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  • AppCoins Price Prediction: How Much Will APPC Be Worth in 2025?

    Despite this downturn, we anticipate a short-term recovery in the coming week as
    traders capitalize on the dip as a buying opportunity for APPC. These predictions are based on a variety of factors, including historical price action, market sentiment, technological advancements, and regulatory developments. The projected trading range for AppCoins https://cryptolisting.org/ (APPC) in 2029 suggests a minimum trading price of $0.0144. Looking ahead to the year 2026, based on the observed growth patterns of the AppCoins price movement, APPC could potentially reach a maximum price of $0.0057. Meanwhile, the critical supports could be located around $1.10, $1.00, and $0.90 if the selling volume keeps increasing.

    Join us today and elevate your trading strategy to new heights with
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    endeavors. appc coin price prediction Don’t miss out on this opportunity to take your trading game to the next
    level, sign up now. Over the past 7 days, AppCoins has exhibited bearish tendencies, as the coin
    has experienced a decline of
    0.49%
    .

    Investors should conduct their own research and analysis before making any investment decisions. You should also be aware of the potential for loss, and only invest what you can afford to lose. However, Bitcoin Minetrix (BTCMTX) stands out as an exceptional alternative to Bitcoin. Remarkably, this token has garnered nearly $6.7 million during its presale, prompting traders to explore investment opportunities. Meanwhile, Irtaza Ali also mentioned to his 8.8k followers in his X account that the confirmation of a breakout and subsequent retest of a multi-year descending trend line for ApeCoin (APE) has occurred.

    1. Bitcoin
      BTC
      has suddenly rebounded from a crash under $40,000 per bitcoin, climbing back from what some thought was a “critical” price level.
    2. Technical
      analysis and chart patterns can provide insight, but predictions on our website
      should be viewed as directional indicators rather than definitive forecasts.
    3. Nevertheless, the 9-day moving average remains below the 21-day moving average revealing that the market may gain more upwards if faces the north.
    4. AppCoins’s current circulating supply is 239.81M APPC out of max supply of 239.81M APPC.

    This chart shows long-term APPC crypto price prediction for the next several years 2025, 2030, and 2040. Trading and investing in digital assets is highly speculative and comes with many risks. The analysis / stats on CoinCheckup.com are for informational purposes and should not be considered investment advice.

    Is AppCoins a good buy in 2024?

    When the price falls below the lower band, it may indicate that the asset is oversold and a buy signal. Historically the price of APPC last day of January was above the open price three times out of 6, and 3 out of 6 the price was lower than the price at the start of the month. The best month for AppCoins has been October for the last seven years, five times the price of APPC at the end of October was higher than the price at the start of the month. The worst month is June, six times out of 7, the price at the end of June was lower than starting price. The 14-day relative strength index (RSI) is currently at 41.64, indicating Natural conditions in the market without being oversold or overbought.

    AppCoins Price Prediction Visual

    The circulating supply for AppCoins
    is 0, resulting in a total market cap
    of $0. If you are keen to explore AppCoins price predictions for 2025, 2030, 2040, and even 2050, this is the perfect place to start. âš  Trading cryptocurrencies involves risk, and may not be suitable for all investors. Cryptocurrency prices can be volatile and unpredictable, and may be influenced by various factors, including market manipulation, regulatory changes, and technological developments. ApeCoin (APE) price is currently undergoing a rebound following a period of consolidation, even amidst the impact of Bitcoin (BTC) exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on other altcoins.

    As interest in the metaverse and gaming narrative intensifies, APE seems to be garnering support to counter increasing selling pressure. Additionally, positive social dominance and volume metrics are bolstering altcoins, especially as the gaming narrative gains momentum. When trying to make a AppCoins forecast, many traders also try to monitor the activity of APPC “whales”, which are entities and individuals that control large amounts of APPC. Since the AppCoins market is relatively small compared to traditional markets, “whales” can single-handedly have a big influence on AppCoins’s price movements. This failed breakdown could lead to forced liquidation for the short position trade and pour additional buy orders into the market. By the press time, the DOT price was at $7.158 with an intraday gain of 4.16%.

    How does our price prediction for AppCoins work?

    From 2024 to 2030 time gap will bring significant years for AppCoins growth. Based on historical data and expert opinions, In 10 years AppCoins could reach a minimum and maximum price of $0.0682 to $0.0817 respectively. On the other hand, our technical analysis also suggests a minimum price of $0.0046 for AppCoins in 2026. The highest price ever recorded for APPC was $3.73, which we consider to be a key level for the price of AppCoins to potentially return to in the next bull run. As APPC is a low trade volume cryptocurrency, its price can experience higher volatility compared to more highly liquid coins. Therefore, while it has the potential to rally quickly, it can also drop just as fast.

    Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan, has long criticized bitcoin and crypto amid wild … This graph contains dummy data, create an account to view the real predictions. Since 2017, DigitalCoinPrice has become one of the trusted brands within the crypto community. This success award goes to the combination of people, accurate crypto market analysis and data, the latest news, latest blogs, advertisement placements, and many more.

    Utilize our cutting-edge technology to
    gain a competitive edge in your trading strategies. Our prediction for 2028 suggests that AppCoins could reach a maximum price value of $0.0113, reflecting the positive trajectory it might experience. By the end of year 2028, we predict an average trading price of $0.0100 for APPC, with $0.0098 as minimum expected price. Monthly performance data shows the change in price of a cryptocurrency month over month.

    Nevertheless, the 9-day moving average remains below the 21-day moving average revealing that the market may gain more upwards if faces the north. The ApeCoin price prediction reveals that APE is moving bullishly with a gain of 2.35%, as the coin prepares for a bullish cross. Just like with any other asset, the price action of AppCoins is driven by supply and demand. These dynamics can be influenced by fundamental events such as block reward halvings, hard forks or new protocol updates. Regulations, adoption by companies and governments, cryptocurrency exchange hacks, and other real-world events can also affect the price of APPC.

    The flow of funds from Grayscale’s GBTC has partly gone into rival spot bitcoin ETFs as investors are attracted by lower fees. Bitcoin
    BTC
    has suddenly rebounded from a crash under $40,000 per bitcoin, climbing back from what some thought was a “critical” price level. Because AppCoins has strong fundamentals and a lot of people are invested in this cryptocurrency, we predict that the future for APPC looks promising. Register an account to unlock exclusive access to a comprehensive suite of technical trading tools, including top-tier AppCoins price forecasting, sophisticated APPC buy/sell indicators, and much more. Yes, AppCoins price will increase according to our predicted data in future.

    The crypto market is known for its high level of volatility, making it difficult to
    accurately predict future prices using traditional forecasting methods. However,
    technical analysis can provide valuable insights into potential price movements. It
    is important to keep in mind that our predictions are based on historical data and
    should not be considered financial advice. To minimize risk and maximize returns, it
    is imperative to consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any
    investment decisions. The ApeCoin price is currently hovering above the 9-day and 21-day moving averages.

  • The Californian Challenge: what kind of digital future do we want to live in?

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be speaking about two decades of The Californian Ideology at Bucerius Lab‘s The Californian Challenge conference on 19th-20th February 2016 at Kampnagel, Jarrestraße 1, Hamburg, Germany.

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  • Hegel & The Ethical State

    French victory over Prussians at 1806 battle of Jena: Hegel in crowds cheering Napoléon Bonaparte = “World Soul on horseback.” Editor of Bonapartist newspaper in Germany. Brother and brother-in-law killed during 1812 French invasion of Russia. Bonaparte’s liberal dictatorship = third way between Bourbon kings and Jacobin republic. 1789 French revolution = “the end of history”: social and political foundation of human freedom.

    18th century Enlightenment discredited Christian justification for absolute monarchy -> Hegel’s speculative philosophy discovers rational basis for state authority. World Spirit = the inevitable progress of the “idea of freedom” through repeated dialectical contradictions of global history: Asia -> Greece -> Rome -> Germany. 1807 Philosophy of the Spirit: the master-slave dialectic as the primordial struggle for recognition explains pre-1789 class society divided between aristocrats and labourers. 1517 Martin Luther’s 95 Theses = Protestant equality of believers -> 14/7/1789 Storming of the Bastille = Hegelian equality of citizens. Slaves have learnt to beat masters on the battlefield = end of history as feudal class antagonisms. Instability of post-1789 France: Liberalism = atomised individualism into social chaos -> Jacobinism = Absolute Liberty into Absolute Terror. Bonaparte’s 1799 coup d’état -> Napoleonic empire: meritocratic elite = “every soldier has a Marshal’s baton in his knapsack”; mixed form of government = Emperor, Senate, Tribunate & Conseil d’État; and European unity = Code Civil, common currency & single market. 1821 Philosophy of Right: military defeat of Bonaparte -> political victory of Bonapartism. Hegel’s obscure language = Freemasonry’s occult truths: king of Rome disguised as king of Prussia.

    Hegel’s political philosophy = negative freedoms of civil society -> substantive freedoms of the state. Modernity = master-slave dialectic superseded by bourgeois citizenship. Hegel admires liberal economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Private property = externalisation of individual wills. Family = patriarchal contract between two individual wills. Law = universalisation of individual property ownership. Market competition between property owners = multiplication of needs -> one-sided development of bourgeois individuals. Civil society = dynamic and egoistic -> anarchy and collapse. Mass poverty -> violent revolution.

    Bonapartist state imposes political discipline upon capitalist competition. Three estates as intermediary institutions between ruler and ruled: notables, bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Assembly of notables = hereditary or appointed landowners who serve the state and funded by land rent. Corporations of bourgeoisie = urban merchants, artisans and bankers who create both wealth and deprivation. State bureaucracy = meritocratic civil service outside and above civil society. Political supervision of market economy: law, defence, infrastructure, welfare and education. Patriotism = reconciliation of individual wills and collective interests through ethical concept of state. Hegel rejects social contract theory of Rousseau = levelling conformity of Jacobin republic. Hegel advocates mixed constitution with separation of powers between executive = bureaucracy and legislature = notables and corporations. Wealth moderated by wisdom.

    The people’s emperor: formless mass of egotistic individuals united by Great Man who personifies World Spirit of historical progress. Monarchy is single mind above squabbling factions of notables and bourgeoisie. Long-term goals not short-term gains. Political and military leadership for national conflicts for global dominance. Hegel rejects Immanuel Kant’s belief that liberal republics = perpetual peace. Rationality of warfare = world-historical evolution from autonomous states into universal state. 14/7/1789 = realisation of freedom in one nation -> dissemination to all nations. Bonaparte’s downfall = hubris of ignoring intermediary institutions of Napoleonic empire. Mixed constitution enables selfish individuals of capitalist market to be patriotic citizens of ethical state. The end of world-history = “the real is rational” for everyone everywhere.

  • GEORG HEGEL & THE ETHICAL STATE

    French victory over Prussians at 1806 battle of Jena: Hegel in crowds cheering Napoléon Bonaparte = “Word Soul on horseback.” Editor of Bonapartist newspaper in Germany. Brother and brother-in-law killed during 1812 French invasion of Russia. Bonaparte’s liberal dictatorship = third way between Bourbon kings and Jacobin republic. 1789 French revolution = “the end of history”: social and political foundation of human freedom.

    18th century Enlightenment discredited Christian justification for absolute monarchy -> Hegel’s speculative philosophy discovers rational basis for state authority. World Spirit = the inevitable progress of the “idea of freedom” through repeated dialectical contradictions of global history: Asia -> Greece -> Rome -> Germany. 1807 Philosophy of the Spirit: the master-slave dialectic as the primordial struggle for recognition explains pre-1789 class society divided between aristocrats and labourers. 1517 Martin Luther’s 95 Theses = Protestant equality of believers -> 14/7/1789 Storming of the Bastille = Hegelian equality of citizens. Slaves have learnt to beat masters on the battlefield = end of history as feudal class antagonisms. Instability of post-1789 France: Liberalism = atomised individualism into social chaos -> Jacobinism = Absolute Liberty into Absolute Terror. Bonaparte’s 1799 coup d’état -> Napoleonic empire: meritocratic elite = “every soldier has a Marshal’s baton in his knapsack”; mixed form of government = Emperor, Senate, Tribunate & Conseil d’État; and European unity = Code Civil, common currency & single market. 1821 Philosophy of Right: military defeat of Bonaparte -> political victory of Bonapartism. Hegel’s obscure language = Freemasonry’s occult truths: king of Rome disguised as king of Prussia.

    Hegel’s political philosophy = negative freedoms of civil society -> substantive freedoms of the state. Modernity = master-slave dialectic superseded by bourgeois citizenship. Hegel admires liberal economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Private property = externalisation of individual wills. Family = patriarchal contract between two individual wills. Law = universalisation of individual property ownership. Market competition between property owners = multiplication of needs -> one-sided development of bourgeois individuals. Civil society = dynamic and egoistic -> anarchy and collapse. Mass poverty -> violent revolution.

    Bonapartist state imposes political discipline upon capitalist competition. Three estates as intermediary institutions between ruler and ruled: notables, bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Assembly of notables = hereditary or appointed landowners who serve the state and funded by land rent. Corporations of bourgeoisie = urban merchants, artisans and bankers who create both wealth and deprivation. State bureaucracy = meritocratic civil service outside and above civil society. Political supervision of market economy: law, defence, infrastructure, welfare and education. Patriotism = reconciliation of individual wills and collective interests through ethical concept of state. Hegel rejects social contract theory of Rousseau = levelling conformity of Jacobin republic. Hegel advocates mixed constitution with separation of powers between executive = bureaucracy and legislature = notables and corporations. Wealth moderated by wisdom.

    The people’s emperor: formless mass of egotistic individuals united by Great Man who personifies World Soul of historical progress. Monarchy is single mind above squabbling factions of notables and bourgeoisie. Long-term goals not short-term gains. Political and military leadership for national conflicts for global dominance. Hegel rejects Immanuel Kant’s belief that liberal republics = perpetual peace. Rationality of warfare = world-historical evolution from autonomous states into universal state. 14/7/1789 = realisation of freedom in one nation -> dissemination to all nations. Bonaparte’s downfall = hubris of ignoring intermediary institutions of Napoleonic empire. Mixed constitution enables selfish individuals of capitalist market to be patriotic citizens of ethical state. The end of world-history = “the real is rational” for everyone everywhere.

  • Utopian Dreaming: 50 years of Imagined Futures in California and at UCSC

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be speaking about two decades of The Californian Ideology at 3:15pm on Saturday 7th November for the California Techno-pasts & Utopian Futures panel at the Utopian Dreaming: 50 years of Imagined Futures in California and at UCSC conference, UCSC, Santa Cruz, California.

  • THE CLASS OF THE NEW

    Building upon the analysis in Imaginary Futures, this 2006 OpenMute book explains the historical predecessors and later remixes of Daniel Bell’s concept of the knowledge class.

    Download the pdf version for free

  • INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN EDITION

    The email came from the translators in Brazil: “We want you to write an introduction to the Portuguese version of Imaginary Futures – something special for the local readers.” What should I say? My immediate thought was that Suba, Marky and Patife were on the soundtrack during the all-night writing sessions which created this book. Their rhythms contributed to the construction of its sentences and the flow of its arguments. Maybe I should begin the introduction by explaining why these musicians were in the mix? It definitely was no accident. Thanks to my job at Westminster University, I’ve had the pleasure of teaching some very smart Brazilian students over the past decade. Through them and other contacts, I’ve made the long journey south three times to speak at conferences and festivals in Rio, São Paulo, Brasilia and Pipa. I’ve danced at a samba school, in hip nightclubs and under the stars on a beach. I’ve discussed the politics of the Workers’ Party, analysed the global justice movement and debated leftist theory long into the night. I’ve admired the creativity and dedication of Brazilian artists, hackers and activists. Despite the language barrier, I now have dear friends in this fascinating faraway country. Enthused by these visits, I returned the favour by helping in 2005 to organise an event in London where Gilberto Gil talked about the Brazilian Ministry of Culture’s innovative new media initiatives. But, you might ask, what have these reminiscences got to do with this book? Why talk about them in the introduction for the Portuguese translation of Imaginary Futures? It’s because I recall sitting outside the Telecentro cybercafe in Pipa in 2004 when I was asked the all-important question: “Has being in Brazil changed the way that you think about the Net?” My task in this introduction must be explaining why the answer is: “Yes!”

    Imaginary Futures is a book about the political and cultural power of technological prophecies. During the Cold War, the American and Russian empires competed not only to control space, but also to own time. Computers and the Net have long been much more than useful tools. For over half a century, they have also embodied utopian dreams in the service of imperial ambition. The nation that is pioneering the future in the present can claim leadership over the whole of humanity. When I began the research for this book in 2002, my focus was exclusively on the North. I was fascinated by how the imaginary futures of the Cold War still dominated the contemporary world long after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The American empire might have prevailed over its Russian rival, but its boosters remained trapped within an ideological framework devised for this geopolitical conflict. Not surprisingly, this book reflects the times in which it was written: the aftermath of the dotcom bubble and the moment of the US-led invasion of Iraq. Across Europe, political leaders, academic experts and media commentators were convinced that America – the land of cutting-edge computing and the Net – was our tomorrow today. Where the US president led, our countries must follow – even if it meant sending troops into foreign lands where they weren’t welcome. As one of the two million people who marched against this folly in London on 15th February 2003, I wrote this book as a howl of protest. By painstakingly explaining the history of the imaginary futures of artificial intelligence and the information society, I wanted to equip its readers with the knowledge to refute these anachronistic prophecies. The next time that someone told them that the post-industrial utopia was just around the corner, they could reply that this prediction was nothing more than recycled McLuhanism. The Cold War was over – and its made-in-America imaginary futures were too.

    As my questioner in Pipa was wondering, I didn’t need to visit Brazil or know anyone from the country to come to this conclusion. Few of the authors who fill the shelves of my study with their thoughts about computing and the Net are interested the impact of information technologies within the developing world. Like them, I could have said everything that I wanted to say in this book without making any mention of the majority of humanity. Computers and the Net are from the North, so why bother talking about the South? Fortunately, my Brazilian comrades have prevented me from succumbing to this lazy temptation. Their influence has added depth to the analysis of Imaginary Futures. First and foremost, I’ve realised how different the world looks from the South compared to the North. It’s not just the constellations in the sky that are upended, but also geopolitical memory. When I visited Brasilia in 2004, I saw with my own eyes the modernist edifices of a better society that was denied to their country. As the book emphasises, leading intellectuals of the American empire were cheerleaders of the 1964 military coup which overthrew the democratically elected government of João Goulart. The wonders of the US-style hi-tech future to come justified the horrors of the brutal dictatorship that was imposed on Brazil in this period. For those of us who live in Western Europe, it is always a shock to encounter the inequality and violence which resulted from this authoritarian path of development. Because our experience of American hegemony during the Cold War was relatively benign, we only truly understand the human costs of its imperial rule when we come to the South. The concluding chapters of Imaginary Futures reflect what I learnt from my Brazilian trips. When I was writing the book, I knew that the fiercest criticism of these utopian prophecies from the North was explaining how their advocates had tried to realise them in the South. Tellingly, I discovered that the American instigators of the 1964 coup in Brazil were also the architects of their nation’s disastrous invasion of Vietnam. With US-led forces occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, the parallels with the present had to be drawn. The desire to own time is intimately connected with the ambition to control space. When I looked at the world from the South, I could see how easily hi-tech dreams can turn into nightmares of barbarism and cruelty. Going to São Paulo was the precondition for understanding why – in Imaginary Futures – Saigon plays such a key role in the history of the global village.

    When I first visited Brazil in 2002, the importance of envisaging the world from the South when writing this book wasn’t immediately obvious. At the conference at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, our hosts entertained their foreign guests with the sad story of the local version of Californian hi-tech hype. Mesmerised by the late-1990s dotcom bubble, Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration had fantasised about Brazil making a great leap forward from underdevelopment to the information society without having to pass through Fordism. With the inhabitants of the nearby favelas lacking the basic amenities and welfare services which are taken for granted in Europe, we were appalled at how the imaginary futures of the North had given a modernist gloss to the perpetuation of exploitation in the South. When the supporters of the newly elected Lula government told us that reaching Fordism would be a major achievement for the urban poor of Brazil, we couldn’t disagree. Focusing the country’s economic policy on computers, the Net and mobile phones seemed grotesque when so many people lacked water, sewage, electricity, healthcare and education. We’d read our Marx – we knew that the South couldn’t avoid following the North’s slow and painful path to modernity.

    I then had a worrying thought. Ironically, our leftist sympathies for the inhabitants of the favelas might be disguising a dubious assumption of European superiority. With its huge gulf between rich and poor, travelling to Rio in the early-21st century does seem like going back in time to London in the late-19th century. It was certainly true that lots of tourists go to Brazil for a quick dose of exoticism and adventure before returning to their safe European homes. If our motivations for foreign travel were no purer, did this mean that the inhabitants of an underdeveloped country couldn’t tell us anything about computing and the Net that we didn’t know already? Here was another troubling conclusion. Cardoso had been a respected Marxist economist before he sacrificed principles for power. His perverse embrace of dotcom neo-liberalism might be founded upon a kernel of rationality: the South had faithfully to imitate the North in all its vices. With his ambition of jumping over Fordism to post-industrialism, maybe he was the true radical rather than the Lula government with its cautious programme of incremental reforms? Who wants to be Sweden when you could become Silicon Valley?

    Six years later, as the global financial system is wracked in crisis, it seems absurd that Brazil would want to transform itself into California. On the contrary, it’s now widely recognized that many of the elements of the new paradigm of modernity are more likely to be found in this supposedly underdeveloped country than in its advanced neighbour to the north. By the time that Mídia Tática Brasil invited me back for their conference in 2003, Gilberto Gil was already arguing – as a government minister – in favour of an open source vision of the Net. For him, funding community cybercafes and media hotspots complimented the provision of other essential amenities to the underprivileged. Most wonderfully, it was the copyright fetishists of the North who would have to imitate the South’s relaxed attitude to intellectual property not the other way around. The ownership of computers and access to broadband might be much lower in Brazil than Europe and America, but it was here that could be found the precursor of the participatory culture of the Net. Carnival not the market was the Minister of Culture’s model for the emerging information society. True to his roots in Tropicália, Gil is a true cosmopolitan. Imitation isn’t subservience – it’s inspiration and cooperation. Remixing, sampling and quoting are the tools of collective labour in the hi-tech-gift economy.

    In the conclusion of this book, I argue that we must invent new futures. Exorcising the Cold War ideologies of artificial intelligence and the global village is my contribution to mapping out a path through the multiple political, economic, social and environmental problems that now confront humanity. Crucially, as my interlocutor in Pipa guessed, you too have helped to create this text in a small way. Imaginary Futures would have been a different book in many subtle ways if I hadn’t visited Brazil and learnt from the people who I met there. The inhabitants of the North and South are in this venture of modernity together. So let’s continue our collaboration in the common endeavour of making a more equalitarian, sustainable and prosperous world. The drum ‘n’ bass is playing and this book is waiting to be read. Enjoy!

    Richard Barbrook,
    London,
    England,
    16th November 2008.

  • Stuart Hall: Stalinist in theory and Blairite in politics

    I suppose those who make their living out of teaching Cultural Studies have to mourn the demise of Stuart Hall. However, the airbrushing of Hall’s unpleasant politics in his obituaries cannot be allowed to pass without some attempt at correcting the historical record. Here are my thoughts which come from someone who – in more than one period of his life – was on the opposite side of the barricades to this high priest of philosophical confusion.

    Stuart Hall joined the CPGB (British Stalinist party) after the Russian army crushed the 1956 Hungarian revolution and remained a member through the 1968 suppression of the Prague Spring, the breaking of the 1970 Gdansk strikes, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the 1981 Polish military coup and was still there when this shameful outfit finally dissolved itself in 1991 because the Soviet Union had imploded. During these three decades, he never took any public stand against the Russian occupation of Eastern Europe or the vicious repression of workers’ struggles by the Stalinist system. Silence = complicity.

    In the various fawning obituaries of Hall, he has been described as a great ‘Marxist’ thinker. Yet, if you read his publications, there is no evidence that he ever seriously studied Marx’s writings. The only references in them are to:-
    * The CPGB’s bowdlerised version of The German Ideology which carefully removed all of the passages where Marx and Engels gleefully mock the 1840s equivalents of Hall;
    * The chapter on commodity fetishism in Capital Volume 1 which Hall bizarrely mistook for a theory of ideology;
    * The most famous quotes from The Communist Manifesto; 18th Brumaire and The Civil War in France which every CPGB member was supposed to know.

    As far as I can make out, Hall never read the rest of Capital, Grundrisse, Theories of Surplus Value or any of Marx’s wonderful journalistic articles. I have taught undergraduate students who’ve read more of Marx’s writings than Hall ever did!

    Instead of Marx, Hall devoted himself to promoting Louis Althusser’s remix of Stalin’s socio-linguistics in the English-speaking world. During the late-1970s and early-1980s, his disciples were the most sectarian of any group on the English Left which – given our long history of Protestant sectarianism – is saying something. If you still need to understand why Hall’s obsession with Althusser was elitist and reactionary, please read Edward Thompson’s and Simon Clarke’s excellent articles which demolish the idiocies of this Stalinist philosophy.

    Since then, we’ve had two generations of academic leftists brought up on Hall who have wasted their energies on the spawn of Althusser: Foucault; Derrida; Deleuze & Guattari; Badiou; Zizek and so on. In this fifth year of the Great Recession, they have nothing sensible to say because they lack the basic theoretical knowledge to refute the propagandists of neo-liberalism. For, as Stalin and Hall argued, Marx’s critique of political economy was only for ‘textualists and Talmudists’ …

    In 1978, Hall and his BCCCS colleagues published Policing the Crisis which claimed that the rise of neo-liberalism was an entirely ideological offensive by the Tory party. Amazingly, this book never discussed Hayek, Mises, Friedman or any of the other bourgeois economists who Thatcher and her allies were loudly proclaiming as their gurus at the time. Then as now, refusing to study value theory was a big mistake. Even worse, Hall’s book splenetically denounced all English Situationists as ‘terrorists’ which – given how many of their ideas he’d stolen for the BCCCS’ work on youth subcultures – was most ungrateful. A year later, Dick Hebdige proved himself a diligent pupil of Hall when he published a book on the punk movement which never mentioned that its founders were English Situationists. Stalin would have been proud of both of them!

    In the early-1980s, Hall rose to prominence as the intellectual maestro of the Eurocommunist faction of the CPGB which controlled the party’s misnamed theoretical journal: Marxism Today. In issue after issue, he and his associates denounced the Labour Left’s struggles against the Thatcher monster as extremist and deranged. We just didn’t understand that the English proletariat was irredeemably racist, sexist and homophobic. It was Thatcher who knew how to appeal to these reactionary impulses – and our attempts to mobilise the working class in all of its diversity against her oppressive regime were doomed to failure. At first, Hall’s faction of the CPGB kept the Althusserian faith by analysing Tory rule solely as a ideological project. After a few years, even they eventually realised that neo-liberalism might have something to do with the despised discipline of political economy. However, instead of reading some value theory, Hall’s faction now proclaimed Thatcher’s regime as the future in the present. Neo-liberalism was the New Times to come which – most conveniently for them – meant that the Labour Left’s resistance to Tory hegemony was futile. Delighted that the local franchise of the Cold War enemy had switched sides in the class struggle, the right-wing press enthusiastically promoted the new party line of (anti-)Marxism Today. They knew that they could rely on the Althusserians to purge the ‘Trotskyist wreckers’ who threatened the bourgeoisie’s wealth and privileges.

    In the late-1980s, I was told by a member of Hall’s faction of the CPGB that they were very pleased that Thatcher had defeated the miners’ strike and crushed the local government Left because the Labour party would now be forced to adopt their centrist political programme. Within a decade, this prognosis was realised when Blair was elected prime minister on a manifesto which assured the bankers that New Labour had no intention of breaking with Thatcher’s neo-liberal settlement. In the early reforming years of this administration, Hall made not one word of complaint about its failure to repeal anti-trade union laws, its attacks on welfare claimants and various other dubious policies. However, when New Labour eventually got old and discredited, he suddenly reappeared as a critic of the neo-liberal government which his faction of the CPGB had helped into power! Of course, we should always welcome someone who recants their past errors. Yet, Hall was still incapable of providing any intelligent analysis of the failings of neo-liberalism because this would have required the one thing that he’d always refused to do: studying Marx’s critique of political economy.

    If there is one lesson to be learnt from this sad tale of political failure and theoretical chicanery, we must not make the same mistake as Hall and his disciples. Comrades – let us become Marxists who’ve read some Marx!

  • Californian Ideology Then & Now

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be speaking about two decades of The Californian Ideology at 3.20pm on Wednesday 9th October for the Networked Art panel at RENEW 2013: the 5th International Conference on the Histories of Media Art, Science and Technology in Riga, Latvia.

  • Imaginary Futures at ITSC Cologne Conference

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be the keynote speaker for the Media Evolution and Society session at the Internationales Film & Fernsehfestival at 2.00pm on Friday 5th October in Köln, Germany.

  • Imaginary Futures at Future Camp

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be participating in the Dark Web/Deep Web/ Invisible Web panel of Future Camp at 9.30pm on 28th September 2012 at Kampnagel, Jarrestraße 20, 22303 Hamburg, Germany. Other speakers include Angela Richter, Andreas Leo Findeisen and Ote Reissmann.

  • Marx on the State

    20th century Marxisms were a theology of state power with Marx’s anti-statist writings as holy texts.

    Social Democracy = parliamentary democracy and the welfare state.
    Bolshevism = totalitarian party and state planning.

    19th century Marxism of Marx proposed two different concepts of state power:
    The Parasite State = “Strong government and heavy taxes are identical”.
    The Class State = “the managing committee of the bourgeoisie”.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels grew up during the post-1815 Restoration.
    Bonaparte’s liberal empire replaced by European Christian monarchies.
    Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1806).
    Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (1820).

    Young Hegelians attacked the reactionary politics of the Prussian monarchy by criticising conservative appropriation of Hegel’s Idealist philosophy.
    Freedom was creating materialist philosophy to discredit the alienated consciousness of religion.
    Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

    Marx and Engels rejected philosophical criticism for the critique of political economy.
    Freedom required a materialist conception of history to end alienated labour under capitalism.
    The grand narrative of history as successive modes of production: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
    Increasing efficiency of labour through specialisation and professionalisation, especially science and technology.
    Egoism of bourgeois individual in market economy reflected one-sided development of modern everyday life.
    Bourgeois private property as expression of alienated labour of capitalism.
    Proletariat was the propertyless class which would liberate all of humanity by overcoming the division of labour.
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845).
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).

    Hegel celebrated the universal class of state bureaucrats who regulated the selfish interests of bourgeois society.
    Marx saw the state bureaucrats as a self-interested caste created by the division of labour within capitalism.
    The common interests of the people transformed into the private property of the government bureaucracy: the parasite state.
    Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843)

    1848 German Revolution: Red republic against Prussian and Austrian monarchies.
    1851 coup d’etat by Louis Bonaparte replaces French republic with new empire.
    State was above and against all classes within civil society.
    The parasite state living off the taxes extracted from the people.
    Oriental despotism: autarchic villages and irrigation schemes
    Absolutist monarchy: declining aristocracy and rising bourgeoisie.
    Bonapartism: economic modernisation and repression of the proletariat.
    Capitalism was authoritarian rule by a liberal oligarchy which feared political democracy.
    Karl Marx, British Rule in India (1853).
    Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
    Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

    Marx and Engels lived most of their lives as political refugees in London and Manchester.
    Great Britain was the first capitalist nation with 50% of global industrial production in 1850.
    Britain was the future of the rest of the world in the present.
    Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845).
    Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (1867)

    Britain was a crowned bourgeois republic: limited franchise, free speech and the rule of law.
    Under the liberal republic, the state acted as “the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”.
    Class violence against internal enemies, including repression and confiscation.
    Rule of law to protect private property: human rights and free contracts enabled class exploitation.
    Public works to support capitalist development, such as canals, railways and education.
    Economic policies favourable to national bourgeoisie, such as free trade in Britain or protectionism in Germany and the USA.
    Imperial conquests to grab resources or exclude competitors from overseas markets, such as the British in Ireland and India.
    The struggle over the franchise was over which class fraction would control British state through parliamentary elections.
    The abolition of the Corn Laws marked the ascendency of industrial bourgeoisie over the capitalist landowners.
    Egoism of civil society undermined political democracy.
    Bourgeois politicians were professional hucksters and swindlers.
    Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Articles on Britain (1971).

    Two-stage revolutionary struggle: political democracy -> social democracy.
    Primary task of the continental European Left was to overthrow parasite state.
    Alliance of proletarians, petit-bourgeoisie and peasantry fighting to create the democratic republic: the 1871 Paris Commune.
    Primary task of British and American Left was to extend the franchise and campaign for social reforms: the Chartist movement.
    Both liberals and socialists believed that universal suffrage would lead to “the dictatorship of the proletariat”.
    Democratic republic under capitalism was inherently unstable as workers can exercise political power while still being economically exploited.
    Universal suffrage secured through participatory politics: abolition of state bureaucracy, official religion, national education, media censorship and professional army.
    Marx had been a newspaper editor in 1840s who opposed press censorship, nationalised media and government press subsidies.
    “The Paris Commune made that watchword of the bourgeois revolution – cheap government – into a reality.” – Karl Marx.
    Participation of citizens in DIY politics ended the division of labour between bureaucrats and people: militia, juries, posses, administration.
    From the Ancient Athenian agora to the Wild West democracy of the USA.
    The dictatorship of the proletariat would use emergency powers against the threat of the “slave owners’ revolt” like the Union against the Confederacy in the American Civil War.
    Karl Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press (1842).
    Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
    Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
    Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

    The self-emancipation of the proletariat through the three wings of the labour movement: mass political parties, workers’ militia and trade unions/cooperatives.
    Revolutionary reformism of Marx and Engels emphasised political campaigns for economic improvements: limiting the working day, factory regulations, consumer protection, regulating banking system.
    Participatory politics abolished politics as a profession: “the withering away of the state”.
    Communism was the overcoming of the division between mental and manual labour within civil society.
    Workers’ cooperatives were prefiguring the democratic organisation of the whole economy.
    “The socialist future will an Athens without slaves.” – Paul Lafargue.
    Communism was the principles of participatory democracy applied to all aspects of life.
    Karl Marx, Capital Volume 3 (1894).
    Paul Lafargue, The Right To Be Lazy (1883).

  • THE MARXIST POLITICS OF KARL MARX

    “The one thing of which I’m certain is that I’m not a Marxist.”- Karl Marx

    Post-Communist nostalgia for 1948 Cold War Marxisms.
    Social Democracy: parliamentary elections, welfare state and US imperialism.
    Bolshevism: totalitarian party, state planning and Russian imperialism.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were ’48ers: the young radicals of the 1848 European revolutions against the post-1815 Christian monarchies and bourgeois liberalism.

    1836 students at the University of Berlin.
    Young Hegelians were critics of Georg Hegel’s Idealist interpretation of history: the World Spirit making the real rational.

    The materialist refutation of religion was the philosophical rejection of reactionary rule in Germany:
    Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841).

    From the philosophy of intellectual freedom to the materialist conception of history:
    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845).
    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845)

    Liberal concept of socio-economic progress: hunting → herding → agriculture → commerce.
    Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)
    Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).

    1848 European Revolution: the springtime of the peoples.
    Republican democracy, national liberation and socialist reforms.
    Marx was a newspaper editor and Engels was a soldier.
    The German Republic defeated by Prussian monarchy in 1848.
    The French Republic overthrown by Louis Bonaparte in 1851.
    The Russian empire was the leader of European reaction.

    Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848).
    Book launch at the Red Lion (aka Be At One), Great Windmill Street, Soho.
    Socialist concept of socio-economic progress: tribalism → slavery → feudalism → capitalism → communism.
    The Left of Red Republicanism: ”The communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties.”

    Liberal concept of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy in the 1642 English Revolution, the 1776 American Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution:
    François Guizot, The History of Civilisation in Europe (1828).
    Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856).

    Socialist concept of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the 1848 European Revolution:
    The limitations of bourgeois liberalism: property franchise, media censorship, regressive taxation, state bureaucracy and professional army.
    Bourgeois fear of republican democracy caused the defeat of the 1848 Revolution.
    Bonapartism was the parasite state dominating civil society in its own interests.
    Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843).
    Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850).
    Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).

    The proletarian struggle for political democracy: Paris sans-culottes (1792-1794), Polish nationalists (1830/1863), English Chartists (1838-1848), Irish Fenians (1848/1867) and American Unionists (1861-1865).
    Red republicanism: universal suffrage, participatory politics, media freedom, low taxes, socio-economic reforms and citizen militia.
    1871 Paris Commune held multi-party elections while under siege by the Right.
    “Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat.” – Friedrich Engels.
    Karl Marx, The American Civil War (1861-4).
    Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871).
    Prosper Lissagaray, History of the Paris Commune (1876).

    1864 International Working Men’s Association: trade union cooperation, solidarity with the North in the American Civil War and supporting Polish nationalism.
    1872 Hague Congress: the split in the First International between the Marxist Socialists and the Bakuninist Anarchists.
    Marxists symbolised their victory by moving the headquarters of the First International to New York: the USA was the most advanced capitalist economy which would be the first communist country.

    Anarchism: select conspiracy of intellectuals who wanted to be the ‘invisible dictatorship’ directing the spontaneous revolution of the masses.
    Pre-1914 Anarchism: Bonnet gang, CGT, CNT and the IWW.

    Socialism: mass party of industrial and office workers seeking control of the democratic republic which was the political basis for creating social democracy.
    Pre-1914 Socialism: British Labour Party, German Social Democratic Party and French Socialist Party.
    Political economy of labour over the political economy of capital: 8 hour day, workers’ cooperatives, left culture and community organisations.

