possess sufficient skill to perform the most difficult and sufficient strength to execute the most laborious of the operations into which the art is divided”. [24]

    As Babbage and his allies among the political economists showed, the disaggregation of the production process into its simplest components allowed a series of economies and practices of surveillance. Mechanized production required strict discipline. The same was true of the Analytical Engine. Parcelling the processes of Lagrangean algebra into specific components allowed the increase in speed of the machine, the transformation of infinities of space into manageable durations of time, the most economical recompense to each component in terms of consumed power (if mechanical) or consumed wages (if human). “The whole history of the invention has been a struggle against time”, Babbage wrote in 1837. The replacement of individual human intelligence by machine intelligence was as apparent in the workshop as in the engines. In the former, this task was both politically and economically necessary. “One great advantage which we derive from machinery is the check which it affords against the inattention, idleness or the dishonesty of human agents”. This set of failings could produce erroneous astronomical tables, hence the significance of Prony’s reports on the performance of the least intelligent computers when subject to the right management. Unreliable agents could also form trade union combinations, which, Babbage held, were always “injurious” to the workforce itself. His aim here was to contest the influence of “designing persons” and show the working classes that “the prosperity and success of the master manufacturer is essential to the welfare of the workman”, even though “I am compelled to admit that this connexion is in many cases too remote to be understood by the latter”. [25]

    Babbage’s political strategies of the strife-ridden decade of the 1830s outlined a crucial role for the analytic manager. In his texts on political economy, such as his brief chapter on “the future prospects of manufacture as connected with science”, he mapped out this role in some detail. The combination of theory and practice adumbrated both in the Economy of Machinery and in the notes on the Analytical Engine was necessary and possible, if only because the machinery of the factory and the calculating engines precisely embodied the intelligence of theory and abrogated the individual intelligence of the worker. Only the superior combination and correlation of each component guaranteed efficient, economical, planned and therefore intelligent performance. This general, abstract, lawlike behaviour was only visible to the overseer, the manager, men such as Babbage. No doubt his own status as a gentlemanly specialist helped. He inherited £100,000 from his banker father in 1827, while the state spent more than £17,000 on his engines within the next decade. “The efforts for the improvement of its manufactures which any country can make with the greatest probability of success”, he argued in his text on machinery, “must arise from the combined exertions of all those most skilled in the theory, as well as in the practice of the arts; each labouring in that department for which his natural capacity and acquired habits rendered him most fit”. Such declarations, reiterated in Babbage’s successive reformist propaganda throughout his career, made his new class of managerial analysts the supreme economic managers and legislators of social welfare. In good Bonapartist style he thought they should be rewarded with newfangled life peerages and political power. The original cases of the division of mental labour had both inspired the first Difference Engine and also demonstrated the relevance of the principles of manufacture to the sciences themselves. This made the science of calculation the supreme legislative discipline, just as, according to Plana, the calculating engines provided both legislative and executive co-ordination. In 1832 Babbage spoke on the hustings in a Clerkenwell pub about the political advantage of his “wholesome habit…to be careful in the obtaining and sifting of facts”. In 1838 Babbage claimed that “whenever engines of this kind exist in the capitals and universities of the world, it is obvious that all the enquirers who wish to put their theories to the test of number” would design their work so that it would be subjected to the engines’ sums. “Those who neglect the indication” would be reduced to fallible human labour and thus excluded from the community of science. And in 1842, in the midst of a stormy interview with the premier Robert Peel, Babbage quoted at him Plana’s remarks about the new “control over the executive” offered by his engines: “Sir R. Peel seemed excessively angry when I knocked over his argument about professional service”. [26] This political and managerial language was not merely an elegant reformist metaphor. The calculating engines were themselves products of the system of automatic manufacture which Babbage sought to model, indeed, they were some of that system’s most famous and most visible accomplishments.

    The Automatic System and Skill

    “Everything which has been produced is the work of men’s hands, that is, has been made by the hands of the labouring portion of the people and of right belongs to them. No matter when it was produced or by whose head work as well as by their hands’ work it was produced, it all belongs to them because they are the workmen, or in their own language, producers” Francis Place, 1826. [27]

    The first automaton which Babbage ever saw was a danseuse, one foot high, “her eyes full of imagination and irresistible”, when a very young visitor to the backstage workshop of a London exhibitor. Thirty years later he bought the danseuse at an auction sale of a bankrupt mechanical show and, after restoring its gears, displayed it at his house-parties. “A gay but by no means unintellectual crowd surrounded the automaton. In the adjacent room the Difference Engine stood nearly deserted: two foreigners alone worshipped at that altar”. [28] The anecdote illuminates the social site which the calculating engines occupied as competitors for polite attention with the vast array of automata and mechanisms on display in the London showrooms, the Jacquard looms and more catchpenny artifices among them. The trade brought a living to many operators. After he was hired in 1829 by Maudslay, the young engineer James Nasmyth sold the model of a steam engine which had got him the post to a London maker “who supplied such apparatus to lecturers at mechanics’ institutions”. Similarly, in early 1834 two models of the Difference Engine itself were made by the instrument designer Francis Watkins, who plied his trade as electrician and showman at the Adelaide Gallery. His models were designed to help Lardner’s public lectures on the Engine’s principles. When the Engine had been abandoned Babbage insisted “it should be placed where the public can see it”. It was put on display at the Strand museum of King’s College London. Next door, at the Admiralty Museum in Somerset House, visitors could view Maudslay’s celebrated block-making machinery designed for the Portsmouth naval dockyards. These technical systems were on show as the highest achievements of the early Victorian machine-tool industry. [29]

    The London machine shows were designed to win income and teach important lessons to a wide range of publics. This was not an audience which knew exactly what it wanted and certainly not an audience that obviously wanted exactitude. Babbage reckoned that automatic systems, notably his own calculating engines, should yield specific truths about the relation between intelligence, work and mechanism. These truths were by no means self-evident nor uncontroversial, especially during the Swing riots and machine-breaking in the countryside and the factory towns which raged during the struggle for Reform. A Kent observer of the riots told Babbage in 1830 that “you in London, except the conspirators who are there, can form no idea of the effect the ceaseless fires are producing”. [30] Babbage’s lessons hinged on the proper ownership of machinery and thus, in the jargon of his favourite science, the source of productive value. The rights of the workers to the whole value of their labour informed much of the radical protest of these key years. Babbage announced that the capacity of his engines to produce reliable and exact values depended on their capacity to act automatically and demonstrated the immediate relationship between the intelligence of the analyst and the machine’s performance. Who should “own” these machines? Whose labour did they embody? The political implications of these questions could not have been missed, even if Babbage had not touted them so publicly in his Finsbury election campaign of 1832. During the revolutionary struggles of 1830-32, meliorist observers such as the London tailor and journalist Francis Place were persistently struck by “the systematic way in which the people proceeded”, while the “people” themselves protested against the campaigns “to make us tools” or “machines”. Plebeian agitators had been dispossessed by machines and treated as machines. These issues made urgent the problem of the source and ownership of the skills embodied in machines confessedly designed to perform mental work. [31]

    The radical conflicts of the 1830s often centred on a contrast between two accounts of skilled labour. Working class interests appealed to traditional custom, in which skill was recognized as a property inherent in the persons of the workers themselves. As such, skill was reckoned to be scarcely communicable outside carefully controlled milieux which were designed to remain opaque to the surveillance of managers and inspectors. Thus attempts by observers such as Babbage to gather intelligence about machines and the workforce were politically controversial. In contrast to the traditional model, philosophers of machinery promoted an account of rational valuation, attempting to render the labour process transparent and skills rather easily measurable in the marketplace of wage labour. Babbage’s programme of intelligence about machinery and intelligence embodied in machinery was inevitably conflicted. These are early nineteenth century English conflicts which, following E.P.Thompson, we now typically associate with political economic campaigns of the against the Corn Laws and the customary moral economy of the grain rioters, where economic rationality fought with traditional forms of exchange, or, following Michel Foucault, with Benthamite strategies for the surveillance of the body in the illuminated spaces of the Panopticon. Babbage’s campaigns for machine intelligence take their place alongside these more familiar strategies for the reconfiguration of the productive body. [32]

    In this context, the faculties of memory and foresight with which Babbage sought to endow the Analytical Engine also characterize his self-presentation as the unique author of the machine. They embodied his control over the engine and disembodied the skills, and camouflaged the workforce, on which it depended. He explained his view of the property of skill involved in the calculating engines in an appeal to the Duke of Wellington about their future in late 1834. He used the language of reform to defend his own status as their author. “My right to dispose, as I will, of such inventions cannot be contested; it is more sacred in its nature than any hereditary or acquired property, for they are the absolute creations of my own mind”. [33] This remarkable declaration followed a decade of strife with Clement, the brilliant (but here characteristically unnamed) engineer on whose work so much of the engine’s development depended. When the project was inaugurated Babbage had to work out whether the design was in “such a form that its execution [might be] within the reach of a skilful workman”. In turn, this prompted his immediate examination “in detail of machinery of every kind”. Fights were endemic about Babbage’s claims that the workforce should submit to, and only needed slavishly to follow, his detailed recipe for the calculating engines and that any results of this labour would belong to Babbage himself. [34]

    Whatever his own sense of the capacities of the London engineers, Babbage’s first specifications placed unprecedented demands on the capacities of the machine-tool workshops at a key moment in their history. For the first engine mill he required at least six coaxial gear wheels turned to an extraordinary exactitude, while the printing system needed a further set of interlocking gears engraved with letters and figures. A report drafted in 1829 for the Royal Society by Babbage’s closest allies, including John Herschel and William Whewell, conceded that “in all those parts of the machine where the nicest precision is required the wheelwork only brings them by a first approximation (though a very nice one) to their destined places, and they are then settled into accurate adjustment by peculiar contrivances which admit of no shake or latitude of any kind”. [35] The troublesome terms in these bland remarks by the gentlemen of science were the references to nice precision, accurate adjustment and shake or latitude. At the start of the century such demands would have been judged proper solely to the closeted capacities of millwrights and turners. The great Manchester engineer William Fairbairn reminisced that “the millwright of former days was to a great extent the sole representative of mechanical art”. But in very rapid succession, in fields such as clock making, ornamental turning and, above all, the development of steam pistons and screw gears, masters such as Joseph Bramah and his chief workman Henry Maudslay began to design self-moving cutting lathes to allow the production of precise planes, reliable screws and slide-rests to control the work in the chuck. Their network of machine-tool firms dominated the training and regulation of precision engineering. Maudslay set up his own London works in Lambeth in 1797, and employees there followed suit: Richard Roberts in 1814 in Manchester, James Nasmyth, hired by Maudslay in 1829 before setting up in Manchester in 1836, and Joseph Whitworth, who began working for Maudslay in early 1825 and established his own firm in Manchester in 1833. The careers of all these men were charted and moralised in the mid-century by Samuel Smiles, the indefatigable chronicler of self-improvement and engineering achievement. [36] Clement was one of Smiles’ heroes and a veteran of this system too. The son of a handloom weaver, the trade which suffered most from rapid mechanization, Clement worked as a turner in Glasgow before training with Bramah and Maudslay in the 1810s. In 1817 he set up shop in Southwark, near Maudslay and the centre of the London engineering trade, where he soon introduced a new form of slide rest to render lathe-work regular and manageable. This remained rather domestic labour. When Babbage commissioned him in 1823 on the recommendation of the eminent engineer Marc Brunel, Clement had just one lathe set up in his own kitchen. As cash began to flow for the calculating engine project, Clement’s firm soon expanded to a scale of workforce, and of individual machine tools, quite new in the trade. Up to one-third of his business depended on the Difference Engine project. Whitworth was hired to work for Clement on the design. The Manchester City News observed that “Mr Clement contrived and manufactured numerous tools for executing the several parts of this [calculating] machine, educating, at the same time, special workers to manipulate and guide them….Mr Whitworth was possessed of a special aptitude for that minute accuracy of detail in mechanical work which necessarily must have been a marked characteristic of the skilled workmen engaged on Babbage’s machine”. [37]

    These workshops were designed to train apprentices in the production of regular and repeatable accurate work through the use of highly standardised and automatic tools. A Lancashire engineer working in the 1840s recalled that “men in large shops are not troubled with a variety of work, but had one class of work and special tools. The men soon became expert and turned out a large quantity of work with the requisite exactness without a little of the thought required of those who work in small shops where fresh work continually turns up but always the same old tools”. However, as the comments on Whitworth reveal, the shops were also highly private sites of specialist aptitude routinely judged to be the personal quality of some privileged individual. Nasmyth remembered how his drawings of high pressure steam engines were decisive in obtaining employment at Maudslay’s shop: “Mechanical drawing is the alphabet of the engineer. Without this the workman is merely a hand; with it, he indicates the possession of a head”. Such local entanglements of standardised production and individualised skill were not easily unravelled by Babbage’s campaign for the mechanisation and quantification of the value of mental and manual labour. [38] Two critical problems haunted the work on the calculating engines. Firstly, the place of skill and the social and cognitive distance between designers, machinists and draughtsmen was vital for the project’s conduct. When Babbage set out on a European tour in 1828 he left Clement what he reckoned were “sufficient drawings to enable his agents to proceed with the construction of the Difference Engine during his absence”. Such written recipes soon proved hopelessly inadequate. Two years later, on his return, Babbage demanded that the engine construction site be moved from Clement’s works across the river to Babbage’s own house in Dorset Street. Brunel helpfully suggested a compromise site at the British Museum. When the government funded a new workshop next door to Dorset Street, Clement demanded a large financial recompense for the costs of splitting his workforce between two places. The financiers refused and Clement sacked most of his men. Jarvis, Clement’s ex-draughtsman and future co-designer of the Analytical Engine, explained to Babbage why it was important that work proceed “under your immediate inspection”: “you might be at once appealed to whenever it was found very difficult to produce nearly [the desired] effect which is a very common case in machinery”. The lesson is a familiar one. The production and reproduction of skills and material technology requires intense and immediate interaction in spaces specifically designed for the purpose. Such designs violated the conventions by which the machinists plied their trade. In Maudslay’s works, a large locked door protected “his beautiful private workshop” where “many treasured relics of the first embodiments of his constructive genius” were hung. “They were kept as relics of his progress towards mechanical perfection”. Such shrines were importantly protected from the intrusions of customers and patrons alike. Clement, for example, always refused to make out bills for his work and tools “because it not the custom of engineers to do so”. [39]

    A second decisive problem for the engine project was therefore the issue of ownership and public knowledge. The costs of the work were traditionally in the hands of the engineer, while his tools, in this case the lathes, planes and vices, were always his own property. Thus the question of whether the Difference Engine was itself a tool became moot. From 1829 Babbage and Clement were in dispute about property and prices. Clement nominated Maudslay and Babbage nominated Bryan Donkin, designer of machinery for national weights and measures, to adjudicate the fight. Clement at once appealed to the customs of his craft: all the tools, especially the new self-acting lathes, belonged exclusively to him and he insisted on his right to make more calculating engines without Babbage’s permission. Once again, Jarvis explained the point to the infuriated mathematician:

    “It should be borne in mind that the inventor of a machine and the maker of it have two distinct ends to obtain. The object of the first is to make the machine as complete as possible. The object of the second – and we have no right to expect he will be influenced by any other feeling – is to gain as much as possible by making the machine, and it is in his interest to make it as complicated as possible”. [40]

    The Imperial Engine

    Babbage’s characteristic solution was to propose the nationalisation of the engine, the tools and the designs. He was pursuing what he reckoned was the practical logic of much of the machine-tool industry. Outstanding initiatives, such as the campaign to establish imperial measures, the recoinage run from the Royal Mint, the development of precision tools at Greenwich Observatory, and the installation of a production-line for blockmaking machines at the Admiralty’s dockyards, were all state-funded projects. Such projects formed part of the activity of what has been labelled the “fiscal-military state”, involving large-scale military investment, a major financial bureaucracy and commitment to the accumulation of quantitative information about civil society. Babbage’s machine intelligence was designed to appeal to, and reinforce, these rather fragile interests. [41] In his direct appeals to the government, therefore, Babbage was forced to explain how rationally managed design might look like costly disorder. He told Wellington in summer 1834 that the shift from the Difference to the Analytical design was part of this order. “The fact of a new superseding an old machine in a very few years is one of constant occurrence in our manufactories….half finished machines have been thrown aside as useless before their completion”. This scarcely consoled the administration nor did it easily engage with the culture of the machine shops, where personal skill and thus individual property was at stake in every “improved” design and workshop layout. Once the engine had been nationalised and shifted to Babbage’s own workshop, it was proposed that Jarvis work there but remain under Clement’s management. Clement refused the deal because “my plan may be followed without my being in any way a gainer”, and Jarvis refused because he would be blamed for any failure “as being necessarily most familiar with the details, whereas all the praise which perfection would secure would attach to Mr Clement who would come over now and then and sanction my plans only when he could not substitute any of his own”. The machinist refused to become “party to my own degradation”. Babbage and his Royal Society allies might judge this as rational management, while the engineers often saw it as a challenge to their rights and skills. [42]

    But while Babbage’s early projects collapsed under the force of these challenges, his campaign for machine intelligence and the automatic system successfully captured the interests of the engineering managers and their new system. The intelligence gathered for his work on manufacture offered two important lessons about wage rates and skill patterns. The engineers were prepared to value the calculating engine project by raising the wages of workmen who had been involved in the scheme and they were committed to the design of increasingly automated systems which would break down craft divisions and allow the employment of increasingly cheap hands and increasingly subordinate labour processes. In a telling annotation to his correspondence with Wellington, Babbage remarked that “I have been informed by men who are now scattered about in our manufacturing districts, that they all get higher wages than their fellow workmen in consequence of having worked at that machine”. Babbage’s source was Richard Wright, whom he first employed as a valet on his European tour in 1828. Five years later, Wright set up as an engineer in Lambeth Road, very near Maudslay. Armed with Babbage’s instructions, the young man set out on a tour of the northern workshops as part of the campaign to gather intelligence for Babbage’s book. In summer 1834 Wright went to Manchester to work for Whitworth, who had opened his mill there a year earlier after leaving the Difference Engine project. “They are building as large a Factory as any in Manchester”, Wright told Babbage. The struggle between craft custom and innovative production-line techniques was striking. According to an American visitor to the Whitworth factory, because of subordination of the workforce and the increasing use of self-acting machines “no-one in his works dared to think”. So Wright set out to make himself fit for the Babbage engine scheme. He went to classes at the local Mechanics’ Institute and drawing academy. He reported to Babbage that “there is much talk about the [calculating] Machine here, so much so that a man who has worked at it has a greater chance of the best work and I am proud to say that I am getting more wages than any other workman in the Factory”. Wright offered himself to Babbage as a possible master-engineer. “I should be glad to convince you that I am able to complete it by making either a model….or by making any difficult part of the Machine either calculating or printing”. During the later 1830s Wright was on the tramp throughout the factory system. In 1835, for example, he walked from London to Yorkshire, where he surveyed the factories and the mines, then on to Scotland, Ulster and Lancashire. Though he complained that “the habits and conversation of the Factory are indeed disgusting to a thinking mind”, by the end of the decade he had set up his own works in Manchester, where “I intend to employ nothing but the best workmen and material”, and from the early 1840s was in active consultation on the Analytical project. By making himself a “thinking mind”, Wright became Babbage’s ideal, a Smilesian paragon who reckoned that rational management and the careful surveillance of the division of labour provided the key to success in making the calculating engines. In a lengthy epistle Wright explained to Babbage how the new system should work and how management should rule the skills of the workforce:

    “The man you select for the workshop ought to be a good general workman both at Vice and Lathe for such a man can see by the way a man begins a job whether he will finish it in a workmanlike manner or not. Perhaps you are not quite aware that at Mr Clement’s and most other Factories the work is divided into the branches Vice and Lathe, and in most cases the man who works at the one is nearly ignorant of the other….He ought above all to have studied the dispositions of workmen so as to keep the workshop free from contention and disorder and the causes of the repeated failures of so much new Machinery for I am sure there is more failures through waste of labour and bad management than there is through bad schemes or any other cause”. [43]

    Wright’s was the anonymous voice recorded in the pages of Babbage’s Economy of Machinery and which this text helped make representative of the automatic system in the machine-tool trades. In the philosophy of manufacture much was made of the highly personal skills embodied in the master-engineers. In his travel notes for the engine survey, Babbage recorded that “causes of failure” should be found by consulting a “man of science on the principle” and “a practical engineer on mechanical difficulties”. It was acknowledged, and celebrated, that manual dexterity remained a central attribute of “the skilled workman”. Babbage reckoned that “the first necessity” for his Difference Engine was “to preserve the life of Mr Clement…it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to find any other person of equal talent both as a draftsman and as a mechanician”. Engine masters became heroes. According to Nasmyth “by a few masterly strokes Maudslay could produce plane surfaces so true that when their accuracy was tested by a standard plane surface of absolute truth, they were never found defective”. At the same time, “absolute truth” was increasingly vested in the standardised tool-kit of the machine shops. No doubt this was why the authoritative scales and tools in use were so often fetishised. Maudslay’s benchtop scale was “humorously called….The Lord Chancellor”, while Nasmyth and his colleagues boasted of “the progeny of legitimate descendants” which they had produced. [44]