    1889 foundation of the Second International: political democracy, trade union cooperation and world peace.
    1914 was the end of Second International Marxism: reformism and nationalism had prevented the socialist revolution.
    The Russian reinterpretation of Marxism: the Bolshevik vanguard party.
    1917 Russian Revolution: the Congress of Soviets not the Constituent Assembly.
    Direct democracy and vanguard party not representative democracy and mass party.
    1917-21 Russian Civil War: one-party state, secret police, ideological mobilisation and professional army.
    1921 Kronstadt Rebellion: Soviets without Bolsheviks.

    20th century Marxisms without Marx’s 19th century politics: Social Democracy, Leninism, Council Communism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Austro-Marxism, Maoism, New Left, Situationism and Autonomism.
    1989-91 Georg Hegel’s end of history was representative democracy and neo-liberal globalisation.
    2008 financial crash and the Occupy movement have popularised David Harvey’s course on Karl Marx’s Capital.
    2015 election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader: the 21st century revival of Second International Marxism.

  • Imaginary Futures at the European Culture Congress

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be participating in the Cyberiad panel of the European Culture Congress at 12.30pm on 9th September 2011 at the Regional Centre for Business Tourism in Wroclaw, Poland. He has written The Davos Parallax which is a SF tale about the banking crisis to introduce this panel.

    Imaginary Futures is one of the inspirations for the Tomorrow Never Dies exhibition and installation on 8th-11th September 2011 at the Design Gallery in Wroclaw, Poland.

  • Imaginary Futures at Virtual Futures 2.0’11

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be talking about Imaginary Futures at the Virtual Futures 2.0’11 conference at the University of Warwick on Saturday 18th June at 6.00pm.

    Location: MS.02, University of Warwick, Kirby Corner Rd, Coventry, West Midlands CV4.

    Richard will also be introducing a screening and discussion of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War on Sunday 19th June in the Milburn Studio at 4.00pm at the same venue.

  • Imaginary Futures at the Babylonia Festival

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be talking about Imaginary Futures at the Babylonia Anti-Authoritarian Festival in Athens, Greece, on Thursday 26th May at 9.00pm.

    Location: School of Fine Arts, Peireos 256, 18233 Athens, Greece.
    metro: Kallithea

    Richard will also be introducing a screening and discussion of Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War on Saturday 29th May at 9.00pm at the same venue.

  • Internet Ideology

    REFF: Most of the technologies which are arising in these years are about knowledge and information. Do you think that they are the most revolutionary technologies of the last centuries? What do you think about it?

    RB: The first thing I would say is that if you look at the last century, the key technologies are probably antibiotics and the contraceptive pill. These are actually the most important technologies ever invented. Also maybe mass transit, as cars and above all airplanes. These are technologies that really have transformed people’s lives but it’s interesting that the convergence between computing media and telecommunications is actually seen as the societal shift in technology. You have these technologies which maybe are not the most important but, because they were given this theoretical and ideological role of bringing on the new society, they are seen as the most important technology even if we could argue that they’re not. I personally work with these technologies so obviously I have an interest in saying that Internet is a very good thing. I am also a writer and the fact that I can distribute my writings, I can put up videos and Flash presentations and I can access so much stuff on the Internet, is fantastic. But I doubt that these technologies are important as antibiotics or contraceptive pill. For instance now days you may not die by a minor infection and women would not die giving birth; actually women can control their own reproduction. And what about the fact that you can travel from country to country by airplane very cheaply now? Those things are probably much more life-changing than information and communication technology. It’s not that information and communication technologies are a bad thing or that we should dismiss them, it’s just that I think that we should be sceptical about the way they have been used for ideological purposes. There is a real positive benefit in the convergent technologies, but we should be sceptical about the ideological use that has been made of them. The ideology of Internet comes before its invention; both Russians and Americans thought the Internet was going to create a new society and they both wanted to claim that their empire was building the new society; therefore the Internet took on this much more exaggerated role. The other thing is that if you are a writer or you are involved in the media or you are a journalist, obviously you are going to think that these technologies really affect you as the most important technologies. People that are working in the communication and information industry, or the intellectuals, those people are obviously going to be obsessed by this technologies, but they tend to exaggerate their own technologies and forget about these other things because they can just take antibiotics!

    REFF: One new thing is the example that technologies may give to other disciplines, as, for example, does the open source, which is not only about software, it can be applied to agriculture, politics, everything. Is there a real opportunity?

    RB: I think it is the other way around. It’s not that the technology has created a culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities and technology express them. Guy Debord and Gil Wolman wrote a famous essay on ‘Methods of Détournement’ in 1957 [1] saying what artist should do in this mass media culture. Artists should be able to appropriate the mass media culture, artefacts, cartoons, films, advertising and then remix them – that’s what detournement really means. Debord was right in saying that since we live in this mass media culture, actually making art about it or being creative about it, implies that artist have to continually refer to it. When Debord made his film, The Society of the Spectacle [2], he had to get a very generous patron who allowed him to buy a film, cut it up, and then go to the studio and re-record it and re-dub it, a very laborious, difficult process. When we made Class Wargames Presents Guy Debord’s The Game of War [3], we managed to do it with a very small grant from the Arts Council of England, a Mac laptop, Final Cut and we only had to go to the studio to record the voiceover. We can mix the voiceover into the whole, mix the images into the voiceover through one Laptop. It has taken 50 years for the technology to catch up with what someone has done in 1957. Someone would argue that this is actually what the Cubists were doing when Picasso was making collages putting a socialist newspaper into the collage. In a sense Picasso was already doing those things in 1910; now we can do this because of these digital technologies, we can take other people’s films, we can put our own performances together. I think it is the other way around it’s not that the technology has created the culture, it is that people have wanted these possibilities, these technologies that actually were often developed for other things. I remember an old hippie from the 1960s who said that he would always remember when he used to build disco sound systems which cut off the sound from one turntable when switching between two records – people had just never thought of that use, taking the two records and playing them together as if they were music. So you are taking a technology and using it for something it shouldn’t be used for.

    REFF: We may say that now days tools are available, if you just have money you get them, but in another way these tools are controlled, e.g. platforms, iPhone, Facebook, lots of stuff. Do you think that there is a paradox out there?

    RB: Well, that is the paradox of capitalism – it is our labour, we are all variable capital, our labour builds capitalism, capitalism has to organise itself to appropriate the collective to make it so sure that we can only work collectively as through the capitalist social innovation. It’s not a new thing, capitalism’s greatest achievement is that it allows people to work together collectively on a global scale but of course people can only do it in a social relationships which individualizes, atomizes. We’ve been in capitalism three or four hundred years, now we have this very intense socialization but people is trying to cooperate in a different way. I think Facebook is really interesting – I mean it is dotcom capitalism in way, they’re making money out of the advertising but they’re giving people all of this service space for free and they’ve made all this very nice interface, easy to use software. I haven’t uploaded things on my own website because I know it is much easier doing it on Facebook then you can share them with your friends. YouTube is amazing as well. You can just stick up videos, the whole world is sticking up videos and as far I can tell they are not making any money off it. They’re making all sorts of money off Google searches and they’re subsidizing our free distribution of videos to enjoy. And if you think if Facebook did try to control the content people would just migrate to another service because they know what happened to MySpace, and then it just got covered with advertising and they tried to make it too corporate and apart from musicians, everybody, all these 18-20 year olds they’re on Facebook now. In a way they are making money out of this but on the other hand they’re providing us with a free service that’s easy to use. Take the bad with the good.

    Let’s answer the question about what happened to the avant-garde movement, I mean I think that’s the interesting. Because fifteen years ago making new media was avant-garde by itself; actually doing anything with a screen was really radical. It is interesting now that that avant garde is being historicised. In the last five years or so people have been writing books about Internet art and they have a lot to look at concerning the last 10 or 15 years. It is interesting because actually just doing something with a screen is considered radical anyway. It is like the Cubist avant-garde, where just making a collage was exciting. You had to make a good collage for people to see, or making a ready-made by itself seemed to be exciting just because you have done it. After a while people said “so what”. Once you’ve got over the ‘shock of the new’, that favorite phrase in art history, you then have to start deciding whether its good or bad, interesting or an absurd concept. So I think to do something avant-garde and new is not going to be necessarily on the screen – it can be partly on the screen or use the screen or it will be collaborative culture. Last Christmas, I met this woman who works at Battersea Arts Theatre in London and she was saying all the most radical wacky ideas of 1960s and 1970s theatre are now mainstream because they have an Internet generation audience. They expect to be able to interact with the play they don’t like just standing there, sitting there, watching the play on a stage. It’s like in the 60s there were people walking through the audience, they want like actors in the audience, you know this guy sitting next to you and he suddenly actually is really an actor gets up after half an hour and starts acting, getting the audience to vote and all this stuff is cause they’re used to participating. And say something that was once seen as wacky extremism, loony stuff, is now mainstream theatre so again that’s the interesting thing about how it does affect the different culture.

    REFF: How do you feel with the fact that Joi Ito the founder of Creative Commons, is a venture capitalist and the intellectual property laws in general?

    RB: Well, there are two ways in which we could look at it. If you are a vulgar Marxist, as I am, you can say that it is the classic examples in Marx: forces of production develop and in relation to production they eventually become a barrier to the development itself. In this sense intellectual property has become a barrier to setting up this network communications system and actually intellectual property is becoming a barrier to how we use it. It’s like the laws against recreational drugs the bad thing about these laws it’s not just that they’re stupid but it’s that they make people disrespect the law. And the same point can be made about copyright, these too are laws that people don’t obey. Politicians can’t enforce laws that most people spontaneously don’t obey: when a law does not work it is like there is no law at all. It seems to me that a big problem with this copyright law is that everybody is expected to pay for every tune that they ever listen to. On the one hand, you have music as a commodity, on the other, it is a gift. If you want to get a tune for free, you can with a bit of effort. But lots of people don’t have the time to look for free tunes, so they buy it on iTunes just because it is easier to do. However what they are paying for now is not the tunes themselves, it is the simplicity of getting hold of them. This a small example of the weird nature of any intellectual property: the copyright owners sell it to you but you don’t really own it. It is not a fully bourgeois form property (bourgeois property means that you can alienate property and do what you like with the property you bought); with intellectual property is much more like feudal property where the king would deem you a land but you could not do what you like with it you could not sell it. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that people can so easily spontaneously ignore the dictates of these copyright laws!

  • CALIFORNIAN IDEOLOGY: IL DOGMA LIBERISTA DELLA CLASSE VIRTUALE

    “Non mentire sul futuro è impossibile e uno può mentire su esso a proprio piacimento”.
    Naum Gabo [1]

    COME IL CONTENUTO IDRICO DI UN SERBATOIO TRABOCCA …

    Alla fine del ventesimo secolo, la convergenza a lungo predetta dei media, del computer e delle telecomunicazioni nell’hypermedia finalmente si sta verificando. Ancora una volta, il movimento inesorabile del capitalismo per diversificare ed intensificare i poteri creativi del lavoro umano si trova sul punto di trasformare qualitativamente il modo in cui lavoriamo, agiamo e viviamo insieme. Tramite l’integrazione di tecnologie differenti intorno a protocolli comuni, qualcosa sta per essere creato che è più della somma delle sue parti. Quando l’abilità di produrre e di ricevere quantità illimitate di informazioni in qualsiasi forma è combinata con la portata delle reti di telefonia globale, le forme esistenti di lavoro e di piacere possono essere fondamentalmente trasformate. Nasceranno nuove industrie ed i favoriti del mercato azionario attuale saranno spazzati via. In tali momenti di profondo cambiamento sociale, tutti coloro che possono fornire una semplice spiegazione di ciò che sta accadendo saranno ascoltati con grande interesse. In questo frangente cruciale, una libera alleanza di scrittori, hackers, capitalisti e artisti dalla West Coast degli Stati Uniti d’America è riuscita a definire una ortodossia eterogenea per l’era dell’informazione che sta per sopraggiungere: la Californian Ideology.

    La nuova fede è emersa da una bizzarra fusione del boemianismo culturale di San Francisco con le industrie hi-tech della Silicon Valley. Promossa su riviste, libri, programmi televisivi, siti Web, newsgroups e conferenze in Rete, la Califonian Ideology combina promiscuamente lo spirito a ruota libera degli hippies e lo zelo imprenditoriale degli yupppies. L’amalgamazione degli opposti è stata raggiunta tramite una profonda fede nel potenziale emancipatorio delle tecnologie della nuova informazione. Nell’utopia digitale, tutti saranno all’ultima moda e ricchi. Non sorprendentemente, questa visione ottimistica del futuro è stata entusiasticamente abbracciata dai fanatici del computer, dagli studenti fannulloni, dai capitalisti innovativi, dagli attivisti sociali, dagli accademici all’ultima moda, dai burocrati futuristi e dai politici opportunistici degli Stati Uniti. Come al solito, gli Europei non sono stati lenti nel copiare l’ultima moda bizzarra dall’America. Mentre un recente rapporto della commissione europea raccomanda di seguire il modello del “libero mercato” californiano, per costruire la “super-autostrada dell’informazione”, artisti all’avanguardia e accademici imitano con entusiasmo i filosofi “post-umanistici” del culto dell’Extropian della West Coast [3]. Senza alcun rivale evidente, il trionfo della Californian Ideology sembra essere completo.

    L’ampio fascino di questi teorici della West Coast non è semplicemente il risultato contagioso del loro ottimismo. Soprattutto essi sono difensori appassionati di ciò che sembra essere una forma impeccabilmente libertaria di politica – essi vogliono che le tecnologie dell’informazione vengano usate per creare una nuova “democrazia Jeffersoniana” in cui tutti gli individui saranno in grado di esprimersi liberamente nel cyberspazio [4]. Tuttavia, difendendo questo apparentemente ammirevole ideale, questi tecno-pubblicitari stanno allo stesso tempo riproducendo alcune delle più ataviche caratteristiche della società americana, specialmente quelle derivate dal penoso legame della schiavitù. La loro visione utopistica della California dipende dalla ostinata cecità verso le altre – molto meno positive – caratteristiche di vita sulla West Coast: razzismo, povertà e degradazione ambientale [5]. Ironicamente, nel passato non troppo distante, gli intellettuali e gli artisti della Bay Area erano appassionatamente interessati a tali questioni.

    RONALD REAGAN VERSUS GLI HIPPIES

    Il 15 maggio 1969, il Governatore Ronald Regan ha ordinato alla polizia armata di effettuare un raid all’alba contro i contestatori hippie che avevano occupato People’s Park, vicino al campus di Berkley dell’Università di California. Durante la battaglia che ne conseguì, un uomo venne ucciso ed altre 128 persone necessitarono di cure ospedaliere [6]. Quel giorno, il mondo “onesto” e la contro-cultura sembravano essere implacabilmente contrastata. Da una parte delle barricate, il Governatore Regan ed i suoi seguaci difendevano la libera iniziativa privata e sostenevano l’invasione del Vietnam. Dall’altra parte, gli hippies difendevano una rivoluzione sociale in casa e si opponevano ad una espansione imperiale all’estero. Nell’anno del raid al People’s Park, sembrava che la scelta storica tra queste due opposte prospettive del futuro dell’America poteva essere stabilita solo tramite il conflitto violento. Come Jerry Rubin, uno dei leaders degli Yippie, disse allora:

    “La nostra ricerca dell’avventura e dell’eroismo ci porta fuori dall’America, verso una vita di auto-creazione e ribellione. In risposta, l’America è pronta a distruggerci …” [7].

    Durante gli anni ’60, i radicali della Bay Area hanno aperto la strada alla prospettiva politica ed allo stile culturale dei movimenti della Nuova Sinistra nel mondo. Rompendo con la ristretta politica dell’era post-bellica, essi hanno lanciato campagne contro il militarismo, il razzismo, la discriminazione sessuale, l’omofobia, il consumismo irrazionale e l’inquinamento. Al posto delle rigide gerarchie tradizionali della sinistra, essi hanno creato delle strutture collettive e democratiche che, presumibilmente, prefiguravano la società libertaria del futuro. Soprattutto, la Nuova Sinistra californiana ha combinato la lotta politica con la ribellione culturale. Al contrario dei loro genitori, gli hippies rifiutavano di conformarsi alle rigide convenzioni sociali imposte sull’’organizzazione dell’uomo’ dall’esercito, le università, le corporazioni e persino i partiti politici dell’ala sinistra. Invece, essi dichiaravano apertamente il loro rifiuto del mondo onesto, per mezzo dei loro abiti casual, la promiscuità sessuale, la musica ad alto volume e le droghe ricreative [8].

    Gli hippies radicali erano liberali nel senso sociale della parola. Essi hanno difeso ideali universali, razionali e progressivi come la democrazia, la tolleranza, l’autorealizzazione e la giustizia sociale. Incoraggiati da oltre venti anni di crescita economica essi credevano che la storia stesse dalla loro parte. Nei romanzi di fantascienza essi sognavamo una ‘ecotopia’: una California del futuro in cui le auto erano scomparse, la produzione industriale era ecologicamente vitale, le relazioni sessuali erano egualitarie e la vita quotidiana era vissuta in comunità. Per alcuni hippies, questa prospettiva poteva essere realizzata solo rifiutando il progresso scientifico come un falso Dio e ritornando alla natura. Altri, in contrasto, credevano che il progresso tecnologico avrebbe inevitabilmente reso i loro principi libertari in un fatto sociale. Influenzati in modo decisivo dalle teorie di Marshall McLuhan, questi tecnofili ritenevano che la convergenza dei media, dei computer (??) e delle telecomunicazioni avrebbe inevitabilmente creato una agora elettronica – un luogo virtuale in cui tutti sarebbero stati in grado di esprimere le loro opinioni, senza il timore della censura [10]. Nonostante fosse un professore inglese di mezza età, McLuhan predicava il messaggio radicale che il potere di un grande affare e di un grande governo sarebbe stato abbattuto prossimamente dagli effetti che intrinsecamente danno potere alle nuove tecnologie sugli individui.

    ‘I media elettronici … aboliscono le dimensioni spaziali …Tramite l’elettricità, noi ovunque ricominciamo le relazioni personali come sul modello del più piccolo villaggio. E’ una relazione in profondità, senza delega di funzioni o poteri … Il dialogo sostituisce la conferenza’ [11].

    Incoraggiati dalle predizioni di McLuhan, i radicali dell West Coast vennero conivolti nello sviluppo di nuove tecnologie dell’informazione per la stampa alternativa, le stazioni radio della comunità, i clubs di computer per uso domestico e i video della collettività. Questi attivisti della comunità dei media erano convinti che essi si trovavano in prima linea per costruire un nuova America. La creazione dell’agora elettronica era il primo passo verso la realizzazione della democrazia diretta in tutte le istituzioni sociali [12]. La lotta potrebbe essere dura, ma ‘l’ecotopia’ sarebbe quasi a portata di mano.

    L’ASCESA DELLA CLASSE VIRTUALE

    Chi avrebbe previsto che, in meno di trenta anni dopo la battaglia per People’s Park, squares e hippies avrebbero creato insieme la Californian Ideology? Chi avrebbe pensato che tale contraddittoria mescolanza di determinismo tecnologico e di libertario individualismo sarebbe diventata l’ortodossia ibrida dell’era dell’informazione? E chi avrebbe sospettato che poiché la tecnologia e la libertà erano sempre più venerati sarebbe diventato sempre meno possibile dire qualsiasi cosa di sensato sulla società in cui venivano applicate?

    La Californian Ideology deriva la sua popolarità proprio dall’ambiguità dei suoi precetti. Negli ultimi decenni, il lavoro pioneristico della comunità degli attivisti dei media è stato ampiamente recuperato dalle industrie hi-tech e dai media. Sebbene le società in tali settori possano automatizzare e sub-appaltare molte delle loro mansioni di lavoro, esse rimangono dipendenti da persone chiave che sono in grado di fare ricerca e creare prodotti originali, dai software e dai chip dei computer ai libri ed ai programmi TV. Insieme ad alcuni imprenditori questi di abili lavoratori formano la cosiddetta ‘classe virtuale’: ‘… la tecno-intellighenzia degli scienziati cognitivisti, ingenieri, esperti di computer, creatori di video-games e tutti gli altri specialisti delle comunicazioni …’ [13] Incapaci di assoggettarli alla disciplina della catena di montaggio o di sostituirli con le macchine, i managers hanno organizzato tali lavoratori intellettuali attraverso contratti a tempo determinato. Come ‘l’aristocrazia laburista’ del secolo scorso, il personale centrale dei media, le industrie dei computers e delle telecomunicazioni fanno l’esperienza dei riconoscimenti e delle insicurezze del mercato. D’altra parte, questi artigiani dell’hi-tech non solo tendono ad essere ben remunerati, ma godono anche di una considerevole autonomia sul loro ritmo di lavoro e sul luogo di impiego. Come risultato, la separazione culturale tra gli hippie e ‘l’uomo dell’organizzazione’ è diventata ora piuttosto approssimativa. Tuttavia, d’altra parte, tali lavoratori sono legati dalle clausole dei loro contratti e non hanno garanzie di un lavoro continuato. Non avendo il tempo libero degli hippies, il lavoro in sé è diventato la strada principale per l’autorealizzazione per molta della ‘classe virtuale’ [14].

    La Californian Ideology offre un modo di comprendere la realtà vissuta da questi artigiani dell’hi-tech. D’altra parte, questi lavoratori sono una parte privilegiata della forza lavoro. D’altro canto essi sono gli eredi delle idee radicali degli attivisti della comunità dei media. La Californian Ideology, quindi, contemporaneamente riflette le discipline delle economie di mercato e le libertà dell’artigianato hippie. L’ibrido bizzarro è solo reso possibile tramite un quasi universale credo nel determinismo tecnologico. Sin dagli anni ’60, i liberali nel senso sociale della parola, hanno sperato che la nuova tecnologia dell’informazione avrebbe realizzato i loro ideali. Rispondendo alla sfida della Nuova Sinistra, la Nuova Destra ha resuscitato una più antica forma di liberalismo: il liberalismo economico [15]. Al posto della libertà collettiva perseguita dagli hippie radicali, essi hanno difeso la libertà degli individui all’interno del mercato. Tuttavia, persino questi conservatori non potevano resistere al fascino delle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Negli anni ’60 le predizioni di McLuhan furono reinterpretate come un annuncio pubblicitario per nuove forme di media, computer e telecomunicazioni, essendo state sviluppate nell’ambito privato. Dagli anni ’70 in poi, Toffler, de Sola Pool e altri gurus tentarono di dimostrare che l’avvento dell’hypermedia avrebbe paradossalmente implicato un ritorno al liberalismo economico del passato [16]. Questa retro-utopia faceva eco alle predizioni di Asimov, Heilein e altri romanzieri di fantascienza i cui mondi futuri erano sempre popolati da commercianti spaziali, super-disinvolti venditori, geniali scienziati, capitani pirati e altri austeri individualisti [17]. La strada del progresso tecnologico non conduce sempre alla ‘ecotopia’ – essa potrebbe invece portare indietro all’America dei Padri Fondatori.

    AGORA O MERCATO?

    L’ambiguità della Californian Ideology è più evidente nelle sue visioni contraddittorie del futuro digitale. Lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia è una componente chiave del prossimo campo d’azione del capitalismo. Come fa notare Zuboff, l’introduzione delle tecnologie dei media, dei computer e delle telecomunicazioni nella fabbrica e in ufficio è l’apice di un lungo processo di separazione della forza lavoro dal coinvolgimento diretto nella produzione [18]. Se solo per ragioni competitive, tutte le maggiori economie industriali saranno alla fine costrette a fare in modo che le loro popolazioni ottengano gli aumenti di produttività del lavoro digitale. Ciò che è sconosciuto è l’impatto sociale e culturale del consentire alle persone di produrre e scambiare delle quantità quasi illimitate di informazione su scala globale. Soprattutto, l’avvento dell’hypermedia realizzerà le utopie o della Nuova Sinistra o della Nuova Destra? Come una fede ibrida, la Californian Ideology risolve questo enigma credendo in entrambe le visioni allo stesso tempo – e non criticando l’una o l’altra.

    D’altra parte, la purezza anti-corporativa della nuova Sinistra è stata protetta dai sostenitori della ‘comunità virtuale’. Secondo il loro guru, Howard Rheingold, i valori della contro-cultura dei baby boomers stanno forgiando lo sviluppo di nuove tecnologie informatiche. Come conseguenza, gli attivisti della comunità saranno in grado di utilizzare l’hypermedia per sostituire il capitalismo corporativo ed il governo forte con una ‘economia del regalo’ hi-tech. Già i bullettin board systems, le conferenze in Rete in tempo reale ed i servizi delle chat si basano sullo scambio volontario di informazioni e conoscenze tra i loro partecipanti. Secondo il punto di vista di Rheingold, i membri della ‘classe virtuale’ sono tuttora in prima linea nella lotta per la liberazione sociale. Nonostante il frenetico coinvolgimento commerciale e politico nella costruzione della ‘superstrada dell’informazione’, l’agora elettronica inevitabilmente trionferà sui suoi nemici corporativi e burocratici.

    D’altra parte, altri ideologi della West Coast hanno abbracciato l’ideologia del laissez-faire dei loro nemici conservatori del passato. Per esempio, Wired – la rivista mensile bibbia della ‘classe virtuale’ – ha acriticamente riprodotto le opinioni di Newt Gingrich, il leader repubblicano di estrema destra della Casa dei Rappresentanti, e dei Tofflers, che sono i suoi stretti consiglieri [20]. Ignorando le loro politiche per i tagli per il welfare, la rivista è ipnotizzata dal loro entusiasmo per le possibilità libertarie offerte dalle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Tuttavia, sebbene essi adottino il determinismo tecnologico di McLuhan, Gingrich e i Tofflers non stanno sostenendo l’agora tecnologica. Al contrario, essi affermano che la convergenza dei media, dei computer e delle telecomunicazioni produrrà un mercato elettronico:

    ‘Nel cyberspazio …, mercato dopo mercato verrà trasformato dal progresso tecnologico da un ‘monopolio naturale’ ad uno in cui la competizione è la regola’ [21].

    In questa versione della Californian Ideology, a ciascun membro della ‘classe virtuale’ viene promessa l’opportunità di diventare un imprenditore hi-tech di successo. Le tecnologie dell’informazione, così la controversia prosegue, rafforza il singolo, accresce la libertà individuale e riduce radicalmente il potere dello stato-nazione. Le strutture sociali, politiche e legali esistenti deperiranno per essere sostituite dalle interazioni senza restrizioni tra gli individui autonomi ed i loro software. Questi ‘McLuhanitiani’ ridisegnati sostengono che il grande governo dovrebbe stare lontano dalle spalle degli imprenditori pieni di risorse, che sono le uniche persone abbastanza disinvolte e coraggiose per assumere dei rischi. Al posto di regole contro-produttive, gli ingegneri lungimiranti stanno inventando gli strumenti necessari per creare un ‘libero mercato’ nel cyberspazio, come la crittografia, il denaro digitale, e le procedure di verifica. Invece, i tentativi di interferire con le proprietà emergenti di queste forze tecnologiche ed economiche, particolarmente da parte del governo, si ripercuotono semplicemente su coloro che sono abbastanza stolti da sfidare le leggi primarie di natura. Secondo l’editore esecutivo di Wired, la ‘mano invisibile’ del mercato e le forze cieche dell’evoluzione darwiniana sono effettivamente le stesse cose [22]. Come nei romanzi fantascientifici di Heinlein e di Asimov, la strada verso il futuro sembra condurre indietro verso il passato. Il ventunesimo secolo dell’era dell’informazione sarà la realizzazione degli ideali liberali del diciottesimo secolo di Thomas Jefferson:

    ‘… la …creazione di una nuova civilizzazione, fondata sulle verità eterne dell’Idea di Americana’ [23].

    IL MITO DEL ‘LIBERO MERCATO’

    In seguito alla vittoria del partito di Gingrich nelle elezioni legislative del 1994, l’ala destra della versione della Californian Ideology è ora dominante. Tuttavia, i principi sacri del liberalismo economico sono contraddetti dalla storia attuale dell’hypermedia. Per esempio, le tecnologie iconiche del computer e della Rete potrebbero essere state inventate solo con l’aiuto dei sussidi massicci dello stato ed il coinvolgimento entusiasta degli appassionati. La aziende private hanno giocato un ruolo importante, ma solo come una parte di una economia mista.

    Per esempio, il primo computer – the Different Engine – è stato progettato e costruito da società private, ma il suo sviluppo è stato possibile solo tramite una sovvenzione, da parte del Governo Britannico, di 17.47 sterline, che era una piccola fortuna nel 1834 [24]. Da Colossus a EDVAC, dai simulatori di volo alla realtà virtuale, lo sviluppo del computer è dipeso in momenti chiave dalla ricerca pubblica fatta circolare o da corposi contratti con le agenzie pubbliche. La società IBM ha costruito il primo computer digitale programmabile solo dopo che è stato richiesto dal Dipartimento della Difesa degli Stati Uniti durante la guerra di Corea. Fin da quando, lo sviluppo delle generazioni successive di computer è stato direttamente o indirettamente sovvenzionato dal budget della difesa americana [25]. Così come l’aiuto dello stato, l’evoluzione del computer è anche dipeso dal coinvolgimento della cultura d.i.y. Per esempio, i personal computer sono stati inventati da tecnici dilettanti che volevano costruirsi le loro macchine a buon mercato. L’esistenza di una ‘economia del regalo’ tra gli appassionati era una precondizione necessaria per il successo successivo dei prodotti creati da Apple e da Microsoft. Persino oggi, i programmi in shareware giocano ancora un ruolo vitale nell’avanzamento della progettazione dei software.

    La storia di Internet contraddice anche i principi delle ideologie del ‘libero mercato’. Per i primi venti anni della sua esistenza, lo sviluppo della Rete è dipeso quasi completamente dall’assai insultato governo federale americano. O attraverso l’esercito degli Stati Uniti, oppure tramite le università, grandi quantità di dollari dei contribuenti andarono nella costruzione delle infrastrutture della Rete e l’abbassamento dei costi di utilizzo dei suoi servizi. Allo stesso tempo, molti dei programmi chiave della Rete e delle applicazioni sono stati inventati sia dagli appassionati sia dai professionisti che hanno lavorato nel loro tempo libero. Per esempio, il programma MUD, che consente di fare conferenze in tempo reale in Rete, stato inventato da un gruppo di studenti che volevano fare dei giochi di fantasia su una rete di computer [26].

    Una delle cose più strane della spinta verso destra della Californian Ideology è che la West Coast stessa è una creazione dell’economia mista. I dollari del governo sono stati utilizzati per costruire i sistemi di irrigazione, le autostrade, le scuole, le università ed altri progetti di infrastrutture che rendono possibile la buona vita in California. All’apice di questi sussidi pubblici, il complesso industriale hi-tech della West Coast ha banchettato con il maiale più grasso nella storia di decenni. Il governo degli Stati Uniti ha versato miliardi di dollari di tasse nell’acquisto di aerei, missili e in bombe elettroniche e nucleari da società californiane. Per quelli non accecati dal dogma del ‘libero mercato’, era ovvio che gli Americani avessero sempre avuto un piano statale: soltanto lo chiamavano budget per la difesa [27]. Allo stesso tempo, gli elementi chiave dello stile di vita della West Coast venivano dalla sua lunga tradizione di bohème culturale. Sebbene fossero stati commercializzati più tardi, i media della comunità, lo spiritualismo ‘new age’, il surfing, i cibi salutisti, le droghe ricreative, la musica pop e molte altre forme di eterodossia culturale sono emerse tutte dagli scenari decisamente non commerciali basati intorno ai campus universitari, alle comunità di artisti ed ai comuni rurali. Senza la sua cultura d.i.y, i miti della California non avrebbero avuto la risonanza globale che hanno oggi [28].

    Tutto questo finanziamento pubblico e coinvolgimento della comunità ha avuto un effetto immensamente benefico – sebbene non riconosciuto e senza costi – sullo sviluppo della Silicon Valley e sulle altre industrie hi-tech. Gli imprenditori capitalisti hanno spesso un senso inflazionato delle loro proprie risorse nello sviluppo di nuove idee e danno poco riconoscimento ai contributi ottenuti o dallo stato, o dalla propria forza lavoro o dalla più ampia comunità. Tutto il progresso tecnologico è cumulativo – esso dipende dai risultati da un processo storico collettivo e deve essere considerato, almeno in parte, come una conquista collettiva. Perciò, come in qualsiasi altro paese industrializzato, gli imprenditori americani hanno inevitabilmente fatto affidamento sull’intervento dello stato e sulle iniziative d.i.y. per nutrire e sviluppare le loro industrie. Quando le società giapponesi hanno minacciato di prendere il controllo sul mercato del microchip americano, i capitalisti libertari del computer della California non hanno avuto scrupoli ideologici ad unirsi in un cartello sponsorizzato dello stato per respingere gli invasori dall’Est. Finché i programmi della Rete che consentono la partecipazione della comunità nel cyberspazio potevano essere inclusi, Bill Gates riteneva che la Microsoft non aveva altra scelta se non ritardare il lancio di ‘Windows ‘95’ [29]. Come in altri settori dell’economia moderna, il problema che sta di fronte all’industria emergente dell’hypermedia non è se sarà organizzata o no come una economia mista, ma quale sorta di economia mista sarà.

    LIBERTA’ E’ SCHIAVITU’

    Se i suoi precetti sacri sono rifiutati dalla storia profana, perché i miti del ‘libero mercato’ hanno influenzato così i proponenti della Californian Ideology? Vivendo in una cultura del contratto, gli artigiani hi-tech conducono un’esistenza schizofrenica. Da una parte, non sono in grado di sfidare il primato del mercato sulle loro vite, dall’altra, risentono dei tentativi di quelli al potere, che intaccano la loro autonomia individuale. Mescolando la Nuova Sinistra con la Nuova Destra, la Californian Ideology fornisce una risoluzione mistica degli atteggiamenti contraddittori tenuti dai membri della ‘classe virtuale’. L’anti-statalismo fornisce in modo deciso i mezzi per riconciliare le idee radicali e reazionarie sul progresso tecnologico. Mentre la Nuova Sinistra se la prende con il governo per il finanziamento del complesso industriale militare, la Nuova Destra attacca lo stato per l’interferenza nella diffusione spontanea della nuove tecnologie, tramite la competizione di mercato. Nonostante il ruolo centrale giocato dall’intervento pubblico nello sviluppo dell’hypermedia, gli ideologi Californiani predicano un vangelo anti-statalista di libertarianismo hi-tech: un’accozzaglia bizzarra di anarchismo hippie e di liberalismo economico rimpolpata da una grande quantità di determinismo tecnologico. Piuttosto che comprendere il capitalismo realmente esistente, i gurus sia della Nuova Sinistra, sia della Nuova Destra preferiscono di gran lunga sostenere versioni contrapposte della ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ digitale. Per esempio, Howard Rheingold della Nuova Sinistra è convinto che l’agora elettronica consentirà agli individui di esercitare quella sorta di libertà dei media sostenuta dai Padri Fondatori. Similmente, la Nuova Destra sostiene che la rimozione di tutti i freni regolatori dell’iniziativa privata creerà la libertà dei media, degna della ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ [30].

    Il trionfo di questo retro-futurismo è un risultato del fallimento del rinnovamento negli Usa durante la fine degli anni ’60 e gli inizi degli anni ’70. In seguito al confronto al People Park, la lotta tra l’estabilishment americano e la contro-cultura è entrata in una spirale di confronto violento. Mentre i Vietnamiti – a costo di un’enorme sofferenza umana – sono stati in grado di espellere gli invasori americani dal loro paese, gli hippies ed i loro alleati nel movimento dei diritti civili dei neri sono stati alla fine schiacciati da una combinazione di repressione di stato e di co-opzione culturale.

    La Californian Ideology incapsula perfettamente le conseguenze di questa sconfitta per i membri della ‘classe virtuale’. Sebbene essi godano delle libertà culturali conquistate dagli hippies, molti di loro non sono più coinvolti attivamente nella lotta per costruire ‘l’ecotopia’. Invece di ribellarsi apertamente al sistema, questi artigiani hi-tech ora accettano che la libertà individuale possa essere raggiunta solo lavorando nei limiti del progresso tecnologico e del ‘libero mercato’. In molti romanzi cyberpunk, questo libertarianismo asociale è personificato dal personaggio centrale dell’hacker, che è un individuo solo che lotta per la sopravvivenza in un mondo virtuale di informazione [31].

    La spinta verso la destra da parte degli ideologi californiani è favorita dalla loro accettazione fiduciosa dell’ideale liberale dell’individuo autosufficiente. Nel folklore americano, la nazione è stata costruita da un deserto da individui con gli stivali – cacciatori, cowboys, predicatori e colore che hanno stabilito le frontiere. La rivoluzione americana in sé è stata combattuta per proteggere le libertà e la proprietà degli individui contro le leggi oppressive e le tasse ingiuste imposte da una monarchia straniera. Per entrambe, la Nuova Sinistra e la Nuova Destra, i primi anni della repubblica americana forniscono un modello potente per le loro versioni contrapposte della libertà individuale. Tuttavia c’è una profonda contraddizione al centro di questo sogno primordiale americano: in questo periodo, gli individui prosperavano solo tramite le sofferenze degli altri. In nessun luogo è più chiaro se non nella vita di Thomas Jefferson – la figura più importante della Californian Ideology. Thomas Jefferson è stato l’uomo che ha scritto l’appello che ispira la democrazia e la libertà nella Dichiarazione Americana di Indipendenza e – allo stesso tempo – possedeva circa duecento esseri umani come schiavi. Come politico, difese il diritto dei contadini e degli artigiani americani di determinare i loro destini, senza essere soggetti alle restrizioni dell’Europa feudale. Come altri liberali del periodo, pensava che le libertà politiche potessero essere protette dai governi autoritari solo tramite il possesso diffuso della proprietà privata individuale. I diritti dei cittadini sono derivati da questo fondamentale diritto di natura. Al fine di incoraggiare l’autosufficienza, ha proposto che a ciascun americano dovessero essere dati almeno cinquanta acri di terra per garantire la loro indipendenza economica. Tuttavia, mentre idealizzava i piccoli coltivatori e gli uomini d’affari della frontiera, Jefferson era, in realtà, un possessore di piantagioni in Virginia che viveva del lavoro dei suoi schiavi. Sebbene le ‘istituzioni peculiari’ del sud preoccupavano la sua coscienza, egli credeva ancora che i diritti naturali dell’uomo includevano il diritto a possedere gli esseri umani come proprietà privata. Nella ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’, la libertà per i popoli bianchi si basava sulla schiavitù del popolo nero [32].