    In London, Lancashire, Clydeside and elsewhere, the systems these men helped forge were the sites of a new managerial and technical network, dependent as much on strenuous regulation of the labour process as on the development of new automatic machinery. The development of ready-made metal textile machinery, for example, was a result of this system. In the process, craft customs were subverted and standardised, accurate production secured. [45] The managers of the most advanced workshops eventually became Babbage’s closest allies and sources of intelligence and support. In his Economy of Machinery, Babbage made much of the means through which the lathe would guarantee “identity” and “accuracy”, and then accounted accuracy as an economy of time, since “it would be possible for a very skilful workman, with files and polishing substances”, to produce a perfect surface. So artisan skill could be transmuted into its wage equivalent. In 1847, he contributed a discussion of this theory of lathe-work and metal-turning to the definitive textbook produced by Charles Holtzapffel, doyen of specialist lathe designers. Holtzapffel himself then contributed a long description of Babbage’s own tools on the engine project. In the next decade, both Whitworth and Nasmyth offered Babbage support in completing the Analytical Engine and testified in public to the benefits of the calculating engines for their own trade. Babbage’s friend the dissenting mathematician Augustus de Morgan brilliantly summarised the relation between the lathe, emblem of automatic skill, and Babbage, master of mechanical analysis in a cartoon showing him at the lathe armed only with a series of logarithmic functions. [46]

    Two salient features of this new network mattered for Babbage’s own project. Firstly, the systematisation of machine-tool production and working was immensely controversial and highly charged politically. Secondly, this process demanded the reorganisation of the productive body and of the visible space in which it performed. The pre-eminent example of these two features of the automatic system was provided at Portsmouth dockyard, the very earliest site at which the automatic machine-tool system was implemented. Between 1795 and 1807 the entire system of production of pulley-blocks for the Royal Navy was overhauled. Traditionally this production relied on highly specialised crafts in woodworking and milling. Turning and shaping had relied on manual skill and recompense claimed in terms of the informal acquisition by the workforce of wood-chips from the yards for domestic fuel and independent working. In the face of mass protests, military force was used. The new production-line system destroyed and reorganised every feature of this pattern. Pulley-blocks were standardised and marked to prevent what was now called “theft”. Standardised machinists replaced specialist craftsmen. Wood was replaced by steam-driven all-metal machinery and separate artisan tasks embodied in purpose-built lathes and clamps. The protagonists of this reorganisation were also the protagonists of much wider social change. The system was developed by Samuel Bentham, the inspector of naval works, who in collaboration with his brother Jeremy had already introduced an identical system of surveillance in Russian wordworking schemes in the early 1780s, a scheme soon to be known as the Panopticon. The engineering works were laid out by Marc Brunel and implemented by his close ally Henry Maudslay. These were the men who introduced Clement to Babbage, and the men who made this system of inspection, regulation and line-production a visible exemplar of rational management. [47]

    Samuel Bentham and his colleagues made Portsmouth dockyard a site of “incessant work” and then turned it into a tourist attraction. The Panopticon could be switched from its initial function as a system of surveillance over wood-workers into a general machine for social control. The Portsmouth team argued that public visibility could be an invaluable aspect of their industrial reformation. Bentham “considered it highly conducive to the hastening the introduction of a general System of machinery that public opinion should be obtained in its favour, and that this was likely to be more surely effected by a display of well arranged machines, for the accomplishing of one particular object”. So from the 1810s the block machinery became a common resort for interested visitors. As Peter Linebaugh has argued, the new system of technological repression institutionalised at Portsmouth can be taken as exemplary of the emergence of the wage form and of the productive labourer. “On entering the block mill, the spectator is struck with the multiplicity of its movements and the rapidity of its operations”. [48] The impersonal pronouns in this account are eloquent. The combination of the disembodied labour process and the public representation of systematic mechanisation were equally vital for Babbage’s political economy. A mark of this significance was his development of and publicity for the mechanical notation which he developed to represent the structure and motions of machinery. Initially designed to “see at a glance what every moving piece in the machinery was doing at each instant of time”, this panoptic notation was proffered as a technology of universal management. In a draft of his 1826 paper Babbage stressed the advantages of machine semiotics because “of all our senses that of sight conveys intelligence most rapidly to the mind”. The industrial journalist Dionysius Lardner reported that the working of the human body and of the factory system could both be represented and managed this way. The analogy of machine, body and workshop was developed at once: “not only the mechanical connection of the solid members of the bodies of men” but also, “in the form of a connected map or plan, the organization of an extensive factory, or any great public institution, in which a vast number of individuals are employed, and their duties regulated (as they generally are or ought to be) by a consistent and well-digested system”. It is for this reason that the term “system” requires further historical analysis. The panoptic gaze which revealed the order of the factory system and the mechanism of the body also rendered the workforce and its resistance rather hard to make out. [49]

    Touring the Factory System

    “You wish to make yourself acquainted with the state of affairs in England. You drop a remark or two as to the condition of the workers. The manufacturer understands you, knows what he has to do. He accompanies you to his factory in the country. The presence of the employer keeps you from asking indiscreet questions. You begin to be converted from your exaggerated ideas of misery and starvation. But…if you should desire to see the development of the factory system in a factory town, you may wait long before these rich bourgeoisie will help you!” Friedrich Engels, 1845. [50]

    Babbage’s survey of machinery and manufacture took its place in a vast genre of such works, texts such as James Kay Shuttleworth’s Moral and physical conditions of the working classes (1832), Andrew Ure’s Philosophy of Manufactures (1835), Peter Gaskell’s Artisans and Machinery (1836), Robert Vaughan’s Age of Great Cities (1843), William Cooke Taylor’s Factories and the Factory System (1844) and, of course, Friedrich Engels’ Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), which were both products of well-publicised tours of the new factory system and also producers of intelligence about the factory system which flowed from the steam-presses in the 1830s and 1840s.

    These publications emerged at a novel cultural moment which saw a tense encounter between literary tourists and the violent changes of industrial society. “I went, some weeks ago, to Manchester, and saw the worst cotton mill”, Babbage’s friend Charles Dickens noted in November 1838. “And then I saw the best. Ex uno disce omnes. There was no great difference between them”. Babbage’s predicament appears in its relation to manufacture at least twice in Dickens’ fictions: notoriously in Little Dorrit (1857), in the guise of the frustrated inventor Daniel Doyce, a victim of government circumlocution and the evils of patent laws, and, more tangentially, in Hard Times (1850), the novel which Dickens always promised to write against the industrial interest after his Manchester visit, in which the utilitarian Thomas Gradgrind inhabits an “Observatory” stocked with parliamentary reports and statistical tables amidst the nightmarish industrial cityscape of Coketown. Dickens’ description of this Observatory – “a stern room, with a deadly statistical clock in it, which measured every second with a beat like a rap upon a coffin-lid” bears a remarkable similarity to Babbage’s account of his Difference Engine in his Economy of Machinery, in which the tabulation of the values of polynomial functions using the summation of constant differences was analogized to “three clocks placed on a table side by side, each having only one hand and each having a thousand divisions instead of twelve hours marked on the face”. [51] Faced with easy satire and stern moralising, the genre to which Babbage’s Economy belonged steered an uneasy course between sensational journalism, sober but politically charged parliamentary reportage and the analyses of political economists, and the incendiary imagery of gothic horrors and unimaginable power. Often stunned by the unprecedented formation of industrial capital and labour power, and lacking a reliable vocabulary with which to analyse or account for the rapidity of population growth, economic concentration and worldwide trade networks, these writers produced accounts which were as significant for their omissions as the details which they contained.

    As Maxine Berg notes, “the factory system itself was a term which frequently concealed more than it revealed”. [52] Babbage’s tours were no exception. Babbage often appealed to the traditional romanticised imagery with which the factory tourists all larded their stories. Visiting the blast furnace of an ironworks at Leeds he reported that “the intensity of the fire was peculiarly impressive. It recalled the past, disturbed the present and suggested the future…Candour obliges me to admit that my speculations on the future were not entirely devoid of anxiety, though I trust they were orthodox”. It was characteristic that such pictures drew attention away from conditions of labour towards the orthodoxies of apocalyptic. Nasmyth described the Coalbrookdale forges in exactly the same terms: “the workmen within seemed to be running about amidst the flames as in a pandemonium, while around and outside the horizon was a glowing belt of fire, making even the stars look pale and feeble”. At least as important, however, was vigilance in restricting access to the workplace. In Bradford, for example, seeking information about labour co-operatives, Babbage was bluntly refused access to the secret codes of the local trades unions. At exactly the same moment, in 1833, agitators such as the Owenite James Morrison reckoned that while “these ceremonies [are] so many relics of barbarism”, it was necessary to preserve proletarian ritual to recruit members to the new socialist unions. The seclusion of the workplace was at least as important for the managers. In London, Babbage self-consciously reported the “inconvenience” which tourists posed to managers: “when the establishment is very extensive, and its departments skillfully arranged, the exclusion of visitors arises, not from any illiberal jealousy, nor, generally, from any desire of concealment….but from the substantial inconvenience and loss of time throughout an entire series of well-combined operations which must be occasioned even by short and casual operations”. He also made much of the problem of public access to his own workshop. In 1835 he told one aspiring tourist of the calculating engine that “if I were to admit the numerous claimants I should not have one moment left in which to finish it”. Even as strenuous a journalist as Harriet Martineau, who printed reports in Dickens’ magazine about the Birmingham glass-works which supplied the Crystal Palace, was discouraged by the managers’ instructions to suppress the news that female labour was used instead of men. It was very much in the interests of the artisans’ culture of the workplace to maintain the closure of their world in the name of the custom of their trade. The very lack of systematisation of the rituals which surrounded the workplace made it rather opaque to the bourgeois tourist, evangelising missionary or government inspector, and thus promoted the conflicting images of the newly systematic and transparent factory and the ancient, secretive and subversive workshop. [53]

    The system was, by definition, visible to the instructed viewer. Orthodox authors of factory tours routinely appealed to platitudes about the systematic character of the industrial economy. It was thus that the very term “factory system” was produced through these texts. The writers exploited an exceptionally powerful account of the production of systems developed in eighteenth century Scotland by philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. Smith had famously argued that the benevolent “invisible hand” which truly guided the economy was apparent to the wise philosopher, even if obscured from economic and self-interested agents themselves, subject as they were to the tyranny of the division of labour. As culture, so nature. James Hutton, Smith’s literary executor, had argued very similarly that events in earth history, such as earthquakes or volcanic explosions, might seem random or miraculous to the uneducated or superstitious observer, but to the enlightened philosophic naturalist they could be accounted as elemental parts of a rational and providentially planned system of earth history. [54] In an early essay by Smith which Hutton published in 1795 it was argued that “when we enter the work-houses of the most common artizans, such as dyers, brewers, distillers, we observe a number of appearances, which present themselves in an order that seems to us very strange and wonderful. Our thought cannot easily follow it, we feel an interval betwixt every two of them, and require some chain of intermediate events to fill it up and link them together”. Smith argued that artisans themselves would never see the need for such a systematic chain and that casual observers would merely be astonished by the conduct of the workshop. In good Humean spirit, Smith reckoned that only philosophic observers, “those of liberal fortunes, whose attention is not much occupied either with business or with pleasure”, would construct systems which made sense of the conduct of everyday labour. Significantly, Smith made the analogy between such explanatory systems and the machines they were designed to explain:

    “Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to perform, as well as to connect together, in reality, those different movements and effects which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed.” [55]

    The Moral Economy of the Factory System

    By the 1820s the programme of political economy and philosophy of mind promulgated among the Scottish elite was dominated by the Edinburgh professor Dugald Stewart, Adam Smith’s earliest academic expositor and a primary source and personal support for Babbage’s own work on analysis and economics. Under Stewart’s leadership, reformers urged the close relationship between the design of machine systems and the systematic gaze to which they should be subject. In the new colleges and mechanics institutes, the new periodicals and Benthamite professional committees, this model of intelligence and vision remained a crucial topic of debate for the designers and observers of the early nineteenth century factory system. [56]

    A locus classicus of “Scotch knowledge” applied to the factories was The Philosophy of Manufactures produced in 1835 by the Scottish consulting chemist Andrew Ure, a veteran of reformist Glaswegian technical education. His disastrous performances as lecturer to Glasgow artisans prompted their secession from his courses, the establishment of independent mechanics’ institutes and his own permanent alienation from the workers’ movement and sustained support for the “Proprietors of our great Factories”. In 1830 he arrived in London from Glasgow. His Philosophy, distributed through the same useful knowledge network as Babbage’s Economy, was the first work to include the phrase “factory system” in its title. In a survey of what he baptised the “moral economy of the factory system”, Ure spelt out the point that such information about factory economy and machinery was often lacking amongst the mill-owners themselves. “Such complex mechanisms, like the topography of an irregular city, are most readily comprehended by the inspection of a plan, in which the mutual bearings and connections of the parts are analytically shown”. Ure made the modish Scots analogy between the “organic systems” of manufacture, mechanical, moral and commercial, and “the muscular, the nervous and the sanguiferous systems of an animal”. His systematic analysis, which Marx famously castigated as “his apotheosis of large-scale industry”, depended on a tour taken after being advised by his physician “to try the effects of travelling with light intellectual exercise”. His philosophic survey was ultimately a carefully-judged polemic on the openness of the factory system and the systematic expropriation of manual labour by industrial and self-acting machinery. When he had finished his survey he even tried, unsuccessfully, to gain access to Babbage’s workshops. Babbage was told that Ure had “drawings of the most delicate parts of the machinery at Manchester, etc., some of which machinery nobody has hitherto been permitted even to see, but the proprietors have nobly sacrificed the vulgar prejudice in favour of secrecy in order to promote science”. This moral, and this philosophic, pose, came to dominate the observers of the factory system from the 1830s on. [57]

    Such observers were liberally supplied with handbooks. Literary companions were produced as a skilful mixture of travel diary and tourist guide. Readers were repeatedly instructed on the right mode of deportment when on tour in the manufacturing districts. Representative was the work of the Irish journalist William Cooke Taylor, a well-connected client of the Christian economist Richard Whateley, Dugald Stewart’s principal interpreter south of the border. Cooke Taylor was a notable propagandist for free trade and the manufacturing interests of Manchester, and an amateur ethnographer, the author of a treatise on The Natural History of Society (1840), in which class struggle was explained in terms of mutual ignorance and a devotee of the statistical movement – he attended its debates at the same British Association meeting in Manchester where Bessel and Jacobi discussed the Analytical Engine with Babbage. In his Factories and the Factory System of 1844, a work dedicated to the Tory premier and reluctant free trader Robert Peel, Cooke Taylor noted the contrast between hasty visions of the industrial sublime and philosophical meditation on the systematic benefits of the factory. “It is not surprising that many false notions should prevail respecting the influence of machinery; the tourist, visiting a factory district for the first time, cannot contemplate without wonder and even some emotions of involuntary fear the …. mighty steam-engine performing its functions with a monotonous regularity not less impressive than the enormous force which it sets in motion. His earliest impression is that fire and water – proverbially the best servants and the worst masters – have here established despotic dominion over man, and that here matter has acquired undisputed empire over mind”. The prosody was significant and owed much to Scottish philosophical discourse. Gothic imagery was linked with intemperate confusion and, above all, hideous materialist power. Such errors, which Cooke Taylor reckoned had bred unfortunate evangelical efforts to limit and control factory conditions, could only be corrected by “time and patience, repeated observation, and calm reflection”. The philosophic gaze would see that “the giant, steam, is not the tyrant but the slave of the operatives, not their rival but their fellow-labourer, employed as a drudge to do all the heavy work, leaving to them the lighter and more delicate operations”. Under Cooke Taylor’s wizardry, steam power was fetishised as human labour, and human labour transformed into a form of delicate leisure. [58]

    These careful transformations were hammered home in the tour guides produced in the 1830s and 1840s. A handbook for visitors to Manchester, the “metropolis of manufactures”, produced in 1839, counselled all tourists to read Ure thoroughly and then obtain letters of introduction to the mills run by Fairbairn and Nasmyth, the bastions of mass-production engineering and the deployment of machine tools on a large scale. Amongst almost one hundred various machine firms in the city, walking through Fairbairn’s ironworks, or travelling on a specially-built train through Nasmyth’s Bridgewater foundry, a “gratifying treat”, would give the appropriate sense of wonder together with the understanding of regular system. “The visitor should take a walk among the mills, and whatever his notions may be respecting their smoke and steam and dust, he will be compelled to indulge in feelings of wonder at their stupendous appearance”. But in troubled times such feelings, as Cooke Taylor also stressed, should be immediately tempered by the sense of regular order. The Bridgewater Foundry, for example, was established in 1836, where major strikes of Lancashire engineers soon erupted in protest against harsh wage rates and the destruction of the apprentice system. From summer 1838, Chartist demonstrations in Manchester demanding the enfranchisement of the working class commanded more than fifty thousand marchers. In contrast, the ideal tourist would expect to see Nasmyth’s “straight-line system” of throughput and the widespread application of self-acting machine tools. At Fairbairn’s works “in every direction the utmost system prevails, and each mechanic appears to have his peculiar description of work assigned with the utmost economical subdivision of labour”. Once again, the power of mind over matter was much lauded. “It is by means of these admirable adaptations of human skill and intelligence that we are giving to the present age its peculiar and wonderful characteristic, namely the triumph of mind over matter”. [59]

    This triumph was at once a claim about the machine tool system, and thus the control of matter by human intelligence, and a claim about labour discipline, and thus the control of the workforce by its masters. Ure stressed the relation between “the automatic plan” and “the equalization of labour”. “On the handicraft plan, labour more or less skilled, as usually the most expensive element of production – Materiam superabat opus; but on the automatic plan, skilled labour gets progressively superseded…. The grand object therefore of the modern manufacturer is, through the union of capital and science, to reduce the task of his work-people to the exercise of vigilance and dexterity”. It was precisely for this reason that in his tours Ure judged the factory as a form of laboratory, a potentially utopian site devoid of strife and replete with scientific truth. “The science of the factory” was at once a means of disciplining labour and an object-lesson in thermal physics, “better studied in a week’s residence in Lancashire than in a session of any university in Europe”. The Manchester guide explained that the self-acting principle applied to slide control in machine lathes “is that which enables a child or the machine itself to operate on masses of metal and to cut shavings off iron as if it was deprived of all hardness and so mathematically correct than even Euclid himself might be the workman!” In teaching inquirers how to interpret the relation between labour unrest and mechanization, Nasmyth also struck the Euclidean theme. “Those wonderful improvements in automaton machinery that produce you…the piston rod of a steam engine of such an accuracy as would make Euclid’s mouth water to look at” were immediately prompted by the “intolerable annoyance resulting from strikes”. The tour guides agreed. “The frequent and insufferable annoyances which engineers have experienced from trades unions” produced “those admirable contrivances which are enabling mechanicians to perform such wonders in overcoming the resistance of the material world”. [60] In their accounts of this resistance, a characteristic series of themes were developed in the literature of factory tourism. The apparently overwhelming power of the works should rightly be understood as labour discipline within a system of division and co-ordination, producing geometrical precision out of mere manual skill in despite of proletarian resistance.

    Intelligence in the Factory System

    “I regard the Factory System as un fait accompli….The Factory System originated in no preconceived plan – it sprang from no sudden exercise of wisdom, like Minerva from the brain of Jupiter, but it was formed and shaped by the irresistible force of circumstances. Those who are called the fathers of the Factory System were neither such demons as it has been sometimes the fashion to describe the millowners, nor yet were they perfect angels; they were simply men of great intelligence, industry, and enterprise” William Cooke Taylor, 1844. [61]

    The familiar tropes of precision, discipline and class struggle were matters of considerable debate. Thus Engels summarised what he judged the farcical and sinister performances of factory tourism: “You come to Manchester….You naturally have good introductions to respectable people. You drop a remark or two as to the condition of the workers”. Engels brilliantly satirised the “easy, patriarchal relation” which tourists would see: “you see what the bourgeoisie promises the workers if they become its slaves, mentally and morally…Dr Ure sings a dithyramb upon the theme”. Engels’ critique hinged on the contrast between the gaze of the bourgeois philosopher, which he reckoned sightless, and a more penetrating analysis which saw behind the factory’s scenes. This was why the question of intelligence was so central in the political production of the factory system, the intelligence gathered about the works and the intelligence embodied within them. The factory system was not an inevitable consequence of the development of power machinery in the textile trades, but, instead, machines were designed to fit new forms of discipline and labour processes within the workshops. Arkwright’s new spindles were only licensed in units of a thousand or more so that he could maintain control over the technique, thus spawning large-scale textile enterprises. Manchester strikes in the cotton trade in the 1820s prompted the development of self-acting mules which would give more control of the production process to the employers. Ure characteristically lapsed into the imagery of Olympus and of Frankenstein to describe Richard Roberts’ new mule as “the Iron Man sprung out of the hands of our modern Prometheus at the bidding of Minerva – a creation destined to restore order among the industrious classes”. The comment was picked up by Marx as an archetype of the disciplinary function of the machine and of “the spirit of the factory”. Uneven developments in the implementation of such techniques as Roberts’ mule show that the automatic system depended on the extent to which it fitted managerial demands. As William Lazonick has argued, overlookers preferred less mechanical methods for winding yarn onto spindles because such methods yielded much greater intelligence about the conduct and quality of labour. [62] Contemporary analysts would hesitate between the attribution of productive success and labour discipline to the machines themselves, and thus to the logic of the system, or to the human workforce, and thus to the skill of proletarians and engineers alike. The development of these new social formations, as Engels claimed, involved an apparently paradoxical relation between machinery and human intelligence. He opened his analysis with a crude picture of pre-industrial life dominated by machine-like agricultural labour. “The industrial revolution has simply carried this out to its logical end by making the workers machines pure and simple, taking from them the last trace of independent activity, and so forcing them to think and demand a position worthy of men”. [63]

    The two central political issues of the revolutionary decade of the 1830s were those of the intelligence to be attributed to the working class and of the possibility of representing the new factory regime and its associated system as a natural, and providential, rather than artificial, and thus corrupt, formation. These issues were hard to tease apart. Apologists repeatedly emphasised the inevitability and the virtue of the factory system. Cooke Taylor reckoned that “factories are a result of the universal tendency to association which is inherent in our nature” and that “the factory system is not only innocent in itself but a necessary element in the progress of civilization and a most efficient means of promoting human happiness.” In a fashion characteristic of the Scottish philosophy of mind, these remarks referred the co-ordination and discipline of the work-force to principles inherent in human consciousness. Eighteenth century associationism, it was claimed, reached its apotheosis in the cotton works. Thence it was easy to argue that the apparent evils of the factory system were entirely external to its logic. Thus while Cooke Taylor blamed “the want of intelligence in the ruling power….and not the factory system, which does not possess any means for self-legislation”, the eminent reformist physician James Kay Shuttleworth, whose revelations about the health of the manufacturing towns supplied countless journalists with scare stories, commented that the evils affecting the Mancunian working class “result from foreign and accidental causes. A system, which promotes the advance of civilization and diffuses it all over the world….founded on the benefits of commercial association, cannot be inconsistent with the happiness of the great mass of the people”. [64] The systematic character of the factories was precisely what allowed them to represented as virtuous, and this virtue was allegedly achieved automatically.

    The crisis of proletarian intelligence in the factory system emerged as a problem of automatism. “The factory system has a tendency within itself to correct many of the evils”. If the factory were not merely the product of an automatic law of moral progress but the consequence of the adoption of the automatic system of manufacture, it was still necessary but difficult to represent the inmates of the factory as themselves possessed of intelligence. The puzzle of the thinking machine was the very stuff of this debate. No doubt this was why the images of the modern Prometheus and of Athena springing fully-clad from the mind of Zeus were so common. Defining the site of intelligence was a key political task. Critics reiterated their suspicion that automatic machinery and factory discipline mechanized the proletariat. Cooke Taylor addressed the puzzle directly. “I am willing to confess that the mechanical processes which require a continuous and unvarying repetition of the same operation…have a tendency to degrade the workman into an automaton”. He conceded that “there is a tendency in the use of machinery to materialize the thoughts”. But in drawing a picture of the balance between the necessary division of labour and the combination of tasks required within the factory system, he urged that “such combination requires no small exercise of mind and no conceivable adaptation of wood and iron will produce a machine that can think”. Nasmyth told the parliamentary commissioners that automatic machinery prompted workers’ intellectual development, just because under benevolent management removed the need for hard work. Challenged that under the division of labour “the labourer becomes part of the machine instead of an entire machine”, Nasmyth replied that “some of our modern machines are most interesting, and after a time the men begin to feel it…the mere looking at anything absolutely correct or true in geometrical form, I think, has in itself a tendency to improve the mind”. [65]

    The suspicion, however, was that this vaunted intellectual improvement flowed from the master-machines, and thus from their masters. Ure characteristically and frankly celebrated this subordination. The Manchester guidebook quoted him approvingly: “the benignant power of steam summons around him his myriads of willing menials, and assigns to each the regulated task, substituting for painful muscular effort upon their part the energies of his own gigantic arm”. There was thus an unresolved contradiction between stress on the subordination, and thus mechanization, of workers’ intelligence, and on the co-ordination, and thus cerebration, of their labour. A notorious example appeared in Ure’s attempts to define the term “factory”. On the very same page of his Philosophy of Manufactures he defined the factory both as “a vast automaton composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs….all of them being subordinated to a self-regulated moving force”, and also as “the combined operation of many orders of work-people…in tending with assiduous skill a system of productive machines”. Marx immediately picked up this striking contradiction between automatism and skill and associated it closely with Babbage’s account of the division of labour in the machine system. “These two descriptions [by Ure] are far from being identical. In one, the combined collective worker appears as the dominant subject, and the mechanical automaton as the object; in the other, the automaton itself is the subject, and the workers are merely conscious organs”. The “automatic workshop” posed in an unprecedently acute form the challenge of situating its intellectual and thus governing principle: within the skilful workforce, as Cooke Taylor hinted, within the managerial regime, as Nasmyth so often claimed, or within the machines, as Ure and Babbage boasted. [66]

    The Labour of the Head

    This problem of the geography of intelligence depended on the fetishisation of the machines and the reification of the labour power exerted around them. As Raphael Samuel has demonstrated, mid-Victorian industrial mechanization was accompanied by the preservation, intensification and expansion of skilled manual labour throughout the economy. “The mid-Victorian engineer was still characteristically a craftsman, an artisan or mechanic rather than an operative or hand”. [67] The representation of this dual process of the intensification of skill and the subordination of mechanization involved a remarkable balancing act amongst the commentators on the factory system. In the report of his Lancashire tour during the Chartist general strike of 1842, in which almost every cotton works was closed, Cooke Taylor premised that “the diffusion of the Factory System has created a larger demand than previously existed for intelligence and contrivance” among the workforce, and deduced that the machines themselves could not, or should not, be granted tyrannic power. “The operatives are stringently ruled by their own consent…So strange a combination of perfect despotism with perfect freedom never before existed, and to have produced such a state is one of the noblest triumphs of morality and intelligence”. [68] The problem remained. Whose intelligence had produced this splendid state of voluntary servitude and supreme skill? Protagonists of the cotton masters had no doubt – it flowed from the machines themselves. Thus Edward Baines, a veteran lecturer against the Chartists on the benefits of rapid automation, argued in his history of the cotton industry that “all the precision, power and incessant motion belong to the machines alone, and the work-people have merely to supply them with work”. The embodiment of skill within the automatic system was used to distract attention from the labour power exerted by the workforce itself. The most hostile critics of the machine economy, such as the Liberal Manchester medic Peter Gaskell, countered that it followed that any worker would be “reduced to a mere watcher or feeder of his mighty assistant”, and that “the struggle carrying on between human power on the one hand, and steam aided by machinery, is gradually approaching a crisis”. [69]

    The terms of this critical struggle provided the vocabulary for all early Victorian accounts of the relation between skill, labour power and the machine. For the political economists, on whom Babbage drew so much, the property of skill was switched from its traditional place as an aspect of the customary life of the artisan, and transferred as a species of mental capital to the factory system itself. The claim that skill was a property of the artisan collective body had long warranted various forms of working-class resistance to mechanization and deskilling. The more heroic achievements of early Victorian engineering, including the Difference Engine, might be attributed solely to their named authors, such as Babbage, the managerial entrepreneur, but many artisans retained and expressed their sense of the skilful labour which they had devoted to these projects. The socialist Thomas Hodgskin, editor of the Mechanics’ Magazine, lectured at the London Institute in 1826 that “the enlightened skill of different classes of workmen” had indeed produced higher improvements in machinery but that it was wrong to attribute “the productive power of this skill” to “its visible products, the instruments”, and even worse that “the mere owners….who neither make nor use them imagine themselves to be very productive persons”. Six years later in a London pub Hodgskin challenged Babbage on the Finsbury hustings about the fate of the public money which had been poured into the Difference Engine. [70] In response to such demands for recognition of artisanal skill, the Ricardian economists John McCulloch and Nassau Senior both saw artisan skill as a product of the intensity of the division of labour and not a quality imminent in, nor belonging to, the workforce itself. Richard Jones, Christian economist and close ally of William Whewell, argued that capital alone contributed “the formation of the human agency by which the continuity of labour is secured; the maintenance of the intellect which enlightens its application [and] the employment of power which resides either in a higher order of moving forces or in mechanical contrivance”. According to Jones and his colleagues, manufacture’s “sovereign power over the material world” was entirely dependent on “the eye of a superior enforcing everywhere steady and conscientious labour”. [71]

    These claims were highly consequential for the politics of intelligence. Intelligence just was the warrant of humanity’s power over matter. Under the new orthodoxies of political economy, the surplus value extracted from the machines was the product of the intelligence of capital made real in the force of steam-driven engines. On this showing, “intelligence” itself was easily identified with just those qualities displayed by manufacturing capital and the subordinate “servants of the machine”, notably foresight and vigilance. So when Whewell and Jones debated the right model of value in the 1840s, the Cambridge mathematician reckoned that in a cotton mill “the value of its produce must equal the value of the moving power plus the value of the mechanism”. These analysts used the term “labouring force” to describe the former value, thus decisively shifting their model towards a general theory of machinery. Jones agreed: “we can have no measure of the power…employed in production unless we are familiar with the greater or less degree of perfection of the machinery and implements”. The value of the factory system was therefore entirely to be located in the array of mechanisms deployed in the workshops and its intelligence was to be referred to the planning and the discipline with which these machines were managed. [72]

    The aim of this polemic was to make the identity of intelligence and capitalist machine management self-evident. Socialist, radical and plebeian critics sought, in contrast, to make it nonsensical or disastrous. This made the problem of workers’ intelligence vital in political debate. Trades union newspapers argued that “continued improvements in machinery” might increase the demand for manual labour but destroyed demand for “the labour of the head”. Lecturers at the Mechanics’ Institutes insisted that “if the body have lost its value, the mind must get into business without delay”. Chartist pamphleteers announced that “the Duke of Wellington could have gained ten Waterloo battles easier than he could have learned to form one single nail to the perfection attained by some poor men in the forlorn and sooted smithy”. [73] The pervasiveness of the language of machine intelligence was most marked in the more sophisticated socialist analyses, for in these texts claims for the liberation of the proletariat from the subordination of factory discipline simultaneously used, and assumed, the image of the human body as “living machinery”. So when the pre-eminent socialist campaigner Robert Owen promulgated his New View of Society in 1816, he appealed to mill-owners’ own interests in tending their workforce just as carefully as their “inanimate mechanisms”: “the more delicate complex living mechanism would be equally improved by being trained to strength and activity”, Owen charged, “that its mental movements might not experience too much irritating friction, to endeavour by every means to make it more perfect”. Where the Lanark utopian judged that manufacturers would immediately understand the rationality of social improvement because they saw their workers as living machines, Engels reckoned that in Manchester the process which mechanized the very bodies and minds of the workforce would also radicalize their politics despite the capitalists’ power. Machine systems helped divide the body into specialised, monstrous capacities. “No activity…claims the operative’s thinking powers”. Engels straightforwardly rejected the meliorist claims of Cooke Taylor, Ure and their colleagues that machine superintendence was a form of leisure. It was rather a form of tedium. “The operative is condemned to let his physical and mental powers decay”, Engels added; “if the operatives have nevertheless not only rescued their intelligence but cultivated and sharpened it more than other workingmen, they have found this possible only in rebellion against their fate and the bourgeoisie”. [74]

    Such remarks indicate the need to legitimate the discourse on the factory system produced in the 1830s and 1840s and its polemical vocabulary of machine intelligence. The processes of automation and co-ordination which had spawned the factory system had made the problem of the place of intelligence urgent. Proponents of machinofacture reckoned that the factory system was evidently a consequence of intelligent reason and thus providential and virtuous. They situated this intelligence in the complex relation between the fixed capital of the steam-driven engines and the mental capital of the millowners. The workforce itself was only judged a producer of value to the extent that it matched precisely the capacities of the machines. The qualities attributed to this intelligence were just those required from this form of superintendence, anticipation and meticulous scrutiny. This was the definition of intelligence which Babbage embodied in his machines and the sense of intelligence which he reckoned those machines displayed. He even claimed that these were the virtues of divinity.

    The Apotheosis of Machine Intelligence

    “Innumerable are the illusions of Custom, but of all these, perhaps the cleverest is her knack of persuading us that the Miraculous, by simple repetition, ceases to be Miraculous….Am I to view the Stupendous with stupid indifference, because I have seen it twice, or two hundred, or two million times? There is no reason in Nature or in Art why I should: unless, indeed, I am a mere Work-Machine, for whom the divine gift of Thought were no other than the terrestrial gift of Steam is to the Steam-Engine, a power whereby Cotton might be spun, and money and money’s worth realised” Thomas Carlyle, 1831. [75]

    It was, perhaps, inevitable that Babbage should ultimately teach the supreme value of machines possessed of foresight and memory by attributing these powers to the Deity. Natural theology was the indispensable medium through which early Victorian savants broadcast their messages. The dominant texts of this genre were the Bridgewater Treatises produced in the early 1830s by eminent divines and natural philosophers under the management of the Royal Society’s presidency. The treatise produced by William Whewell, then mathematics tutor at Trinity College Cambridge, was among the most successful of these works and included a claim about the relation between mathematics, automatism and atheism which Babbage decided he had to answer. His machine philosophy was here assailed from a perspective in complete contrast to those of the radical artisans. Whewell, a moderate evangelical and follower of Coleridgean politics, argued that whereas the great scientific discoverers were men of faith, because their acts of induction would inevitably prompt them to identify divine intelligence in the creation, mathematical deductivists might falsely hold that the laws of the world could be spun out by analysis and that the world itself might seem to be an automatic system. Whewell maintained a consistent hostility to the implications of mechanised analysis: “we may thus deny to the mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times any authority with regard to their views of the administration of the Universe”. Worse was to follow. Whewell brutally denied that mechanised analytical calculation was proper to the formation of the clerisy. In classical geometry “we tread the ground ourselves at every step feeling ourselves firm” but in machine analysis “we are carried along as in a railroad carriage, entering it at one station and coming out of it at another…..it is plain that the latter is not a mode of exercising our own locomotive powers…It may be the best way for men of business to travel but it cannot fitly be made a part of the gymnastics of education”. [76]

    These remarks were direct blows to Babbage’s programme. He called the reply to Whewell he produced in 1837 the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise and labelled it “a fragment”. It contained a series of sketches of his religious faith, his cosmology and his ambitions for the calculating engines. It amounted to a confession of his faith that the established clerisy was incompetent, dangerous and innumerate. Babbage had shown that memory and foresight were the two features of intelligence represented in his machines. He now showed, using resources from his calculating engines and from Hume’s notorious critique of miracles and revelation, that these features of machine intelligence were all that was needed to understand and model the rule of God, whether based on the miraculous work of the Supreme Intelligence or on His promise of an afterlife. “Foresight” could be shown to be responsible for all apparently miraculous and specially providential events in nature. Throughout the 1830s Babbage regaled his guests with a portentous party trick. He could set the machine to print a series of integers from unity to one million. Any observer of the machine’s output would assume that this series would continue indefinitely. But the initial setting of the machine could be adjusted so that at a certain point the machine would then advance in steps of ten thousand. An indefinite number of different rules might be set this way. To the observer, each discontinuity would seem to be a “miracle”, an event unpredictable from the apparent law-like course of the machine. Yet in fact the manager of the system would have given it foresight. Whewell’s Bridgewater Treatise appeared at the start of March 1833. Less than two months later Babbage had already worked out an experiment using the Difference Engine to print the series of even integers up to ten thousand and then increase each term in steps of three. The sudden discontinuity was both predictable to the analyst and yet surprising to the audience. Babbage drew the analogy with divine foresight, whether in the production of new species or in miraculous intervention. In May 1833, therefore, Babbage was ready to show a mechanical miracle.

    His onlookers were almost always impressed. The dour Thomas Carlyle was predictably sceptical, and thundered his complaint about Babbage’s analogy between thought and steam power. But as early as June 1833 Lady Byron and her daughter “both went to see the thinking machine (for such it seems) and were treated to Babbage’s miraculous show of apparently sudden breaks in its output. “There was a sublimity in the views thus opened of the ultimate results of intellectual power”, she reported. Two years later George Ticknor was treated to a lecture of three hours on the topic of programmed discontinuities: “the whole, of course, seems incomprehensible, without the exercise of volition and thought”. Here, then, was the theological equivalent of the systematic gaze. In answer to Whewell’s boast that only induction might reveal the divine plan of the world, and that machine analysis could never do so, Babbage countered that the world could be represented as an automatic array only visible as a system from the point of view of its manager. The world-system was a macroscopic version of a factory, the philosophy of machinery the true path to faith, and the calculating engines’ power of “volition and thought” demonstrated to all. [77]

    The mechanical metaphor for miracles, creations and extinctions was, of course, profoundly influential on the actualist naturalists among Babbage’s friends, including Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin. In the Ninth Treatise, Babbage reproduced his own views on crustal elevation and stratigraphy and two crucial letters from John Herschel on the uniformity of earth history and the production of life. He sent copies to figures of political eminence, including both the new Queen Victoria and the Piedmontese premier Cavour. He also sent the text to the gentlemen of science. Lyell predicted that “some people would not like any reasoning which made miracles more reconcilable with possibilities in the ordinary course of the Universe”, while the American mathematician Nathaniel Bowditch told Babbage that “when you carried me from the simple machine made by a man to the grand machine of the Universe I wish I could express to you one half of the enthusiasm I felt….I want no priestcraft, but I want high feelings always to exist in men’s minds in regard to God”. [78] Babbage was not content with making mechanizable foresight responsible for all apparently miraculous and specially providential events. Mechanizable memory was to be associated with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. “We must possess the memory of what we did during our existence in order to give them those characteristics. In fact, memory seems to be the only faculty which must of necessity be preserved in order to render a future state possible”. Babbage even managed to offer a material cause for the preservation of memory, for since all sound, and thus all speech, was preserved in aerial vibrations, the memory of all previous consciousness would be preserved in the atmosphere. However hypothetical, with this model Babbage managed to show that just those features of intelligence displayed in his machine were also required for religion. Without memory, there could be no heaven nor hell, and without foresight, no providence. [79]

    The apotheosis of the intelligent machine was an integral part of Babbage’s ambitious programme. This programme has been used here to illuminate the complex character of systematic vision in the Industrial Revolution. In the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, the system was coextensive with the universe, and Babbage explained that its order and logic would only be visible from a privileged point of view. In his surveys of the factories and workshops, Babbage set out to reveal the systematic character of the machine economy by pointing out the rationale of the production, distribution and deployment of power in the workshops of industrial Britain. In his project to build intelligent calculating engines, he attempted to represent himself as the intellectual manager of the complex labour relations of the machine-tool industry, initially disastrously, and then as part of his overall vision of a newly rational system of automatic precision engineering. In the setting of early Victorian society, the connections between these spheres of theological, political and technological work cannot be seen as merely metaphorical. These techniques helped make a new social order and a new form of knowledge. The systematic gaze was designed to produce the rational order it purported to discover. This is to place Babbage’s project alongside those of Bentham, whose panoptic schemes have been associated with the production of the docile body, and of Smiles, whose hagiographies cleverly connected the self-fashioning of the Victorian engineers with the transformations they wrought on the material world. [80] A third, and highly suggestive, contemporary is Henry Mayhew, the surveyor of the unproductive bodies of the London poor in a four volume work of 1861 subtitled A Cyclopaedia of the condition and earnings of those that will work, those that cannot work, and those that will not work. In Mayhew’s ghastly and obsessive stories, the apparent nomadic disorder of the diseased bodies of the London streets is inexorably revealed as systematic and possessed of its own rationality, and thus, paradoxically, its own productivity. Mayhew cites Babbage directly at this key point in his work – the discussion of waste. In Babbage’s Economy of Machinery, the reader is regaled with details of the admirable system for slaughtering horses at the factories in Paris. Even the rats which live off rotting horse carcasses could be systematically caught, killed and sold. With an exhaustive and exhausting tabulation of data, Babbage showed that a twelve shilling horse carcass could produce more than four pounds of income. Mayhew went one better, by linking the statistics of dead horses to the entire economy of productive waste and waste- sellers on the London streets. As Catherine Gallagher has remarked, Mayhew here effects the “conversion of economic into physiological categories”. [81] This interconversion holds the key to the systematic vision. Under Babbage’s productive gaze, the powers of the body were simultaneously rendered mechanical and thus profitable, or wasteful and thus consigned to oblivion.

    Footnotes

    Thanks to Billy Ashworth, Bob Brain, William Ginn, Iwan Morus, Otto Sibum and Richard Staley for their generous help, and to the librarians at the Cambridge University Library, the British Library and the Royal Society for help with manuscripts in their possession.

    [1] Henry Colebrooke, “Address on presenting the Gold Medal of the Astronomical Society to Charles Babbage”, Memoirs of the Astronomical Society 1 (1825), 509-12, pp. 509-10; Babbage to Herschel, 27 June 1823, Royal Society HS 2.184.