    AVANTI VERSO IL PASSATO

    Nonostante la finale emancipazione degli schiavi e le vittorie del movimento dei diritti civili, la segregazione razziale si trova ancora al centro della politica americana – specialmente sulla West Coast. Nell’elezione del 1994 del governatore della California, Pete Wilson, il candidato repubblicano, ha vinto tramite una feroce campagna anti-immigranti. A livello nazionale, il trionfo del partito repubblicano di Gingrich nelle elezioni legislative era basato sulla mobilitazione degli ‘arrabbiati maschi bianchi’ contro la minaccia supposta dei ladruncoli del benessere nero, immigrati dal Messico ed altre minoranze arroganti. Questi politici hanno raccolto i benefici elettorali della polarizzazione crescente tra coloro che abitano fuori città, principalmente bianchi e ricchi – molti dei quali votano – ed i cittadini del centro città, prevalentemente non bianchi e più poveri – molti dei quali non votano [33].

    Sebbene essi conservino alcuni ideali hippie, molti ideologi californiani hanno trovato impossibile prendere una posizione chiara contro le politiche che creano divisione dei Repubblicani. Questo perché le industrie hi-tech e dei media sono un elemento chiave della coalizione elettorale della Nuova Destra. In parte, entrambi i capitalisti ed i lavoratori ben pagati temono che l’aperto riconoscimento dei fondi pubblici delle loro società giustificherebbe l’innalzamento delle tasse da pagare terribilmente necessarie per la salute, la salvaguardia ambientale, l’alloggio, il trasporto pubblico e l’educazione. In modo più rilevante, molti membri della ‘classe virtuale’ vogliono essere sedotti dalla retorica libertaria e dall’entusiasmo tecnologico della Nuova Destra. Lavorando per le società hi-tech e dei nuovi media, ad esse piacerebbe credere che il mercato elettronico possa risolvere in qualche modo i problemi sociali ed economici pressanti dell’America, senza alcun sacrificio da parte loro. Preso nelle contraddizioni della Californian Ideology, Gingrich è – come un collaboratore di Wired ha detto – sia loro ‘amico, sia nemico’ [34].

    Negli Usa, una maggiore redistribuzione della ricchezza è urgentemente necessaria nel benessere economico a lungo termine della maggioranza della popolazione. Tuttavia, questo è contro gli interessi a breve termine del popolo bianco ricco, che include molti membri della ‘classe virtuale’. Piuttosto che dividere con i loro vicini poveri neri o ispanici, gli yuppies, invece, si ritirano nei loro sobborghi ricchi, protetti da guardie armate e sicuri con i loro servizi di benessere privato [35]. Lo svantaggiato partecipa solo, nell’era dell’informazione, fornendo del lavoro a buon mercato, non sindacalizzato, per le insalubri fabbriche di chip della Silicon Valley [36]. Persino la costruzione del cyberspazio potrebbe diventare parte integrante della frammentazione della società americana in classi antagoniste, determinate dalla razza. Già ‘segnati in rosso’ dalle compagnie telefoniche affamate di profitto, gli abitanti poveri delle aree del centro città sono ora minacciati con l’esclusione dai nuovi servizi on-line per la mancanza di denaro [37]. In contrasto, i membri della ‘classe virtuale’ ed altri professionisti possono divertirsi ad essere dei cyberpunk nella hyper-realtà, senza dover incontrare alcuno dei loro vicini impoveriti. Insieme alle sempre ampie divisioni sociali, un’altra discriminazione sta per essere creata tra i ‘ricchi di informazione’ ed i ‘poveri di informazione’. In questa ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ hi-tech, la relazione tra i padroni e gli schiavi continua in una nuova forma.

    PADRONI CYBORG E SCHIAVI ROBOT

    Il timore del ‘sottoproletariato’ ribelle ha ora corrotto il principio della Clifornian Ideology: il suo credo nel potenziale emancipatorio delle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Mentre i proponenti dell’agora elettronica e del mercato elettronico promettono di liberare gli individui dalle gerarchie dello stato e dai monopoli privati, la polarizzazione sociale della società americana sta portando avanti una immagine più oppressiva del futuro digitale. Le tecnologie della libertà si stanno trasformando in macchine di dominio.

    Presso la sua proprietà a Monticello, Jefferson ha inventato molti gadget ingegnosi per la sua casa, come un ‘montavivande’ per portare il cibo dalla cucina alla sala da pranzo. Mediando i suoi contatti con i suoi schiavi con la tecnologia, questo individualista rivoluzionario si risparmiava di fronteggiare la realtà della sua dipendenza dal lavoro forzato dei suoi simili esseri umani [38]. Nel tardo ventesimo secolo, la tecnologia sta per essere ancora una volta usata per rinforzare la differenza tra i padroni e gli schiavi.

    Secondo alcuni visionari, la ricerca della perfezione della mente, del corpo e dello spirito inevitabilmente condurrà al sorgere di un post-umano: una manifestazione bio-tecnologica dei privilegi sociali della ‘classe virtuale’. Mentre gli hippies vedevano lo sviluppo di se stessi come una parte della liberazione sociale, gli artigiani hi-tech della California contemporanea è più probabile che cerchino l’autosoddisfacimento tramite la terapia, lo spiritualismo, l’esercizio o altre occupazioni narcisistiche. Il desiderio di fuga nel sobborgo protetto dell’hyper-reale è solo un aspetto di questa profonda ossessione di sé [39]. Incoraggiato dai supposti avanzamenti nella ’Intelligenza Artificiale’ e nella scienza medica, il culto dell’Extropia fantastica di abbandonare il ‘wetware’ dello stato umano nel suo complesso per diventare macchine viventi [40]. Proprio come Virek e Tessier-Ashpools nei romanzi di Gibson Sprawl, essi credono che il privilegio sociale, alla fine, fornirà loro l’immortalità [41]. Invece di predire l’emancipazione dell’umanità, questa forma di determinismo tecnologico può solo prevedere un approfondimento della segregazione sociale.

    Nonostante queste fantasie, la gente bianca in California rimane dipendente dai loro simili dalla pelle più scura per lavorare nelle loro fabbriche, fare il raccolto, badare ai loro bambini e curare i loro giardini. In seguito alle rivolte L.A., essi temono sempre più che questo ‘sottoproletariaro’ un giorno chiederà la propria liberazione. Se gli schiavi umani sono, in definitiva, poco affidabili, quindi, quelli meccanici devono essere inventati. La ricerca del sacro calice della Intelligenza Artificiale rivela il desiderio del Golem – uno schiavo forte e fedele la cui pelle è il colore della terra, il cui interno è fatto di sabbia. Come nel romanzo di Asimov, Robot, i techno-utopisti immaginano che è possibile ottenere il lavoro simile degli schiavi dalle macchine inanimate [42]. Tuttavia, sebbene la tecnologia può immagazzinare o amplificare il lavoro, non potrà mai eliminare la necessità per gli esseri umani di inventare, costruire e mantenere tali macchine al primo posto. Il lavoro degli schiavi non può essere mantenuto senza che qualcuno venga ridotto in schiavitù.

    Nel mondo, la Californian Ideology è stata abbracciata come una forma ottimistica ed emancipatoria di determinismo tecnologico. Tuttavia, questa fantasia utopistica della West Coast dipende dalla sua cecità – e dipendenza – dalla sua polarizzazione sociale e razziale della società da cui è nata. Nonostante la sua radicale retorica, la Californian Ideology è, in definitiva, pessimistica su un cambiamento sociale fondamentale. Al contrario degli hippies, i suoi sostenitori non stanno lottando per costruire la ‘ecotopia’ o persino per aiutare a far rivivere il ‘New Deal’. Invece, il liberalismo sociale della Nuova Sinistra ed il liberalismo economico della Nuova Destra sono conversi in un sogno ambiguo di ‘Democrazia Jeffersoniana’ hi-tech. Interpretato generosamente, questo retro-futurismo potrebbe essere una visione di una frontiera cybernetica dove gli artigiani hi-tech scoprono il loro autosoddisfacimento individuale o nell’agora elettronica, o nel mercato elettronico. Tuttavia, come lo zeitgeist della ‘classe virtuale’, la Californian Ideology è allo stesso tempo una fede esclusiva. Se solo alcune persone hanno accesso alle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione, la ‘democrazia Jeffersoniana’ può diventare una versione hi-tech dell’economia della piantagione del Vecchio Sud. Riflettendo la sua profonda ambiguità, il determinismo tecnologico della Californian Ideology non è semplicemente ottimistico ed anticipatorio. E’ contemporaneamente una visione profondamente pessimistica e repressiva del futuro.

    CI SONO DELLE ALTERNATIVE

    Nonostante le sue profonde contraddizioni, le persone nel mondo credono ancora che la Californian Ideology esprima la sola via verso il futuro. Con la crescente globalizzazione dell’economia del mondo, molti membri della ‘classe virtuale’ in Europa ed in Asia sentono maggiore affinità con i loro colleghi californiani che con gli altri lavoratori del loro paese. Tuttavia, in realtà, il dibattito non è stato più possibile o più necessario. La Californian Ideology è stata sviluppata da un gruppo di persone residenti in uno stato specifico, in una particolare mescolanza di scelte socio-economiche e tecnologiche. La sua miscela eclettica e contraddittoria di economia conservativa e radicalismo hippie riflette la storia della West Coast – e non il futuro inevitabile del resto del mondo. Per esempio, le assunzioni anti-stataliste degli ideologi californiani sono piuttosto limitate. A Singapore, il governo non sta solo organizzando la costruzione di una rete a fibre ottiche, ma sta anche tentando di controllare l’idoneità ideologica dell’informazione distribuita su di essa. Data la assai veloce crescita delle ‘tigri’ dell’Asia, il futuro digitale non arriverà necessariamente per primo in California [43].

    Nonostante le raccomandazioni neo-liberali del Bangemann Report, la maggior parte delle autorità europee sono determinate ad essere coinvolte da vicino nello sviluppo delle nuove tecnologie dell’informazione. Il Minitel – la prima rete di successo nel mondo – è stata la creazione voluta dalla Francia. Rispondendo ad una relazione ufficiale sull’impatto potenziale dell’hypermedia, il governo ha deciso di investire delle risorse nello sviluppo delle tecnologie ‘taglienti’. Nel 1981, la France Telecom ha lanciato il sistema Minitel, che forniva una mescolanza di informazioni basate sul testo e i mezzi di comunicazione. Come un monopolio, questa compagnia del telefono è stata in grado di costruire una massa critica di utilizzatori per il suo sistema pioneristico on-line, dando i terminali gratuiti a chiunque volesse rinunciare alle guide cartacee del telefono. Una volta che il mercato è stato creato, i providers commerciali e della comunità erano poi in grado di trovare clienti o partecipanti sufficienti da avere successo nel sistema. Da allora in poi, milioni di francesi di tutti gli strati sociali hanno felicemente prenotato i biglietti, chiacchierato tra loro e si sono organizzati politicamente on-line, senza rendersi conto che stavano infrangendo i precetti libertari della Californian Ideology [44].

    Lungi dal demonizzare lo stato, la stragrande maggioranza della popolazione francese crede che un maggiore intervento pubblico sia necessario per una società efficiente e sana [45]. Nelle recenti elezioni presidenziali, quasi tutti i candidati dovevano sostenere – almeno retoricamente – un maggiore intervento dello stato per porre fine all’esclusione sociale dei disoccupati e dei senza tetto. Al contrario dei suoi equivalenti americani, la rivoluzione francese andò oltre il liberalismo economico verso la democrazia popolare. In seguito alla vittoria dei Giacobini sui loro avversari liberali nel 1972, la repubblica democratica in Francia divenne l’incarnazione della ‘volontà generale’. Come tale, si credeva che lo stato difendesse gli interessi di tutti i cittadini, piuttosto che proteggere i diritti dei possessori della proprietà individuale. Il discorso dei politici francesi permette un’azione collettiva da parte dello stato per mitigare – o persino rimuovere – i problemi incontrati dalla società. Mentre gli ideologi californiani tentano di ignorare i dollari dei contribuenti che sovvenzionano lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia, il governo francese può intervenire apertamente in questo settore dell’economia [46].

    Sebbene la sua tecnologia sia ora datata, la storia del Minitel confuta chiaramente i pregiudizi anti-statalisti degli ideologi californiani – e del comitato di Banbemann. Il futuro digitale sarà un ibrido di intervento dello stato, imprenditorialità capitalista e cultura d.i.y. In modo decisivo, se lo stato può incoraggiare lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia, un’azione consapevole potrebbe anche essere presa per prevenire il sorgere della segregazione sociale tra il ‘ricco di informazione’ ed il ‘povero di informazione’. Non lasciando ogni cosa alle bizzarrie delle forze di mercato, l’Unione Europea ed i suoi stati membri potrebbero garantire che ogni cittadino abbia la possibilità di essere connesso ad una rete a banda larga a fibre ottiche al più basso prezzo possibile.

    In primo luogo, questo sarebbe uno schema di lavoro assai necessario per la creazione di lavori semi-specializzati in un periodo di disoccupazione di massa. Come le misure di impiego Keynesiane, niente sconcerta pagare delle persone per scavare buche nella strada e riempirle ancora [47]. Ancora più importante, la costruzione di una rete a fibre ottiche nelle case e al lavoro potrebbe dare a chiunque l’accesso a nuovi servizi on-line e creare una comunità ampia e vitale di conoscenza condivisa. I guadagni a lungo termine per l’economia e la società dalla costruzione dello ‘infobahn’ sarebbe incommensurabile. Consentirebbe all’industria di lavorare in modo più efficiente e di commercializzare nuovi prodotti. Assicurerebbe che l’educazione ed i servizi dell’informazione siano disponibili a tutti. Senza dubbio lo ‘infobahn’ creerà un mercato di massa per le compagnie private per vendere le materie prime dell’informazione esistente – films, programmi tv, musica e libri – attraverso la Rete. Allo stesso tempo, una volta che la gente può distribuire, così come ricevere l’hypermedia, emergerà rapidamente un prosperare di comunità dei media e di gruppi di particolare interesse. Perché accada tutto ciò, sarà necessario l’intervento collettivo per assicurare che tutti i cittadini siano inclusi nel futuro digitale.

    LA RINASCITA DEL MODERNO

    Anche se non è in circostanze di loro propria scelta, è necessario ora che gli Europei sostengano il loro proprio punto di vista sul futuro. Ci sono varie vie verso la società dell’informazione – ed alcune strade sono più desiderabili di altre. Al fine di effettuare una scelta informata, gli artigiani digitali d’Europa hanno bisogno di sviluppare una analisi più coerente dell’impatto dell’hypermedia, che può essere trovata tra le ambiguità della Californian Ideology. I membri della ‘classe virtuale’ europea devono creare la loro popria identità distintiva.

    Questa comprensione alternativa del futuro parte da un rifiuto di qualsiasi forma di segregazione – sia all’interno, sia all’esterno del cyberspazio. Ogni programma per lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia deve assicurare che la totalità della popolazione abbia accesso ai nuovi servizi on-line. Al posto dell’anarchia della Nuova Sinistra o della Nuova Destra, una strategia europea per lo sviluppo delle tecnologie della nuova informazione deve necessariamente riconoscere l’inevitabilità di una qualche forma di economia mista – la miscela creativa e antagonistica di iniziative di stato, corporative e d.i.y. L’indeterminatezza del futuro digitale è il risultato dell’ubiquità di questa economia mista nel mondo moderno. Nessuno sa esattamente quale saranno le forze relative di ciascun componente, ma l’azione collettiva può assicurare che nessun gruppo sociale sarà deliberatamente escluso dal cyberspazio.

    Una strategia europea per l’era dell’informazione deve anche celebrare i poteri creativi degli artisti digitali. Poiché il loro lavoro non può essere aspecializzato o meccanizzato, i membri della ‘classe virtuale’ esercitano un grande controllo sul loro lavoro. Piuttosto che soccombere al fatalismo della Californian Ideology, dovremmo abbracciare la possibilità creative dell’hypermedia. All’interno delle limitazioni dell’economia mista, gli artigiani digitali sono in grado di inventare qualcosa di completamente nuovo – qualcosa che non è stato previsto in alcun romanzo di fantascienza. Queste forme innovative di conoscenza e di comunicazioni proverà le conquiste degli altri, inclusi alcuni aspetti della Californian Ideology. E’ impossibile ora per alcuni movimenti seri per l’emancipazione sociale non includere domande sul femminismo, la cultura della droga, la liberazione omosessuale, l’identità etnica ed altre questioni aperte dai radicali della West Coast. In modo simile, qualsiasi tentativo di sviluppare l’hypermedia in Europa richiederà dello zelo imprenditoriale ed un atteggiamento del poter fare sostenuto dalla nuova destra Californiana. Tuttavia, allo stesso tempo, lo sviluppo dell’hypermedia significa innovazione, creatività ed invenzione. Non esistono precedenti per tutti gli aspetti del futuro digitale.

    Come pionieri del nuovo, gli artigiani digitali hanno bisogno di ricollegarsi alla teoria ed alla pratica dell’arte produttiva. Essi non sono impiegati di altri – o addirittura sarebbero degli imprenditori cybernetici. Essi sono anche degli ingegneri-artisti – disegnatori del prossimo stadio della modernità. Avvicinandosi all’esperienza di Saint, dei Simonisti e dei Costruttivisti, gli artigiani digitali sono in grado di creare una nuova macchina estetica per l’era dell’informazione [48]. Per esempio, i musicisti hanno utilizzato i computers per creare semplicemente delle forme digitali di musica, come il jungle e la techno [49]. Gli artisti interattivi hanno esplorato la potenzialità delle tecnologie del CD-rom, come mostrato dal lavoro dell’ANTI-rom. L’Hypermedia Research Centre ha costruito uno spazio sociale virtuale sperimentale chiamato J’s Joint [50]. In ciascun esempio, gli ingegneri-artisti stanno tentando di spingere oltre le limitazioni di entrambe le tecnologie e la loro creatività. Soprattutto, queste nuove forme di espressione e di comunicazione sono collegate con la cultura più vasta. Coloro che sviluppano l’hypermedia devono riaffermare la possibilità di un controllo razionale e consapevole sulla forma del futuro digitale. Al contrario dell’elitarismo della Californian Ideology, gli ingegneri-artisti europei devono costruire un cyberspazio che è inclusivo ed universale. Ora è il momento per la rinascita del Moderno.

    ‘Le circostanze presenti favoriscono il lusso nazionale. Il lusso diventa utile e morale quando è goduto dall’intera nazione. L’onore ed il vantaggio di impiegare direttamente, negli accordi politici, il progresso delle scienze esatte e delle belle arti .. è stato riservato per il nostro secolo’ [51].

    NOTE

    [1] Naum Gabo e Anton Pevsner, ‘The Realistic Manifesto, 1920’, in John E. Bowlt (ed.), Russian Art of the Avant-Garde, London 1976, p. 214.

    [2] Per oltre 25 anni gli esperti hanno predetto l’arrivo imminente dell’era dell’informazione, vedi Alain Touraine,La Société post-industrielle; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages; Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society; e Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom.

    [3] Vedi Martin Bangemann, Europe and the Global Information Society, ; e il programma e gli abstracts della Warwick University’s Virtual Futures ’95 Conference.

    [4] Vedi Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.

    [5] Vedi Mike Davis, City of Quartz; Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’; e le registrazioni di Ice-T, Snoop Dog, Dr Dre, Ice Cube, NWA e molti altri rappers della West Coast.

    [6] Vedi George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left, p. 124.

    [7] Jerry Rubin, ‘An Emergency Letter to my Brothers and Sisters in the Movement’.

    [8] Per il ruolo chiave giocato dalla cultura popolare nell’identità della Nuova Sinistra americana, vedi George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left; e Charles Reich, The Greening of America. Per una descrizione delle vite dei lavoratori dal colletto binco nell’America degli anni ’50, vedi William Whyte, The Organization Man.

    [9] In un romanzo best seller della metà degli anni ’70, la metà più a nord della West Coast si è separata dal resto degli Stati Uniti per formare una utopia hippie, vedi Ernest Callenbach, Ecotopia. Questa idealizzazione della vita di comunità californiana può anche essere trovata in John Brunner, The Shockwave Rider,; ed anche in lavori successivi, come Kim Stanley Robinson, Pacific Edge.

    [10] Per un’analisi dei tentativi di creare una democrazia diretta tramite le tecnonologie dei media, vedi Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom.

    [11] Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, pp. 255-6. Vedi anche Marshall McLuhan e Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage; and Gerald Emanuel Stern (ed.), McLuhan: Hot & Cool.

    [12] Vedi John Downing, Radical Media.

    [13] Arthur Kroker e Michael A. Weinstein, Data Trash, p. 15. Questa analisi segue quella di quei futurologi che pensano che ‘knowledge workers’ fossero l’embrione di una nuova classe dirigente, vedi Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; e gli economisti che credevano che i ‘symbolic analysts’ sarebbero diventati la parte dominante della forza lavoro sotto un capitalismo globalizzato, vedi Robert Reich, The Work of Nations. In contrasto, negli anni ’60, alcuni teorici della Nuova Sinistra credevano che i lavoratori tecnico-scientifici stavano conducendo una lotta per la liberazione sociale, tramite l’occupazione delle fabbriche e la richiesta di auto-gestione, vedi Serge Mallet, The New Working Class.

    [14] Vedi Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, per una descrizione del contratto di lavoro nella Silicon Valley; e per una trattazione romanzesca del medesimo tema, Douglas Coupland, Microserfs. Per un esame più teorico dell’organizzazione del lavoro post-Fordista, vedi Alain Lipietz, L’audace ou l’enlisement e Mirages and Miracles; Benjamin Coriat, L’atelier et le robot; e Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved.

    [15] C’è un aconsiderevole confusione politica e semantica sul significato di ‘liberalismo’ da entrambe le parti dell’Atlantico. Per esempio, gli Americani usano liberalismo per descrivere qualsiasi politica che avviene da essere sostenuta in apparenza dalla sinistra del partito Democratico. Tuttavi, come Lipset ha puntualizzato, questo ristretto senso della parola cela l’accettazione quasi universale, negli Stati Uniti, del liberalismo nel suo significato classico. Come dice: ‘Questi valori [liberali] erano evidenti nel ventesimo secolo fatto che … gli Stati Uniti non solo mancavano di un partito socialista vitale, ma non hanno neanche mai sviluppato uno stile conservativo britanni o europeo o un partito dei Tory’, vedi see Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism, pp. 31-2. La convergenza della Nuova sinistra e della Nuova Destra intorno alla Californian Ideology, pertanto, è un esempio specifico del più ampio consenso intorno al liberalismo anti-statalista, come un discorso politico negli Stati Uniti.

    [16] Per il successo di McLuhan sul circuito del viaggio ufficiale corporativo, vedi Tom Wolfe, ‘What If He Is Right?’. Per l’utilizzo di questa idea dai pensatori conservatori, vedi Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages; Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave; e Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom.

    [17] Gli eroi sono comuni nei romanzi classici di fatascienza, vedi D. D. Harriman in Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon; o i personaggi principali in Isaac Asimov, The Foundation Trilogy; I, Robot; e The Rest of the Robots. Hagbard Celine – una versione più psichedelica di questo archetipo maschile – è il personaggio centrale in Robert Shea e Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminati Trilogy. Nella tabella temporale della ‘storia del fututro’ di fronte al romanzo di Robert Heinlein, predice che, dopo un periodo di crisi sociale, causata dal rapido avanzamento tecnologico, la stabilità sarebbe stata ristabilita negli anni ’80 e ’90 tramite ‘ .. un’apertura di nuovefrontiere ed un ritorno all’economia del diciannovesimo secolo!’. Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon, pp. 8-9.

    [18] Vedi Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine. Certamente, questa analisi è derivata da Karl Marx, Grundrisse; e ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’.

    [19] Vedi Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community; e la sua home page.

    [20] Vedi l’esuberante intervista con i Tofflers in Peter Schwartz, ‘Shock Wave (Anti) Warrior’; e, per la caratteristica ambiguità della rivista sullo Speaker del programma politico reazionario della House, vedi l’intervista chiamata, a proposito, con Newt Gingrich in Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’.

    [21] Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, p. 5.

    [22] Vedi Kevin Kelly, Out of Control. Per una critica del libro, vedi Richard Barbrook, Pinocchio Theory.

    [23] Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream: , p. 13. Toffler e gli amici proclamano orgogliosamente anche che: ‘L’America … rimane la terra della libertà individuale, e questa libertà, chiaramente, si esende al cyberspazio’, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, p. 6. Vedi anche Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’.

    [24] Vedi Simon Schaffer, Babbage’s Intelligence: Calculating Engine and the Factory System.

    [25] Vedi Jonathan Palfreman e Doron Swade, The Dream Machine, pp. 32-36, per un resoconto di come una mancanza dell’intervento dello stato abbia significato che la Germania Nazista abbia perso dell’opportunità di costruire il primo computer del mondo. Nel 1941 l’Alto Comando Tedesco ha rifiutato di finanziare ulteriormente Konrad Zuze, che ha aperto la strada all’utilizzo del codice binario, all’immagazzinamento dei programmi e ai gates logici elettronici.

    [26] Vedi Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community.

    [27] Come il Segretario del Lavoro del Presidente Clinton ha affermato: ‘Ricordatevi che , durante l’era del dopoguerra, il Pentagono è stato tranquillamente responsabile di aiutare le corporazioni americane di progredire con le tecnologie come i motori degli aerei, le cellule, itransistors, i circuiti integrati, i nuovi materiali, i lasers e le fibre ottiche … Il Pentagono ed i 600 laboratori nazionali che lavorano con esso e con il Dipartimento dell’Energia sono la cosa che l’America ha di pù vicino al noto Ministero del Commercio Internazionale del Commercio e dell’Industria giapponese’, Robert Reich, The Work of Nations, p. 159.

    [28] Per un resoconto di come queste innovazioni culturali sono emerse dalla recente scena, vedi Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test. Curiosamente, uno degli autisti del famoso bus era, che è ora uno dei principali collaboratori di Wired.

    [29] Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, pp. 21-2, sostiene che l’industria del computer americana è già stata incoraggiata dal Pentagono a formare dei cartelli contro la competizione straniera. Gates ammette che ha realizzato solo di recente che il ‘massiccio cambiamento strutturale’ è stato causato dalla Rete, vedi Bill Gates, ‘The Bill Gates Column’.

    [30] Vedi le home pages di Howard Rheingold, e Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’. Nonostante gli istinti liberisti di entrambi questi scrittori, la loro infatuazione per l’era dei Padri Fondatori è condivisa dalla Milizia neo-fascista e dei movimenti patriottici, vedi Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America.

    [31] Vedi gli eroi hacker in William Gibson, Neuromancer; Count Zero; e Mona Lisa Overdrive; o in Bruce Sterling (ed.), Mirrorshades. Un prototipo di questa sorta di anti-eroe è Deckard, il cacciatore esistenziale dei replicanti in Bladerunner di Ridley Scott.

    [32] Secondo Miller, Thomas Jefferson credeva che le persone nere non potessero essere membri del contratto sociale di Locke che riunisce insieme i cittadini della repubblica americana. ‘Il diritto dell’uomo … mentre teoricamente e idealmente il diritto di nascita di ogni essere umano si applicava in pratica negli Stati Uniti solo agli uomini bianchi: gli schiavi neri erano esclusi dalla considerazione perché, sebbene certamente esseri umani, essi erano anche proprietà e dove i diritti dell’uomo entravano in conflitto con i diritti di proprietà, la proprietà aveva la precedenza’, vedi John Miller, The Wolf by the Ears, p. 13. L’opposizione di Jefferson alla schiavitù era retorica al massimo. In una lettera del 22 Aprile 1820, disonestamente suggeriva che il modo migliore per incoraggiare l’abolizione della schiavitù era legalizzare le proprietà privata degli esseri umani in tutti gli Stati dell’Unione e dei territori di frontiera! Egli affermava che ‘ … la loro diffusione in territori più ampi li avrebbe resi individualmente più felici e aprebbe facilitato in proporzione la realizzazione della loro emancipazione, dividendo il peso su un grande numero di collaboratori [cioè i possessori di schivi]’, vedi Merill Peterson (ed.), The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. 568. Per una descrizione della vita nella sua piantagione, vedi anche Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello.

    [33] Per la svolta a Destra della California, vedi Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’.

    [34] Vedi Esther Dyson, ‘Friend and Foe’. Esther Dyson ha collaborato con i Tofflers nello scrivere Peace and Progress Foundation, Cyberspace and the American Dream, che è un manifesto retro-futurista progettato per raccogliere voti per Gingrich, da parte dei membri della ‘classe virtuale’.

    [35] Per il sorgere dei sobborghi fortificati, vedi Mike Davis, City of Quartz; e Urban Control. Questi ‘sobborghi con i cancelli’ forniscono l’ispirazione per lo sfondo alienato di molti cyberpunk dei romanzi di fantascienza, come Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash.

    [36] Vedi Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain.

    [37] Vedi Reginald Stuart, ‘High-Tech Redlining’.

    [38] Vedi Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello.

    [39] Vedi Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain.

    [40] Per una esposizione del loro programma retro-futurista vedi l’Extropian FAQ.

    [41] Vedi William Gibson, Neuromancer, Grafton, London 1984, e Count Zero, Grafton, London 1986.

    [42] Vedi Isaac Asimov, I, Robot; e The Rest of the Robots.

    [43] Vedi William Gibson e Sandy Sandfort, ‘Disneyland with the Death Penalty’. Dal momento che questi articoli sono un attacco a Singapore, è ironico che la vera Disneyland sia in California – il cui codice penale repressivo include la pena di morte!

    [44] Per la relazione che ha condotto alla creazione del Minitel, vedi Simon Nora e Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society. Un resoconto dei primi anni del Minitel può essere trovato in Michel Marchand, The Mintel Saga.

    [45] Secondo un sondaggio condotto durante le elezioni presidenziali del 1985, il 67% della popolazione francese era a favore dell’affermazione che ‘lo stato deve intervenire di più nella vita economica del nostro paese’, vedi ‘Une majorité de Français souhaitent un vrai “chef” pour un vrai “Etat”.

    [46] Per l’influenza del Giacobinismo sulle concezioni francesi dei diritti democratici, vedi Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom. Alcuni economisti francesi credono che proprio la storia differente dell’Europa ha creato un modello specifico – e superiore socialmente – del capitalismo, vedi Michel Albert, Capitalism v. Capitalism; e Philippe Delmas, Le Maître des Horloges.

    [47] Come Keynes stesso dice: ‘ “Per scavare buche nel terreno”, sborsati i risparmi, crescerà non solo l’impiego, ma anche il dividendo nazionale reale per i beni di prima necessità ed i servizi’, vedi J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, p. 220.

    [48] Vedi Keith Taylor, Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825; and John E. Bowlt, Russian Art of the Avant-Garde.
    [49] Come Goldie, un compositore di musica, sostiene: “Dobbiamo portarlo avanti e prendere il tamburo ed il basso e spingerlo spingerlo spingerlo. Ricordo quando si diceva che non poteva essere più spinto. E’ stato spinto dieci volte da allora”, vedi Tony Marcus, ‘The War is Over’.

    [50] Per informazioni sull’ANTI-rom e J’s Joint, vedi i loro contributi all’Hypermedia Research Centre’s Web site.

    [51] Henri Saint-Simon, ‘Sketch of the New Political System’ in Keith Taylor, Henri Saint-Simon 1760- 1825, p. 203.

    —————————————————————

    Bibliographia

    Michel Albert, Capitalism v. Capitalism, Four Wall Eight Windows, New York 1993.

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    Martin Bangemann, Europe and the Global Information Society, European Union, Brussels 1994.

    Richard Barbrook, Media Freedom: the contradictions of communications in the age of modernity, Pluto, London 1995.

    Richard Barbrook, ‘The Pinnochio Theory’.

    Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, Basic Books, New York 1973.

    Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: too close for comfort, Guilford Press, New York 2000.

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    Ernest Callenbach, Ecotopia, Bantam, New York 1975.

    Benjamin Coriat, L’atelier et le robot, Christian Bourgois Éditeur, Paris 1990.

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    Mike Davis, City of Quartz, Verso, London 1990.

    Mike Davis, Urban Control: the Ecology of Fear, Open Magazine, New Jersey 1992.

    Philippe Delmas, Le Maître des Horloges, Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris 1991.

    John Downing, Radical Media, South End Press, Boston 1984.

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    The Extropians, FAQ.

    Naum Gabo and Anton Pevsner, ‘The Realistic Manifesto, 1920’, in John E. Bowlt (editor), Russian Art of the Avant-Garde: Theory and Criticism, Thames & Hudson, London 1976, pages 208-214.

    Bill Gates, ‘The Bill Gates Column’, The Guardian, On-Line Section, 20 July 1995, page 14.

    William Gibson, Neuromancer, Grafton, London 1984.

    William Gibson, Count Zero, Grafton, London 1986.

    William Gibson, Mona Lisa Overdrive, Grafton, London 1989.

    William Gibson and Sandy Sandfort, ‘Disneyland with the Death Penalty’, Wired, 1.4, September/October 1993, pages 51-55, 114-115.

    Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, Free Association Books, London 1989.

    Robert Heinlein, The Man Who Sold the Moon, Signet, New York 1950.

    Mitch Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Heading?’, Wired, 1.3, July/August 1993, pages 53-59, 94.

    George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: a Global Analysis of 1968, South End Press, Boston 1987.

    Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: the New Biology of Machines, Fourth Estate, London 1994.

    Tony Marcus, ‘The War is Over’, Mixmag, August 1995, page 46.

    John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London 1964.

    Arthur Kroker and Michael A. Weinstein, Data Trash: the theory of the virtual class, New World Perspectives, Montreal 1994.

    Alain Lipietz, L’audace ou l’enlisement, Éditions La Découverte, Paris 1984.

    Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles, Verso, London 1987.

    Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a double-edged sword, W.W. Norton, New York 1996.

    Serge Mallet, The New Working Class, Spokesman Books, Nottingham 1975.

    Michel Marchand, The Mintel Saga: A French Success Story, Larousse, Paris 1988.

    Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Penguin, London 1973.

    Karl Marx, ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’ in Albert Dragstedt (editor), Value Studies by Marx, New Park, London 1976, pages 71-193.

    Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1964.

    Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage, Penguin, London 1967.

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    Le Monde, ‘Une majorité de Français souhaitent un vrai “chef” pour un vrai “Etat”‘, Le Monde, 11 avril 1995, page 6.

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    Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerisation of Society, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1980.

    Jon Palfreman and Doron Swade, The Dream Machine: exploring the computer age, BBC, London 1991.

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    Charles Reich, The Greening of America, Random House, New York 1970.

    Robert Reich, The Work of Nations: a blueprint for the future, Simon & Schuster, London 1991.

    Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: finding connection in a computerised world, Secker & Warburg, London 1994,

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    Kim Stanley Robinson, Pacific Edge, Grafton, London 1990.

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    Henri de Saint-Simon, ‘Sketch of the New Political System’ in Keith Taylor (editor), Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825: Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation, Croom Helm, London 1975, pages 198-206.

    Simon Schaffer, ‘Babbage’s Intelligence: Calculating Engines and the Factory System’.

    Peter Schwartz, ‘Shock Wave (Anti) Warrior’, Wired, 1.5, November 1993, pages 61-65, 120-122.

    Ridley Scott (director), Bladerunner, Warner Brothers, USA 1982.

    Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminati Trilogy, Dell, New York 1975.

    Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom, Belknap Press, Harvard 1983.

    Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash, Roc, New York 1992.

    Bruce Sterling (editor), Mirrorshades, Paladin, London 1988.

    Gerald Emanuel Stern (editor), McLuhan: Hot & Cool, Penguin, London 1968.

    Reginald Stuart, ‘High-Tech Redlining: are Afro-Americans being frozen out of the new communications network’, Utne Reader, 68, March-April 1995, page 73.

    Keith Taylor (editor), Henri Saint-Simon 1760-1825: Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation, Croom Helm, London 1975.

    Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Pan, London 1980.

    Alain Touraine, La Société post-industrielle, Editions Denoël, Paris 1969.

    Virtual Futures ’95, Conference Website.

    Richard Walker, ‘California Rages Against the Dying of the Light’, New Left Review, 209, January-February 1995, pages 42-74.

    Tom Wolfe, ‘What If He Is Right?’, The Pump House Gang, Bantam Books, London 1968, pages 107-133.

    Tom Wolfe, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, Bantam Books, New York 1968.

    William Whyte, The Organization Man, Simon & Schuster, New York 1956.

    Paul Wilstach, Jefferson and Monticello, William Heinemann, London 1925.

    Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: the future of work and power, Heinemann, New York 1988.

    ——————————————————————

  • Imaginary Futures at the Futurological Congress

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be talking about Imaginary Futures at the Futurological Congress in Lviv, Ukraine, on Saturday 27th November at 3.30pm.