    [2] Herschel to Babbage, 25 October 1814, Royal Society HS 2.31; H.W.Buxton, Memoir of the Life and Labours of the Late Charles Babbage, ed. R.A.Hyman ([1880] Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press, 1988), p. 46.

    [3] Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp. 195-228; Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 55-64; Adrian Desmond, The Politics of Evolution (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989).

    [4] John R. Searle, “Minds, Brains and Programs”, in Rainer Born, ed., Artificial Intelligence: the case against (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987), 18-40 (originally in Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 417-24).

    [5] H.M.Collins, Artificial Experts (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press, 1990), pp. 64-5.

    [6] Steven Shapin, “The Invisible Technician”, American Scientist 77 (1989), 554-63; Howard Becker, Art Worlds (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).

    [7] Karl Marx, Capital Volume One ( [1867] Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1976), p. 493 n.4; “Speech at the Anniversary of the People’s Paper” [April 14 1856] in Selected Works, ed. V.Adoratsky , 2 vols. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1942), 2: 428; Grundrisse, Notebook 6 [February 1858], ed. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 692-3. For Marx as a systems theorist see Thomas P. Hughes, “The Order of the Technological World”, History of Technology 5 (1980), 1-16, pp. 5-7 and Raniero Panzieri, “The Capitalist Use of Machinery”, in Phil Slater, ed., Outlines of a Critique of Technology (London: Ink Links, 1980), 44-68.

    [8] Ada Lovelace, “Sketch of the Analytical Engine by L.F.Menabrea”, Taylor’s Scientific Memoirs, 3 (1843), 666-731, pp. 689-90 (translation of L.F.Menabrea, “Notions sur la machine analytique de M. Charles Babbage”, Bibliotheque universelle de Geneve 41 (1842), 352-76, p. 376).

    [9] Charles Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher (London: Longmans, 1864), pp. 53-74; Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, pp. 80-102; Anthony Hyman, Charles Babbage: Pioneer of the Computer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 123-35; Michael Lindgren, Glory and Failure: the Difference Engines of Johann Mueller, Charles Babbage and Georg and Edvard Scheutz (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T.Press, 1990), pp. 52-59.

    [10] For these plans see Babbage, Passages, pp. 112-41; Hyman, Charles Babbage, pp. 164-73; for Ada Lovelace’s role see Dorothy Stein, Ada: a Life and a Legacy (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T.Press, 1985), pp. 108-20 (who plays down her originality) and Betty Alexandra Toole, Ada, the Enchantress of Numbers (Mill Valley, CA.: Strawberry Press, 1992), pp. 194-260 (who emphasises it).

    [11] Babbage, Passages, p.114.

    [12] Babbage, Passages, pp.129-35; Lovelace/Menabrea, “Sketch of the Analytical Engine”, p. 675. For Piedmontese science policy, Plana and Menabrea see Pietro Redondi, “Cultura e scienza dall’illuminismo al positivismo”, in Gianni Micheli, ed., Storia d’Italia: Scienza e tecnica nella cultura e nella societa dal Rinascimento a oggi (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), 685-814, pp. 766-76.

    [13] Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, p.216 n.8; Lovelace/Menabrea, “Sketch of the Analytical Engine”, pp. 675, 689, 692, 723. For the ambitions for a new science see Toole, Ada, pp. 209-16.

    [14] Lovelace/Menabrea, “Sketch of the Analytical Engine”, pp. 696, 706; Babbage, Passages, pp. 306-8. Passages was dedicated to Victor Emmanuel, then King of unified Italy. Babbage was an enthusiastic correspondent of his premier, Cavour.

    [15] Hyman, Charles Babbage, pp. 82-3; Maxine Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 162. For the Ricardian critique see [J.R.McCulloch], “Babbage on Machinery and Manufactures”, Edinburgh Review 56 (1833), 313- 32, p.326; Biancamaria Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: the Edinburgh Review 1802-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 140-6 .

    [16] Charles Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures 4th ed. (London: Charles Knight, 1835), preface (1832), p. iii.

    [17] Babbage, Economy of Machinery, p. 195. The first reference to Prony is in Babbage to Davy, 3 July 1822, published as A Letter to Humphry Davy (London: Booth, 1822), p.8. The gift from Didot in 1819 is recorded at the front of Babbage’s copy of the sine tables, Cambridge University Library MSS ADD 8705.37. For other responses see [Dionysius Lardner], “Babbage’s Calculating Engines”, Edinburgh Review 59 (1834), 263-327, p. 275.

    [18] Babbage, Passages, pp. 59-63 and 114-116.

    [19] Babbage, Passages, pp. 123-9 and The Exposition of 1851, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1851), pp. 184-5.

    [20] Babbage, Passages, pp. 120-2.

    [21] Babbage, Passages, p. 67 and Exposition, p.188.

    [22] Babbage, Economy of Machinery, p. 118. For Babbage’s notes on his own tours, compiled for the book, see Cambridge University Library MSS ADD 8705.25, p. 10.

    [23] Babbage, Exposition, p.171. For political economy and the science of progress in the 1830s see Simon Schaffer, “The Nebular Hypothesis and the Science of Progress” in J.R.Moore, ed., History, Humanity and Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

    [24] Babbage, Economy of Machinery, pp. 120, 175. See Richard M. Romano, “The Economic Ideas of Charles Babbage”, History of Political Economy 14 (1982), 385-405, p. 391. For Marx’s response to the Babbage principle see Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p.469: “the collective worker now possesses all the qualities necessary for production in an equal degree of excellence, and expends them in the most economical way”.

    [25] Babbage, Economy of Machinery, pp. 54, 250-1; Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, p. 194.

    [26] Babbage, Economy of Machinery, pp. 379, 388; Hyman, Babbage, p.86; Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, pp. 215, 111. For Babbage on honours see Exposition, pp.220-49 and for the Bonapartist connexion see Reflections on the Decline of Science in England (London: Fellowes, 1830), pp. 25-27.

    [27] [Francis Place], in Trades’ Magazine and Mechanics’ Weekly Gazette, 49 (June 1826), 779-80, cited in Gregory Claeys, “The Reaction to Political Radicalism and the Popularisation of Political Economy in early Nineteenth Century Britain”, in Terry Shinn and Richard Whitley, eds., Expository Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), 119-136, p. 129. Here Place summarised the socialist views on productive labour which he rejected.

    [28] Babbage, Passages, pp. 17-18, 365-7, 425-7. See Hyman, Babbage, p.175.

    [29] Hyman, Babbage, p. 192; James Nasmyth, Autobiography, ed. Samuel Smiles (London: John Murray, 1883), pp. 142-3, 134; Carolyn Cooper, “The Portsmouth System of Manufacture”, Technology and Culture 25 (1984), 182-225, p. 213. For Watkins’ models see Watkins to Babbage, 15 January 1834, British Library MSS Add 37188 f.160.

    [30] Hyman, Babbage, p.79.

    [31] E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), pp. 889, 915; John Rule, The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England (London: Longman, 1986), pp. 357-63.

    [32] E.P.Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd”, Past and Present 38 (1967) and Customs in Common ((London: Merlin, 1991), chapters 4 and 5; Foucault, Discipline and Punish, part 3 and “The Eye of Power”, in Colin Gordon, ed., Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), chapter 8. For customary skill see John Rule, “The Property of Skill in the Period of Manufacture”, in Patrick Joyce, ed., The Historical Meanings of Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 99-118.

    [33] Babbage to Wellington, 23 December 1834, British Library MSS ADD 40611 f.181.

    [34] Babbage, “The science of number reduced to mechanism” (1822) in Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, p. 65.

    [35] Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, p.86.

    [36] William Fairbairn, Treatise on Mills and Machines (London, 1861), p. v; Samuel Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers (London, 1863). The Life of Clement is chapter 12.

    [37] K.R.Gilbert, “Machine-Tools”, in C.Singer et al., eds., History of Technology Volume 4 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958), 417-41; A.E.Musson, “Joseph Whitworth and the Growth of Mass Production Engineering”, Business History 17 (1975), 109-49, p. 115.

    [38] “Autobiography of Thomas Wood” in John Burnett, ed., Useful Toil: Autobiographies of Working People (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 310; Nasmyth, Autobiography, p.125.

    [39] Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, pp. 81-2, 97; Hyman, Babbage, pp. 125, 130-2; Nasmyth, Autobiography, p.130. For the move to Dorset Street, see Babbage to Clement, 18 May 1832, British Library MSS Add 37186 f.400. For Clement’s refusal to give bills, see Clement to Babbage, 18 November 1829, British Library MSS Add 37184, f. 419.

    [40] Hyman, Babbage, pp. 124, 128 and Jarvis to Babbage, February 1831, British Library MSS ADD 37185 f.419. The best discussion of the fight with Clement is William Ginn, Philosophers and Artisans: the relationship between men of science and instrument makers in London 1820-1860 (PhD thesis, Kent, 1991), pp. 157-69.

    [41] For state standardisation, see Julian Hoppit, “Reforming Britain’s Weights and Measures”, English Historical Review (1993), 82-104; for the fiscal-military state see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

    [42] Babbage to Wellington, July 1834, in Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, p. 104; Jarvis and Clement to Babbage, in Hyman, Babbage, pp. 131-2.

    [43] Wright to Babbage, 18 June 1834 and 13 January 1839, British Library MSS ADD 37188 f.390 and 37191 ff. 99-100; compare Hyman, Babbage, pp. 66, 107.

    [44] Babbage, “Notes for Economy of Manufacture”, University Library Cambridge MSS Add 8705.25 p. 10; Babbage, “Report on the Calculating Machine”, 1830, British Library MSS ADD 37185 f. 264 ; Nasmyth, Autobiography, pp. 148-9, 179. Compare Ginn, Philosophers and Artisans, p. 167, on the uniqueness of artisan skill.

    [45] John Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), pp. 224-5; Ian Inkster, Science and Technology in History (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 82-83.

    [46] Babbage, Economy of Machinery, p. 67; Charles Hotzapffel, Turning and Mechanical Manipulation, 5 vols. (London, 1843-1884), 2: 984-91; Nasmyth to Babbage, 22 June 1855 and Babbage to Whitworth, July 1855, British Library MSS ADD ff. 249, 366. The cartoon is in de Morgan to Babbage, 21 October 1839, British Library MSS ADD 37191 f. 256.

    [47] Cooper, “Portsmouth System”; Peter Linebaugh, “Technological Repression and the Origin of the Wage”, The London Hanged (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), chapter 11.

    [48] Cooper, “Portsmouth System”, pp. 213-14; Linebaugh, London Hanged, pp. 399-401.

    [49] Babbage, “On a Method of Expressing by Signs the Action of Machinery”, Philosophical Transactions 116 (1826), 250-65 and draft in Cambridge University Library MSS ADD 8705.21; [Lardner], “Babbage’s Calculating Engine”, pp. 318-319. For Lardner’s collaboration on mechanical notation with Babbage, and its publicity in Paris and Berlin, see Babbage to Dupin, 20 December 1833 and Babbage to Humboldt, December 1833, British Library MSS ADD 37188 ff. 117, 123.

    [50] Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, ed. Eric Hobsbawm ([1845] London: Granada, 1982), p.214.

    [51] Charles Dickens (1838) cited in Stephen Marcus, Engels, Manchester and the Working Class (New York: Norton, 1985), p. 31; Doyce in Little Dorrit, Book 1 chapter 10 and Gradgrind’s Observatory in Hard Times, Book 1 chapter 15. Babbage describes the three clocks in Economy, p.198.

    [52] Maxine Berg, The Age of Manufactures 1700-1820 (London: Fontana, 1985), p.229.

    [53] Babbage, Passages, pp. 230-2; Economy, pp. 115-16, 269-71; Babbage to Evans, British Library MSS ADD 37189 f. 18; Nasmyth, Autobiography, p.164. On workshop secrecy see Clive Behagg, “Secrecy, Ritual and Folk Violence: the Opacity of the Workplace in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century”, in R.D.Storch, ed., Popular Culture and Custom in Nineteenth Century England (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 154-79, pp. 156, 159.

    [54] For Smith’s invisible hand see A.L.Macfie, “The Invisible Hand of Jupiter”, Journal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971), 595-9; for Hutton’s system see R.Grant, “Hutton’s Theory of the Earth”, in L.Jordanova and R.S.Porter, eds., Images of the Earth (Chalfont St Giles: British Society for History of Science, 1979), 23-38.

    [55] Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W.P.D.Wightman, J.C.Bryce and I.S.Ross ([1795] Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 44, 50, 66.

    [56] For Stewart’s role see Anand C.Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment and Early Victorian English Society (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 22-28; Pietro Corsi, “The Heritage of Dugald Stewart: Oxford Philosophy and the Method of Political Economy 1809-32”, Nuncius, 2 (1987), 89-144; Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 38-41, 170. For Babbage’s close alliance with Stewart see Hyman, Babbage, p.55; Buxton, Memoir of Babbage, p. 350. In 1821 Babbage testified to the “influence which [Stewart’s] works on the Philosophy of Mind made in directing the course” of his own : Babbage to Helen Stewart, April 1821, British Library MSS ADD 37182 (thanks to Billy Ashworth for this source).

    [57] W.V.Farrar, “Andrew Ure and the Philosophy of Manufactures”, Notes and Records of the Royal Society 27 (1973), 299-324, p. 309; Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of Manufactures (London: Charles Knight, 1835), pp. ix, 42-44, 55-66 ; Hilton, Age of Atonement, p. 198; Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p.470; Evans to Babbage, 16 February 1835, British Library MSS ADD 37189 f.17. For Ure’s organic systems theory see Boyd Hilton.

    [58] William Cooke Taylor, Factories and the Factory System (London: Jeremiah How, 1844), p.11. For his presence at the BAAS see Cooke Taylor, Tour in the Manufacturing Districts of Lancashire, 2nd ed. (London: Duncan and Malcolm, 1842), pp. 223; for his ethnography see Christopher Herbert, Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 61-64.

    [59] Manchester as it is (Manchester: Love and Barton, 1839), pp. 201-2, 214-17, 210. For Nasmyth on the strikes see Nasmyth, Autobiography, pp. 222-8. For Manchester and machine tools see A.E.Musson, “Joseph Whitworth and the Growth of Mass-production Engineering”, Business History 17 (1975), 109-49, p. 113. For Chartist demonstrations see Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1984), ch.3.

    [60] Ure, Philosophy of Manufactures, pp. 20-21, 25; Manchester as it is, pp. 217, 32-33; Nasmyth’s parliamentary evidence 1867-8, in Maxine Berg, ed., Technology and Toil in Nineteenth Century Britain (London: CSE Books, 1979), p. 159.

    [61] Cooke Taylor, Factories and the Factory System, pp. i-ii.

    [62] Berg, Age of Manufactures, p. 243; Tine Bruland, “Industrial Conflict as a source of technical innovation: the development of the automatic spinning mule”, Economy and Society 11 (1982), 91- 121; Ure, Philosophy of Manufactures, p.367; Marx, Capital, p.563; William Lazonick, “Industrial Relations and Technical Change: the case of the self-acting mule”, Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 (1979), 231-262. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) was subtitled “the modern Prometheus”.

    [63] Engels, Condition of the Working Class, pp. 214-15, 39. Compare Marcus, Engels, pp. 135-7, 178- 99.

    [64] Cooke Taylor, Factories and the Factory System, pp. 1, 5, 77; James Kay Shuttleworth, Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes employed in the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester (London, 1832), p. 47.

    [65] Cooke Taylor, Tour in the Manufacturing Districts, pp. 140, 126, 139 and Factories and the Factory System, p.3; Nasmyth’s testimony in Berg, Technology and Toil, p.158.

    [66] Andrew Ure, Dictionary of Arts, in Manchester as it is, p.207; Ure, Philosophy of Manufactures, p.13; Marx, Capital, p.544: he had already discussed this passage from Ure in Poverty of Philosophy ([1847] Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), p.138 and Grundrisse ([1858] Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 690, where it is linked with Babbage’s Economy of Machinery.

    [67] Raphael Samuel, “The Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology in mid-Victorian Britain”, History Workshop Journal, 3 (1977), 6-72, p. 40.

    [68] Cooke Taylor, Tour, pp. 116, 123-4. For the strike see Mick Jenkins, The General Strike of 1842 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), chapter 2.

    [69] Edward Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture of Great Britain (London, 1835), p.460 and Peter Gaskell, Artisans and Machinery (London: Parker, 1836), pp. 7-9. For Baines see Berg, Machinery Question, pp. 103-4, 196-7; for Gaskell see Engels, Condition of the Working Class, p. 98.

    [70] Berg, Machinery Question, p.172; Hyman, Babbage, p.84.

    [71] Berg, Machinery Question, pp. 126-8. On the “property of skill” see Peter Linebaugh, “Labour History without the Labour Process”, Social History, 7 (1982) and Rule, “The Property of Skill in the Period of Manufacture”.

    [72] Whewell to Jones, 14 February 1843 in Isaac Todhunter, ed. William Whewell: an Account of his Writings, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1876), 2: 312-13; William Whewell, ed., Literary Remains (London: Longmans, 1859), p.25. See Berg, Machinery Question, pp. 130-133; Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 126; M.Norton Wise and Crosbie Smith, “Work and Waste”, History of Science (1989).

    [73] Official Gazette of the Trades Union (August 1834) in Berg, Technology and Toil, p.84; James Martineau at Liverpool, in Berg, Machinery Question, p.158; Humphry Price, A Glance at the Present Times chiefly with reference to the Working Men (London, 1838), pp. 3-5. Price was a Kidderminster priest who worked for Chartism in the west country.

    [74] Robert Owen, A New View of Society ([1816] London: Dent, 1927), p. 9; Engels, Condition of the Working Class, pp. 169, 204.

    [75] Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus ([1833] London: Collins, 1931), p. 232.

    [76] William Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics Considered with reference to Natural Theology (London: Pickering, 1834), p. 334 and Of a Liberal Education in General (London: Pickering, 1845), pp. 40-41. See Richard Yeo, “William Whewell, Natural Theology and the Philosophy of Science in mid-nineteenth-century Britain”, Annals of Science 36 (1979), 493-516.

    [77] Babbage, Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1838), pp. 32-43; Babbage’s first experiment with the Difference Engine, 18 May 1833, Cambridge University Library MSS ADD 8705.38 p.38. For the date of Whewell’s Treatise and his intention to single out William Rowan Hamilton as a notable exception to the irreligion of mathematicians, see Whewell to Jones, 2 February 1833 and Whewell to Hamilton, 18 March 1833, in Todhunter, Whewell, 2: 154, 162.

    [78] Lady Byron to King, 21 June 1833, in Doris Langley Moore, Ada Countess of Lovelace (London: John Murray, 1977), p.44; George Ticknor, Life, Letters and Journals (London, 1876).

    [79] Lyell to Babbage, May 1837, in K.Lyell, Life, Letters and Journals of Charles Lyell, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1881), 2: 9-10; Bowditch to Babbage, 21 February 1835, British Library MSS ADD 37189 f.28. For the Treatise and actualism see W.F.Cannon, “The Problem of Miracles in the 1830s”, Victorian Studies 4 (1960), 5-32.

    [80] Babbage, Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, pp. 108-19 and Passages, p.405.

    [81] Foucault, “The Eye of Power”; for Smiles on self-fashioning and system building see Thomas Parke Hughes, “Introduction”, in Smiles, Selections from Lives of the Engineers (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T.Press, 1966), pp. 9-25.

    [82] Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor, 4 vols. (London: Griffin, Bohn, 1861-2), 2: 6-9 citing Babbage, Economy of Machinery, pp. 10-11, 393-6. For Mayhew on the unproductive body see Catherine Gallagher, “The Body versus the Social Body in Malthus and Mayhew”, in C.Gallagher and Thomas Laqueur, eds., The Making of the Modern Body (Los Angeles: California University Press, 1987), 83- 106, p. 99; Herbert, “Mayhew’s Cockney Polynesia”, in Culture and Anomie, chapter 4.

  • BABBAGE’S DANCER by Simon Schaffer

    Introduction

    In a very well-known passage of Capital, Marx described labour as ‘a process between man and nature’ through which man ‘acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.’ Intelligence made the labour process distintively human. ‘What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees,’ Marx argued, ‘ is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax.’ In this paper, we explore the relationship between intellectual and manual labour in the culture which Marx himself studied, the industrial-scientific complex of early nineteenth century England. Like him, we ask (a) how such labour processes change human capacities just much as they transform nature, (b) how different kinds of workers can be said to build structures in the mind and (c) how intelligence can be embodied in the labour process. My paper focuses on the work of Charles Babbage, whose designs for thinking machines, minature factories to process numbers launched in London between the 1820s and the 1850s, now figure so largely in the standard histories of computers. This is a story about automata because such devices, capable of self-government and intelligence, helped people understand the new factory system and also Babbage’s intelligent machines. And this paper is about the place of intelligence and its display, because geography was crucial for the politics of the machinery system. When Victorians defined where the intelligence of a system was, they were defining where the political control of theat system was vested. Marx’s parable of the architect and the bee is important, both becasue it draws our attention to the problem of thinking and unthinking labour, and because it reminds us that the place where thinking happens is a key aspect of any working machine. Marx was Babbage’s most penetrating London reader, and during debates with the city’s workers about mechanisation in 1856, he announced the ‘all our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force.’ A year later, he observed that ‘it is the machine, which possess skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself a virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it.’ Within the ‘system of machinery, the automatic one is merely the most complete, most adequate form, and alone transforms machinery into a system.’ What follows is an attempt to examine some implications of this ‘automatic system’ by taking the geography of automata very seriously indeed.

    Calculator or Dancer?

    ‘They needed a calculator, but a dancer got the job’ (The Marriage of Figaro, 1784)

    In the steam-punk metropolis of Gibson and Sterling’s Difference Engine, the sickly Keats runs a cinema, Disraeli is a gossip journalist unwillingly converted to using a keyboard, and fashionable geologists visit the Burlington Arcade to buy pricey mechanical trinkets, ‘outstanding pieces of British precision craftsmanship’. Above them looms Lord Babbage, his original calculating engines already outdated, his scheme for life peerages on merit become part of everyday politics. Babbage’s dreams doubtless deserve this treatment from the apostles of cyberfiction – he touted his schemes in pamphlets and exhibitions all over early nineteenth century London. It was a city apparently obsessed by displays of cunning engines, enthusiastic in its desire to be knowingly deceived by the outward appearance of machine intelligence, and Babbage heroically exploited the obsession in his lifelong campaign for the rationalisation of the world.

    The enterprise of the calculating engines was certainly dependent on the city’s workshops, stocked with lathes, clamps and ingenious apprentices, and on government offices, stocked with ledgers, blue books and officious clerks – a heady mixture of Bleeding Heart Yard and the Circumlocution Office. But, as Gibson and Sterling see so acutely, it was also tangled up with the culture of the West End, of brightly lit shops and showrooms, of front-of-house hucksters and backroom impresarios. Put the Difference Engine in its proper place, perched uneasily between Babbage’s drawing room in wealthy Marylebone, the Treasury chambers in Whitehall, and the machine shops over the river in Lambeth, but at least as familiar in the arcades round Piccadilly and the squares of Mayfair, where automata and clockwork, new electromagnetic machines and exotic beasts were all put on show.

    It was in the plush of the arcades that Babbage, barely eight years old, first saw an automaton. Some time around 1800 his mother took him to visit the Mechanical Museum run by the master designer John Merlin in Prince’s Street, just between Hanover Square and Oxford Street. A Liègeois in his mid-sixties, working in London for four decades, Merlin was one of the best-known metropolitan mechanics, deviser of new harpsichords and clocks, entrepreneur of mathematical instruments and wondrous machines. His reputation even rivalled that of Vaucanson, the pre-eminent eighteenth century designer of courtly automata. As he rose through fashionable society, Merlin hung out with the musical Burney family, figured largely as an amusing and eccentric table-companion, and ‘a very ingenious mechanic’, in Fanny Burney’s voluminous diaries, sat for Gainsborough, and used his mechanical skills to devise increasingly remarkable costumes for the innumerable masquerades then charming London’s pleasure-seekers. To help publicise his inventions, Merlin appeared at the Pantheon or at Ranelagh dressed as the Goddess Fortune, equipped with a specially designed wheel or his own newfangled roller-skates, as a barmaid with her own drink-stall, or even as an electrotherapeutic physician, shocking the dancers as he moved among them.

    Merlin ingeniously prowled the borderlands of showmanship and engineering. He won prestigious finance from the backers of Boulton and Watt’s new steam engines. He opened his Mechanical Museum in Hanover Square in the 1780s. For a couple of shillings visitors could see a model Turk chewing artificial stones, they might play with a gambling machine, see perpetual motion clocks and mobile bird cages, listen to music boxes and try the virtues of Merlin’s chair for sufferers from gout. After unsuccessfully launching a plan for a ‘Necromancic Cave’, featuring infernal mobiles and a fully mechanized concert in the Cave of Apollo, he began opening in the evenings, charged his visitors a shilling a time for tea and coffee, and tried to pull in ‘young amateurs of mechanism’.

    Babbage was one of them. Merlin took the young Devonshire schoolboy upstairs to his backstage workshop to show some more exotic delights. ‘There were two uncovered female figures of silver, about twelve inches high’. The first automaton was relatively banal, though ‘singularly graceful’, one of Merlin’s well-known stock of figures ‘in brass and clockwork, so as to perform almost every motion and inclination of the human body, viz. the head, the breasts, the neck, the arms, the fingers, the legs &co. even to the motion of the eyelids, and the lifting up of the hands and fingers to the face’. Babbage remembered that ‘she used an eye-glass occasionally and bowed frequently as if recognizing her acquaintances’. Good manners, it seemed, could easily be mechanized. But it was the other automaton which stayed in Babbage’s mind, ‘an admirable danseuse, with a bird on the forefinger of her right hand, which wagged its tail, flapped its wings and opened its beak’. Babbage was completely seduced. ‘The lady attitudinized in a most fascinating manner. Her eyes were full of imagination, and irresistible’. ‘At Merlin’s you meet with delight’, ran a contemporary ballad, and this intriguing mixture of private delight and public ingenuity remained a powerful theme of the world of automata and thinking machines in which Babbage later plied his own trade.

    Merlin died in 1803, and much of his Hanover Square stock was sold to Thomas Weeks, a rival ‘performer and machinist’ who had just opened his own museum on the corner of Tichborne and Great Windmill Streets near the Haymarket. The danseuse went too. The show cost half-a-crown, in a room over one hundred feet long, lined in blue satin, with ‘a variety of figures inert, active, separate, combined, emblematic and allegoric, on the principles of mechanism, being the most exact imitation of nature’. Like Merlin, Weeks also tried to attract invalids, emphasising his inventions of weighing-machines and bedsteads for the halt and the lame. There were musical clocks and self-opening umbrellas, and, especially, ‘a tarantula spider made of steel, that comes independently out of a box, and runs backwards and forwards on the table, stretches out and draws in its paws, as if at will. This singular automaton that has no other power of action than the mechanism contained in its body, must fix the attention of the curious’.

    Once again, seduction was an indispensable accompaniment of the trade in automata. One of the most famous automata of the early nineteenth-century, a ‘Musical Lady’, was originally brought to London in 1776 by the great Swiss horologist Jaquet-Droz. His London agent Henri Maillardet put her on show after the turn of the century at the Great Promenade Room in Spring Gardens behind Whitehall: ‘the animated and surprizing Motion of the Eye aided by the most eloquent gesture, are heightened to admiration in contemplating the wonderful powers of Mechanism which produce at the same time the actual appearance of Respiration’. The accomplished lady’s eyes really moved, her breast heaved. ‘She is apparently agitated’, a contemporary remarked, ‘with an anxiety and diffidence not alway felt in real life’. Such shows often turned to titillating effect modish materialist philosophies which, in the wake of enlightened theories of sensibility and mesmeric strategies for restoring health, sought to mechanize the passions, and especially those of women. Maillardet’s adverts put love on sale:

    If the Poet speaks truth that says Music has charms Who can view this Fair Object without Love’s alarms Yet beware ye fond Youths vain the Transports ye feel Those Smiles but deceive you, her Heart’s made of steel For tho’ pure as a Vestal her price may be found And who will may have her for Five Thousand Pounds.

    The neat connection between passion, exoticism, mechanism and money permeated the showrooms. Since the 1760s, London designers, especially Merlin and his erstwhile employer James Cox, had built extraordinary automata for the East India Company’s China trade, opened shops in Canton where mandarins could acquire mechanical clocks, mobile elephants and automatic tigers, and thus oiled the wheels of the booming tea business. Maillardet and his partners joined in the market. But this lucrative eastern commerce languished, as after American independence and a huge reduction in the tea duty, the British entrepreneurs found it ever harder to balance imports of the precious leaf. Bengal opium and Indian cotton were now used to help pay for Chinese tea, and successive delegations to the Chinese imperial court failed to impose what they tended to see as rational economic relations. Cox’s firm went broke, and, while Weeks never quite managed to revive it, he ruthlessly exploited the appealing orientalist gloss it gave his Haymarket show. The word ‘factory’, it’s worth remembering, was used for Company store-houses in the Indies before it was used to described workshops back in Europe, and the automata shifted between both these worlds. According to Weeks’ advertisements for his machines, ‘these magnificent specimens which constitute almost all the labour of a long life, and were all executed by one individual, were originally intended as presents for the east, they have, indeed, all the gorgeous splendour, so admired there, and we can fancy the absorbing admiration they would create in the harems of eastern monarchs, where their indolent hours must be agreeably relieved by these splendid baubles, which however are so constructed as to combine in almost every instance some object of utility’. The slippery move between images of langorous oriental baubles and honest utilitarian labour defines the significantly ambiguous place the automata occupied in a metropolis equally impressed by the mechanical ingenuity, excess wealth and eroticised luxury which all marked its new world-wide imperium. This was an apt stage for automatic Turks, mechanical elephants, and clockwork women.

    The silver dancer never went on show at Weeks’ Museum, but stayed neglected in an upstairs attic. Blocked from the Chinese trade, and failing to win London audiences, Weeks’ Museum closed and its nonagenarian owner died in 1834. By now, Babbage was an engineer and entrepreneur in his own right, the heir to a fortune of over £100,000 from his banker father. Throughout 1834 he was in the toils of a disastrous dispute with his master-machinist Joseph Clement, a fight which soon ended with the abandonment of the Difference Engine project. At the start of the year, he presciently commissioned two demonstration models of the Difference Engine from the instrument-maker Francis Watkins, who also supplied electromagnetic and mechanical equipment to the new Adelaide Gallery of Practical Science, an exhibition of newfangled steam guns, clockwork model steamboats and telegraphic devices, in the Lowther Arcade just off the Strand and round the corner from Weeks’ old showrooms. And in the midst of these machine plans and troubles, Babbage also took the time to visit Weeks’ auction and buy, for £35, the long-lost silver lady. He painstakingly restored the automaton and put her on a glass pedestal in his Marylebone salon in the room next to the unfinished portion of the first Difference Engine.

    What was proper to a machinist’s storeroom was slightly risqu/ in the drawing room of a gentleman of science – the naked dancer needed a dress. Though he commissioned a new robe from local dressmakers, Babbage initially made do with a few strips of pink and green Chinese crepe, a turban, a wrap and ‘a pair of small pink satin slippers, on each of which I fixed a single silver spangle’. She was a hit, drew amused if slightly off-colour jokes from his visitors, and provided Babbage with the chance to teach a portentous moral about the decline of the industrial spirit in England. ‘A gay but by no means unintellectual crowd’ of English guests could all too easily be entertained by the dancer’s ‘fascinating and graceful movements’. Only sterner Dutch and American inquirers would bother to visit the Difference Engine next door. Babbage ever after used the divergence to teach his audience about the sinister contrast between foreign seriousness and domestic triviality, between the easy charms of the silver dancer and the demanding challenges of the calculating engine.

    Babbage worked hard to make, then exploit, this distinction between catchpenny and serious machines. He expostulated noisily and persistently against music machines, organ-grinders and steam-engines and published a long pamphlet, Street Nuisances (1864), describing the persecution he’d suffered in his once peaceful Marylebone home: ‘the neighbourhood became changed: coffee-shops, beer-shops, and lodging houses filled the adjacent small streets. The character of the new population may be inferred from the taste they exhibit for the noisiest and most discordant music’. Eventually ‘Babbage’s Act’ against street music became law: ‘a grinder went away from before my house at the first word’, reported Babbage’s friend the London mathematics professor Augustus de Morgan. And the barrier between popular machines and scientific ones had more than merely the advantages of domestic tranquility. The story of the silver dancer was partly designed to help contrast the appeal of fashion with the demands of manufacture. In the midst of his tortuous negotiations of 1834 about funding a new Analytical Engine, Babbage told the Duke of Wellington that the switch from the older difference-based design to the new mechanism was not to be damned as modish novelty. ‘The fact of a new superseding an old machine in a very few years, is one of constant occurrence in our manufactories, and instances might be pointed out in which the advance of invention has been so rapid, and the demand for machinery so great, that half-finished machines have been thrown aside as useless before their completion’. This was scarcely likely to mollify a penny-pinching administration, but throughout Babbage’s career he felt it necessary to explain to what he saw as an irredeemably puerile public how to spot the difference between the engines which could make them rich and intelligent and those which deluded them into the gaudy fantasies of tricksy parlour-games and theatrical delights. The inquisitive polymath Sophia Frend, later de Morgan’s wife, recalled that most of the audience for Babbage’s engine ‘gazed at the working of this beautiful instrument with the sort of expression, and I dare say the sort of feeling, that some savages are said to have shown on first seeing a looking-glass or hearing a gun’.

    The obscure objects of desire embodied in the automata were never self-evidently distinct from any of Babbage’s projects. For example, like the automata of Cox, Merlin and Weeks, the Difference Engine apparently was also an object of fascination to the Chinese, and one visitor from China asked Babbage whether it could be reduced to pocket-size. Babbage replied that ‘he might safely assure his friends in the celestial empire that it was in every sense of the word an out-of-pocket machine’. Indeed, in the later 1840s, when all his engine schemes had run into the sand, he cast about for new ways of raising money to revive them, including writing novels, but was dissuaded because he was told he’d surely lose money on fiction. One such entirely abortive scheme involved designing an automaton ‘to play a game of purely intellectual skill successfully’. This was at least partly an attempt to assert the very possibility of building an automatic games-player. Babbage knew, at least at second-hand, of just how seductive gambling could be – his close friend Ada Lovelace, Gibson and Sterling’s dark lady of the Epsom motor-races, lost more than £3000 on the horses during the later 1840s. ‘Making a book seems to me to be living on the brink of a precipice’, she was told by her raffish gambling associate Richard Ford in early 1851.

    The Games Machine

    Babbage’s attention turned to the prospects of a games machine. In a brief memorandum, he demonstrated that if an automaton made the right first move in a game of pure skill with a finite number of possible moves at each stage, the machine could always win. Such a device, he reckoned, must possess just those faculties of memory and foresight which he always claimed were the distinctive features of his Analytical Engine, the features which made it intelligent. So Babbage began to design an automaton which could win at noughts-and-crosses, planning to dress it up ‘with such attractive circumstances that a very popular and profitable exhibition might be produced’. All his memories of Merlin, Weeks and the Regency world of mechanical wonders came into play. As he reminisced in his 1864 autobiography, ‘I imagined that the machine might consist of the figures of two children playing against each other, accompanied by a lamb and a cock. That the child who won the game might clap his hands whilst the cock was crowing, after which, that the child who was beaten might cry and wring his hands whilst the lamb began bleating’.

    But there was, of course, a hitch. One point of his games machine was to raise money for the more portentous Analytical Engine, and Babbage soon discovered that though ‘every mamma and some few pappas who heard of it would doubtless take their children to so singular and interesting a sight’, and though he could try putting three shows on at once, nevertheless the mid-Victorian public simply weren’t interested any more. ‘The most profitable exhibition which had occurred for many years’, Babbage moaned, ‘was that of the little dwarf, General Tom Thumb’, Phineas Barnum’s famous midget money-spinner, displayed in 1844 before gawping London audiences at the self-same Adelaide Gallery where a decade earlier the Difference Engine models, steam guns and electromagnetic engines had drawn large audiences. According to London journalists the Adelaide ‘with its chemical lectures and electrical machines’ had by the later 1840s ‘changed its guise, and in lieu of philosophical experiments we have the gay quadrille and the bewildering polka’. So however apparently distinct, the fate of the automata shows and the calculating engines was remarkably similar, as metropolitan fashion switched away from the machines that could simulate human motions and emotions to the high life where the genteel tried these activities out for themselves.

    Ultimately, Babbage’s Difference Engine suffered more or less the same end as a whole range of Victorian automata, ending its days as a museum piece. In 1842, when the Government finally abandoned the project, Babbage told them it should be carefully preserved and ‘placed where the public can see it, for example, the British Museum’. In the event, in January 1843 it was put behind glass in the very middle of the new Museum at King’s College London, alongside a vast collection of memorabilia and eighteenth-century scientific instruments made for George III. For two decades, as Babbage bitterly remarked, ‘it is remarkable that during that long period no person should have studied its structure’. The Engine was briefly brought out for the London International Exhibition of 1862 and put in what Babbage called ‘a small hole, closed in and dark’, where scarcely anyone could see it and, so he reckoned, it would have needed about 800 square feet of wall space to lay out all the diagrams required to explain its principles. Such exhibitions were increasingly devoted not to machines but to their products, and rapidly became the Victorians’ favourite sites for display of mechanically-produced commodities. Babbage was told that he could have no more space for his calculating engines because of the room required for an appealing display of children’s toys. Once again, he reflected, the British had revealed themselves to be more interested in entertaining tricks than thoughtful engineering.

    This dismal fate was scarcely the sole link between the machine shows and Babbage’s engines. There was an even more intriguing one, since all these devices neatly captured the puzzle of mechanical passion, of the possibility that artifices could think and feel. In his essay on the games machine, interpolated in a chapter of his autobiography entitled ‘The author’s further contributions to human knowledge’, Babbage made the point in his characteristically pithy way. He asked his friends ‘whether they thought it require human reason to play games of skill. The almost constant answer was in the affirmative. Some supported this view of the case by observing, that if it were otherwise, then an automaton could play such games’. Babbage set out to show that an automaton could do just this. For example, there would always be occasions when the automaton was faced with two equally good moves. Then Babbage would program it so that a random number could direct the machine’s decision between them. ‘An enquiring spectator who observed the games played by the automaton might watch a long time before he discovered the principle upon which it acted’. In combination with his celebrated principles of foresight and memory, this principle of random moves programmed in advance governed Babbage’s stories about machine intelligence.

    From the 1830s, his favourite party-trick, for those who got bored watching the silver dancer, was to program his Difference Engine to print out a very long series of unchanging numbers and then suddenly switch to a new series. Was this not exactly like a miracle? he would ask his guests. In summer 1833 Ada and her mother, Lady Byron, the Princess of Parallelograms, saw the trick. Lady Byron described the encounter to William King, a rather conventionally pious Cantab she’d persuaded to act informally as mathematics teacher for Ada. ‘We both went to see the thinking machine (for so it seems). The Machine could go on counting regularly 1,2,3,4 & c – to 10,000 – and then pursue its calculation according to a new ratio. There was a sublimity in the views thus opened of the ultimate results of intellectual power’. The miraculous counting game was obviously a crowd pleaser, the implications of the machine’s discontinuous outputs were allegedly clear and radical, and at least one of Babbage’s guests, Charles Darwin, soon picked up the hint. Darwin saw that if apparently inexplicable discontinuities could really be the result of a system of mechanical laws laid down in advance, then here was a useful analogue of the way new species could emerge entirely through natural law. Indeed, for Babbage and his allies, this was turned into a definition of what made machines intelligent. They could foresee, they could remember, and they could switch their behaviour in ways which seemed random but were really determined.

    And in the epoch of the new factory system and Chartist strikes, this was also just how economic journalists lauded the new machines of automatic industry. In his oleaginous work of industrial reportage, A Tour in the Manufacturing Districts of Lancashire (1842), the free-trader William Cooke Taylor described a Manchester spinning-mule which ‘recedes and then returns so gracefully that I was almost going to say the effect was picturesque. I can assure you that the brightness of the machinery, which looks like steel, and the regularity of its motions, produce a tout ensemble which has a novel and striking effect. It seems to me that the machines can do everything but speak’. These machines had been developed in Lancashire, following strikes in the cotton factories, to give employers more control over the production process. Cooke Taylor piously observed that in these factories ‘the human agents work with all the exactness of machinery. So strange a combination of perfect despotism with perfect freedom never before existed, and to have produced such a state is one of the noblest triumphs of morality and intelligence’. There was no mistaking the moral that the intelligence belonged to the system, not the operatives. In his notoriously eulogistic Philosophy of Manufactures (1835), published little more than a decade after Mary Shelley’s novel, the Scottish science writer Andrew Ure lapsed significantly into the imagery of her Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus to describe the new spinning mule as ‘the Iron Man sprung out of the hands of our modern Prometheus at the bidding of Minerva – a creation destined to restore order among the industrious classes’.

    So machine intelligence was a central theme of the politics of manufacture, just as it was being worked out in the London showrooms and Babbage’s workshops. In his long drawn out contests with the engineers of the Lambeth machine shops, the dominant theme was precisely the kind of intellectual property represented by the calculating engines and the skills required for their construction. Babbage might try to keep street-organs and noisy proles away from his door, but he wanted the calculating engines indissolubly linked with his property, and even tried shifting the whole engine works from Lambeth to his own back yard. He told Wellington in 1834 that his ownership of the engines was complete, ‘for they are the absolute creations of my own mind’. But it had been a tradition of the machinists that all their tools belonged to the workmen, not the customers or masters, and it was thus an extremely sensitive issue as to which aspects of the calculating engines’ enterprise counted as tools, and which as finished work. It was not at all obvious to a master-machinist like Joseph Clement, the designer of remarkable new planing machines and facing lathes, that Babbage’s mind was the unique source of these engines’ value. The intelligence they embodied, therefore, was a prize contested by engineers, designers, proprietors and financiers, and intelligence’s place was a major aspect of the political geography of the industrial system.