    Location: Center for Urban History of East-Central Europe, Bohomoltsia 6, Lviv.

    Besides this presentation, Richard Barbrook will also be hosting a Class Wargames performance for the Futurological Congress with Stefan Lutschinger on Sunday 28th November at the Center for Urban History of East-Central Europewhich will feature a collective playing of Guy Debord’s The Game of War accompanied by a discussion of its importance to our understanding of Situationist theory and practice.

  • NJUJORÅ KA PROROÄŒANSTVA: ZAMIÅ LJENA BUDUĆNOST VEÅ TAÄŒKE INTELIGENCIJE

    Budućnost je ono što je i bila

    “BioloÅ¡ka inteligencija je nepromenljiva, zato Å¡to je u pitanju stara, zrela paradigma, dok nova paradigma nebioloÅ¡kog raÄ?unarstva i inteligencije eksponencijalno raste. Prelaz će se odigrati 2020-ih a nakon toga, bar sa stanoviÅ¡ta hardvera, dominiraće nebioloÅ¡ko raÄ?unarstvo…“
    Kurcvejl (Kurzweil), 2004, str. 3.

    Na poÄ?etku 21. veka, san o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji ukorenjen je duboko u savremenu maÅ¡tu. Od detinjstva pa nadalje, ljudima u razvijenom svetu se govori da će raÄ?unari jednog dana moći da rasuÄ‘uju – Ä?ak i da imaju osećanja – baÅ¡ kao ljudi. U priÄ?ama nauÄ?ne fantastike, maÅ¡ine koje misle su odavno omiljeni likovi. Publika je odrastala sa likovima robota drugara, kao Å¡to je Dejta iz serije Zvezdane staze: Nova generacija. ili nemilosrdnih robota-Ä?udoviÅ¡ta poput kiborga iz Terminatora. (Startrek.com 2005; Kameron/Cameron 1984). Ove nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne maÅ¡tarije dodatno podstiÄ?u pouzdana predviÄ‘anja istaknutih informatiÄ?ara. Neprekidna poboljÅ¡anja hardvera i softvera naposletku će dovesti do stvaranja veÅ¡taÄ?kih inteligencija, moćnijih od “bioloÅ¡ke inteligencije” ljudskog mozga.

    Komercijalni proizvoÄ‘aÄ?i već neko vreme sa nestrpljenjem iÅ¡Ä?ekuju dan kada će prodavati svesne maÅ¡ine koje obavljaju kućne poslove i pomažu starijima (Honda 2004). Neki informatiÄ?ari Ä?ak veruju da je stvaranje “nebioloÅ¡kih inteligencija” jedna duhovna potraga. U Kaliforniji, Rej Kurcvejl, Vernor Vindž (Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge) i njihove kolege s nestrpljenjem oÄ?ekuju Singularnost: Prvi dolazak silicijumskog mesije (Vindž 1993; Bel/Bell 2004). Bilo da su nadahnuti novcem ili misticizmom, svi ovi zagovornici veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije dele uverenje da se sadaÅ¡njost mora shvatiti kao ’embrion’, kao budućnost u zametku – a upravo iz budućnosti će se rasvetljivati potencijal sadaÅ¡njosti. Svaki napredak u raÄ?unarskoj tehnologiji objavljuje se kao novi korak ka stvaranju potpuno svesne maÅ¡ine. ProroÄ?anstvo o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sve bliže je ispunjenju sa pojavljivanjem svakog novog komada softvera ili hardvera. Nije važno ono Å¡to raÄ?unari mogu sada, već ono Å¡to će moći uskoro. SadaÅ¡njica je beta verzija nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nog sna: zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost.

    Uprkos svom istaknutom mestu u kulturi, vera u svesne maÅ¡ine podložna je teorijskom egzorcizmu. Daleko od toga da bude prazan oznaÄ?itelj, ovo proroÄ?anstvo duboko je ukorenjeno u vremenu i prostoru. OÄ?ekivano, savremeni propagatori veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije retko priznaju koliko je sâm koncept star. Žele da napreduju, ne da se osvrću. Ipak, proÅ¡lo je viÅ¡e od Ä?etrdeset godina otkad je san o razumnim maÅ¡inama prvi put zaokupio maÅ¡tu javnosti. ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije ima dugu povest. Analiziranje te prvobitne verzije proroÄ?anstva preduslov je za razumevanje njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. S tim u vidu, vratimo se u drugu deceniju Hladnog rata kada je najveća svetska raÄ?unarska kompanija priredila predstavu o Ä?udesima razumnih maÅ¡ina u finansijskoj prestonici najmoćnije i najbogatije zemlje na planeti…

    Milenijum napretka

    Na dan 22. aprila 1964. godine, Svetski sajam (World’s Fair) u Njujorku otvoren je za javnost. U naredne dve godine, ta moderna zemlja Ä?uda ugostila je preko 51 milion posetilaca. Na izložbi su bili zastupljeni svi delovi ameriÄ?ke elite: savezna vlada, državne uprave, velike korporacije, finansijske ustanove, industrijski lobiji i verske grupe. Svetski sajam je dokazao da SAD prednjaÄ?i u svemu: u robi Å¡iroke potroÅ¡nje, demokratiji, Å¡ou-biznisu, modernistiÄ?koj arhitekturi, lepim umetnostima, verskoj toleranciji, kućnom životu i, iznad svega, tehnologiji. Kao Å¡to je sugerisao jedan od reklamnih slogana izložbe, “milenijum progresa” doživeo je vrhunac u ameriÄ?kom stoleću (Stenton/Stanton 2004, 2004a; Ljus/Luce 1941).

    Ta rodoljubiva poruka slavljena je veliÄ?anstvenim predstavljanjem novih tehnologija na Svetskom sajmu. Pisci i filmadžije odavno su maÅ¡tali o putovanju na druge svetove. Sada je u Nasinom (National Aeronautics and Space Administration – Nacionalna agencija za aeronautiÄ?ka i svemirska ustraživanja, popularno NASA) Svemirskom parku, javnost mogla da se divi ogromnim raketama koje su odnele ameriÄ?ke astronaute u orbitu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf /Time-Life Books 1964, str. 208; Lorens/Laurence 1964, str. 2-14). Uprkos svom poÄ?etnom neuspehu kada su Rusi lansirali prvi satelit 1957, SAD sad tek Å¡to nisu pretekle svog takmaca u “svemirskoj trci” (Å efter/Schefter 1999, str. 145-231). A ono Å¡to je najbolje od svega, posetiocima Svetskog sajma govorilo se kako će i sami imati priliku da za svog životnog veka postanu astronauti. U paviljonu Futurama Dženeral motorsa (General Motors), Amerikanci iz 1980-ih bili su prikazani kako provode godiÅ¡nji odmor na Mesecu (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 222). Druge korporacije bile su podjednako sigurne da će dostignuća sadaÅ¡njice ubrzo biti prevaziÄ‘ena trijumfima sutraÅ¡njice. U svom paviljonu Progreslend (Progressland), Dženeral motors predvideo je da će elektriÄ?na energija proizvedena u reaktorima za nuklearnu fuziju biti “isuviÅ¡e jeftina da bi se naplaćivala” (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 90-92; Lorens 1964, str 40-43). U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti Svetskog sajma, Amerikanci neće samo postati svemirski turisti – oni će takoÄ‘e biti blagosloveni besplatnom elektriÄ?nom energijom…

    Za mnoge korporacije, najdelotvorniji metod da dokažu svoju tehnoloÅ¡ku savremenost bio je taj da izlože raÄ?unar. Klerolova (Clairol) maÅ¡ina birala je “najlaskavije boje za kosu” za posetiteljke, a mejnfrejm (eng. mainframe, veliki, Ä?esto i ogromni centralni kompjuterski sistemi, kakvi su poÄ?eli da se razvijaju 40-ih i 50-ih godina, prim. prev.) Parker pena je uparivao ameriÄ?ku decu sa “prijateljima za dopisivanje” iz stranih zemalja (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 86, 90). Koliko god možda delovali impresivno svojoj publici, ti eksponati nisu bili niÅ¡ta drugo do reklamni trikovi. Za razliku od njih, IBM (skraćeno od International Business Machines, jedna od prvih i najvećih informatiÄ?kih kompanija, osnovana pod imenom Tabulating Machine Company 1896, danas sa oko 400 000 zaposlenih u 170 zemalja, prim. prev.) je bio u mogućnosti da svoj paviljon posveti iskljuÄ?ivo Ä?udima informatike kao zasebne tehnologije. U 1961, jedan jedini proizvod – IBM 1401 – Ä?inio je Ä?etvrtinu svih raÄ?unara koji su radili u SAD-u (Pju 1995, str. 265-267). Po poimanju mnogih Amerikanaca, IBM je bio sinonim za ‘kompjuter’. BaÅ¡ pred otvaranje Svetskog sajma, korporacija je izbacila seriju proizvoda koji će joj obezbediti dominaciju industrijom i u iduće dve decenije: System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, str. 54-146). UgrabivÅ¡i priliku za isticanje koju je sajam nudio, Å¡efovi IBM-a naruÄ?ili su paviljon koji će zaseniti sve ostale. Ero Sarinen (Eero Saarinen) – renomirani finski arhitekta – nadgledao je konstrukciju veliÄ?anstvene zgrade: bele dvorane u obliku jajeta sa reljefnim korporativnim logotipom, koja je lebdela visoko u vazduhu uz pomoć 45 metalnih stabala boje rÄ‘e. Ispod te upeÄ?atljive atrakcije nalazile su se interaktivne izložbe koje su veliÄ?ale IBM-ov doprinos raÄ?unarskoj industriji (Stern, Melins i FiÅ¡man/Stern, Mellins, Fishman, 1997, str. 1046-1047).

    Za samu dvoranu, ÄŒarsl i Rej Ims (Charles i Ray Eames) – par koji je bio oliÄ?enje ameriÄ?kog modernistiÄ?kog dizajna – napravili su glavnu zanimljivost u IBM-ovom paviljonu: “InformatiÄ?ku maÅ¡inu” (The Information Machine). PoÅ¡to bi zauzeli svoja mesta u “Ljudskom zidu” (People Wall) sa 500 sediÅ¡ta, posetioci bi bili podignuti u jajoliku graÄ‘evinu. Kada bi se naÅ¡li unutra, narator bi najavio “veliÄ?anstvenu” multimedijalnu predstavu o tome kako su maÅ¡ine izložene u IBM-ovom paviljonu preteÄ?a svesnih maÅ¡ina budućnosti. RaÄ?unari su u procesu sticanja svesti. (urednici knjiga Tajm-Lajf 1964, str. 70-74; Lorens 1964, str. 57-58). U bliskoj budućnosti, svaki Amerikanac biće vlasnik odanog mehaniÄ?kog sluge baÅ¡ kao Å¡to je Robot Robi (Robby the Robot) iz Zabranjene planete (Forbidden Planet), popularnog nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nog filma iz 1956. godine (Vilkoks/Wilcox, 1999). Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku, IBM je ponosno objavio da će taj san o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji napokon biti ostvaren. Sa izbacivanjem serije System/360, mejnfrejmovi su postali dovoljno moćni da izgrade prototipe jednog potpuno svesnog raÄ?unara.

    Ta Ä?udesna meÅ¡avina avangardne arhitekture i multimedijalnog performansa u IBM-ovom paviljonu doživela je veliki uspeh i u medijima i u javnosti. Zajedno sa svemirskim raketama i nuklearnim reaktorima, raÄ?unar je potvrdio svoju poziciju kao jedna od tri ikoniÄ?ne tehnologije moderne Amerike. IdeoloÅ¡ka poruka tih maÅ¡ina bila je nedvosmislena: sadaÅ¡njost je budućnost u zametku. U IBM-ovom paviljonu, raÄ?unari su postojali istovremeno u dva vremenska okvira. Sa jedne strane, tadaÅ¡nji modeli su prikazani kao prototipovi svesnih maÅ¡ina iz budućnosti; sa druge strane, vizija raÄ?unarske svesti pokazala je istinski potencijal mejnfrejmova izloženih u IBM-ovom paviljonu. Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1964, izbacivanje serije System/360 se slavilo kao najava zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije.
    “Nije daleko dan kada će sposobnostî [ljudskog] mozga za reÅ¡avanje problema i rukovanje informacijama biti prekopirane; iznenadio bih se ako se to ne bi ostvarilo u narednoj deceniji.”
    Sajmon/Simon, str. 39.

    Otkrivanje razumne mašine

    FuturistiÄ?ke fantazije iz IBM-ove multimedijalne predstave bile su nadahnute nepristrasnom logikom akademskog sveta. Alan Tjuring (Turing) – utemeljivaÄ? informatike – oznaÄ?io je razvoj veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije kao dugoroÄ?ni cilj te nove discipline. Sredinom 1930-ih, ovaj matematiÄ?ar sa Kembridža objavio je uticajan Ä?lanak koji je opisivao apstrakni model za programabilni raÄ?unar: “univerzalnu maÅ¡inu” (Tjuring 2004). Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, njegov tim inženjera napravio je prvi elektriÄ?ni kalkulator kako bi se ubrzalo deÅ¡ifrovanje nemaÄ?kih vojnih signala. Kada se sukob okonÄ?ao, Tjuring se preselio na Univerzitet u ManÄ?esteru kako bi se pridružio timu istraživaÄ?a koji su pravili programabilnu maÅ¡inu. Kao Å¡to je bilo izloženo u njegovom Ä?lanku iz 1936, koristiće se softver kako bi se hardveru omogućilo da obavlja niz razliÄ?itih zadataka. Na dan 21. juna 1948, pre no Å¡to je Tjuring Ä?ak i doÅ¡ao na svoje novo radno mesto, njegove kolege ukljuÄ?ile su prvi svetski elektronski raÄ?unar sa unapred ugraÄ‘enim programom: Baby. Taj teoretski koncept, do tada opisan u jednom struÄ?nom Ä?asopisu, se materijalizovao u obliku ogromne metalne kutija ispunjene ventilima, prekidaÄ?ima, žicama i brojÄ?anicima (Tjuring 2004a; Ejgar/Agar, 2001, str. 3-5, 113-124; Hodžis/Hoges, 1992, str. 314-402).

    Za Tjuringa, Baby je bio daleko viÅ¡e od poboljÅ¡ane verzije kancelarijskog tabulatora. Kada hardverom upravlja softver, raÄ?unanje postaje svest. U nizu uticajnih Ä?lanaka, Tjuring je izneo tezu da je njegova matematiÄ?ka maÅ¡ina preteÄ?a jednog sasvim novog oblika života: mehaniÄ?kog matematiÄ?ara. To predviÄ‘anje potkrepio je odredivÅ¡i ljudsku inteligenciju kao neÅ¡to Å¡to bi mogli raditi i raÄ?unari. Budući da je raÄ?unanje prefinjeni vid razmiÅ¡ljanja, raÄ?unarske maÅ¡ine su zasigurno sposobne da misle. Ako deca stiÄ?u znanje obrazovanjem, edukativni softver mogao bi da stvori obrazovane raÄ?unare. PoÅ¡to ljuski mozak radi kao maÅ¡ina, oÄ?igledno je da bi se maÅ¡ina mogla ponaÅ¡ati kao elektronski mozak (Tjuring 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Å afer/Schaffer, 2000). Sudeći po Tjuringu, iako prvobitni raÄ?unari joÅ¡ nisu bili dovoljno moćni da bi dostigli svoj pravi potencijal, pre ili kasnije, kroz neprestano poboljÅ¡avanje hardvera i softvera, ta ograniÄ?enja bi bila prevaziÄ‘ena. U drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka, raÄ?unarska tehnologija brzo se razvijala ka svojoj unapred utvrÄ‘enoj sudbini: veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji.

    “Memorijski kapacitet ljudskog mozga verovatno je reda deset hiljada miliona binarnih brojeva. Ali najveći deo toga po svoj prilici se koristi za pamćenje vizuelnih utisaka, i na druge relativno rasipniÄ?ke naÄ?ine. Ostvarivanju istinskog napretka [ka veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji] možemo se osnovano nadati sa nekoliko miliona brojeva [raÄ?unarske memorije].”
    Tjuring 2004a, str. 393

    U svom najpoznatijem Ä?lanku, Tjuring je opisao test za prepoznavanje pobednika u toj ‘trci za budućnost’. Kada posmatraÄ? ne bude mogao da razluÄ?i da li razgovara ljudskim bićem ili raÄ?unarom u onlajn konverzaciji, onda viÅ¡e neće postojati bitna razlika izmeÄ‘u te dve vrste svesti. Ako se imitacija ne može razlikovati od originala, maÅ¡ina se onda mora smatrati razumnom – kompjuter je položio ispit (Tjuring 2004c, str. 441-448; Å afer 2000). Od tada pa nadalje, raÄ?unari su postali mnogo viÅ¡e od pukih praktiÄ?nih alatki i robe kojom se trguje. Kao Å¡to je Tjuringov Ä?lanak objasnio, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije otkrivala je potencijal ove nove tehnologije da se konstantno menja. Uprkos svojim nedostacima, aktuelni modeli raÄ?unara predstavljaju preteÄ?u svesnih maÅ¡ina koje će za njima doći…

    Pred kraj 1940-ih, katihizis veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije već je bio ustoliÄ?en. U okviru informatike, ono Å¡to je bilo i ono Å¡to će biti je postalo jedno te isto. Uprkos tom dostignuću, Tjuring je bio prorok Ä?iji je uticaj slabio u njegovoj roÄ‘enoj zemlji. RaÄ?unar je možda izmiÅ¡ljen u Britaniji, ali njena zadužena vlada nije imala sredstava da bi dominirala razvojem te nove tehnologije (Ejgar 2003, str. 266-278). S druge strane Atlantika, prilike su se umnogome razlikovale. Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata, ameriÄ?ka vlada takoÄ‘e je obezbedila izdaÅ¡na sredstva za istraživanje elektronskog raÄ?unarstva. Shodno tome, kada je pobeda izvojevana, presudilo je to Å¡to se nauÄ?nici koji su radili na tim projektima nisu susreli sa ozbiljnim poteÅ¡koćama u daljem obezbeÄ‘ivanju sredstava. Dok je Britanija oskudevala u novcu, SAD su lako sebi mogle priuÅ¡titi da finansiraju najsavremenija istraživanja u oblasti novih tehnologija. Kada je Hladni rat poÄ?eo, ameriÄ?kim politiÄ?arima nije bilo teÅ¡ko da svojim biraÄ?ima opravdaju te dotacije (Lesli/Leslie, 1993, str. 1-13; Luontin/Lewontin, 1997).

    U SAD, informatiÄ?ari su imali joÅ¡ jednu veliku prednost u odnosu na svoje britanske suparnike: meta-teoriju kibernetike. Tokom poznih 1940-ih i ranih 1950-ih, grupa istaknutih ameriÄ?kih intelektualaca sastajala se na Mejsi konferencijama (Macy conferences) kako bi istraživala naÄ?ine da se sruÅ¡e granice izmeÄ‘u razliÄ?itih nauÄ?nih disciplina: (Hajms/Heims, 1991). Od samog poÄ?etka, kao guru tog poduhvata izdvojio se Norbert Viner (Norbert Wiener). Dok je radio na MIT-ju (skraćeno od Massachusetts Institute of Technology, privatni istraživaÄ?ki univerzitet i institut lociran u gradu Kejmbridžu, država MasaÄ?usets, SAD, prim. prev.), on je izmislio kibernetiku kao novi teorijski okvir za analiziranje ponaÅ¡anja i ljudi i maÅ¡ina. Input (unos, ulaz) informacija o okruženju vodi do autputa (output, izlaz, rezultat) delovanja Ä?iji je cilj da to okruženje promeni. Nazvan “povratna sprega” (feedback loop), taj ciklus nadražaja i rezultirajućih odgovora je Å¡irenje entropije u svemiru okrenuo u obrnutom pravcu – red je moguće stvoriti iz haosa (Viner 1948, str. 21, 32-33). U 1948, Viner je izneo svoju novu univerzalnu teoriju u knjizi ispunjenoj stranicama matematiÄ?kih dokaza: “Kibernetika – ili komanda i kontrola u životinji i maÅ¡ini” (Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine).

    Na svoje veliko iznenaÄ‘enje, ovaj nauÄ?nik je napisao bestseler. Prvi put, jedan zajedniÄ?ki skup apstraktnih naÄ?ela povezivao je i prirodne i druÅ¡tvene nauke. Vinerov tekst pružio je moćne metafore za opisivanje haj-tek (hi-tech, visoko-tehnoloÅ¡kog, prim. prev.) sveta Amerike u periodu Hladnog rata. ÄŒak i ako nisu razumeli njegove matematiÄ?ke jednaÄ?ine, Ä?itaoci su lako mogli da prepoznaju kibernetiÄ?ke sisteme u okviru druÅ¡tvenih institucija i mreža komunikacije koje su dominirale njihovim svakodnevnim životom. Povratna sprega, informacije i sistemi ubrzo su postali deo narodnog govora (Konvej/Conway i Sigelman/Siegelman 2005, str. 171-194; Hajms 1991, str. 271-272). Uprkos javnom odobravanju, Viner je ostao autsajder u krugovima ameriÄ?ke inteligencije. Podsmevajući se ideoloÅ¡kom pravoverju Amerike u Hladnom ratu, ovaj guru bio je pacifista i socijalista.

    PoÄ?etkom 1940-ih, Viner – kao i skoro svaki ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nik – verovao je da će Ä?oveÄ?anstvo imati koristi od razvijanja oružja kojima bi se pobedila nacistiÄ?ka NemaÄ?ka. Kada je poÄ?eo Hladni rat, njegove kolege koje je finansirala vojska tvrdile su kako njihov istraživaÄ?ki rad takoÄ‘e doprinosi borbi protiv jednog agresivnog totalitarnog neprijatelja (Luontin 1997). Osporavajući taj patriotski konsenzus, Viner je izneo tezu da bi ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nici trebalo da zauzmu sasvim drugaÄ?iji stav u sukobu sa Rusijom. Upozorio je da bi trka u nuklearnom naoružanju mogla dovesti do uniÅ¡tenja Ä?oveÄ?anstva. SuoÄ?eni sa ovom opasnom novom situacijom, odgovorni nauÄ?nici bi trebalo da odbiju da sprovode vojna istraživanja (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 237-243, 255-271). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, Vinerovo politiÄ?ko otpadniÅ¡tvo nadahnulo je njegovo socijalistiÄ?ko tumaÄ?enje kibernetike. U epohi korporativnih monopola i atomskog oružja, teorija koja objaÅ¡njava ponaÅ¡anje i ljudi i maÅ¡ina mora se upotrebiti kako bi ljudi uspostavili kontrolu nad svojim maÅ¡inama. NapuÅ¡tajući svoje prvobitno oduÅ¡evljenje Tjuringovim proroÄ?anstvom, Viner je sada naglaÅ¡avao opasnosti koje predstavljaju svesni raÄ?unari (Viner 1966, str. 52-60, 1967, str. 239-254). Pre svega, pokuÅ¡aj stvaranja veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije predstavljao je skretanje sa neodložnog zadatka uspostavljanja socijalne pravde i globalnog mira.

    “Svet budućnosti biće jedna sve zahtevnija borba protiv ograniÄ?enja naÅ¡e sopstvene inteligencije, a ne udobna ležaljka na koju se možemo ispružiti da bi nas služili naÅ¡i robovi – roboti.”
    Viner 1966, str. 69.

    Suprotstavljajući se militarizaciji nauÄ?nog istraživanja, osnivaÄ? kibernetike je svoje pokrovitelje iz redova ameriÄ?ke elite doveo u priliÄ?no nezgodnu situaciju. Na sreću po vladare Amerike, na Mejsi konferencijama bio je joÅ¡ jedan briljantan matematiÄ?ar, koji je istovremeno bio i fanatiÄ?an borac u Hladnom ratu: Džon fon Nojman (John von Neumann). Budući traumatizovan nacionalizacijom svoje porodiÄ?ne banke za vreme MaÄ‘arske revolucije iz 1919, njegovi antikomunistiÄ?ki stavovi su bili toliko ekstremni da je sredinom 1940-ih bio zagovornik preventivnog rata kako bi se Rusija spreÄ?ila da napravi nuklearno oružje (Hajms 1980, str. 235-236, 244-251). Dok je igrao glavnu ulogu i u razvoju atomske bombe, Fon Nojman je već primenjivao svoje matematiÄ?ke i organizacione veÅ¡tine u tada novoj oblasti informatike. Kada se 1946. održala prva Mejsi konferencija, njegov tim istraživaÄ?a radio je na izgradnji prototipa mejnfrejm kompjutera za ameriÄ?ku mornaricu (ÄŒeruci/Ceruzzi, 2003, str. 21-4). U Fon Nojmanu, ameriÄ?ka imperija je pronaÅ¡la gurua bez i jednog traga krivoverja.

    Na prvim Mejsi konferencijama, politiÄ?ke razlike meÄ‘u prisutnima nisu bile oÄ?igledne. Ujedinjeni u antifaÅ¡istiÄ?koj borbi, Viner i Fon Nojman mogli su da zastupaju isti koncept kibernetike (Konvej i Sigelman 2005, str. 143-149; Hajns 1980, str. 201-207). MeÄ‘utim, kako su im se politiÄ?ki stavovi razilazili, ove dve zvezde Mejsi konferencija poÄ?ele su da zastupaju suparniÄ?ka tumaÄ?enja te meta-teorije. U svojoj leviÄ?arskoj verziji, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija optužena je kao apoteoza tehnoloÅ¡ke dominacije. Kada je formulisao svoj desniÄ?arski remiks, Fon Nojman je odveo kibernetiku u dijametralno suprotnom pravcu. Pre svega, njegovo tumaÄ?enje podvlaÄ?ilo je Ä?injenicu da je njegova univerzalna teorija nadahnuta proroÄ?anstvom o razumnim maÅ¡inama. Sredinom 1930-ih, Tjuring je kratko radio sa Fon Nojmanom na univerzitetu Prinston. ÄŒitavu deceniju pre no Å¡to je i sam poÄ?eo da se bavi informatikom, maÄ‘arski nauÄ?nik znao je sve o zamisli da se napravi univerzalna maÅ¡ina. Kada su dva Ä?ikaÅ¡ka psihologa poÄ?etkom 1940-ih primenila Tjuringovu teoriju kako bi objasnili procese ljudskog miÅ¡ljenja, Fon Nojman je bio oÄ?aran implikacijama njihovih pretpostavki.

    PoÅ¡to je mehaniÄ?ki raÄ?unar napravljen po modelu ljudskog mozga, Voren Mekalok (Warren McCulloch) i Volter Pits (Walter Pitts) izneli su tezu da je svest isto Å¡to i raÄ?unanje. Poput elektriÄ?nih veza IBM-ovog tabulatora, neuroni su prekidaÄ?i koji prenose informacije u binarnom obliku (Mekalok i Pits 1943). OÄ?aran ovom inverzijom Tjuringove linije argumenta, Fon Nojman je postao uveren da je teorijski moguće napraviti razumnu maÅ¡inu. Ako se neuroni ponaÅ¡aju kao prekidaÄ?i u ljudskom mozgu, ventili bi se mogli upotrebiti kako bi se po istom principu napravio elektronski mozak (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 43-46, 1976, str. 308-311). Dok se bavio raÄ?unarskim istraživanjima za ameriÄ?ku vojsku, Fon Nojman je koristio ljudski mozak kao model za svoju eponimsku kompjutersku arhitekturu. SliÄ?no kao i Tjuring, ovaj prorok je tvrdio da će – kada se broj ventila u raÄ?unaru bude približio broju neurona u mozgu – maÅ¡ina moći da misli (Fon Nojman 1966, str. 36-41, 1976, str. 296-300, 2000, str. 39-52). U roku od decenije, Fon Nojman i njegove kolege opremaće ameriÄ?ku vojsku kibernetiÄ?kim vojnicima sposobnim da se bore u nuklearnom ratu i izvojuju svaku pobedu…

    “Dr Mekalok: Å ta mislite o pravljenju raÄ?unarskih maÅ¡ina tako da ako budu oÅ¡tećene u vazduÅ¡nim napadima… mogu da zamene delove… i nastave sa radom?
    Dr Fon Nojman: To su zaista pre kvantitativna no kvalitativna pitanja.”
    Fon Nojman 1976, str. 324

    Do ranih 1950-ih, ameriÄ?ki akademski svet i korporativni istraživaÄ?ki timovi preoteli su od svojih britanskih takmaca vodeći položaj u informatici. Od tada pa nadalje, sve najnaprednije maÅ¡ine pravile su se u Americi (ÄŒeruci 2003, str. 13-46). Ipak, stvorivÅ¡i kibernetiku bez Vinera, Fon Nojman se postarao da ove ameriÄ?ke laboratorije poÄ‘u Tjuringovim putem ka zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti: kroz izgradnju veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Metafora povratne sprege sada je dokazala da raÄ?unari funkcioniÅ¡u kao ljudi. Inputi informacija vode do autputa delovanja. Ako mozak radi kao maÅ¡ina, onda mora biti moguće razviti maÅ¡inu koja oponaÅ¡a funkcije mozga. Kompjuteri već raÄ?unaju brže od ljudi koji su ih izmislili. Ovladavanje složenostima matematiÄ?ke logike mora biti prvi korak ka opremanju ovih maÅ¡ina novim odlikama ljudske svesti. Jezik je skup pravila koji se može kodifikovati u obliku softvera. UÄ?enje iz novih iskustava može se programirati u hardver (Minski/Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Tokom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih, ameriÄ?ki nauÄ?nici su naporno radili na izgradnji misleće maÅ¡ine. Jednom kada bude imao dovoljnu moć obrade podataka, raÄ?unar će postati svestan (Edvards/Edwards, 1996, str. 239-273). Kada je IBM izbacio svoj mejnfrejm System/360 na Svetskom sajmu 1964, delovalo je kao da je Tjuringov san blizu svom ostvarenju.

    Informatika za vreme Hladnog rata

    ÄŒetvrt veka ranije, jedna od zvezda Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939. bio je Elektro (Electro): robot koji je – sudeći po njegovim publicistima – “… umeo da priÄ?a, hoda, broji na prste, pućka cigaretu, i razlikuje crvenu i zelenu boju pomoću fotoelektriÄ?ne ćelije” (Ims i Ims 1973, str. 105). Uprkos svoj svojoj pretvornosti, na ovoj izložbi je prvi put ponovljena zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Pre Svetskog sajma 1939, roboti u knjigama i filmovima gotovo uvek su prikazivani kao frankenÅ¡tajnovska Ä?udoviÅ¡ta koja imaju nameru da uniÅ¡te svoje ljudske stvoritelje (Å elijeva/Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Nadahnut svojim odlascima na izložbu, Isak Asimov (Isaac Asimov) je odluÄ?io da promeni tu negativnu sliku. BaÅ¡ kao i Elektro, roboti iz njegovih nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nih priÄ?a su bezbedni i prijateljski nastrojeni proizvodi jedne velike korporacije (Asimov 1968, 1968a). Kada je 1964. godine otvoren Svetski sajam u Njujorku, ova pozitivna slika veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije već je bila jedna od najpopularnijih zamiÅ¡ljenih budućnosti u Americi. I u nauÄ?noj fantastici i u nauÄ?noj stvarnosti, robot sluga bio je simbol boljih vremena koja će uslediti…

    Na Svetskom sajmu u Njujorku 1939, Elektro se nadmetao sa aktuelnom tehnoloÅ¡kom ikonom tog trenutka: automobilom. Zanimljivosti koje se nisu smele propustiti bile su Demokrasiti (Democracity) – maketa izložena u zgradi Perisfera Njujork Stejta (New York State Perisphere) – i Futurama – diorama (Ä?esto “trodimenzionalna” predstava, model ili maketa odreÄ‘enog objekta ili pejzaža, prim. prev.) u paviljonu Dženeral motorsa (General Motors). Obe izložbe promovisale su viziju bogate i haj-tek Amerike 1960-ih. U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti, najveći deo stanovniÅ¡tva živi u porodiÄ?nim domovima u predgraÄ‘u i na posao odlazi vlastitim automobilom (publikacije sa izložbe/Exposition Publications 1939, str. 42-45, 207-209). Za najveći broj posetilaca Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1939, ovo proroÄ?anstvo potroÅ¡aÄ?kog blagostanja zasigurno je delovalo kao utopijski san. AmeriÄ?ka ekonomija i dalje se oporavljala od najgore recesije u istoriji zemlje, Evropa je bila na rubu novog razornog graÄ‘anskog rata a istoÄ?na Azija već u vrtlogu smrtonosnih sukoba. No, kada se otvorio Svetski sajam 1964, najÄ?uvenije predviÄ‘anje sa izložbe 1939. već je bilo ostvareno. Koliko god da su posetioci bili podozrivi 1939, dvadeset godina kasnije, diorame Demokrasiti i Futurama delovale su izuzetno dalekovido. Do ranih 1960-ih, Amerika je postala potroÅ¡aÄ?ko druÅ¡tvo koje živi u predgraÄ‘u i poseduje kola. ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost postala je savremena stvarnost.

    “Automobil… upravlja celokupnim [druÅ¡tvenim] ponaÅ¡anjem, od ekonomije do govora. Protok saobraćaja je jedna od glavnih funkcija druÅ¡tva… Prostor [u gradskim oblastima] osmiÅ¡ljava se u skladu sa automobilistiÄ?kim potrebama, a saobraćajni problemi imaju veću važnost od smeÅ¡taja… Ä?injenica je da je za mnoÅ¡tvo ljudi auto možda i najvažniji deo njihovih ‘životnih prilika’.”
    Lefebr/Lefebvre, 1984, str. 100

    Budući da su se predviÄ‘anja sa izložbe iz 1939. u velikoj meri ostvarila, posetiocima Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964. moglo se oprostiti Å¡to su poverovali da će se njegove tri glavne zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti takoÄ‘e ostvariti. Ko je mogao sumnjati u to da će – najkasnije do 1990. godine – većina Amerikanaca uživati u blagodetima svemirskog turizma i besplatne elektriÄ?ne energije? A ono Å¡to je najbolje od svega, živeće u svetu gde će im svesne maÅ¡ine biti verne sluge. MeÄ‘utim, vera ameriÄ?ke javnosti u te zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti zasnivala se na pogreÅ¡nom osećaju kontinuiteta. Uprkos tome Å¡to je održan na istom mestu i Å¡to je na njemu uÄ?estvovalo mnogo istih izlagaÄ?a, Svetski sajam iz 1964. bio je usredsreÄ‘en na neÅ¡to sasvim drugo od njegovog prethodnika iz 1939. Dvadeset pet godina ranije, glavni eksponat na izložbi bio je automobil: potroÅ¡aÄ?ki proizvod masovne proizvodnje. Za razliku od njega, zvezde izložbe na Svetskom sajmu 1964. bile su tehnologije subvencionisane od strane države, a za potrebe voÄ‘enja Hladnog rata. Kompjuteri su izraÄ?unavali putanje kojima će se ameriÄ?ke rakete naoružane nuklearnim bombama kretati kako bi uniÅ¡tavale ruske gradove i njihove nesrećne stanovnike (Ajzeks/Isaacs i Dauling/Dowling 1998, str. 230-243). Ako je reprezentativni objekat na njegovom prethodniku iz 1939. bio motorizovani prevoz za mase, zvezde Svetskog sajma 1964. su bile maÅ¡ine atomskog armagedona.

    Dok je osmiÅ¡ljavala svoj paviljon, korporacija IBM je morala da se pozabavi sa ovim problemom u odnosima sa javnošću. Nalik nuklearnim reaktorima i svemirskim raketama, i raÄ?unari su razvijani kao oružja za Hladni rat. ENIAC – prvi prototipski mejnfrejm napravljen u Americi – bio je maÅ¡ina za izraÄ?unavanje tabela kako bi se poboljÅ¡ala preciznost artiljerijskih topova (ÄŒeruci 2003, str. 15). Od ranih 1950-ih pa nadalje, IBM-ov raÄ?unarski odsek bio je usredsreÄ‘en na dobijanje narudžbi od Ministarstva odbrane (Pju/Pugh, 1995, str. 167-172). Koristeći mejnfrejmove nabavljene od ove korporacije, ameriÄ?ka vojska se spremala za nuklearni rat, pripremala invazije na “neprijateljske2 zemlje, upravljala bombardovanjem neprijateljskih meta, isplaćivala plate svojim trupama, vodila složene ratne igre i rukovodila lancem snabdevanja (Berkli/Berkeley 1962, str. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Zahvaljujući ameriÄ?kim poreskim obveznicima, IBM je postao tehnoloÅ¡ki lider raÄ?unarske industrije.