    Babbage’s most successful publication of the 1830s, a thorough survey of this geography, charted in great detail the ways in which mechanization automated the production process and insisted that the division of labour could be applied to mental just as much as to mechanical operations. Copying machines were one of his principal themes, and he explained them by describing such automata as the Prosopographus and the Corinthian Maid, machines shown in the Strand in the early 1830s which could apparently copy the likeness of any sitter. Babbage explained that such shows really relied on a concealed camera lucida where a backstage assistant using a pentagraph linked to the automaton’s own hand could quickly produce a reasonably accurate portrait of the customer. Here intelligence turned out to be the result of concealed skill in alliance with ingenious mechanization. In all these places, indeed, the puzzle of thinking engines was wrapped up with the problem of selective vision. Cooke Taylor aestheticized the cotton factory so that its intelligence seemed vested in the machinery, not the labour force. Ure saw the machines as the immediate intellectual offspring of the manufacturers, just as his idol Charles Babbage claimed that the Difference Engine was the unique product of his own mind. Clement saw his own workshop as a place of intelligent skill and so refused to move his workmen and their tools to Marylebone, where they would be under Babbage’s immediate gaze. There Babbage’s calculating engines looked miraculously prescient because of his party-goers’ ignorance of their original programs. And, inevitably, the point of the West End automata was to mimic the actions of mind by concealing the springs of their artful design. To see such devices as intelligent, it was necessary to ignore, or conceal, or divert one’s gaze from, the machinations which drove them and the human skill on which they all depended.

    Babbage’s dancer was never just a gaudy trick. She was rather an alluring emblem of the aestheticized gaze of the impresarios of intelligence. The attribution of intelligence and reason to any machine depended on the perspective of the machine’s audience, and on the visibility of the labour on which its performance relied. Babbage’s friends told him that to play a game of skill needed human reason and so denied any automaton could do it unaided. They would always suspect that any automaton which could apparently play chess must somehow be accompanied by a rational human temporarily hidden from view. Babbage and his critics both had one spectacular and timely precedent, a notorious automaton chess-player, first shown in London in 1783-4 on Savile Row, and then again from 1818 at the showroom in Spring Gardens, where the charming Musical Lady also found her home. This chess-player was built at the end of the 1760s by an aristocratic Slovak engineer, Wolfgang von Kempelen, as an entertainment for Maria Theresa, and its subsequent career took it from central European court society to the more vulgar milieux of French and English showrooms.

    Von Kempelen himself never took the device very seriously, and frankly confessed it relied on a blatant trick. He temporarily dismantled it in 1773. Before then, guests at his house in Bratislava, just downriver from the Habsburg capital, were shown upstairs through his workshop, stocked with tools and unfinished projects for steam engines, perpetual clocks, and especially his favoured scheme for a speaking machine, into his study, decorated with antiques, curiosities and prints. There, in the middle of the room, stood a large cabinet running on castors, and behind it an impressive full-scale model of a seated Turk smoking a pipe. On top of the cabinet was screwed a chessboard, the object of the Turk’s fixed attention. Von Kempelen would open both the front and the back of the cabinet, revealing an extraordinarily complex array of gearwheels, barrels and pulleys. The custom was to shine a candle into the cabinet to show that nothing could possibly be hidden, and the Turk’s torso and legs would also be stripped bare. Inanimate Reason (1784), the significantly-titled publicity sheet for von Kempelen’s machine, reported that ‘you see at one and the same time, the naked Automaton, with his garments tucked up, the drawer and all the doors of the cupboard open’. Then, after von Kempelen had wound up the automaton, giving it enough power to run for about a dozen moves, the games would begin, the Turk gracefully moving pieces with his left hand, nodding his head when giving check, tapping the table and replacing any piece if a false move was made by his opponent, and bowing to the spectators when the game ended, almost always with the Turk’s triumphant victory. The ritual of open display and brilliant chess never varied. ‘Never before did any mere mechanical figure unite the power of moving itself in different directions as circumstances unforeseen and depending on the will of any person present might require’, and nowhere else in Europe did the relation between intelligence, mechanism and concealment become such a matter of public interest.

    The Mechanical Turk

    Innumerable pamphlets followed the Turk’s progress across Europe to London in the mid-1780s, where, having already been used in Vienna to bemuse aristocratic visitors to the Imperial court, and in Paris to contest the mastery of the chess wizards at the Café de la Régence, it now rivalled the shows of Merlin and Maillardet in Mayfair. The Turk’s arrival in western Europe coincided precisely with that of another Viennese guru, Franz Mesmer – while von Kempelen had the ability to build an automaton which displayeé human intelligence, mesmeric s/ances seemed able to reduce the most rational humans to the condition of automata. Indeed, von Kempelen seems first to have built the Turk to distract attention from Viennese interest in the phenomena of animal magnetism. Enlightened philosophers drew the appropriately arrogant moral: ‘these days’, claimed a gossipy German periodical in 1783, ‘physics, chemistry and mechanics have produced more miracles than those believed through fanaticism and superstition in the ages of ignorance and barbarism’. Others simply reckoned that von Kempelen must be dealing with the devil. Like Mesmer, however, the Turk was also the target of committed exposés. ‘The machine cannot produce such a multitude of different movements, whose direction couldn’t be foreseen in advance, without being subject to the continual influence of an intelligent being’. Some London commentators immediately alleged the automaton contained a child, or a dwarf, inside the box, without ever quite managing to explain where the diminutive prodigy lay hidden, nor did the hostile stories which appeared in such profusion yet damage the enthusiasm of the automaton’s public.

    On von Kempelen’s death in 1804, the Turk was soon bought by a brilliant Viennese musical engineer, Johann Maelzel, court mechanician for the Habsburgs and a close ally of one of their favoured composers, Beethoven. Maelzel swiftly saw the patronage he could win by trading on von Kempelen’s automaton, and the Turk became a temporary habitué of the new Napoleonic courts in Germany. E. T. A. Hoffmann, a fellow musician, found the figure of a mechanical Turk a suitably exotic subject for his pen, and in 1814 sent a Leipzig musical magazine a story entitled The Automata, in which he ‘took the opportunity to express myself on everything that is called an automaton’, teasingly hinting that the Turk might work by setting up a musical harmony with the mind of its audience. Hoffman used his story to debate the most up-to-date views of occultist German philosophies of nature, much devoted to the inner rhythms of human mental life, then turned his attention to the equally modish attempts to mechanize musical composition. Meanwhile, Maelzel threw himself into another lucrative mechanical project for regulating musical performance with a device he baptized the ‘metronome’. The metronome was, of course, a rather more potent means of mechanizing and standardizing artistic creativity than any mere chess-player would ever be: ‘an universal standard measure for musical time is thus obtained’, chorused the musical journalists, ‘and its correctness may be proved at all times by comparison with a stopwatch’. After furious patent suits with rival inventors, and complex negotiations with Beethoven, Maelzel established himself as the monopoly distributor of these newfangled musical timekeepers, re-purchased the Turk from the Bavarian court, and then, in 1818, set off on a marketing and publicity tour of Paris and London.

    Maelzel’s London show was very carefully staged. In autumn 1818 at Spring Gardens, in a pair of candlelit drawing rooms equipped with sloping benches, he displayed the Turk alongside a fine mechanical trumpeter, and when he soon moved round the corner to a larger chamber in St James’ Street he added a moving diorama of the burning of Moscow, ‘in which Mr Maelzel has endeavoured to combine the Arts of design, mechanism and music so as to produce by a novel imitation of Nature a perfect facsimile of the real scene’, and a set of automatic rope dancers, ‘scarcely to be distinguished from those of a living performer’, moving ‘with the utmost and correctness without any apparent Machinery’. Maelzel also helped realize his metronomic dream of a completely automatic orchestra, the Panharmonicon of 42 mechanized musicians, for which Beethoven had specially composed his ghastly Battle Symphony, a composition rather likely to appeal to jingoistic British audiences. One London paper praised such an orchestra which ‘displayed none of the airs of inflated genius, but readily submitted to being wound up’.

    The wind-up Turk, of course, occupied pride of place amidst these other wonders. Maelzel faithfully followed von Kempelen’s recipe, imitating precisely the ritual opening of the cabinet front then back, moving a candle round the interior, and winding up the mechanism at regular intervals. And his metropolitan audience faithfully reproduced their earlier enthusiasm for the show. Ever considerate to this public, Maelzel even announced that the Automaton would purposely make bad moves so as deliberately to lose if the company seemed bored with over-lengthy games, while the Turk’s opponents were ordered to move as fast as possible to alleviate the tedium. A pamphlet authored by a pseudonymous Oxford graduate alleged the whole trick relied on a hidden piece of wire or catgut: ‘it seems to be a thing absolutely impossible’, the Oxonian alleged, ‘that any piece of mechanism should be invented which possessing perfect mechanical motion should appear to exert the intelligence of a reasoning agent’. Unmoved by this futile revelation, during the summers of 1819 and 1820, when the London ‘season’ ended, Maelzel took his show to the provinces and to Scotland, with apparently equal success. Back in St James’ at the end of 1820, however, his nemesis was ready at last.

    Robert Willis was an ingenious young Londoner, heir to a distinguished medical family – his father famously attended George III during the monarch’s madness. In later life Willis himself became, like Babbage, a pre-eminent Cambridge mathematician, then distinguished professor of applied mechanics and untiring surveyor of ecclesiastical architecture. He also produced one of the best mechanical analyses of the principles of speaking machines, including those von Kempelen had tried to build. During 1819, still a teenager, he patented a new mechanism for harp pedals and toured all the major instrument-shops, including high-class machinists such as Holtzapffel and Bramah, and John Newman’s works, supplier of equipment to many of the best scientific lecturers in the city. Early in the year he noticed a telling advert placed in the London papers by one ‘Monsieur Novoski’ of Knightsbridge Post Office, who offered to sell the secret of the chess-player for 2000 guineas. Willis took up the challenge at once. He bought copies of the games the Turk had played and won. He made sure to visit Maelzel’s show while it occupied the cramped space of Spring Gardens, ‘more favourable to examination as I was enabled at different times to press close up to the figure while it was playing’. Then he smuggled an umbrella into the room so as to measure ‘with great accuracy’ all the dimensions of the Turk’s celebrated cabinet. He went back to St James’ for the 1820 season, and by the autumn had completed an obsessively detailed analysis of just how the ‘automaton’ really worked.

    Willis’ accurate umbrella and his command of wheel-work made all the difference. The chest, he demonstrated, was much larger than it seemed, giving more than enough room for a fully grown (and doubtless experienced) human chess player to fit inside. ‘Instead of referring to little dwarfs, semi-transparent chess boards, magnetism, or supposing the possibility of the exhibitor’s guiding the automaton by means of a wire or piece of catgut so small as not to be perceived by the spectators’, Willis’ Attempt to Analyze the Automaton Chess Player, finished in December 1820, proffered the simplest possible scheme of the Turk’s hidden intelligence. The noisy gear-wheels were there simply so that their sound would conceal any noise made by the concealed player. Even more influentially, he ponderously laid down the law of mechanism’s limits: ‘the movements which spring from it are necessarily limited and uniform, it cannot usurp and exercise the faculties of the human mind, it cannot be made to vary its operations so as to meet the ever-varying circumstances of a game of chess. This is the province of intellect alone’. Despite the care with which he drew the dramatic plates for his pamphlet, there was still some continuing debate about Willis’ story: for example, while he reckoned the hidden chessplayer put his arm inside that of the Turk, more reflective analysts guessed that the machine must use the kind of pentagraph which Babbage described in the case of drawing automata. These debates received their fullest publicity in the best-selling Letters on Natural Magic (1832) by the Edinburgh optical expert David Brewster. Maelzel himself left London, tried to sell the Turk in Paris, then went to the United States in 1825. Willis’ pamphlet was frequently reproduced there by newspapers eager to exploit public interest in the automaton. After Maelzel’s show had stunned Richmond and Baltimore, the local writer Edgar Allan Poe lifted Willis’s report directly from Brewster, brazenly passed it off as his own brilliant detective job in the Southern Literary Messenger (1836), then used it as a precedent for a whole series of rather more original, and certainly better-known, stories about the application of analysis to cunning mysteries, whether purloined letters or concealed bodies. Poe never forgot von Kempelen, nor his deceit, for in the midst of the California goldrush Poe teasingly announced that a New Yorker of that name, doubtless connected with the Slovak engineer, had discovered how to transmute lead into precious metal. If the Turk’s progenitor had this shadowy afterlife, its promoter Maelzel never came back to Europe – he died on board ship off Cuba in 1838 – and nor did the Turk, who went up in flames in Philadelphia scarcely fifteen years later.

    Moralists found the story of the chess automaton irresistible. The pious drew the obvious implication that if a genius like von Kempelen had not been able to build a rational machine, what must be the skill of the divine Creator who had pulled off this trick? Others sang the praises of the Turk’s hidden managers, now revealed as William Lewis and Jacques Mouret, who’d played chess so well and under such apparently overwhelming disadvantages in Britain between 1818 and 1820. George Walker of the Westminster Chess Club, writing in Fraser’s Magazine in 1839, mourned Mouret’s ‘beautiful emanations of genius’ when the Frenchman ‘burnt out his brain with brandy’ and died in Paris ‘reduced to the extremest stage of misery and degradation’. It was a commonplace that such machines belonged at court, whether in the Orient of the Arabian Nights or the grandiose palaces of the Tzars. ‘To the half-bred savages of the north’, Walker sneered, ‘the exhibition could not fail to be striking’. Novels and reviews told how the Turk had conned the powerful and humbled the great: ‘even Bonaparte, who made automata of Kings and Princes at his will, was foiled in an encounter with the automaton chess player’. Later in the century, a successful French play put the Turk on stage in a victorious contest with Catherine the Great. It was rather the point, so populist writers explained, that self-styled experts, the politically powerful, and the superstitious mob, could all be deceived by a mechanism effortlessly unmasked in public prints directed at a new and confidently rational readership. ‘Had the gulled mob reasoned on the matter earlier’, Walker noted in dangerously republican terms, ‘King Automaton would have been speedily deposed from his high places’.

    But the most telling lesson of the Turkish chess-player was the relationship between machine intelligence, technological progress and the puzzles of concealment. This was a moment when, as the Automaton’s admirers never hesitated to remark, ‘political economists amuse themselves and the public with the nicely-balanced powers of man as a propagating and eating animal and philosophers and divines often assure us that he is, in other and higher respects, but a machine of a superior description’. Correspondents from the London chess clubs predicted that ‘a man inside will most assuredly never again work the charm, but, advanced as science is during the present generation, a Brunel or a Stephenson could easily and successfully vary the deception’. And in the 1830s one economic journalist, describing the rapid growth and progress of automation in the Lancashire cotton industry, told the apocryphal story of the invention of the power loom, half-a-century earlier, by Edmund Cartwright. Cartwright had allegedly seen the Turk in London, trusted its purely mechanical origin, and thus been thoroughly convinced that a weaving machine could scarcely be harder to make than one which could play chess so well. Rather similar stories appeared in Poe’s favourite source, Brewster’s Natural Magic, which was dedicated to Brewster’s close friend Walter Scott and entirely devoted to teaching his fellow-citizens the inner secrets on which all apparently miraculous and surprising mechanical devices really depended. Part of the point was characteristically Presbyterian: gaudy tricks conned the ignorant into idolatry. Part, however, was economic. In his chapter on automata, Brewster devoted pages to von Kempelen’s chess player, summarised the other notorious stage-shows of the age, then moved straight to Babbage’s calculating engines themselves. ‘Those mechanical wonders which in one century enriched only the conjurer who used them, contributed in another to augment the wealth of the nation. Those automatic toys’, he concluded, ‘which once amused the vulgar, are now employed in extending the power and promoting the civilization of our species’. Apparently theatrical automata really had inspired the industrial revolution.

    Surrounded by stories which made the intimate link between the plausibility of mechanizing intelligence and the reality of automatic manufacture, it was scarcely surprising that Babbage’s new calculating engines, first seriously proposed to the new Astronomical Society in 1820 and first publicized in a pamphlet of summer 1822, should raise in such a lurid way the puzzles of mechanical intelligence which the Turk had just dramatised. It was also rather predictable that his reflexions on the intelligence of calculating machines should eventually culminate in a detailed analysis of whether chess could be reduced to a program and an engine whose inner workings would be completely hidden from view behind a gaudy exterior. In his public letter to the President of the Royal Society, Humphry Davy, written barely eighteen months after Willis’ pamphlet on the chess automaton, Babbage conceded that his own plans for a machine to ‘substitute for one of the lowest operations of human intellect’ might ‘perhaps be viewed as something more than Utopian, and that the philosophers of Laputa may be called up to dispute my claim to originality’. He was, as usual, absolutely right.

    The Chinese Room

    Babbage and his collaborators never found it very easy to teach their audiences just where the intelligence of the calculating engines really was. This became even more true when the Analytical Engine was launched in the 1830s. At the end of 1837, Babbage composed a long memoir on its powers, noting that ‘in substituting mechanism for the performance of operations hitherto executed by intellectual labour, the analogy between these acts and the operations of mind almost forced upon me the figurative employment of the same terms’. Phrases like ‘the engine knows’, he confessed, were simply irresistible even though they might be misleading. And the lengthy Sketch of the Analytical Engine, a joint effort of the early 1840s by Ada Lovelace and Babbage’s Piedmontese admirer, the mathematician Luigi Menabrea, urged that ‘it is desirable to guard against the possibility of exaggerated ideas that might arise as to the powers of the Analytical Engine’. It was a slave which could only follow what it was ordered to do, could originate nothing, was not, in fact ‘a thinking being, but simply an automaton which acts according to the laws imposed upon it’.

    But there were real dangers in the apparently innocent word ‘automaton’. Ada Lovelace, who in 1843 called herself ‘the High Priestess of Babbage’s Engine’, famously explained how it worked by comparing it with the best-known programmable machine of the automatic weaving system, the Jacquard Loom, a device whose introduction had almost completely destroyed the jobs of silk-weavers in London’s East End. ‘We may say most aptly’, she noted in the Sketch, ‘that the Analytical Engine weaves algebraical patterns just as the Jacquard Loom weaves flowers and leaves’. Lovelace never raised the problem of the substitution of weavers’ intelligence by a series of automatic program cards nor the consequent sufferings of London’s skilled unemployed. Instead, she directed her polite readers to the Adelaide Gallery, where they would see the Loom at work. But such galleries were scarcely likely to resolve the problem of exactly whether the engines could think. In fact, just as in Babbage’s reception rooms the Silver Dancer and the Difference Engine stood next door to each other, so at the Adelaide Gallery the Jacquard Loom ‘in daily operation’ stood in the next room to a splendidly automatic Chinese juggler. It was exactly in such places that the distinction between entertaining automata and rational engines was all too easily effaced, and it was there, too, that all the puzzles of mechanized intelligence were graphically put on show.

    There is a tempting contemporary resonance to these stories of dancers, Turks, chess and calculating engines. The currently canonical way of telling whether a machine is intelligent explicitly involves deceiving an audience in a manner all too reminiscent of Maelzel’s shows at Spring Gardens. The so-called Turing test requires the construction of a hidden device which can produce outputs capable of convincing human judges that it is one of them. Alan Turing, brilliant Cambridge-trained mathematician and veteran of the secret wartime campaign to crack the German Enigma code, was a keen reader of Babbage and Lovelace and much concerned with the problems of automating chess. ‘One can produce paper machines for playing chess’, Turing wrote in 1948, ‘playing against such a machine gives a definite feeling that one is pitting one’s wits against something alive’. In 1950, after a debate at Manchester University on the possibility of making intelligent machines, he wrote a paper proposing what he called an ‘imitation game’, in which a man and a machine would both feed typed answers to a judge concealed in a different room. Turing’s own life was soon destroyed by homophobic persecution, so it is intriguing that his first version of the imitation game involved judging which of two invisible respondents was a man, which a woman. In the later test of human and machine, if the judge could not tell which was the man, then the computer would pass the intelligence test. Turing’s 1950 paper explicitly discussed Lovelace’s ideas about whether the Analytical Engine could be truly intelligent, while in an earlier version he proposed, like Babbage, programming random elements into the computer so as to increase its capacity for innovative intelligence. Turing over-optimistically predicted that by our century’s end computers should have developed so much that they would win a five-minute game at least 3 times in 10, and public computer competitions, funded by a manufacturer of portable disco dance floors and directed by a behaviourist psychologist, are run nowadays in California on exactly the lines Turing set out.

    The Turing test is about concealment and detection. Its appeal hinges on the place where intelligence is to be found inside a space to which access is forbidden. In a celebrated paper published in 1980, the philosopher John Searle argued against the conventional interpretation of the Turing test. He proposed a device of which von Kempelen would have been proud, a ‘Chinese room’ occupied by a human being completely devoid of intelligence about Chinese but supplied with a set of symbols and rules which would allow response to inquiries from outside the room. Searle envisaged that such a system might pass the Turing test by being indistinguishable from native Chinese speakers to anyone outside. But neither necessary nor sufficient conditions could be given for attributing intelligence to such a system. In response to the suggestion that while the room’s occupant might not possess intelligence about Chinese, yet the entire system might be said to do so, Searle countered that the enterprise of artificial intelligence ‘must be able to distinguish the principles on which the mind works from those on which non-mental systems work’, and to judge that a system is intelligent just because of its imputs and outputs would force us to attribute intelligence to a wide range of non-mental systems. The parable of the Chinese room dramatises the spatial mode of such debates, by insisting on a definition of the place where intelligence might be said to reside.

    Here the geography of intelligence is not simply a matter of mundane showmanship, but also relies on the exoticism of distance and the esotericism of concealment. In many western myths of mechanical intelligence, with Chinese or Japanese, Turks or Nazis as their protagonists, aliens are automata, mindless subjects of tyranny; they build automata, because they possess fiendish cunning; and they conceal what they have done, because they desire to master us. In the world of Babbage’s Dancer, mechanical imitation seemed most at home in oriental climes of which rather little was supposed to be known and almost anything might be credited. In Turing’s world, as his brilliant biographer Andrew Hodges points out, intelligence meant secretive messages passed within a guarded coterie and the cryptanalysis of enemy codes as least as much as computers’ capacity to imitate human beings. At the end of Gibson and Sterling’s fantasy, the cunning orientals would inherit the Earth by mastering machine programming and British engines fail through dark conspiracies. There is, perhaps, a long-term political and aesthetic relationship between intelligent automata, orientalism and the covert. The tale of the automata and their impresarios confirms that the places whence machines come, where machines are put on show and the places within machine-systems where intelligence is supposed to reside raised, and still raise, delicate political and philosophical issues.

    Most of these issues hinge on the problem of work and its visibility. Babbage never reconciled himself to the workforce on which he relied; von Kempelen exploited preconceptions about the role of skill; Turing explicitly ruled out any computational task which required the use of a body. Much is made of the collaborative work required from human beings to make their machines look expert and intelligent in a recent book by the sociologist Harry Collins, Artificial Experts (1990). ‘One of the reasons we tend to think a calculator can do arithmetic’, Collins suggests, ‘is the natural way we help it out and rectify its deficiencies without noticing. All the abilities we bring to the calculation – everything that surrounds what the calculator does itself are so widespread and familiar that they have disappeared for us’. This is the point of the tale of the Dancer and the Difference Engine. The intelligence attributed to machines hinges on the cultural invisibility of the human skills which accompany them. In Babbage’s devices, the skills which surrounded automatic mechanization were systematically rendered invisible. Then and only then might any machines seem intelligent. The moral about the politics and geography of serious trickery is certainly worth remembering. If such machines look intelligent because we do not concentrate on where their work is done, then we need to think harder about the work which produces values and who performs it.

    Suggestions for further reading:

    Richard Altick, The Shows of London (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1978)

    C.M.Carroll, The Great Chess Automaton (New York: Dover Books, 1975)

    Alfred Chapuis and Edmond Droz, Automata (London: Batsford, 1958)

    H.M.Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1990)

    Anne French, John Joseph Merlin: the Ingenious Mechanick (London: Greater London Council, 1985)

    William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, The Difference Engine (London: Victor Gollancz, 1990)

    Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: the Enigma (London: Hutchinson, 1983)

    Anthony Hyman, Charles Babbage: Pioneer of the Computer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)

  • ADDING UP THE BITS by Vincent Porter

    The Changing Balance of Interests

    The laws protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs) will play a key role in shaping the economy of the information superhighway, or the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) as it is now called in international circles. Although the technologies themselves are protected by patent rights, it is the details of copyright law that will structure the market.

    According to legal theory in the USA, copyright was granted to serve the welfare of the public by promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. But in continental Europe, on the other hand, the author’s right was granted to protect the intrinsic human right of the individual author in works which he or she had created. In the final analysis however, the laws of copyright are not natural laws, but laws made by governments, at the national, the European and the international level. The same will hold true for the laws regulating traffic down the Information Superhighway.

    In both legal philosophies, the law has traditionally balanced the interests of authors, investors and the public. But that balance is changing as the author’s right tradition of civil law countries is merged with the copyright tradition of common law countries. Both at the international level and in the European Union, harmonisation has been achieved by raising the minimum levels of national protection and by limiting the rights of natural authors.

    Today, legal persons are increasingly recognised as authors. Neighbouring rights are almost as extensively protected as authors rights; and copyright now protects computer software and electronic databases, neither of which are truly in the literary or artistic domain. In addition, the term of protection has been extended far beyond that necessary to encourage science or the useful arts; and many works which were in the public domain have now been brought back into the marketplace, by giving them, like Lazarus, a new lease of life.

    In some countries, employers own the rights of their employees, while in others, investors can require authors to waive their moral rights. Elsewhere, the provisions in the Berne Convention which guarantee freedom of information and encourage learning are being restrictively interpreted. Finally, the TRIPS Agreement requires GATS signatory states to augment civil sanctions for breach of copyright with criminal penalties.

    Within the European Union the situation is even more complicated. In intra-Community trade, the provisions of the Treaty of Rome take precedence over those of the multilateral conventions. Each Member State must therefore afford equal protection to nationals of all other Member States in the European Union and European Economic Area, although once a work has been offered for sale on the European market, the right of authorisation in other Member States is exhausted. This does not apply however, if the work is performed, broadcast or communicated to the public. Finally, the exercise of copyright within the Union may also constitute a breach of competition policy, such as the abuse of a dominant position.

    As a result, the simple humanist certainties of the theory of the author’s right have been twisted and deformed, almost beyond recognition; and the pragmatic policies of the original proponents of copyright have been highjacked by investors to afford themselves protection far beyond that necessary to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. The precedence given by the European Union to competition law, over the manner in which copyrights are exercised, may eliminate some of the most gross abuses by rights holders of their monopoly powers over protected works, but competition law is an insufficient guarantee of public welfare. As yet, there has been inadequate consideration at the European level of the impact of these changes on the public’s right to receive information and ideas, which is guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights; or on the needs of educators. Furthermore, it is unlikely that when the new intellectual property regime is agreed for the GII, the whole world will accept the supremacy of European competition law. It will therefore be necessary to return to fundamental principles when designing the new regime. Unfortunately this will not be easy, as many of the rules are already in place.

    The Issues for the GII

    In designing an IPR regime for the GII, the international community has to address two major challenges simultaneously. The first is conceptual, the second is administrative. At the heart of the intellectual challenge is the digital nature of the signals transmitted. This means that signals can exist in atom-sized packets, they can be transformed electronically, they can be copied without loss of quality and they, or the copies, can travel with the speed of light.

    The ease with which a copy of a digital work can be copied, or transformed and the speed with which copies of digital works can be moved around the globe also poses administrative challenges. If a consumer acquires a copy of a work, is there any guarantee that it is authentic? Furthermore, if a deformed copy was supplied, or if an illegal copy was made, in which jurisdiction did the offence take place, and in which jurisdiction must any suit for infringement be brought? Finally, even if the international community can reach an agreement as to the appropriate jurisdiction in which an aggrieved consumer should bring a suit for the supply of deformed copies, or an aggrieved right holder should sue for illegal copying, the ease and speed with which works and their copies can travel between jurisdictions will mean that the minimum standards of protection become the de facto maximum standards of protection.

    Paradoxically however, I believe that if the international community addresses these intellectual challenges with foresight and imagination they can be overcome. But in order to do so, old thinking and old structures will have to be replaced by new structures. Essentially there are five key issues. They are:

    (a) the international dimension of the GII;
    (b) the subject matter of protection;
    (c) the appropriate right for protected works;
    (d) the authenticity of the work; and
    (e) the problem of enforcement.

    One of the potentially most exciting aspects of the International Superhighway is its international reach. But it is precisely this international reach that may cause problems for the protection of intellectual property rights. If the international community persists with the traditional approach of setting down minimum standards of protection for national laws, there is a grave danger that a two tier system will be established for the GII. On the one hand, there will be an international structure, like the present internet, where there will effectively be no protection of IPRs. On the other hand, there will be a series of national superhighways down which protected works may travel, protected by the copyright law of the country concerned. Even if international links between national superhighways were established by bilateral treaties, it would still be necessary to decide in which jurisdiction any alleged offence occurred. If the European Union were to agree to such an approach, the opportunity of constructing a genuine European superhighway would be lost.

    An alternative approach, would be to establish a new international law which protected all intellectual property rights on the GII. All member states would then compel their telecommunication operators to require all subscribers to obey these laws. The same law would then apply over all the GII. I submit that the new law should be distinct from, but related to the provisions set out in the Berne and the Rome Conventions. Furthermore, just as the protection afforded by the Rome Convention leaves intact and in way affects the protection afforded to literary and artistic works, so the new law should not affect the protection afforded by either the Berne or the Rome Conventions. I shall turn first to the protection afforded by these conventions.

    The Subject Matter of Protection

    Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention has a dual structure. It provides that:

    “The expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every production in the literary artistic and scientific domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as …”

    There then follows a long list of forms of works. In effect the list of different forms of expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings, dramatic or dramatico-musical works, cinematographic works etc., constitutes a mandatory minimum requirement for signatory states. But in addition, many states have granted more extensive protection within their territory to other pseudo-literary works, such as compilations, which are not universally protected.

    The TRIPS agreement also requires the protection of computer programs as literary works and the protection of databases if the way in which the data is selected or arranged constitutes an intellectual creation. In this, the TRIPS agreement echoes article 2(5) of the Berne Convention, which requires signatory states to afford protection to collections of literary and artistic works (but not data) “which by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations.” However, the TRIPS Agreement does not protect the data and any other material the database may contain, although in some states they may enjoy protection per se. As a result, negotiations are currently under way to establish a Protocol to the Berne Convention which, among other things, would afford protection to computer programs and to databases which constituted intellectual creations by reason of the selection, coordination or arrangement of data or other material. However some countries, notably the USA, also want to protect compilations of data or unprotected materials as literary or artistic works. Even though the US Supreme Court has already required originality in the selection and arrangement of materials in order to justify the protection of compilations, the US Government is still concerned “that many factually-oriented databases may be denied copyright protection or that courts may determine infringement in ways that severely limit the scope of copyright protection for databases.” But at the present time, it therefore seems unlikely that the international community will accept the suggestion of the United states to protect collections of data or other unprotected materials as literary or artistic works.

    One of the key difficulties for the international community is to agree a standard of originality. In general, the Anglo-American or common law system requires a relatively low level of originality for protection, whereas in continental countries, the civil-law system requires a relatively high level of originality. In some countries, database owners may also call on unfair competition laws to defend their interests. The solution of the European Union has been to propose a sui generis right of unfair extraction, although individual Member States still have different unfair competition laws.

    This caution by the international community in extending the subject matter of protection is wise. For the advent of digitisation means that it is necessary for the international community to draw a clear distinction between protected works and unprotected information. Because information can be digitised, it does not follow that it should be protected. Conversely, even if a protected work, such as a cinematograph film, can be stored or transmitted in digital form, it is more than mere information, and should continue to be protected. But in establishing the GII, there will need to be international agreement as to which packets of digitised information are protected and which are not. Under the present system, the answer varies according to the details of the national jurisdiction under which protection is claimed.

    The extent of protection may involve the interplay of at least three elements in a national law, none of which are precisely defined in the Berne Convention. They are the subject matter protected, the level of originality and the protection afforded by unfair competition law. There are thus essentially two options for the international community when it establishes the GII. The first is to continue with the present system. If so, the GII will be regulated by linked national jurisdictions, and thus as a series of linked national networks, analogous to the system developed for terrestrial goods and services. The second would be to establish a new international regime for the GII which would address its specific problems by putting in place new internationally agreed definitions of the subject matter to be protected, the level of originality demanded for protection and the nature of unfair competition in the supply and consumption of digitized works. The simplest way to achieve this would be to establish a separate international jurisdiction to protect IPRs on the GII, above and beyond national jurisdictions. If the international community were unable to agree on this, the European Union could establish its own autonomous European regime.

    The increasing ease with which digitised works can be distributed has led to renewed pressure for the introduction of a distribution right. The proposal for a distribution right was rejected by the Stockholm Conference in 1967. At that time, the view was that a right of distribution followed from the reproduction right, and it was therefore unnecessary to specify it separately. Furthermore, in many countries the right was deemed to be exhausted after the first sale of the work. The current proposal is to include a general distribution right in the Protocol to the Berne Convention which would be restricted to the distribution of physical and tangible copies.

    As for digital transmissions, when the work is transmitted in non-tangible form, there are currently two proposals at the international level. The first would be to interpret extensively the current provision for a right to communicate a work to the public. The point at issue here is that the right to communicate the work to the public has traditionally been thought to be the right to communicate the work to many members of the public simultaneously, as for example in a cable system. But other countries consider that this right covers the right to communicate the work on a one-to-one basis. By applying this right in conjunction with the right of reproduction, and possibly the right of distribution, the right owner could prevent illegal copying at the recipient end of the network.

    The other possible approach would be to extend the right of distribution to include digital transmissions. Either way, as the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention has already recognised, it would be necessary for there to be international agreement on the appropriate norms.

    A key difference between these two approaches is that the digitised distribution right for the work would be a new right, whereas the right to communicate the work to the public is an old right. This difference will be crucial in establishing the transitional arrangements from the old regime to the new regime. The policy issue at stake here is which will better promote the progress of science and the useful arts, the extensive re-interpretation of an old right or the introduction of a new right? If the international community extensively re-interprets the right to communicate the work to the public as a de facto digital distribution right, then the effect will simply be to create a new market for old works, not to encourage new investment for a new market. If the international community adopts this approach it will be the old rights owners, who already dominate the old markets, who will be the principal beneficiaries. But if a digitised distribution right is adopted however, it will be a new right. This would permit the right to be restricted to new works. If the international community wishes to encourage investment for new works on the GII, it would seem sensible not to extend the new right to old works, but to restrict it to works which are published after it has been introduced, thus encouraging new investment for the GII. Regrettably however, the European Union has already taken the opposite view. The Rental Right Directive awards a distribution right to all works which were still protected on 1 July 1994. This is simply creating a new market for old works, and new revenues for old rights holders.

    A particular variant of the distribution right is the rental right. In the TRIPS agreement, authors of computer programs, cinematograph works and phonogram producers were granted a right to prohibit the commercial rental of their works. States need not provide a rental right for cinematograph works however, unless rental practices have led to “widespread copying of such works which is materially impairing the exclusive right of reproduction.”

    The current proposals for a Protocol to the Berne Convention go further. They propose to introduce a rental right, not merely for audiovisual works, phonograms and computer programs, but also for any other literary or artistic work, such as writings, graphic works or databases, when the copy is in a digital format. The European Union has already gone even further by awarding a rental right to all authors, except those of buildings and applied art. Like the digital distribution right, the rental right would be a new right and if the international community has a genuine desire to encourage the production of new works on the GII, it would seem unwise to extend the right to already published works. As with the distribution right however, the European Union has already adopted the opposite approach.

    Linked to the general question of the distribution right is the issue of a right of importation. This would allow a right owner to prevent the importation into one country of a work which had been circulated in another. As yet there is no international agreement on the wisdom of introducing a right of importation. Those countries resisting the introduction of such a right have argued that once copies of a work were placed on the market the right of distribution should be internationally exhausted; and that for a right owner to control the importation of copies of works would be an unacceptable restriction on the free circulation of goods and cultural products, as it might restrict the flow of cultural goods across national borders by requiring that licenses for the use of works were negotiated on a country by country basis. Those countries which advocated the introduction of a right of importation argued that investors required the security of dividing markets territorially, that the long-term effect of allowing parallel importation would be to concentrate the international distribution system in the hands of a few major entities that can afford global presence to the detriment of small entities that sought to promote alternative markets. The absence of a right of importation would end the current system of supply from a plurality of sources; and it might contribute to illegal copying by allowing the piracy of lawfully -made copies of works which were intended for markets where the risk of unauthorised copying was less.

    At the heart of these discussions by the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention lies a deepening international debate in intellectual property and trade circles. Broadly speaking, net importers of products embodying intellectual property rights favour the international exhaustion of rights. In Australia, for instance, three successive enquiries carried out by the Price Surveillance Authority concluded that the right of importation had forced Australian consumers to pay higher prices for books, sound recordings and computer software than consumers in other countries, and had the effect of restricting the availability of copies to customers. Not surprisingly however, net exporters of products embodying intellectual property rights, such as the USA, favoured an importation right. Within the European Union, an importation right would be exhausted once the work had been put onto the European market.

    These discussions concerned the sale of physical and tangible goods, not the provision of services. As yet there has been no proposal at the international level to introduce a right of digital importation. If there were, the concept of a Global information infrastructure would be dead in the water. What would emerge would be a series of interlocking national information infrastructures. But if a right of importation were introduced for physical and tangible goods alone, two separate systems of international distribution would be put in place. One for physical and tangible goods which, except in the European Union would be divided nationally. The second for digitised goods and services, would be genuinely international. One of the outstanding issues still to be resolved, is whether a right owner should be able to use the proposed new importation right to prevent the importation and circulation of works which have been transmitted overseas in digital form via the information superhighway.

    The Authenticity of the Work

    One of the key differences between works which are stored or transmitted in digitized form is the ease in with which they can be transformed, or as their rights owners would say, deformed. A key aspect of consumer protection on the information highway will therefore be to ensure that the version of the work which is rented, or bought, is genuine and complete. This will be particularly important as the consumer, or perhaps more properly the subscriber, will be paying to see or hear the work before it can be inspected. In effect, the work will be electronically shrink-wrapped.

    One obvious way to tackle this problem would be to rethink the role of the author’s moral right, and in particular the right of integrity. The moral rights of authors have been virtually ignored in the headlong rush to international harmonisation. The USA has been allowed to ratify the Berne Convention even though its domestic laws afford virtually no protection for an author’s moral rights. In the United Kingdom an author can be required by a publisher to waive his or her moral rights. Under the TRIPS Agreement, although member states have to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, they are under no obligation to protect the moral rights of authors. Finally, in the European Union, all four copyright directives are silent on moral rights.

    Until recently, common law countries have had a sound economic argument for denying authors their right of integrity. If the rationale of copyright law was to serve the welfare of the public by promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, in most cases this required a marriage of labour and capital – the author and the investor. It would therefore be unwise to grant a right of integrity to the author, as it would be likely to discourage investment, for if the investor wanted to modify a work in order better to satisfy the needs of the consumer, the assertion by the author of a right of integrity could prevent this.

    It must be remembered however, that this argument only holds good so long as two conditions pertain. The first is that the investor can retain control over the integrity of the work once it has been put onto the market. This will now be difficult to enforce once a work is digitised. The second is that the consumer can inspect the work before purchasing it – by browsing through a book for instance. In some fields of exploitation, such as film exhibition, consumers have traditionally had no means of knowing whether or not they were seeing the integral version of a work, they have relied on the retailer, here the cinema exhibitor. But in others, such as television transmission, neither the investor nor the consumer has been able to prevent the work being interrupted by advertising commercials.

    One way to overcome these difficulties would be to augment the author’s right of integrity with a new right of integrity for a work when it was digitally transmitted. This right would be owned by the person making the arrangements for the production of the work, that is the producer. It would therefore encourage, not just the labour to create the work, but also the investment necessary to produce the work. In addition, it would provide the consumer with a guarantee of authenticity.

    The Problem of Enforcement

    I have indicated above, that if the GII is to be international, it will be necessary to harmonise the separate national provisions for the subject matter to be protected, the level of originality demanded for protection and the laws of unfair competition when establishing the GII. And that the best way to achieve this would be to establish a new international jurisdiction for the information superhighway. I now want to consider the separate, but additional, problem of enforcing those conditions.

    One of the major problems with the Berne and Rome Conventions was that there was no international mechanism for ensuring that national legislation in all member countries did indeed afford adequate protection for rights holders. This was one of the main reasons why the TRIPS agreement was included in the GATS. The dispute mechanism administered by the WTO was effectively superimposed over those of the domestic courts in all countries, in order to guarantee to rights holders the protections afforded by the Berne and the Rome Conventions. But this is a messy approach for three main reasons. First, the dispute mechanism cannot be invoked by an individual right holder, only by a national government. Second, there is a grave danger that a nation’s general trade policy will become embroiled in disputes over intellectual property rights. And third, the procedure is awfully slow and cumbersome. Although this approach has enabled the developed world to bring into line nations offering inadequate protection for intellectual property rights by threatening them with trade sanctions, these arrangements would be unusable for resolving IPR disputes on the GII.

    The TRIPS agreement also laid down new international norms for enforcing IPRs. No doubt these will be taken into account when establishing the enforcement provisions for the GII. However, the international community will also need to reach a common view on three further key issues if they are to resolve IPR disputes on the GII.

    First, jurisdiction. If an alleged offence occurs on the Superhighway, in which jurisdiction does it take place? If there is an unauthorised extraction from a database, does the offence take place in the jurisdiction where the database is located? Or is it in the jurisdiction in which the digitised information is finally stored? If a digitised signal is intercepted unlawfully, does the offence occur in the jurisdiction through which the signal was passing when it was intercepted, or does the offence not occur until the illegally intercepted signal is copied onto the interceptor’s own computer?

    Second, extradition. What, if any, arrangements will be made for the extradition of the alleged offender to face trial in the appropriate jurisdiction? What defence can an alleged offender offer in order to prevent extradition? If found innocent, will the defendant be given the right to receive adequate compensation for extradition, as well as for wrongfully suffered injuries, as provided in the TRIPS agreement?