    Kada se 1964. otvorio Svetski sajam u Njujorku, IBM je i dalje bio tesno povezan sa mnogo razliÄ?itih vojnih projekata. Ipak, paviljon te korporacije je bio posvećen promovisanju nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne maÅ¡tarije o razumnim maÅ¡inama. Kao i u sluÄ?aju predviÄ‘anja o besplatnoj energiji i svemirskom turizmu, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije onemogućavala je posetiocima Svetskog sajma da otkriju pravi motiv za izgradnju IBM-ovih mejnfrejmova: ubijanje miliona ruskih civila. Iako je imperijalna hegemonija supersila zavisila od atomskog oružja, njegovo posedovanje postajalo je sve problematiÄ?nije usled pretnje od sveopÅ¡teg uniÅ¡tenja. Dve godine ranije, SAD i Rusija umalo nisu greÅ¡kom uÅ¡le u katastrofalan rat oko Kube (Dalek/Dallek, 2003, str. 535-574). Uprkos tome Å¡to je propast za dlaku izbegnuta, supersile nisu bile sposobne da prekinu trku u naoružanju. U bizarnoj logici Hladnog rata, predupreÄ‘ivanje totalnog sukoba izmeÄ‘u dva bloka zavisilo je od neprestanog povećanja broja nuklearnih glava koje obe strane poseduju. Vladajućim elitama SAD i Rusije bilo je teÅ¡ko da priznaju sebi – a kamoli svojim graÄ‘anima – duboku iracionalnost te nove vrste vojnog nadmetanja. U retkom trenutku lucidnosti, ameriÄ?ki analitiÄ?ari izmislili su ironiÄ?nu skraćenicu za tu visokoriziÄ?nu strategiju “uzajamnog sigurnog uniÅ¡tenja”: MAD (skraćeno od Mutually Assured Destruction:, na engleskom “mad” znaÄ?i, otprilike, “ludilo”, uglavnom u nasilnom ili agresivnom obliku, prim. prev.) (Ajzeks i Dauling/Dowling, 1998. str. 230-243; Kan/Kahn 1960, str. 119-189).

    OÄ?ekivano, propagandisti sa obe strane opravdavali su ogromno traćenje sredstava na trku u naoružanju promovisanjem mirnodopske primene vodećih tehnologija primenjenih u Hladnom ratu. Do otvaranja Svetskog sajma u Njujorku 1964, oružje genocida uspeÅ¡no je prepakovano u proizvode korisne za ljude. Nuklearna sila uskoro će svima obezbeÄ‘ivati besplatnu elektriÄ?nu energiju. Svemirske rakete ubrzo će voziti turiste na godiÅ¡nje odmore na Mesecu. Nestali su gotovo svi tragovi vojnog porekla tih tehnologija. SliÄ?no, u IBM-ovom paviljonu, mejnfrejm System/360 promovisan je kao preteÄ?a veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Od posetilaca se oÄ?ekivalo da se dive tehnoloÅ¡kim dostignućima korporacije i da ne preispituju njenu sumnjivu ulogu u proizvodnji naoružanja. Užasi tekućeg Hladnog rata bili su skriveni Ä?udesima zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti. IBM-ov ideoloÅ¡ki trik umnogome je olakÅ¡ala jedna od osobenih crta industrijske modernosti: kidanje eksplicitnih veza izmeÄ‘u proizvoda i njihovih proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a. Hiljadama godina, ratnici i sveÅ¡tenici otvoreno su od seljaÅ¡tva izvlaÄ?ili njihove proizvodne viÅ¡kove radi sopstvene koristi. MeÄ‘utim, kada su Evropljani poÄ?eli da privatizuju vlasniÅ¡tvo nad zemljiÅ¡tem i mehanizuju ruÄ?nu proizvodnju, rodio se jedan novi – i napredniji – ekonomski sistem: liberalni kapitalizam. Preduzetnici su dokazali da se, konkurentnošću cena, ljudskim radom posredno može daleko delotvornije upravljati nego neposrednim metodama feudalizma. Pustolovi su otkrili da je prodavanje robe na svetskom tržiÅ¡tu daleko unosnije od nametanja otimaÄ?ke najamnine zemljoradnicima na jednoj ograniÄ?enoj teritoriji. Prvi put u ljudskoj istoriji ostvarivao se proizvodni potencijal kolektivnog rada (Smit/Smith 1976, str. 1-287; 401-445; Marks/Marx 1976, str. 762-940).

    U toj novoj ekonomiji od ljudi se zahtevalo da meÄ‘usobno komuniciraju putem stvari: robe, novca i kapitala. Podela rada u Ä?itavoj ekonomiji regulisala se cenama i platama koje je odreÄ‘ivala konkurencija na tržiÅ¡tu. MeÄ‘utim, kraj aristokratije i sveÅ¡tenstva nije okonÄ?ao klasnu vladavinu. Kada se rad kupuje i prodaje u kapitalistiÄ?koj ekonomiji, jednakost na tržiÅ¡tu vodi do nejednakosti na radnom mestu (Marks 1976, str. 270-280; Rubin 1972, str. 77-253). PoÅ¡to se roba razmenjivala za drugu robu iste vrednosti, ovaj novi oblik klasne vladavine bio je umnogome drugaÄ?iji od onoga koji mu je prethodio. Neposredno vladanje zamenjeno je posrednim izrabljivanjem. I, pre svega, sudbinu pojedinaca sada je odreÄ‘ivalo bezliÄ?no kretanje tržiÅ¡ta. Svetom viÅ¡e nisu vladali ljudi, već stvari.

    “To znaÄ?i da se tajanstvenost robnog oblika sastoji prosto u tome Å¡to on ljudima druÅ¡tvene karaktere njihovog sopstvenog rada odražava kao karaktere koji objektivno pripadaju samim proizvodima rada, kao druÅ¡tvena svojstva koja te stvari imaju od prirode, a otuda im (se) i druÅ¡tveni odnos proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a prema celokupnom radu odražava kao druÅ¡tveni odnos koji izvan i nezavisno od proizvoÄ‘aÄ?a postoji meÄ‘u predmetima.”
    Marks 1976, str. 164-165

    Razvoj kapitalizma stvorio je mnogo složeniju podelu rada unutar ekonomije. Uporedo sa povećanjem broja radnih mesta u fabrikama i kancelarijama, nauÄ?no istraživanje se takoÄ‘e izdvojilo kao zaseban poziv (Bar/Bahr 1980; Smit 1976, str. 7-16). UspeÅ¡na preduzeća rasla su ne samo tako Å¡to su zapoÅ¡ljavala joÅ¡ radnika, već i ulažući u novu maÅ¡ineriju. U fetiÅ¡izovanom svetu kapitalizma, rast produktivnosti prouzrokovan sve prefinjenijom saradnjom rada i fabrici i nauÄ?nog istraživanja je bio izražen kroz razvoj najsavremenijih tehnologija. Sa ljudskom kreativnošću skrivenom iza robe, proces modernizacije dobio je kao svoj subjekat jedan izuzetno vidljiv objekat: “… automatski sistem maÅ¡inerije… pokretaÄ?ku snagu koja pokreće samu sebe.” (Marks 1973, str. 692)

    Sredinom dvadesetog veka, fetiÅ¡izacija tehnologije dostigla je svoju apoteozu u proroÄ?anstvu o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji. Za ljude koji su živeli u druÅ¡tvu u kojem je nova maÅ¡inerija naoko bila pokretaÄ?ka snaga druÅ¡tvene evolucije, Tjuringova i Fon Nojmanova tvrdnja da maÅ¡ine evoluiraju u živa bića nije delovala neobiÄ?no. Kada raÄ?unari vrÅ¡e svoje operacije, rad uložen u razvoj njihovog hardvera i pisanje njihovih programa nije neposredno vidljiv. OÄ?arani tehnoloÅ¡kim fetiÅ¡izmom, obožavatelji Tjuringa i Fon Nojmana ubedili su sebe da će elektronski mozak ubrzo moći da misli kao i ljudski mozak. U 1964-toj, raÄ?unarska moć mejnfrejma System/360 je bila toliko velika da se Ä?inilo kao da je ta IBM-ova maÅ¡ina na pragu svesnosti. Tvorevina je trebalo da postane stvoritelj.

    KibernetiÄ?ka nadmoć

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti privremeno su uspele da od ameriÄ?ke javnosti prikriju osnovni cilj svoje tri ikoniÄ?ne tehnologije. Ali, Ä?ak ni najbriljantnije opsenarsko umeće nije moglo veÄ?no da krije njihove lažne upotrebne vrednosti. Kako su decenije proticale, nijedno od predviÄ‘anja o kljuÄ?nim tehnologijama iz Hladnog rata datih na Svetskom sajmu se nije ostvarilo. ElektriÄ?na energija se i dalje naplaćivala, turisti nisu posećivali Mesec, a raÄ?unari joÅ¡ uvek nisu postali razumni. Za razliku od dalekovide vizije automobila za mase na Svetskom sajmu iz 1939, proroÄ?anstva o Ä?uvenim tehnologijama sa izložbe iz 1964. delovala su gotovo besmisleno dvadeset pet godina kasnije. Hiper-realnost se sudarila sa realnošću – i izgubila bitku.

    Uprkos neuspehu svog proroÄ?anstva, IBM nije pretrpeo nikakvu Å¡tetu. Za razliku od nuklearne energije i putovanja u svemir, informatika je bila hladnoratovska tehnologija koja je uspeÅ¡no pobegla iz konteksta Hladnog rata. Od samog poÄ?etka, maÅ¡ine koje su se pravile za ameriÄ?ku vojsku prodavale su se i profesionalnoj klijenteli (Pju 1995, str. 152-155). Kada je IBM izgradio svoj paviljon za Svetski sajam 1964, zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije morala je da Ä?uva u tajnosti viÅ¡e od sumnjive primene informatike u vojne svrhe. FetiÅ¡izam robe takoÄ‘e je odigrao svoju klasiÄ?nu ulogu skrivanja ljudkog rada u procesu proizvodnje. RaÄ?unari su opisivani kao “razumni” kako bi se zanemario naporan rad uložen u njihovo projektovanje, graÄ‘enje, programiranje i rukovanje. Iznad svega, proroÄ?anstvo o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sakrilo je ulogu tehnoloÅ¡kih inovacija u okviru ameriÄ?kih radnih mesta. Pronalazak raÄ?unara odigrao se u pravi Ä?as za krupan biznis. Tokom prve polovine dvadesetog veka, velike korporacije postale su dominantne institucije ameriÄ?ke ekonomije. Divovska fabrika automobila Henrija Forda (Henry Ford) postala je eponimni simbol nove druÅ¡tvene paradigme: fordizma (Ford i Krouter/Crowther 1922; Aljeta/Aglietta 1979). Kada im je to uvećavalo zaradu, korporacije su zamenjivale posredno regulisanje proizvodnje putem tržiÅ¡ta neposrednim nadzorom preko birokrata. Kako su plate kancelarijskih službenika postojano rasle, preduzećima je bilo potrebno sve viÅ¡e opreme kako bi se podigla produktivnost na radnom mestu. Mnogo pre pronalaska raÄ?unara, fordistiÄ?ke korporacije vodile su informatiÄ?ku ekonomiju uz pomoć tabulatora, pisaćih maÅ¡ina i drugih vrsta kancelarijske opreme (Benidžer/Beniger, 1986, str. 291-425). MeÄ‘utim, do poÄ?etka 1950-ih, mehanizacija u administraciji se zaustavila. Povećanje produktivnosti u kancelariji dobrano je zaostajalo za povećanjem produktivnosti u fabrici. Kada su se na tržiÅ¡tu pojavili prvi raÄ?unari, upravnici korporacija brzo su uvideli da nova tehnologija nudi reÅ¡enje za taj urgentan problem (Sobel 1981, str. 95-184). Posao velikog broja operatera tabulatora sada je mogla obavljati mnogo manja grupa inženjera uz pomoć mejnfrejm kompjutera (Berkli 1962, str. 5). JoÅ¡ i bolje, nove informatiÄ?ke tehnologije omogućavale su kapitalistima da prodube kontrolu nad svojim organizacijama. Mnogo viÅ¡e informacija o mnogo viÅ¡e tema sada je moglo da se sakuplja i obraÄ‘uje na sve složenije naÄ?ine. Upravnici su bili gospodari svega Å¡to su mogli da drže na oku.

    Maltene od svog prvog pojavljivanja na radnom mestu, mejnfrejm je – sa dobrim razlogom – karikiran kao mehaniÄ?ko savrÅ¡enstvo birokratske tiranije. U nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?nim priÄ?ama Isaka Asimova, gospodin i gospoÄ‘a ProseÄ?ni bili su ponosni vlasnici sluge-robota. Ali, kada su prvi raÄ?unari stigli u ameriÄ?ke fabrike i kancelarije, tom novom tehnologijom upravljali su Å¡efovi, a ne radnici. U 1952, Kurt Vonegat (Kurt Vonnegut) je objavio nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ni roman koji je satirizovao autoritarne ambicije korporativne informatike. U njegovoj antiutopijskoj budućnosti, vladajuća elita poverila je upravljanje druÅ¡tvom sveznajućoj veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji.

    “EPIKAK XIV… odluÄ?ivao je koliko od svega Amerika i njene muÅ¡terije mogu dobiti i koliko će ih to stajati. I… odluÄ?ivaće koliko će inženjera i upravnika i… državnih službenika, i kakvih veÅ¡tina, biti potrebno da se roba isporuÄ?i; i koji će koeficijent inteligencije i nivo sposobnosti deliti korisne muÅ¡karce [i žene] od onih beskorisnih, i koliko se zaposlenih… može izdržavati na odreÄ‘enom nivou plate…”
    Vonegat, 1969, str. 106

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, IBM-ov paviljon obećavao je da će razumne maÅ¡ine biti sluge Ä?itavog Ä?oveÄ?anstva. A ipak, u isto vreme, njihove službe za prodaju su objaÅ¡njavale Å¡efovima velikih korporacija kako raÄ?unari uvode birokratsku vlast u savremeno druÅ¡tvo. Herbert Sajmon (Herbert Simon) – jedan od vodećih ameriÄ?kih teoretiÄ?ara upravljanja i nekadaÅ¡nji Fon Nojmanov kolega – predvideo je da će sve veća moć mejnfrejmova omogućiti preduzećima da automatizuju sve viÅ¡e i viÅ¡e administrativnih zadataka. Upravo kao u fabrici, i u kancelariji maÅ¡ine preuzimaju posao od ljudske radne snage. Sa pojavom veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije, mejnfrejmovi će bezmalo sasvim zameniti birokratsku i tehniÄ?ku radnu snagu u okviru proizvodnje. Krajnji cilj je stvaranje potpuno automatizovanog radnog mesta. Preduzećima tada viÅ¡e neće biti potrebni ni fiziÄ?ki ni kancelarijski radnici koji bi pravili proizvode ili pružali usluge. ÄŒak će i sami upravnici većinom postati ‘viÅ¡ak’. Umesto njih, ameriÄ?kim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljaće razumne maÅ¡ine (Sajmon 1965, str. 26-52). U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije, korporacija i raÄ?unar biće jedno isto. Ovo predviÄ‘anje temeljilo se na Fon Nojmanovom konzervativnom tumaÄ?enju kibernetike. U svojim tekstovima o teoriji upravljanja, Sajmon je izneo tezu da rad u jednom preduzeću nalikuje operacijama raÄ?unara. Kao i u psihologiji Mekaloka i Pitsa (McCulloch i Pitts), ovo poistovećivanje bilo je dvosmerno. Upravljanje radnicima izjednaÄ?avano je sa programiranjem raÄ?unara. Pisanje softvera bilo je nalik sastavljanju poslovnog plana. I zaposlenima i maÅ¡inerijom upravljalo se nareÄ‘enjima izdatim odozgo. RadniÄ?ka antiutopija ‘Veliki Brat’ superkompjutera je mutirala u kapitalistiÄ?ku utopiju kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma. IroniÄ?no, verodostojnost Sajmonove ideologije upravljanja zavisila je od toga hoće li njegovi Ä?itaoci zaboraviti žestoke kritike koje je na raÄ?un korporativne informatike izneo sam utemeljivaÄ? teorije sistema. Pozivajući se na Marksa, Viner je upozoravao da je osnovna uloga nove tehnologije pod kapitalizmom intenziviranje izrabljivanja radnika. Umesto da stvori viÅ¡e slobodnog vremena i poboljÅ¡a životne standarde, kompjuterizacija ekonomije će pod fordizmom povećati nezaposlenost i smanjiti plate (Viner 1967, str. 206-221). Da bi se izbegla Vonegatova antiutopija, ameriÄ?ki sindikalisti i politiÄ?ki aktivisti moraju se mobilisati protiv korporativnog Golema (Viner 1966, str. 54-55). U skladu sa Vinerom, kibernetika je dokazala kako veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija predstavlja pretnju za ljudske slobode.

    „Ne zaboravimo da je automatska maÅ¡ina… precizan ekvivalent robovske radne snage. Svaka radna snaga koja se nadmeće sa robovskom mora prihvatiti ekonomske uslove robovske radne snage.“
    Viner 1967, str. 220

    Za poslovne rukovodioce, Vonegatova i Vinerova noćna mora bila je njihov raÄ?unarski san na javi. MeÄ‘utim, ova korporativna vizija kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma znaÄ?ila je zaboravljanje istorije samog fordizma. Ova ekonomska paradigma zasnivala se na uspeÅ¡noj koordinaciji masovne proizvodnje sa masovnom potroÅ¡njom. IroniÄ?no, budući da su bile u većoj meri povezane sa druÅ¡tvenom realnošću, izložbe Demokrasiti i Futurama iz 1939. pružile su daleko taÄ?nije predviÄ‘anje razvojnog puta informatike nego Å¡to je to uÄ?inio IBM-ov paviljon iz 1964. BaÅ¡ kao i automobili dvadeset pet godina ranije, ova nova tehnologija polako se preobražavala iz retke, ruÄ?no pravljene maÅ¡ine u sveprisutnu robu masovno proizvedenu u fabrici. Isto kao i u Fordovim fabrikama, IBM-ovi mejnfrejmovi sastavljali su se na pokretnim trakama (Pju, Džonson/Johnson i Palmer 1991, str. 87-105, 204-210). Ti prvi koraci ka masovnoj proizvodnji raÄ?unara predvideli su ono Å¡to će biti najvažniji pomak u ovom sektoru dvadeset pet godina kasnije: masovnu potroÅ¡nju raÄ?unara. Po svojem spoljaÅ¡njem obliku, mejnfrejm System/360 iz 1964. je bio nezgrapan i skup prototip mnogo sitnijeg i jeftinijeg IBM-ovog PC-ja iz 1989.

    ZamiÅ¡ljena budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije bila je naÄ?in da se izbegne razmiÅ¡ljanje o verovatnim druÅ¡tvenim posledicama Å¡iroko rasprostranjenog posedovanja raÄ?unara. Ranih 1960-ih, superkompjuter tipa ‘Veliki Brat’ je pripadao moćnoj vladi i krupnom biznisu. Pre svega, povratna sprega je bila znanje onih nad kojima se vlada, monopolizovano od strane vladara. MeÄ‘utim, kao Å¡to je istakao Viner, fordistiÄ?ka proizvodnja će skupe mejnfrejmove neminovno pretvoriti u jeftinu robu (Viner 1967, str. 210-211). Zauzvrat, sve rasprostranjenije posedovanje raÄ?unara verovatno će poremetiti postojeći druÅ¡tveni poredak. Jer je povratna sprega informacija u okviru ljudskih institucija najdelotvornija kada je dvosmerna (Viner 1967, str. 67-73). Ponovnim povezivanjem zamisli i izvrÅ¡enja, kibernetiÄ?ki fordizam je podrivao druÅ¡tvene hijerarhije koje su bile osnova samog fordizma.

    “… prosta koegzistencija dve jedinice infomacije relativno je male vrednosti, psim ako se te dve jedinice ne mogu uspeÅ¡no kombinovati u nekom umu… koji je sposoban da jednu oplodi pomoću druge. Ovo je upravo suprotno od organizacije u kojoj svaki Ä?lan prelazi unapred odreÄ‘eni put…”
    Viner 1967, str. 172

    Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, ta mogućnost definitivno nije bila deo IBM-ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti. Pre nego da za cilj ima proizvodnju sve većeg broja sve efikasnijih maÅ¡ina po nižim cenama, korporacija je bila usredsreÄ‘ena na stabilno povećavanje sposobnosti svojih raÄ?unara kako bi saÄ?uvala svoj skoro potpuni monopol nad vojnim i korporativnim tržiÅ¡tem. Umesto da se maÅ¡ine veliÄ?ine sobe smanjuju i vremenom postaju stoni raÄ?unari, laptopovi i, naposletku, mobilni telefoni, IBM je bio uveren da će raÄ?unari zauvek ostati krupni i nezgrapni mejnfrejmovi. Korporacija je iz sve snage verovala da će – ukoliko taj put tehnoloÅ¡kog razvoja bude ekstrapoliran – rezultat sasvim sigurno biti veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija. I, najvažnije, ovaj konzervativni oporavak kibernetike je podrazumevao da će svesne maÅ¡ine neizbežno evoluirati u oblike života naprednije od obiÄ?nih ljudi. FordistiÄ?ko razdvajanje izmeÄ‘u ideje i izvrÅ¡enja bi dostiglo svoju tehnoloÅ¡ku apoteozu.

    OÄ?ekivano, IBM je bio reÅ¡en da se usprotivi tom uznemirujućem tumaÄ?enju sopstvene futuristiÄ?ke propagande. Na Svetskom sajmu 1964, paviljon korporacije je isticao utopijske mogućnosti informatike. Ipak, i upkros svojim najvećim naporima, IBM nije mogao da u potpunosti izbegne dvosmislenost sadržanu u zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Ta fetiÅ¡izovana ideologija mogla je biti privlaÄ?na svim slojevima ameriÄ?kog druÅ¡tva samo u sluÄ?aju da će raÄ?unari ispunjavati najdublje želje obe strane na radnom mestu. Stoga je IBM, na izložbama u svom paviljonu, promovisao jednu jedinu viziju zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti, viziju koja je objedinjavala dva nepomirljiva tumaÄ?enja veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Sa jedne strane, radnicima se govorilo da će sve njihove potrebe zadovoljavati razumne maÅ¡ine-roboti: sluge koje se nikada ne umaraju, ne žale i ne dovode nareÄ‘enja u pitanje. Sa druge strane, kapitalistima se obećavalo da će njihovim fabrikama i kancelarijama upravljati razumne maÅ¡ine-roboti: proizvoÄ‘aÄ?i koji nikada ne zabuÅ¡avaju, ne izražavaju miÅ¡ljenje i ne Å¡trajkuju. Robot Robi viÅ¡e se nije mogao razlikovati od EPIKAK-a XIV. Iako tek na nivou ideologije, IBM je pomirio klasne podele u Americi 1960-ih. U zamiÅ¡ljenoj budućnosti, radnici viÅ¡e neće morati da rade, a poslodavcima viÅ¡e neće biti potrebni nameÅ¡tenici. NauÄ?nofantastiÄ?na maÅ¡tarija o veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji uspeÅ¡no je omela ljude u pokuÅ¡aju da preispitaju posledice uvoÄ‘enja informatike na radnom mestu. Posle posete IBM-ovom paviljonu na Svetskom sajmu 1964, bilo je suviÅ¡e lako poverovati da će svi biti na dobitku jednom kada maÅ¡ine dobiju svest…

    Izmišljanje novih budućnosti

    ÄŒetrdeset godina kasnije, joÅ¡ Ä?ekamo na zamiÅ¡ljenu budućnost veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. U meÄ‘uvremenu, neprestano su nam obećavali njen neposredni dolazak. Ipak, uprkos stalnim pomacima u razvoju hardvera i softvera, maÅ¡ine i dalje nisu sposobne da “misle”. Likovi u video-igrama i dalje predstavljaju neÅ¡to najbliže veÅ¡taÄ?koj inteligenciji sa Ä?ime se većina ljudi susrela. MeÄ‘utim, kao Å¡to pokazuje rastuća popularnost igranja na Internetu, gde ljudi i dalje igraju jedni protiv drugih, virtuelni protivnik je slaba zamena za ljudskog igraÄ?a. Kada se osvrnemo na istoriju ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti, oÄ?igledno je da se ni optimistiÄ?ka ni pesimistiÄ?ka verzija veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije nisu ostvarile. Robot Robi nije naÅ¡ verni sluga, a EPIKAK XIV ne upravlja naÅ¡im životima. Umesto da se razviju u razumne maÅ¡ine, raÄ?unari su postali potroÅ¡aÄ?ka roba. Mejnfrejmovi veliÄ?ine sobe nastavljaju da se smanjuju u sve sitnije i sitnije maÅ¡ine. U savremenom svetu raÄ?unari su svugde – a njihovi korisnici itekako znaju da su oni i dalje glupi.

    Ovi ponovljeni neuspesi bi, oÄ?ekivano, trebalo da su nepovratno naruÅ¡ili ugled zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti veÅ¡taÄ?ke inteligencije. Ipak, njeni zagovornici nemaju griže savesti. ÄŒetiri decenije posle Svetskog sajma 1964, IBM i dalje tvrdi da su njihove maÅ¡ine na pragu toga da postanu svesne (Bel/Bell 2004, str. 2). Upornost ove nauÄ?nofantastiÄ?ne fantazije pokazuje trajnu važnost Fon Nojmanovog konzervativnog pripajanja kibernetike raÄ?unarskoj industriji. Kao i ranih 1960-ih, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija i dalje pruža sjajan alibi za razvoj novih vojnih tehnologija. Stvaranje Singularnosti deluje daleko prijateljskije od saraÄ‘ivanja sa ameriÄ?kim imperijalizmom. A Å¡to je joÅ¡ važnije, ova zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost nastavlja da prikriva posledice uvoÄ‘enja informatike na radno mesto. I upravnicima i radnicima i dalje se obećavaju tehnoloÅ¡ka reÅ¡enja za druÅ¡tveno-ekonomske probleme. San o svesnim maÅ¡inama je mnogo bolji medijski materijal od realnosti kibernetiÄ?kog fordizma. Na poÄ?etku 21. veka, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija ostaje dominantna ideoloÅ¡ka manifestacija (velikog) obećanja informatike.

    Verodostojnost ove zamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti zavisi od zaboravljanja njene sramotne istorije. Osvrt na to kako su ranije verzije proroÄ?anstva iznova i iznova diskreditovane podstiÄ?e duboki skepticizam po pitanju njegovog savremenog ponavljanja. NaÅ¡a liÄ?na frustriranost raÄ?unarskom tehnologijom bi trebalo da pokaže koliko je mala verovatnoća da se ona pretvori u Silicijumskog mesiju. ÄŒetrdeset godina posle Svetskog sajma u Njujorku, veÅ¡taÄ?ka inteligencija je postala zamiÅ¡ljena budućnost iz davne proÅ¡losti. Ono Å¡to nam umesto toga sada treba jeste daleko prefinjenija analiza potencijala informatike. Viner – ne Fon Nojman – mora biti naÅ¡ kibernetiÄ?ki guru. ProuÄ?avanje istorije bi trebalo da nas pouÄ?i kako da iznova izmislimo budućnost. Mesijanski misticizam se mora zameniti pragmatiÄ?nim materijalizmom. Pre svega, ta nova slika budućnosti bi trebalo da slavi raÄ?unare kao oruÄ‘a za uvećavanje ljudske inteligencije i kreativnosti. VeliÄ?anje hijerarhija kontrole mora se zameniti zagovaranjem dvosmernog deljenja informacija. Budimo nadahnuti i strastveni u zamiÅ¡ljanju naÅ¡ih sopstvenih vizija boljih vremena koja će uslediti (Barbruk/Barbrook i Å ulc/Shultz 1997; Barbruk 2000).

    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    Argumenti u ovom Ä?lanku dalje se razvijaju u knjizi RiÄ?arda Barbruka ZamiÅ¡ljene budućnosti: od razumnih maÅ¡ina do globalnog sela, Pluto, London 2007. ViÅ¡e tekstova i ažurirane informacije na adresi: www.imaginaryfutures.net
    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

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  • Imaginary Futures – Introduction to the Polish edition

    I was sitting in a lecture theatre at University College London listening to the speakers at the final session of the Solidarity/solidarities conference on the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Jan Dzierzgowski had worked hard on this translation and I owed it to him to write a smart introduction for its Polish readers. Where better to find inspiration than at this retrospective look at the demise of the Cold War? Imaginary Futures is a book about the political and cultural impact of the technological prophecies which emerged from this geopolitical confrontation. Computers and the Net are much more than useful tools. For over half a century, they have also embodied utopian dreams in the service of imperial ambition. During the Cold War, the American and Russian empires competed not only to control space, but also to own time. The nation that was pioneering the future in the present could claim leadership over the peoples of the world. The Berlin Wall might have fallen and the Russian troops have returned home, but this technological determinist ideology has proved to be remarkably persistent. The cheerleaders of neo-liberal globalisation have spent the past two decades pointing out American predominance over the computer industry and the Net – and then ordering the rest of the humanity to adopt their socio-economic panaceas of US-style privatisation, deregulation and financial speculation. By painstakingly explaining the history of the imaginary futures of artificial intelligence and the information society, my aim is to equip the readers of this book with the knowledge to refute this passé argument. The next time that someone tells you that the post-industrial utopia is just around the corner, you can reply that this prediction is nothing more than recycled McLuhanism. The Cold War is over – and so are its made-in-America imaginary futures.

    If I needed confirmation of this book’s relevance, I could find it in the air of melancholy at the Solidarity/solidarities conference. This event was being held to mark the 20th anniversary of the wonderful historical moment when the Stalinist monopoly over political power was breached for the first time: the 4th June 1989 multi-party elections to the Polish parliament. Within a few months, the old order was being swept away across Eastern Europe – and decades of mendacity and oppression had come to an end. Yet, as I sat in the lecture theatre, the closing session of this conference seemed to be as much a memorial service for frustrated aspirations as a celebration of revolutionary victories. One Polish member of the audience ruefully admitted that he and his compatriots now enjoyed that greatest of European privileges: being able to complain in public about how dreadful everything was. The excitement of 1989’s ‘springtime of the nations’ seemed like a distant memory when the region was being battered by the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. Adding to the misery, its governments were still in thrall to the ideological choices that had been made during the transition to national independence and political pluralism. Neo-liberal economic policies didn’t just mark the break with the impoverished Russian empire, but also a commitment to American post-industrial modernity. The new elites of ‘new Europe’ had made the mistake of swapping one Cold War superpower’s imaginary future for that of the other. While I was listening to the downbeat discussion at the Solidarity/solidarities conference, I cast my mind back to when I first realised that our continent was on the brink of a momentous upheaval. The implosion of the Russian empire might have been a big surprise to expert opinion in the West, but it wasn’t to me. A Polish leftie had predicted what would happen in 1984 – and the opinions of someone who is on the side of the workers are always more credible than those who only think what is allowed to be thought. Trust your own, that’s what I say.

    “It’s all over, you know. No one believes in the system. Not the workers, not the peasants, not even the bureaucrats.” Elcia was a Solidarnösc activist who had fled to London after the 1981 military coup. We’d first met when she and her friends were making a programme for their fellow refugees on Our Radio: 103.8FM. They would knock on the door of the house in Kilburn where the studio of this pirate station was based and proudly announce that the “mad Poles” had arrived to do their show. Yet, beneath this bravado, there was the sadness that they faced long years of exile from their homeland. Scattered across London were the exiles from the 1953 Berlin Uprising, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring. This new wave of Polish émigrés knew that they might have to wait 10 or 20 years before another attempt was made to overthrow the Stalinist regimes which oppressed the nations of Eastern Europe. They would be condemned to live in limbo – separated from their family and friends back home with their children growing up in England having little more than an exotic name to connect them with their Polish heritage. No wonder my friend was so jubilant. It was only three years after the military coup that had crushed Solidarnösc – and she’d been able to make a quick visit to see her parents without any difficulties. The secret police must have known about her subversive activities in London, but no one seemed to care in Warsaw. She was enjoying a sweet irony: “Remember what Lenin said? The revolution will succeed when the masses can’t go on in the same old way and neither can the ruling class. Well, that’s what it’s like in Poland now. It’s all over, finished, done with. Once Poland goes, the whole rotten structure will collapse across the East. We’ve won, we’ve won!!”

    Elcia had read the historical conjuncture correctly. She could now move back to Poland with her son in anticipation of what was to come. Five years later, it really was all over. For those who weren’t around at the time, it is difficult to explain the liberation that we felt when the Cold War finally ended. I’d spent all of my adult life with the nagging fear that a stoned American pilot or a dodgy piece of Russian technology might accidentally launch a nuclear weapon which would start a conflagration that wiped out a large percentage of the European population. What made matters worse was how the institutionalised hypocrisy of the two superpowers had colonised the minds of people trapped on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was a looking-glass world where the American bastion of democracy overthrew elected governments and the Russian champion of socialism sent in the tanks against the proletariat. Of course, it was easy to see the ideological corruption of this imperial duplicity in others. Our Polish friends from Solidarnösc were horrified when English leftists carried banners of Lenin and Trotsky on their demonstrations. We were disgusted when the workers of Gdansk gave a hero’s welcome to Margaret Thatcher so soon after she had brutally smashed the National Union of Miners’ strike at home. But, trying to get each other to understand that these acts of stupidity were symbolic gestures of defiance was almost impossible. Convinced that your enemy’s enemy must be your friend, too many dissidents on both sides had forgotten that they were united in a common struggle for freedom and dignity.

    In 1989, when the Polish elections began a chain reaction which swept away the Stalinist regimes across Eastern Europe, there was the brief moment of euphoria when it seemed that the doublethink of the Cold War might be exorcised. Jacek KuroÅ„ joked in an interview that he was on the verge of accomplishing his mission in life: restoring the rationality of politics in Europe by making the Left on the left and the Right on the right. The crowds in the streets of Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Berlin and Bucharest chanted the slogan: “We don’t want any more social experiments.” They weren’t like their parents who’d been fooled by fascists who spoke like communists. This was Georg Hegel’s ‘end of history’ when utopian dreams are transformed into pragmatic solutions. On that magic evening of 9th November when the Berlin Wall came down, we celebrated in style in London with expensive champagne and strong weed. Power hungry US Presidents and Russian General Secretaries would no longer be aiming nuclear missiles at the major cities of Europe. The common people had shown that – with enough courage and determination – it was possible to overcome the violence and lies of a modern state. This time, the good guys were the winners.

    Two decades on, the participants at the Solidarity/solidarities conference faced the hard task of explaining what one contributor called the ‘double disappointment’ of the hopes of the 1989 revolutions. Radicals in the West had expected that the collapse of Stalinism would lead to the emergence of a reinvigorated socialism in the East – and instead witnessed the nations of ‘new Europe’ embracing neo-liberalism in its most brutal forms. Oppositionists in the East had anticipated that the adoption of a free market economy would lead to consumer plenty for all like in the West – and instead saw the divisions between rich and poor within their societies growing ever wider. Of course, it is now all too easy to blame the shabby deals that allowed the Party bosses to plunder the state’s assets in return for relinquishing their grip over political power without bloodshed. What is more difficult to understand – twenty years on – is why there was mass support for the ‘shock therapy’ of privatisation, deregulation and cuts in welfare. Having rejected the failed social experiment of Russian-style Communism, sane and sensible people had voted in overwhelming numbers for a new social experiment: US-style neo-liberalism. It wasn’t as if there weren’t any other options. Just across the Baltic, there were the prosperous and egalitarian societies of Scandinavian Social Democracy, but, unfortunately, they lacked the ideological magic of the free market model. Above all, the American empire had seized the ownership of the imaginary future of the information society. As the transition gathered pace in the early-1990s, the arrival of the Net confirmed the correctness of this US-led path of modernisation for the nations of the East. In the same way that their parents had admired the industrial combines of Stalinist Russia, these ‘new Europeans’ were convinced that the dotcom entreprises of neo-liberal California represented the future in the present. No wonder that ‘double disappointment’ was the leitmotif of final panel at the Solidarity/solidarities conference…

    In 2009, the Polish community in London is thriving. Unlike Elcia and her friends, a new wave of exiles has come here voluntarily to earn money, learn English and experience life in a foreign country. They take it for granted that they can move and back forth across Europe with no problems. The only thing that they’re escaping from back home is the conservative morality of the Church. You can move in with your partner without getting married as long as you do it abroad. Tellingly, most of the Polish students who I teach at Westminster University choose the ‘liberal’ option for Political Views on their Facebook profile – and they mean it in both the social and economic senses of the term. These are the children of the defeat-in-victory of the 1989 revolution. Solidarnösc smashed the Stalinist bureaucracy – and then the neo-liberal regime destroyed the organised working class in Poland. As this generation came to adulthood, the dream of dissidents like Elcia of founding the Self-Managed Socialist Republic of Poland must have seemed like a relic from a long forgotten theological debate. Let’s remember that – for them – Francis Fukyama had reinterpreted the ‘end of history’ to outlaw any alternative to US-style capitalism. There was only the American path to modernity.

    The aim of this book is to help its readers to refute this ideological claim to imperial hegemony. On 15th September 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers marked the end of the neo-liberal ascendancy. George W. Bush – one of the most reactionary presidents in US history – was soon implementing the 5th demand of The Communist Manifesto: public ownership of the financial system. In such strange times, it is necessary to rediscover the complex history of the imaginary future of the information society. Here’s an interesting fact which is overlooked in the official accounts of the West. One of the first prophets of post-industrialism was Oscar Lange in the 1950s – and he was Polish. This visionary believed that the advent of the Net would provide the technological foundation for participatory democracy in both politics and the economy: cybernetic communism. With intellectual property withering away in cyberspace, his prediction does seem more prescient than it did a decade ago at the height of the dotcom bubble. If nothing else, Lange is telling us that the future is not necessarily neo-liberal California – and that the Polish Left can find its own path to a better future. The reformers of his generation opened the way for their successors to begin the process of dismantling of totalitarian rule. What they could have never envisaged was that one evil empire’s imaginary future would be replaced with that of its rival. As the last public act of his eventful life, Jacek Kuroń wrote an open letter in support of the people protesting against the 28th–30th April 2004 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Warsaw. Castigating the neo-liberal orthodoxy with the same contempt that he once directed against Stalinism, he called upon the dissidents of the 21st century to ‘create a new conception of social cooperation, realise the ideals of freedom, equality and social justice.’ What more needs to be said? I hope that the Polish translation of my book can make a small contribution towards fulfilling this goal. You can use the tools of the Net to invent new futures for humanity. Enjoy the book – and be inspired!