    Third, enforcement. What remedies can courts impose? Can courts in one jurisdiction order the seizure of alleged offending copies in a second jurisdiction? Can a preliminary injunction be served in one jurisdiction against an alleged offender living in another jurisdiction? Can a court in one jurisdiction enforce a guilty party who is living in another jurisdiction to desist from repeating the offence?

    Clearly whatever system is set up, will have to balance the rights of defendants with those of rights holders. Yet the more international the dimensions of the alleged offence, the more difficult it will be to protect the interests of both parties. These problems of jurisdiction, extradition and enforcement would be far easier to solve if a new international jurisdiction was established for the GII.

    In future, users of the GII will effectively become subscribers to an international network. The rules of the network, including rules of enforcement, would therefore be established by international body which would be set up by governments. Subscribers will each have their own e-mail address, or subscriber reference. Writs of alleged offences could be served electronically, by the network management body, and the accused could also submit any defence electronically to the court responsible for the enforcement of network justice, without having to appear personally. Injunctions could be served and enforced electronically, and any fines could be added to the offender’s network charges. In the last resort, an offender could be banned from the network. For non-network offences, national courts would retain jurisdiction.

    Conclusion

    I have indicated above, that if the GII is to be international, it will be necessary to harmonise the separate national provisions for the subject matter to be protected, the level of originality demanded for protection and the laws of unfair competition when establishing the GII. And that the best way to achieve this would be to establish a new international jurisdiction for the information superhighway. I now want to consider the separate, but additional, problem of enforcing those conditions.

    I have tried to show in this paper that in order to establish an international GII, rather than a series of linked national networks, it would be sensible to introduce a new system of protection for copyrights on the GII. This would augment the current provisions of the Berne and the Rome Conventions, augmented by the TRIPS agreement.

    The new system would establish a common legal system for protecting these new rights. This would include an internationally agreed definition of the subject matter of digitised information protected, the level of originality required for protection and the details of a new law on unfair competition. Ideally, this new system would be established on a global basis, but if not, the European Union could establish an autonomous supranational system in Europe. Digitised information would remain free and unprotected unless it fell within the subject matter specifically protected by the international community.

    In order to encourage investment for new works for the GII, the new rights of distribution or rental should only to extend to new works. In this regard, the international community should not follow the precedent set by the European Union. In addition, the progress of science and the useful arts on the GII could also be encouraged, the distortion of digitised works discouraged and the rights of consumers protected, by giving investors in new works a right of integrity in the digitised transmission of those works.

    The GII could also be centrally administered as a self-regulating jurisdiction set up by the international community. Procedures would then be put in place to balance measures for the enforcement of IPRs, with the rights of defendants.

  • BASIC BANALITIES by Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron

    Common sense for the digital age

    Information technology has no destiny – it simply mediates social relations between people.

    Cyberspace is not a consensual hallucination, it is a construction site created by human labour.

    People create their own technology, but not in circumstances of their own choosing.

    Cyberspace is where the imaginary can become real.

    Artist-engineers must create virtual spaces fit for human habitation.

    The desire for union with the machine is fear of the flesh.

    Po-mo is retro.

    The electronic marketplace – spend in private.

    The electronic agora has yet to be built.

    Your taxes built the Net – thank the agencies of the state for their visionary planning.

    The information superhighway is a Keynesian jobs creation scheme.

    State, corporate and DIY – mix ‘n’ match the path to the digital future.

    Information doesn’t want to be free – but people do.

    Technology is not the issue.

  • HYPERMEDIA FREEDOM by Richard Barbrook

    Turn On, Log In and Drop Out!

    As with any other law, the Telecommunications Reform Act will face the problem of enforcement. The ‘War on Drugs’ hasn’t stopped Americans from voraciously consuming billions of dollars of illegal chemicals every year. There must be similar doubts about the practicality of the censorship measures in the new Act. Is the American state really going to be able to prevent its citizens saying fuck to each other in their private e-mails? How will it prevent people logging-on to Web sites in other countries with a less hypocritical attitude towards adult sexuality? The development of hypermedia is the result of the convergence not only of radio and television broadcasting, but also of other types of less censored media, such as printing and music. Why should the Net be subject to broadcasting-style restrictions rather than those applied to printed material? A long political battle is now beginning to find an acceptable level of legal controls over the new forms of social communications.

    Yet, at this crucial moment, one of the leaders of the principal cyber-rights lobbying group – the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) – has been gripped by an attack of ideological hysteria. In bizarre act of presumption, John Perry Barlow, the EFF’s co-founder, has issued a Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace. In this manifesto, he casts himself as the new Thomas Jefferson calling the people to arms against the tyranny of Bill Clinton: ‘the great invertebrate in Washington’. Claiming to speak ‘on behalf of the future’, he declares that the elected government of the USA has no right to legislate over ‘Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind’. Because ‘we are creating a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live’, Barlow asserts that cyberspace exists outside the jurisdication of the American or any other existing state. In cyberspace, only Net users have the right to decide the rules. According to Barlow, the inhabitants of this virtual space already police themselves without any interference from Federal legislators: ‘you do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society with more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions.’ Users of the Net should therefore ‘reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers’ and ignore the censorship imposed by the Telecommunications Reform Act.

    It is too easy to laugh at this Declaration as a high tech version of the old hippie fantasy of dropping out of straight society into a psychedelic dreamworld. In sci-fi novels, cyberspace has been often poetically described as a ‘consensual hallucination’. Yet, in reality, the construction of the infobahn is an intensely physical act. It is flesh and blood workers who spend many hours of their lives developing hardware, assembling PCs, laying cables, installing router systems, writing software programs, designing web pages and so on. It is obviously a fantasy to believe that cyberspace can be ever be separated from the societies – and states – within which these people spend their lives. Barlow’s Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace therefore cannot be treated as a serious response to the threat to civil liberties on the Net posed by the Christian fundamentalists and other bigots. Instead, it is a symptom of the intense ideological crisis now facing the advocates of free market libertarianism within the online community. At the very moment that cyberspace is about to become opened up to the general public, the individual freedom which they prized in the Net seems about to be legislated out of existence with little or no political opposition. Crucially, the lifting of restrictions on market competition hasn’t advanced the cause of freedom of expression at all. On the contrary, the privatisation of cyberspace seems to be taking place alongside the introduction of heavy censorship. Unable to explain this phenomenon within the confines of the Californian Ideology, Barlow has decided to escape into neo-liberal hyper-reality rather than face the contradictions of really existing capitalism.

    Cyberspace – the Final Frontier

    The ideological bankruptcy of the West Coast libertarians derives from their historically inaccurate belief that cyberspace has been developed by the ‘left-right fusion of free minds with free markets’ (Louis Rossetto, editor-in-chief of Wired Magazine). As Andy Cameron and I showed in our article, Californian Ideology, neo-liberalism has been embraced by the West Coast version of Kroker and Weinstein’s virtual class as a way of reconciling the anarchism of the New Left with the entrepreneurial zeal of the New Right. Above all, this weird hybrid has relied on projecting old myths about the American revolution onto the process of digital convergence. According to Wired Magazine, the development of hypermedia would create a high tech ‘Jeffersonian Democracy’ – the eighteenth century will be reborn in the twenty-first century.

    In his Declaration, John Perry Barlow consciously mimics the rhetoric of the Founding Fathers’ Declaration of Independence of the United States. Once again, free-spirited individuals are standing up to an oppressive and corrupt government. However, these revolutionary phrases from the past contain within them many reactionary aspirations. Back in 1776, Jefferson expressed the national dream of building a rural utopia in the wilderness of America. The winning of independence from Britain was necessary so that Americans could live as independent, self-sufficent farmers in small villages. Jefferson’s pastoral vision rejected city-life as the source of corruption – which he saw in the rapidly expanding conurbations of contemporary Europe. But, as America itself began to industrialise, the pastoral dream had to be displaced westwards towards the frontier. Even after the Indian wars had ended, the Wild West remained a place of individual freedom and self-discovery in American mythology. Jefferson had become a cowboy.

    By its name, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is therefore invoking not just the cowboy myths of the last century, but also the pastoral fantasies of the writer of the original Declaration of Independence. When American government agencies first decided to crack down on hackers, a group of old radicals decided to defend the new generation of cyberpunks. Out of this act of solidarity, the EFF emerged as the political lobby group of the West Coast cyber-community. Using libertarian arguments, it campaigned for minimal censorship and regulation over the new information technologies. But, the EFF was never just a campaign for cyber-rights. It was also a leading cheerleader for the individualist fantasies of the Californian Ideology. According to the tenets of this confused doctrine, hippie anti-authoritianism is being finally realised through the fusion of digital technologies with free market liberalism. However, this inevitable rebirth of Jeffersonian Democracy now seems to have been postponed. Above all, the lobbying work of the EFF appears to have been frustrated – the repressive measures in the Telecommunications Reform Act passed with almost no opposition in the legislature or from the executive. At this moment of crisis, Barlow has embraced the wildest fantasies of the West Coast anarcho-capitalists. Once encryption is widely available, they believe that free-spirited individuals will be able to live within a virtual world free from censorship, taxes and all the other evils of big government. Unable to face the social contradictions of living within the digital city, Barlow has decided to join the virtual cowboys living on the electronic frontier.

    If This is the Electronic Frontier, Who Are the Indians?

    It is no accident that Barlow mimics Jefferson for this retro-futurist programme. Unlike Europeans who fantasied about rural utopias, Jefferson never rejected technology along with the city. On the contrary, the ‘sage of Monticello’ was an enthusiastic proponent of technological innovation. Crucially, he believed that it was possible to freeze the social development of the United States while simultaneously modernising its methods of production. The proponents of the Californian Ideology follow a similar logic. They wish to preserve cyberspace as the home of rugged individuals and innovative entrepreneurs while at the same time supporting the commercial expansion of the Net. For them, the development of the new information society can only take place through the realisation of the eternal principles of liberalism revealed by the Founding Fathers. Yet, like all other countries, the United States exists within profane history. Its political and economic structures are the result of centuries of contradictory social processes, not the expression of sacred truths. Its leaders were complex human beings, not one-sided ‘men of marble’.

    This dialectical reality can be most easily seen by looking at the lives of those Founding Fathers – Jefferson, Washington and Madison – invoked by Barlow in his Declaration. On the one hand, they were great revolutionaries who successfully won national independence and established constitutional government in America. Yet, at the same time, they were vicious plantation-owners who lived off the forced labour of their slaves. In other countries, people have come to terms with the contradictory nature of their modernising revolutionaries. Even Chinese Communist Party now admits that Mao Zedong’s legacy contains both positive elements, such as the liberation of the country from colonialism, and negative features, such as the massacres of the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, Barlow – and many other Americans – can never acknowledge that their beloved republic wasn’t just created by hard-working, freedom-loving farmers, but also through the slavery of millions of Africans and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of indigenous peoples. The plantation economy of the Old South and the extermination of the First Nations are the equivalents of the Irish Famine, the Holocaust and the Gulag Archipelago in American history. But, these contradictions of the real history of the USA are too painful to contemplate for Barlow and other believers in the ahistorical truths of liberal individualism. Jefferson must remain as an unsullied portrait chiselled into the face of Mount Rushmore.

    Yet, in understanding contemporary debates over the future of the Net, it is important to remember the contradictory nature of historical precedents glibly invoked by the Californian Ideology. Back in the early nineteenth century, the spread of the new industrial technologies freed no slaves. On the contrary, the invention of the cotton gin and mechanical spinning machines actually reinforced the archaic and brutal institutions of slavery in the Old South. Nowadays, the libertarian rhetoric of individual empowerment through new information technologies is similarly used to hide the reality of the growing polarisation between the largely white virtual class and the mainly dark-skinned underclass. If interpreted with a European sense of irony, Jeffersonian Democracy can be an appropriate metaphor for the dystopian present found in the inner cities of the USA!

    The First Electronic Frontier

    Because the liberal principles of Jeffersonian Democracy exist outside real history, Barlow and other Californian ideologues cannot recognise the temporal dynamics of really existing capitalism. Although new frontiers may be opened up by enterprising individuals, the original pioneers are quickly replaced by more collective forms of organisation, such as joint-stock companies. For instance, the free-spirited cowboys of the Wild West soon ended up as employees of agri-businesses financed by the industrialised East. A similar process occured in the first electronic frontier in American history: radio broadcasting. Back in the early 1920s, radio was initially developed by an enthusiastic minority of amateurs and entrepreneurs. With few restrictions over broadcasting, almost anyone could either set up their own station or rent airtime on somebody else’s. Yet, once cheap radio receivers became widely available, the airwaves were rapidly taken over by the corporate networks provided by NBC and CBS. This process of monopolisation was consolidated by the Federal government through the 1927 Radio Act which restricted broadcasting to the holders of licences granted by a state-appointed regulatory body. Not surprisingly, conservative politicians seized the opportunity to silence political and cultural radicals, especially from the Left. However, this imposition of censorship encountered little popular disapproval. On the contrary, most voters supported the Radio Act because the licencing system ensured that the popular programmes of the national networks could be heard clearly without interference from other stations. The democratisation of the availability of radio broadcasting had ironically removed most opportunities for participation within the new media.

    The key question now is whether the new electronic frontier of cyberspace is condemned to follow the same path of development. Contrary to Barlow’s assertion that cyberspace is not a ‘public construction project’, the principal obstacle to the expansion of the Net in the USA is the problem of who pays for the building of the fibre-optic grid. Given that they refuse to provide state investment, the Democrats and Republicans have had to use the new Telecommunications Reform Act to create a regulatory framework friendly to the large corporations which possess the capital needed for the construction of the infobahn. Above all, both parties have given their blessing to the growing number of mergers between companies operating within the converging sectors of the media, computing and telecommunications. Because it has lost its competitive edge in its traditional Fordist industries, the American economy now relies heavily on companies at the centre of the process of digital convergence, such as the Hollywood studios, Microsoft and AT&T. Far from encouraging a Jeffersonian Democracy composed of small businesses, the Telecommunications Reform Act has cleared the way for the emergence of American ‘national champions’ which have sufficent size both to build the infobahn at home and to compete successfully abroad against their European and Asian rivals.

    For many on the Left, these multi-media corporations are the greatest threat to free speech on the Net. As happened in radio – and later television – broadcasting, the desire to attract a mass audience can be a far more effective method of inhibiting political radicalism and cultural experimentation than any half-baked censorship provisions tacked onto the end of a Telecommunications Reform Act. The Neo-Luddite pessimists have their worst fears confirmed when corporate leaders openly proclaim their aim to transform the Net into ‘interactive television’. In this scenario, the new forms of sociability existing within contemporary cyberspace would be replaced by the passive consumption of pop entertainment and biased information provided by multi-media corporations. Despite their disingenuous protests against the anti-pornography provisions in the new Act, these corporations cannot be too sad to see the introduction of regulations which would turn the Net into a safe – and therefore profitable – form of family fun.

    In this vision of the future, Jeffersonian Democracy is simply neo-liberal propaganda designed to win support for the privatisation of cyberspace from the members of the virtual class. By promiscuously mixing New Left and New Right together, the Californian Ideology attracts those individuals who hope that they’re smart – or lucky – enough to seize the opportunities presented by the rapid changes in the technological basis of social production. But, while they’re being sold the dream of making it big as cyber-entrepreneurs, most digital artisans are, in reality, denied the employment security previously enjoyed by workers in Fordist industries. Far from being self-sufficent pioneers on the electronic frontier, many end up living hand-to-mouth from one short-term corporate contract to another. Similarly, the privatisation of cyberspace also threatens community uses of cyberspace. As more commercial money is spent on providing online services, it becomes increasingly difficult for amateurs to create Web sites of sufficient quality to attract large number of users. Yet, as happened in 1920s radio broadcasting, many people will happily accept corporate control over cyberspace if they are provided with well-produced online services. According to the Neo-Luddites, the democratisation of the availability of the Net is removing most opportunities for meaningful participation within cyberspace.

    Cyberspace is Social

    The current controversy in the USA over the Telecommunications Reform Act has cruelly exposed the limitations of the Californian Ideology. Barlow may dream of escaping into the hyper-reality of cyberspace, but he is simply trying to avoid facing the political and economic contradictions of really existing capitalism. Far from producing an electronic frontier composed of many small businesses, the commercialisation of cyberspace is creating the conditions for the concentration of capital on a global scale. Given the huge costs of building a national broadband network, only very large corporations can mobilise enough investment to carry out this infrastructure project. Within this emerging oligopoly, innovative entrepreneurs will still achieve public prominence as either leaders of big businesses or as sub-contractors of the multi-media corporations. But their individual success will only be made possible through the huge collective effort to build the infobahn. The dynamics of digital convergence within really existing capitalism are pushing towards the ever increasing socialisation of production and communications, not the realisation of 18th century fantasies of individual self-sufficiency.

    It is therefore rather one-sided for the EFF to direct its criticisms solely against the anti-pornography regulations contained within the new Telecommunications Reform Act. Freedom of expression on the Net is not only threatened by the state, but also by the market. As shown by the history of radio broadcasting in the USA, these two forms of censorship have often been imposed in parallel. Both politicians and corporations have a common interest in ensuring that middle America is not disturbed by any radical political and cultural ideas emanating from new forms of mass communications. Therefore, any meaningful campaign for digital rights has to fight for freedom of expression against both state and market forms of censorship. The development of the Net offers a way of overcoming the political and economic restrictions on free speech within the existing media. Everyone could have the opportunity not only to receive information and entertainment, but also to transmit their own productions. The problem is how this potentiality will be realised.

    A campaign for hypermedia freedom can only be successful if it recognises the inherent contradictions within this fundamental right of citizens. The political rights of each individual are circumscribed by the rights of other citizens. For instance, in order to protect children, the state has a duty to restrict the freedom of speech of paedophiles on the Net. Because ethnic minorities have the right to live in peace, the democratic republic should try to prevent violent fascists from organising online. But, apart from these minimal restrictions, citizens do have the right to say what they like to each other. A democratic state certainly has no mandate to impose a narrow religious morality on all its citizens regardless of their own beliefs.

    Similarly, a campaign for digital rights must also recognise the economic contradictions within hypermedia freedom. Because they use amateur labour, community hypermedia projects can happily exist within the hi-tech gift economy. But, if digital artisans are to be paid for their work, some form of commodity exchange will have to be created within the Net. However, the dominance of the free market will inhibit the free circulation of ideas. Therefore demands for digital rights have to engage with the economic contradictions of hypermedia freedom. Above all, they cannot take absolutist positions over the shape of the information economy. On the contrary, the development of cyberspace has so far been carried out through a hybrid of public, private and community initiatives. All sectors have played an important role in the construction of the infobahn. But, in the new Telecommunications Reform Act, Americans now face the problem of the wrong type of government action, rather than too much state intervention. While it seems all too eager to impose moral censorship on Net users, the Federal government has simultaneously shirked its duty to ensure that all citizens can have access to online services. While the corporations may possess the resources to build the broadband network, the state should use its powers to prevent any section of society being excluded from cyberspace for lack of resources.

    Contrary to the predictions of the pessimists, it is possible to win the struggle against both the political and economic censorship of cyberspace. Although the state can – and should – prosecute the small minority of paedophiles and fascists, the resources needed to spy on everyone’s email and Web sites will make the imposition of moral puritanism very difficult to enforce. Even with sophisticated censorship programs, the sheer volume of Net traffic should eventually overwhelm even a well-funded surveillance body. While it might just about be possible to regulate the output of thousands of radio and television stations, the sheer cost of employing humans to vet the many millions of users logging onto a global network of online services would be prohibitive. The social nature of hypermedia is the best defence of the individual’s right of freedom of expression.

    Similarly, the corporation’s ambition to buy up the whole of cyberspace will also be checked by the social basis of the process of convergence. For instance, the recent trials of interactive television have been commercial failures. As Andy Cameron points out in Dissimulations, the corporate cheerleaders are trapped within a category mistake: they’re trying to impose the form of earlier media onto the new hypermedia. Above all, interactivity can’t be restricted to clicking through a series of menu options. Most people want to meet other people within cyberspace. Unlike the existing electronic media, the Net is not centred on the one-way flow of communications from a limited number of transmitters. On the contrary, hypermedia is a two-way form of communications where everybody is both a receiver and a transmitter. The multi-media corporations will undoubtedly play a leading role in building the infrastructure of the infobahn and selling information commodities over the Net, but they will find it impossible to monopolise the social potential of cyberspace.

    Over recent years, the advocates of the Californian Ideology have been claiming that 18th century liberal individualism would be miraculously reborn through the process of digital convergence. Yet, now online services are becoming available to the mass of the population, the collective nature of the new information society is becoming increasingly obvious. Within politics, electronic democracy will be at the centre of the relationship between representatives and their voters. Within all sectors of the economy, the infobahn will soon become the basic infrastructure for collaborative work across time and space. Crucially, this socialisation of politics and economics will be the best protection for individual freedom within cyberspace. Far from having to escape into a neo-liberal hyper-reality, people can utilise the new digital technologies to enhance their lives both inside and outside cyberspace. The electronic agora is yet to be built.