    Richard Barbrook,
    London,
    England,
    12th June 2009

  • Imaginary Futures is published in Polish

    PrzyszÅ‚oÅ›ci Wyobrażone – the Polish translation by Jan Dzierzgowski of Imaginary Futures – has been published by Muza SA in their Spectrum series. For more information, check out the Muza website.

  • ANARCHISM

    The 1872 Hague Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association
    The split in the First International:
    British, German & Dutch Sections v. Swiss, Spanish & Italian Sections
    Socialism v. Anarchism
    Karl Marx v. Mikhail Bakunin
    mass party v. revolutionary conspiracy
    democratic republic v. local communes
    working class v. peasants, students & bandits
    organised labour v. spontaneous uprisings

    Bakuninists’ forerunners of anarchism:
    William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1789)
    Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? (1840)
    Max Stirner, Ego and His Own (1845)

    1889 Second International: parliamentary socialism, trade unions and cooperatives
    German Social Democratic Party, British Labour Party and French Socialist Party
    Friedrich Engels, The Bakuninists at Work
    Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists

    Libertarianism: invisible dictatorship, propaganda of the deed and collectives
    Mikhail Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy
    Sergei Nechaev, The Catechism of a Revolutionary
    Errico Malatesta, Anarchy

    Individualist anarchism v. collectivist anarchism

    Anarchist terrorism:
    Tsar Alexander II (1881), US President McKinley (1901)
    Sidney Street siege (1911), Bonnot gang (1911-12)

    Anarcho-syndicalism:
    General Strike, labour exchanges and workers’ cooperatives
    CGT in France, CNT in Spain and IWW in USA
    1905 Russian Revolution
    Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence
    Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid

    Socialist Maximalism: anti-parliamentary and syndicalist
    Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions

    Outbreak of 1st World War 1914: patriotism v. internationalism
    Benito Mussolini, National Syndicalism, Italian Fascism and the corporate state

    October 1917 Russian Revolution
    Marx + Bakunin = Bolshevism
    vanguard party, revolutionary dictatorship and worker-peasant alliance
    1918 dissolution of Constituent Assembly
    1921 suppression of the Kronstadt Soviet
    V.I. Lenin, State & Revolution
    Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat

    1919 Third International
    Totalitarian Communism v. Council Communism
    V.I. Lenin, Left-Wing Communism: an infantile disorder
    Anton Pannekoek, World Revolution and Communist Tactics

    1936 Spanish Revolution
    Barcelona workers’ uprising v. fascist military coup
    CNT, FAI and the Durruti Column
    workers’ militias and peasants’ cooperatives
    Popular Front against fascism
    1937 Barcelona May Days:
    Catalan Nationalists, Stalinists and Socialists v. Anarchists and POUM
    George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia
    Abel Paz, Durruti

    New Left revival of anarchism:
    1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Budapest Workers’ Council
    1957 CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and the Aldermaston marches
    1964 Free Speech Movement in UC Berkeley
    1965 American invasion of Vietnam
    Hippie counter-culture: folk music, rock ‘n’ roll, festivals, happenings, pot, LSD and rural communes
    Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism
    Charles Reich, The Greening of America
    Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation

    May ’68 French Revolution
    Sorbonne occupation, general strike and worker-student alliance
    Situationist International, Kommune 1 and Italian Autonomism
    urban squats, rural communes, feminism, gay liberation and anti-racism
    Weather Underground, Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof Gang
    Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle
    Dany & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: the left-wing alternative
    Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved

    Punk subculture: independent labels, pirate radio and fanzines
    Sex Pistols, Anarchy in the UK (1976)
    Class War (1983-9), Stop the City (1983-4, Bash the Rich marches (1984-5) and Poll Tax riot (1990)
    Jon Savage, England’s Dreaming
    Class War, A Decade of Disorder

    Post-modern anarchism: new social movements, anti-prisons and anti-psychiatry
    Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish
    Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Thousand Plateaus

    Green anarchism:
    Earth First!, monkey wrenching and primitivism
    Theodore Kaczynski, The Unabomber Manifesto
    John Zerzan, Why Primitivism?

    Alter-globalisation movement:
    1999 Seattle protests, World Social Forum and the Black Block
    IndyMedia, DIY Culture and social networks
    Toni Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire
    George McKay, DiY Culture
    nettime.org
    metamute.org

  • Imaginary Futures Author at Transmediale 10

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be appearing at Transmediale 10 to open its The Futurity Long Conversation – ‘a relay of one-to-one conversations, brings 21 leading artists, designers, theorists, journalists and media interventionists together to discuss, contextualise and explore the abstract and qualitative elements defining what we conceive of the future today’ – at 1.00pm on Friday 5th February in Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, Germany. For more information, check out the Transmediale website.

  • Editora Peirópolis Publishes Futuros Imaginários

    Editora Peirópolis from São Paulo, Brazil, have just published Futuros Imaginários – das máquinas pensantes à aldeia global – the Portuguese translation of Imaginary Futures. Richard Barbrook will be visiting the country over the next two weeks for a lecture tour to promote the book. His first appearance will be at the International Seminar “Information, Power, and Politics: new institutional and technological mediationsâ€? on 15th-17th April at the Auditorium of the CPRM – Research Company for Mineral Resources, Av. Pasteur, 404, 4th floor, Urca, Rio de Janeiro.

    Buy the book

    Download the pdf version

  • Imaginary Futures Author at Creative Cities Symposium in Vienna

    Dr Richard Barbrook will be giving a talk entitled ‘Creative Labour and Proletarian Playtime’ at the ORF Symposium on Creative Cities on the afternoon of Tuesday 31st March at RadioKulturhaus, Großer Sendesaal, Argentinierstraße 30a, 1040 Wien, Austria.

    For more details, check out the ORF website.

  • Imaginary Futures Author at Transmediale ’09

    Dr Richard Barbrook will speaking the Transmediale Festival ’09 in the session on ‘How Enthusiasts, Amateurs and Hobbyists Shape the (Music) World’ at 3.00pm on Tuesday 27th February at Kunstraum Kreuzberg Bethanien, Mariannenplatz 2. 10997 Berlin-Kreuzberg. For further details, see the Transmediale Festival website.

  • imaginary futures at the Radiator Festival

    Dr Richard Barbrook will speaking about Imaginary Futures at the 4th Radiator Festival – “Exploits in the Wireless City” – on Thursday afternoon on 15th March at the Broadway Media Centre, Nottingham, England. For further details, see the Radiator festival website.

  • Imaginary Futures at St. Petersburg Art Academy

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will speaking about Imaginary Futures as part of a Digital Artisans’ Evening at the ProArte Institute in the Peter & Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg on Wednesday 26th November. For further details, see the ProArte Institute’s website: http://www.proarte.ru

  • imaginary Futures at Cold War Culture conference

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be appearing at the Cold War Culture conference which takes place at the Victoria & Albert museum in London on Friday 21st – Saturday 22nd November. This major conference brings together some of the most exciting thinkers on art, design and architecture in the post-1945 period to reflect on the ways in which Cold War politics shaped art and design. Organised in conjunction with the V&A’s landmark Cold War Modern exhibition, it offers new perspectives on a period which continues to grip the imagination today.

    Richard’s lecture – ‘Cold War Imaginary Futures: cybernetic communism and the information society’ – is scheduled for the Saturday afternoon session of the confernce.

    More details about the Cold War Culture conference can be found on the V&A website.

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  • CREATIVE CITY THESES

    1) We Must Invent New Futures

    The information society has arrived – and the McLuhanist prophecy of the network utopia has been disappointed. The critical analysis of the creative city provides an opportunity to devise new futures to guide our actions in the present.

    2) The New Class of the New

    Like their forebears who moved from artisan workshops into the Fordist factory, the present generation is learning how to make new things in new ways with new technologies. This study will examine how far the flattened hierarchies and cooperative ethos of cognitive capitalism are remaking the shape of the city’s economy.

    3) Mapping the Creative Workforce

    The emergence of a new class of the new lives is not just an economic phenomenon, but also social, political and cultural. This study will measure the vital statistics of the creative class: age, gender, ethnicity, education and ideology. In parallel, psychogeographical research will both delineate the neighbourhoods where its members congregate and trace their links with the global diaspora of intellectual labour.

    4) Funky Businesses in Trendy Locations

    Just like the artisan trades of medieval times, the creative sector is clustered in specific areas of the world city. Forming a distinct subculture, its members wear the same clothes, drink in the same bars, listen to the same music and share a common obsession with cutting-edge technology. This study will examine the role of these marks of distinction in forming the new class of the new.

    5) The Cultural Vanguard of Property Speculation

    The creative sector is making a major contribution to the regeneration of neglected inner-city areas. Unfortunately, in many cases, the original inhabitants of these neighbourhoods have been bypassed by this economic turn around. They lack the technical skills, cultural outlook and social connections required for employment within this post-industrial sector. Worst of all, an influx of creative companies and their employees causes a rapid inflation in property prices and commercial rents in the area. This study will track this gentrification of inner city neighbourhoods and how its negative consequences can be countered.

    6) Self-Managed Exploitation

    The neo-liberal cult of authoritarian managerial power has become an anachronism within the creative industries. Instead, as the business manuals of the dotcom boom explained, the spread of contract working and job insecurity can be rebranded as extending individual freedom and career opportunities. Among the most talented employers and employees, the measure of success isn’t just making lots of money, but also creating something cool. This research will investigate how respect and autonomy for knowledge workers are the preconditions of innovation and excellence in this sector.

    7) The Carnival Economy

    For most of the citizens of the world city, creativity is what happens when they’re playing outside the workplace. Within popular music, the new thing appears on the dance floor and in the streets before it’s repackaged as a commodity. This study will investigate how those who earn their living outside the creative industries are not just participating in cultural production, but also, in many cases, driving forward innovation in this sector.

    8 ) Sharing Knowledge as Collective Production

    The information society isn’t just a new phase of capitalism, but also an evolutionary stage beyond capitalism. Alongside orders and commodities, gifts are now one of the principle methods of organising collective labour. The technical icon of the knowledge economy – the Net – is primarily a tool for sharing knowledge not selling information. This study will examine how the principles of open architecture and open source can be extended from the virtual realm into the real world.

    9) Libertarian Social Democracy

    Social welfare and economic security provide the best foundations for constant change and perpetual innovation. Contrary to the neo-liberal prognosis, public housing, free healthcare, subsidised culture and state education are still the preconditions of a modern civilisation. This study will ponder how this reformist programme can be updated and extended for the new conditions of the 21st century. Political democracy requires cultural democracy. If everyone is a voter, then everyone is also a creator. When mapping out the route to the future of libertarian social democracy, our vision of the new class must become inclusive.

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  • KAUTSKY IN CAMBRIDGE

    “How was the conference?”, Simon Schaffer asked. “Very interesting”, I replied. “The Autonomists have finally come out of the closet as reformists!”At the opening session of the Immaterial Labour conference in Cambridge, Andrea Fumagalli had told us that Toni Negri and the other gurus of the movement now advocated a commendably pragmatic political programme: a guaranteed income for all citizens; employment rights for precarious workers; the democratisation of the European Union; and more environmental protection. “As left-wing members of the Labour Party”, I pointed out, “we can no longer criticise the Autonomists. Their policies are also our policies!”

    I continued, “It’s particularly good to see that – after 25 years – the Autonomists have at long last aligned their practice with their theory.” Back in the early-1980s, Simon and I had both diligently studied the Red Notes booklets which had first made available the key texts by Negri, Tronti and their comrades to an English-speaking audience. What was then so striking about the writings of the Autonomists was their engagement with Marx’s critique of political economy. In contrast with their Althusserian and Trotskyist peers, these Italian leftists did have something intelligent to say about the neo-liberal restructuring of capitalism. However, at this point, the Autonomists’ admiration for Marx’s theory didn’t extend to his practice. Far from being social democrats, they took pride in their revolutionary intransigence. Autonomism was the extreme left of the Ultra-Left.

    “What was the comrades’ reaction to Andrea Fumagalli’s speech?” Simon asked. “As you might have guessed”, I replied, “it didn’t go down very well with most of his audience. For the old school, it was a betrayal of the holy precepts of Autonomism. For the younger generation, it was a bit like going to see Johnny Rotten and discovering that he had always been a Bee Gees fan!” “What did they expect?”, Simon exclaimed. “It was obvious that Autonomism was reformist right from the beginning. Haven’t they ever read Negri’s article on Keynes from the mid-1970s? If you – correctly – point out that ‘effective demand’ is a euphemism for working class struggle, then you’re arguing in favour of social democracy!” “Maybe”, I mused, “their horrified reaction proves that the revolutionary image of Autonomism was always more important than its theoretical achievements? It can’t be an accident that its acolytes prefer reading the Grundrisse to Capital. If they carefully studied the chapter on the Factory Acts in Volume 1, they would realise that Marx himself was a social democrat!”

    “So was your visit to Cambridge worthwhile?”, Simon enquired. “Back in the early-1980s, we might have disagreed with their politics, but we always enjoyed going to their conferences.” “Of course”, I responded. “It’s not just that our politics which have converged. Do you remember the cyber-communism article which I wrote in the late-1990s for the McLuhan conference in New York? At the time, it was meant as a satirical piece: America invented the only working model of communism in human history – it’s called the Net! Well, you’ll be pleased to hear that there were two excellent papers at the conference which put forward the same argument.” “Very good”, Simon said. “But do you think that anyone outside the academic Left is listening to what was said?” “I do hope so since the conference was – rather appropriately – being held in Keynes Hall at Kings. Looking at the current state of the Labour Party, it certainly needs some fresh ideas. Maybe – as in the 1930s – Cambridge can again provide them?” My comrade smiled somewhat sceptically, “I look forward to that day!” “You never know”, I joked, “in a couple of decades time, we could be going to a similar conference in the Negri Hall at Kings.” “After Blairism”, Simon announced, “Autonomist reformism!” “We should drink to this future!”, I concluded – and so we left for the pub to continue the conversation over a few pints…

  • Imaginary Futures wins 2008 Marshall McLuhan Award

    The Media Ecology Association (MEA) has selected Richard Barbrook’s Imaginary Futures: from thinking machines to the global village as the winner of the 2008 Marshall McLuhan Award for Outstanding Book in the Field of Media Ecology.

    Past recipients of this award include Francis Fukuyama, Doug Rushkoff and Neil Postman.

    The official presentation of the award will at the MEA’s annual convention which is being held at Santa Clara University in Silicon Valley, California, USA on 19th-22nd June 2008.

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will be attending the awards ceremony on Friday 20th June and will give a lecture about his book.

    Further details can be obtained from the MEA website.

  • World Ex-Position ’08

    Fahim Amir has posted a review of the World Ex-Position ’08 which took place on 26th April-15th May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. He concludes his Mute article with this observation on Richard Barbrook’s talk about Imaginary Futures at the festival:

    “His politically apt and historically well informed argument presents a strong antidote to the euphoric manifestos of the net’s postmodern leftist theorists of the likes of Antonio Negri, without falling for the techno-pessimistic traps of an oversimplifying critique of ideology. Indeed, to quote Barbrook, ‘those who forget the future are condemned to repeat it’.”

    Read Famir Amin’s review.

  • New reviews of Imaginary Futures

    Two reviews of Imaginary Futures were published in December 2007:

    John Barker’s Up For Grabs in Science as Culture, Number 4, Volume 16, 2007, pages 481-488.

    “By giving us the history of intellectuals thriving on an ahistorical view of the world, and what this view leads to, [Barbrook] has given depth to the critique that began with The Californian Ideology, and provided the tools to see through new versions of the same, however attractively packaged. The imaginary future is an area of contestation.”

    Bruce Robinson’s The Future Is What It Used to Be in Solidarity & Workers’ Liberty, 3rd December 2007.

    “The book tells an important story well. The left should neither forget the history and ideology of the Net in a blaze of techno-enthusiasm, nor simply retreat into “neo-Luddismâ€?. Telling the story of the past of the future is a useful aid to orienting ourselves in the “Information Ageâ€?.”

  • UP FOR GRABS: Richard Barbrook’s Imaginary Futures, From Thinking Machines to the Global Village

    The imaginary future is invariably a claim to the present by its dominant political and economic class. In the case of Cold War America, there was an urgency to its creation, because although it was outdoing the USSR in all conventional economic and productive indices, the distorted Marxist veneer maintained in Moscow had a stronger rhetorical vision of the future which, in the end, it claimed, would win out: history was on its side. The creation of such an American version ‘imaginary future’, spurred on also by short lived moments when the Soviets were ahead, or appeared to be ahead in certain modernist technologies – the first satellite in space, and then the possibility of a communist cybernetics — is what Richard Barbrook describes in this book. It is an account which exhaustively pulls out the ideological and fetishistic dynamics from under the flim-flam of its promoters, but also describes how the development of the internet and its world wide web has ironically emerged as a tool with liberatory possibilities.

    His starting point is the 1964 World’s Fair in New York that took place during an intense period of the Cold War, its planning no doubt underway during the time of the Cuban missile crisis. With its futurist IBM Pavilion the Fair acted as Trojan-Horse type propaganda. “Instruments of genocide,� Barbrook writes “were successfully disguised as benefactors of humanity.� Nuclear weapons, militarized computing, and militarized space use were presented as the utopian future being made real in the present.

    To make the particular nature of this futurism clear, he contrasts the Fair with London’s Great Exhibition of 1851, which instead disguised Britain’s modern hi-tech world in the medieval fantasies of the Gothic Revival; and with the American exhibition of 1939 whose promise of a suburban America built around the motor car was realized, and had a New Deal rhetoric of a cohesive and peaceful society. On the other hand, the 1964 promises of unmetered energy (nuclear fusion), tourism to the moon, and intelligent computers, have been unfulfilled and, since Chernobyl and an Apollo crash at take-off, have been discredited. Only the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence is still on the table, pursued with a fanaticism borne of some deep and perverse psychic need, and enabled by the non-stop levels of its research budget, forthcoming during the period described here, because of an equally deep ideological need to disguise the grotesque military ‘game-playing’ it allowed for.

    Barbrook himself was at the 1964 Fair as a boy with his mother, sister, and an academic father who he comes to realize was part of what he calls the cold-war left, one which willingly made accommodation with the technological fantasies on display there, and the ‘military definition of reality’ as described by C. Wright Mills. This, given that he hates this view of the world and what it lead to, gives the book its drive and its edge. It ends with a rousing cry for the equality of an intelligent citizenry, allied to use of the world wide web as a liberatory tool, but it is also an angry lament, that a generation of self-styled progressives should have destroyed social democracy both as a possible, perhaps likely, governmental mode, and as an ideal.

    What destroys it is the Vietnam War, though he is scrupulous enough to avoid his anger becoming yet another version of this being ‘an American Tragedy’. He is forthright in saying that this was a Vietnamese tragedy, and is horrified that here were nominal progressives who became obsessed with how many Vietnamese peasants could be killed. This callousness began with an ideological notion of what was modernity – a Cold War version – but also from a faith in technology itself. This faith — in line with the top-down history of social democracy — involved a denial of human agency. Describing the IBM Pavilion at the 1964 Fair, he argues that it wasn’t just military use being disguised, but that the imaginary future of electronic brains concealed the human labour involved. Computers were described as ‘thinking’ so that the hard work, the surplus-value producing labour of designing, building and operating of them, could be discounted.

    EX-MARXISTS MADE GOOD

    In the course of World War II, various intellectuals, including Marxists, and ex-Marxists, found a place in positions of responsibility and power in a militarized government. This wartime government was the genesis of what C. Wright Mills came to call the Power Elite, and as it morphed into Cold War governments, the ‘military definition of reality’ became a crucial cohesive force for it. In this transition the newcomer intellectuals who remained in this elite included ex-Marxists, and especially ex-Trotskyists whose hostility to the USSR as it existed, made the switch to a wholly militarized American view of the world not so difficult. (1)

    Barbrook sees them as playing an important role in the creation of this ‘counter futurism.’ We have seen something depressingly similar among the ‘Blairites’ of New Labour, and the presence of ex-Marxists among today’s American neo-cons has also been noted. He quotes from Ignazio Silone that “the final struggle (for global hegemony)…will be between the Communists and the ex-Communists.� But with both the neo-cons of today, and the real villains of this book, their influence is rather over played for polemical effect. In this book those real villains are intellectuals, social democrat Keynesians if pushed, but with a penchant for American military superiority, and a role in the Power Elite, who had read some Marx, understood the idea of historical materialism, and wanted to create a class-free version of it.

    Early in the book he introduces the ex-Trotskyist leader James Burnham, who had made such a switch, to describe a revolution in which a managerial class was the deservedly new elite, one most developed in the USA. To give this notion force, Burnham wanted to give it the Shock and Awe touch, inevitability. It is true that managerialism was new in its ideological and practical importance for the Power Elite, and that computer development would only strengthen this development. Equally, the imagined future was dependent on managerial capacity, but of itself, managerialism provided none of the required appeal.

    HEROES AND VILLAINS

    Instead, Barbrook presents the advent of cybernetics, and soon after the ‘global village’ notions of converging communication technologies pioneered in new style by Marshall McLuhan. Both were, and are, capable of varying interpretation and so become, though he is hesitant to say it, sites of ‘struggle’. He traces the history of cybernetics back to ‘the Macy Conferences’, and from this there emerge hero and villain. The hero, and this is the big rescue job of the book, is Norbert Wiener. True, Wiener’s theory of a continual feedback between information and action which could be used to describe the behaviour of living organisms and technological systems would seem to make misuse possible, even likely, but he also challenged the ‘patriotic consensus’ of the Cold War which allowed scientists to rationalize their military-funded research; and asserted the need for humans to control their machines.

    Later he became an inspiration to a short-lived reformist faction of the USSR elite and their utopian idea of computerized and interactive planning, a “new cybernetic model of communism: the ‘unified information network’.” It did not survive the return to centralized control under Brezhnev, but in turn, spurred the American cybernetic world to make something more inspiring than one dominated by military use and Artificial Intelligence fanaticism. This is how Barbrook characterizes the turn cybernetics had taken when it became dominated by John von Neumann, mathematician and Cold War enthusiast, who had been involved in developing the atomic bomb and then in building a prototype mainframe computer for the US Navy. The inherent danger of metaphor and analogy in scientific work, allowed him to argue that ‘feedback’ meant that computers operated like humans. He is the first of Barbrook’s villains whose propagandizing of AI, allowed the development of war games with a clean conscience for those doing the work.

    But this, no more than Burnham’s managerial elite, created much of an attractive version of the future. Enter Marshall McLuhan, an obscure literature professor in Canada with a suitably modern mish-mash of snappy perceptions based on the ideas of Harold Innis. that ‘the movement of information’ played the primary role in shaping human societies. In Understanding Media and the more snappier titled The Gutenberg Galaxy, he postulated a convergence of a communication technologies, and neutral gloablisation. For him “print consciousness – the indifference of rationalism – would be superseded by electronic media consciousness – the empathy of intuition,â€? as Barbrook puts it. One might object to the domineering arrogance of some of its proponents, but the superseding of rationalism, can only make one nervous. The intellectuals of the Power Elite on the other hand, were all to happy keep their monopoly on rationalism, while taking up McLuhan’s ideas. What appealed to them in his work was not just the heralding of the information age, but in particular the converging and ‘unification’ of computing, media and telecommunications, and how this provided a vision of the future in which the USA already had an unassailable lead. The technical determinism implied in his argument – a changed technological mode of communication making for a new mode of consciousness – also meant that, in the right hands, the ideas could be rendered ideologically safe.

    MCLUHANISM WITHOUT MCLUHAN

    The intellectuals, the ones Barbrook calls ‘the cold war left’, were of the type who tell you what you were really saying the moment you’ve finished saying it. In this instance there was not even acknowledgement of what McLuhan had said.. He had to be interpreted and unacknowledged because he himself was too off-the-wall to provide a Cold War imaginary future, or to be useful to academic careerists. Without acknowledgement, interpretation becomes appropriation, and what was constructed was McLuhanism without McLuhan. This when McLuhan himself had shown his ‘flakiness’ when, at a 1969 meeting of the Bilderberg Group he asked, “What are we fighting Communism for? We are the most Communist people in world history.�

    The appropriation of the ideas and breakthroughs of inventers, innovators, and mavericks by those with institutional and financial power is hardly new. In the case of McLuhan, his appropriators were real operators, Daniel Bell and the geopolitical cold warrior Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of Bell’s multi-disciplinary Commission which had come out of the American Cybernetics Conference of 1964 and was financed by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Bell had already provided an early version of the ‘Third Way’ with his The End of Ideology, (“The end of ideology is not – and should not – be the end of utopia as wellâ€?) having already proved himself a reliable hatchet man for the Power Elite with a critique of Wright Mills’ book, that depended on nod-and-wink put-downs and the distortions that arise from simply ignoring the phenomena it highlighted.(2) As well as professional academics, the Commission also involved think-tankers like Herman Kahn who, in the 1950s, had claimed a nuclear war against the USSR was winnable on the basis of simulated war games. It was he and a colleague from the Hudson Institute who came up with a list of 100 imminent inventions for the Commission. Much was predicated on the power of ‘thinking machines’. Meanwhile Brzezinski in a 1968 article and a 1970 book, reproduced McLuhanism as academic sociology with technology as the driving form of human history, no class conflict involved. And this time it was new technology which was effecting a new economy, and a view of the world to go with it, the information society replacing the industrial with the USA in the lead.

    Barbrook argues that Bell found this insufficient, that it didn’t offer their own vision of “the emancipated society�, their vision of utopia, and that this was his self-appointed job. His point of view was essentially similar however: “As in earlier stages of growth, people were spectators of an evolutionary movement outside of their control,� Barbrook writes. Certain ironies also arise. For one thing, there is a distinct whiff of ‘the end of history’ in Bell’s conclusions, and the end of history itself sounds all too like the thousand year Reich, an absurd claim, inviting hubris. Already there has been a new version of the end of history, American also, but from a rather different viewpoint. Then there is the date of Bell’s final ‘canonical text’ (a phrase Barbrook is overly fond of) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. It finally appeared in 1973, but by then the political-ideological base it had been built on, had gone. Not that the technological developments towards the information society as network (net) came to a stop, far from it, but that his ‘third way version’ had been discredited by the Vietnam War, a triple whammy.

    HUBRIS

    First of all information technology was used not just in a callous manner in this war, it also created delusions of victory. It is also the Vietnamese – and this irony Barbrook does emphasize – who used television to greater effect, making it integral to the Tet Offensive which had such an impact on American opinion. Then a youth counter-culture which had already smelled something rotten, a technological determinism which was intrinsically anti-democratic in this notion of a post-industrial society, saw that the War brought it out into the open. This counter-culture included students who, for Bell, were to be integral to, leaders of the information society, with bases in the universities. They were integral to his society. Instead many students became militant opponents of the War and all that went with it.

    Longer term, the costs of the war was a catalyst for a radical shift in general capitalist policy. The Keynesianism which had been taken for granted by the cold war left was in any case becoming unacceptable to capital and its representative power elite, blamed for its failure to deliver social discipline. The costs of the war and those of the Great Society, and then the oil price shock in the same year that Bell finally published, made this shift in capitalist strategy both necessary and possible. It was a switch aimed at making people work harder for the same, or less money. Computerized technology, developed as it was within the capitalist relations of production that Bell airbrushed out of the picture, was an important means of making this happen. Instead of the greater free time for creativity inherent in the cold war left’s imaginary future, people have come to work harder and for longer hours.

    Barbrook describes the political ironies, but remains ambivalent about them because of the longevity he ascribes to the conception of the information society as both imaginary future and fetish, that was developed by this group with Bell as its synthesiser and promoter. But before he gets there, and what this means and has meant for the present, the real villain of this cold war left, W.W. Rostow steps out of his role as a key intellectual contributor to cold war leftist ideology, to become the most enthusiastic of the Washington desk bombers of Vietnam; and the one who could not give up on its supposed efficacy. The saddest off-stage individuals in the book are his parents who had optimistically christened him Walt Whitman. For Rostow, the global village required the destruction of real villages that did not, and had no chance of following his stages of growth,

    ARMCHAIR WARRIORS

    The ideological contribution was his stages of economic growth theory which had the merit of providing a historical materialist alternative to Marxism as against the dominant bourgeois theories of the market and equilibrium. He understood, as Barbrook puts it, that “market competition was a historical creation rather than an immutable law of nature.� But that was as far as it went, ‘progressive’ only in relation to the pre-New Deal economics of laisser-faire, and in its promise of everyone a consumer of the goods technology had made available. It is a theory which eradicates class and class conflict as a motor of economic growth; and leaves out the crucial importance of the military budget for both research and armaments to the US economic growth of the time, something at least recognized by ex-President Eisenhower in his ‘military-industrial complex’ warning speech of 1961. Most of all the theory itself is also ahistorical, believing that the American model was the only ‘modern’ one in town, and that it was universally available, its prescriptive stages ultimately unrecognizing of all the advantages and violence of the USA’s economic history. For development to take place for Rostow, a change in attitudes to technology was required, along with a “willingness to work�.

    However, its claim as a model for modernity and the future for the “Third World� in a period when a proxy Cold War was being fought in this world, fell down when even “communist economics� seemed more modern and realistic, given the USA’s support for the most regressive forms of the elites of that world. That this was the case was intolerable not just to Rostow and the Cold War left, but to American ultra-nationalists wholly imbued with a ‘military definition of reality’ like Samuel Huntington who, at this time, was railing – with racist overtones – about a surfeit of democracy within the USA, itself, and who hated the very idea of the Great Society. (3) With some consistency, his solution to the ‘Maoist threat’ was to destroy the Vietnamese peasantry as a class, the non-modern peasant class. This coalition of forces, the cold war left and authoritarian nationalists, has recently returned to cause more misery to other people, and exhibited the same characteristics:

    -the same arrogant ignorance. In the earlier case they could not even be bothered to know Vietnam’s history of fierce independence towards China, when China was presumed to be the instigator of ‘dominos’ falling.
    -the same gruesome wishful thinking
    -the same absolute belief in the abstract violence of its military technology.

    Noting the importance of games theory, and then war gaming, Barbrook says “When processed through a computer, the irrational could be made to appear rational … and according to ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency, an agency with financial backing from the military) computer simulations, the success of their B52 air offensive was guaranteed. When their losses in people and property reached the critical breaking point, the Communists would be forced to admit defeat and abandon the struggle against South Vietnam.�

    For Rostow, the war criminal, the people whose losses were to reach breaking point were abstractions, and whose deaths were required to prove a point. At the same time, he never questioned the reliability of the data provided by the US military (with its own interests), and placed his trust in “the mediated interpretation of the war provided by information technologies.� That the people killed in wars are abstract figures for those who perpetuate them was not new, but the fetishizing of information technology took it to new levels, while all the time, this same technology was being proclaimed for making a liberatory society possible.

    INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR USES

    Imaginary Futures is a history lesson. Its purpose to show how the Net both as shorthand for, and realization of the Information Society, was theorized by the cold war left he describes. He argues that this theorizing made in the circumstances of the Cold War, has somehow survived the limits of its time and, one way or another, established the parameters within which it is imagined. The blind faith in American superiority in information age warfare, re-packed as Shock and Awe, has played a great part in the devastation heaped on the people of Iraq. The notion that any model other than the American information society is of the dinosaur variety (a handy and clichéd symbol implying what is heavy, slow-moving, and awaiting distinction) has had great resonance, as well as minimizing the political impact of a decline in US manufacturing and its balance of trade.

    This is true, but as a history of the intellectuals in this process, questions remain. An alternative view of these cold war leftists might be that those who ally themselves with the power elite, are its ‘useful idiots’, useful only at certain times. In this case, that it was not just the Vietnam War, but a shift in the elite’s requirements that meant that any ‘progressive’ elements that existed in their imaginary future could be ditched, and just the rhetoric maintained. This is not a single case. Monetarism for example, economic theory from the 1920s, was dusted down to be used in the capitalist offensive of the 1970s. Lip service to Milton Friedman was still to be paid until his recent death, but voodoo economics and militarized Keynesianism have been the order of the day ever since.

    Barbrook cannot bring himself to give this alternative view. It is a history of intellectuals, but he has a problem with them. With a nasty piece of work like von Neumann, the ‘fanatical Cold War warrior’, there is a psycho-political history attached; he was “traumatized by the nationalization of his family’s bank during the Hungarian revolution of 1919�. What we don’t get is any real history of more ‘progressive figures’ in the story. Or rather, a question posed by Armin Medosch, is whether the psycho-political histories of the technologists who helped make some of the building blocks of the Net as a reality, played a part in the nature of the technical developments they worked on. Barbrook makes the practical suggestion that as with reading Marx himself, rather than the Bolshevik version, we should read Norbert Wiener and McLuhan in their own words. Wiener the pacifist socialist he implies is the person who theorized cybernetics as a non-hierarchical form of interaction. But what of J.C.R. Licklider and his ARPA group. Of these he says that some of the cybernetic radicals who had been ‘persuaded’ to serve the US military were able to “hardwire the academic gift economy into its social mores and technical architecture.� This begs the question as to whether certain technical achievements were the product of some ‘socialist’ consciousness. Paul Baran for example, and Licklider himself, was such consciousness at work in the development of packet-switching?

    Technological and scientific leaps have been made, or managed by, people committed to such advances being public property. There is the well-known case of Tim Beners-Lee and the world wide web. Sir John Sulston has been very clear about the moral basis of the long battle to keep the Human Genome Project as public property against Craig Venter’s push for profitable patenting. In this instance, motivation did not change the nature of the human genome, but given that it is in this field we are likely to see a new wave of technological determinism, that it is public knowledge is likely to be crucial.

    Neither Berners-Lee nor Sulston were financed by the military however, so that motivations are visible. In the case of packet-switching, Barbrook is not helpful with his ‘persuaded’ and ‘hardwired’, a word that seems to substitute itself for explanation. Is the net as gift economy an accidental, ironic outcome of ARPA, or is he suggesting that Licklider and Baran consciously mad a ‘deal with the devil’ knowing the ultimate public good that could come from packet-switching. (4)

    If this question, now perhaps being resolved in the world of the computer itself by the ‘hactivists’ of Open Source Culture, is not answered in the book, it is much clearer in the case of the maverick McLuhan. He has been as Barbrook shows, open to interpretation from all sides (5), but it is the “we are the most communist people in history,� that he says to the Bilderberg Conference, which should stand out to us.. It is this possibility, this possible view of the present, which has stood out in Barbrook’s own writing from the famous The Californian Ideology onwards.(6) This is, in a sense, the miracle; an internet which regardless of the motives of those making its constituent parts has real elements of the gift economy and the public ownership of knowledge so important to Sulston, This is what Barbrook aims to celebrate. It is accompanied by his consistent attack on technological determinism, and an insistence on people-made decisions as to how technology can and should be developed. It follows up his previous attacks on capitalist versions of the Net. By giving us the history of intellectuals thriving on an ahistorical view of the world, and what this view leads to, he has given depth to the critique that began with The Californian Ideology, and provided the tools to see through new versions of the same, however attractively packaged.

    The imaginary future is an area of contestation. Harlan K. Ullman, co-author of Shock and Awe, a man with his own military consultancy business sits on the Advisory Board of the Roosevelt Group, a characteristically Power Elite organization, a mega-consultancy for CEOs and their senior corporate executives who are “charged with leading, indeed inventing the future.� Given how much technological research is financially controlled by military and corporate interests, a grim future is what they have in mind. Imaginary Futures gives us some tools to recognize and contest the flim-flam with which it will be presented as it was in the New York World’s Fair of 1964.

    NOTES

    (1) This was not a wholly new phenomena however. In Mimesis, Eric Auerbach describes a frequent trajectory in Europe between the World Wars, of ultra-leftists to the extreme right.

    (2) The American Journal of Sociology, November 1958. Reprinted in C.Wright Mills and the Power Elite, Beacon Press 1969. Essays collected by G.William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard.

    (3) In his essay in The Crisis of Democracy, Huntington aghast at an excess of democracy makes a plea for cultivating “discouragement and apathy.� He goes on to say “Democracy is only one way of constituting authority, and is not necessarily a universally applicable one. In many situations the claims of expertise, seniority, experience and special talents may override the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority.� And with the brazen cheek for which he is well known goes on to say – this when the budget for waging war on Vietnam was almost limitless – that “a government which lacks authority and which is committed to substantial domestic programmes will have little ability, short of a cataclysmic crisis, to impose on its people the sacrifices which may be necessary to deal with foreign policy problems and defense.�

    (4) Don de Lillo has a fine passage in the Epilogue section of Underground on consciousness and technological outcome financed by the military. The protagonist is watching a weapons demonstration in free enterprise Russia. “Viktor asks me if I’ve ever witnessed a nuclear explosion. No. It is interesting, he says how weapons reflect the soul of the maker. The Soviets always wanted bigger yield, bigger stockpiles. They had to convince themselves they were a superpower. Throw-weight. What is throw-weight? We don’t know exactly but we agree it sounds like hurled bulk, the hurled will of the collective. Soviet long-range missiles had greater throw-weight…
    And the USA, I say…
    It was the US, Viktor says, that designed the neutron bomb. Many buzzing neutrons, very little blast. The perfect capitalist tool. Kill people, spare property.�

    (5) It could be argued that what McLuhan really provides is a vocabulary-led weltanschaung for what was emerging somewhat in the manner of William Gibson’s Neuromancer trilogy, fiction that is also open to various interpretations.

    (6) Co-written with Andy Cameron.

  • Author to Participate in performance of Guy Debord’s The Game of War – 23rd October 2007

    CLASS WARGAMES PRESENTS GUY DEBORD’S THE GAME OF WAR

    Tuesday 23rd October 2007 at 6.00pm

    01zero-one
    Westminster Kingsway College
    Soho Centre
    Peter Street
    London
    W1F 0HS

    (01zero-one’s main entrance is on Hopkins Street)

    Class Wargames

    The Game

    Class Wargames will play Guy Debord’s The Game of War using a replica of his original 1977 design for the board game.

    “Politics is a continuation of war by other means.�

    The Game of War is a Clausewitz simulator: a Napoleonic-era military strategy game where armies must maintain their communications structure to survive – and where victory is achieved by smashing your opponent’s supply network rather than by taking their pieces.

    “The 1789 French Revolution brought great changes in the art of war. Similarly, the establishment of spectacular domination has radically altered the art of government.�

    Debord is celebrated as the leader of the Situationist International and as the author of the searing critique of the media-saturated society of consumer capitalism: The Society of the Spectacle. What is much less well known is that after the May ’68 Revolution, Debord and his partner – Alice Becker-Ho – quit Paris and went to live in a remote French village. Over the next two decades, Debord devoted much of the rest of his life to inventing, refining and promoting what he came to regard as his most important project: The Game of War.

    “Wargames are a continuation of politics by other means.�

    For Debord, The Game of War wasn’t just a game – it was a guide to how people should live their lives within Fordist society. By playing this Clausewitz simulator, revolutionary activists could learn how to fight and win against the oppressors of spectacular society.

    “An untrained militant would only be an object of embarrassment to the vanguard.”

    Now, in 2007, Debord’s fascination with wargames is finally being discovered. Coinciding with the publication by Atlas Press of the English translation of Debord and Becker-Ho’s The Game of War book, Class Wargames in London and the Radical Software Group in New York are playing matches in public and developing their own versions of the game.

    On Tuesday 23rd October, you will have your chance to see The Game of War in action and to question the Class Wargamers about this Clausewitz simulator. Let battle commence!

    The Players

    The members of Class Wargames are:

    Dr. Richard Barbrook, University of Westminster and author.

    Rod Dickinson, University of the West of England and artist.

    Alex Veness, University of Southampton and artist.

    Ilze Black, Waterman’s Art Gallery and artist.

    Fabian Tompsett, London Psychogeographical Association and author.

    Mark Copplestone, Copplestone Castings and figure designer.

    Lucy Blake, designer and e-learning developer.

    Links

    London Games Festival Fringe 2007

    Class Wargames photos

    Atlas Press

    Radical Software Group

  • Author to Host Leiden University Conference – 3rd October 2007

    Dr. Richard Barbrook will host and speak at The Netherlands Conference “The Futures of Digital Technology� at Leiden University in The Netherlands, 3rd October 2007. He joins academics, digital professionals and writers, including popular science fiction writer China Mièville. Please see the attached press release and conference flyer for more information about this event.

    Download the workshop programme (PDF)

    Download the press release (Word)

  • INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY LECTURES

    1POL547
    INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
    SEMESTER 1 2007-2008

    Dr. Richard Barbrook
    Room 408 Wells Street
    Extension 2313
    R.Barbrook (a) wmin.ac.uk

    Option: International Political Economy

    Code: 1POL547

    Staff: Richard Barbrook and Nik Howard

    Time and Location: Thursdays 2.00pm – 5.00pm
    Fyvie Lecture Theatre

    Assessment Scheme: Essay (2,500 – 3,000 words): 30%
    Unseen Examination: 70%

    Assessment Criteria: Full Details in your handbook.

    Synopsis: Criteria for grading assessed work will include the following:

    Structure and Quality of Argument
    Use of Evidence
    Contents
    Writing, Presentation and Communication Skills

    Assignment Deadline: Tuesday 8th January 2008

    Office Hours: Please email or phone to make an appointment

    Room 408 Wells Street

    Website: http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/author/ipe/

    There is a link in the blogroll on the bottom right-hand side of the Imaginary Futures website.

    Key text: Meghnad Desai, Marx’s Revenge: the resurgence of capitalism and the death of statist socialism, Verso, London 2002.

    The quickest and easiest way to obtain a copy of this book is from abebooks.

    Essay Questions

    LECTURE PROGRAMME

    1. 27th September
    Introduction: What is International Political Economy and why does it determine your life? (RB)

    2. 4th October
    The Lessons of History: the East Asian miracle and Japan’s bubble economy of the late 1980s. (NH)

    3. 11th October
    The 18th and 19th Century Theories of the Global Political Economy: Liberalism versus Nationalism versus Marxism. (RB)

    4. 18th October
    The 20th Century Theories of the Global Political Economy:
    Leninism versus Keynesianism versus Neo-Liberalism. (RB)

    5. 25th October
    Theory into Practice: North Korea and South Korea. (NH)

    6. 1st November
    Building the World Market: the rise and fall of the British empire 1649– 1914. (RB)

    7. 8th November
    Private Study Week

    8. 15th November
    Managing the Global Economy: the ascendancy and decline of the American empire 1914-2007. (RB)

    9. 22nd November
    Money as Command: chaos and order in the international financial system. (RB)

    10. 29th November
    The Carbon Economy: the affluent society and the limits to growth. (RB)

    11. 6th December
    The Global Village: the Net as dotcom capitalism and cybernetic communism. (RB)

    12. 13th December
    Think Locally, Act Globally: beyond the neo-liberal paradigm. (RB)

    READING LIST

    Michel Aglietta, M. (1979) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the US experience, Verso, London.

    Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism vs. Capitalism, Four Wall Eight Windows, New York.

    Ambrose, S. (1971) Rise to Globalism: American foreign policy 1938-1970, Penguin, London.

    Aoki Masahiko, Kim Hyung-ki and Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro (eds.) (1998) The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Oxford University Press. New York.

    Atkinson, B and Johns S (2001) Studying Economics, Palgrave.

    Bacevich, A. (2002) American Empire: the realities and consequences of U.S. diplomacy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.

    Barbrook, R. (1990) ‘Mistranslations: Lipietz in London and Paris’, http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/2007/02/01/mistranslations-lipietz-in-london-and-paris-by-richard-barbrook/

    Barbrook, R. (2006) The Class of the New, Open Mute, http://www.theclassofthenew.net

    Barbrook, R. (2007), Imaginary Futures: from artificial intelligence to the global village, Pluto, London, http://www.imaginaryfutures.net

    Bell, D. (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: a venture in social forecasting, Basic Books, New York.

    Walden, B. and Rosenfeld, S. (1992) Dragons in Distress: Asia’s Miracle Economies in Crisis, Penguin Books. London.

    Berry, C. (1997) Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

    Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defence of Globalisation, Oxford University Press.

    Brenner, R. (2002) The Boom and the Bubble: the US in the world economy, Verso, London.

    Buchan, J. (2006) Adam Smith and The Pursuit of Perfect Liberty, Profile.

    Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G. (1993) British Imperialism: innovation and expansion 1688-1914, Longman, London.

    Cassidy, J. (2002) dot.con: the greatest story ever sold, Penguin, London.

    Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society: the information age – economy, society and culture volume 1, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Chiu, Stephen W.K. and So, Alvin Y. (1995) East Asia and the World Economy, Sage Publications. California, London and New Delhi.

    Crump, J. (2003) Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism, Routledge/Curzon. Richmond, England.

    Cumings, B. (2004) North Korea: Another Country, New Press.

    Meadows, D and the Club of Rome (1972) The Limits to Growth, Earth Island, London.

    Desai, M. (2002) Marx’s Revenge: the resurgence of capitalism and the death of statist socialism, Verso, London.

    Diamond, J (1997) Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, New York: Norton.

    Earle E M (ed) Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, The Economic Foundations of Military Power, Makers of Modern Strategy.

    Eckert, C. J. et al. (1990) Korea Old and New: A History, Ilchokak Publishers. Seoul.

    Economides, S and Wilson, P (2001) The Economic Factor in International Relations.

    Fallows, J. (1994) Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System, Vintage.

    Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class: and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life, Basic, New York.

    Frieden, J and Lake, D (eds) (2001) International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, New York: St Martins Press.

    Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London.

    Galbraith, J.K. (1961) The Great Crash 1929, Penguin, London.

    Galbraith, J.K. (1970) The Affluent Society, Penguin, London.

    Gilpin, R (2001) Global Political Economy, Princeton University Press.

    Gittings, J. (2006) The Changing Face of China: from Mao to market, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Godard, R and Cronin, P (ed) (2003) International Political Economy, Palgrave.

    Gruber, H. (1991) Red Vienna: experiment in working-class culture 1919-1934, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Gundar Frank, A. (1969) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: historical studies of Chile and Brazil, Monthly Review, New York.

    Halliday, J. and McCormack, G. (1973) Japanese Imperialism Today: ‘Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia’, Penguin Books.

    Harris, N. (1987) The End of the Third World: newly industrialising countries and the decline of an ideology, Penguin, London.

    Hayek, F. A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom, Routledge, London.

    Held, D and McGrew, A. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Helleiner, E. (1994) States and the Re-Emergence of Global Finance, Cornell.

    Hersh, J. (1993) The USA and the Rise of East Asia since 1945: Dilemmas of the Postwar International Political Economy, Macmillan, London.

    Hettine, B. (ed) (2001) International Political Economy, London: Zed Books.

    Hilferding, R. (1981) Finance Capital: a study of the latest phase of capitalist development, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

    Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (2000) Globalisation in Question, Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Hobsbawm, E. (1968) Industry and Empire: an economic history of Britain since 1750, Penguin, London.

    Hobson, J.A. (1902) Imperialism: a study, George Allen & Unwin, London.

    Huntington, S. (2002) The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Free Press, London.

    Hyam, R. (2002) Britain’s Imperial Century 1815-1914: a study of empire and expansion, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

    Irwin, D. A. (1996) Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton University Press.

    Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford University Press.

    Jones, G. S. (2005) An End to Poverty: A Historical Debate, Profile Books.

    Kalecki, M. (1972) The Last Phase in the Transformation of Capitalism, Monthly Review, New York.

    Kant, I. (1983 ) ‘To Perpetual Peace: a philosophical sketch’, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Hackett, Indianapolis, pages 107-143.

    Kelly, K. (1998) New Rules for the New Economy: 10 ways that the network economy is changing everything, Fourth Estate, London.

    Kennedy, P. (1989) The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana, London.

    Keynes, J.M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, MacMillan, London.

    Kihl, Young Whan, ed (1994) Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado.

    Krugman, P. (November 1994). “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle: A Cautionary Fable�. Foreign Affairs.

    Landes, D. (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, New York: W W Norton.

    Lenin, V.I. (1965) Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism, Progress, Moscow.

    Lipietz, A. (1987) Mirages and Miracles: the crises of global Fordism, Verso, London.

    Luxemburg, R. (1963) The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge, London.

    Madison, A (2001) The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD 2001.

    Mandel, E. (1980) Long Waves of Capitalist Development, CUP, Cambridge.

    Mao, Z. (1967) ‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society’, Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, pages 13-21.

    Marx, K. (1976) Capital Volume 1: a critique of political economy, Penguin, London.

    Marx, K. (1978) Capital Volume 2: a critique of political economy, Penguin/New Left Review, London.

    Marx, K. (1981) Capital Volume 3: a critique of political economy, Penguin/New Left Review, London.
    McLean, B. and Elkind, P. (2004) The Smartest Guys in the Room: the amazing rise and scandalous fall of Enron, Portfolio, New York.

    McLuhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media: the extensions of man, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

    Meiskens Wood, E. (2003) Empire of Capital, Verso, London.

    von Mises, L. (1947) Planned Chaos, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-On-Hudson.
    Negri, T. (1988) ‘Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State’, Revolution Retrieved: selected writings on Marx, Keynes, capitalist crisis & new social subjects 1967-83, Red Notes, London, pages 9-42.

    Negri T. and Hardt, M. (2000) Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.

    Ocalan, A. (2007) Prison Writings: the roots of civilisation, Pluto, London.

    Odell, J. S. (2000) Negotiating the World Economy, Cornell University Press.

    Okina Y., Shirakawa M., and Shiratsuka S., ‘The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons’, Monetary and Economic Studies (February 2001).

    Pilbeam, K. (2006) Finance and Financial Markets, Palgrave.

    Phillips, N. (2006) Globalising International Political Economy, Palgrave.

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    Schuster, London.

    Ricardo, D. (1911) The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Everyman, London.

    Richardson, B. (1997) Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

    Ridderstråle, J. and Nordström, K. (2000) Funky Business: talent makes capital dance, ft.com, London.

    Roberts, P. (2004) The End of Oil, Bloomsbury.

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    Rubin, I.I. (1979) A History of Economic Thought, Ink Links, London.

    Sachs, J. (2005) The End of Poverty, Penguin.

    Scholte, J. (2000) Globalisation, Critical Introduction, London: Macmillan.

    Schumpeter, J. (1976) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper, New York.

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    Szporluk, R. (1988) Communism & Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, OUP, Oxford.

    Todd, T. (2004) After the Empire: the breakdown of the American order, Constable, London.

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    PERIODICALS

    The Economist
    Capital & Class
    Journal of Political Economy
    International Studies Perspectives
    The World Economy
    Third World Quarterly
    Race and Class
    New Left Review
    Journal of World Trade
    OPEC Review
    Asian Pacific Review
    World Development
    The Journal of Asian Studies
    The Journal of Japanese Studies
    Japan Forum

    WEBSITES

    http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
    http://www.iccwbo.org/
    http://www.europa.eu.int
    http://worldbank.org/
    http://eldis.org/
    http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/
    http://www.newunionism.net/
    http://www.un.org/climatechange/
    http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk
    https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

    Assignment

    Answer ONE question, typed in 12 point or above and approximately 2,500 words in length.

    Submit to the Assessment Letterbox in the SSHL Undergraduate Office, Wells Street by 6.00pm, Tuesday 8th January 2008.

    Severe penalties will apply to late entries.

  • Cronopis Associats Interview

    Andrés Lomeña of Cronopis Associats interviewed Richard Barbrook on 13th September 2007.

    Question 1

    AL: Franco Bifo Berardi criticises your The Holy Fools. In his opinion, you simplify the rhizomatic thought of Deleuze and Guattari, making equal it to technonomadism and The Californian Ideology. Berardi argues that the state cannot solve the self-organisational structure of the Net. My question is: what ethical and aesthetic paradigm should we take for Internet given that the May ’68 Revolution was defeated?

    RB: Bifo is attacking me for the very crime which inspired my article! In late-1990s London, Hari Kunzru and others at Wired UK were arguing that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari were proponents of the Californian ideology. Knowing these gurus’ political history and theoretical writings, I was curious as to why it was so easy to confuse their particular brand of hippie leftism with its apparent opposite: dotcom neo-liberalism. A decade earlier, an anarchist comrade who was running a pirate radio station in Paris had jokingly told me that Deleuze and Guattari – and their milieu – should be called the “Pol Pot tendencyâ€?. Michel Foucault only a few years earlier had been praising the Islamist seizure of power in Iran as a revolution against modernity. When D&G fantasised about nomads destroying the city in A Thousand Plateaus, they – scarily – did mean what they were saying! In The Holy Fools, I tried to explain this intellectual paradox: these prophets of hardcore anti-modernism had provided the theoretical tools for their own post-modernist recuperation. As Bifo’s loud protests demonstrate, there is obviously an embarrassing similarity between New Left anti-statism and New Right anti-statism. Much more seriously, D&G were also proponents of a post-structuralist approach which is completely compatible with the tenets of McLuhanism. Information – not humanity – is the subject of history. Artists and intellectuals are the new class of the new. So maybe it wasn’t so surprising that D&G’s vision of the Net was so easily misinterpreted as a celebration of the dominant imaginary future of the American empire: the information society…

    Question 2

    AL: You are really witty when you quote and analyse Eric S. Raymond’s essays. You are the first one. It demonstrates that you study the phenomena of Internet from inside, without keeping your distance; we need to contaminate ourselves to talk about Net (the metaphor would be: “we cannot talk about dirtiness if we do not get dirty�). In my opinion, there is a maladjustment between the generations. Are there more hopes with our generation, totally immersed in new medias?

    RB: I’m from the punk rock generation – my formative moment was seeing the Sex Pistols and discovering Situationism as a 20-year old student in 1976. When the Net took off in England two decades later, I thought that technology had finally caught up with what me and my mates had been doing for all of our adult lives. In 2007, instead of climbing tower blocks to install pirate transmitters like we did in the 1980s, my students run their radio stations from their bedrooms – and, most wonderfully, have many more listeners than we ever did. Respect! Of course, it is easy for people from my generation to say that the youth aren’t as politically engaged as we were, but the historical moment is very different. If nothing else, today’s 20-somethings have the advantage over us that Leninism is ancient history. In my Imaginary Futures book, I argue that they also possess the privilege of living within the information society. It is difficult to believe that the Net will liberate humanity when almost everyone you know has a broadband connection – and corporate capitalism is more in control of the global economy than it has ever been.

    Question 3

    AL: The New Left sought anarcho-communism, based on gift economy. However, the New Economy of the cyberspace is an advanced way of social democracy: anarcho-communism is sponsored by corporate capital. This seems paradoxical. Is it possible to have a collapse of the system? All of this is quite disconcerting.

    RB: The contemporary symbiosis of cybernetic communism and dotcom capitalism is only a paradox if – like Deleuze – you are anti-Hegelian! However, if you study history, this contradictory phenomenon is unexceptional. The feudal monarchy played a key role in the rise of capitalism and – against its own intentions – destroyed its own patriarchal power. Stalinist states industrialised their economies and – in the process – undermined the social foundations of totalitarian rule. We should not be surprised that corporate capitalism is similarly unaware of its own historical mission. Kevin Kelly in New Rules for the New Economy says that dotcom entrepreneurs should adopt the maxim of “follow the free�: commercialising the innovations of the hi-tech gift economy. But, as the music industry has found out to its cost, the opposite is also taking place: the decommodification of proprietary information. Don’t be disconcerted, enjoy the paradox!

    Question 4

    AL: I would like to read a critical evaluation of Google. What do you think? Do they symbolise a huge change in the recent history of the Net?

    RB: So would I. What is interesting is that Google makes its money out of searches not content. When most of the information on the Net is made by amateurs who work for nothing and pay for their own hosting, then the profit-making point is owning the large numbers of servers needed to catalogue and sort this data. Google is getting rich off what neo-classical economists call a “natural monopoly�: a privatised public utility. I wonder if Bifo disapproves of the French state’s plans to launch a European competitor to this American hegemon?!

    Question 5

    AL: Creative commons modified the map of Internet. Many people think that this licence is a restrictive choice (with a libertarian make up). They would prefer the deregulated situation before Creative Commons. I do not have opinion here. What about you?

    RB: Tellingly, Tim Berners-Lee – the inventor of the web – didn’t release html under a copyleft licence because its provisions were too restrictive. Despite its name, Creative Commons is also a form of private property. If you want to operate within the contemporary economy, this licence does offer some protection against your work being ripped off or being used inappropriately. If you were a cynic, copyleft could also be seen as the last stand of intellectual property lawyers against the decommodification of information on the Net. Imprisoning teenagers for sharing music or movie files with each other is absurd in the 2000s. According to its promoters, Creative Commons is the only way that commercial organisations can sue each other for making money out of what private individuals are doing on a daily basis…

    Question 6

    AL: What do you think about the Technorealism Manifesto? I sort of agree with it. It is very symptomatic of lot of manifestos that I’ve read on the Internet.

    RB: Sweet. We should encourage all signs of resistance in America against the neo-liberal hegemony which dominates that long suffering country.

    Question 7

    AL: Is it possible to have a new Luddite movement in our society (I still remember a Thomas Pynchon’s article where he was really ironic about the Luddites)?

    RB: I’m all in favour of celebrating Luddism as long as we’re talking about the Luddites in early-19th century England. These heroic rebels were founders of the Labour movement in this country. Unfortunately, many on the Left believe the smears of the liberal bourgeoisie against them. Contrary to the dictionary definition, the Luddites were NOT against all new technologies – only those which deskilled and displaced artisanal workers. Spinning Jennies deserved to be smashed – and Jacquard Looms were rightly cherished. If we want to learn from the Luddites, we should welcome technologies which make our work more interesting and our lives more pleasurable…

    Question 8

    AL: We must to extend the political history of Internet into all areas of life. However, the thing is that if we begin transforming cyberspace and then we want to change our society… it seems to me that we are adopting a naive reformism. The Internet is a good battlefield, but it’s not the only field where we can fight, right?

    RB: The Net is a tool not a talisman. When Debord published The Society of the Spectacle in 1967, only the privileged few could make radio and television programmes. Four decades later, anyone with the time and money in the North can broadcast their efforts to a global audience over the Net. Contrary to Debord’s expectations, the smashing of the spectacle didn’t require a proletarian revolution. Does this make us backsliding reformists? Or does it mean that we realise that we live within a historical process which capital and labour – consciously or unconsciously – compete to mould society in their own interest? If we’re lefties, our ambition is to ensure our side is more conscious about what we’re doing than our opponents.

    Question 9

    AL: How do you value the role of John Perry Barlow in the history of the Internet? Everyone can laugh at his neo-liberal utopianism, but he founded the EFF, among other things. Maybe we should consider his Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace like poetry, not like a political programme.

    RB: John Perry Barlow was also Dick Cheney’s campaign manager when he stood for the US Senate in 1978! Conclusion: you can smoke good weed and still be on the wrong side of the barricades.

    Question 10

    AL: Is there anything else that you want to add?

    RB: Check out the website of my new book: http://www.imaginaryfutures.net

  • NEW YORK PROPHECIES: THE IMAGINARY FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

    The Future Is What It Used To Be

    ‘Biological intelligence is fixed, because it is an old, mature paradigm, but the new paradigm of non-biological computation and intelligence is growing exponentially. The crossover will be in the 2020s and after that, at least from a hardware perspective, non-biological computation will dominate…’
    Kurzweil 2004, p. 3.

    At the beginning of the 21st century, the dream of artificial intelligence is deeply embedded within the modern imagination. From childhood onwards, people in the developed world are told that computers will one day be able to reason – and even feel emotions – just like humans. In science fiction stories, thinking machines have long been favourite characters. Audiences have grown up with images of robot buddies like Data in Star Trek TNG and of pitiless monsters like the cyborg in The Terminator (Startrek.com 2005; Cameron 1984). These science fiction fantasies are encouraged by confident predictions from prominent computer scientists. Continual improvements in hardware and software will eventually led to the creation of artificial intelligences more powerful than the ‘biological intelligence’ of the human mind.

    Commercial developers are already looking forward to selling sentient machines which can do the housework and help the elderly (Honda 2004). Some computer scientists even believe that the creation of ‘non-biological intelligences’ is a spiritual quest. In California, Ray Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge and their colleagues are eagerly waiting for the Singularity: the First Coming of the Silicon Messiah (Vinge 1993; Bell 2004). Whether inspired by money or mysticism, all these advocates of artificial intelligence share the conviction that the present must be understood as the future in embryo – and the future illuminates the potential of the present. Every advance in computing technology is heralded as another step towards the creation of a fully conscious machine. The prophecy of artificial intelligence comes closer to fulfilment with the launch of each new piece of software or hardware. It is not what computers can do now that is important but what they are about to do. The present is the beta version of a science fiction dream: the imaginary future.

    Despite its cultural prominence, the meme of sentient machines is vulnerable to theoretical exorcism. Far from being a free-floating signifier, this prophecy is deeply rooted in time and space. Not surprisingly, contemporary boosters of artificial intelligence rarely acknowledge the antiquity of the concept itself. They want to move forwards not look backwards. Yet, it’s over forty years since the dream of thinking machines first gripped the public’s imagination. The imaginary future of artificial intelligence has a long history. Analysing this original version of this prophecy is the precondition for understanding its contemporary iterations. With this motivation in mind, let’s go back to the second decade of the Cold War when the world’s biggest computer company put on a show about the wonders of thinking machines in the financial capital of the most powerful and wealthiest nation on the planet…

    A Millennium Of Progress

    On the 22nd April 1964, the New York World’s Fair was opened to the general public. During the next two years, this modern wonderland welcomed over 51 million visitors. Every section of the American elite was represented at the exposition: the federal government, US state governments, large corporations, financial institutions, industry lobbies and religious groups. The World’s Fair proved that the USA was the leader in everything: consumer goods, democratic politics, show business, modernist architecture, fine art, religious tolerance, domestic living and, above all else, new technology. As one of the exposition’s advertising slogans implied, a ‘millennium of progress’ had culminated in the American century (Stanton, 2004, 2004a; Luce 1941).

    This patriotic message was celebrated in the awe-inspiring displays of new technologies at the World’s Fair. Writers and film-makers had long fantasised about travelling to other worlds. Now, in NASA’s Space Park, the public could admire the huge rockets which had taken American astronauts into orbit (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, p. 208; Laurence 1964, pp. 2-14). Despite its early setback when the Russians launched the first satellite in 1957, the USA was now on the verge of overtaking its rival in the ‘space race’ (Schefter 1999, pp. 145-231). Best of all, visitors to the World’s Fair were told that they too would have the opportunity to become astronauts in their own lifetimes. In the General Motors’ Futurama pavilion, Americans of the 1980s were shown taking their holidays on the moon. (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, p. 222). Other corporations were equally confident that the achievements of the present would soon be surpassed by the triumphs of tomorrow. At its Progressland pavilion, General Electric predicted that electricity generated by nuclear fusion reactors would be ‘too cheap to meter’ (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp. 90-92; Laurence 1964, pp. 40-43). In the imaginary future of the World’s Fair, Americans would not only become space tourists but also be blessed with free energy.

    For many corporations, the most effective method of proving their technological modernity was showcasing a computer. Clairol’s machine selected ‘the most flattering hair shades’ for female visitors and Parker Pen’s mainframe matched American kids with ‘pen pals’ in foreign countries (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp 86, 90). However impressive they might have appeared to their audience, these exhibits were nothing more than advertising gimmicks. In contrast, IBM was able to dedicate its pavilion exclusively to the wonders of computing as a distinct technology. For over a decade, this corporation had been America’s leading mainframe manufacturer. In 1961, one single product – the IBM 1401 – had accounted for a quarter of all the computers operating in the USA (Pugh 1995, pp. 265-267). In the minds of many Americans, IBM was computing. Just before the opening of the World’s Fair, the corporation had launched a series of products which would maintain its dominance over the industry for another two decades: the System/360 (DeLamarter 1986, pp. 54-146). Seizing the opportunity for self-promotion offered by the exposition, the bosses of IBM commissioned a pavilion designed to eclipse all others. Eero Saarinen – the renowned Finnish architect – supervised the construction of the building: a white, corporate-logo-embossed, egg-shaped theatre which was suspended high in the air by 45 rust-coloured metal trees. Underneath this striking feature were interactive exhibits celebrating IBM’s contribution to the computer industry (Stern, Mellins and Fishman 1997, pp. 1046-1047).

    For the theatre itself, Charles and Ray Eames – the couple who epitomised American modernist design – created the main attraction at the IBM pavilion: ‘The Information Machine’. After taking their places in the 500-seat ‘People Wall’, visitors were elevated upwards into the egg-shaped structure. Once inside, a narrator introduced a ‘mind-blowing’ multi-media show about how the machines exhibited in the IBM pavilion were forerunners of the sentient machines of the future. Computers were in the process of acquiring consciousness. (Editors of Time-Life Books 1964, pp. 70-74; Laurence 1964, pp. 57-58). In the near future, every American would own a devoted mechanical servant just like Robby the Robot in the popular 1956 sci-fi film Forbidden Planet (Wilcox 1999). At the New York World’s Fair, IBM proudly announced that this dream of artificial intelligence was finally about to be realised. With the launch of the System/360 series, mainframes were now powerful enough to construct the prototypes of a fully conscious computer.

    The IBM pavilion’s stunning combination of avant-garde architecture and multi-media performance was a huge hit with both the press and the public. Alongside space rockets and nuclear reactors, the computer had confirmed its place as one of the three iconic technologies of modern America. The ideological message of these machines was clear-cut: the present was the future in embryo. Within at the IBM pavilion, computers existed in two time frames at once. On the one hand, the current models on display were prototypes of the sentient machines of the future. On the other hand, the vision of computer consciousness showed the true potential of the mainframes exhibited in the IBM pavilion. At the 1964 New York World’s Fair, the launch of the System/360 series was celebrated as the harbinger of the imaginary future of artificial intelligence.

    ‘Duplicating the problem-solving and information-handling capabilities of the [human] brain is not far off; it would be surprising if it were not accomplished within the next decade.’
    Simon, p. 39.

    Inventing the Thinking Machine

    The futurist fantasies of IBM’s multi-media show were inspired by the dispassionate logic of the academy. Alan Turing – the founding father of computer science – had defined the development of artificial intelligence as the long-term goal of this new discipline. In the mid-1930s, this Cambridge mathematician had published the seminal article which described the abstract model for a programmable computer: the ‘universal machine’ (Turing 2004). During the Second World War, his team of engineers had created a pioneering electronic calculator to speed up the decryption of German military signals. When the conflict was over, Turing moved to Manchester University to join a team of researchers who were building a programmable machine. As proposed in his 1936 article, software would be used to enable the hardware to perform a variety of different tasks. On 21st June 1948, before he’d even taken up his new post, Turing’s colleagues switched on the world’s first electronic stored-program computer: Baby. The theoretical concept described in an academic journal had taken material form as an enormous metal box filled with valves, switches, wires and dials. (Turing 2004a; Agar 2001 pp. 3-5, 113-124; Hodges 1992, pp. 314-402).

    For Turing, Baby was much more than just an improved version of the office tabulator. When software could control hardware, counting became consciousness. In a series of seminal articles, Turing argued that his mathematical machine was the precursor of an entirely new life form: the mechanical mathematician. He backed up this prediction by defining human intelligence as what computers could do. Since calculating was a sophisticated type of thinking, calculating machines must be able to think. If children acquired knowledge through education, educational software could create knowledgeable computers. Because the human brain worked like a machine, it was obvious that a machine could behave like an electronic brain (Turing 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e; Schaffer 2000). According to Turing, although the early computers weren’t yet powerful enough to fulfil their true potential, continual improvements in hardware and software would – sooner or later – overcome these limitations. In the second half of the twentieth-century, computing technology was rapidly evolving towards its preordained destiny: artificial intelligence.

    ‘The memory capacity of the human brain is probably of the order of ten thousand million binary digits. But most of this is probably used in remembering visual impressions, and other comparatively wasteful ways. One might reasonably hope to be able to make some real progress [towards artificial intelligence] with a few million digits [of computer memory].’
    Turing 2004a, p. 393

    In his most famous article, Turing described a test for identifying the winner of this race to the future. Once an observer couldn’t tell whether they were talking with a human or a computer in an on-line conversation, then there was no longer any substantial difference between the two types of consciousness. If the imitation was indistinguishable from the original, the machine must be thinking. The computer had passed the test (Turing 2004c, pp. 441-448; Schaffer 2000). From this point onwards, computers were much more than just practical tools and tradable commodities. As Turing’s articles explained, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence revealed the transformative potential of this new technology. Despite their shortcomings, the current models of computers were forerunners of the sentient machines to come.

    By the late-1940s, the catechism of artificial intelligence had been fixed. Within computing, what was and what will be were one and the same thing. Despite this achievement, Turing was a prophet whose influence was waning within his own country. The computer might have been invented in Britain, but its indebted government lacked the resources to dominate the development of this new technology (Agar 2003, pp. 266-278). Across the Atlantic, the situation was very different. During the Second World War, the American government had also provided generous funding for research into electronic calculation. Crucially, when the victory was won, scientists working on these projects didn’t encounter severe problems in maintaining their funding. While money was scarce in Britain, the USA could easily afford to pay for cutting-edge research into new technologies. Once the Cold War was underway, American politicians had no problem in justifying these subsidies to their constituents (Leslie 1993, pp. 1-13; Lewontin 1997).

    In the USA, computer scientists possessed another major advantage over their British rivals: the meta-theory of cybernetics. During the late-1940s and early-1950s, a group of prominent American intellectuals came together at the Macy conferences to explore ways of breaking down the barriers between the various academic disciplines: (Heims 1991). From the outset, Norbert Wiener was recognised as the guru of this endeavour. While working at MIT, he had devised cybernetics as a new theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of both humans and machines. The input of information about the surrounding environment led to the output of actions designed to transform the environment. Dubbed ‘feedback’, this cycle of stimulus and response reversed the spread of entropy within the universe. Order could be created out of chaos (Wiener 1948, pp. 74-136). According to Wiener, this master theory described all forms of purposeful behaviour. Whether in humans or machines, there was continual feedback between information and action. The same mathematical equations could be used to describe the behaviour of living organisms and technological systems (Wiener 1948, pp. 168-191). Echoing Turing, this theory implied that it was difficult to tell the difference between humans and their machines (Wiener 1948, pp. 21, 32-33). In 1948, Wiener outlined his new master theory in a book filled with pages of mathematical proofs: Cybernetics – or command and control in the animal and the machine.

    Much to his surprise, this academic had written a bestseller. For the first time, a common set of abstract concepts covered both the natural sciences and the social sciences. Wiener‘s text had provided potent metaphors for describing the new hi-tech world of Cold War America. Even if they didn’t understand his mathematical equations, readers could easily recognise cybernetic systems within the social institutions and communication networks which dominated their everyday lives. Feedback, information and systems soon became incorporated into popular speech (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 171-194; Heims 1991, pp. 271-272). Despite this public acclamation, Wiener remained an outsider within the US intelligentsia. Flouting the ideological orthodoxies of Cold War America, this guru was a pacifist and a socialist.

    In the early-1940s, Wiener – like almost every US scientist – had believed that developing weapons to defeat Nazi Germany benefited humanity. When the Cold War started, his military-funded colleagues claimed that their research work was also contributing to the struggle against an aggressive totalitarian enemy (Lewontin 1997). Challenging this patriotic consensus, Wiener argued that American scientists should adopt a very different stance in the confrontation with Russia. He warned that the nuclear arms race could lead to the destruction of humanity. Faced with this dangerous new situation, responsible scientists should refuse to carry out military research (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 237-243, 255-271). During the 1950s and early-1960s, Wiener’s political dissidence inspired his socialist interpretation of cybernetics. In the epoch of corporate monopolies and atomic weaponry, the theory that explained the behaviour of both humans and machines must be used to place humans in control of their machines. Abandoning his earlier enthusiasm for Turing’s prophecy, Wiener now emphasised out the dangers posed by sentient computers (Wiener 1966, pp. 52-60, 1967, pp. 239-254). Above all, this attempt to build artificial intelligences was a diversion from the urgent task of creating social justice and global peace.

    ‘The world of the future will be an ever more demanding struggle against the limitations of our own intelligence, not a comfortable hammock in which we can lie down to be waited upon by our robot slaves.’
    Wiener 1966, p. 69.

    By opposing the militarisation of scientific research, the founder of cybernetics had embarrassed his sponsors among the US elite. Fortunately for the rulers of America, there was another brilliant mathematician at the Macy conferences who was also a fanatical Cold War warrior: John von Neumann. Traumatised by the nationalisation of his family’s bank during the 1919 Hungarian revolution, his anti-communist politics were so extreme that he had argued in the mid-1940s in favour of launching a pre-emptive war to stop Russia acquiring nuclear weapons (Heims 1980, pp. 235-236, 244-251). While playing a leading role in developing the atomic bomb, von Neumann had already applied his mathematical and organisational talents to the new field of computing. When the first Macy conference was held in 1946, his team of researchers were working on building a prototype mainframe for the US navy (Ceruzzi 2003, pp. 21-4). In von Neumann, the American empire had found a guru without any trace of heresy.

    At the early Macy conferences, the political differences among its attendees weren’t apparent. United by the anti-fascist struggle, Wiener and von Neumann could champion the same concept of cybernetics (Conway and Siegelman 2005, pp. 143-149; Heims 1980, pp. 201-207). But, as their politics diverged, these two stars of Macy conferences began advocating rival interpretations of this meta-theory. In its left-wing version, artificial intelligence was denounced as the apotheosis of technological domination. When he formulated his right-wing remix, von Neumann took cybernetics in exactly the opposite direction. Above all, his interpretation emphasised that this master theory had been inspired by the prophecy of thinking machines. Back in the mid-1930s, Turing had briefly worked with von Neumann at Princeton. A decade before his own involvement in computing, this Hungarian scientist had known all about the idea of the universal machine. When two Chicago psychologists in the early-1940s applied Turing’s theory to explain the processes of human thought, von Neumann became fascinated by the implications of their speculations.

    Since the mechanical calculator was modelled on the human brain, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts argued that consciousness was synonymous with calculation. Like the electrical contacts of an IBM tabulator, neurons were switches which transmitted information in binary form (McCulloch and Pitts 1943). Entranced by this inversion of Turing’s line of argument, von Neumann became convinced that it was theoretically possible to build a thinking machine. If neurons acted as switches within the human brain, valves could be used to create an electronic brain (von Neumann 1966, pp. 43-46, 1976, pp. 308-311). When he was working on computer research for the US military, von Neumann used the human brain as the model for his eponymous computer architecture. Echoing Turing, this prophet claimed that – as the number of valves in a computer approached those of the neurons in the brain – the machine would be able to think (von Neumann 1966, pp. 36-41, 1976, pp. 296-300, 2000, pp. 39-52). Within a decade, von Neumann and his colleagues would be equipping the US military with cybernetic soldiers capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war.

    ‘Dr. McCulloch: How about designing computing machines so that if they were damaged in air raids … they could replace parts … and continue to work?
    Dr. von Neumann: These are really quantitative rather than qualitative questions.’
    von Neumann 1976, p. 324

    By the early-1950s, the USA’s academic and corporate research teams had seized the leadership of computing from their British rivals. From then onwards, all of the most advanced machines were made-in-America (Ceruzzi 2003, pp. 13-46). Yet, by creating cybernetics without Wiener, von Neumann had ensured that these US laboratories would also follow Turing’s path to the imaginary future: building artificial intelligence. The metaphor of feedback now proved that computers operated like humans. Inputs of information led to outputs of action. If the mind operated like a machine, then it must be possible to develop a machine which duplicated the functions of the mind. Computers could already calculate faster than their human inventors. Mastering the complexities of mathematical logic must be the first step towards endowing these machines with the other attributes of human consciousness. Language was a set of rules which could be codified as software. Learning from new experiences could be programmed into hardware (Minsky, 2004, 2004a). Throughout the 1950s and early-1960s, American scientists worked hard to build the thinking machine. Once it had enough processing power, the computer would achieve consciousness. (Edwards 1996, pp. 239-273). When IBM launched its System/360 mainframe at the 1964 World’s Fair, Turing’s dream appeared to be close to realisation.

    Cold War Computing

    A quarter of a century earlier, one of the stars of the 1939 New York World’s Fair had been Electro: a robot which – according to its publicists – ‘… could walk, talk, count on its fingers, puff a cigarette, and distinguish between red and green with the aid of a photoelectric cell’ (Eames and Eames 1973, p. 105). For all its fakery, this exhibit was the first iteration of the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. Before the 1939 World’s Fair, robots in books and movies had almost always been portrayed as Frankenstein monsters intent on destroying their human creators (Shelley 1969; Lang 2003). Inspired by his visits to the exposition, Isaac Asimov decided to change this negative image. Just like Electro, the robots in his sci-fi stories were safe and friendly products of a large corporation (Asimov, 1968, 1968a). By the time that the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, this positive image of artificial intelligence had become one of the USA’s most popular imaginary futures. In both science fiction and science fact, the robot servant was the symbol of better times to come.

    At the 1939 New York World’s Fair, Electro was competing against the technological icon of the moment: the motor car. The must-see attractions were Democracity – a model featured in the New York State’s Perisphere building – and Futurama – a diorama inside the General Motors’ pavilion. Both exhibits promoted a vision of an affluent and hi-tech America of the 1960s. In this imaginary future, the majority of population lived in family homes in the suburbs and commuted to work in their own motor cars (Exposition Publications 1939, pp. 42-45, 207-209). For most visitors to the 1939 New York World’s Fair, this prophecy of consumer prosperity must have seemed like a utopian dream. The American economy was still recovering from the worst recession in the nation’s history, Europe was on the brink of another devastating civil war and East Asia was already engulfed by murderous conflicts. Yet, by the time that the 1964 World’s Fair opened, the most famous prediction of the 1939 exposition had been realised. However sceptical visitors might have been back in 1939, the Democracity and Futurama dioramas seemed remarkably prescient twenty-five years later. By the early-1960s, America was a suburban-dwelling, car-owning consumer society. The imaginary future had become contemporary reality.

    ‘The motor car … directs [social] behaviour from economics to speech. Traffic circulation is one of the main functions of a society … Space [in urban areas] is conceived in terms of motoring needs and traffic problems take precedence over accommodation … it is a fact that for many people the car is perhaps the most substantial part of their ‘living conditions’.’
    Lefebvre 1984, p. 100.

    Since the predictions of the 1939 exposition had largely come true, visitors to the 1964 New York World’s Fair could have been forgiven for believing that its three main imaginary futures would also be realised. Who could doubt that – by 1990 at the latest – the majority of Americans would be enjoying the delights of space tourism and unmetered electricity? Best of all, they would be living in a world where sentient machines were their devoted servants. However, the American public’s confidence in these imaginary futures would have been founded upon a mistaken sense of continuity. Despite being held on the same site and having many of the same exhibitors, the 1964 World’s Fair had a very different focus from its 1939 antecedent. Twenty-five years earlier, the centrepiece of the exposition had been the motor car: a mass produced consumer product. In contrast, the stars of the show at the 1964 World’s Fair were state-funded technologies for fighting the Cold War. Computers calculated the trajectories which would guide American missiles armed with nuclear bombs to destroy Russian cities and their unfortunate inhabitants (Isaacs and Dowling 1998, pp. 230-243). While its 1939 predecessor had showcased motorised transportation for the masses, the stars of the 1964 World’s Fair were the machines of atomic armageddon.

    When the IBM pavilion was being designed, the corporation had to deal with this public relations problem. Like nuclear reactors and space rockets, computers had also been developed as Cold War weaponry. ENIAC – the first prototype mainframe built in America – was a machine for calculating tables to improve the accuracy of artillery guns (Ceruzzi 2003, p. 15). From the early-1950s onwards, IBM’s computer division was focused on winning orders from the Department of Defence (Pugh 1995, pp. 167-172). Using mainframes supplied by the corporation, the US military prepared for nuclear war, organised invasions of ‘unfriendly’ countries, directed the bombing of enemy targets, paid the wages of its troops, ran complex war games and managed its supply chain (Berkeley 1962, pp. 56-7, 59-60, 137-145). Thanks to the American taxpayers, IBM had become the technological leader of the computer industry.

    When the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, IBM was still closely involved in a wide variety of military projects. Yet, its pavilion was dedicated to promoting the sci-fi fantasy of thinking machines. Like the predictions of unmetered energy and space tourism, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence distracted visitors at the World’s Fair from discovering the original motivation for developing IBM’s mainframes: killing millions of Russian civilians. Although the superpowers’ imperial hegemony depended upon atomic weapons, the threat of global annihilation made their possession increasingly problematic. Two years earlier, the USA and Russia had almost blundered into a catastrophic war over Cuba (Dallek 2003, pp. 535-574). Despite disaster being only narrowly averted, the superpowers were incapable of stopping the arms race. In the bizarre logic of the Cold War, the prevention of an all-out confrontation between the two blocs depended upon the continual growth in the number of nuclear weapons held by both sides. The ruling elites of the USA and Russia had difficulties in admitting to themselves – let alone to their citizens – the deep irrationality of this new form of military competition. In a rare moment of lucidity, American analysts invented an ironic acronym for this high-risk strategy of ‘mutually assured destruction’: MAD (Isaacs and Dowling 1998, pp. 230-243; Kahn 1960, pp. 119-189).

    Not surprisingly, the propagandists of both sides justified the enormous waste of resources on the arms race by promoting the peaceful applications of the leading Cold War technologies. By the time that the 1964 New York World’s Fair opened, the weaponry of genocide had been successfully repackaged into people-friendly products. Nuclear power would soon be providing unmetered energy for everyone. Space rockets would shortly be taking tourists for holidays on the moon. Almost all traces of the military origins of these technologies had disappeared. Similarly, in the IBM pavilion, the System/360 mainframe was promoted as the harbinger of artificial intelligence. Visitors were expected to admire the technological achievements of the corporation not to question its dubious role in the arms race. The horrors of the Cold War present had been hidden by the marvels of the imaginary future.

    IBM’s ideological legerdemain was made much easier by one of the distinguishing features of industrial modernity: the breaking of the explicit links between products and their producers. For millennia, warriors and priests had overtly extracted the surpluses of the peasantry for their own benefit. But, when Europeans started to privatise land ownership and mechanise handicraft production, a new – and more advanced – economic system was born: liberal capitalism. Entrepreneurs proved that price competition could indirectly coordinate human labour much more efficiently than the direct methods of feudalism. Adventurers discovered that selling commodities in the world market was much more profitable than rack-renting peasants in one locality. For the first time in human history, the productive potential of collective labour was being realised (Smith 1976, pp. 1-287, 401-445; Marx 1976, pp. 762-940).

    In this new economy, people were required to interact with each other through things: commodities, money and capital. The distribution and division of labour across the economy was regulated by the prices and wages set by market competition. However, the demise of the aristocracy and the priesthood hadn’t ended class rule. When labour was bought and sold in the capitalist economy, equality within the marketplace resulted in inequality inside the workplace (Marx 1976, pp. 270-280; Rubin 1972, pp. 77-253). Because commodities were exchanged with others of equivalent value, this new form of class rule was very different from its predecessor. Indirect exploitation had replaced direct domination. Above all, the impersonal movements of the markets now determined the destiny of individuals. Things not people now ruled the world.

    ‘The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists … simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of [women and] men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relations of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers.’
    Marx 1976, pp. 164-165

    The growth of capitalism created a much more complex division of labour within the economy. In parallel with the proliferation of factory and office jobs, scientific research also emerged as a distinct profession (Bahr 1980; Smith 1976, pp. 7-16). Successful firms grew by not only employing more workers but also investing in new machinery. In the fetishised world of capitalism, the growth in productivity caused by the increasingly sophisticated cooperation of factory labour and scientific research was expressed as the development of cutting-edge technologies. With human creativity hidden behind the commodity, the process of modernity had acquired a highly visible object as its subject: the ‘… automatic system of machinery … a moving power that moves itself.’ (Marx 1973, p. 692).

    During the mid-twentieth century, the fetishisation of technology reached its apotheosis in the prophecy of artificial intelligence. Living in a society where new machinery appeared to be the driving force of social evolution, Turing and von Neumann’s claim that machines were evolving into living beings didn’t seem outlandish. When computers were operating, the labour involved in developing their hardware and writing their programs wasn’t immediately visible. Mesmerised by technological fetishism, the admirers of Turing and von Neumann had convinced themselves that an electronic brain would soon be able to think just like a human brain. In 1964, the calculating power of the System/360 mainframe was so great that this IBM machine seemed be on the threshold of consciousness. The creation was about to become the creator.

    Cybernetic Supremacy

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, imaginary futures temporarily succeeded in concealing the primary purpose of its three iconic technologies from the American public. But even the flashiest showmanship couldn’t hide dodgy use values forever. As the decades passed, none of the predictions made at the World’s Fair about the key Cold War technologies were realised. Energy remained metered, tourists didn’t visit the moon and computers never became intelligent. Unlike the prescient vision of motoring for the masses at the 1939 World’s Fair, the prophecies about the star technologies of the 1964 exposition seemed almost absurd twenty-five years later. Hyper-reality had collided with reality – and lost.

    Despite the failure of its prophecy, IBM suffered no damage. In stark contrast with nuclear power and space travel, computing was the Cold War technology which successfully escaped from the Cold War. Right from the beginning, machines made for the US military were also sold to commercial clients (Pugh 1995, pp. 152-155). By the time that IBM built its pavilion for the 1964 World’s Fair, the imaginary future of artificial intelligence had to hide more than the unsavoury military applications of computing. Commodity fetishism also performed its classic function of concealing the role of human labour within production. Computers were described as ‘thinking’ so the hard work involved in designing, building, programming and operating them could be discounted. Above all, the prophecy of artificial intelligence obscured the role of technological innovation within American workplaces.

    The invention of computers came at an opportune moment for big business. During the first half of the twentieth century, large corporations had become the dominant institutions of the American economy. Henry Ford’s giant car factory became the eponymous symbol of the new social paradigm: Fordism (Ford and Crowther 1922; Aglietta 1979). When it boosted their profits, corporations replaced the indirect regulation of production by markets with direct supervision by bureaucrats. As the wage-bill for white-collar employees steadily rose, businesses needed increasing amounts of equipment to raise productivity within the office. Long before the invention of the computer, Fordist corporations were running an information economy with tabulators, typewriters and other types of office equipment (Beniger 1986, pp. 291-425). However, by the beginning of the 1950s, the mechanisation of clerical labour had stalled. Increases in productivity in the office were lagging well behind those in the factory. When the first computers appeared on the market, corporate managers quickly realised that the new technology offered a solution to this pressing problem (Sobel 1981, pp. 95-184). The work of large numbers of tabulator operators could now be done by a much smaller group of engineers using a mainframe (Berkeley 1962, p. 5). Even better, the new technology of computing enabled capitalists to deepen their control over their organisations. Much more information about many more topics could now be collected and processed in increasingly complex ways. The managers were masters of all that they surveyed.

    Almost from its first appearance in the workplace, the mainframe was caricatured – with good reason – as the mechanical perfection of bureaucratic tyranny. In Asimov’s sci-fi stories, Mr and Mrs Average were the owners of robot servants. Yet, when the first computers arrived in America’s factories and offices, this new technology was controlled by the bosses not the workers. In 1952, Kurt Vonnegut published a sci-fi novel which satirised the authoritarian ambitions of corporate computing. In his dystopian future, the ruling elite had delegated the management of society to an omniscient artificial intelligence.

    ‘EPICAC XIV … decided how many [of] everything America and her customers could have and how much they would cost. And it … would decide how many engineers and managers and … civil servants, and of what skills, would be needed to deliver the goods; and what I.Q. and aptitude levels would separate the useful men [and women] from the useless ones, and how many … could be supported at what pay level…’
    Vonnegut 1969, p. 106.

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, the IBM pavilion promised that thinking machines would be the servants of all of humanity. Yet, at the same time, its sales personnel were telling the bosses of large corporations that computers were hard-wiring bureaucratic authority into modern society. Herbert Simon – one of America’s leading management theorists and a former colleague of von Neumann – foresaw that the increasing power of mainframes would enable companies to automate more and more clerical tasks. Just like in the factory, machines were taking over from human labour in the office. When artificial intelligence arrived, mainframes would almost completely replace bureaucratic and technical labour within manufacturing. The ultimate goal was the creation of the fully automated workplace. Companies would then no longer need either blue-collar or white-collar workers to make products or provide services. Even most managers would become surplus to requirements. Instead, thinking machines would be running the factories and offices of America (Simon 1965, pp. 26-52). In the imaginary future of artificial intelligence, the corporation and the computer would be one and the same thing.

    This prediction was founded upon von Neumann’s conservative interpretation of cybernetics. In his management theory texts, Simon argued that the workings of a firm resembled the operations of a computer. As in McCulloch and Pitts’ psychology, this identification was made in two directions. Managing workers was equated with programming a computer. Writing software was like drawing up a business plan. Both employees and machinery were controlled by orders issued from above. The workers’ dystopia of Big Brother mainframe had now mutated into the capitalist utopia of cybernetic Fordism. Ironically, the credibility of Simon’s managerial ideology depended upon his readers forgetting the fierce criticisms of corporate computing made by the founding father of systems theory. Echoing Marx, Wiener had warned that the primary role of new technology under capitalism was to intensify the exploitation of the workers. Instead of creating more leisure time and improving living standards, the computerisation of the economy under Fordism would increase unemployment and cut wages (Wiener 1967, pp. 206-221). If Vonnegut’s dystopia was to be avoided, American trade unionists and political activists must mobilise against the corporate Golem (Wiener 1966, pp. 54-55). According to Wiener, cybernetics proved that artificial intelligence threatened the freedoms of humanity.

    ‘Let us remember that the automatic machine … is the precise equivalent of slave labour. Any labour which competes with slave labour must accept the economic conditions of slave labour.’
    Wiener 1967, p. 220.

    For business executives, Vonnegut and Wiener’s nightmare was their computer daydream. However, this corporate vision of cybernetic Fordism meant forgetting the history of Fordism itself. This economic paradigm had been founded upon the successful co-ordination of mass production with mass consumption. Ironically, since these exhibits were more closely connected to social reality, Democracity and Futurama in 1939 provided a much more accurate prediction of the development path of computing than the IBM pavilion did in 1964. Just like motor cars twenty-five years earlier, this new technology was also slowly being transformed from a rare, hand-made machine into a ubiquitous, factory-produced commodity. As in the Ford factories, IBM’s System/360 mainframes were manufactured on assembly-lines (Pugh, Johnson and Palmer 1991, pp. 87-105, 204-210). These opening moves towards the mass production of computers anticipated what would be most important advance in this sector twenty-five years later: the mass consumption of computers. In its formal design, the 1964 System/360 mainframe was a bulky and expensive prototype of the much smaller and cheaper IBM PCs of 1989.

    The imaginary future of artificial intelligence was a way of avoiding thinking about the likely social consequences of the widespread ownership of computers. In the early-1960s, Big Brother mainframe belonged to big government and big business. Above all, feedback was knowledge of the ruled monopolised by the rulers. However, as Wiener had pointed out, Fordist production would inevitably transform expensive mainframes into cheap commodities (Wiener 1967, pp. 210-211). In turn, increasing ownership of computers was likely to disrupt the existing social order. For the feedback of information within human institutions was most effective when it was two-way (Wiener 1967, pp. 67-73). By reconnecting conception and execution, cybernetic Fordism threatened the social hierarchies which underpinned Fordism itself.

    ‘… the simple coexistence of two items of information is of relatively small value, unless these two items can be effectively combined in some mind … which is able to fertilises one by means of the other. This is the very opposite of the organisation which every member travels a preassigned
    path ɉ۪
    Wiener 1967, p. 172.

    At the 1964 World’s Fair, this possibility was definitely not part of IBM’s imaginary future. Rather than aiming to produce ever greater numbers of more efficient machines at cheaper prices, the corporation was focused on steadily increasing the capabilities of its computers to preserve its near-monopoly over the military and corporate market. Instead of room-sized machines shrinking down into desktops, laptops and, eventually, mobile phones, IBM was convinced that computers would always be large and bulky mainframes. The corporation fervently believed that – if this path of technological progress was extrapolated – artificial intelligence must surely result. Crucially, this conservative recuperation of cybernetics implied that sentient machines would inevitably evolve into lifeforms which were more advanced than mere humans. The Fordist separation between conception and execution would have achieved its technological apotheosis.

    Not surprisingly, IBM was determined to counter this unsettling interpretation of its own futurist propaganda. At the 1964 World’s Fair, the corporation’s pavilion emphasised the utopian possibilities of computing. Yet, despite its best efforts, IBM couldn’t entirely avoid the ambiguity inherent within the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. This fetishised ideology could only appeal to all sections of American society if computers fulfilled the deepest desires of both sides within the workplace. Therefore, in the exhibits at its pavilion, IBM promoted a single vision of the imaginary future which combined two incompatible interpretations of artificial intelligence. On the one hand, workers were told that all their needs would be satisfied by sentient robots: servants who never tired, complained or questioned orders. On the other hand, capitalists were promised that their factories and offices would be run by thinking machines: producers who never slacked off, expressed opinions or went on strike. Robby the Robot had become indistinguishable from EPICAC XIV. If only at the level of ideology, IBM had reconciled the class divisions of 1960s America. In the imaginary future, workers would no longer need to work and employers would no longer need employees. The sci-fi fantasy of artificial intelligence had successfully distracted people from questioning the impact of computing within the workplace. After visiting IBM’s pavilion at the 1964 World’s Far, it was all too easy to believe that everyone would win when the machines acquired consciousness.

    Inventing New Futures

    Forty years later, we’re still waiting for the imaginary future of artificial intelligence. In the intervening period, we’ve been repeatedly promised its imminent arrival. Yet, despite continual advances in hardware and software, machines are still incapable of ‘thinking’. The nearest thing to artificial intelligence which most people have encountered are characters in video games. But, as the growing popularity of on-line gaming demonstrates, a virtual opponent is a poor substitute for a human player. Looking back at the history of this imaginary future, it is obvious that neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic versions of artificial intelligence have been realised. Robby the Robot isn’t our devoted servant and EPICAC XIV doesn’t control our lives. Instead of evolving into thinking machines, computers have become consumer goods. Room-sized mainframes have kept on shrinking into smaller and smaller machines. Computers are everywhere in the modern world – and their users are all too aware that they’re dumb.

    Repeated failure should have discredited the imaginary future of artificial intelligence for good. Yet, its proponents remain unrepentant. Four decades on from the 1964 World’s Fair, IBM is still claiming that its machines are on the verge of acquiring consciousness (Bell 2004, p. 2). The persistence of this sci-fi fantasy demonstrates the continuing importance of von Neumann’s conservative appropriation of cybernetics within the computer industry. As in the early-1960s, artificial intelligence still provides a great cover story for the development of new military technologies. Bringing on the Singularity seems much more friendly than collaborating with American imperialism. Even more importantly, this imaginary future continues to disguise the impact of computing within the workplace. Both managers and workers are still being promised technological fixes for socio-economic problems. The dream of sentient machines makes better media copy than the reality of cybernetic Fordism. At the beginning of the 21st century, artificial intelligence remains the dominant ideological manifestation of the promise of computing.

    The credibility of this imaginary future depends upon forgetting its embarrassing history. Looking back at how earlier versions of the prophecy were repeatedly discredited encourages deep scepticism about its contemporary iterations. Our own personal frustrations with computer technology should demonstrate the improbability of its transformation into the Silicon Messiah. Forty years after the New York World’s Fair, artificial intelligence has become an imaginary future from the distant past. What is needed instead is a much more sophisticated analysis of the potential of computing. Wiener – not von Neumann – must be our cybernetic guru. The study of history should inform the reinvention of the future. Messianic mysticism must be replaced by pragmatic materialism. Above all, this new image of the future should celebrate computers as tools for augmenting human intelligence and creativity. Praise for top-down hierarchies of control must be superseded by the advocacy of two-way sharing of information. Let’s be inspired and passionate about imagining our own visions of the better times to come (Barbrook and Schultz 1997; Barbrook 2000).

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    The arguments in this article are developed further in Richard Barbrook, Imaginary Futures: from thinking machines to the global village, Pluto, London 2007. Check out the book’s website: <www.imaginaryfutures.net>.

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    Wiener, N. (1966) God & Golem, Inc.: a comment of certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

    Wiener, N. (1967) The Human Use of Human Beings: cybernetics and society, New York: Avon Books.

    Wilcox, F. (dir.) (1999) Forbidden Planet, Turner Entertainment.

  • Virtual Dreams, Real Politics

    ‘What are we fighting Communism for? We are the most Communist people in world history.’

    – Marshall McLuhan, 1969.

    In 1961, at its 22nd Congress, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formally adopted the goal of spreading the benefits of computerisation across the whole economy. Over the next two decades, the information technologies being developed within the Russia’s research laboratories were going to create a socialist paradise. Ever since the 1917 Revolution, totalitarian Communists with a big C had drawn ideological sustenance from their self-proclaimed role as the vanguard of proletarian communism with a small c. Under Stalin, the horrors of forced industrialisation were sold to the Russian population as premonitions of the promised land of socialism. Ironically, it was the successful completion of this task which posed a potentially fatal existential dilemma for the totalitarian system. Having successfully identified communism with the factory, the Communist Party was now making itself obsolete. According to its reformist faction, the vanguard had to move on to tackling the tasks of the next stage of its world-historical mission: building the ‘Unified Information Network’. Computers should be placed in every factory, office, shop and educational institution. In this Russian vision of the Net, two-way feedback between producers and consumers would calculate the correct distribution of labour and resources which most efficiently satisfied all of the different needs of society. Even better, this technological revolution also promised to democratise an undemocratic society. In his leader’s speech at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev assured his audience that – after decades of purges, wars, corruption and austerity – the promised land was within sight. By the 1980s at the latest, the inhabitants of the Russian empire would be enjoying all the wonders of cybernetic communism.

    Across the Atlantic, the CIA had watched the rise to power of the post-industrial reformers in the East with growing concern. Embracing their opponents’ analysis, its analysts warned the US government that the technological race to develop the Net was becoming the key contest which would decide which superpower would lead humanity into the future. Back in 1957, America had suffered a major setback in the propaganda struggle when its Cold War enemy succeeded in launching the first satellite into space. Determined to prevent any repetition of this humiliation, the US government had quickly set up ARPA: the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Next time, America was going to win the hi-tech race. Responding to the CIA’s briefings, the Kennedy administration sent ARPA into battle against the cybernetic Communist enemy. Bringing together the top scientists in the field, the agency coordinated and funded an ambitious programme of research into computer-mediated-communications. In 1969, overtaking the Russian opposition, its team created the appropriately-named first-ever iteration of the Net: ARPANET.

    From the outset, the US government was convinced that this contest was much more than a test of scientific virility. The two superpowers were competing not only to develop new technologies, but also, more importantly, to decide which side had the most advanced social system. In 1964, a multi-disciplinary team of intellectuals led by Daniel Bell was given a large grant to invent the Anti-Communist vision of the non-communist future: The Commission on the Year 2000. Luckily, these experts were able to find exactly what they were looking for in Marshall McLuhan’s bestselling book Understanding Media. Just like Marx, this prophet had also foreseen that the next stage of modernity would sweep away the most disagreeable manifestations of capitalism: national rivalries, industrial exploitation and social alienation. As in proletarian communism with a small c, peace, prosperity and harmony would reign in the global village. What made McLuhan so much more attractive than Marx was that the knowledge elite – not the proletariat – was the maker of history.

    In 1966, three years before its first hosts were connected, the Bell commission persuaded itself that the arrival of the Net utopia was imminent. Just as McLuhan had foreseen, the limitations of industrialism were about to be overcome by the wondrous technologies of the information society. Best of all, 1960s America was already entering into this post-capitalist future. J.C.R. Licklider – the founder of ARPA’s project to build the Net – had long been arguing that the primary purpose of computer-mediated-communications was facilitating the idiosyncratic working methods of the scientific community. Instead of trading information with each other like the overwhelming majority of cultural producers, academics collaborate by sharing knowledge. Promotion and prestige depends upon contributing articles to journals, presenting papers at conferences and distributing findings for peer review. Although deeply enmeshed with the state and corporate hierarchies of the USA, this communistic method of advancing knowledge had proved its worth in both the natural and social sciences. Thanks to the American taxpayer, Licklider now had the money to sponsor the emergence of a virtual social space emancipated from both the market and the factory. Inside this hi-tech gift economy, proprietary hardware and software were technical obstacles to the most efficient ways of working. The people who built the Net were the ones who ran it. In a bizarre twist, at the height of the Cold War, the US military was funding the invention of cybernetic communism.

    Even more ironically, it was the Russian elite which lacked the self-confidence to sponsor even ARPA-style small-scale experiments in networked socialism. The reformers had offered a rejuvenation of the world-historic mission of the vanguard party. However, for their conservative opponents, the advantages of owning the imaginary future were by far outweighed by the threat which the Net posed to their power and authority. When the Czechoslovak reformers’ theoretical manifesto Civilisation at the Crossroads celebrated the Unified Information Network as the demiurge of participatory democracy, the subversive image of this cybernetic technology was confirmed for these conservative bureaucrats. In 1968, the Russian government sent in its tanks to put an end to the Prague Spring. The perpetuation of totalitarian Communism depended upon the prevention of cybernetic communism.

    Back in the 1930s, Stalinist state planning had been at the cutting-edge of economic modernity. But, by holding on to its ideological monopoly, the Communist Party had deprived itself of the information which it needed to deliver the goods. In 1980, the Polish workers rebelled when they were once again called upon to pay for the mistakes of the economic planners. The disintegration of totalitarianism in one country started a chain-reaction of events which within a decade brought down the entire Russian empire. Communism with a big C was the future which had failed. In his 1992 neo-conservative bestseller The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama proudly announced that the whole world had become American. With all alternatives now discredited, there was only one path to modernity.

    Back in the mid-1960s, McLuhanism had been invented as a credo of the mildly reformist Democratic Party. Over the next four decades, its meaning had moved steadily rightwards. In 1983, Ithiel de Sola Pool – a Bell commission member – codified this neo-liberal appropriation of McLuhanism in his masterpiece: Technologies of Freedom. From software to soap operas, all forms of information would soon be traded as commodities over the Net. For the first time, everybody could be a media entrepreneur. By the end of the 1980s, this conservative remix had become the dominant form of American McLuhanism. George Gilder – a Republican Party activist – proclaimed the computer companies of northern California as the harbingers of a free market paradise. Not only Stalinist central planning, but also Social Democratic welfare provision were relics from the Fordist past. Looking at Silicon Valley, the neo-liberal prophets were convinced that the factory and the campus were synergising into a superior entity: the hi-tech entrepreneurial firm.

    By the time that the 1990s dotcom boom took off, McLuhanist technological determinism had become an unapologetic celebration of ‘out of control’ capitalism. In his New Rules for the New Economy, Kevin Kelly explained how technologies which were prototyped within the hi-tech gift economy could be successfully spun off into commercial products. Like the Stalinist elite, the music majors had found out to their cost that it was futile trying to resist the onrush of the McLuhanist future. In contrast, dotcom companies had shown how to transform user generated content and on-line communities into profitable enterprises. The phenomenal growth of MySpace, Bebo and YouTube demonstrates that successful businesses can be built upon Kelly’s dictum of following the free. Clever managers know how to make cybernetic communism serve establishment goals.

    Like their Stalinist predecessors, these 1990s proponents of McLuhanism saw themselves as the vanguard of the hi-tech utopia. As the early-adopters and beta-testers of the dotcom future, this privileged group was prefiguring today what the general public would be doing tomorrow. When everyone had access to the Net, participatory democracy and cooperative creativity would be the order of the day. But, until this happy moment arrived, humanity required the guidance of the cybernetic elite to reach the promised land. Ironically, in the 2000s, the boosters of the information society – like the Stalinists before them – are unexpectedly faced with the problem of living within their own future. Confounding the McLuhanist credo, the advent of the Net hasn’t marked the birth of a new humanistic and equalitarian civilisation. For more than four decades, the knowledge elite have asserted its control over space through ownership of time. Now, in the early-twenty-first century, the imaginary future of the information society is materialising in the present. What the McLuhanists have to explain is why utopia has been delayed.

    When the users of the Net are both consumers and producers of media, the vanguard has lost its ideological monopoly. Yet, at the same time, the arrival of the information society hasn’t precipitated a wider social transformation. Cybernetic communism is quite compatible with dotcom capitalism. Contrary to the tenets of McLuhanism, the convergence of media, telecommunications and computing has not – and never will – liberate humanity. The Net is a useful tool not a mechanical saviour. In the 2000s, ordinary people have taken control of sophisticated information technologies to improve their everyday lives and their social conditions. Freed from the preordained futures of McLuhanism, this emancipatory achievement can provide inspiration for new anticipations of the shape of things to come. Cooperative creativity and participatory democracy need to be extended from the virtual world into all areas of life. Rather than disciplining the present, our futurist visions should be open-ended and flexible. We are the inventors of our own technologies. We can intervene in history to realise our own interests. Our utopias provide the direction for the path of human progress. Let’s be hopeful and courageous when we imagine the better futures of libertarian social democracy.

     

    Response

    Carl Gudeian’s nettime rant

  • The Guardian Features Imaginary Futures

    In “How we have been fooled by utopian visions of the future”, Christine Evans-Pughe, writing for The Guadian’s Technology section, concludes of Richard Barbrook’s Imaginary Futures that:

    Barbrook has an amusing take on our distorted − if not delusional − relationship with technology, but his underlying point is serious: future visions of technology are used to distract us and also control us, and if we forget these imaginary futures, we are likely to repeart them.  -The Guardian, Thursday, June 7, 2007

    For the full transcript of this article view here.

  • Book Launch Photos Live

    Thanks to all – about 300 of you – who attended the Imaginary Futures book launch celebration on 16th May 2007 at Madame JoJos in London’s SoHo. Photos are now posted on Flickr.com, and will soon be added to the Imaginary Futures Gallery on this website. Please view the photos here.

  • First Review

    Writer Sarah Snider has reviewed Richard Barbrook’s newly released book Imaginary Futures for Culture Wars

    She comments that:

    Imaginary Futures shows how technology has itself been, and is still, mediated by competing versions of the future. The parallax of time allows us to turn correlation into causality, retroactively instilling agents with intentionality, and actions with meaning.

    Culture Wars is the first formal review to be published, and more are due soon. To read the full review click here.

  • Author To Host SOUNDWAVES Artist Evening

    Join Richard this coming Wednesday, 30th May, to explore new sonic artworks showing in the SOUNDWAVES exhibition, a colloboration of Kinetica Museum and Cybersonica, running until 29th June. Richard will introduce audiences to Julie Freeman (Specious Dialogue), Michael Markert (Kontakstation and kII 2.2) and Andy Huntingdon (tapTap) who have produced works for the exhibition. The talk starts at 6 pm at Kinetica Museum in Spitalfields Market (see www.kinetica-museum.org) and tickets will be sold at the door for £7, with £5 concessions. Copies of Imaginary Futures will be available for sale.

  • Author Appearance – Housmans 29th May

    Richard Barbrook will discuss his new book Imaginary Futures at Housmans bookshop this coming Tuesday, 29th May, 2007. Housemans specialises in books and periodicals of radical interest and progressive politics and offers the most comprehensive range of radical newsletters, newpapers and magazines of any shop in Britain. The shop is selling Imaginary Futures, and the author will be signing copies of the new book at the gathering. The talk begins at 6:30 pm and Housemans is located at 5 Caledonian Road, Kings Cross, London, N1, just one block from the Kings Cross/St. Pancras Underground lines and train station. This event is FREE. Visit www.housemans.com for more information.

  • 300 Welcome New Book

    Imaginary Futures Book Launch Press Release

    The Imaginary Futures book launch at Madame JoJos in London’s SoHo drew a celebratory crowd of 300 on 16th May 2007. Richard Barbrook debuted his newest book, published by Pluto Press, to an enthusiastic audience of academics, press, technologists, students and the author’s friends and family at the nightclub venue. Barbrook presented an overview of Imaginary Futures, alongside Simon Schaffer, BBC 4 Presenter and Cambridge University Professor, with Simon debating Richard on some concepts in the book and an open Q&A session with the audience. Guests were treated to late night entertainment from Robert Owens, one of the founding Chicago House-style performers, and DJs Kieth Franklin and Ray Stanley kept the crowd dancing until 2 a.m.

    Richard Autographs Book

    *Note: A video of Richard and Simon’s presentation will appear on this site soon, as well as photos from the book launch.

  • CYBERSALON MANIFESTO

    Manage Your Own Medium

    1.0 Genesis.

    In March 1960 J.C.R Licklider envisioned a network of computers connected together where human and machine would work together in intimate association. He prophesised that this era would be intellectually the most creative and exiting in the history of mankind. We are living in this time. Our group is a collective of people emerging from the human/computer interface who are engaged in digital practices and theories. As artists, practitioners and academics we have joined together to create the Cybersalon: live gatherings in the image of the new digital medium of the Net.

    2.0 The medium is no longer the message, we formulate the medium to convey our own message.

    Creating in pixels underpins the use of the computer both as a tool and as a communicating device. These two characteristics have completed their integration in the Net. Within new media, the creative process is made and distributed in bits and pixels. The exchanging, sharing and manipulating information is an integral part of our work. Our networked computers are the devices of creativity and of communication. Our message is intended for a pixel-generated screen mediating the relationship of humans and computers.

    3.0 Enjoy the schism.

    Our visual culture has been formulated by an analogue world whose traditions have been uneasily carried on into the digital format. We are still confined by the look, design, fashions and aesthetics of the old media. Our practices and theories must now be changed for the time of the Net. The schism between old and new media is caused by the passivity of the first and the interactivity of the second. The medium that carries our message conveys an active and intimate association with its users. New media exist only in digital format: identical copies can be shared between makers and receivers. We must now deliver in the same format that we create in.

    4.0 The original is obsolete.

    The digital format assumes countless identical copies of the same work. The do-and-undo command encourages non-linear approaches within the creative process. A digital work can be shared between its makers who can add and delete parts. Visuals, sounds and machine code can be placed and accessed across the Net. Whether we’re multi-media constructors, web developers, programmers, theoreticians, digital artists, we all have to ask ourselves these key questions: Whose idea was it anyway? Who inspired whom? Is the remix better than the original version? How can we contribute our creativity to the collective digital work?

    5.0 We must meet up soon.

    New media brings together people from a wide range of different practices. For instance, when building a website, the computer programmer and the graphic designer will each contribute their own particular skills to the common product. Within the creative process, each person possesses their own heterogeneous experience of the human/computer interface. Out of these divided and layered practices, a collective aesthetic is emerging in the form of code and pixels.

    6.0 Cybersalon is a real-time environment.

    Cybersalon is a real and virtual space where people involved in digital creativity can congregate and meet with each other. If we want to discover innovative practices and theories, it is essential for us to share and communicate our on-line experiences. Some short-sighted interests are trying to inhibit the participatory nature of the Net. In contrast, we want to celebrate and promote the emancipatory and creative possibilities of the new information technologies. We will organise discussions around the social and cultural issues brought out by the Net. We will exhibit cutting-edge digital work. We present the latest practices and theories emerging from the educational, commercial, community and artistic forms of new media.

    7.0 Beyond hi-tech neo-liberalism.

    We are escaping from the most liberal times in the history of communications. After decades of globalisation, privatisation and deregulation, information became something which could only be bought and sold. Education, entertainment and political debates were read-only files. Now all these old certainties are being swept away. The Net is overcoming the enforced passivity and cultural boundaries imposed by the old media. Whether as individuals or as groups, we now have the ability to create our own media with the new information technologies. We can enjoy the benefits of sharing knowledge, giving information, communicating our ideas and making friends within a place where time and space are undetermined. In this new situation, we are forced to reconsider our practices and theories of cultural creativity. We must revisit the revolutionary legacy of the past. We must invent new ways of acting and thinking.

    8.0 Montage the medium.

    Living inside the human/computer interface is an integral part of everyday life. As digital practitioners, we use our computer as a production tool and as a communications device. As mobile phone users, we each carry with our own personal transmitter. Although we don’t own the landlines or airwaves, we are still able to give away our content to whoever wants to download it. We can collect and filter information from the Net to customise our own information. Neither political censors nor copyright enforcers have the power to control our freedom of expression. Across the globe, individuals and groups can now enjoy the most libertarian interpretation of media freedom. We are no longer limited to owning only receivers of information. Each of us can now possess their own transmitter. Everyone can be an artist, a designer, a broadcaster and a theorist. Our pixel-aided world is the integration of all known culture – and the emergence of entirely new practices and theories.

    Sophia Drakopoulou
    Richard Barbrook
    3rd October 2000